Before the Falklands conflict, there was a plan to sell one of the UK CVS carriers to Australia, but the efficacy of the Harriers in that fight put an end to this idea. When the Royal Australian Navy retired its Skyhawks from operational service, several of their pilots moved to the northern hemisphere to become Sea Harrier pilots. Bringing their carrier experience and antipodean humour with them, they fitted in well. One who enjoyed notable success, commanded a Sea Harrier squadron, and saw the transition from FRS1 to FA2, was Dave Baddams. Here, he describes some memorable periods of his RN service. After that, Brian Johnstone gives an insight into the challenges faced by those who looked after the maintenance of the Sea Harriers while embarked. Both Dave and Brian were awarded an MBE for their Harrier service.
DAVE BADDAMS
This story begins when I took over as senior pilot 800 NAS aboard HMS Invincible in Hong Kong during the fleet deployment cruise Orient ’92. My CO on 800 NAS was the very famous and senior Lieutenant Commander David Braithwaite, known as ‘Brave’ since his early days as a naval aviator because it is said he landed a burning Sea Vixen back on board ship rather than risk losing his observer due to an apparently dodgy seat/hatch interconnect on the ejection seat mechanism. He was an avuncular and supportive boss who allowed me much leeway in keeping his squadron on the right path.
My predecessor in post was my guide and mentor for many years. Lieutenant Commander Simon Hargreaves had been my air warfare instructor during my initial Sea Harrier training, and had remained a key figure in my development as an operational fighter pilot in the ensuing years. Both Brave and Simon were incredibly capable fighter pilots and fine leaders, and they provided much inspiration to me in developing my own leadership style.
Orient ’92 was a training cruise, and the opportunity was taken to display British military prowess east of Suez for the first time in many years. We trained and operated with elements of the USN 7th Fleet, Republic of Singapore Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force, Royal Malaysian Air Force, and while I was on board we visited Singapore, Malaysia, UAE and Israel. After arriving home in December 1992 things started to move quickly. In January 1993, HMS Ark Royal and 801 NAS (Lieutenant Commander Tim Mannion) were scrambled for operations in the Adriatic. NATO had taken on a role to police the skies overhead Bosnia/Herzegovina, and to provide support to UN ground forces, should they deploy. Two 800 NAS aircraft were transferred to 801 NAS as reinforcements, along with myself and Lieutenant Bob Nadin.
Due to political constraints, after a very rapid force generation and deployment, the build up to operations screeched to a halt. We were all ready for action, but the authorities were not sure how to apply force in an effort to curtail the brutal civil war on the ground without picking sides…where no side really appeared to be blameless in the competition for brutality. With this delay to action in mind, the reinforcement of 801 NAS was only in place from 11 January – 19 February 1993. There was a clear NATO requirement for fighter cover to provide airspace denial, close air support and reconnaissance, and to that end, Ark was deployed. These were all skills SHAR pilots were trained for, but with the politics in mind, the rate of progress did not enable any notable operations to take place for the entire first deployment of HMS Ark Royal. As soon as the likely delays became apparent to me, as senior pilot of 800 NAS, I fed back to my squadron what areas and techniques needed to be honed, and arranged for my return to the UK in order to participate in the preparations for the deployment of HMS Invincible and 800 NAS planned for July 1993 as a relief for Ark.
There is no doubt that 800 NAS was in a much higher state of preparedness for operations over Bosnia when they sailed in July 1993. Within a few days of arriving on station in the Adriatic, 800 NAS commanded by Lieutenant Commander Chris Neave commenced the first RN fixed-wing operational missions over land since the Falklands War. It was my honour to lead the first mission, an armed reconnaissance sortie, with Lieutenant Jon ‘Chips’ Lawler as my wingman. We flew up to Bihac in the north-western corner of Bosnia where we photographed artillery positions on the road to the south east.
From August 1993 until the end of January 1994, 800 NAS was committed to the NATO mission over Bosnia. 492 operational sorties were planned in that period, and the squadron achieved a 100% sortie success rate. The missions 800 NAS was tasked for were armed reconnaissance, operational close air support, exercise close air support (training of FACs on the ground in theatre) and offensive counter air. The aircraft configuration was varied for each role as appropriate; every mission flying overland was armed and ready to participate should the need arise. As is the nature of modern offensive operations, the political process remained slow. Ground operations were hectic and if they could not be called open warfare between the various factions, it was most certainly bloody conflict involving armed criminality. Throughout Invincible’s initial deployment to the theatre, there was an increasing level of tension calling for air support. The skies were swept clear of most activity although rules of engagement were never relaxed enough to curtail suspect helicopter activity. Everyone knew helicopters were being used for hostile purposes, but it was impossible to differentiate peaceful helicopters supplying aid and emergency services from those carrying arms and soldiers into battle. The answer, despite multiple intercepts and engagements, even at night and high altitude for a helicopter, was to leave them alone.
It was apparent from the increasing tempo of operations that live military activity was very close as Invincible turned for home whilst Ark Royal picked up the baton on behalf of the Royal Navy. 800 NAS had laid the operational leadership and ground work, and placed the whole SHAR force in a thorough state of readiness for what was to come; three further years of watch on stop on carrier deployments in support of NATO during the conflict in Bosnia/Herzegovina.
When the squadron returned to the UK in March 1994 I was appointed to the Naval Flying Standards Flight (Fixed Wing) for a two-year tour. During this time I was able to fly every fixed wing type available to the Fleet Air Arm, and my relationship with the Royal Naval Historic Flight commenced. Major milestones on the way were: monitoring and assisting the RAF Strike Attack OEU on board HMS Illustrious in preparing the Harrier GR7 for embarked duties; providing instructional services and standards oversight to 899 NAS, the Royal Navy’s Sea Harrier training unit; converting to the new Sea Harrier FA2; and as an aside I was lucky enough to fly the venerable and much loved RNHF Swordfish for two display seasons at the same time as re-introducing the beautiful Hawker Sea Hawk jet fighter back into the RNHF for the first time since the mid 1980s.
My next appointment commencing January 1996 was to be my last in the navy, and I felt most honoured to be selected as the senior pilot 899 NAS (Lieutenant Commander Mark Boast). With my background in flying instruction reinforced by the two years at NFSF (FW), it felt like the very best way to spend my final appointment prior to retirement. By 1996 the FA2 was in serious front-line service actively participating in the NATO Orbat, and being on 899 bringing on the next generation of young Sea Harrier pilots was particularly thrilling. The most important aspect of my time at 899 was much more personal though. In January 1997 the naval officers’ appointer approached me, and offered me a continuance of my commission if I accepted an appointment in command of a fighter squadron. To reach this point in my career, and not accept such an offer felt like it would be reading a book without finishing the last chapter. My decision was quick and easy. I agreed to a command and asked which squadron I could have. The appointer said, and I paraphrase, “You say which one you want and I’ll tell you when you start. Then all you’ll need to agree to is at least 2 years in command.” In January 1997, I told the appointer I would like 800 NAS aboard HMS Invincible as my command, and he told me my appointment would commence 26 August 1997.
Joining 800 NAS in command at such a point made it feel like I had personally selected each and every member. Squadron morale was high and team spirit was strong. Invincible was not returning to the Adriatic. For the first time since 1993, the plan was to deploy initially to the Mediterranean for joint operations and training with the RAF, 1(F) Squadron (Wing Commander Mark Leakey) also embarked, and with elements of both the Spanish navy and the Spanish air force. On completion of the Med training, two aircraft from 800 deployed via an air-to-air refuelling tanker trail to China Lake in the USA in preparation for the planned annual AMRAAM firing exercise out of Puerto Rico in early November. The remainder of the squadron sailed for the West Atlantic, bringing the helicopter squadrons for ASW training with the USN while 800 disembarked for a long period of dissimilar air combat training with elements of the US military in Oceana, Cherry Point, and Cecil Field.
Having enjoyed a thoroughly good work up with our 1(F) Squadron shipmates and with the Spanish forces, from day one in training with the United States military, it was apparent that the FA2 was a tremendous multi-role fighter asset, and with AMRAAM it was a world-beating air-to-air machine. Due to the RN/ US military exchange programme, we had a good understanding of the way to work with the Americans, and indeed they were excellent and welcoming hosts. Much mutual benefit was achieved through the many lessons learned as to how to fly and fight with our primary allies.
On completion of training with Cecil Field-based F-18s we were to perform for the base’s final air show prior to closure. This event occurred on the last weekend in October 1997. After a very successful base families day and display practice on the Friday, I was woken relatively early on the Saturday morning by a telephone call from the duty lieutenant commander (DLC) on board our ship, which was now alongside nearby in Mayport, close to Jacksonville in Florida. The message he had was for me to gather in my squadron and return to the ship immediately. The DLC was relatively junior, and I didn’t know him well, so it seemed natural to me that he was being put to the test by other influential parties (like the helicopter squadrons who were not at the air show) so I very politely told him I did not believe him and hung up.
About fifteen minutes later, the phone rang again, and this time it was commander air from the ship. He told me his call was “no duff” and that I mustn’t ask any more questions over the phone, but I seriously had to bring the squadron back to the ship immediately. My squadron chief petty officers were an incredibly fine group of leaders, and once I gave the order everything was arranged and we were on our way within a few hours. The ground party reached the ship in time for lunch with all our deployment packs, and the aeroplanes flew to Mayport that afternoon. The ship sailed with my squadron embarked first thing Sunday morning. Once on board ship we were told the situation in Iraq was developing quickly. Saddam Hussein had evicted the UN inspectors looking for evidence of WMD, and the Security Council had agreed to deploy forces in order to re-affirm the international commitment to the containment of Iraq’s military threat to its neighbours.
HMS Invincible sailed at speed with the initial destination planned to be Gibraltar where we would store ship for a major military deployment and embark the 1(F) Squadron ground party. There were several false starts as political activity reached frenzied levels and we found ourselves bouncing around the Atlantic for quite a few days as the allied governments postured and negotiated. During this period, I witnessed a feat of great bravery based on the operationally essential act of bringing the two aircraft detached for the planned Sea Harrier OEU AMRAAM shoot back to Invincible. Two excellent pilots, Lieutenant Commander Bill Dean of the SHAR OEU and Lieutenant David Lindsey, one of my junior officers, flew the aircraft on a multi-leg return to ship procedure leaving Puerto Rico early 2 November 1997. In launching from their final island staging post bound for the ship, they had no communications for nearly a day and had to fly to a rendezvous position hundreds of miles from land in any direction, completely dependent on the ship being where it said it would be when they left Puerto Rico early in the morning. They arrived safely on board late in the afternoon 2 November having completed an over-water leg of more than 800 nautical miles without any diversion or landing options other than the ship. The ship eventually arrived in Gib for a one-day visit 17 November 1997. Storing ship was completed very quickly and the ship sailed into the Med so as to enable 1(F) to embark.
My friend Wing Commander Mark Leakey was in charge at 1(F), and he came aboard raring to go. He insisted on night flying immediately on arrival, and this led to an unfortunate accident on their very first night on board. One aircraft was lost, and the pilot, Mark himself, was very lucky to survive. Nevertheless we pressed on with training and preparations as our new instructions came out, ‘poise for action in the western Mediterranean’.
We practised heavily both internally with 1(F) and at Decimomannu in Sardinia, and the ship also sailed into the Adriatic where we performed useful operational missions over Bosnia. This programme of poise was maintained for close to two months. HMS Invincible (Captain James Burnell-Nugent) was ordered through the Suez Canal 18 January 1998. The first time a British carrier had deployed for operations east of Suez since the Aden withdrawal during the 1960s.
Operation Bolton, the British contribution to the allied containment of Saddam Hussein’s regime, commenced with a night mission over Iraq 29 January 1998. A four-ship of FA2s escorted a four-ship of GR7s from 1 Squadron, and we were in a combined formation of over seventy-five aircraft mostly from the USS George Washington air group. Our recent travels to America really paid off, with our formations integrating seamlessly with the American embarked forces.
Invincible/800 NAS/1(F) stayed on station in the northern Arabian Gulf, carrying out both day and night sweeps most days in February 1998 and flowing into March. The tempo of operations increased as a showdown drew close. At night, it was easy to see our presence was opposed with occasional ground fire and missile launches observed. There was a brief respite around 23 February, when forces withdrew and an ultimatum was delivered to the Iraqi government by the UN Secretary General himself: “Re-admit my weapons inspectors or a bombing campaign will commence”. Within a few days a tentative settlement was reached, and whilst the tempo of operations remained, the level of clear opposition declined. At that point, Illustrious steamed into view with our brothers of 801 NAS on board, and 3(F) Squadron. After a three-months training cruise had extended to a six-month operational deployment, Invincible and her reinforced air group turned for home. 18 March 1998, the squadron disembarked to Akrotiri in Cyprus. The ground party was picked up in a chartered airliner, and the Sea Harriers launched on the long tanker trail to Yeovilton, all arriving home to a rousing family and base welcome at sunset that same day.
After a period of leave, 800 NAS was back to work with normal peacetime training requirements. There was a period where we had two aircraft and support crews in Sardinia performing flight trials with the Sea Harrier OEU, two aircraft and crews on board with a pair of BAe development aircraft trialling new systems for the SHAR JTIDS upgrade, and two aircraft ashore undergoing maintenance.
When the squadron was all together, we participated in NATO exercises, were with the ship for a joint maritime course in the North West Approaches, went on a fantastic port visit to Gdynia in Poland, and topped off a busy year acting as red air for a tactical leadership programme exercise in the south of France.
Just prior to Christmas 1998 the commander of the UK Task Group (COMUKTG) notified me that a plan to visit the West Atlantic was confirmed, and that despite increased military tension and activity over Iraq, we would definitely not be deploying for a further period of operations over southern Iraq. My Christmas message to the squadron was to enjoy a safe and happy break with their families and to return at the end of leave ready for embarkation within a week. To that end, the squadron was fully ready to deploy prior to the Christmas leave period, and yet again we were at a very high state of operational readiness.
The day after the squadron departed on Christmas leave, the COMUKTG duty officer requested a full recall because the ship’s plan had indeed been changed to return to the northern Arabian Gulf early in the second week of January. I had discussed the likelihood of such an event with Captain Burnell-Nugent and with my planning team, but the young officer seemed completely taken aback when I informed him we were ready to deploy immediately, so I would not recall my squadron because as soon as the ship actually set course for Iraq, we would be on board. In the meantime, I wanted my team to get a good break after a busy year.
This deployment to the NAG was much more planned than 1998. We left UK waters around 10 January 1999 and planned to leave the Arabian Gulf 29 March 1999. Operations in cooperation with the United States forces deployed in the region were planned throughout February and March. These operations included the aggressive containment of Saddam Hussein’s forces with hostile activities observed and suppressed on a regular basis. The Sea Harrier role was exclusively offensive and defensive counter air, and in this role the RAF VC10 tanker force played a crucial part.
There were many memorable activities and occasions. Two come to mind, of which one became an apocryphal story, and the other was simply funny. The first instance was after a short break in Dubai, the ship was proceeding to our station off Kuwait, and I led a four-ship of my more junior pilots on a currency and orientation sortie to practise our four-ship fighter sweep tactics. After about half an hour of training, one of the young officers notified me on the chat frequency that he was hearing us being called on the international guard frequency. I switched to guard and identified my formation to a local national air traffic controller, and told him we were okay operating in international air space with due regard for other traffic because we had guidance from our ship’s air traffic controllers, and we were also very capably equipped with our own on-board radars.
The local controller was quite clearly an expatriate British officer, and on hearing my call he became agitated. He threatened to launch a pair of armed F-16s to engage us and drive us out of his airspace. My response was polite and clear. I asked him where he would like us to move to, and he aggressively gave us a vector north 100 miles. Following that instruction would have taken us out of international airspace and placed us in Iranian skies. My next statement on guard was along the lines of, “We’ll be finished here in an hour. We will not be flying into Iranian airspace, and if you wish to launch F-16s to drive us off we would love to see them. You should advise your fighters that we are armed and awaiting their arrival.” Now whilst he didn’t become apoplectic, he was most certainly angry despite my further reassurances that all would be well if he just let things be. I mentioned that I would switch the guard frequency off if he continued to interrupt our training. He then shouted down the radio, “What would you do if we parked an aircraft carrier in the English Channel?” I replied, “But sir, you don’t have an aircraft carrier,” and turned guard volume down. We completed our training and never heard another word about it.
The second event related to activity on board. During a busy operational period I was piped to attend a meeting in the admiral’s staff briefing room. Captain Burnell-Nugent was there with some very serious-looking high-ranking admiral’s staff officers. They briefed me on a new threat that had just been fielded. Saddam Hussein had broadcast in the media how his forces intended to take down a Sea Harrier. They had modified an old Soviet-era Ababil artillery rocket launcher to shoot rockets with altitude and proximity sensing warheads. The intention was to put a full salvo of rockets up through a Sea Harrier formation, cutting us to shreds. Captain B-N turned and asked me what I thought. My reply was, “Sir, I think he has about as much chance of hitting us as there is of a piece of falling space debris taking out a SHAR”. Captain B-N appreciated my reassurance, although he did make me explain to the staff why I assessed the risk as negligible, and our show went on.
As Invincible withdrew from operations over Iraq on 29 March 1999, I was notified that we were fast transiting to the Aegean Sea to participate in NATO operations against Serbia in support of the independence of Kosovo. The Kosovo mission for 800 NAS was defensive counter air. Our combat air patrol stations were predominantly over Skopje (capital city of Macedonia) facing north and overlooking Pristina, or further west positioned over northern Albania facing Podgorica in Montenegro. The squadron was well equipped and trained to fulfil the mission, and again the RAF supplied tankers, this time in the form of TriStars, to enable useful four-hour windows on task. The airspace over Serbia and Kosovo was incredibly busy with NATO aircraft. The SHAR radar and weapon system was ideally suited for the mission in that we could easily identify friendly forces at high level at the same time as tracking others at low level.
All squadron pilots had incidents and events where enemy activity was observed, and where they faced up to the threat. The rules of engagement were such that no one ever actually got to shoot, but many of us were certainly placed in a position where engagement was very close. One such engagement happened during my last operational sortie in the navy, and as it turns out, it was 800 NAS’s last mission of the war in Kosovo. My wingman, Lieutenant Nick Weightman, and I were positioned over Skopje when we detected a fast jet over Pristina operating at low level directly below a pair of friendly F-16s. We tracked north and both achieved high probability of kill firing solutions. Due to the proximity of the F-16s we were ordered to haul off. We turned south and tracked outbound back to our CAP station. When we faced north again we found the same picture, two F-16s now orbiting directly above the low level target, only now the target was declared as hostile. There was no response to a suggestion from me that the F-16s bug out and get out of our way, even though it was clear that at their vertical range above the bandit they were unlikely to get a sighting, let alone a shot. In frustration, I turned my formation towards the tanker and told the controller a little of how I felt.
As soon as we were on track for the tanker, we got a snap vector from the controller on board an RAF E3D AWACS aircraft. We had been facing north, so the vector 030° at 20 miles was an imminent threat. Both Nick and I picked up ‘the bandit’ immediately and we were cleared to engage. Both of us also realised that we were looking at a decoy or a bundle of chaff, possibly floating down range from one of the F-16s. Having flown up to the stationary threat and then flown through it, we realised the AWACS was gone, and there didn’t seem to be anyone listening out at the airborne command, control and communications platform, so we notified the tanker we were inbound to them. Given the real proximity of the bandit, and the unknown nature of the target we were vectored for, the high value assets had performed survival manoeuvres, and we were quite relieved when they came back on air and found that all was well.
On the same mission, transiting back to the CAP station, AWACS directed us towards Podgorica stating that they thought there may be activity on the airfield. We steered west and picked up helicopters nearly immediately. The rest of our operation that evening was sparring with the helicopters, painting them with radar, watching them try to evade, and due to constraints placed upon us by rules of engagement, we strictly stayed outside the airfield-centred missile engagement zone (MEZ). The targets were already designated bandits, so we were chomping at the bit to get in amongst them with missiles. Several more visits to the tanker, and an hour spent awaiting the arrival of the SEAD aircraft which would have enabled entry into the MEZ saw our relief CAP aircraft arrive on station.
Our next day was planned to be a stand down from flying stations. The ship’s executive officer surprised me with an early morning call to say I needed to talk to the captain. The message on 18 May 1999 was that an RAF Tornado squadron was deploying and that Invincible was cleared to go home.
I was honoured to lead 800 Naval Air Squadron during such an exciting period. We were called upon three separate times to stand up and be counted to perform armed operational missions over hostile territory, and no one on my squadron faltered. Our relationship with our ship, HMS Invincible, was first class, and we were very much a part of the finest Fleet Air Arm Carrier Air Group seen in modern times.
As a result of our participation in Operation Bolton in early 1998, the UK contribution to the containment of Iraq, the 1(F) Squadron executive officer (Squadron Leader Ian Cameron) and I were awarded MBEs in October 1998. I deeply appreciate the efforts of my entire squadron in coming with me on our exciting journey. Further, I am grateful to 1(F) for stepping right out of their comfort zone ashore and proving the STOVL concept as the answer to the future of naval aviation.
BRIAN JOHNSTONE
EMBARKED ENGINEERING
A squadron typically works a basic eight hours on/eight hours off watch-keeping system and a typical day for the maintainers would start at 0400 hours, with a 0400 to midday shift, a midday to 2000 shift and 2000 to 0400. Watch change times are coincident with meals except breakfast. In a two-watch system this means that over a two-day period each watch will work one of each shift.
The early shift consists of preparing the aircraft for the day’s flying and movement of the flyers to the flight deck, followed by any required weapons loading and then a period of flight operations. Preparation is the carrying out of the before flight servicing (BFS) which consists of a walk round inspection to look for overnight damage or changes to the aircraft’s condition such as landing-gear suspension extensions, tyre pressures, ejection seat emergency oxygen bottle charge and fuel at correct contents for intended flight (usually full).
Gaseous oxygen (GOX) packs had to be collected from the GOX charging bay which was accessed through a hatch in the hangar wall by the forward aircraft lift with the lift at hangar deck level. These were taken up to the flight deck and stowed in a locker at the aft end of the flight deck and waited until the aircraft were spotted at their allocated flight deck position before they would be fitted. It was not practice to fit GOX packs in the hangar. They were fitted and removed only with the aircraft on the flight deck.
The middle shift was mostly concerned with continuing daytime flight ops and any ongoing hangar maintenance, carrying out turnround servicing (TRS) inspections between flights. TRS is that which is required to get the aircraft back in the air as quickly as possible and consists of a walk around visual inspection, refuelling and only those replenishments indicated to be needed (engine oil, GOX etc). If systems are correctly serviced during an after-flight servicing (AFS) and rechecked at BFS then very few systems need further replenishment for a number of flights; fuel, water and weapons being the main consideration.
The late shift would continue flight ops, with TRS between each flight, including any night flying which would require an extra pre-night flying inspection called a night flying conditional (NFC) which basically checks all necessary lighting works and adds a colour filter to the head-up display projector. On completion of night flying they would strike aircraft to the hangar deck for AFS and any routine servicing requirements and fault rectification. An AFS inspection would be the most rigorous of the flight serving inspections and would return all systems back to full and require a thorough inspection of the aircraft. It is essential that the aircraft is fully inspected at this point in time to ensure any maintenance arisings can be dealt with prior to starting flight ops the following day. Some systems such as engine and gearbox oils must also be checked for levels within a specified time of equipment shut down or erroneous readings may be taken.
Securing of aircraft and all equipment is an essential part of life at sea. Even in the calmest of conditions the ship will pitch and roll due to sea swell or wave action and because of the ship manoeuvring, often violently, without notification. This requires that all equipment and aircraft when not being moved are chained or lashed to the deck using chains, nylon lashings or rope (GSE only). There are two conditions of lashing; normal (everyday weather conditions) or storm (when foul weather is forecast). With regard to aircraft, once a pilot has manned the aircraft and he has started the engine, and under the direction of the flight deck crew, lashings may be removed. Two types of lashing are used on aircraft carriers: chain and nylon webbing. In general, nylon was used for helicopters and equipment and chains used for aircraft.
Chains are threaded through the ship’s deck fitting (ringbolt), secured to themselves with the end hook, and then attached to the aircraft’s picketing point using a quick release coupling which can then be adjusted like a turnbuckle to tighten the chain. Nylon lashings are attached at the hook end to the deck ringbolt and at the clutch mechanism end to the aircraft’s picketing rings. They are tightened by pulling on the free end of webbing and locked using the lever-locking device. One advantage provided by webbing-style lashings is that during rough weather you can leave the lashing connected at both ends and by releasing the locking mechanisms you can move the helicopter or aircraft using a technique known as ‘running lashings’, by allowing the webbing straps to extend and quickly locking should the situation demand it.
The biggest difference at sea was the conduct of an engine change. Ashore, the aircraft was placed on jacks and trestles and set in a level condition. Following disconnection of the various system connections the wing was lifted clear, using a mobile crane and placed on a wing stand and then the engine could be lifted out of the fuselage and be placed in a spare engine stand. On board ship this was made a good deal more difficult for several reasons. The equipment had to be far bulkier to stand the loads imposed by the ship’s movement. The jacking and trestle equipment was bigger and to cater for the lack of roof clearance the trestle was fitted with its own jacks so that once jacked up and levelled, the trestle could be lowered until its own jacks contacted the deck and then the actual aircraft jacks could be removed, and then the trestle could be lowered until the aircraft was just feet off the deck. We also attached ‘goalposts’ to the trestle which allowed the large embarked sling to be guided up the posts when lifting the wing and then when lifting the engine. The idea behind this was to prevent the large heavy wing or engine from swinging about as the ship rolled. When we lifted wing or engine it was normal practice to ask the officer of the watch on the bridge to steer a straight course for the period of the lift but although this helped prevent any sudden movement it did not cater for normal sea movement.
Engine change at sea. (Brian Johnstone)
The other problem with an embarked engine change was that it took up the entire forward hangar, usually big enough to take four Sea Harriers. With the wing alongside on its stand then two engine stands, one with the new engine in it and the other for the removed engine, and stowage space for all the removed parts from the aircraft, a lot of space was required. A good amount of storage space, for all this equipment, was required when not in use, with some equipment (wing stand and engine sling) being broken down into parts and stowed on the first shelf, one deck up the hangar wall. These are still large and an evolution in its own right to be got down and assembled in readiness for the task. The sling alone when assembled weighed about 350 lbs. An engine change could take anything from three up to twelve hours to achieve, making maintenance on other aircraft more difficult because it may have to be carried out on deck, in the dark and in inclement weather. All the equipment and aircraft parts removed had to be secured to the deck and securing everything for sea exacerbated difficulties associated with maintenance. It just simply took longer to do things because of having to unsecure and re-secure things you needed to move and even under normal conditions once all the aircraft were in the hangar moving large items was impossible due to the closeness of the aircraft and chains leading from all landing-gear legs to ring bolts in the deck and from any GSE or tool boxes.
A full CVS hangar. (Brian Johnstone)
It is a requirement, when ashore, to foam wash the aircraft on a routine basis about every five-six weeks. When embarked it is reduced to weekly although it may just be a wash with fresh water, saving the foam wash for convenient non-flying days such as port calls. However, fresh water washing of engine compressors is carried out on a daily basis when the aircraft is used. This is to prevent a build-up of salt on compressor blades. It is usually carried out following the last flight of the day and it is achieved by positioning the flight deck tractor near where returning aircraft are marshalled to after landing. Once the aircraft comes to rest and whilst the chocks and lashings are being fitted and the engine is still running an indication is made to the pilot, by showing him the water hose nozzle, that you intend to carry out a compressor wash. The pilot will select a few system switches to the off position (systems that take bleed air from the engine so that water does not enter them) and when he gives the thumbs up the water hose nozzle is offered up to the edge of the engine air intake and is turned on allowing a ten-second flow of water into the intake, the hose is then taken under the aircraft to the other side air intake and the process repeated. If an aircraft lands and the pilot vacates it, but it is subsequently declared unserviceable, then a ground run will be carried out by maintainers specifically to wash the engine compressor before the aircraft goes to the hangar.