III.2.6 DIGITAL ARCHIVE 1056599
Mexican poet and Nobel Laureate Octavio Paz (1914–1998) wrote this newspaper essay in San Francisco in the days leading up to the drafting of the charter of the United Nations, which occurred on June 26, 1945. Paz wrote this piece while completing his Guggenheim Fellowship, which had enabled him to study at the University of California, Berkeley, and prior to his first assignment as a member of the Mexican diplomatic corps in Paris. At that time and as a result of his experience in California, he began writing what would become one of his most famous works, The Labyrinth of Solitude (1950). Paz recounts how the Latin American republics acted in exemplary solidarity to push for a human rights bill as part of the charter and how their collective stance paid off when U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius accepted the petition under mounting pressure from both civic and religious groups in the United States. It is in this context that Paz discusses Pan Americanism as a very malleable system of international relationships that enabled the Latin American republics to soften the stronghold of its most powerful, northern neighbor. As a part of his undisguised “official” reading of the events, Paz underscores the importance of the Act of Chapultepec through which the TIAR (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Defense) was articulated. “La unidad de Latinoamérica. Batalla diplomática en San Francisco” was published initially in Mañana [(Mexico City), no. 92 (June 2, 1945), 12–13, 15] and reprinted in the recent anthology Crónica trunca de días excepcionales [Octavio Paz (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2007), 81–92], on which this translation is based.
ON MAY 15, AT A DINNER AT THE PRESS CLUB in this city, Ezequiel Padilla,1 the head of the Mexican Delegation, addressed more than two hundred journalists and announced that at last, that afternoon, the issue of regional agreements had been resolved. He added, “This has been one of the happiest days of my life. The unity of the Americas has been preserved.” After his speech, I and the few other Mexican journalists who were there requested an interview. Half an hour later, he received us in his suite at the Hotel Saint-Francis. He was silent, still overcome by emotion, and handed us a sheet of paper; it was the statement issued by Stettinius.2 As he gave it to us, Padilla seemed to be saying, “This is the result of a battle that lasted two weeks; read it, and if it doesn’t seem to be much, consider that it is probably more than any of us expected.” There were three or four of us in the room, and we immediately began to translate the document and make notes.
When we had finished, someone wanted to ask questions. But Minister Ezequiel Padilla refused. He was exhausted, and said, “It’s very late. Besides, I have nothing further to add.”
“Did every Latin American delegation accept the proposal offered by the United States?”
Though extremely tired, Padilla answered.
“Of course. And I can and should tell you that we all remained united during the course of this two-week struggle. We should be as proud of that as we are of our victory.”
That was true. For me, Latin America’s unity has been the most encouraging feature of our recent history. In the face of Pan-Americanism, which has traditionally been seen as a way of dividing us, Latin Americans maintained an exemplary unity. And I say exemplary because it was not achieved by one country exerting its power over other, weaker ones.
Why were the Latin Americans so willing to keep Pan-Americanism as part of the new world organization? On the face of it, this willingness contradicts what we have said in the past; we have always mistrusted Pan-American unity and have at times been hostile to the idea. There are two reasons for this sudden about-face: the evolution of the Inter-American system and the growth of Latin American countries.
The Pan-American Union was founded in 1896 at the request of the United States. It began as a trade agency. It was an expression of the famous dollar imperialism, which was one of the stages in the development of Yankee international policy. When the Union was created by the State Department, it coincided with the introduction of a new style of politics in which good manners were intended as a substitute for the stick, though they did not entirely replace it. The first Pan-American conference was held in Mexico in 1902; from that moment on, the Union ceased to be a trade agency and became a political organization.3 After 1902, a conference was organized every four years: in Havana, in Lima, in Montevideo, in Rio. . . The delegates to these meetings discussed and approved agreements, treaties, and conventions that were later submitted to their own governments for ratification. Pan-Americanism was a very elastic system of international relations; or, to put it in the jargon used by the professionals, it was an “open” system.
Though the United States introduced this policy because it conveyed the international legal endorsement for North America’s need for expansion, it was not long before the Latin Americans also discovered that the system had its advantages. They found that it provided a forum where they could argue with their powerful neighbor, fight with it, and often defeat it or at least soften its demands. As the importance of the Union grew with each conference, it became increasingly harder for the United States to resort to its old method of using the stick. The Pan-American system developed into an instrument for the advancement of the policies of all the countries in the region, rather than those of just one of the participants. In recent years the United States has discovered that its southern neighbors are political and economic powers that are beginning to wake up; they cannot be beaten or domesticated, but must be handled through negotiations and agreements.
In spite of all these favorable circumstances, nothing would have been accomplished without the emergence of a new political attitude in the United States. That new awareness was embodied in one name: Roosevelt. For the past twelve years the Good Neighbor policy has been the object of both cloying praise and poisonous, passionate criticism. Many saw it as the same old wolf in new clothing. What those critics did not understand was that this new policy was not a perverse, ingenious plot invented by the State Department; it was in fact the expression of a new attitude and an organic change in American life. Thanks to that change, the Pan-American system has been improved and has become one of the most essential, complex organizations in contemporary international life.
In Rio de Janeiro, and later in Chapultepec, the system reached full maturity.4 The pressure of war undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the resolutions agreed to at these two conferences were of a militant nature that emphasized continental unity. But what was remarkable about these resolutions was that they all tended to advocate a peaceful solution to any conflict and, most important, they aimed to solve them jointly, as a group. All those treaties and agreements created a legal foundation of exceptional importance for the future: Nations’ Rights and Obligations; Dispute Conciliation and Arbitration; Rejection of War; Non-Intervention; Reciprocal Assistance, and so on. The Non-Intervention agreement, for example—unlike the one that betrayed Spain—guaranteed the independence and sovereignty of nations and prohibited foreigners from interfering in the internal affairs of the countries involved. The Chapultepec Agreement—a Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance—stipulated that, in the event of an attack on any American country, all the others would come to its defense. This resolution was of great importance because it prevented any unilateral action, transformed the Monroe Doctrine into a group instrument, and guaranteed the unity of the continent.
But the war continued to wreak profound changes on American society and politics. It transformed the United States into a world power. Or, rather, it awakened the country to its true situation; the Americas, and the Inter-American system, were not enough for the United States. Dumbarton Oaks was the expression of that change. When Latin American diplomats read the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, their first question was, “What will happen to the Pan-American system and, above all, to the Chapultepec Agreement?” The answer was expressed in the Big Four’s proposals, but it was a confusing answer. On one hand, it said that regional organizations would be part of the new world organization and that their existence should be encouraged. But it also indicated that the Security Council would be authorized to initiate coercive activities. (Regional organizations could only initiate them with approval from the Council.) Dumbarton Oaks negated the Chapultepec Agreement. And, as if that weren’t enough, the Big Three, in San Francisco, introduced a new amendment: All regional organizations and agencies that were capable of taking coercive actions should submit to the High Command of the Inter-American Defense Council, an emergency organization created during the war that consisted of representatives of the high commands of each country in the region. If the Defense Council survived, it would exist under the umbrella of the Security Council’s High Command.
The Dumbarton Oaks plan is, theoretically, a denial of the Monroe Doctrine; in the event of a conflict in the Americas, the Security Council could send Russian, or English, or French troops to quell the disturbance. But that is just an option. The Big Five have veto powers and the United States would surely put a stop to any action if the Council tried to send non-American troops to the American continent. It is reasonable to assume that the United States—representing the Council—would be in charge of imposing order in the Americas. Dumbarton Oaks, which in theory is a denial of the Monroe Doctrine, is in fact a step backward to a stage that we had already put behind us. Once again, the United States would be the only country with the power to initiate coercive actions on the continent. Or, at least, it would be the only one in a position, through the Council, to authorize such actions.
That was the situation. A battle then began, which the daily press has been reporting and whose results are now known. Daily meetings, diplomatic skirmishes, and interviews. The Latin Americans remained united and unyielding. The United States delegation was on the verge of division. The situation was confusing, and those of us who witnessed the battle frequently felt that all was lost. Just a few hours before arriving at the compromise in which Padilla played such an important role, Stettinius seemed determined to give no ground. Both sides were playing a dangerous game; above all, the World Organization had to be saved, but Latin America had shown that friendship is better than the stick, and that our loyalty can be easily gained if we are treated as an equal. And, finally, on the afternoon of May 15, a solution was found that can be summed up in three points:
1. The Security Council would be the supreme authority.
2. If the Council takes no action, each nation will be entitled to act in self-defense (a conditional admission of the Chapultepec Agreement).
3. Regional organizations must be considered the normal channels for arbitrating local disputes.
The Pan-American system was essentially saved at the San Francisco Conference. While it is true that the Chapultepec Agreement was only saved on a conditional basis—since it will function as an auxiliary instrument of the Security Council—that was inevitable. That is the price of our international cooperation. In previous articles, I have tried to show how we must adjust to a new world in which world politics will be the single decisive factor. San Francisco has been the first test. There will be others. I think we have passed the test and that, contrary to what many expected, we have come away with an intelligent compromise, and that is a victory. Padilla was right; Latin American diplomats can be proud of their efforts.
1
Ezequiel Padilla (1890–1971) was the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1940–45), and his performance in that post made him one of the strongest presidential pre-candidates for the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana [Party of the Mexican Revolution]. In 1945, while still head of Foreign Affairs, he was chairman of the Inter-American Conference on War and Peace that was held at Chapultepec Castle, which led to the Chapultepec Agreement, and he was the head of the Mexican Delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Together with Manuel Tello and Francisco Castillo Nájera, he signed the United Nations Charter on June 26, 1945. The following year he was the PMD and PAN candidate for president of the Republic, but Miguel Alemán Valdez was elected. Padilla died in Mexico City on September 16, 1971.
2
Edward ReiIly Stettinius, Jr. (1900–1949), was the final Secretary of State in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration, and the first to serve under Harry S. Truman, from 1944 to 1945. Truman, who did not attend the event in San Francisco, put Stettinius in charge of the conference. Afterward the president asked him to resign his cabinet post so that he could accept the position of United States ambassador to the United Nations.
3
Nineteen countries attended the second meeting of the Pan American Union, held in Mexico City. The Pan American Health Office was created on this occasion. The United States insisted on the creation of the Pan American Bank, but no agreement was reached on the subject.
4
This refers to the Third Meeting of the Secretaries of State of the American Republics, held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. This meeting set out to establish regional plans for defense and economic solidarity, and to sever relations between American countries and the Axis powers. The Chapultepec Agreement was issued at the Inter-American Conference on War and Peace at the meeting held in 1945 at Chapultepec Castle; delegates to the conference declared that all sovereign states are legally equal.