The Theory of Nonsense
It’s frustrating to know in your heart that what you’ve just heard is nonsense but not to be able to pinpoint why it is nonsense.
Robert J. Gula
Common sense is wrong about nonsense, for common sense views nonsense as an unknowable, formless nothingness that is inherently separate from reason and logic. However, in this book we have reduced a large amount of knowledge about nonsense to a few transparent statements that are rationally comprehensible and confirmable. In effect, the statements in this book form an emerging preliminary theory of nonsense. This chapter will shore up the theory by refining concepts, closing loopholes, and forestalling foreseeable objections.
Nonsense operates by its own intelligible, internal logic. Aristotelian logic works only with true or false statements that are of literal meaning. In other words, it is a binary code that allows only two values: true and false. Moreover, according to Aristotle’s law of the excluded middle, a statement must be either true or false.
Earlier, though, we saw that nonsensical sentences are neither true nor false, even if they look like statements. Accordingly, then, we can think of nonsense as a third value of logic, apart from truth and falsehood. Yet, as we also saw, in some cases nonsense can somehow transmute into truth. Furthermore, nonsense exists and is defined in terms of the same rules and conventions that govern ordinary language and logic.
The upshot of all this is that rational principles of nonsense constitute an auxiliary non-Aristotelian logic of three values. In effect, a piece of reason was missing. By filling in the vacant space, the theory of nonsense opens a new level of reason and analysis.
Borderline Nonsense
Nonsense is bounded in part by borderline cases. Common sense puts nonsense on one side of an unbridgeable divide and meaningful language on the opposite side. The reality of the situation is not so simple, though. Some language falls somewhere in the middle and blurs the boundary between nonsense and meaningful language. As James Thurber said, “Ours is a precarious language, as every writer knows, in which the merest shadow line often separates affirmation from negation, sense from nonsense, and one sex from the other.”63
Reflecting on borderline cases brings the concept of nonsense into sharper focus. After all, borderline cases of nonsense exist because there are clear-cut cases of nonsense with which to contrast them.
Ornamental English
What is known as ornamental English provides illuminating borderline cases of nonsense. Ornamental English is a form of decorative writing used mainly in Japan. Using writing as a decoration is a time-honored tradition of Japan. In the aftermath of World War II, many Japanese favorably associated the English language with modernization. Strange messages, such as those below, soon began to appear on clothing and accessories manufactured for domestic consumption.
On a handbag:
ReSpice Enjoy fashion life,
Nice to Heart and Just Impression
On another handbag:
The New York City Theater District
Is where you can and us, anyone
On an eyeglasses case:
This case packs my dream and
Eyeglasses
On a pencil case:
Tenderness is completed a pastel
Throughout much of Asia, products that are labeled in English sell better. Since few who purchase the products can actually read English, the meaning, or lack thereof, does not matter. Hence, ornamental English is meant to be seen, not read. Somebody who speaks only English could not comprehend the bizarre messages of ornamental English. But is it nonsense?
Usually, ornamental English results from the literal translation of typically Japanese phrases and sentiments into English. In that sense, then, they are ragged translations. Theoretically, a skilled translator could recover the original Japanese thoughts and render them meaningfully into English.
On the other hand, the odd writing seen on Japanese products attracted attention in the West, and people attempted to reproduce it. To make a fashion statement, American and British designers began to adorn garments with strange messages similar to ornamental English. For instance, a British manufacturer emblazoned the incomprehensible words “Rodeo-100 Percent Boys for Atomic Atlas” on a fashionable jacket. Hence, ornamental English is a transitional phenomenon with one foot in meaningful language and the other foot in unintelligible nonsense.
Baby Talk
Baby talk, or motherese, is also midway between meaningful language and nonsense. Adults sometimes use simplified grammar and exaggerated intonation when talking to infants or toddlers. Some adults say that baby talk makes it easier for children to understand language. Some adults justify baby talk as an expression of affection.
Baby talk also contains a smattering of silly sounding, made-up nonsense expressions such as “kitchy-kitchy-coo.” Mostly, however, baby talk is not nonsense, but meaningful language made more accessible to the young. In other words, for the most part, baby talk is simplified sense, not nonsense.
In sum, ornamental English and baby talk straddle the fence between meaningful language and unintelligible nonsense. Additional forms of language can be found that are intermediary between sense and nonsense. However, it is important to remember that borderline cases do not imperil the concept of nonsense. To reiterate, borderline cases of nonsense exist because there are clear-cut cases of nonsense with which to contrast them.
Metalanguage
Nonsense can be described meaningfully in metalanguage, which is language about language. Does the theory of nonsense harbor the seeds of its own destruction? Some would say that there is a built-in paradox in the very notion of such a theory, for the theory consists of numerous declarative sentences that are purportedly about unintelligible nonsense. Specifically, the sentences supposedly describe, categorize, or analyze nonsense or its effects.
Now, presumably a declarative sentence must be either meaningful or else it is nonsense. But into which of these two categories should we put declarative sentences about nonsense? Are they meaningful or are they nonsense?
How could sentences like that be meaningful, though? If nonsense itself is meaningless, then how could declarative sentences about nonsense be meaningful? If they must be meaningless, however, rational inquiry into the subject would be impossible. The entire notion of a theory of nonsense would collapse into incoherence.
In other words, the apparent paradox threatens to invalidate the entire edifice of knowledge about nonsense that this book has constructed. But, fortunately, a concept known to logicians and philosophers as metalanguge can resolve the supposed paradox. Metalanguage is language that is about language. The sentences below will help explain the concept:
Jack has four sisters.
“Jack” has four letters.
Elephants are social animals.
“Elephants” is a plural noun.
The first and third sentences above are about things in extralinguistic reality. But, the second and fourth sentences are about language—specifically, the proper noun “Jack” and the general noun “elephants”—hence these sentences are examples of metalanguage. Placing the words “Jack” and “elephants” in quotation marks is a conventional way of indicating that the sentences are metalanguage.
Metalanguage can be about nonsense as easily as it can be about meaningful language. Metalanguage about nonsense can be meaningful even though the nonsense itself is meaningless. In other words, it is quite possible to talk intelligibly about nonsense, even though nonsense itself is unintelligible.
Now, the statements in this book that make up the theory of nonsense are instances of metalanguage. Furthermore, although nonsense itself is neither true nor false, this book’s metalinguistic statements about nonsense are either true or false—mostly true, I believe; therefore, the existence of metalanguage, or language about language, makes a rational theory of nonsense possible.
Metalanguage also enables us to incorporate unintelligible nonsense within larger structures of meaningful language. A meaningful sentence can be made that surrounds a piece of nonsense and swallows it whole. For instance, quoting nonsense is one way of encasing it within a meaningful sentence. Consider the pair of sentences below:
Reluctant garbage jabbers in green.
Uncle Hamperd took a whiff of nitrous oxide and said, “Reluctant garbage jabbers in green.”
The first sentence is unintelligible nonsense. Nevertheless, the second sentence, which directly quotes the first, is meaningful as a report of something somebody said. In other words, a sentence that directly quotes a nonsensical utterance may be meaningful. In summary, the concept of metalanguage resolves certain puzzles concerning the possibility of meaningful language about unintelligible nonsense.
Resolving Disputes Through Nonsense
Calling proposed new ideas “unintelligible nonsense” is a common form of objection in rational debates. Reasonable people sometimes disagree over whether proposed ideas are nonsense, yet there are no public rules and conventions, no rational standards for settling disagreements like those.
The theory of nonsense provides a sound rational basis for resolving some such disputes. Specifically, we saw that nonsense can be deliberate or involuntary. Either way, though, nonsense has the same structural patterns.
Now, presumably, scientists and academicians don’t talk nonsense on purpose. If they lapse into unintelligible language and ideas, their nonsense is involuntary. Still, we can prove it is nonsense if its structural pattern matches one or more of the many types of deliberate nonsense we have already identified.
The principle seems obvious. However, a specific example is necessary. The following demonstration uses the typology of nonsense to resolve a documented historical dispute concerning unintelligibility. The specific dispute has to do with an ancient magical text known as the Emerald Tablet.
Apollonius of Tyana, an ancient holy man and wonder worker, supposedly discovered the work when he descended to the underworld. Apollonius claimed he had found a secret subterranean chamber in which an old man sat upon a golden throne. In his hand, the man held a tablet made of pure emerald. Apollonius saw an inscription on the tablet that he memorized and recorded for posterity. Apollonius attributed the inscription to Hermes Trismegistus, a renowned magician.
The Emerald Tablet kept eminent scholars and hobbyists busy for centuries trying to decipher its meaning. Many were convinced that it contained some deep secret of the universe or the key to unlimited wealth. For example, Sir Isaac Newton took the Emerald Tablet seriously, pondered its meaning, and translated it into English. Many other luminaries solemnly studied it, too, but the many interpretations that have been offered vary widely.
Other scholars characterized Apollonius as an impostor and charlatan and claimed that he made up the whole story. They said that the Emerald Tablet is a hoax, and that it is meaningless nonsense. Until now, however, there has not been a rational method for settling the dispute. Let us look at the text of the Emerald Tablet and see what the theory of nonsense can tell us.
The text is composed of cryptic sentences:
The truth, certainty, truest, without untruth. What is above is like what is below. What is below is like what is above. The miracle of unity is to be attained. Everything is formed from the contemplation of unity, and all things come about from unity, by means of adaptation. Its parents are the Sun and Moon. It was borne by the wind and nurtured by the Earth. Every wonder is from it and its power is complete.…This is the power of all strength—it overcomes that which is delicate and penetrates through solids. This was the means of the creation of the world. And in the future wonderful developments will be made, and this is the way. I am Hermes the Threefold Sage, so named because I hold the three elements of all the wisdom. And thus ends the revelation of the work of Sun.64
An analysis in terms of the typology of nonsense solves the riddle of the Emerald Tablet, for the text plainly consists of several types of nonsense that we already identified and described. Specifically, the text consists of elements of self-contradiction, numerative nonsense, figurative nonsense, nonreferential pronouns, and pseudo-profound nonsense.
In an exercise, my students discovered they could use the Emerald Tablet as an abstract pattern for making other works of nonsense that sound just as mysterious and profound.
For instance, an often-cited portion of the text is “What is above is like what is below. What is below is like what is above. The miracle of unity is to be attained.” My students easily wrote sentences modeled on that pattern that sounded equally enigmatic and deep. For instance, one student wrote, “The within arises from the without and the without arises from the within—the manifestation of the Absolute.” Another student wrote, “The odd embraces the even, and the even embraces the odd—the timeless process of Essence.”
This analysis shows that in some cases a systematic typology of nonsense can be used to resolve disputes concerning unintelligibility. Even so, the method has three significant limitations. First, the method is effective for rational thinkers whose desire and interest are to seek truth. People who are fixated on an ideology are unlikely to be swayed if applying the method contradicts their cherished beliefs. For example, hobbyists who spend their lives trying to unlock a hidden meaning in the Emerald Tablet would probably be unmoved by the above analysis.
Second, the method won’t work for all disputes concerning unintelligibility, for the method works by matching a disputed case to known structural patterns of deliberate nonsense. However, we have not identified and characterized all types of deliberate nonsense. Therefore, we cannot conclude that a disputed case is not nonsense, merely because we are unable to match it to a known structural pattern.
Third, we saw that calling a proposed idea unintelligible nonsense is generally regarded as a particularly powerful, even final, kind of objection. However, its power, efficacy, and finality have been greatly exaggerated, for even a clear, incontrovertible determination that a notion is unintelligible nonsense does not always invalidate the notion. In reality, proving that an idea is nonsense doesn’t necessarily have the dire consequences that proponents of such objections imagine. Sometimes we accept an idea with grace and ease even if we know it is unintelligible.
Judges sometimes impose nonsensical sentences on perpetrators of particularly heinous crimes. A judge may sentence a condemned prisoner to “six consecutive life terms plus fifty-five years,” for example. Sentences like that are plainly unintelligible nonsense.
Theoretically, if a judge handed down a sentence that was meaningless and unintelligible, the sentence should be invalid, for how could a prisoner be required to serve a nonsensical sentence? But what actually happens in cases like that? Defense attorneys don’t protest. The legal system doesn’t fall apart, and the court and penal system continue functioning as usual.
In the real world, nonsense is mostly harmless. Still, there are plenty of exceptions. Accordingly, the next chapter will discuss common misuses of nonsense.