Throughout the course of our enquiry we have been concerned with the problems of freedom and meaning. In particular, our attention was fixed on how the Enlightenment’s pursuit of progress problematized freedom and led to a loss of meaning. In response to this problem, it was claimed that a bulwark to nihilism was present within the ethical ideal of authenticity. This argument was first posited in Chapter 3, where we offered an initial explanation as to how living authentically provides us with purpose. In order to illustrate that authenticity was best suited to this role, we considered alternative responses as posed by modern, postmodern and pre-modern advocates. Each of the respective theorists whom we considered was shown to construct an ethical ideal in response to the intellectual fallout of the Enlightenment. Having considered these three alternative approaches, and shown them to be wanting with regard to the problem of meaning, our aim will be to draw upon these encounters and develop the socio-existential approach to authenticity in relation to each. The primary purpose of this chapter, however, will be to bring our investigation to a close and justify our claim regarding the importance of authenticity. The aim, therefore, will be to further develop our concept and demonstrate the manner in which authenticity offers a satisfactory resolution to the problem, enabling us to find meaning in freedom.
The first section of this chapter (Section 7.1) will begin with an overview of the alternative responses to the problems of freedom and meaning, as explicated within the previous three chapters. We will then discuss the ways in which our concept of authenticity has developed through engagement with the aforementioned theorists. Here we will reiterate the aspects which we incorporated and further develop these in relation to our concept of socio-existential authenticity. In Section 7.2, we will turn to address the opening question of this book (can authenticity provide a compelling resolution to the problems of freedom and meaning which pervade modern existence?) by explaining how we can find meaning within the freedom created by the Enlightenment. Having provided a defence of our theory, we will then consider some practical problems with authenticity in Section 7.3. Here we will discuss the concern that authenticity has become commodified, and that the pursuit of such an ideal can only end in disillusion or disappointment. A further problem which we will consider is caused by our increased dependence on technology. Namely, as a large percentage of communication is conducted through social media, it will be questioned whether the internet provides an alternative domain within which to achieve authenticity. We will then offer some concluding remarks in Section 7.4, where we will evaluate the success of our socio-existential concept of authenticity and elucidate that which we have determined through our enquiry.
In the previous three chapters, we considered alternative explanations as to that which caused the problems of freedom and meaning and their proposed resolution. The first alternative was Habermas’s modernist approach, which diagnosed the problems to be a consequence of the colonization of the lifeworld. Habermas’s proposal to reverse the encroachment of systems imperatives upon the lifeworld was to increase communicative action through the ethical ideals of self-determination and self-realization. Next, we analysed Foucault’s postmodern account, which claimed discourses of power had come to impinge upon and diminish the autonomy of the individual. His response to such social domination was to engage in self-creation and cultivate the ideal of care. Finally, we addressed MacIntyre’s pre-modern perspective, which offered an ethical post-mortem, claiming that the breakdown of hierarchies has led to the rise of manipulation and the emergence of a culture of emotivism. His suggestion was that the ills of modernity could be overcome through reviving the virtue ethics tradition. However, in each of the aforementioned accounts, we found that although they offered compelling arguments to address the problems of freedom and meaning, their approaches nevertheless left something to be desired.
Habermas was taken to be a representative of modernism for the obvious reason that he sought to continue the Enlightenment’s ‘project of modernity’. His means to achieve this was through increased communicative action, which he believed to be an underdeveloped form of rationality. Through the realization of this strand of rationality, Habermas believed that greater autonomy could be achieved. However, although he recognized unbalanced rationalization had led to decreased freedom and the loss of meaning, his resolution to these problems was shown to be inadequate. Habermas’s attempt to address the colonization of the lifeworld was to increase communicative rationality. This, however, relied upon an unrealistic dualism of system and lifeworld. The problem was that Habermas believed power could be restricted to systems. Furthermore, his emphasis on the priority of the right over the good was shown to be inconsistent and led to a performative contradiction, as any concept of right necessarily depends upon a preconceived notion of good. As a consequence, if good has precedence, and Habermas attempts to form his conception of the good through the notion of ‘right’, then this results in the situation that his notion of ‘right’ is unfounded and incapable of setting the limits for self-realization. Thus, not only is Habermas’s account subject to a performative contradiction but it is also unable to directly address the problems of freedom and meaning.
Foucault’s account was viewed as postmodern, for the reason that he rejected the project of modernity and attempted to go beyond it, attempting to overcome the problems it produced. Although the Enlightenment’s aim was to increase freedom through rationalization, Foucault argued that those very institutions which were built upon a rational foundation have ironically come to dominate subjects through the discourse of power. The ultra-radical conception of power, which he was shown to espouse, not only ‘subjected’ agents but consequently also stifled their ability to live a meaningful existence. Although Foucault suggested the Stoic-inspired ‘care of the self’ as a resolution to this form of social control, his response did not provide a substantial account of how one can live a meaningful life. His resolution, rather, is to engage in the aesthetic practice of self-creation, crafting our lives into a work of art. This ideal, however, was argued to be but an empty aesthetic, which, devised entirely by the subject, was devoid of intersubjective meaning.
MacIntyre offered a pre-modern response to the extent that he attempted to revive a philosophical framework which existed prior to the Enlightenment. In his account, modern moral discourse has become unintelligible because thinkers of the Enlightenment deconstructed the frameworks within which ethical concepts made sense. Furthermore, the loss of a shared good has led to a culture of emotivism and the rise of instrumental reasoning. That is, as a consequence of lacking a universal good, our moral decisions have become based on our emotions, and we consciously, and without moral quandary, treat others as a means to an end, rather than as an end in themselves. MacIntyre’s solution to these problems was to revive the virtue tradition and re-imbue society with a new telos. In order to provide a new shared social standard, his suggestion was to reintroduce virtue ethics through the notions of practices, narrative and tradition. This would address the problem of freedom by restoring teleology, the loss of which led to these problems. With regard to the problem of meaning, MacIntyre enables the individual to find fulfilment through the concept of narrative quest. Out of the three considered theorists, he offers the most fully developed response to the problem of meaning. However, his approach was deemed to be ultimately unrealistic. The reason why MacIntyre’s account is incapable of being enacted is because it rests upon an inaccurate account of the distinction between pre-modernity and modernity. Furthermore, his concept of tradition, which underpins his virtue theory, leads to the pessimistic conclusion that the necessary conditions are no longer present.
Having discussed the three alternative resolutions to the modern problems of freedom and meaning, we are now in a better position to address the question which motivated this enquiry: Does appeal to the ideal of authenticity provide a satisfactory response to the problems of modernity? Before addressing this question, it will be necessary to first expand on that which we have learnt through our engagement. Although we have argued that each of the alternative accounts offers an insufficient response to the problems of freedom and meaning, our analysis is not to be entirely negative. On the contrary, there are lessons to be learnt and benefits to be derived from each of our encounters. The greatest concepts are not those which develop in isolation, but those which are forged and tempered through external engagement. As Nietzsche aptly puts it, ‘the very reason [the Greeks] got so far is that they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where others had left it’ (1998: 30). The aspects which we have drawn out, and intend to integrate, are Habermas’s engagement with the colonization thesis, Foucault’s concept of social domination in terms of power and MacIntyre’s notion of narrative quest. Having made our intentions explicit, we shall now turn to explicating these positive experiences and to illustrating how they help to develop our concept of authenticity.
From engagement with Habermas it was claimed that his attempt to reverse the colonization of the lifeworld would provide us with the continued possibility to live authentically. In particular, we will focus on his ‘colonization thesis’, which diagnosed a central concern of contemporary capitalist society. This was the suggestion that economic and administrative models of the systems sphere have begun to colonize the public and private realms of the lifeworld sphere. As Habermas explains, ‘in the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration even in those areas where a consensus-dependent coordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake’ (1987: 196). Put simply, institutions and practices which were not previously economically orientated have become dominated by, and directed towards, the acquisition of capital. This problem is one which is all too familiar to anyone involved within the arts and humanities, where practices which ought to be pursued for their own end have been restricted by and subjected to bureaucratic ‘blue sky thinking’.1
This insight is valuable insofar as it has conceptualized a phenomenon which many of us can recognize yet may be unable to articulate. In what way, however, can this be said to contribute towards our concept of authenticity? Habermas’s insight, that various aspects of public and private life are being transformed by economic and managerial imperatives, enables us to preserve the domains within which authenticity can be realized. It also leads us to take the criticism seriously, that authenticity as an ideal has become commoditized. As mentioned earlier, colonization entails that those practices which ought to be pursed for their own good have been subjected to economic and bureaucratic standards. This then raises the question of whether our concept of authenticity is also subject to these very demands. Although Habermas’s account offers a resolution to this problem, our rebuttal of his response requires that we demonstrate how the account of authenticity developed here is capable of circumventing this issue. This concern, however, will be taken up in the following section, where sufficient space can be dedicated to such an undertaking.
Through our analysis of Foucault, we determined that the most beneficial aspect of his account is his treatment of power, which, unlike Habermas, accepts that power is to be found within all spheres. Foucault’s perspective entails that institutions exert their influence through discourse, and that this acts as an external force which simultaneously produces the subject. As he himself puts it, ‘Power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production’ (1991a: 194). Our analysis of Foucault argued that although his early work offers an ultra-radical concept of power, within which the subject is dominated and produced, within his later work he employs a subtler concept of power. Attempting to overcome the subjection which discourse impinges upon agents, Foucault argues that we can do so through care of the self. However, the concept of power which he operates under is not ultra-radical, but, as Lukes claims, ideological power. In what way, then, can this understanding of power be beneficial to our concept of authenticity?
This understanding of power relations enables us to better understand those externally imposed values which we associate with inauthentic existence. That is, we can understand the social subjugation/pressure to conform perpetuated by das Man as a form of ideological power exercised over us. Thus, rather than simply ‘inauthentic’, we can more accurately claim that the inability to achieve self-actualization is a consequence of externally applied power. Aside from a diagnostic tool, by which we can determine why one’s existence is inauthentic, what other benefits are there of endorsing this concept of power? Thinking of authenticity in terms of power also permits us to conceive of the self beyond our immediate, concrete social situation. In particular, it allows us to better understand how we conduct ourselves and are shaped online. In contemporary society, many of our social interactions and communication are conducted through social media. And as the internet provides an alternative platform for social interaction, it also exists as a potential platform for domination. We will, however, reserve this discussion until Section 7.3, where we will address the question of how power shapes so cial media, and consequently, our virtual selves.
The aspect which we shall derive from our engagement with MacIntyre is his concept of narrative. According to this idea, whenever we attempt to make sense of our lives, we do so through the construction of narratives. In this way, our previous actions and achievements are incorporated into and interpreted as a unified whole which contributes towards our current understanding of our selves. Everything we have done in our life seems to point towards our current project. What if our project fails? Do we lose our identity? According to MacIntyre, this failed project is assimilated into our next narrative; that is, ‘the narrative in terms of which he or she at first understood and order experiences is itself now made into the subject of an enlarged narrative’ (2006a: 5). Thus, when we engage in self-reflection, we always do so within a narrative framework. Through this manner of understanding, we come to think of our lives as directed towards a particular end, which MacIntyre terms ‘narrative quest’. However, for MacIntyre, the end which one pursues is not previously known. Rather, it is only through the quest that one comes to understand oneself. As he explains, ‘it is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood’ (2010: 219).
What is it, in particular, that we intend to integrate into our own approach from MacIntyre’s account? MacIntyre’s concept of narrative unity offers us a valuable metaphor by which to understand one’s authentic self. That is, through the notion of narrative one can explain how one gives unity to one’s past projects, by interpreting them as contributing towards one’s current project. With our example of the authentic academic, it was not taken to be one’s individual essence. That is, we do not introspect and discover our attributes as an academic; rather, we interpret our past choices and various projects retrospectively and form them into one intelligible whole. MacIntyre’s account of narrative quest also correlates with the dimension of ‘becoming what one is’, insofar as one does not necessarily know what one is to become, and in this way avoids arbitrary choice. That is, one’s choice is not arbitrary because it is not chosen in a vacuum but arises out of circumstance. The concept of narrative can thus further explain where our understanding of ourselves comes from.
7.2 Finding meaning in freedom
Now that we have illustrated why the alternative approaches are insufficient, and the manner in which these encounters have helped shape our concept of authenticity, we may continue to address the question raised at the outset of our intellectual voyage. Namely, we will proceed to demonstrate that the concept of authenticity provides a satisfactory resolution to the problem of meaning. The problem was that increased freedom, which was pursued by the Enlightenment, not only liberated one from metaphysical and social restraints but simultaneously also diminished any prior sense of purpose. The increase of rationality then confined us within a Weberian iron cage, restricting our freedom and ability to exist in any genuine sense. Regardless of narrative – whether through loss of social goals or natural telos – meaning is not externally offered, but must be subjectively sought within our intersubjective context. Before we address this question, by determining the means by which we achieve purpose, it will be beneficial to first recap on our concept of authenticity.
Thus far construed, our concept of socio-existential authenticity is comprised of six dimensions. Insofar as we rejected possession of an inner essence to be discovered through introspection, we determined that the first dimension to offer the means of attaining authenticity was choice. After discussing the implications of choice, it was illustrated that in order for one’s choice to be meaningful, that a second necessary condition was that of commitment. The third dimension arose in response to the problem that one might choose and commit to a project which one is incapable of realizing, here it was claimed that this could be avoided through maturity. To address the problem of arbitrary choice of projects, it was upheld that ‘what we are’ emerges immanently, and that we choose to accept or reject this by becoming what one is. This choice of acceptance or rejection is determined by the fact that our choices are only meaningful within intersubjective horizons of significance, and this adds an ethical dimension which we achieve through intersubjective consciousness. Following from this, it was claimed that our possibilities are shaped by historical factors and that authenticity is temporal insofar as it is not a permanently attained state, but is in fact determined by our heritage. As a consequence of adhering to these six dimensions, it was then determined that the individual can conceive of their life as a unified whole, and by thinking of it as possessing an end provides our lives with meaning.
In what way then can our concept of socio-existential authenticity be said to respond to the problems of freedom and meaning? With regard to freedom, within a liberal democracy a new good, which offers a substantive way of life, cannot be posited as a political ideal all should adhere to. The reason is because we ought to respect everyone’s individual autonomy, and to uphold one world view would doubtless lead to oppression. That is, were we to posit a singular substantive good, this would discriminate against those who do not hold the same cultural values, have a different national identity or lack the capacities to realize such an ideal. In a liberal democracy we ought to respect difference and esteem everyone according to their own abilities. As Taylor concisely explains, ‘democracy has ushered in a politics of equal recognition, which has taken various forms over the years, and has now returned in the form of demands for the equal status of cultures and of genders’ (1994: 27). As a consequence, the only guide to action is that which we ourselves ascertain.
That is, because we lack a singular, unified, objective good, which orders our behaviour, there is no external guide, but rather we ought to turn inwards. We are thus confronted with ethical responsibility for our lives, and authenticity provides the most realistic approach to this problem. Thus, although we cannot posit a substantive vision of the good (that one ought to be pious, rational, etc.), we can offer a set of formal conditions, or dimensions, which presents an ethical ideal whilst preserving the individual’s freedom to choose. That is, through living an authentic existence we can achieve freedom, rejecting the social shackles imposed upon us, and determine our values for ourselves.
As for the problem of meaning, in Chapter 3 a preliminary account was given to explain the manner in which our socio-existential approach could address this prob lem. Here we claimed that these combined dimensions led to a unified sense of self which brought one’s projects together. Offering the example of an authentic academic, we claimed that through the dimension of choice we do not have to accept a way of life which others have determined for us. With regard to commitment, our project must be that which we are committed to achieving. As for maturity, we must be physically and mentally capable of achieving our goal. By becoming what one is, we are then capable of avoiding arbitrary choice. Intersubjective consciousness prevents us from forming a project which is ethically undesirable. Through heritage our choices are historically bound. A consequence of adhering to each of these dimensions is that our project becomes meaningful. However, we have since supplemented our account with the additional dimension of MacIntyre’s concept of narrative unity, which enables us to further articulate the notion of unity inherent within authenticity. Understood in this way, the example of an authentic academic is a consequence of narrative; that is, we have interpreted our choices, heritage, what we are, etc., to point to this particular project.
Our concept of socio-existential authenticity is therefore capable of addressing the problem of freedom and meaning. We can engage with the loss of freedom by rejecting externally applied values and conceptions of the good imposed upon us. That is, rather than living in accordance with tradition or convention, for no other reason than it is socially endorsed, we ought to critically analyse such values. Our concept of authenticity also offers a satisfactory response to the loss of meaning, which was induced by the loss of natural teleology, by advocating the construction of individual projects. That is, rather than offering an objective good which everyone can adhere to, we claimed that the individual is tasked with determining the good for themselves. Having explicated the way in which our modified concept of socio-existential authenticity addresses the problem of freedom and meaning, we will now consider it in relation to the alternative theories considered in the preceding chapters. Here we will illustrate the manner in which authenticity overcomes the problems the previous three approaches encountered, and the way in which authenticity can be said to offer a better approach to the problems of freedom and meaning.
In our analysis of Habermas, it was illustrated that he acknowledges the problems caused by the failure of the Enlightenment and actively attempts to resolve them by developing communicative rationality. However, although he acknowledges that freedom and meaning have been problematized by modernity, it is the loss of autonomy which maintains his focus. One consequence of prioritizing the loss of autonomy, caused by the colonization of the lifeworld, at the expense of the loss of meaning, is that he attempts to posit a rational foundation for morality, as opposed to focusing on a concept of the good. However, it was determined that his theory depends upon a prior conception of the good. A further implication is that his discourse ethics fails to address the problem of meaning. Our concept of authenticity, however, did not encounter this problem. Rather than beginning with a context-less, rational-based, moral theory, authenticity instead offers a new good, insofar as it implores the individual to realize their life for themselves. In this way, we prioritized ethics, and since ethics is an intersubjective, collaborative endeavour, which is bound by social norms, we realize our authentic self through our interactions with others.
In engagement with Foucault, it was determined that he rejected the Enlightenment as a failed project, and that the rational institutions it established had ironically limited freedom. To recover a sense of subjectivity, he emphasized the reintroduction of the ethic of ‘care’ as a way of responding to the problem of power. Although Foucault offers an ethical ideal in response to the loss of freedom, his ethic of care lacks the context to make choice meaningful. That is, despite his injunction to cultivate oneself into a work of art, which provides a sense of unity, the grounds of one’s choice are still ultimately arbitrary. Thus, although he could be considered to address the problem of meaning through turning one’s life into an oeuvre, the choice of how to construct one’s life is one which is fundamentally meaningless. Our theory of authenticity, on the other hand, offers unity through the Nietzschean ideal of ‘becoming what one is’ and narrative. That is, because choice is something which arises unconsciously and which we ourselves give shape to through interpretation, it is not an arbitrary action. The dimension of intersubjective consciousness ensures one’s choice does not negatively impinge upon other’s attempts to attain authenticity, which Foucault’s aesthetic approach is unable to prevent.
MacIntyre provides the most formidable challenge to authenticity in that his account adequately addresses the problems of freedom and meaning. Recognizing that the Enlightenment led to a loss of natural teleology, MacIntyre attempts to construct a new telos to remedy the negative implications caused by the pursuit of autonomy. In order to develop his social teleology, he relies upon a tripartite concept of virtue (practices, narrative and tradition). However, it was demonstrated that his concept of tradition is ultimately informed by nostalgia. Rather, than attempting to restore teleology, our approach was instead to accept our socio-existential condition and to face the consequences. That is, the authentic approach was to recognize that a single, objective conception of the good cannot be restored, and to do so would impinge upon the democratic right to equality, and the subsequent ability to freely choose one’s mode of existence. Although the most ideal resolution may be to reinstate an objective goal, this is simply something which cannot be achieved within our current cultural climate. Thus, what we can conclude is that our concept of authenticity provides the best response to the problem of freedom and meaning out of those considered.
7.3 Can one be authentic within contemporary society?
Although we have defended our theory, and demonstrated the manner in which our concept of authenticity is capable of addressing the problems of freedom and meaning, we will now turn to address some practical problems which do not need to be solved, but do pose problems. That is, we will consider concrete problems which are not necessary for the maintenance of our socio-existential approach, but which deserve attention. Two particular problems will be raised: (i) whether authenticity has been commodified and (ii) whether the internet provides us with an alternative domain to realize our authentic selves. We will begin this section by readdressing a concern first raised in Chapter 3, that authenticity, which was initially a reaction against the commodification of society, has itself been subjected to this very form of commodification.
In the previous section, we stated that a potential problem of the colonization of the lifeworld was that authenticity itself had become commodified. The argument that authenticity has been assimilated into capitalism has also been made by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello.2 In The New Spirit of Capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello argue that the reciprocal shaping of authenticity and capitalism is evident within managerial literature. More generally, they analyse the dynamic relation between capitalism and critique and determine that recent transformations in capitalism have been accompanied by ideological changes. These changes led to the emergence of new ‘spirits’ which are comprised of alternative configurations of autonomy, authenticity, security and the common good.3 Through their analysis of managerial texts, they determine that capitalism has to date taken three particular forms.
The first spirit of capitalism that Boltanski and Chiapello present was prevalent in the late nineteenth century and was epitomized by the bourgeois entrepreneur and the family business. The form of the common good and sense of security which were espoused centred on economic propensities, including avarice, saving and the tendency to rationalize daily life, and traditional domestic predispositions, such as lineage, and patriarchal relations with employees to ensure subordination (2005: 17). However, the critique of bourgeois morality – good manners and doing what was done – and the domination of cultural institutions led to the development of the second spirit of capitalism. In the 1930s the family business and entrepreneur came to be replaced by the bureaucratized industrial firm and the character of the manager. The common good of the industrial firm was achieved through the solidarity of the institution and pursuit of social justice through collaboration between large firms and the state. Workers were afforded security in the second spirit through the emphasis on long-term planning and the very size of the organization, which offered job security and career prospects (2005: 18).
The third spirit which emerged was that of ‘network capitalism’, and which was fuelled by a ‘connexionist’ logic: that professional development is to be achieved through connections. In reaction to authoritarian, unadaptable and attached employees who prefer security, network capitalism instead favours enthusiastic, flexible, autonomous workers who can lead authentic lives by engaging in projects and maintaining networks (2005: 112–19). The ideal which modern individuals are expected to cultivate is accurately encapsulated by Hans J. Pongratz and G. Günter Voß’s concept of the ‘entreployee’ (Arbeitskraftunternehmer) (2003: 239–54). What the concept of entreployee entails is an employee who is required to understand their abilities as commodities which require entrepreneurial development. Whilst the previous two spirits offered security, the third instead offers freedom to pursue one’s own end. Instead of a hierarchy there is an emphasis on working with others in projects, making connections and acquiring abilities to improve one’s employability as a form of personal capital.
The emergence of this ‘new spirit of capitalism’, we are told, was a consequence of the aesthetic critiques of capitalism’s massification of the subject.4 This criticism entails that material reproduction led to a mass society bereft of difference. The consequence is that ‘human beings are standardized and lose all particularity, all difference, when they are assembled in a crowd’ (2005: 439). Thus, it is not only products which have become mass-produced but human beings have also been subjected to these same conditions through the externally cultivated desire for consumption. As Boltanski and Chiapello explain, there is no longer any relevant distance between my desire for some particular object and someone else’s desire for an identical object’ (2005: 439). This concern of massification can also be illustrated through the examples of workers on a production line, or infantry soldiers on the front line, each of whom fulfils the same role as their colleagues and can be easily replaced.
The new spirit of capitalism, however, responded to this demand for differentiation and demassification by internalizing this critique. Capitalism achieved this by incorporating the demand for authenticity into its own specific mechanisms through commodification. As Boltanski and Chiapello explain, ‘hearing the demand expressed by the critique, entrepreneurs seek to create products and services which will satisfy it, and which they will be able to sell’ (2005: 441–2). The intended outcome, then, was to dispel massification by producing and providing products and services which are not mass-produced, but possess difference and are deemed ‘authentic’. In order to achieve this aim, entrepreneurs turned their attention to certain qualities of human beings and goods that had hitherto remained outside of the commodity sphere. Furthermore, they employed a method of codification which involves discovering and reproducing the distinctive features which make a product authentic. The consequence of this search for authentic products then led to the commodification of tourism, cultural activities, personal services and leisure, as can be seen through the anti-tourism movement.5
Thus far, Boltanski and Chiapello’s diagnosis seems to correlate with Habermas’s colonization thesis, that certain relationships with others and other’s very mode of being has been assimilated into capitalism. However, Boltanski and Chiapello argue that the commodification of authenticity possesses a paradoxical character. Namely, in order to profit from human qualities, products have to be manufactured in a way which removes them from the context which made them authentic in the first place. As they explain, ‘on the one hand, to earn the label “authentic” these goods must be drawn from outside the commodity sphere, from what might be called “sources of authenticity”’ (2005: 443). This, however, is problematic because once an instrumental end is introduced, such as profit, then the phenomenon no longer continues to be authentic.
Furthermore, since consumers demand authentic products, and commodities which are offered fail to be authentic as soon as they are introduced into the commodity sphere, any such attempt can only result in failure for the producer and discontent for the consumer. As Boltanski and Chiapello elucidate, ‘simply by virtue of the fact that to ensure their commodification these goods must be reproduced and copied, while undergoing a process of coding and calculation of profitability, they are bound to disappoint’ (2005: 445). The failure of this attempted assimilation then casts a shadow of suspicion over authenticity. Namely, ‘how can we know if some particular thing, event or feeling is the expression of the spontaneity of existence, or the result of a premeditated process aimed at transforming an “authentic” good into a commodity? Similarly, how can we tell if a particular author is an “authentic” rebel or an “editorial” product?’ (2005: 446).
As a consequence of the failure of capitalism to fully incorporate authenticity, a deep seated distrust of authenticity has ensued. One can no longer tell if public figures are truly how they present themselves, or whether their marketing team has determined that the persona they portray is one which resonates with the youth, and as such, is capable of acquiring a greater fan base and thus profit. Furthermore, due to the emphasis on making connections and networking, one is unable to decidedly determine whether a colleague or client is a true friend or simply seeking to increase their contacts. The consequence, in Boltanski and Chiapello’s account, is that the attempt to assimilate these criticisms has led to high levels of anxiety and frequent cycles of enchantment and disenchantment regarding the authenticity of individuals and products.
Susanne Ekman takes Boltanski and Chiapello’s argument one step further by arguing that authenticity is exploited not only by management and organizations but also by the employees. Agreeing that the demand for authenticity heightens anxiety and worker vulnerability, Ekman claims employees also exploit the connexionist logic as a means of pursing authenticity. In her own words, ‘while managers emphasized that employees should provide personal authenticity to serve commercial concerns, the employees emphasized, in turn, that they would only pursue commercial concerns in a context of authenticity’ (2013: 307). This leaves mangers and organizations vulnerable because they are required to accommodate workers whom they depend upon for their competitive advantage.
Although authenticity has been assimilated into the capitalist engine, even if it has not been fully incorporated, it nevertheless raises concerns whether individuals are indeed authentic. However, Ekman’s extension of this enquiry could be seen to provide a counter-argument to the claim that authenticity has been commodified. By illustrating that employees put self-development before commercial concerns, Ekman’s analysis suggests a resistance to commodification. That is, the refusal of employees to relegate their pursuit of authenticity to commercial ends demonstrates the importance of authenticity in their lives. Thus, although Boltanski and Chiapello’s position stresses that authenticity has been hollowed out, Ekman illustrates that people nevertheless pursue it. A further criticism of Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis, made by Armand Hatchuel, is that its focus on managerial literature is too narrow. Hatchuel’s criticism is that it does not tell us anything about capitalism itself, but simply demonstrates what people who write about management literature think about management (Leca and Naccche 2008: 616).
This second argument could be challenged by Somogy Varga’s extension of Boltanski and Chiapello’s argument, that capitalism has appropriated authenticity, and which he develops in line with Charles Guignon’s focus on self-help literature. Varga agrees with Boltanski and Chiapello to the extent that authenticity, ‘an idea once used to question the legitimacy of hierarchical institutions and to critique the power of capitalistic requirements, now seems to function as an institutionalized demand on subjects that matches the systematic demands of contemporary capitalism’ (2012: 127–8). For Varga the relationship between authenticity and capitalism has become paradoxical because ‘the same intentional process of institutional realisation that has led to normative progress now runs counter to its original aim’ (2012: 147). Thus, although the concept of authenticity initially provided a critical response to hierarchical institutions and capitalist requirements, it no longer appears to fulfil this function.
The problem for Varga is that the reciprocal shaping of capitalism and authenticity has led to the development of a ‘performative model’ of authenticity, within which employability is a by-product of self-fashioning. As he explains, ‘in the performative model of authenticity, difference is not the by-product of an autonomous life but the primary source of both authenticity and market value’ (2012: 134). Focusing on self-help guides, Varga illustrates how these motivational manuals combined the quest for authenticity with management strategies.6 Namely, we are urged to ‘take stock of our assets’ and taught to employ techniques of self-marketing and personal branding to achieve authenticity. Here, however, the narrative is maintained that adherence to these ideals does not change our character but leads to a discovery of who we truly are. That is, ‘creating an authentic “personal brand” is not considered an adjustment of one’s personality to external market requirements but as a part of oneself’ (2012: 134). Moreover, we are assured that distinction is the reason for success, since it makes us stand out from the competition. In this way, then, authenticity becomes bound to performance, since it is in performing the act of differentiation that our authentic self supposedly lies.
However, this ‘performative model’ of authenticity which emerged contains an inner tension because it was developed by combining two competing means of achieving authenticity. As Varga explains, ‘both the idea of being true to something given – detected by introspection – and the productionist idea of choosing from different identities from a pool of possibilities have become moulded into the performative model of authenticity’ (2012: 135). This tension between introspection and self-creation turns the performative model into something which is not only contradictory but also impossible to achieve, and which Varga claims leads to mental fatigue. As he exclaims, ‘the attempt to fulfil the institutional demand for authenticity (to permanently perform and to put the self and emotions to work in order to secure employability) creates the social preconditions which lead to the exhaustion of the self’ (2012: 149). One’s authentic self only exists in the performance of difference, and as such, one’s authentic self must be continuously created. ‘If it is the performance of the uniqueness of my self that confers worth to my self, and if the significance of my uniqueness comes from being performed by me at my will, then my strategy of authenticity is self-defeating’ (2012: 151). The reason why it is self-defeating is because the very attempt to perform by creating difference not only leads to exhaustion but also leads to depression, which Varga suggests has become the other of the contemporary demand for authenticity.
Varga’s analysis could be challenged on the grounds that he focuses upon a popular concept of authenticity as developed within self-help books. This is problematic because, as argued in Section 3.2, the notion of ‘authenticity’ which these propose is a generic approach which is designed to appeal to a mass audience. Whilst adherence to this concept can account for rises in diagnosed cases of depression, the performative model goes against one of the defining features of authenticity, that it is an end in itself. Thus, although this concept may have been endogenized by capitalism, it seeks the end of employability through performance, as opposed to living an authentic existence. As with Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis, any attempt to commoditize authenticity ultimately ends in inauthenticity. As for the concern of exhaustion through performance, on our account, which is aligned with self-creation, one does not necessarily need to engage in constant recalibration of character to remain authentic. Rather, it is only necessary to engage in self-adjustment when social circumstances change and the conditions which permitted one to be authentic in the first place have been eroded.
A further response to Varga would be to suggest that his approach is overly critical. That is, the constant critique of commodification leads to a perspective of doom and gloom, that it is a problem which can never be resolved. In the analysis that commodification is constantly attempting to assimilate authenticity, one could simply respond that everything can be commodified, and that is just how commodification works. We must acknowledge that at this stage in history, commodification is a problem which modernity sensitizes us to. However, whilst commodification is a potent danger – we can claim, as Ekman has illustrated, that authenticity provides a counterweight. Thus, rather than remain constantly critical as Varga’s position entails, we ought to remain eternally vigilant. That is, although commodification is not a fundamental problem, it still poses a persistent threat, and as such, we simply need to be aware of the dangers.
Although we cannot claim that authenticity has been successfully incorporated into capitalism, the problem of commodification nevertheless remains. The consequence of the role of authenticity within a connexionist world leads to anxiety and a general distrust of authenticity, and from an emphasis on the performance of difference the threat of exhaustion and depression emerges. Thus, through Boltanski and Chiapello, and Varga’s analysis of attempts to assimilate authenticity into capitalism, as reflected within managerial literature and self-help guides, we have been led to the understanding of the dangers which authenticity is vulnerable to. In order for our socio-existential concept of authenticity to be successful, we must be able to avoid these concerns. However, since the emphasis on networking and performance is something which is beyond our control, the best we can do is to acknowledge these problems so that we ourselves do not fall prey to them.
If authenticity is subjected to systems imperatives and capitalism’s demands, then perhaps we ought to seek out an alternative domain within which to live authentically? Within contemporary society, an increasing amount of communication and social interaction is conducted virtually. That is, relationship building and networking is established and developed outside of the classroom and the office, though not in physical locations, but online through social media.7 And as technology develops, it could be speculated that a great deal more of our socializing will be relocated to virtual space. With this in mind, the internet, and in particular, social media could potentially provide us with a commodification-free space to live authentically. Thus, in order to determine whether this is the case, we will now turn our attention to discussing the possibilities of living authentically online through social media.
One interesting feature of social media is that it appears to provide the ideal platform for self-development. This is made explicit by psychologist, Sherry Turkle, in Life on the Screen, where she claims that ‘the Internet has become a significant social laboratory for experimenting with the constructions and reconstructions of self that characterize postmodern life’ (1995: 180). Turkle offers the case study of sixteen-year-old, American student, Audrey, who experiments with different aspects of her personality online. ‘Audrey tries out a “flirty” style. She gets a good response from Facebook friends, and so she ramps up the flirtatious tone. She tries out an “ironic, witty” tone in her wall posts. The response is not so good, so she retreats’ (1995: 192). In Turkle’s account, the internet exemplifies the postmodern phenomenon of multiple identities. This, however, is problematic for our account, as discussed in Section 5.4, since postmodernism emphasizes fragmentation instead of unity. Furthermore, Rahel Jaeggi questions Turkle’s claim regarding the creation of multiple identities and instead argues that the internet does not lead to new kinds of identity formation. Instead, Jaeggi claims that ‘what takes place is not a multiplication of selves but playing with various aspects of an identity’ (2014: 107).
Thus, the supposed reconstruction of life which Turkle associates with the internet, does not necessarily lead to a plurality of selves, but a multitude of possibilities to realize one’s self. Given that this is the case, one ought to question whether it is possible to portray an authentic virtual self. One problem which may appear to hinder such self-projection is whether our online selves are shaped by others’ demands of us, or by ourselves. To extend Foucault’s conception of power to virtual communities, the internet has become a ‘virtual panopticon’ where individuals are constantly observed and regulate their online footprint to conform to popular consensus. As it has been argued that authenticity offers a way beyond the discourses of power which society produces, it seems reasonable to assume that one can also express one’s authentic self on the internet. That is, as social media sites provide a vehicle for creative self-development, it should be possible to cultivate an authentic self online, irrespective of constant surveillance.
Discussion which relates to this question arises within Turkle’s Alone Together, where it is argued that social media sites cause us to perform to an audience. Turkle’s claim is that through social media the self is becoming increasingly externally manufactured, as opposed to internally developed. In Turkle’s account, a consequence of creating something for other’s consumption leads to us playing to an audience, and especially in ways which we imagine our audience to desire. Thus, rather than presenting our true selves, our online presence instead becomes a performance (2010). This, however, differs from Varga’s claim regarding the performative model of authenticity. In Varga’s account, the emphasis is upon performing difference, which emphasizes employability as a by-product of self-fashioning. For Turkle, on the other hand, the notion of performance instead suggests individuals do not portray who they truly are, but what others expect from them.
This issue of performance is not merely problematic in terms of achieving authenticity but, like the performative model in Varga’s account, these attempts to realize one’s true self also lead to psychological deprivation. The reason is because, like Weber’s critique of science, there is no end to the internet, but instead, a perpetual present. The internet presents more possibilities and opportunities to promote ourselves and network with others, but we cannot utilize all of these possibilities. As Mark Dooley elucidates, ‘it is a culture of immediacy in which only the present moment matters. There is no past or future in cyberspace, only a perpetual ‘now’ in which all desires must be instantaneously gratified. It is a no man’s land devoid of the public-private distinction, a spectral sphere where no one can hide, a domain where no one ever sleeps’ (2015: 2). Thus, whilst there are infinite opportunities to develop ourselves, the attempt to keep up with these can only end in fatigue. The internet never rests, but we must.
Our online interactions thus appear to be, for the most part, shaped and determined by others’ expectations of us. By making such demands online, this influences how we conduct ourselves in reality. That is, we document our experiences and attempt to live lives which exceed standard expectations, so that we may convey them to others. In this way, social media produces a new dimension of social and physical reality. Although social media profiles appear to be externally constructed by other’s criticisms and demands, on the socio-existential approach this does not inhibit one from developing an authentic self. The dimension of intersubjective consciousness recognizes that we do not develop in monologue, but that we are shaped by our interactions with others. Thus, the fact that we may develop our virtual selves in accordance with other’s demands is not problematic. What is important is that one does not allow these demands to entirely consume and control one’s virtual self, as with the example of Audrey downplaying her wit to conform to the one-dimensional image which others expect of her.
The primary benefit of the internet is that it allows us to experiment. As Hubert Dreyfus makes explicit, ‘[the internet presents] a new medium for exploring other ways of life, virtual worlds may enable people to learn through safe experimentation which sort of life works best for them’ (2009: 98). Focusing on the virtual world Second Life, Dreyfus enquires into the possibilities of experimentation. Here he determines that there are less consequences to one’s action, and as such, fewer risks. Dreyfus offers the example of virtual relationships, noting that if one breaks up, one does not have to face the person again: ‘one doesn’t have to clean up the mess one leaves. You can always just walk away’ (2009: 100).8 He compares Second Life to a masquerade to the extent that ‘people are disguised and are allowed to do normally forbidden things without adverse consequences for their everyday lives’ (2009: 100). However, Dreyfus determines that although risk-free experimentation may be more exciting, it does not provide serious satisfaction (2009: 101). The reason is precisely because in order to derive true satisfaction, risk must be involved. On the internet, however, where there is nothing ventured, there is nothing to be gained.
Moreover, it could be argued that the benefit of online experimentation is simultaneously its downfall. Namely, the internet encourages us to act without thinking of the consequences. Whilst this permits us to pursue any lifestyle we can conceive of, no matter how deviant, this is only possible because there are no moral boundaries online. As Dooley attests, ‘it is, moreover, a pleasure paradise which facilitates any and all “experiments in living” irrespective of the moral repercussions for those still rooted to the real’ (2015: 3). It is perhaps for this reason that people on social media behave in ways which they would not in real social interactions. We can see the dark side of online experimentation when we conceive of those who, like MacIntyre’s rich aesthetes, manipulate others for their own entertainment, through trolling and cyber-bulling.
Such behaviour is exemplified in the case of Brenda Leyland who ‘trolled’ Madeleine McCann’s family on Twitter. Leyland, a 63-year-old, university-educated mother of two, posted or reposted more than four hundred messages about the McCanns, referring to them as ‘liars’ and ‘profiting from tragedy’ (2018). However, after her information was anonymously passed to a Sky news reporter, who turned up on her doorstep and broadcast her image on television, Leyland took her own life, illustrating remorse regarding her behaviour. A further high-profile case is that of Peter Nunn, a 33-year-old, who aspired to study law at university and was jailed for threatening to rape Stella Creasy MP and Caroline Criado-Perez. Nunn targeted Creasy and Criado-Perez for the trivial reason that they campaigned to have Jane Austen’s image on the Bank of England ten pound note. Nunn directly threatened Creasy: ‘You better watch your back, I’m going to rape your arse at 8pm and put the video all over.’ He also referred to Creasy and Criado-Perez as ‘witches’ and posted appalling tweets such as ‘Best way to rape a witch, try and drown her first then just when she’s gagging for air that’s when you enter’ (2018).
The sort of behaviour elicited within these two examples is certainly not something which could be considered acceptable in any social circumstance. Nevertheless, behind the protection of an anonymous username, people feel free to engage in ethically appalling behaviour, irrespective of the psychological effects which it may have upon others. As Andrew Potter makes explicit, ‘in a sense, what we’re seeing is a great sociological experiment in the slow but steadily corrosive effects of information technology on the private sphere. For all their benefits, digital communications technologies work as a sort of social acid, eating away at the boundaries between public and private and eliminating the established norms of discretion, courtesy, and common sense’ (2010: 162). Thus, whilst social media may provide us with a platform for experimentation to discover our authentic selves, it is subject to the same criticism as we levelled against Foucault’s ethic of care: it is morally bereft. Thus, whilst we can engage in aesthetic cultivation online through self-expression and experimentation, the internet cannot be held morally responsible.
Moral issues aside, it could also be claimed that the attempt to live authentically online is also not free from commodification. The economic impingement upon authenticity can be said to be continued through algorithms which depend upon us accurately portraying who we are online.9 Amazon, for example, makes suggestions based on the products we view and purchase, to entice us into making further purchases. Search engines and social media websites are also connected: if we search for a product on Google, the item then appears advertised in our news feed on Facebook. In these ways, the information which we input enables companies to access their target audience directly. The act of expressing our authentic selves on the internet thus not only leads to increased sales but also provides extremely efficient market research. Here we can see further evidence of Boltanski and Chiapello’s claim that capitalism is adapting the ideal of authenticity. Thus, whilst we may feel motivated to live authentically on the internet, the more we reveal about our true selves, the greater the opportunity for companies to generate profit.
We initially turned to the internet as a domain in which to pursue authenticity and evade commodification. However, it has been determined that the commodification of authenticity is continued through internet-based algorithms. Moreover, not only was it suggested that commodification cannot be evaded online but the conditions for living authentically are actually worse as well. The internet thus seems to pose the same problems of performance of difference, and commodification, but without the reward of risk, and the issue that online behaviour is often morally devoid. Thus, whilst the internet may provide us with a platform for self-discovery and to experiment, it does not appear to be a domain through which to attain authenticity.
In this section, we raised some practical problems which theories of authenticity must contend. Specifically, we considered the problems induced by commodification and the increasing dependence upon social media. However, we have only hinted towards the extent of these issues, and in order to offer a conclusive account, a much more sustained analysis is required. From what our brief survey has suggested, Boltanski and Chiapello, and Varga point out real dangers which all concepts of authenticity are vulnerable to, that commodification does pose a genuine threat to authenticity. However, the realization that any attempt to live a meaningful existence may be impinged upon by capitalism should not be interpreted as a passive response. On the contrary, to confront reality is to cultivate a state of preparedness and a willingness to accept the inevitable. The benefit of heeding these concerns then enables us to live an authentic existence within contemporary modern society, by being aware of the dangers and actively resisting the subordination of authenticity to commercial ends. Thus, whilst we do recognize dangers, which require further engagement, our initial reaction is to remain eterna lly vigilant.
This investigation began with the aim of addressing two specific research questions. First, we set out to determine the manner in which modernity has come to problematize freedom and meaning. Here it was discovered that the unforeseen consequences of the Enlightenment’s pursuit of progress was the loss of objective meaning. Furthermore, that the rational foundations which many modern institutions were built upon have ironically led to decreased freedom. The second research question which we aimed to address was to determine whether the phenomenon of authenticity can provide a satisfactory response to the problems of freedom and meaning. Noting the competing accounts of authenticity, we reviewed contemporary approaches, their contributions and defects, and constructed a socio-existential approach which incorporated aspects from the two major approaches. Having provided a full account of authenticity, we then offered a provisional explanation as to how our concept of authenticity could address the problems of freedom and meaning. This account suggested that one could operate within restricted freedom and acquire intersubjective meaning through pursuit of a maturely conceived project. Although we demonstrated that our concept of authenticity can respond to the problems of freedom and meaning, we then considered three alternative approaches which could be said to address the same concern.
The three approaches we analysed were Habermas’s modernist approach, Foucault’s postmodern perspective and MacIntyre’s pre-modern response to the problems of freedom and meaning. Habermas attempted to resolve these issues by completing the Enlightenment project, Foucault saw rationality as problematic and suggested turning inwards to avoid subjection caused by discourse, and MacIntyre understood modernity as ethically impoverished and attempted to revive the virtue ethics tradition. Each of these accounts, however, was shown to provide insufficient resolutions to the problems of freedom and meaning induced by the Enlightenment. Habermas’s account was shown to be dependent on a preconceived conception of the good, Foucault’s ethic of care lacked a moral filter and MacIntyre’s nostalgia led to an obscured view of modernity and an overly pessimistic position. And although these were deemed to be deficient in terms of meaning, we nevertheless learnt from our engagement. We adopted MacIntyre’s notion of narrative quest and used it to supplement our account; influenced by Habermas, we drew out the implications of the colonization thesis for authenticity, and demonstrated that commodification does appear to pose a threat; and from Foucault, we considered authenticity in terms of power relations, which led us to the realization that the question of identity within a digital age is one which will eventually require further engagement.
What we have determined from our enquiry is that the concept of authenticity is tremendously important to modern individuals, insofar as it provides an ethical ideal by which to orientate our actions and derive a sense of purpose. And although the problems of freedom and meaning could be relinquished by imposing a unified conception of the good, this is simply an unrealistic and unachievable aim, as illustrated by our discussion of MacIntyre’s nostalgic-pessimistic approach. Furthermore, the attempt to continue down the path paved by the Enlightenment, as demonstrated by Habermas’s focus on autonomy and his relegation of ethics, is likewise impeded because it is necessary to possess a prior conception of the good, which this approach is unable to provide us with. We must also attempt to offer an intersubjective account of ethics in order to avoid descending into aestheticism and subjectivism. We do need a conception of the good, though this conception cannot be coercively imposed, but can only be realized by people in plural and individual ways. Insofar as our approach does not deceive itself into engaging in the impossible task of presenting a singular substantive vision of the good, or continuing the failed project of modernity, our socio-existential approach, therefore, provides the most comprehensive account out of those considered.
We have therefore achieved our aim, insofar as we defended our theory, and illustrated how it can respond to the problems of freedom and meaning. However, it was also demonstrated that capitalism and the internet provide practical and social challenges to living authentically. And whilst it is not necessary to resolve these problems to support our theory, these are important issues which require further consideration. With regard to capitalism, the extent to which commodification impedes our ability to live an authentic existence remains to be seen. As for the internet, we merely scratched the surface with regard to whether it makes it easier to be ourselves, and whether we ought to understand it in more positive terms. Both of these issues are wide avenues of enquiry, which deserve further investigation, and whilst we do not have the space or necessity to fully address them here, we have provided a good foundation for future research.
Notes
1 This problem is the focus on Boltanski and Chiapello’s excellent study, The New Spirit of Capitalism, and which will be elucidated in Section 7.3.
2 Boltanski and Chiapello employ the concept of authenticity in a very general sense, incorporating both the subjective self-realization and the genuineness of material objects, as opposed to any specific concept.
3 Hugh Willmott notes that despite developing Weber’s concept of capitalism, as is evident in the title of their text, Boltanski and Chiapello’s concept of ‘spirit’ offers a very different formulation of the same term. See ‘Spirited Away: When Political Economy Becomes Culturalized’, in New Spirits of Capitalism?: Crises, Justifications, and Dynamics, ed. Paul du Gay and Glenn Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
4 This demand for liberation and individuality was manifested in the visual criticisms of bohemian and avant-garde artists, who reacted against the loss of difference by turning their lives into artwork. The Bloomsbury Group, for example, opposed convention and offended Victorian sensibilities through their rejection of sexual taboos. Rather than simply painting or writing about that which was prohibited they instead lived in commune with multiple lovers. Their ‘transgressive’ lifestyle, or unifying every aspect of their life into one whole, became the ideal, and was incorporated as a cog into the capitalist machine.
5 Citizens in Venice have objected on the grounds that tourism is eroding the quality of their life. The main complaint is that the surge in B&B’s, to accommodate tourists, has made it difficult for residents to find homes to rent on a long-term contract. Angela Giuffrida. ‘“Imagine Living with This Crap”: Tempers in Venice Boil over in Tourist High Season’, The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/23/venice-tempers-boil-over-tourist-high-season (accessed 30 January 2018). Opposition to tourism is also premised on the basis that it leads to the impoverishment of the local working class. Although one may conjecture that tourism boosts the local economy, ‘tourist-prices’ in Catalonia and Barcelona have not only increased the cost of living but also led to increased rent which many blue-collar workers are unable to afford. Laurence Peter. ‘“Tourists Go Home”: Leftists Resist Spain’s Influx’, BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40826257 (accessed 30 January 2018).
6 The self-help guides which Varga appeals to include William Arruda’s An Introduction to Personal Branding: A Revolution in the Way We Manage Our Carriers (2003); Peter Horn’s Personal Branding (2004), Christiane Gierke’’s Persönlichkeitsmarketing (2005); and Gitte Härter and Christiane Öttl’’s Selbstmarketing (2005).
7 This is made evident by Shannon Vallor who notes, ‘LinkedIn encourages social relations organized around our professional lives, Twitter is useful for creating lines of communication between ordinary individuals and figures of public interest, MySpace was for a time a popular way for musicians to promote themselves and communicate with their fans, and Facebook, which began as a way to link university cohorts and now connects people across the globe, has seen a surge in business profiles aimed at establishing links to existing and future customers’. See ‘Social Networking and Ethics’, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ethics-social-networking.’ (accessed 14 January 2018)
8 Contrary to Dreyfus, Vallor argues that ‘Facebook, LinkedIn and Google+ would shift away from the earlier online norms of anonymity and identity play, instead giving real-world identities an online presence’. However, Dreyfus’s claim regarding experimentation remains pertinent. See ‘Social Networking and Ethics’, in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ethics-social-networking (accessed 14 January 2018).
9 The extent to which algorithms affect authenticity has been explored by Wendy Hui Kyong Chun who argues that ‘the imperative “be true to yourself”, or more simply “be true”, makes our data valuable – that is, recognizable – across the many media platforms we use’, Twitter.com https://twitter.com/joannekcheung/status/932041231160561665 (accessed 22 November 2017).