IF A PERSON sins because he does not speak up when he hears a public charge to testify regarding something he has seen or learned about, he will be held responsible. 2“‘Or if a person touches anything ceremonially unclean—whether the carcasses of unclean wild animals or of unclean livestock or of unclean creatures that move along the ground—even though he is unaware of it, he has become unclean and is guilty.
3“‘Or if he touches human uncleanness—anything that would make him unclean—even though he is unaware of it, when he learns of it he will be guilty.
4“‘Or if a person thoughtlessly takes an oath to do anything, whether good or evil—in any matter one might carelessly swear about—even though he is unaware of it, in any case when he learns of it he will be guilty.
5“‘When anyone is guilty in any of these ways, he must confess in what way he has sinned 6and, as a penalty for the sin he has committed, he must bring to the LORD a female lamb or goat from the flock as a sin offering; and the priest shall make atonement for him for his sin.
7“if he cannot afford a lamb, he is to bring two doves or two young pigeons to the LORD as a penalty for his sin—one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering. 8He is to bring them to the priest, who shall first offer the one for the sin offering. He is to wring its head from its neck, not severing it completely, 9and is to sprinkle some of the blood of the sin offering against the side of the altar; the rest of the blood must be drained out at the base of the altar. It is a sin offering. 10The priest shall then offer the other as a burnt offering in the prescribed way and make atonement for him for the sin he has committed, and he will be forgiven.
11“if, however, he cannot afford two doves or two young pigeons, he is to bring as an offering for his sin a tenth of an ephah of fine flour for a sin offering. He must not put oil or incense on it, because it is a sin offering. 12He is to bring it to the priest, who shall take a handful of it as a memorial portion and burn it on the altar on top of the offerings made to the LORD by fire. It is a sin offering. 13In this way the priest will make atonement for him for any of these sins he has committed, and he will be forgiven. The rest of the offering will belong to the priest, as in the case of the grain offering.’”
Original Meaning
PURIFICATION OFFERING OR reparation offering? Many readers of the Bible have been puzzled by Leviticus 5:1–13. Does this passage provide instructions for purification offerings, as in the preceding chapter, or does it have to do with reparation (so-called “guilt”) offerings, as in the following section (5:14–6:7)? In support of the former, the sacrifices here are designated ḥaṭṭaʾt (“purification offering; 5:6–9, 11–12). On the other hand, the victim that the offerer must bring for his or her sin is called an ʾašam (5:6–7), the same word that later means “reparation offering” (5:15–16, 18–19; 6:6).
We can settle the matter by recognizing that the language of Leviticus unambiguously places a given ritual in a particular category in any of three ways:
1. The ritual label can appear in a verbless (nominal) clause, most often immediately followed by a pronoun, which is translated “It is a label of ritual type (. . .)” Thus, “it is a burnt offering . . .” (1:9, 13, 17), or, “it is a purification offering” (4:24; cf. v. 21).
2. The ritual label can immediately follow the preposition l (“as/for”), for example, “as a well-being offering” (3:6) or “as a purification offering” (4:3, 14, 32, 33).
3. The ritual label can be placed next to the word qorban, the generic term for “sacrifice.” In 2:1, 4 the grain offering is qorban minḥah (cf. v. 12). The introduction to the well-being offering in 3:1 reads literally: “If his sacrifice (qorban) is a well-being offering . . .”
Returning to 5:1–13, we find that this passage clearly labels its sacrifices as ḥaṭṭaʾt through the first two of the strategies listed above: in a nominal clause, “it is a purification offering” (vv. 9, 11–12), and with preposition l, “as a purification offering” (vv. 6–8, 11). Notice the parallel in verse 7, where one bird is offered “as [l] a purification offering” and the other “as [l] a burnt offering.” Just as “burnt offering” is a kind of sacrifice here, so is “purification offering.” By contrast, the word ʾašam does not appear in 5:1–13 as a label for a type of ritual.
While ʾašam in 5:6–7 does not label the sacrifice as a “reparation offering,” it refers to a function of the purification offering. In verse 6 the ʾašam is for the sin (ḥaṭṭaʾt) that the person has sinned (ḥaṭaʾ ), which is abbreviated in verse 7 to “ʾašam [for] that which he has sinned [ḥaṭaʾ ].” The abbreviated wording is paralleled in verse 11, with qorban (“sacrifice”) as the functional equivalent of ʾašam: “qorban [for] that which he has sinned [ḥaṭaʾ ].”1 So the qorban, consisting in this case of a purification offering, has an ʾašam function.
The purpose of an ʾašam is illuminated by 1 Samuel 6, where the Philistine priests and diviners explained to their people how they should send back the ark of the covenant to the Israelites (1 Sam. 6:3–5). The Philistines understood that by seizing the ark of the covenant, they had wronged Israel’s deity, for which he was punishing them. Therefore they must return to him an ʾašam, that is, something of value as a reparation, to make up for what they had done.
Just as gold tumors and rats served as an ʾašam (“reparation”) from the Philistines to the Lord (1 Sam. 6:3–5), so in Leviticus 5:6–7 a purification offering functions as an ʾašam from an Israelite sinner to the Lord. When the word ʾašam labels a particular kind of ritual, there is emphasis that a sinner must make reparation of a literal amount of property, including restitution of the principal plus a 20 percent penalty, to the wronged party before bringing the sacrifice (5:16, 6:4–5).
The ʾašam in 5:1–13 consists of a purification offering rather than a reparation offering because the cases of sin here (see below) do not involve literal amounts of value for which reparation can be made. It is true that in addition to confession before bringing a sacrifice, the situations in 5:1–13 implicitly require action to put things right by fulfilling delayed obligations: testifying (v. 1), undergoing ritual purification (vv. 2–3), or fulfilling an oath (v. 4). The difference is that the liability lies in the area of action rather than property to which a price tag can be attached.
While sacrifice expiates for a sin of neglect, it does not fulfill the neglected obligation. Jonathan Edwards was on target:
Sacrifice does not take the place of performing a known duty. And though the obedience of saints has no merit, yet it is pleasing and acceptable to God; it is as a sweet-smelling savour, and is compared to sacrifices, and preferred before them. 1 Samuel 15:22.2
Experiencing/feeling liability. Milgrom has shown that Hebrew words from the root ʾšm, like other Hebrew terms for sin, can refer to punishment for wrongdoing as well as to sinful actions themselves.3 Such ʾšm consequences cannot be lumped under the customary catch-alls “guilt” or “is guilty,” but are differentiated into parts of the process that moves from committing a wrong to suffering punishment for it or making reparation (moving down the middle column below):4
Expression | Meaning | Reference(s) |
noun ʾašam | sinful act | Ps. 68:21 |
verb ʾšm + preposition l | incur liability to | Lev. 5:19; Num. 5:7 |
infinitive ʾašmab of verb ʾšm | be/become liable | Lev. 4:3; 6:5, 7 |
noun ʾašam | punishment for liability | Gen. 26:10; Ps. 34:21–22; Jer. 51:5 |
verb ʾšm | experience liability | Lev. 4:13, 22, 27; 5:2–5, 17; 6:4; Num. 5:6 |
noun ʾašam | reparation | Lev. 5:6–7, 15; Num. 5:7–8; 1 Sam. 6:3–4, 8, 17 |
noun ʾašam | reparation offering | Lev. 5:15–16, 18–19; 6:6; 7:1, 2, 5, 7 |
Milgrom interprets the stative verb ʾšm as “feel guilt” in Leviticus 4:13, 22, 27; 5:2–5, 17; 6:4; and Numbers 5:6.5 He explains this feeling: “It is not a metaphor or mental abstraction, but a physical reality, felt in pain or illness—literally pangs of conscience.”6 Thus in Leviticus 5:2–5, when a person sins in any of several ways and then has a negative experience that involves or generates cognitive dissonance, he or she must confess and bring a purification offering. Compare the case of the Philistines, who experienced liability when plagues gave them the impression that the God of Israel was opposed to what they had done and was holding them accountable (1 Sam. 6).
Unlike Milgrom, Knierim takes the verb ʾšm to mean “incurring guilt-obligation.”7 This more traditional interpretation fails to explain 5:17–19, where a sinner who is ʾašem must sacrifice a reparation offering even though he does not know the nature of the offense. Of course the individual is guilty. That is not in question. The issue is: How can the person be prompted to bring any sacrifice at all? The answer is: He cannot, unless he or she somehow experiences liability (see table above) in the sense that the obligation generates a kind of cognitive dissonance.8
Someone on the Internet has reported the following familiar scenario, which reflects similar uncertainty: “I was at the airport, checking in at the gate, when the airport employee asked, ‘Has anyone put anything in your baggage without your knowledge?’ I said, ‘If it was without my knowledge, how would I know?’ He smiled and nodded knowingly, ‘That’s why we ask.’”
Compare 4:22–23, 27–28, where an inadvertent sinner who is ʾašem or his sin is made known (Hophal of ydʿ ) to him (by someone else) must bring a purification offering. If ʾašem here only means that the sinner has objectively incurred a “guilt-obligation,” how will he or she know to bring a purification offering in the event that nobody else points out the sin? Milgrom must be right that in these contexts ʾašem represents an alternative way for sinners to find out about their inadvertent faults. Consequently, the word must include the idea of “feeling guilty.”
“Graded” purification offering. The fact that 5:1–13 concerns purification offerings explains why verse 6 can skip over the ritual procedure that uses a female flock animal. The activities are simply the same as in 4:27–35, the commoner’s purification offering. However, 5:1–13 differs from chapter 4 in three respects. (1) Whereas chapter 4 covers inadvertent violation of any divine command (4:2, 13, 22, 27), 5:1–13 cuts a much narrower swathe by dealing with specific kinds of non-inadvertent (= advertent) cases not covered by the earlier legislation (see below). (2) Leviticus 5:1–13 requires a sinner to confess before bringing a sacrifice (v. 5). (3) In chapter 4 sacrificial victims of different values are determined by the status of the sinners, but in 5:1–13 a descending gradation of victims/materials is based on what sinners can afford.
Leviticus 5:1–13 continues a major organizing principle of the book: Gradations of sacrificial victims/materials are presented in order of descending value, beginning with and therefore honoring the more valuable offerings even if the lesser ones may have been sacrificed more frequently in actual practice.9
herd (1:3–9) | → | flock (1:10–13) | → | bird (1:14–17) | |||
Grain: | grain (ch. 2) | ||||||
Well-being: | herd (3:1–5) | → | flock (3:6–16) | ||||
Purification: | herd (4:3–21) | → | flock (4:22–35; 5:6) | → | bird (5:7–10) | → | grain (5:11–13) |
By comparison with chapter 4, we see that the rituals in 5:1–13 comprise a related but distinct subcategory of purification offerings. Following the rabbis, who called this the “ascending and descending” sacrifice because of its gradation of victims/materials in accordance with the economic ability of the offerer, Milgrom terms it the “graduated purification offering.”10 While it does make allowances for the poor, the fact that its function is distinguished from the chapter 4 rituals in other ways as well—non-inadvertence and prior confession—indicates that it is not simply a poor person’s purification offering.
A bird cannot be offered by itself as a purification offering, presumably because it is too small a victim, so it is accompanied by another bird for a burnt offering (5:7–10). Whereas the priest simply drains out the blood of the burnt offering bird against the side of the altar (1:15), he sprinkles some blood of the purification offering bird there (not on the horns as in other purification offerings) and then drains out the remainder at the base of the altar (5:9; cf. 4:7, 18, 25, 30, 34).
That the bird rituals are a unit is shown by the fact that the expiation (kipper) formula is stated only once, covering both rituals as a single complex (5:10).11 The combination of a purification offering with a burnt offering serves as the functional equivalent of a single purification offering of a flock animal (cf. 5:6). So the burnt offering supplements the quantity of the purification offering (cf. Num. 15:24–28).12 It is true that a burnt offering expiates (1:4; 16:24; cf. 14:19–20; Job 1:5; 42:8), but in combination with a purification offering its function is subsumed to provide what amounts to a greater purification offering.13
In Leviticus 5:11–13 the purification offering of grain is like the uncooked semolina offering in 2:1–3, except that its quantity of flour is specified as one tenth of an ʾepah14 and no oil or frankincense are added because it is for an unjoyful occasion of sin. After the priest turns the token portion to smoke on the altar, the remainder belongs to him “like the minḥah” (5:13). Although it consists of grain, it is not a minḥah (“grain offering”); the text insists that this is a purification offering (5:11–12). Like other purification offerings, it provides expiation (kipper) prerequisite to forgiveness (5:13). However, it is unique as the only mandatory expiatory sacrifice that lacks blood (cf. Heb. 9:22).
Bridging Contexts
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF EXPIATION. In Leviticus 4 the sins remedied by purification offerings are limited to those committed “inadvertently.” In 5:1–13, however, confession plus the graduated purification offering expands the scope of expiation beyond inadvertence, which is not mentioned here, to sins committed through omission or neglect,15 including failure to supply required testimony (v. 1) and forgetting to perform a duty to the Lord, whether ritual purification (vv. 2–3) or fulfilling an oath (v. 4).16 Later we will find that reparation offerings also remedy some deliberate sins (6:1–7; Num. 5:5–8). Nevertheless, each of these cases of non-inadvertent sin remedied by a purification or reparation offering involves some kind of mitigating factor that places it with inadvertent wrongs in the category of nondefiant offenses rather than with flagrant, defiant violations, for which no animal sacrifice can expiate (Num. 15:30–31).
In the contrast between expiable nondefiant sins and inexpiable defiant wrongs, we see God’s “bottom line” for maintaining a relationship with his people: The criterion is not simply whether a person deliberately breaks his law, but whether a violation carries an attitude of defiant disloyalty to him. The focus is relational. It is true that in a sense every sin is disloyal and tainted with an aspect of rebellion against God. But for him the most important thing is whether or not a person really wants him as Lord. A deliberate sin is a serious mistake that may be committed for any of a number of “reasons,” including lust, anger, and fear, but not all deliberate sins are rebellious in the sense of defiantly casting off basic allegiance to God.
In 5:1, because deliberate neglect to give mandatory testimony is graciously associated with cases of forgetfulness (5:2–4), implying that it is not defiant, it can be remedied by a purification offering. This concession appears to acknowledge the risks of testifying and encourages squeamish witnesses, who could not otherwise be identified by human agency, to voluntarily speak up even after they have delayed.17
Notice the factor of delay. Committing an inadvertent offense and realizing it only later (ch. 4), balking at a requirement to testify (5:1), or forgetting a duty to undergo ritual purification or to fulfill an oath (5:2–4) all involve delay between the time when evil occurs and the time when it is expiated.18
Just as inadvertence does not excuse a person from responsibility to remedy a fault, neither do forgetting or procrastinating. As in United States law, negligence was culpable when an Israelite had a legal duty to act. Delay expiates nothing. In fact, where fulfillment of an obligation to God is concerned, time is of the essence and inordinate delay constitutes sin, as shown by the fact that a person who is purified or fulfills an oath in a timely manner incurs no sin at all. Although physical ritual impurity itself is not sin in the sense of moral fault, violation of a divine command regarding treatment of ritual impurity, including a requirement for timely purification, is sin.
Leviticus assumes that God can hold everyone accountable because he sees, knows, and remembers everything that happens. You can run, but you can’t hide! This is especially relevant to 5:1, where a person who fails to support the judicial process by testifying is warned that this “secret” sin is not hidden from the Lord. In this context a publicly proclaimed oath or (conditional) curse (ʾalah) of adjuration would serve notice that the call for witnesses was divinely enforced. The effect of such a proclamation would be like making everyone in a modern community solemnly place his or her hand on a Bible and swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Witnesses would likely be afraid to commit culpable negligence, which would be a form of perjury punishable by God (cf. Judg. 17:1–2).
Confession is good for the soul. Verbal confession is a precondition for sacrificing a graduated purification offering (Lev. 5:5). This is the first instance of the word for “confess” (Hithpael of ydh) in the Hebrew Bible. The other instances in Pentateuchal ritual law are the unique case of 16:21, where the high priest confesses while leaning both hands on the (nonsacrificial) live goat for Azazel on the Day of Atonement, and Numbers 5:7, where confession is required along with restitution to the wronged party before a reparation offering.
In Leviticus 5:5 and Numbers 5:7, confession precedes bringing a sacrifice to the sanctuary.19 So there is no evidence in the Pentateuch for verbal confession at the sanctuary in connection with leaning one hand on the head of the victim just before it is slaughtered. Therefore the confession required by Leviticus 5:5 and Numbers 5:7 cannot be to a priest; it must be to the Lord, and of course, payment of reparation to any human party that the sinner has wronged would necessarily involve confession to that person as well.
It is true that at the sanctuary the offerer would need to inform the officiating priest what kind of sacrifice to perform, which would imply that he or she had done something belonging to a general category of sin. Also, the gesture of leaning one hand on the head of an animal or handing a bird or grain item over to a priest served as an implicit confession. But at the sanctuary, the precise nature of the fault safely remained between the offerer and the Lord, who alone forgives sins against him. As Charles Spurgeon advised, “confess to God, but not to man unless you have wronged him, and confession of the wrong is due to him.”20
James 5:16 advocates voluntary confession of faults between believers so that they can offer intercessory prayer on behalf of each other, as Moses did for the Israelites when they confessed their wrong in speaking against God and against him (Num. 21:7). However, this kind of intercessory role was not part of the exclusive, official job description of the ancient Israelite priesthood.
In Pentateuchal ritual law, confession before sacrifice is required only in cases that involve deliberate sin (Lev. 5:5; Num. 5:7).21 So it appears that verbal confession, demonstrating repentance and loyalty to the Lord by humbly acknowledging accountability to him, is needed to affirm that a deliberate sin is not defiant. With an inadvertent fault there would be no question of possible defiance because the sinner would not even know that he or she was violating a divine command.
In Leviticus 5:1 an Israelite who has sinned bears culpability/blame (ʿawon) that inevitably leads to punishment unless it is removed by confessing and offering a sacrifice (5:5–6). So by providing for expiation through confession and sacrifice, the Lord opens a door to freedom from condemnation and its ensuing punishment. There is only one door, and in order to escape, the sinner must choose to go through it. He or she is under obligation to accept the means that God has provided by coming boldly to the sanctuary, confident because God has promised forgiveness to those who repent.
Because we have a sympathetic high priest in God’s heavenly temple (Heb. 4:14–15), we can “approach the throne of grace with confidence, so that we may receive mercy and find grace to help us in our time of need” (4:16). Even when all our instincts clamor for cover to shield our shame from the bright light of divine holiness (cf. John 3:20), the right place for us to be is right there at the throne, claiming the promise:
If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and purify us from all unrighteousness. . . .
My dear children, I write this to you so that you will not sin. But if anybody does sin, we have one who speaks to the Father in our defense—Jesus Christ, the Righteous One. (1 John 1:9–2:1)
A state of denial expiates nothing. The fig leaves of cover-up, like the first one that was attempted by Adam and Eve (Gen. 3:7), yield nothing but scratchy discomfort. The sooner you confess the better. “Confession is telling God you did the thing he saw you do. He doesn’t need to hear it as much as you need to say it.”22 The catharsis of confession is good for the soul, the only avenue to peace with God and healing of cognitive dissonance (Ps. 32:3–5).
Why sacrifice? The need of the Israelites for mercy does not adequately explain the need for expiatory sacrifices. The Lord could forgive apart from such rituals before the sanctuary was constructed (e.g., Ex. 34:6–7) and during its period of operation, as shown by the stories of David (2 Sam. 12:13) and King Manasseh (2 Chron. 33:12–13; cf. 30:18–19). Even sacrificial expiation at the sanctuary did not accomplish divine forgiveness but was only prerequisite to it (Lev. 4:20, 26, 31, 35).
Why should God deal with sin through sacrifice when he could do without it? Some have plausibly suggested that the ritual system was to teach moral values, contrasting divine holiness with human sinfulness.23 Similarly, D. P. Wright proposes that the system of purities taught the Israelites the difference between holy and profane, pure and impure categories so that they could properly and safely relate to the Lord, who was dwelling in their midst. Even when focusing on “lesser impurities, this Pentateuchal tradition really has the larger moral issues and goals of religion as a major concern.”24
Wright is surely correct as far as he goes, which is within the context of ancient Israelite rituals. But what about the culminating sacrifice of Christ? If sin causes God pain, why would he choose to immeasurably augment his suffering by giving up his Son to the worst possible death?
Christ’s sacrifice is crucially necessary because it enables God to maintain his justice when he extends mercy by forgiving human beings who have violated his law. Only this sacrifice makes it possible for God to be just when he justifies those who believe (Rom. 3:26). Why must grace be so expensive? Why is it so important for God to be just? Because justice and mercy are the two sides of love. If God were to compromise one in favor of the other, whether by doling out easy grace or by protecting himself from pain with a steely armor plate of rejection over his heart, he would not really be a God of love as he claims to be (Ex. 34:6–7; 1 John 4:8), and therefore his government would amount to a hypocritical tour de farce.
We are not talking about a kind of legal fiction by which God somehow pays himself off through Christ’s sacrifice. The glory of the cross is what it reveals about God’s character: He is willing to pay a staggering cost to maintain his absolute integrity as the God of love, who simultaneously maintains justice and offers mercy.
Only if God really is love can his intelligent created beings have love, which is crucial to their existence.
Why is love so important? Because real, unselfish love is the only basis on which intelligent beings with free choice can live in harmony and not destroy each other. Love is as essential to the long-term survival of the human race as food and water are to our short-term survival. Ultimately we cannot live without love.25
Anyone who doubts the truth of this statement is out of touch with daily news, which reeks with examples of mutual assured destruction (MAD) generated by un-love.
Contemporary Significance
MERCY AND JUSTICE. A grandfather found his young grandson jumping up and down in his playpen, crying at the top of his lungs. When little Johnnie saw him, he reached up his chubby hands and implored, “Out, Gramp, out!” The elderly gentleman stooped to lift the boy out of his predicament, but just then Johnnie’s mother approached with the words, “No, Johnnie, you are being punished, so you must stay in.”
The grandfather found himself torn between the simultaneously opposing forces of mercy and justice. Tears and hands reached into his heart, but he also respected the mother’s wisdom in firmly correcting her son for misbehavior. Love found a way to resolve the dilemma: Since Gramp couldn’t take Johnnie out of his pen, he crawled in with him!
On a vastly grander scale, that is what God has done for us. Justly incarcerated as humans have been in mortality that results from sin (Rom. 6:23), the Lord came to dwell with his people in their camp (Ex. 25:8). Then the divine Word stooped low, sacrificing his divine prerogatives to become flesh and make his dwelling among us (John 1:14; Phil. 2:6–7).
If mercy and justice are crucial components of God’s love, which he offers to us (Rom. 5:5), it stands to reason that we should think about how to implement them together in a balanced way. It is not always as easy as getting into a playpen with a toddler, and it is not only parents and grandparents who find themselves caught between the opposing demands of mercy and justice. I have been stuck as a teacher. A few years ago, several students in my class on the biblical sanctuary failed to notice that my quiz had questions on the back of the same sheet of paper. When they missed the points, they requested mercy. Since several had done the same thing, I thought mercy was justified on this one occasion as a kind of “warning ticket.” But others, who did not benefit from this mercy, thought I was being unfair. Mercy to one can be injustice to another!
Mercy sounds more “user-friendly,” more warm and fuzzy, but justice is every bit as valuable. What good is mercy if your civil rights are being trampled or you are a victim of crime? In such cases what you want and need is a stiff dose of justice on your behalf.
Here are a few initial guidelines for balancing mercy and justice:
1. Mercy and justice are principles to be implemented as decisions; they are not simply emotions.
2. Do not attempt to give mercy without first taking justice into account. Justice is the standard/rule governing a given situation, which serves as an anchor to keep you from falling over as you extend mercy.
3. Realize that both justice and mercy can be expensive and require toughness to maintain. Justice may require confrontation with an oppressor to free a victimized person from injustice. Mercy can involve giving up something tangible or intangible that you could rightfully claim, writing it off as a loss.
4. Mercy can be an effective form of discipline if the one being disciplined understands the demand of justice and the cost of the gift of mercy.
5. In a group situation, make sure to grant mercy in the same way to everyone, regardless of what they choose to do with it.
6. Pray for wisdom (James 1:5)!
Equal opportunity. Leviticus established a number of equal opportunities in terms of gender, economic position, and social status. Regarding gender, we have already found that sacrifices were for women as well as men. A wellbeing offering could be an animal of either gender (3:1, 6), and the important purification offering of a commoner was required to be a female flock animal (4:28, 32). Later we will investigate a crucial purification offering of a cow to produce ashes for cleansing from corpse contamination (Num. 19). So both genders played roles that were later fulfilled in Christ’s sacrifice (John 1:29).
Paul affirmed: “There is neither . . . male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28). So women and girls can be “living sacrifices” to God along with their brothers in the faith (cf. Rom. 12:1). If we really follow the biblical teaching, the church will lead the way to wholesome equality based on unity rather than getting bogged down with political collisions (“gender benders”).
With regard to economic position, Leviticus 5:1–13 establishes equal-opportunity accountability and expiation for persons of different means. Poor sinners incur the same kind of liability as more well-to-do folks.
Some people may think that they are unknown and insignificant in the congregation or in society, but they are known by God Almighty. And God had them in mind every bit as much as the influential people when he made provision for purification through sacrificial atonement.26
Compare Leviticus 1, where a poor person can bring a burnt offering of a bird (1:14–17) so that “no one was barred from access or from worship on the basis of income or ability.”27
Human society tends to be highly stratified, with large gaps between people who are “important” and those who are insignificant. In Leviticus 4, however, the difference between a chieftain and a commoner has only a minor impact on their purification offerings: male goat versus female goat or sheep. Before the divine King, worldly status shrinks to insignificance. In Israel there are no politics in expiation.
Elsewhere in the Ancient Near East, monarchs played highly significant religious roles.28 But in Leviticus there is no human king of Israel because the setting of this book is before the period of the Israelite monarchy. It is the high priest, not a king, who represents the Israelites before the Lord. Even if there were a king, he would be classed with the other civil leaders, such as the chieftains, and barred from the priesthood (cf. 2 Chron. 26:16–21). By establishing separation of powers between priests and civil leaders, God ensured that monarchs would not be viewed as god-kings like the pharaohs, some rulers of Mesopotamia, and possibly the Hittite emperors. A leader invested both with civil and religious authority wields dangerously excessive power over his people and tends to usurp divine prerogatives.