2
HALF-WAY HOUSE

In 1900 Great Britain was the most influential nation on earth, in political and economic terms. It held territories in north America and central America, and in South America Argentina was heavily dependent on Britain. It ruled colonies in Africa and the Middle East, and had dominions as far afield as Australasia. Much of the rest of the world was parcelled out between other European powers – France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Italy, and even Denmark. The United States had acquired the Panama Canal in 1899, and the Spanish Empire had just fallen into her hands. But although America’s appetite for influence was growing, the dominant country in the world of ideas – in philosophy, in the arts and the humanities, in the sciences and the social sciences – was Germany, or more accurately, the German-speaking countries. This simple fact is important, for Germany’s intellectual traditions were by no means unconnected to later political developments.

One reason for the German preeminence in the realm of thought was her universities, which produced so much of the chemistry of the nineteenth century and were at the forefront of biblical scholarship and classical archaeology, not to mention the very concept of the Ph.D., which was born in Germany. Another was demographic: in 1900 there were thirty-three cities in the German-speaking lands with populations of more than 100,000, and city life was a vital element in creating a marketplace of ideas. Among the German-speaking cities Vienna took precedence. If one place could be said to represent the mentality of western Europe as the twentieth century began, it was the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Unlike other empires – the British or the Belgian, for example – the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, under the Habsburgs, had most of its territories in Europe: it comprised parts of Hungary, Bohemia, Romania, and Croatia and had its seaport at Trieste, in what is now Italy. It was also largely inward-looking. The German-speaking people were a proud race, highly conscious of their history and what they felt set them apart from other peoples. Such nationalism gave their intellectual life a particular flavour, driving it forward but circumscribing it at the same time, as we shall see. The architecture of Vienna also played a role in determining its unique character. The Ringstrasse, a ring of monumental buildings that included the university, the opera house, and the parliament building, had been erected in the second half of the nineteenth century around the central area of the old town, between it and the outer suburbs, in effect enclosing the intellectual and cultural life of the city inside a relatively small and very accessible area.¹ In that small enclosure had emerged the city’s distinctive coffeehouses, an informal institution that helped make Vienna different from London, Paris, or Berlin, say. Their marble-topped tables were just as much a platform for new ideas as the newspapers, academic journals, and books of the day. These coffeehouses were reputed to have had their origins in the discovery of vast stocks of coffee in the camps abandoned by the Turks after their siege of Vienna in 1683. Whatever the truth of that, by 1900 they had evolved into informal clubs, well furnished and spacious, where the purchase of a small cup of coffee carried with it the right to remain there for the rest of the day and to have delivered, every half-hour, a glass of water on a silver tray.² Newspapers, magazines, billiard tables, and chess sets were provided free of charge, as were pen, ink, and (headed) writing paper. Regulars could have their mail sent to them at their favourite coffeehouse; they could leave their evening clothes there, so they needn’t go home to change; and in some establishments, such as the Café Griensteidl, large encyclopaedias and other reference books were kept on hand for writers who worked at their tables.³

The chief arguments at the tables of the Café Griensteidl, and other cafés, were between what the social philosopher Karl Pribram termed two ‘world-views.⁴ The words he used to describe these worldviews were individualism and universalism, but they echoed an even earlier dichotomy, one that interested Freud and arose out of the transformation at the beginning of the nineteenth century from a rural society of face-to-face intimacy to an urban society of ‘atomistic’ individuals, moving frantically about but never really meeting. For Pribram the individualist believes in empirical reason in the manner of the Enlightenment, and follows the scientific method of seeking truth by formulating hypotheses and testing them. Universalism, on the other hand, ‘posits eternal, extramental truth, whose validity defies testing…. An individualist discovers truth, whereas a universalist undergoes it.’⁵ For Pribram, Vienna was the only true individualist city east of the Rhine, but even there, with the Catholic Church still so strong, universalism was nonetheless ever-present. This meant that, philosophically speaking, Vienna was a halfway house, where there were a number of ‘halfway’ avenues of thought, of which psychoanalysis was a perfect example. Freud saw himself as a scientist yet provided no real methodology whereby the existence of the unconscious, say, could be identified to the satisfaction of a sceptic. But Freud and the unconscious were not the only examples. The very doctrine of therapeutic nihilism — that nothing could be done about the ills of society or even about the sicknesses that afflicted the human body – showed an indifference to progressivism that was the very opposite of the empirical, optimistic, scientific approach. The aesthetics of impressionism — very popular in Vienna – was part of this same divide. The essence of impressionism was defined by the Hungarian art historian Arnold Hauser as an urban art that ‘describes the changeability, the nervous rhythm, the sudden, sharp, but always ephemeral impressions of city life.’⁶ This concern with evanescence, the transitoriness of experience, fitted in with the therapeutic nihilistic idea that there was nothing to be done about the world, except stand aloof and watch.

Two men who grappled with this view in their different ways were the writers Arthur Schnitzler and Hugo von Hofmannsthal. They belonged to a group of young bohemians who gathered at the Café Griensteidl and were known as Jung Wien (young Vienna).⁷ The group also included Theodor Herzl, a brilliant reporter, an essayist, and later a leader of the Zionist movement; Stefan Zweig, a writer; and their leader, the newspaper editor Hermann Bahr. His paper, Die Zeit, was the forum for many of these talents, as was Die Fackel (The Torch), edited no less brilliantly by another writer of the group, Karl Kraus, more famous for his play The Last Days of Mankind.

The career of Arthur Schnitzler (1862–1931) shared a number of intriguing parallels with that of Freud. He too trained as a doctor and neurologist and studied neurasthenia.⁸ Freud was taught by Theodor Meynert, whereas Schnitzler was Meynert’s assistant. Schnitzler’s interest in what Freud called the ‘underestimated and much maligned erotic’ was so similar to his own that Freud referred to Schnitzler as his doppelgänger (double) and deliberately avoided him. But Schnitzler turned away from medicine to literature, though his writings reflected many psychoanalytic concepts. His early works explored the emptiness of café society, but it was with Lieutenant Gustl (1901) and The Road into the Open (1908) that Schnitzler really made his mark.⁹ Lieutenant Gustl, a sustained interior monologue, takes as its starting point an episode when ‘a vulgar civilian’ dares to touch the lieutenant’s sword in the busy cloakroom of the opera. This small gesture provokes in the lieutenant confused and involuntary ‘stream-of-consciousness’ ramblings that prefigure Proust. In Gustl, Schnitzler is still primarily a social critic, but in his references to aspects of the lieutenant’s childhood that he thought he had forgotten, he hints at psychoanalytic ideas.¹⁰ The Road into the Open explores more widely the instinctive, irrational aspects of individuals and the society in which they live. The dramatic structure of the book takes its power from an examination of the way the careers of several Jewish characters have been blocked or frustrated. Schnitzler indicts anti-Semitism, not simply for being wrong, but as the symbol of a new, illiberal culture brought about by a decadent aestheticism and by the arrival of mass society, which, together with a parliament ‘[that] has become a mere theatre through which the masses are manipulated,’ gives full rein to the instincts, and which in the novel overwhelms the ‘purposive, moral and scientific’ culture represented by many of the Jewish characters. Schnitzler’s aim is to highlight the insolubility of the ‘Jewish question’ and the dilemma between art and science.¹¹ Each disappoints him – aestheticism ‘because it leads nowhere, science because it offers no meaning for the self’.¹²

Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1874–1929) went further than Schnitzler. Born into an aristocratic family, he was blessed with a father who encouraged, even expected, his son to become an aesthete. Hofmannsthal senior introduced his son to the Café Griensteidl when Hugo was quite young, so that the group around Bahr acted as a forcing house for the youth’s precocious talents. In the early part of his career, Hofmannsthal produced what has been described as ‘the most polished achievement in the history of German poetry,’ but he was never totally comfortable with the aesthetic attitude.¹³ Both The Death of Titian (1892) and The Fool and Death (1893), his most famous poems written before 1900, are sceptical that art can ever be the basis for society’s values.¹⁴ For Hofmannsthal, the problem is that while art may offer fulfilment for the person who creates beauty, it doesn’t necessarily do so for the mass of society who are unable to create:

Our present is all void and dreariness,

If consecration comes not from without.¹⁵

Hofmannsthal’s view is most clearly shown in his poem ‘Idyll on an Ancient Vase Painting,’ which tells the story of the daughter of a Greek vase painter. She has a husband, a blacksmith, and a comfortable standard of living, but she is dissatisfied; her life, she feels, is not fulfilled. She spends her time dreaming of her childhood, recalling the mythological images her father painted on the vases he sold. These paintings portrayed the heroic actions of the gods, who led the sort of dramatic life she yearns for. Eventually Hofmannsthal grants the woman her wish, and a centaur appears. Delighted that her fortunes have taken this turn, she immediately abandons her old life and escapes with the centaur. Alas, her husband has other ideas; if he can’t have her, no one else can, and he kills her with a spear.¹⁶ In summary this sounds heavy-handed, but Hofmannsthal’s argument is unambiguous: beauty is paradoxical and can be subversive, terrible even. Though the spontaneous, instinctual life has its attractions, however vital its expression is for fulfilment, it is nevertheless dangerous, explosive. Aesthetics, in other words, is never simply self-contained and passive: it implies judgement and action.

Hofmannsthal also noted the encroachment of science on the old aesthetic culture of Vienna. ‘The nature of our epoch,’ he wrote in 1905, ‘is multiplicity and indeterminacy. It can rest only on das Gleitende [the slipping, the sliding].’ He added that ‘what other generations believed to be firm is in fact das Gleitende.’¹⁷ Could there be a better description about the way the Newtonian world was slipping after Maxwell’s and Planck’s discoveries? ‘Everything fell into parts,’ Hofmannsthal wrote, ‘the parts again into more parts, and nothing allowed itself to be embraced by concepts any more.’¹⁸ Like Schnitzler, Hofmannsthal was disturbed by political developments in the dual monarchy and in particular the growth of anti-Semitism. For him, this rise in irrationalism owed some of its force to science-induced changes in the understanding of reality; the new ideas were so disturbing as to promote a large-scale reactionary irrationalism. His personal response was idiosyncratic, to say the least, but had its own logic. At the grand age of twenty-six he abandoned poetry, feeling that the theatre offered a better chance of meeting current challenges. Schnitzler had pointed out that politics had become a form of theatre, and Hofmannsthal thought that theatre was needed to counteract political developments.¹⁹ His work, from the plays Fortunatus and His Sons (1900–I) and King Candaules (1903) to his librettos for Richard Strauss, is all about political leadership as an art form, the point of kings being to preserve an aesthetic that provides order and, in so doing, controls irrationality. Yet the irrational must be given an outlet, Hofmannsthal says, and his solution is ‘the ceremony of the whole,’ a ritual form of politics in which no one feels excluded. His plays are attempts to create ceremonies of the whole, marrying individual psychology to group psychology, psychological dramas that anticipate Freud’s later theories.²⁰ And so, whereas Schnitzler was prepared to be merely an observer of Viennese society, an elegant diagnostician of its shortcomings, Hofmannsthal rejected this therapeutic nihilism and saw himself in a more direct role, trying to change that society. As he revealingly put it, the arts had become the ‘spiritual space of the nation.’²¹ In his heart, Hofmannsthal always hoped that his writings about kings would help Vienna throw up a great leader, someone who would offer moral guidance and show the way ahead, ‘melting all fragmentary manifestations into unity and changing all matter into “form, a new German reality.” ‘The words he used were uncannily close to what eventually came to pass. What he hoped for was a ‘genius … marked with the stigma of the usurper,’ ‘a true German and absolute man,’ ‘a prophet,’ ‘poet,’ ‘teacher,’ ‘seducer,’ an ‘erotic dreamer.’²² Hofmannsthal’s aesthetics of kingship overlapped with Freud’s ideas about the dominant male, with the anthropological discoveries of Sir James Frazer, with Nietzsche and with Darwin. Hofmannsthal was very ambitious for the harmonising possibilities of art; he thought it could help counter the disruptive effects of science.

At the time, no one could foresee that Hofmannsthal’s aesthetic would help pave the way for an even bigger bout of irrationality in Germany later in the century. But just as his aesthetics of kingship and ‘ceremonies of the whole’ were a response to das Gleitende, induced by scientific discoveries, so too was the new philosophy of Franz Brentano (1838—1917). Brentano was a popular man, and his lectures were legendary, so much so that students – among them Freud and Tomáš Masaryk – crowded the aisles and doorways. A statuesque figure (he looked like a patriarch of the church), Brentano was a fanatical but absentminded chess player (he rarely won because he loved to experiment, to see the consequences), a poet, an accomplished cook, and a carpenter. He frequently swam the Danube. He published a best-selling book of riddles. His friends included Theodor Meynert, Theodor Gomperz, and Josef Breuer, who was his doctor.²³ Destined for the priesthood, he had left the church in 1873 and later married a rich Jewish woman who had converted to Christianity (prompting one wag to quip that he was an icon in search of a gold background).²⁴

Brentano’s main interest was to show, in as scientific a way as possible, proof of God’s existence. His was a very personal version of science, taking the form of an analysis of history. For Brentano, philosophy went in cycles. According to him, there had been three cycles – Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern – each divided into four phases: Investigation, Application, Scepticism, and Mysticism. These he laid out in the following table.²⁵

This approach helped make Brentano a classic halfway figure in intellectual history. His science led him to conclude, after twenty years of search and lecturing, that there does indeed exist ‘an eternal, creating, and sustaining principle,’ to which he gave the term ‘understanding.’²⁶ At the same time, his view that philosophy moved in cycles led him to doubt the progressivism of science. Brentano is chiefly remembered now for his attempt to bring a greater intellectual rigour to the examination of God, but though he was admired for his attempt to marry science and faith, many of his contemporaries felt that his entire system was doomed from the start. Despite this his approach did spark two other branches of philosophy that were themselves influential in the early years of the century. These were Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and Christian von Ehrenfels’s theory of Gestalt.

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) was born in the same year as Freud and in the same province, Moravia, as both Freud and Mendel. Like Freud he was Jewish, but he had a more cosmopolitan education, studying at Berlin, Leipzig, and Vienna.²⁷ His first interests were in mathematics and logic, but he found himself drawn to psychology. In those days, psychology was usually taught as an aspect of philosophy but was growing fast as its own discipline, thanks to advances in science. What most concerned Husserl was the link between consciousness and logic. Put simply, the basic question for him was this: did logic exist objectively, ‘out there’ in the world, or was it in some fundamental sense dependent on the mind? What was the logical basis of phenomena? This is where mathematics took centre stage, for numbers and their behaviour (addition, subtraction, and so forth) were the clearest examples of logic in action. So did numbers exist objectively, or were they too a function of mind? Brentano had claimed that in some way the mind ‘intended’ numbers, and if that were true, then it affected both their logical and their objective status. An even more fundamental question was posed by the mind itself: did the mind ‘intend’ itself? Was the mind a construction of the mind, and if so how did that affect the mind’s own logical and objective status?²⁸

Husserl’s big book on the subject, Logical Investigations, was published in 1900 (volume one) and 1901 (volume two), its preparation preventing him from attending the Mathematical Congress at the Paris exposition in 1900. Husserl’s view was that the task of philosophy was to describe the world as we meet it in ordinary experience, and his contribution to this debate, and to Western philosophy, was the concept of ‘transcendental phenomenology,’ in which he proposed his famous noema/noesis dichotomy.²⁹ Noema, he said, is a timeless proposition-in-itself, and is valid, full stop. For example, God may be said to exist whether anyone thinks it or not. Noesis, by contrast, is more psychological – it is essentially what Brentano meant when he said that the mind ‘intends’ an object. For Husserl, noesis and noema were both present in consciousness, and he thought his breakthrough was to argue that a noesis is also a noema – it too exists in and of itself.³⁰ Many people find this dichotomy confusing, and Husserl didn’t help by inventing further complex neologisms for his ideas (when he died, more than 40,000 pages of his manuscripts, mostly unseen and unstudied, were deposited in the library at Louvain University).³¹ Husserl made big claims for himself; in the Brentano halfway house tradition, he believed he had worked out ‘a theoretical science independent of all psychology and factual science.’³² Few in the Anglophone world would agree, or even understand how you could have a theoretical science independent of factual science. But Husserl is best understood now as the immediate father of the so-called continental school of twentieth-century Western philosophy, whose members include Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jürgen Habermas. They stand in contrast to the ‘analytic’ school begun by Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, which became more popular in North America and Great Britain.³³

Brentano’s other notable legatee was Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932), the father of Gestalt philosophy and psychology. Ehrenfels was a rich man; he inherited a profitable estate in Austria but made it over to his younger brother so that he could devote his time to the pursuit of intellectual and literary activities.³⁴ In 1897 he accepted a post as professor of philosophy at Prague. Here, starting with Ernst Mach’s observation that the size and colour of a circle can be varied ‘without detracting from its circularity,’ Ehrenfels modified Brentano’s ideas, arguing that the mind somehow ‘intends Gestalt qualities’ – that is to say, there are certain ‘wholes’ in nature that the mind and the nervous system are pre-prepared to experience. (A well-known example of this is the visual illusion that may be seen as either a candlestick, in white, or two female profiles facing each other, in black.) Gestalt theory became very influential in German psychology for a time, and although in itself it led nowhere, it did set the ground for the theory of ‘imprinting,’ a readiness in the neonate to perceive certain forms at a crucial stage in development.³⁵ This idea flourished in the middle years of the century, popularised by German and Dutch biologists and ethologists.

In all of these Viennese examples – Schnitzler, Hofmannsthal, Brentano, Husserl, and Ehrenfels – it is clear that they were preoccupied with the recent discoveries of science, whether those discoveries were the unconscious, fundamental particles (and the even more disturbing void between them), Gestalt, or indeed entropy itself, the Second Law of Thermodynamics. If these notions of the philosophers in particular appear rather dated and incoherent today, it is also necessary to add that such ideas were only half the picture. Also prevalent in Vienna at the time were a number of avowedly rational but in reality frankly scientistic ideas, and they too read oddly now. Chief among these were the notorious theories of Otto Weininger (1880–1903).³⁶ The son of an anti-Semitic but Jewish goldsmith, Weininger developed into an overbearing coffeehouse dandy.³⁷ He was even more precocious than Hofmannsthal, teaching himself” eight languages before he left university and publishing his undergraduate thesis. Renamed by his editor Geschlecht und Charakter (Sex and Character), the thesis was released in 1903 and became a huge hit. The book was rabidly anti-Semitic and extravagantly misogynist. Weininger put forward the view that all human behaviour can be explained in terms of male and female ‘protoplasm,’ which contributes to each person, with every cell possessing sexuality. Just as Husserl had coined neologisms for his ideas, so a whole lexicon was invented by Weininger: idioplasm, for example, was his name for sexually undifferentiated tissue; male tissue was arrhenoplasm; and female tissue was thelyplasm. Using elaborate arithmetic, Weininger argued that varying proportions of arrhenoplasm and thelyplasm could account for such diverse matters as genius, prostitution, memory, and so on. According to Weininger, all the major achievements in history arose because of the masculine principle – all art, literature, and systems of law, for example. The feminine principle, on the other hand, accounted for the negative elements, and all these negative elements converge, Weininger says, in the Jewish race. The Aryan race is the embodiment of the strong organising principle that characterises males, whereas the Jewish race embodies the ‘feminine-chaotic principle of nonbeing.’³⁸ Despite the commercial success of his book, fame did not settle Weininger’s restless spirit. Later that year he rented a room in the house in Vienna where Beethoven died, and shot himself. He was twenty-three.

A rather better scientist, no less interested in sex, was the Catholic psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840–1902). His fame stemmed from a work he published in Latin in 1886, entitled Psychopathia Sexualis: eine klinisch-forensische Studie. This book was soon expanded and proved so popular it was translated into seven languages. Most of the ‘clinical-forensic’ case histories were drawn from courtroom records, and attempted to link sexual psychopathology either to married life, to themes in art, or to the structure of organised religion.³⁹ As a Catholic, Krafft-Ebing took a strict line on sexual matters, believing that the only function of sex was to propagate the species within the institution of marriage. It followed that his text was disapproving of many of the ‘perversions’ he described. The most infamous ‘deviation,’ on which the notoriety of his study rests, was his coining of the term masochism. This word was derived from the novels and novellas of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, the son of a police director in Graz. In the most explicit of his stories, Venus im Pelz, Sacher-Masoch describes his own affair at Baden bei Wien with a Baroness Fanny Pistor, during the course of which he ‘signed a contract to submit for six months to being her slave.’ Sacher-Masoch later left Austria (and his wife) to explore similar relationships in Paris.⁴⁰

Psychopathia Sexualis clearly foreshadowed some aspects of psychoanalysis. Krafft-Ebing acknowledged that sex, like religion, could be sublimated in art – both could ‘enflame the imagination.’ ‘What other foundation is there for the plastic arts of poetry? From (sensual) love arises that warmth of fancy which alone can inspire the creative mind, and the fire of sensual feeling kindles and preserves the glow and fervour of art.’⁴¹ For Krafft-Ebing, sex within religion (and therefore within marriage) offered the possibility of ‘rapture through submission,’ and it was this process in perverted form that he regarded as the aetiology for the pathology of masochism. Krafft-Ebing’s ideas were even more of a halfway house than Freud’s, but for a society grappling with the threat that science posed to religion, any theory that dealt with the pathology of belief and its consequences was bound to fascinate, especially if it involved sex. Given those theories, Krafft-Ebing might have been more sympathetic to Freud’s arguments when they came along; but he could never reconcile himself to the controversial notion of infantile sexuality. He became one of Freud’s loudest critics.

The dominant architecture in Vienna was the Ringstrasse. Begun in the mid-nineteenth century, after Emperor Franz Joseph ordered the demolition of the old city ramparts and a huge swath of space was cleared in a ring around the centre, a dozen monumental buildings were erected over the following fifty years in this ring. They included the Opera, the Parliament, the Town Hall, parts of the university, and an enormous church. Most were embellished with fancy stone decorations, and it was this ornateness that provoked a reaction, first in Otto Wagner, then in Adolf Loos.

Otto Wagner (1841–1918) won fame for his ‘Beardsleyan imagination’ when he was awarded a commission in 1894 to build the Vienna underground railway.⁴² This meant more than thirty stations, plus bridges, viaducts, and other urban structures. Following the dictum that function determines form, Wagner broke new ground by not only using modern materials but showing them. For example, he made a feature of the iron girders in the construction of bridges. These supporting structures were no longer hidden by elaborate casings of masonry, in the manner of the Ringstrasse, but painted and left exposed, their utilitarian form and even their riveting lending texture to whatever it was they were part of.⁴³ Then there were the arches Wagner designed as entranceways to the stations – rather than being solid, or neoclassical and built of stone, they reproduced the skeletal form of railway bridges or viaducts so that even from a long way off, you could tell you were approaching a station.⁴⁴ Warming to this theme, his other designs embodied the idea that the modern individual, living his or her life in a city, is always in a hurry, anxious to be on his or her way to work or home. The core structure therefore became the street, rather than the square or vista or palace. For Wagner, Viennese streets should be straight, direct; neighbourhoods should be organised so that workplaces are close to homes, and each neighbourhood should have a centre, not just one centre for the entire city. The facades of Wagner’s buildings became less ornate, plainer, more functional, mirroring what was happening elsewhere in life. In this way Wagner’s style presaged both the Bauhaus and the international movement in architecture.⁴⁵

Adolf Loos (1870–1933) was even more strident. He was close to Freud and to Karl Kraus, editor of Die Fackel, and the rest of the crowd at the Café Griensteidl, and his rationalism was different from Wagner’s – it was more revolutionary, but it was still rationalism. Architecture, he declared, was not art. ‘The work of art is the private affair of the artist. The work of art wants to shake people out of their comfortableness [Bequemlichkeit], The house must serve comfort. The art work is revolutionary, the house conservative.’⁴⁶ Loos extended this perception to design, clothing, even manners. He was in favour of simplicity, functionality, plainness. He thought men risked being enslaved by material culture, and he wanted to reestablish a ‘proper’ relationship between art and life. Design was inferior to art, because it was conservative, and when he understood the difference, man would be liberated. ‘The artisan produced objects for use here and now, the artist for all men everywhere.’⁴⁷

The ideas of Weininger and Loos inhabit a different kind of halfway house from those of Hofmannsthal and Husserl. Whereas the latter two were basically sceptical of science and the promise it offered, Weininger especially, but Loos too, was carried away with rationalism. Both adopted scientistic ideas, or terms, and quickly went beyond the evidence to construct systems that were as fanciful as the nonscientific ideas they disparaged. The scientific method, insufficiently appreciated or understood, could be mishandled, and in the Viennese halfway house it was.

Nothing illustrates better this divided and divisive way of looking at the world in turn-of-the-century Vienna than the row over Gustav Klimt’s paintings for the university, the first of which was delivered in 1900. Klimt, born in Baumgarten, near Vienna, in 1862, was, like Weininger, the son of a goldsmith. But there the similarity ended. Klimt made his name decorating the new buildings of the Ringstrasse with vast murals. These were produced with his brother Ernst, but on the latter’s death in 1892 Gustav withdrew for five years, during which time he appears to have studied the works of James Whistler, Aubrey Beardsley, and, like Picasso, Edvard Munch. He did not reappear until 1897, when he emerged at the head of the Vienna Secession, a band of nineteen artists who, like the impressionists in Paris and other artists at the Berlin Secession, eschewed the official style of art and instead followed their own version of art nouveau. In the German lands this was known as Jugendstil.⁴⁸

Klimt’s new style, bold and intricate at the same time, had three defining characteristics – the elaborate use of gold leaf (using a technique he had learned from his father), the application of small flecks of iridescent colour, hard like enamel, and a languid eroticism applied in particular to women. Klimt’s paintings were not quite Freudian: his women were not neurotic, far from it. They were calm, placid, above all lubricious, ‘the instinctual life frozen in art.’⁴⁹ Nevertheless, in drawing attention to women’s sensuality, Klimt hinted that it had hitherto gone unsatisfied. This had the effect of making the women in his paintings threatening. They were presented as insatiable and devoid of any sense of sin. In portraying women like this, Klimt was subverting the familiar way of thinking every bit as much as Freud was. Here were women capable of the perversions reported in Krafft-Ebing’s book, which made them tantalising and shocking at the same time. Klimt’s new style immediately divided Vienna, but it quickly culminated in his commission for the university.

Three large panels had been asked for: Philosophy, Medicine and Jurisprudence. All three provoked a furore but the rows over Medicine and Jurisprudence merely repeated the fuss over Philosophy. For this first picture the commission stipulated as a theme ‘the triumph of Light over Darkness.’ What Klimt actually produced was an opaque, ‘deliquescent tangle’ of bodies that appear to drift past the onlooker, a kaleidoscopic jumble of forms that run into each other, and all surrounded by a void. The professors of philosophy were outraged. Klimt was vilified as presenting ‘unclear ideas through unclear forms.’⁵⁰ Philosophy was supposed to be a rational affair; it ‘sought the truth via the exact sciences.’⁵¹ Klimt’s vision was anything but that, and as a result it wasn’t wanted: eighty professors collaborated in a petition that demanded Klimt’s picture never be shown at the university. The painter responded by returning his fee and never presenting the remaining commissions. Unforgivably, they were destroyed in 1945 when the Nazis burned Immendorf Castle, where they were stored during World War II.⁵² The significance of the fight is that it brings us back to Hofmannsthal and Schnitzler, to Husserl and Brentano. For in the university commission, Klimt was attempting a major statement. How can rationalism succeed, he is asking, when the irrational, the instinctive, is such a dominant part of life? Is reason really the way forward? Instinct is an older, more powerful force. Yes, it may be more atavistic, more primitive, and a dark force at times. But where is the profit in denying it? This remained an important strand in Germanic thought until World War II.

If this was the dominant Zeitgeist in the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the turn of the century, stretching from literature to philosophy to art, at the same time there was in Vienna (and the Teutonic lands) a competing strain of thought that was wholly scientific and frankly reductionist, as we have seen in the work of Planck, de Vries, and Mendel. But the most ardent, the most impressive, and by far the most influential reductionist in Vienna was Ernst Mach (1838— 1916).⁵³ Born near Brünn, where Mendel had outlined his theories, Mach, a precocious and difficult child who questioned everything, was at first tutored at home by his father, then studied mathematics and physics in Vienna. In his own work, he made two major discoveries. Simultaneously with Breuer, but entirely independently, he discovered the importance of the semicircular canals in the inner ear for bodily equilibrium. And second, using a special technique, he made photographs of bullets travelling at more than the speed of sound.⁵⁴ In the process, he discovered that they create not one but two shock waves, one at the front and another at the rear, as a result of the vacuum their high speed creates. This became particularly significant after World War II with the arrival of jet aircraft that approached the speed of sound, and this is why supersonic speeds (on Concorde, for instance) are given in terms of a ‘Mach number.’⁵⁵

After these noteworthy empirical achievements, however, Mach became more and more interested in the philosophy and history of science.⁵⁶ Implacably opposed to metaphysics of any kind, he worshipped the Enlightenment as the most important period in history because it had exposed what he called the ‘misapplication’ of concepts like God, nature, and soul. The ego he regarded as a ‘useless hypothesis.’⁵⁷ In physics he at first doubted the very existence of atoms and wanted measurement to replace ‘pictorialisation,’ the inner mental images we have of how things are, even dismissing Immanuel Kant’s a priori theory of number (that numbers just are).⁵⁸ Mach argued instead that ‘our’ system was only one of several possibilities that had arisen merely to fill our economic needs, as an aid in rapid calculation. (This, of course, was an answer of sorts to Husserl.) All knowledge, Mach insisted, could be reduced to sensation, and the task of science was to describe sense data in the simplest and most neutral manner. This meant that for him the primary sciences were physics, ‘which provide the raw material for sensations,’ and psychology, by means of which we are aware of our sensations. For Mach, philosophy had no existence apart from science.⁵⁹ An examination of the history of scientific ideas showed, he argued, how these ideas evolved. He firmly believed that there is evolution in ideas, with the survival of the fittest, and that we develop ideas, even scientific ideas, in order to survive. For him, theories in physics were no more than descriptions, and mathematics no more than ways of organising these descriptions. For Mach, therefore, it made less sense to talk about the truth or falsity of theories than to talk of their usefulness. Truth, as an eternal, unchanging thing that just is, for him made no sense. He was criticised by Planck among others on the grounds that his evolutionary/biological theory was itself metaphysical speculation, but that didn’t stop him being one of the most influential thinkers of his day. The Russian Marxists, including Anatoli Lunacharsky and Vladimir Lenin, read Mach, and the Vienna Circle was founded in response as much to his ideas as to Wittgenstein’s. Hofmannsthal, Robert Musil, and even Albert Einstein all acknowledged his ‘profound influenee.’⁶⁰

Mach suffered a stroke in 1898, and thereafter reduced his workload considerably. But he did not die until 1916, by which time physics had made some startling advances. Though he never adjusted entirely to some of the more exotic ideas, such as relativity, his uncompromising reductionism undoubtedly gave a massive boost to the new areas of investigation that were opening up after the discovery of the electron and the quantum. These new entities had dimensions, they could be measured, and so conformed exactly to what Mach thought science should be. Because of his influence, quite a few of the future particle physicists would come from Vienna and the Habsburg hinterland. Owing to the rival arenas of thought, however, which gave free rein to the irrational, very few would actually practise their physics there.

That almost concludes this account of Vienna, but not quite. For there are two important gaps in this description of that teeming world. One is music. The second Viennese school of music comprised Gustav Mahler, Arnold Schoenberg, Anton von Webern, and Alban Berg, but also included Richard (not Johann) Strauss, who used Hofmannsthal as librettist. They more properly belong in chapter 4, among Les Demoiselles de Modernisme. The second gap in this account concerns a particular mix of science and politics, a deep pessimism about the way the world was developing as the new century was ushered in. This was seen in sharp focus in Austria, but in fact it was a constellation of ideas that extended to many countries, as far afield as the United States of America and even to China. The alleged scientific basis for this pessimism was Darwinism; the sociological process that sounded the alarm was ‘degeneration’; and the political result, as often as not, was some form of racism.