Obama’s Russia Failures Unleash
New Chaos and Cronyism in Ukraine
“I’m telling you, you’re not getting the billion dollars. I said, you’re not getting the billion. I’m going to be leaving here in, I think it was about six hours. I looked at them and said: I’m leaving in six hours. If the prosecutor is not fired, you’re not getting the money. Well, son of a bitch. He got fired.”1
—Vice President Joe Biden,
to the Council on Foreign Relations, January 2018
In late January 2020, the outcome of President Trump’s impeachment was already cast. An acquittal was a fait accompli. Democrats had failed to make a case with wide bipartisan appeal. And all the House impeachment managers could hope to score was a single Republican defector on the jury, Senator Mitt Romney of Utah.2
The House Democrats voted to impeach Trump (though they failed to win over a single Republican member) after an impassioned closing argument from Congressman Adam Schiff.
Schiff’s spirited speech roused the liberal faithful and their media acolytes, whose desperate three-year obsession to rid the White House of Donald J. Trump had come to this final, failed moment. But in Schiff’s closing utterances, Trump defenders found a rich irony: much of the arguments the California Democrat laid out seemed to apply to the prior administration and the failed orchestrations of the Obama-Biden team in Eurasia a few years prior.3
Yes, a U.S. administration had indeed leveraged foreign aid to force the Ukrainians to do something. (Joe Biden even admitted it on video!) They had created the appearance of a conflict and personal gain. (Indeed, Biden and his son had.) Career bureaucrats were concerned about the conduct. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent testified he even had tried to raise it with Biden but was rebuffed.)4
For conservatives and security experts truly in the know about what transpired in Ukraine—and not trapped in the prevailing media narrative—Schiff’s final summation was the clearest evidence that the impeachment process had really been a defensive maneuver by Democrats to neutralize the impact of their own failures in the region. To the Trump faithful, Schiff’s words almost seemed to be a projection of those Democratic failings upon the current occupant at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. In fairness, Trump had given them an opening with some of his comments and actions. But there was no provable crime, just a political question.5
That question, Schiff argued to the senators, is whether President Trump “will put his personal interests ahead of the national interests?” If so, it cannot be tolerated, Schiff insisted.6
“There’s no Mulligan here when it comes to our national security,” he said, using the golfer’s favorite term for a do-over.7
Perhaps not a do-over. But maybe a makeover. Democrats were trying to rewrite the script from a decade of Russia and Ukraine policy failures so that Trump owned it all heading into the 2020 election. But in so doing, they had unintentionally educated the American public about Joe Biden’s own family foibles and had elevated the Burisma Holdings episode with Hunter Biden into a powerful symbol of American cronyism overseas.8
The very political figures that Schiff’s mission seemingly had sought to protect had now become its casualty.
The extraordinary boomerang began a decade earlier, when a youthful president with a penchant for domestic policy, and a yawn for foreign affairs, first tried to reboot America’s relationship with Moscow. Former speechwriter and security advisor Ben Rhodes summed up Obama’s approach to foreign affairs in a poignant anecdote in his book.
“What’s the Obama doctrine?” [President Obama] asked aloud. The silence was charged, as we’d always avoided that label. He answered his own question: “Don’t do stupid shit.” There were some chuckles. Then, to be sure that he got his point across, he asked the press to repeat after him: “Don’t do stupid shit.”9
Those who watched the Obama doctrine unfold across Russia and Ukraine ultimately concluded his simple rule appeared to have been voided, including by the family of his Vice President Joe Biden, in whom he had entrusted Ukraine policy starting in 2014.10
After Russia had secured billion-dollar deals (at great expense to American taxpayers and national security), it was Ukraine’s turn.11
Just as in Russia, the favors that the Obama administration granted Ukraine benefitted politically powerful oligarchs—notorious for cultivating the culture of corruption, bribery, extortion, kickbacks, and money laundering. Obama’s bailout to Ukraine allowed its oligarchs to plunder not only its national resources but America’s as well.12
Politically connected Americans like the Clinton and Biden families—among myriad others—mysteriously (or perhaps not) landed lucrative deals with these oligarchs and some of the same foreign entities who capitalized on American taxpayer-funded aid.13
Publicly, Obama and his diplomats tried to preserve the Russian reset through 2013. Privately, Hillary Clinton and Moscow Ambassador Michael McFaul had begun meddling in Russian and Ukrainian affairs by 2012. In Russia, the State Department funded opposition groups and fomented protests against Putin and his allies (arguably the equivalent of Putin directly funding political groups in the United States).14
The Maidan revolution—which began in late 2013—provided the perfect opportunity for the West to reduce Putin’s influence over his neighbor by showering Ukraine with cash while simultaneously pushing vague “reforms”—alleged anti-corruption measures that the Ukrainians came to see for what they were: ironic at best.15
In Ukraine, the State Department sought to oust the Putin-friendly leader Viktor Yanukovych and install a pro-Western administration. The installation of President Petro Poroshenko (with his willingness to accept foreign aid money into his country and his own pocket) alienated Russia and swiftly brought Ukraine into the Western sphere of influence.16
As the reset fizzled, the Obama team pivoted toward Ukraine in an apparent attempt to foil Putin’s energy dominance and cyber warfare strategies. Putin sought to counter their efforts, especially in Ukraine. Obama and his top officials had officially botched the Russian reset.17
The exact date that the reset completely collapsed was February 22, 2014, with the ouster of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. A proxy war broke out in the Ukrainian Donbass region shortly after.18
Putin and his maneuvers in Crimea would become a scapegoat, but even the architect of Obama’s Russia policy—Ambassador McFaul—knew that the beginning of the end occurred long before Crimea. In fact, two years before war broke out, the reset was in tatters.19
Obama and his team blamed Putin’s years of aggressive meddling in Ukraine for the diplomatic breakdown, but the truth is that Obama and his diplomats were meddlers too.20
In September 2012, Putin took steps to eliminate their influence.
Reset Failure Led to Damage Control in Ukraine
On September 18, 2012, Putin expelled the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID had operated in Russia since 1992—ramping up dramatically under Bill Clinton’s administration—and has provided nearly $3 billion in funding to various groups that presumably advanced the U.S. agenda. Putin singled out one USAID-funded group called Golos (“vote” in Russian) for its election activities. Indeed, Golos had backed protests against Putin.21
McFaul was defiant. “Many people have asked me whether USAID departure will mean an end to our support for these important initiatives,” McFaul wrote on his blog. “It will not.” This marked the beginning of the end for the reset.22
USAID had partnered with the liberal billionaire investor George Soros on international advocacy projects for more than a decade. Soros had operated in both Russia and Ukraine since before their post-Soviet separation. His Open Society Institute (and his vast network of affiliate nongovernmental organizations—“NGOs”) had entered both Soviet Russia and Ukraine before 1990.23
As one of the most influential globalists in the world, Soros had previously experienced Putin’s protectionist tendencies and declared that his investment in the nationalist country was the worst of his career.24
After USAID’s expulsion, Soros had lost a major co-financier. And now he had a major axe to grind.
By November 2012, Soros and his network were cognizant that their operations could be Putin’s next expulsion. Russia “can do so anytime, legally or illegally,” Soros’ operatives acknowledged in a November 2012 meeting. So, they began ramping up efforts to diminish Putin’s power.25
Soros believed that Russia and Ukraine were suffering from the same problem: a dilemma he termed the “original sin.” The ruling class in both countries had been involved in government corruption for at least a decade. They were all “infected” with the original sin. So, in the event of a coup, any new administration would just be seen as “the bastard child of the old regime” and “a rotting element.”26
As it turned out, Ukraine would be the key in Soros’ pivot.
With all pretenses of the reset largely dispensed, the Obama administration set out to counter Putin’s advances in Ukraine. Even before Clinton left Foggy Bottom in February 2013, the State Department was adapting its democracy-building strategy (the play that had been used to upend the Middle East during the “Arab Spring”) for Ukraine.27
In November 2013, the Maidan Square protests—backed in part by Soros and the State Department—were in full swing. Three months later, pro-Putin leader Viktor Yanukovych was still refusing to sign an agreement to build closer ties with the West.28
On February 20, 2014, the violent protests turned deadly as gunshots rang out from the rooftops overlooking the Maidan Square in downtown Kiev. Snipers (whose identity and affiliation remain unknown) picked off anti-Yanukovych protesters and pro-Yanukovych police forces alike.29
By the time the smoke (and tear gas) had finally cleared, more than fifty protesters and four police officers had been killed. Almost immediately, Western media alleged that the snipers were acting on Yanukovych’s orders and an arrest warrant was soon issued for the deposed leader. The dead—now called the “Heavenly Hundred”—from the mob of irate protestors became martyrs.30
Within forty-eight hours, the pro-Putin government in Kiev had been overthrown.
War in Ukraine
Putin’s disbelief could hardly match his fury. The ouster of the democratically elected Yanukovych was the final straw. From fury, action soon followed from Moscow. Russians had always fretted about the future safety and independence of their ex-patriates in Ukraine’s semiautonomous and strategically important Crimea region. Soon they would act to change the balance of power.
Putin refused to recognize the new Western-backed government in Kiev, seeing it as the offspring of an “unconstitutional coup.”31 Instead, he plotted with his Siloviki (security service chiefs) through the night of February 22, 2014, to rescue Yanukovych and whisk him to safety in Russia. Yanukovych was in mortal peril, he believed, and was grateful that Putin “saved [his] life.”32 By 7:00 a.m. the next day, Putin—no doubt weary from the all-nighter—had decided, “we must start working on returning Crimea to Russia.”33
On February 27, Putin dispatched thousands of heavily armed troops—“little green men”—to the capital city of the Black Sea peninsula called Crimea (a move he initially denied, but later acknowledged).34 Putin’s little green men stormed the Crimean parliament building and raised the Russian flag—a universal declaration of capture.35
Crimea was a strategic outcropping of land in a sea that borders Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Through the Bosporus Strait, the Black Sea connects to the Mediterranean and thus all of Europe and the Western world. Once under Soviet control, the Crimean Peninsula remained majority Russian-speaking and hosted the ex-Soviet Black Sea Fleet.36
A series of treaties governed Russia’s and Ukraine’s claim to the Black Sea territory and, in 2010, a partition treaty guaranteed Russia’s use of the Sevastopol port and the right to station up to twenty-five thousand Russian troops there. The 2010 treaties re-upped Russia’s claims to Crimea through the year 2042 and allowed 24 artillery systems, 132 armored vehicles, and 22 military planes in addition to the troops. In exchange, Russia paid the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain the fleet and offered Ukraine discounted natural gas.37
But by early 2014, Putin apparently felt that the rapidly Westernizing Ukrainians could no longer be trusted and the treaties were as good as ancient history. He thus signed a reunification treaty with the Crimean city of Sevastopol on March 18, 2014, and the so-called annexation of Crimea was officially underway.38 War between Russia and Ukraine seemed imminent.
Indeed, a firefight broke out in the Ukrainian Donbass region less than one month after Putin signed the reunification treaty in Crimea.39
Earlier in March, Kremlin-backed media had leaked a bugged phone call between two European diplomats that undercut the sniper narrative being pushed throughout Western media. On the call, the Estonian foreign minister told the EU foreign affairs chief that “there is a stronger and stronger understanding that behind snipers it was not Yanukovych, it was somebody from the new [Western-backed] coalition.” Years later, questions still lingered over whom the snipers were actually working for.40
Perhaps the war in Ukraine was just a spontaneous combustion of long-volatile relationships, or perhaps Putin’s provocations during the reset and Obama’s (and Soros’) revolutionary reprisals in Putin’s backyard (or vice versa) had made violent conflict inevitable. According to analysts, one thing is certain: February 22, 2014, marked the time of death for Obama’s reset.41
Billion-Dollar Bailouts
On the other side of the world, President Obama tapped Vice President Joe Biden to be his Ukraine point man. Biden rose to the occasion and was on the ground in Kiev in April 2014 to help usher in the new pro-Western regime after the bloody Maidan Square clashes.42
Once Yanukovych was out, and Poroshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk (party rivals) were installed as Ukraine’s new pro-Western president and prime minister, respectively, Biden acted as “marriage counsel[or]” to resolve their political differences. Biden persuaded them to join forces, to unify their factions to combat Putin’s advances. In addition to this advisory role for Ukraine’s political leaders, Biden coordinated the coming deluge of financial assistance to Ukraine.43
Ukraine’s energy debts to Russia were substantial. Furthermore, corrupt oligarchs had plundered billions from Ukraine. Over the years, money simply vanished from Ukraine’s coffers into the byzantine web of shell corporations and offshore accounts in known money-laundering hot spots like Latvia, Cyprus, and Seychelles (as mentioned, FBI operative William Campbell’s Russian contacts called this informal network “the System”).44
The first major financial life rafts to cash-strapped Ukraine came in the form of a $1 billion loan guarantee from the U.S. with an additional “U.S. crisis support package” (plus security assistance) totaling $58 million.45
In March 2014, the White House called on Congress to approve a $1 billion loan guarantee to Ukraine. Congress quickly delivered and appropriated the funds by April 14. Within a week (on April 21), Biden announced the $58 million aid package. Days after Biden announced this first wave of U.S. aid, the IMF approved an additional $17 billion loan package.46
But this funding was only the beginning. By June, the U.S. financial package tripled to more than $184 million (including $23 million in nonlethal “security assistance”).47
The Man Behind the Billion-Dollar Bailouts
A leaked Open Society Foundations (OSF) memo (from a hack attributed to the Kremlin) revealed that, in late March 2014, Soros and his lieutenants met with Obama’s diplomats in Kiev along with Ukrainian officials from the ministries of health, education, and justice (among others). Soros and his NGO operatives discussed a variety of issues ranging from financial assistance to HIV/AIDS initiatives.48
Soros openly acknowledged that his efforts had created momentum for the rebellion. He proudly believed that “the rebellion wounded Putin in his Achilles heel.” Indeed, Soros worked in tandem with Obama’s State Department to help fund the protesters in 2013.49
Now, in March 2014, his NGO network must build on that momentum. The leaked memo made certain that Ukraine had become the “main priority” of the entire Soros network.50
Soros met with U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt on March 31 and impressed upon the ambassador that Obama’s weak Russia policy was a problem. Pyatt was eager to hear Soros’ recommendations and told the billionaire that “Secretary Kerry would be interested to hear [Soros’] views on the [Ukraine] situation directly.”51
“Obama has been too soft on Putin,” Soros told the ambassador. Soros suggested that the U.S. and EU should now play dual roles in the front against Putin. The U.S. should play the “bad cop role” by imposing “potent smart sanctions.”52
American efforts to install a friendly government in Ukraine—especially in coordination with the EU—were a delicate issue at the time of Soros’ visit. One month prior, in February, Pyatt’s phone call with State Department deputy Victoria Nuland had leaked, revealing that Pyatt and Nuland were orchestrating the installation of U.S.-approved Ukrainian leadership. The controversial recording was widely condemned as obvious evidence of U.S. meddling in Ukrainian affairs.53
Nuland’s explicit comments regarding the EU were especially scandalous. She suggested they bring in a UN undersecretary general to assist with the so-called “puppet regime” scheme. Nuland, a Bush-Cheney holdover who won the confidence of the Obama administration, wanted the UN undersecretary general “to help glue this thing and to have the UN help glue it and, you know, Fuck the EU.” “Exactly,” replied Pyatt.54
“We could land jelly side up on this one if we move fast,” Pyatt said but it would help to have someone “with an international personality to come out here [to Ukraine] and help midwife this thing.” Nuland confirmed that Obama’s point man was on board. “Biden’s willing,” she said before they hung up.55
The casual tone Nuland and Pyatt used, behind the scenes, while discussing the fate of a nation on the brink of violent revolution exhibited an ivory tower detachment at which the public does not often get a glimpse.
Soros and his team exhibited similar detachment when discussing ways to further enmesh their network in the Ukraine crisis, as revealed in the hacked memos. They were especially eager to help the Ukrainians with HIV/AIDS and other public health matters (such as opioid addiction). Soros personally offered to send an Open Society expert to “help with the [drug] procurement,” and suggested ways to optimize health budgets “in partnership with the Clinton Foundation.”56
The Clinton Foundation had set up the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) branch in 2002 to focus on HIV/AIDS. By 2003, Soros and Ukrainian billionaire Victor Pinchuk had set up HIV/AIDS programs in Russia and Ukraine. Over the years, Soros and Pinchuk had become Clinton mega-donors, and their HIV/AIDS work often intersected.57
As previously mentioned, when Clinton and Giustra flew to Kazakhstan in 2005 to procure the Uranium One mines, their stated reason for the visit was to discuss HIV/AIDS (despite Kazakhstan’s infinitesimal infection rate).58
The connection between HIV/AIDS and large sums of money flowing to the politically powerful who conduct complex business deals remains unclear. In Ukraine, the Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC) and the Soros/Clinton/Pinchuk-backed HIV/AIDS network would later become embroiled in a controversy surrounding suspected embezzlement and missing aid money. On February 17, 2020, the National Police of Ukraine opened an investigation into the possible theft of aid money flowing through the NGO network—the missing funds in question exceeded $140 million in just two years.59
Soros capped off his trip to Ukraine with a dinner attended by the board of his International Renaissance Foundation (IRF)—the largest branch of the Open Society network in Ukraine. The Soros operatives spoke candidly and thanked the billionaire for all he had done for the revolution in Ukraine.60
Soros returned the compliments to his operatives stating that “his merit is the IRF’s merit.” Soros was proud of the work they had done—it could become a new model. But there was still more work to be done. “Ukraine is in grave danger,” Soros conveyed, “because Putin knows he cannot allow the new Ukraine to succeed.”61
Soros had a carrot-and-stick strategy for the Ukraine-Russia conflict: he wanted the EU (the good cop) to fund Ukraine and the U.S. (the bad cop) to hit Russia in the wallet. Soros said that the U.S. should target Putin’s inner circle banks with sanctions and strategically dump oil reserves on the global market to “depress the price of oil.” Soros suggested hitting Putin financially for ninety days or until he accepted the new pro-Western Ukrainian government (whichever came first).62
Less than one month after Soros’ trip to Ukraine, Obama slapped sanctions on Putin’s inner circle. Among the twenty-four individuals and entities listed were Rosneft’s Igor Sechin, and Putin’s ex-KGB comrade Sergey Chemezov.63
At the same time, plans to prop up Ukraine’s economy were still underway. Obama invited President Poroshenko to the White House in September 2014 to discuss further financial assistance.64 At the press conference, Obama announced that the U.S. had supplied, and would continue to supply, Ukraine with “significant financial assistance” in addition to the billion-dollar loan guarantee and the “hundreds of millions of dollars that we’ve provided in assistance.”65
Obama also promised to provide “additional assistance, both economic and security assistance to Ukraine to make sure that not only are they able to weather this storm economically, but they’re also going to be able to continue to build up an effective security force to defend themselves from aggression.”66
But after a year of war and upheaval, Ukraine’s economy was still spiraling out of control. By 2015, anti-Putin hawks were urging the Americans and other generous Western benefactors for a bigger bailout.67
Soros Pushes for Bigger Bailouts
In January 2015, Soros thought he might know where to find more billions for Ukraine. In an opinion article, Soros urged the EU to dig deep in their pockets to produce far more than the meagre $17 billion from 2014. Soros recommended a whopping $50 billion in emergency relief to Ukraine. “Europe needs to wake up and recognize that it is under attack from Russia,” Soros wrote. “Assisting Ukraine should also be considered as a defense expenditure by the EU countries.”68
Soros was instructing the EU to redirect their funds previously earmarked to help stabilize EU members (Ireland, Portugal, Romania, and Hungary)—and cobble together the next bailout for Ukraine (a non-member). “The additional sources of financing I have cited should be sufficient to produce a new financial package of $50 billion or more.”69
The EU funds Soros cited were likely paid for by EU taxpayers but, “needless to say, the IMF would remain in charge of actual disbursements, so there would be no loss of control.”70
Within weeks of Soros’ article, IMF chief Christine Lagarde announced an assistance package totaling about $40 billion. Lagarde said that approximately $17.5 billion would come from the IMF and the remainder would come from “additional resources from the international community.”71
“The economic and political success of Kiev would be a major blow to the Kremlin’s narrative on Ukraine,” said former Russian Duma member Ilya Ponomarev—a renowned dissident and strong Putin critic. “The West has a chance to show the world—and Russians in particular—what it has to offer,” Ponomarev believed, but “unfortunately [the West] is missing this opportunity.”72
And yet, Ukrainian Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko still did not believe the IMF’s latest tranche would be enough to stabilize Ukraine’s fragile economy.73 Ponomarev agreed and presciently added that corruption in Kiev could siphon funds off the Western aid package, resulting in even less impact.74
By March 2015 (just one month after the $40 billion IMF announcement), Soros announced his intention to invest in major Ukrainian development projects. “There are concrete investment ideas, for example in agriculture and infrastructure projects. I would put in $1 billion. This must generate a profit,” he told an Austrian newspaper. He claimed he would not benefit personally, but his foundation would.75
Soros’ January 2015 EU bailout plea did not mention that he would be seeking a financial stake in Ukraine’s agriculture and infrastructure.76
But Soros was not the only politically connected Westerner scouting deals in Ukraine. Obama’s inner circle would soon do the same.
Commercial Deals: The Burisma Connection
As Biden was flying to and from Kiev amid the Maidan revolution in early 2014, an oligarch who had founded one of Ukraine’s largest natural gas companies—Burisma Holdings—got an idea. Perhaps Burisma (or even the oligarch himself) could curry favor with Obama or his vice president by putting people close to them on the payroll—corruption by proxy.77
The oligarch, Mykola Zlochevsky, had acquired his Burisma gas assets through suspicious—or even criminal—means. Furthermore, he had allegedly looted large sums of money from the company. Now, in April 2014, international investigators were hot on Zlochevsky’s trail.78
By April 22, Burisma had tapped an American named Devon Archer—a close associate of the Biden and Kerry families—for the position of independent director. Archer and the vice president’s son, Hunter, were close friends and business partners in an investment fund called Rosemont Seneca Partners. Archer had also worked on Secretary of State John Kerry’s 2004 presidential campaign and was the roommate of Kerry’s stepson, Chris Heinz, while they studied at Yale.79
Financial statements obtained by the FBI and Ukrainian investigators reveal that exactly one week before Archer publicly joined Burisma as a director, Burisma began funneling substantial sums to bank accounts linked to Devon Archer and Hunter Biden.80 The very next day, April 16, 2014, Archer visited the Obama White House to meet directly with Vice President Biden.81
Within a week, the vice president met with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk to discuss ways to eliminate reliance on Russian gas. Biden urged Ukraine to boost its energy production and said that an unspecified American team was “currently in the region” and that “more teams are coming to support long-term improvements.” The Ukrainian prime minister thanked Biden (and the American taxpayers) for their generous support.82
On April 28, 2014, the reason for Burisma’s peculiar political hire of Archer began to make more sense. The Serious Fraud Office in the U.K. froze certain assets belonging to Zlochevsky and Burisma (worth about $23 million). The U.K. authorities suspected that the money was transferred out of Ukraine fraudulently (Zlochevsky and Burisma have denied any wrongdoing).83
On May 13, 2014—less than one month after Archer was appointed and the first Burisma payments had entered U.S. accounts—Burisma announced that Hunter Biden had officially joined his friend on the board (his bio on Burisma’s website was deleted, but archives indicate that Biden may have quietly joined in April). Within forty-eight hours, Burisma’s sizable twin payments began to flow to the Morgan Stanley account of Rosemont Seneca Bohai (Biden and Archer’s firm).84
Secretary Kerry’s stepson, Chris Heinz, was clearly uncomfortable with his friends’ Ukrainian arrangement. The same day that Burisma announced Hunter Biden had joined the board, Heinz quickly put his concerns in writing to officials at his stepfather’s agency: “I can’t speak to why they decided to [join Burisma],” Heinz wrote his contacts at State, “but there was no investment by our firm in their company.”85
Starting on May 15, 2014, two separate payments of $83,333.33 (for a total of $166,666.66) landed in Biden and Archer’s account. Like clockwork, Burisma’s transfers continued for more than a year.86
While Secretary Kerry’s stepson may have been uncomfortable with the Burisma arrangement, Kerry’s press secretary, Jen Psaki, did not appear to have any issues with the appearance of Hunter Biden making big bucks from Kiev while his father oversaw U.S.-Ukraine policy. “No, he’s a private citizen,” Psaki responded coolly at a routine State Department briefing on May 13. The reporter pushed back, likening Hunter Biden’s private citizenship to that of an oligarch. “No, there are not [any concerns],” Psaki said conclusively.87
Secretary Kerry’s former chief of staff David Leiter had no apparent qualms either. Less than one week after Hunter Biden joined the board, Burisma hired Leiter as their lobbyist. Burisma paid Leiter’s firm $90,000 to lobby his former boss’ department (and Congress) throughout 2014.88
Burisma also hired a Democrat-linked outfit named Blue Star Strategies to help the Ukrainian gas company shed its controversial image. Blue Star Strategies lobbyists dropped Hunter Biden’s name in communications with the State Department and tried to “leverage” the son of the vice president to get key meetings and “burnish” Burisma’s image.89
Part of Hunter Biden’s Burisma duties included advising the company on legal and corporate governance issues. While providing moonlight advice to Burisma, Biden also worked at the law firm Boies Schiller Flexner LLP. When Archer asked Biden to recommend a law firm to counsel Burisma, presumably on their frozen asset dilemma, naturally, Biden recommended his own firm.90
Burisma’s first payment to Boies Schiller occurred on May 7 in the amount of $250,000. Burisma made another payment to the firm—for $33,039.77—less than five months later. Burisma’s payments to Boies Schiller apparently bought the Ukrainian gas company a report (prepared by Nardello & Co.) that concluded Burisma was not under any international investigations.91
This conclusion proved to be false.
The Point Man’s Point Man
As a senior senator serving on the foreign relations committee, Biden had been instrumental in creating a new “Special Envoy” position at the State Department to combat Putin’s maneuvers against his neighbors.92
In 2007, Biden and his colleague Senator Richard Lugar wrote a letter to then-Secretary Condoleezza Rice stating, “Russia’s attempt to consolidate its control over energy resources presents unacceptable security and economic risks to the United States and our allies.” They urged Secretary Rice to appoint a “special representative” to the regions bordering Russia and the Caspian Sea.93
When Secretary Clinton took over the State Department, the “Special Envoy” position that Senator Biden helped create in 2007 underwent significant changes. In October 2011, Clinton created a new bureau of energy resources and appointed an ally named Amos Hochstein to help develop the special energy envoy position.94
Secretary Clinton tapped Hochstein as a deputy assistant secretary for energy diplomacy and created the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR). At the same time, Clinton placed “Special Envoy” Carlos Pascual (a former Ambassador to Ukraine) in charge of the new bureau (under the oversight of Undersecretary Robert Hormats).95
There were few men or women in Washington as knowledgeable about global energy issues as Hochstein. Between stints working as a lobbyist for international energy corporations, Hochstein had advised senators and members of Congress; then he advised Secretary Clinton and her successor Secretary Kerry. During his last federal assignment, Hochstein worked as Obama and Biden’s point man on the Ukraine-Russia standoff.96
On July 8, 2014, Hochstein was, as always, impeccably dressed for his appearance in front of the Senate Foreign Relations European Affairs subcommittee. He appeared like an image from a Brooks Brothers’ catalog, his periwinkle-with-pearl striped repp tie, his snappy pinstripe suit, and jet-black hair greased back—hardly a strand out of place.97
Hochstein was prepared, physically and mentally. His statement (which he had practiced delivering in one form or another since April—several weeks after the Ukraine crisis began) was careful, crisp, and punchy. Hochstein and his colleagues from the Defense Department and USAID were there to discuss how Russia’s conflict with Ukraine affected energy security in the region and to inform senators how Russia had leveraged—and at times weaponized—their energy resources for geopolitical gain.98
Hochstein began with an update on the energy crisis in Ukraine. Russia had ceased gas supplies less than one month prior, on June 16, and Ukraine and the European Union were negotiating with Russia to resolve their energy issues. Russia had demanded repayment from Ukraine for past energy debts before any further negotiations could take place. “The situation is urgent,” Hochstein warned.99
Part of the solution, according to Hochstein, was Ukraine’s integration into the EU energy market. “However,” Hochstein cautioned, “before this integration can happen successfully it is essential that Ukraine reform its energy sector.” Without reform, and “if corruption and inefficiency continue along with crippling energy subsidies for consumers,” Hochstein believed, “Ukraine will be right back where it started.”100
Two weeks later, Hochstein again testified to a separate Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on energy security vis-à-vis Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. In his written testimony, Hochstein reiterated the Russian threats to energy security.101
After quickly mapping out the geopolitical energy landscape generally, Hochstein issued the same caveats he had two weeks prior. “Ukraine and Europe’s dependence on Russian gas is a clear example of the danger of relying on a dominant supplier,” Hochstein told the lawmakers. “The situation is urgent for Ukraine,” he warned and while he did not believe Europe was in immediate danger, a crisis “may be just around the corner.”102
Three days later, Hochstein got promoted to the “Special Envoy” position. As “Special Envoy” and coordinator for international energy affairs, Hochstein led “the U.S. Government’s efforts to combat the use of energy resources for political leverage while promoting a vision of energy cooperation and collaboration.”103
Hochstein was right about Ukraine. In the months leading up to the February 2014 ouster of Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych, Putin’s oil giant Gazprom had rewarded Ukraine for walking away from the EU. Yanukovych rejected an EU trade deal and, in December 2013, Gazprom unilaterally reduced the price of gas for Ukraine by a third. Putin personally and publicly announced the Gazprom discount—a clear demonstration of his approval that Yanukovych had distanced Ukraine from the EU.104
However, three months later, after the Maidan revolution and Yanukovych’s ouster, Putin unleashed his fury: Gazprom jacked up Ukraine’s prices by 81 percent.105
At one event hosted by the Atlantic Council (an entity funded by Soros and Burisma), Hochstein again warned that Russia’s weaponization of energy was predictable and must be counterbalanced:
When the gas was shut off from Russia to Ukraine on June 16th [2014], that was not a unique event. It happened in 2006 and it happened in 2009 and, therefore, it happened again in 2014. And there is no reason to believe it will not happen again. The way to prevent it from happening again is to…[create] new infrastructures that can allow for energy, for gas and for other sources of energy to come into Europe from other places to compete with Russian supplies.106
Between his visits to Congress (and well-connected think tanks) to apprise decision makers of Putin’s energy antics, Hochstein was Biden’s right-hand man on visits with various world leaders. He frequently flew to Ukraine (and other nations) with Biden to work out energy deals.107
But Hochstein had a secret.
Russia’s Best Energy Lobbyist
Time and again, Biden’s advisor failed to mention that he had witnessed Putin’s energy strategy first hand. Hochstein communicated Putin’s energy dominance strategy in the oil and gas sectors very effectively, but he never mentioned Russia’s attempts to corner the global uranium market. It was something he had assisted personally.108
While working as a U.S. lobbyist in the private sector, Hochstein had advised Rosatom’s subsidiary: Tenex.
Hochstein became a revolving door extraordinaire early in his Beltway career. As he weaved in and out of the private sector, his positions (and profits) rose substantially. From 2001 to 2007, Hochstein worked in various capacities at Washington lobbying powerhouse Cassidy & Associates. In 2006, then-Governor Mark Warner (D-VA) hired Hochstein to serve as a senior policy advisor. Hochstein purportedly left Cassidy in January 2007 to join Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd’s presidential campaign, according to a press release by the firm.109
In a 2006 Washington Post interview, Hochstein was asked about his lobbying efforts on behalf of the brutal regime in Equatorial Guinea. “But when you meet with Obiang, do you think to yourself: This guy has done awful things?” reporter Michael Grunwald asked Hochstein. “No, I really don’t. Our meetings have all been very businesslike. He’s convinced me of his deep care for his people,” Hochstein replied.110 Hochstein helped overhaul the corrupt nation’s image (where the police raped and tortured the citizens, according to State Department reports).111 When asked about the $120,000-per-month fees, Hochstein acknowledged that lobbying is not “charity work.”112
Indeed, Hochstein continued to work for Cassidy’s deep-pocketed foreign clients, even while he was employed by Governor Warner and Senator Dodd’s presidential campaign. In 2006, Russian nuclear corporation Tenex asked Campbell (unaware that he was an FBI operative) to find a Beltway lobbying powerhouse to help further their interests. By March 2006, Campbell found himself meeting with Hochstein, who ensured that Tenex hired Cassidy & Associates. Cassidy claims that Hochstein left the firm in January 2007, but Hochstein continued to meet with Putin’s top nuclear officials throughout 2007 and 2008 while he was working with powerful Democrats.113
Did Warner and Dodd know that Hochstein was simultaneously serving Russian interests? Hochstein’s public bios make no mention of his work on behalf of Tenex, although he does acknowledge returning to Cassidy in August 2008 (and remaining there until 2011).114
Before long, he was directly advising Secretary of State Clinton, her successor John Kerry, and Vice President Biden (and even President Obama). His LinkedIn profile is meticulously manicured to show no overlap between his public and private sector gigs, but, in fact, Hochstein advised multiple public officials and simultaneously worked to advance foreign interests while on the payroll of Cassidy.115
According to the Obama White House’s visitor records, Hochstein visited more than 150 times between December 2010 and September 2016, including several trips to the Situation Room. His first visits occurred while he was still working with Cassidy.116 Did Hochstein disclose his past lobbying relationships on behalf of Kremlin interests when he visited the Obama White House?
Furthermore, Hochstein’s current LinkedIn profile states that he stepped down from Cassidy in March 2011. But, an archived version indicates that he left in July 2011, and Cassidy continued to list him on their website through August 2011. This is significant because he began communicating with Clinton’s top lawyer at the State Department, Cheryl Mills, no later than May 10, 2011.117 Did Hochstein advise Clinton or her State Department on energy matters while employed by a lobbying firm that had represented Russian nuclear interests?
Nevertheless, Hochstein’s global perspectives were clearly appreciated within the State Department, and he soon found himself regularly meeting with Secretary Clinton and her inner circle directly. As Clinton’s “Special Envoy” at the ENR, he traveled the globe promoting Secretary Clinton’s energy agenda. “I have been privileged to help build and lead the bureau since its creation,” Hochstein said.118
After Clinton left State, Hochstein initially advised Secretary Kerry and traveled overseas with him to work on EU energy issues.119 While advising Kerry, Hochstein worked closely with other Obama officials including Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland, Special Coordinator Jonathan Winer, National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director Charles Kupchan (each of these individuals played starring roles in Obama’s Russia and Ukraine operations and they later helped perpetrate the political dirty tricks against Trump).120
Hochstein soon found himself in the good graces of Vice President Biden. He traveled around the world with Biden—numerous times to Ukraine, and they also visited Turkey, Cyprus, Romania, and even the Caribbean. At an Atlantic Council summit in Istanbul, Biden praised the special energy envoy and announced that he had put Hochstein in charge of European energy security efforts.121
As “Special Envoy” and advisor to Biden, Hochstein met with an impressive number of top foreign officials on trips to Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean (including Ukraine, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Greece, Croatia, Colombia, Argentina, and Kuwait). He also came under fire from the department’s inspector general for, among other things, his attendance and poor record keeping.122
The State Department inspector general (IG) investigated the ENR and published the findings in February 2016. The report blasted the ENR generally, and Hochstein in particular.123
The IG found: extended absences of top ENR officials were deemed detrimental to ENR’s operational effectiveness; weak institutional procedures, in particular information sharing and communication, as well as the bureau’s organizational structure, hampered internal operations and coordination with bureau partners; the strategic planning process was not inclusive and lacked rigorous prioritization of objectives; the Bureau of Energy Resources lacked an effective security program to ensure the protection of sensitive information.124
Regarding Hochstein’s attendance specifically, the IG found:
The Special Envoy, in particular, travels a great deal and is frequently away from the Department. The official records for his travel and time and attendance indicate that he has not been physically present in ENR for almost two-thirds of regular working days between August 2014 and the beginning of the OIG on-site inspection in May 2015.125
Despite Hochstein’s poor review from the inspector general, he was embraced by his superiors, including Biden.
Firing the Prosecutor
In December 2015, Vice President Biden was preparing for his next trip to Kiev. His aides were bracing for “renewed scrutiny of Hunter’s relationship with Burisma.” Hochstein allegedly “raised” the Burisma issue with Biden but did not recommend Hunter step down from the board.126
On December 6, Biden departed for Ukraine in his capacity as Obama’s point man. He had been sent to “announce that there was another billion-dollar loan guarantee.” But en route to Kiev aboard Air Force Two, Biden had an idea.127
Obama’s point man had previously asked the Ukrainian leadership to “take action” against a prosecutor that was investigating Burisma. When they failed to do so, Biden apparently decided to take matters into his own hands. But he would need to leverage the loan guarantee that he was scheduled to announce. He would need to scrap that language from his upcoming speech. His aides did as they were instructed and edited the speech, removing any references to the billion-dollar loan guarantee.128
Biden’s aides had been right to worry about the Burisma situation. On December 8, two days after Biden and his delegation landed in Kiev, James Risen at the New York Times ran a blistering exposé on the Hunter Biden-Burisma connection stating that “the credibility of the vice president’s anticorruption message may have been undermined by” his son’s connection to Burisma.129
Biden decided to hit two birds with one stone: he could deliver a strong anti-corruption message and eliminate the pesky prosecutor investigating Burisma. The latter could bolster the former and it was a low-risk gamble: Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin “had become widely reviled” by U.S. officials and media (after he began investigating a Soros-funded Ukrainian NGO for diverting U.S. aid). After less than ten months on the job, Shokin had made enemies more powerful than his allies.130
Biden used the visit—his latest of what became approximately one dozen trips to Kiev—to leverage the American aid money against Ukraine and extract concessions. Biden specifically leveraged the aid “as a pressure tactic to force the firing of a prosecutor he did not like.”131
In the wake of the revolution, Biden’s message to Ukraine’s parliament was simple, according to one aide: “If you don’t get your shit together, your country is doomed.”132 By December 2015, Biden’s approach had hardly changed. As a Ukrainian parliamentarian put it, Biden’s tone “was like the big brother coming to tell the little brother what to do—a recommendation that you can’t ignore.”133
According to Biden’s recollection:
I had gotten a commitment from Poroshenko and from Yatsenyuk that they would take action against the state prosecutor. And they didn’t. So they said they had—they were walking out to a press conference. I said, nah, I’m not going to—or, we’re not going to give you the billion dollars. They said, you have no authority. You’re not the president. The president said—I said, call him.
(Laughter.)
I said, I’m telling you, you’re not getting the billion dollars. I said, you’re not getting the billion. I’m going to be leaving here in, I think it was about six hours. I looked at them and said: I’m leaving in six hours. If the prosecutor is not fired, you’re not getting the money. Well, son of a bitch. (Laughter.) He got fired. And they put in place someone who was solid at the time.134
Biden’s threat was effective. By March 29, 2016, prosecutor Shokin was out. The loan guarantee—linked to Ukraine’s efforts to implement reforms and reduce corruption—was finally announced by the U.S. Embassy in Kiev in June 2016.135
A Not-So-Solid Prosecutor Buries Burisma
The position of prosecutor general is the Ukrainian equivalent of the U.S. attorney general. It is a very powerful position, especially due to systemic corruption among the politically connected billionaire oligarch class. The Prosecutor General has the ability to investigate and indict lawbreakers, and effectively end (or exonerate) an oligarch’s reign of corruption.136
In the tangled Obama-Ukraine saga, there are at least two prosecutor generals worth noting—Viktor Shokin (the one Biden wanted fired served from February 2015 to March 2016) and Yuriy Lutsenko (the one Biden called “solid” was not even a lawyer—he served from May 2016 to August 2019, despite attempting to resign in November 2018—Poroshenko refused).137
The irony of Biden’s recollection was that he claimed this unusual incident was an example of his efforts to prevent Ukraine from “backsliding” into a culture of corruption. Hochstein agreed and vehemently denied that Biden forced Shokin’s firing because the prosecutor was investigating Burisma and Hunter Biden. “Many of us in the U.S. government believed that Shokin was the one protecting [Burisma founder] Zlochevsky,” Hochstein said.138
Apparently, Hochstein did not realize how ludicrous such an assertion sounds in retrospect. Was Hochstein really suggesting that Biden wanted his son’s Ukrainian paymaster investigated? Was he actually suggesting that if Shokin protected Burisma, then Biden would want him fired?
Whether Shokin was corrupt or not is of minimal importance given what happened next. In Biden’s oft-quoted CFR video recollection, one piece is often overlooked: Biden claimed that Shokin’s replacement (at the time) was “solid.”139
This crucial afterthought is even more ironic. Shokin’s replacement was far from solid.
The new prosecutor, Yuriy Lutsenko, was a former Ukrainian minister with a checkered past (to put it mildly). In 2006, Lutsenko was removed from his post in parliament on charges of corruption. In 2008, he was accused of assaulting the mayor of Kiev. While drunk in an airport in 2009, Lutsenko was arrested by German authorities for making a scene. That same year, he lost a libel suit (he was known for disparaging his opponents).140
Shortly after Yanukovych took power in February 2010, Lutsenko was charged with public corruption (charges he denied) and sentenced to four years in jail. Yanukovych pardoned Lutsenko in April 2013, and he was released from prison. Soon after his release and by November 2013, Lutsenko became one of the top organizers of the Maidan protests. He was injured during a clash between protesters and riot police in January 2014.141
After the coup, Poroshenko appointed Lutsenko as a top advisor to the new pro-Western administration. He became the head of the Poroshenko bloc political party and held that position until late August 2015. As a Poroshenko loyalist with experience behind bars, Lutsenko knew the consequences of falling out of favor with the administration. Clearly Poroshenko trusted Lutsenko. Euromaidan Press said that the close relationship “casts a shadow” over Lutsenko’s appointment because Lutsenko would be “unlikely to take steps which contradict the President’s views.”142
It remains unclear why Biden deemed Lutsenko “solid,” but six months after Lutsenko’s appointment, the Shokin-era investigations into Burisma disappeared.143
After Trump saw Biden’s explicit quid pro quo on video, he asked Ukraine to investigate the Burisma situation. Was Shokin investigating Burisma when Biden demanded his ouster? Why would Biden say Shokin’s replacement, Lutsenko, was solid? Did it have something to do with the fact that Lutsenko quashed all Burisma investigations within months?144
These were reasonable questions. Even one of Trump’s most virulent critics, Congressman Adam Schiff, would acknowledge that Lutsenko was “widely viewed to be corrupt.”145
Schiff and the Ukrainian Arms Dealer
Initially, President Obama’s assistance to Ukraine was largely financial. He later came under fire for failing to send military assistance.146
Schiff (D-CA), meanwhile, was enthusiastic in his support for Ukraine military assistance. During the impeachment proceedings against Trump, Schiff repeatedly blasted the president for allegedly placing conditions on military aid to Ukraine.
What Schiff failed to mention throughout the impeachment debacle was that he played a key role in appropriating military assistance funds to Ukraine to begin with. Schiff cosponsored a bill in early 2015 that would provide Ukraine with direct military aid. One of Schiff’s fundraisers stood to gain substantially from his efforts.147
On February 12, 2015, the House introduced H.R. 955: “To authorize assistance and sustainment to the military and national security forces of Ukraine.” Schiff had long been an advocate for the interests of the American military-industrial complex.148 In theory, providing Ukraine with new protective gear and weaponry—from Kevlar vests to firearms and ammunitions or even Javelin rocket launchers—could be a windfall for defense contractors.149
One of Schiff’s constituents in California, a Soviet-born American named Igor Pasternak, had a company that had received favorable military contracts since the mid-nineties. Pasternak, who claims to be Kazakh-born and is “proud to forever call [himself] a Ukrainian-Jewish-American.” He played a mysterious role in the Maidan revolution and flew to Kiev in “the final hours of the Yanukovych presidency.…for diplomatic reasons in response to the outbreak of violence….”150
It remains unclear what those “diplomatic reasons” entailed, but Pasternak flew back and forth to Kiev in the aftermath of Yanukovych’s ouster. For his efforts, he received an award from Ukraine’s Embassy in the U.S. and soon began hustling Ukrainian-American defense contracts (which began to flow more freely shortly after the Ukraine bailout billions became available).151
Pasternak founded a company called Aeros Ltd. in Ukraine after he graduated from Lviv Polytechnic University’s engineering school. When he immigrated to the U.S. in 1994, he founded Worldwide Aeros Corporation (“Aeroscraft” or “Aeros”). Aeroscraft manufactures lighter-than-air ships—blimp-like structures that float through the sky on surveillance and reconnaissance missions.152
Aeroscraft’s ships were designed to vacuum up radio signals while hovering high above the ground, out of sight. The company had grabbed multimillion-dollar contracts from NASA, the U.S. Air Force, and other defense agencies interested in Aeros’ patented advanced blimp technology.153
The crisis in Ukraine brought new opportunities for Pasternak’s company.
Pasternak’s first lobbying disclosure was filed March 27, 2014—even before the ink had dried on the bailout packages to Ukraine. His initial lobbying disclosures were generic, though USAID was mentioned as an agency Pasternak sought to target. Once the specific Ukrainian assistance resolution (which Schiff cosponsored) was introduced, Pasternak’s disclosures got more specific.154
As H.R. 955 was meandering through House committees in early 2015, Pasternak aggressively lobbied for its adoption. On April 20, Pasternak’s company disclosed its lobbying efforts on issues that included: “Continued efforts on gaining support and promoting Aeroscraft and lighter-than-air (LTA) product line, including integrating surveillance equipment,” and “Promoting HR 955 the Ukraine Support Act, which will help provide funding for defensive weapons to Ukraine.” Less than sixty days later, Pasternak’s lobbying had apparently paid off.155
In mid-June 2015, Pasternak’s Aeroscraft signed a deal with Ukraine’s defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom. Aeroscraft and Ukroboronprom would be partnering to produce (or retrofit) assault rifles for Ukraine compatible with NATO-standard ammunition (5.56mm rounds).156 This would allow Ukraine to retire their antiquated Kalashnikovs (Soviet-era compatibility) and adopt NATO standards by 2020. Pasternak highlighted the ramifications: “when you see a Ukrainian soldier with a NATO weapon in his hand, it is a strong political message to Russia.”157
Pasternak was thrilled at how quickly his company became a major player in the Ukrainian defense sector. His Washington connections had paid off.
“This is the first time in my practice when the decision to grant a license for the production of weapons in another country was provided by the U.S. government that quickly,” Pasternak boasted at a press conference in January 2017. “We got a license in three weeks and we are already working on setting up production of NATO weapons production in Ukraine.”158
The West had been pushing for reforms in the Ukrainian defense ministry since the 2014 revolution at least. Over time, those reform efforts paved the way for increased Ukrainian cooperation with U.S. and NATO defense contractors (a contentious issue). As a sign of the increased cooperation, the Obama Defense Department invited Ukroboronprom’s CEO, Roman Romanov, to the United States to meet with American defense officials and attend a prestigious weapons conference.159
There was just one problem: Ukroboronprom was a hotbed of corruption and could not be trusted to manage aid money properly.160
International monitors were growing increasingly concerned with the billions (and counting) in missing Ukrainian aid money. By late 2017, the lack of transparency—particularly in Ukrainian defense budgets—was becoming an unavoidable issue.161
At a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (or “CSCE,” which is also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission) hearing in the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, the issue of Trump’s military aid to Ukraine vis-à-vis ongoing corruption arose.162
An attendee from the Center for International Policy (among several Soros-funded NGOs in attendance) asked: “As we’re awaiting President Trump’s decision to transfer defensive weapons to Ukraine, are there any concerns about this affecting current anti-corruption efforts going on in the country, and is there any anti-corruption body that is prepared to oversee this?”163
The moderator asked who the question was directed to. The attendee replied, “Whoever wants to answer it.” “Give it to Orest [former CSCE policy advisor]. He’ll answer anything,” the moderator quipped.164
The former CSCE policy advisor acknowledged that the defense sector was still undergoing reform, but that transparency problems in the procurement process remained. “You have this secrecy law on procurement which even includes things like buckets and socks, for instance, so there’s a lack of transparency….”165
He emphasized that Ukrainians, particularly decision makers, were growing frustrated with the opaque nature of the defense sector, and he specifically identified Pasternak’s partnering entity as central to the problem. Efforts were supposedly underway to make the “whole process more open and transparent, especially also when it comes to Ukroboronprom.”166
A report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that the Ukrainian defense sector was plagued by a “lack of internal coordination between structures; lack of civilian and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces; incomplete integration of volunteers into the regular army; impunity and abusive behavior in the conflict zone; and systemic corruption and non-transparency of budgets.”167
The Carnegie report concluded that Ukroboronprom was a primary driver of corruption:
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that one state-owned conglomerate, Ukroboronprom—variously referred to as a “monster” and a “parasite”—enjoys a de facto monopoly over Ukraine’s defense industry.168
Indeed, the Trump administration was beginning to view Ukroboronprom as a center of corruption in the Ukrainian defense sector.
By mid-2018, the Trump administration was digging into corruption in Ukraine (President Trump was especially concerned with misspent U.S. foreign aid). Trump’s State Department specifically identified Ukroboronprom as a corrupt entity.169
“Ukroboronprom remains very much an umbrella group that provides many of the opportunities for corruption in the military security sphere in Ukraine,” Deputy Assistant Secretary Jorgan K. Andrews said at a foreign press briefing on June 26, 2018. “This umbrella organization [Ukroboronprom] was created to provide kind of this overarching cover for all of the other defense industrial enterprises,” Andrews went on. “And so that middleman doesn’t need to exist, and that middleman provides opportunities for corruption.”170
The State Department deputy left little doubt that Trump’s State and Defense Departments were “working closely with Ukrainian counterparts to recommend serious, profound reforms to the defense industrial sector.”171
Why was Schiff so concerned with Trump seeking to investigate corruption in Ukraine? How many other impeachment-obsessed Democrats had taken money from Pasternak or other Ukrainian interests? Would placing a hold on military aid to Ukraine affect Pasternak’s contracts with Ukroboronprom?
These questions and so many others demand answers.
Uranium One Cover-up and the 2016 Collusion Delusion
The allegations of Trump-Russia collusion are rooted in Ukraine and center around Trump’s former campaign manager Paul Manafort. On August 14, 2016, the Ukrainian efforts to sabotage the Trump campaign went public.
The New York Times published a report titled “Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump’s Campaign Chief.” The report was based on anonymous sources who alleged that Manafort was implicated in a bribery scheme (evidenced by secret payments documented in the so-called “black ledger”). The report was published on a Sunday night, and by Monday morning the allegations had gone viral internationally.172
Then the Clinton spin machine sprang into action. Clinton’s friend, fundraiser, and confidante David Brock used his Media Matters blog (another recipient of Soros’ largesse) to blast the Manafort story and pressure the media to do likewise.173
On the morning of Friday, August 19, 2016, CBS News interviewed Serhiy Leshchenko, the Ukrainian who worked with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the DNC operative Alexandra Chalupa on the dubious black ledger story. Coincidentally, Leshchenko worked with Soros operatives and was at the March 2014 meeting in Kiev (per the leaked OSF memo), and Chalupa was a longtime Clinton ally (and former Clinton White House staffer) working to advance her candidacy.174
During the interview, CBS News aired small snippets of the alleged black ledger on screen. After the interview, Leshchenko quickly posted a link to the interview (uploaded by Clinton-linked Media Matters) on his Facebook page. His comment read:
Our morning’s report on Yanukovych’s money for Manafort…hit the morning news of the American TV channel CBS News. I think this was the last nails in the cover of Manafort’s coffin. I hope that Trump is with him. (translation)175
Before lunchtime, Manafort had resigned from the Trump campaign.176
It did not take long for the Chalupas to take a victory lap. Alexandra’s sister Andrea emailed her colleagues: “Exciting day: Paul Manafort resigned from the Trump campaign and will likely face an investigation for not declaring being a foreign agent while lobbying for Yanukovych and his party.”177
Chalupa’s and her Ukrainian colleagues’ efforts—which she admitted to—helped fan the flames of an FBI operation already underway code-named “Crossfire Hurricane.” The Crossfire Hurricane operation (run by the FBI’s top officials, including James Comey, Andrew McCabe, and FBI “lovebirds” Peter Strzok and Lisa Page) was examining possible collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. That FBI probe ultimately led to a special counsel investigation headed by former FBI Director Robert Mueller. But after many months (and millions spent), Mueller came up with no evidence of collusion.178
Unsatisfied, Trump’s opponents prepared for their next effort to remove him from the White House. This time, Trump was accused of abusing his power by questioning Ukraine’s ongoing corruption and raising doubts over whether foreign aid to Ukraine was being misused—completely valid concerns.
The impeachment case that Schiff and the House managers presented was flimsy. Impeachable offenses must meet the constitutional threshold of “high crimes and misdemeanors,” but the Democrats’ charges—“abuse of power” and “obstruction of Congress”—were not even real crimes (which the Democrats openly acknowledged). The allegation was that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had been pressured to investigate the Bidens and Burisma or risk losing its U.S. aid.179
It took less than two months for Trump’s legal team to expose the weaknesses in that evidence and defeat Schiff’s impeachment effort.
Trump Exonerated
On February 5, 2020, President Trump was acquitted on both charges leveled against him by the House managers. The so-called “Schiff Show” had finally ended. The impeachment inquiry formally began on September 24, 2019, but efforts to remove Donald Trump began literally minutes after he was inaugurated in January 2017.180
Trump maintains that his interaction with Zelensky was a “perfect phone call,” and the transcript released by the White House contains no apparent quid pro quo (an allegation that Schiff repeated ad nauseam).181
To understand Trump’s motives, some context must be applied. The very real problem of corruption in Ukraine dates back decades—since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries in Europe (and possibly the world).182
The specific issues that Trump asked Zelensky to get to the bottom of were allegations of Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election and possible bribery involving Biden.
The allegations that Ukraine meddled in the 2016 election were first publicized by New York Times reporter Ken Vogel (at Politico at the time). Vogel and his colleague David Stern reported that the Ukrainian government worked closely with DNC operatives to support the Clinton campaign. The alleged bribery efforts involving Burisma and Biden date back to the collapse of Obama’s Russia reset and subsequent efforts to perform damage control on Obama’s disastrous Russia policy via Ukraine. While at the New York Times, Vogel reported on the Biden allegations as well.183
The allegations that Trump asked Zelensky to investigate implicate numerous individuals (including Biden and Clinton) and their tangled web of cross-border relationships that span continents and decades. Obama was at the center of this web. Obama, his former officials, and their cronies circled their wagons around Clinton first and then again around Biden. The implications are manifold.
Not only was Trump exonerated and cleared of the charge that his campaign colluded with Russia, but in an ironic twist, DNC operative Chalupa reportedly solicited Ukrainian officials for dirt on Trump stating that the “DNC wanted to collect evidence [proving] that Trump, his organization and Manafort were Russian assets.” Chalupa supplied Clinton’s team with Trump dirt after coordinating with Ukrainian officials—in other words, they colluded. Chalupa tried to distance herself from her previous statement, but more evidence indicates she was correct the first time. Furthermore, current and former government officials close to Vice President Biden attempted to conceal the Ukrainian collusion along with Biden’s alleged corruption.184
For example, the alleged “whistleblower” who kicked off the Trump impeachment inquiry in September 2019 was a thirty-three-year-old CIA operative named Eric Ciaramella. Ciaramella was an Obama NSC holdover who reportedly expressed hostility toward Trump and sought to undermine the president beginning in 2017. Three of Ciaramella’s NSC colleagues—Ukraine-born Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman and staffers Sean Misko and Abby Grace—played major roles in the impeachment effort. Misko and Grace left the NSC to join Congressman Schiff’s staff in 2019. Vindman reportedly relayed the July 25 Zelensky call to Ciaramella, who then worked with Schiff’s staff on the complaint against Trump (an allegation that Schiff’s office denied).185
A further shocking development was that Ciaramella (a Ukraine analyst who advised Biden) met with DNC contractor Chalupa during the 2016 campaign as she investigated then-candidate Trump. The proximity of these obscure relationships is unsettling and has compelled lawmakers and government watchdogs to demand further investigations.186
Had the Democrats not promoted the Trump-Russia conspiracy theory so vigorously, it is possible that House Republicans and President Trump’s legal team would have left the 2016 election in the past. Ironically, during the efforts to defend Trump against baseless accusations of being “Putin’s puppet,” investigators uncovered a broader and more convincing case that the Clinton campaign (with help from Obama officials and the DNC) colluded with multiple foreign governments—primarily Ukraine, the U.K., and Australia—to influence the 2016 election campaign.187
Obama’s doctrine had proven to be little more than an elusive aspiration. The Democrats had overplayed their hand. And it had boomeranged.