With Their Bare Hands

By November 1 Liggett believed that First Army was rested and ready to resume the offensive. Foch, the commander in chief, concentrated on severing German rail communications along the Western Front, particularly at Sedan and Mézières, in the sectors of First Army and the neighboring French Fourth Army respectively. He wanted Liggett to attack westward from the Romagne Heights into the Bois de Bourgogne, a wooded plateau that formed a northward extension of the Argonne Forest and that dominated both the left flank of First Army and the right flank of the French Fourth. Liggett, not wanting to get bogged down in another forest battle, decided instead to attack northward across Barricourt Heights, leaving the Bois de Bourgogne to be occupied after the bypassed German defenders had withdrawn. Unlike many of the divisions used in the initial attack on September 26, his troops now were experienced veterans, adept in artillery coordination and sophisticated tactics such as infiltration and night attacks. V Corps in the center, now commanded by Summerall, would deliver the main attack northward while I Corps on the left pinned the Germans to the Bois de Bourgogne and III Corps on the right drove the enemy back to and across the Meuse. Ever the artillerist, Summerall developed a firing plan for the November 1 assault that included several days of gas, shrapnel, and high explosive on “all enemy organizations, batteries, and routes of communication.” Sudden, intense firing several times a day would keep the Germans guessing as to when the next phase of the attack would open and would shield the registration of the American guns. A complex pattern of standing and rolling barrages was devised. Liggett’s order for the operation prescribed that “fire superiority, rather than sheer man power, be the driving force of the attack.”¹ Liggett’s army had come a long way from Pershing’s infantry-first doctrine.

But since the first week of the Meuse–Argonne offensive it had been obvious that sustained forward progress would depend on silencing the formidable German artillery east of the river. Of the 77 heavy batteries facing First Army early in October, 28—almost 40 percent—were hidden in the defiles of the Heights of the Meuse, directed from observation posts on the Borne de Cornouiller and other promontories overlooking the Meuse valley and the countryside to its west.² Numbers alone do not reveal the problem they posed for the Americans. Not only were the German guns unthreatened by enemy infantry, they were firing in enfilade, making aiming particularly easy. Precision in elevation was not critical; as long as they got the azimuth right, they were pretty certain to hit something. Conversely, the trenches and reverse hillsides on which the Americans relied for shelter ran the wrong way—parallel to the German line of fire rather than across it. The attacks of the American 29th and 33rd Divisions and the French XVII Corps in October had made progress on the east bank of the river, and the volume of fire had diminished somewhat; but the attacks stalled short of the Borne de Cornouiller itself, and the Germans continued to pummel the divisions to the west.

There was a strategic element to the Borne position as well. By the last week of October Ludendorff was withdrawing his forces all along the line, hoping to maintain a continuous defense that would keep the Allies out of Germany. His plan was to retire to a holding position along the Meuse north of Verdun. But doing so required that the supply lines through the Carignan–Sedan–Mézières railroad, which lay in the path of the American advance, be kept open, so retreating from the Kriemhilde-Stellung in front of First Army was impossible; it would have to be defended.³ Ludendorff’s line resembled a door swinging northeastward, its hinge the hilly terrain around the Borne de Cornouiller. If the door could be removed from its hinge, it might fall flat.

On the night of October 27–28 the men of the 79th marched from Verdun to the Bois des Forges, on the west side of the Meuse. There they halted for the day to avoid observation by the ever-present German reconnaissance planes. But the woods had been so wrecked by shell fire that little cover was available; soon enough, shells started to land, killing several engineers. At least the men left with one fond memory of the Bois: a meal of bacon, bread, jam, and coffee, a rare treat.⁴ The following night the division crossed the Meuse to take up its new position in the line of the French XVII Corps, Major General Henri Claudel commanding.

The line held by XVII Corps on October 27 was an arc with its left end anchored on the Meuse and then reaching to the east, southeast, and south. The French 15th Colonial Infantry Division held the left-most sector, a two and a half-mile stretch running eastward south of the riverside town of Sivry-sur-Meuse. To its right was the American 29th Division, now to be relieved by the 79th, holding a front that faced north where it met the 15th D.I.C. but east at its lower extremity. The next division to the right was the American 26th, also facing east and scheduled to shift southward; the 79th would take up the vacancy left by its northernmost brigade. Two more French divisions and the American 81st Division to the south completed the front of XVII Corps and First Army.

The sector assigned to the 79th was a difficult one. To the north and nearly a mile away towered the Borne de Cornouiller, fronted by Molleville Farm, a fortified agricultural compound nestled in a depression at the foot of the hill. The hill itself was bald and offered no cover to attackers. To its right was the forested slope of the Grande Montagne, rising to a peak of 388 meters; its dense woods would let the well-sited German machine guns fire into the flank of any unit attempting to take the Borne. Proceeding clockwise around the arc one encountered a series of small, interlinked woods: the Bois d’Etraye, Bois de Wavrille, Belleu Bois, Bois des Chênes, and Bois d’Ormont, which bordered the position of the neighboring 26th Division. All of them were sited on small hills or the slopes of larger hills, and most were at least partially occupied by the enemy, whose trenches were often only a hundred yards away. As in September, the Germans overlooked the Americans at almost all points along the line. Having been in the sector a long time, their artillery was very familiar with the positions to be taken up by the 79th and would be able to drop shells accurately among them from the moment the division moved in.⁵

But the division had several advantages it had not enjoyed in its previous fight. Its total frontage was a little less than five miles—three times the breadth of its original attack at Montfaucon.⁶ Someone had figured out that jamming 27,000 men into a sector a mile and a half wide had served only to prevent maneuvering and make supply almost hopeless. Second, the division was well served by roads. Two—from Consenvoye to Etraye and from Brabant to Etraye—converged immediately behind the left subsector of the division’s line. The road to Etraye continued parallel to and behind the front, where it was joined by a road coming up from Samogneux to the south. A spur of the latter branched northeastward near the village of Ormont, passing through the Bois des Chênes on the division’s right. Supplying the troops, while always difficult in battle, would not be impossible. As the regiments of the 79th went into the line, the 304th Supply Train set up a station in the rear to distribute supplies, hot food, spare parts, and first aid. The 304th Sanitary Train set up a gas hospital and dressing stations along the roads leading from the front. The 304th Ammunition Train set up dumps at locations convenient for truck transport. Traffic control and road discipline worked well.⁷ Third, mindful of the poor support the artillery had provided in the opening days of the offensive, Liggett had First Army reorganize the army and corps artillery and change the target acquisition system. An operations section was assigned to each army and corps artillery headquarters to assist the staffs in coordinating fire against important targets. Because of their long range and wide field of fire, the heavy guns could now support many divisions on a single day without moving. Also, several heavy artillery brigades could combine their fire on a single objective. This allowed the artillery to adapt its fire to different conditions across the battlefield. And instead of liaison officers assigned solely to units, they were assigned to areas as well. Anything they observed within their assigned area was reported to the artillery, whether it involved an American unit or not. Observers attached to units were responsible for reporting the unit commander’s plans in advance so that artillery support could be arranged.⁸ Most important, Liggett removed the restriction on artillery bombardments close ahead of the attacking infantry. This permitted the guns to assist the attackers all the way to the objective.⁹ Moreover, Kuhn and his staff had learned how to call on corps artillery for support and how to use their own guns to advance the attack and to aid in defense. The machine gun battalions in particular had become skilled at beating off counterattacks.¹⁰ The men now knew to spread out and to dig in quickly in anticipation of artillery fire. Officers had learned to avoid frontal attacks in favor of flank assaults and small-unit strikes on individual strong points.¹¹

79TH DIVISION OPERATIONS, OCTOBER 30–NOVEMBER 11, 1918

One may reasonably ask how the division acquired its newfound proficiency. Some of it came from above: on October 14, Drum, now a brigadier general, ordered all divisions not serving in the front lines to resume their training. “Special emphasis must be placed on the training of recruits and the correction of tactical deficiencies noted in recent engagements.”¹² Accompanying this order was a flood of directives and memoranda on tactics: how to use combined arms—infantry, artillery, smoke, tanks—to silence German machine gun nests; how to coordinate artillery with infantry to avoid shelling one’s own troops; and others.¹³ Even the French got into the act, despite Pershing’s aversion to taking advice from foreigners. Their liaison mission issued a note on how to organize captured positions against counterattacks.¹⁴ General Claudel, commanding XVII Corps, sent the 79th a memorandum on methods for attacking in wooded and rugged terrain.¹⁵ These directives did not merely rest on paper. As we have seen, when the 79th occupied the Troyon sector Kuhn held the 158th Brigade back for training. He augmented this with exercises for cadres, drawn from each regiment and battalion, who would return to their units to impart the lessons they had learned.¹⁶ But while helpful, such measures could not by themselves instill in the officers and men the battlefield instincts they would need to dominate the enemy. The answer can only be that, in the words of historian Andrew Wiest, the AEF had “learned to fight by fighting.” American field- and company-grade officers, learning from their mistakes, taught themselves on the spot the rudiments of staff work, logistics, and tactics.¹⁷

Kuhn assigned his 158th Brigade, now under Brigadier General Evan Johnson, to the left half of the division’s sector and the 157th, under Nicholson, to the right. Johnson, in turn, would place the 316th Infantry Regiment on his left, facing north to the Borne and northeast to the Grande Montagne, and the 315th to its right in the Bois d’Etrayes. Each regiment was to be reinforced by a company or two of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion. Nicholson’s subsector would have the 314th Infantry Regiment (Oury) on the left, spread across the Bois Belleu and the Bois d’Ormont, facing northeast to east, and the 313th (under Colonel Rogers, replacing Sweezey, who was ill) in the Bois d’Ormont on the right facing due eastward. Between them the 311th Machine Gun Battalion would hold the Bois des Chênes. For artillery support the 79th took over the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade from the departing 33rd Division. Commanded by Brigadier General George Albert Wingate, the brigade had been in the area for over a month, so it knew the terrain and the enemy positions.

As the division crossed the Meuse the 158th Brigade turned north. In his diary, Sergeant Davies of the 315th described the march to his platoon’s front-line position:

As we go up thru the dense woods we stumble over many bodies both American and German. The stench from the decaying flesh is terrible and I am almost sick. I think, as we pick our way over these poor bruised bodies, how little the value of life is here ... I can picture the sorrow of the loved ones when they get the word “Killed in Action,” but I wonder if they can realize the living death their boys experienced before the long sleep came to them.¹⁸

The Germans had only recently abandoned these positions, and the countryside showed the detritus of October’s attacks by the French XVII Corps:

The open land across the road, sloping into the ravine of Molleville Farm, was pock-marked with enemy fire, and the farm at the bottom was a crumbled heap of stone. On the far side of the ravine, both to the east and the north, the Germans held the woods, and had the P. C. and the road leading northward to the crossroad under perfect observation. This deathdealing road was lined with broken water carts, dead horses, ammunition boxes, empty marmite cans, and every description of equipment left by men killed while carrying supplies up to the lines.¹⁹

To the south, the regiments of the 157th Brigade had to get to their new lines by hiking up a ravine shown on the map as the Fond de Walonsevaux but called by the men “Death Valley,” a name bestowed by the French former occupants of the sector. As the darkness receded, Lieutenant Kress of the 314th’s machine gun company observed the scene before him:

Here lay a German, his arm drawn back and in his hand a grenade, caught at the critical moment by the messenger of death. There lay another with a flare pistol in his hand, crouched as if he were about to fire, even as a final bullet pierced his brain ... All about lay the shattered bodies of American and German dead, torn and retorn by the constant fall of shells and mortars. Investigation of the bodies showed them to belong to three divisions, the 26th, 29th, and 33rd. Some of them must have been lying there for weeks.²⁰

Nonetheless, many in the division were eager to take the Heights, nursing a grudge as they did over the rough handling they had received from the German guns back in September.

General Claudel’s first task for the 79th was to attack northward, taking the Borne de Cornouiller. Kuhn assigned this mission to the 158th Brigade, while the 157th held its east-facing line until further orders. The Borne not only overlooked the Meuse valley to its west, it also commanded the roads leading east through the Heights to the Woëvre plain where, in addition to their large guns, the Germans had concentrated their railheads, supply depots, and major troop encampments at Etraye, Réville, and Ecurey. Claudel’s orders were phrased in terms of a pursuit eastward, assuming that the Borne would fall easily. This was quickly revealed to be optimistic; patrols reported that the hill was strongly held by German troops who showed no inclination to leave. In fact, German intelligence had identified the 79th Division as soon as it appeared east of the Meuse and predicted that an attack in that sector was imminent. Ludendorff himself, looking on the offensive as a threat to the vital railroad through Mézières, forbade withdrawal from the Heights and sent reinforcements, eventually committing 27 of his reserve divisions to this sector.²¹

Opposing the 158th Brigade would be two German divisions, the 228th and the 192nd, entrenched in the Giselher-Stellung, which ran across the Borne. The 192nd, to the east, was a veteran of the Verdun battles of 1916 and the British counterattack at Amiens in August 1918. In September it had been put into the tip of the salient at St Mihiel, almost immediately retreating as part of the general German withdrawal. Reaching the Borne de Cornouiller on October 24, it had come under heavy bombardment; its 192nd Infantry Regiment had lost four officers and many men in three days and morale was low. American intelligence rated the 192nd as third class.²² The 228th, to its west, had been formed only in May 1917 from regiments scavenged from other divisions; it had suffered many casualties in the French attacks west of the Meuse in August of that year. Reorganized and sent to rest in the Heights of the Meuse, it had then participated in Ludendorff’s Operation Michael in April 1918; all three of its regiments lost heavily. In early October it had been sent to the Meuse–Argonne front, where it fought at Cunel, and was then switched to the east bank of the Meuse. Its regiments reported morale to be high, which its officers ascribed to a policy of shipping “questionable revolutionary forces” to the rear. It too was rated third class by the Americans.²³ But the Germans held the high ground, they were fighting in defense, and they knew the terrain well.

The brigades of the 79th were in position by the morning of November 1 but no movements were ordered for two more days, except for short-range patrols. At first the men thought their accommodations looked pretty good, but they soon found out the hard way that the Germans knew they were there. Captain Glock of the 316th Infantry later wrote of his new regimental PC:

Four of the staff were in an end room working on maps, and two, who had been lying in the middle room resting from a dose of gas, had just gone out for fresh air when a “250” landed a square hit, clove through rock and logs, split the rails, and dropped the roof in the middle room. The officers in the end room were trapped and had to dig out through a little aperture.²⁴

Running short of high explosive ammunition, the German guns soon switched to gas as their primary weapon. On the night of October 31 they shelled the brigade with yellow cross while laying down blue cross and HE on the roads and gullies in the area. Two similar bombardments took place over the next two days. (The 79th would suffer 159 wounded and 80 gassed in its first six days in the Grande Montagne sector.)²⁵ The brigade had started out with two battalions in the front line of each of its two regiments and one in support. But enemy shell fire was so heavy that General Johnson had them each pull one battalion back to minimize casualties. So each regiment had one battalion in front with three companies in the front line and one in support; a second battalion in support; and one company assigned to brigade reserve in the rear. But the shelling continued, heavy and unrelenting, causing many casualties especially among the ration and ammunition carriers, runners, and telephone linemen, all of whom had to cross exposed terrain to accomplish their missions. Several were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross—the second-highest decoration—for their daring.²⁶

As the 79th got acclimated to its new sector, Liggett’s November 1 attack west of the Meuse got off to a roaring start. First Army artillery fired one-quarter of a million shells, over twice the number used on September 26.²⁷ Summerall’s V Corps drove five and a half miles northward and by evening had seized the Barricourt Heights; III Corps to its right made half the distance but took the strategic towns of Andevanne and Aincreville. A day later the Germans withdrew from the outflanked Bois de Bourgogne, as Liggett had predicted; north of the wood, at Boult aux Bois, men of I Corps and the French Fourth Army met and shook hands. The war diary of Army Group Gallwitz reported, “Lieut. Col. Wetzell [Chief of Operations at OHL] ... states that all of the front line commanders report that the Americans are attacking in mass formations in the general direction of Stenay, that the [German] troops are fighting courageously but just cannot do anything. ‘Therefore it has become imperative that the Army be withdrawn in rear of the Meuse and that said withdrawal be effected immediately.’”²⁸ On November 4, Groener ordered a withdrawal to the Antwerp–Meuse line. The entire German line west of the river was in full retreat, and the American attack there turned from an advance into a pursuit. Foch and Pétain were impressed; the latter summarized the reports of the French observers:

These officers inform me that a very remarkable improvement has taken place, that there has been a conspicuous absence of difficulties which occur[r]ed in the advance of September 26th; road movements occur in order, orders in all the units are given well and timely, and ... that the already splendid advance can yet be continued because of the excellent manner in which the whole affair has been managed.²⁹

On November 2, XVII Corps ordered a strong reconnaissance northward for the next day to determine whether the Germans were withdrawing east of the Meuse as well, as First Army airplane reports had led them to believe. The 79th was directed to send patrols against the Borne de Cornouiller; General Johnson gave the mission to the 316th Infantry. Three patrols would advance, each consisting of a forward platoon and one in support plus a section of machine guns and a 37mm mobile gun. Even as they moved into attack position, the three patrols were heavily shelled with HE and gas. Lieutenant Ira Lady of Company E sent a message to Colonel Williams at the PC of the 316th, “Caught in box barrage by H.E. and Phosgene at corner of trail to Headquarters from 1st Battalion P.C. and public roads. Half men gassed. Am waiting orders. Thirty men from E Company gassed. Two wounded.”³⁰ An officer went forward to reorganize the patrols and lead them to the jumpoff point. As shells burst around them, the NCOs distributed ammunition and automatic rifle magazines. Fortunately, no shells fell among the tightly clustered men.

At 5:30 a.m. on November 3 the guns of the 52nd Field Artillery opened up on the German lines; 30 minutes later the three patrols moved forward. The right-most group, heading northeast into the Bois de la Grande Montagne, immediately ran into impenetrable underbrush and got nowhere. The left group, under Captain Francis Johnson and Lieutenant Lady, went straight for the Borne; but machine guns from the trenches above quickly stopped them cold, killing Captain Johnson and wounding Lieutenant Lady. Lieutenant Harold Allston, leading the machine gun section, took command and fought in place until noon, taking prisoners and destroying several machine gun nests. In the center, the patrol under Lieutenants Harry Gabriel and Rudolph Peterson moved slightly northeast, heading for the wooded rise on the eastern flank of the Borne, designated Hill 370. They had gotten about 1,200 yards when they ran into strong machine gun fire. Dropping back to reorganize, they made another 300 yards but then, almost surrounded by German machine guns, withdrew again down the slopes of Hill 370. Unable to maintain his position and with German troops, familiar with the woods and trails, infiltrating around him, Gabriel moved his command to the left to support Allston’s group. After some anxious moments Captain Louis C. Knack brought up his Company B to reinforce the two groups. This was sufficient for the 316th to hold the ground gained; although the Germans continued to shell the position, the regiment spent the night consolidating its new territory and running telephone lines to the rear.³¹

The dead of the 316th for the day were three officers and 20 men.³² There was no count of the wounded; but at least now they were being well cared for. An inspector found that in the 79th:

All wounded questioned stated they had received good care and water and had reached the triage within from one to three hours after having been wounded. As the triage is situated by the side of Evacuation hospital #15 it is only a question of a few minutes in getting the wounded from the triage to the hospital.³³

I am now laid in a row with about forty other stretcher cases in another room. The poor chap on my left died before I was taken into the operating room. Finally two huskies came in and grabbed my stretcher and started off with it. I asked one of them where we are bound for and he tells me I am very lucky as I was to be operated on by the famous Major Graves ... I was placed on a table, and I suppose it was the famous Graves, started to poke around my leg. I heard him say something about infection and hemorrhage in the wound then he turned to a chap, who was standing over me with a bottle and a cloth and said, “smother him.” This guy dropped the cloth over my face and started to feed me ether ... Can I believe my eyes, I am in a real honest to God bed, and its got a white sheet on it. I sure don’t know how to act. This is the first time since I left the States that I have been in a real bed.³⁴

Although the cost was excessive, the reconnaissance-in-force had real results. It gained a foothold on the Borne from which an attack could be mounted on the crest and on Hill 370 nearby. It made the Germans reveal their strength, positions, and tactics, particularly their way of rapidly changing positions and moving back into unoccupied territory once the Americans had passed. It demonstrated the enemy’s system for coordinating artillery and infantry, allowing them to drop a barrage wherever it was needed. Still, the operation took its toll on morale. At 2:30 the next morning the commander of Company K reported:

Effectives – 2 officers, 115 men ... Connection with both flanks. Line solid. Estimate killed of old K. Co. here, Lt. Peterson & 5 men, of new Co. K 1 man. Wounded. Lt. Sayres and 10 men of old K Co., of new Co. 14 men. Self inflicted wounds 2, Deserted posts 4, left 8. Morale low. Rations none. Last rations received night before last. Men from both Cos – no packs or equipment. Automatics out of order from lack of automatic [illegible] and oil. Under heavy shelling and rifle grenade fire. Intermittent sniping. No water or means of chlorination. Think I can hold out tho. Might have to shoot some men for example. If this can not be done let me know.* Get us rations & ammunition. Am sending Peterson’s wallet for your safe keeping. [Emphasis in the original.]³⁵

* The reference to shooting men as an example, which occurs in other messages from company commanders, was certainly an expression of frustration, not of intent. Eleven soldiers were executed in the AEF, all for murder or rape. No one was executed for desertion or cowardice. (Subcommittee on Military Affairs United States Senate, “Establishment of Military Justice–Proposed Amendment of the Articles of War,” (Washington, DC, September 25, 1919), p. 566.

Still on the theory that only rear guards opposed the French 15th Division and the 158th Brigade, General Claudel ordered another attack on the Borne for the next morning, November 4. Johnson assigned the 315th to make a supporting attack into the Bois de la Grande Montagne on the east while the 316th’s 1st Battalion would attack the Borne on the left and the 3rd Battalion would attack its east slope as well as Hill 370 to its right. The artillery would lay down preparatory fire at 5:45 a.m. and the infantry would attack 15 minutes later.

The supporting attack of the 315th got off on time. The terrain in front of them was the same that had confronted the patrol of the 316th the previous day: a tangle of woods and underbrush heavily defended by machine guns. The leading battalion used infiltration tactics, sending small parties of men forward between the defending positions, which allowed them to capture some of the machine guns. Nonetheless, they suffered heavy losses and had to halt after a few hundred yards. One platoon of C Company, 1st Battalion, got too far ahead of its neighbors and lost contact, fighting for 27 hours before it could be brought back. By 11:00 a.m. the advance had halted and 1st Battalion dug in to defend its position.³⁶

The main attack was carried out by two battalions of the 316th. Covered by morning fog, the 1st on the left, under Major Parkin, went straight up the hill while the 3rd, under Major Manning, covered their right flank by moving into the woods on the eastern shoulder of the Borne. By 7:13 a.m. Manning was able to telephone back to Colonel Williams, “Everything going well. We have captured 7 machine guns and 39 prisoners,” and 20 minutes later, “Things are going along as reported before. Ten more prisoners, one machine gun. Enemy artillery has not increased in its fire. Hill 370 practically in our hands as far as the 365 contour.”³⁷

The attack of the 1st Battalion, however, did not go well. Progress up the bare slope of the Borne was slow, the Germans contesting every foot, and hand-to-hand combat was common. By 7:55 a.m. Major Parkin sent a runner back to regimental headquarters saying that his right had reached the crest of the hill and his left was not far behind, but that he expected to be shelled once the fog lifted and would need counterbattery fire.³⁸ In the words of the divisional historian, “What happened in the ensuing hour or two is vague.” Parkin was with Company B on the left of his battalion. Company C on the right was down to 25 men and, although it gained the crest, could not hold its position; it withdrew to the shelter of the Bois de la Grande Montagne. Company B should have been protected on its left by the French 15th Division, which was to have attacked simultaneously; but it found itself taking heavy fire from that direction, with the French nowhere to be found. Parkin sent a runner back at 12:10 p.m. describing his position. Shortly thereafter he was seriously wounded and his successor, Captain Knack, was killed. As the fog lifted, two companies of German infantry rushed Company B. Badly outnumbered, three officers (including Major Parkin) and 21 men surrendered and were taken prisoner.³⁹

When no further word came from Parkin after 7:55 a.m. but the noise of the battle continued, Colonel Williams became concerned and ordered the 1st Battalion reserve, Company D, forward; soon thereafter he sent Captain Carl Glock up the hill with a machine gun detachment to help out. Then Parkin’s runner arrived, too exhausted to give a coherent account of the situation; all he could remember of the message was, “Am being outflanked.”⁴⁰ Surmising that the crest had been lost, Williams ordered a company of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion to fire on the position. This they did for 20 minutes. Then, knowing to expect retaliatory fire, they dismounted their guns and sought shelter. The German response demolished their now-empty positions. Company D, meanwhile, was able to locate Company C but found no trace of Company B or the French. Its commander, Lieutenant Maxwell McKeen, was mortally wounded. The company traded fire with German machine guns, capturing four of them with their gunners; but it was obvious the position could not be held without protection on their left, so Company D fell back to the southern slope of the Borne. Glock’s detachment of about 60 men, coming up behind, found a badly depleted force on top of the hill. Glock himself described their advance:

As the men crept up the lower slopes of the hill an enemy plane swooped close over their heads, opening its machine gun on them. After a brief concealment in a patch of underbrush, they resumed their slow advance, and in the trenches on the hill found the dead left by the morning attack. But there remained not a living soul, not one man of the battalion that had swept up the hill in the morning ... There were not enough men in the reinforcement to fill the whole gap between I Company and the French far to the left, and the line merely zigzagged east and west in shell-hole groups of two and three just back of the open crest of the hill, ignorant of the fate of the 1st Battalion that morning, and awaiting into the night the fortunes of war.⁴¹

Glock and his men joined Company C on the southern slope where they spent the night, withstanding heavy shelling and several enemy patrols that attempted unsuccessfully to make them abandon the position. The 316th had taken and lost the crest twice in the same day. It had suffered three officers and 34 men killed, 22 taken prisoner, and an unknown number wounded.⁴²

That night word came from XVII Corps that the Germans on the west bank of the Meuse were retiring in disorganized fashion and had exhausted all their reserves, and it was possible that the Heights of the Meuse were now being held with reduced forces. III Corps was planning to cross the Meuse at Dun-sur-Meuse to drive the Germans to the northeast. The 79th Division was ordered to continue its attacks on the Borne de Cornouiller to support III Corps. The supposed weakening of the German defenses in front of him must have been news to Kuhn; First Army’s own operations report said that in his sector, “... not only was there violent resistance to any attack, but also repeated counterattacks to regain the lost positions.”⁴³ Nevertheless, Kuhn ordered Johnson to send one battalion northward as the assaulting force with another battalion in support. The attack would start at 9:00 a.m. on the 5th, accompanied by a preparatory bombardment by two corps batteries of 240mm howitzers from 8:30 to 10:15 a.m.; interdiction would be laid down by the division’s 155mm guns and its 75mms would furnish a barrage.

The problem was that the battalions of the 315th and 316th were badly depleted by the actions of the previous two days, with their companies scattered south and east of the crest of the Borne and some of them down to one platoon’s strength. Eventually Colonel Williams put together a provisional battalion with three companies from the 316th and one from the 315th that had not been as badly used up; Major Manning was to lead it. But two of the companies could not be found in time, so Manning decided to attack with the remaining two. Supported by the 310th Machine Gun Battalion and part of the 312th, the detachment took off at 8:30 a.m. and joined Glock’s detachment below the ridge at 9:00 a.m. The combined force advanced into heavy machine gun fire, Major Manning in front swinging his cane in the fashion of a British battalion leader on the Somme. They were able to sweep the Germans off the top by 9:30 a.m., but as he cleared the crest the major was killed by machine gun fire. As they proceeded slowly down the northern slope, two more officers and two NCOs were quickly killed, along with many men. Glock’s narrative continued:

The fragments of the command, now joined on the right by the men who had spent the night on the hill, filtered over the crest and down the bare northern slope. From the left, at Sillon Fontaine Farm, from the nests along the Sivry–Réville Road, at the very base of the slope, from Solferino Farm, a cluster of stone houses on the opposite slope of the valley, and from the woods to the east, the Bois de la Grande Montagne, a hail of machine-gun fire broke out. From the Bois d’Ecurey and the Réville Valley the enemy poured high explosive upon the scattered troops, who were gradually dwindling to nothing. German aeroplanes were now overhead, observing the effect of the German fire. Soon there would be no one left to protect the right flank beyond I Company against attack from the woods.⁴⁴

On the left of the line a sergeant, the only NCO remaining, took five men to attack a machine gun nest; all became casualties. Although wounded, the sergeant picked up the BAR of one of his comrades, finished off the machine gunners, and took command of that part of the line.

Coming up 300 yards behind Manning’s provisional battalion was the 2nd Battalion of the 316th, led by Captain Paul Strong. With Manning’s death, Strong went ahead and took over command. Lieutenant Colonel George Haedicke, accompanying Glock’s small force on the right, saw the losses being taken by the companies on the left that had pushed over the crest and ordered Strong to pull back to the south slope. In the meantime Colonel Williams, gassed and exhausted, had collapsed, so Haedicke was called back to take over command of the regiment. The men on the crest had spotted German forces massing in the Tranchée du Canif, a major fortified line about two miles to the north of the Borne. Suspecting a counterattack, they sent their last carrier pigeon to division headquarters, requesting an artillery concentration on the trench. Half an hour later the three artillery regiments of the division plus two assigned batteries of 240mm howitzers dropped their shells on the German assembly area. General Johnson himself climbed a tree to see the terrible result.⁴⁵

By the afternoon of the November 5 the remnants of nine companies of the 158th Brigade held the crest of the Borne—barely—but could advance no further. General Johnson telephoned Tenney Ross at 4:30 p.m. to summarize the situation:

316th Regiment of this brigade has been engaged for three days in what may be called a minor operation, but the task assigned to it has been one of extreme difficulty owing to the objectives being dominating points and the whole area in which the objective was situated being covered by machine gun and artillery fire of the enemy. The objective was gained but at a very heavy loss. The Lieut. Colonel now in command of the regiment, who has been on the objective for two days and over every part of the line, estimates that the present effective strength of the regiment is about 600 ... Every company with one exception, is now on the line and even under those conditions is holding it but thinly. The one company mentioned is in reserve. The position is organized and will be held, but I believe that the regiment should be relieved and re-organized before it can be effective for any further work.⁴⁶

The day’s attack had cost the 315th 53 men and the 316th three officers and 19 men killed.⁴⁷ Most of the men had received no food for two days and the only water was from gas-contaminated shell holes. Only on the left, where reinforcements for Company K had brought up rations, could the men have a meal. The attack of November 5 left the Americans technically in possession of the hill, but German artillery and machine gun fire from the north kept them from advancing further. While the divisional artillery planted a barrage on the far slope to prevent a counterattack, the provisional battalion took cover for the night below the crest. Army Group Gallwitz’s war diary reported, “The fighting for Höher Eichenberg [Borne de Cornouiller] was particularly violent. The enemy did not succeed in holding it.”⁴⁸

That night, XVII Corps informed the 79th that III Corps had crossed the Meuse eastward and must be supported by a renewed attack on the Borne de Cornouiller the next day, November 6. But the companies of the 316th, scattered over the hillside, were down to around 100 hungry, exhausted men each, low on ammunition and able to do no more than hold on. Kuhn ordered the 2nd Battalion of the 313th Infantry, hitherto in division reserve near Samogneux, to pass through the line held by the provisional battalion of the 316th and lead the attack at 8:00 a.m. One battalion of the 315th was to follow in support. It didn’t happen; continued heavy German shelling from north of the Borne cut up the companies of the 313th with high explosive, shrapnel, and gas as they approached the jumpoff line. Even divisional headquarters, far to the rear, was shelled with mustard gas; despite all precautions, gas seeped into the dugouts, disrupting operations and sending 35 officers and men to the hospital with gas burns.⁴⁹ German aircraft emerged to direct artillery fire and strafe the American lines. Captain George Burgwin commanded the 2nd Battalion; a major in the 315th called him a “tough-looking officer ... usually on the smartly dressed side,” although at the moment he was pretty dirty.⁵⁰ Burgwin reorganized for an attack at 2:00 p.m., but another German bombardment scattered the battalion. Eventually American planes arrived and drove off the Germans; but by the time Burgwin could reorganize again it was too late to attack. So General Johnson ordered the battalion to take over the left of the line, held by the two provisional battalions, that night. The right of the line would continue to be held by the 3rd Battalion of the 316th. In the meantime, the French 15th Colonial Division to the left of the 79th captured Vilosnes, then attacked northeast toward Brandeville, outflanking the German line from Sivry to the Borne de Cornouiller. That night, Maas Group East ordered a general retirement to the line Mouzay–Bois de Remoiville–Vittarville, roughly six miles to the northeast. The German line, although not broken, was now pulling back across the entire front.

On the night of November 6–7, the 79th was assigned to the French II Corps, which took over the sector east of the Meuse. Major General Claudel was still in command. Late in the evening, an order went to the 79th saying that the enemy was disorganized and retreating, and the assault would continue on the morning of the 7th. The 79th was to secure the Borne and continue attacking north. Kuhn told his artillery to begin its preparation at 7:45 a.m., the infantry to advance at 8:10 a.m. using the same formations as the previous day; these would now be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Burt. The objective would be the road from Sivry-sur-Meuse to Réville, half a mile north of the Borne. Further advance would be only at the order of the division commander. As per schedule, the artillery bombarded the hills north of the Borne while the heavy machine guns shot up its north summit. At 8:00 a.m. the 2nd Battalion of the 313th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion of the 315th followed a rolling barrage down the north slope of the Borne. The men, burdened by having to wear their gas masks, bunched up; a single shell killed six and wounded 15 others.⁵¹ But the German fire was relatively light—apparently they were moving their guns north. By 11:00 a.m. the improvised regiment had reached the Sivry–Réville road, taking prisoners along the way. Three of them, from the 35th Regiment of the 228th Division, told their captors that orders had been given to withdraw to Hill 373, three miles north of the Borne, where trenches had been prepared. The historian of the 35th Regiment gave the view from the German side:

The incoming artillery fire increases starting at 9:00 a.m. At 11:00 a.m., the 6th [battalion] of the 35th must retreat because of the threat to its left flank, while the 12th of the 35th must retreat at 4:00 p.m. The enemy presses hard and large numbers of enemy soldiers come down Eichenberg Hill. The Kriemhild [sic] line is heavily bombarded, the enemy penetrates the line’s forwardmost positions.*⁵²

* By November, German clock time was one hour ahead of French clock time. (Army War College, Historical Section, Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War: General Headquarters, Armies, Army Corps, Services of Supply, Separate Forces (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, reprinted 1988, orig. pub. 1931), p. 405.)

The American artillery was doing a good job of suppressing the German machine guns so General Johnson, commanding the 158th Brigade, ordered a further advance of 600 meters to the trenches at Claires Chênes on Hill 329 at 1:30 p.m. But the barrage fell short by 200–300 yards, endangering the attackers and making it impossible to jump off. Lieutenant Colonel Burt, not knowing this, angrily got Major Francis Lloyd, now leading the two attacking battalions, on the phone. The major explained the situation; the artillery barrage was quickly lifted and the attack got off at 3:00 p.m. It made progress against increasing resistance, mostly from machine guns. An artillery barrage preceded the assault, but by 4:10 p.m. the men had caught up with it and were again in danger of being hit. At that point, having no clear targets, the guns stopped firing and the men continued on. They met more machine guns in the trenches at Claires Chênes, but the 312th Machine Gun Battalion brought up two of its heavy weapons and silenced several of them. By now it was dark and the 313th’s 2nd Battalion was exhausted so Company I of the 315th picked up the attack. Two volunteers crept forward and found the German wire and the trench behind it. At that the combined battalions rushed over Hill 329, captured the trenches, and dug in in the Ravine de Vaux. Ahead and above them the German defenders continued to pepper them with fire but the two battalions, now down to a remnant of their original force, maintained their position.

The 79th had taken the Borne de Cornouiller and had passed over a mile beyond. Gallwitz’s war diary, after a week of reporting courageous repulses and valiant counterattacks, conveyed the news in a low key: “The right flank of the 228th Division was forced back a few hundred meters and [Höher-] Eichen-Berg was evacuated by us after some fighting.”⁵³ The historian of the German 183rd Infantry Regiment added telling detail:

Due to further enemy advances in the area of Brandeville–Breheville, the high command orders a retreat from the Côte, to begin on November 8th. One battalion of each regiment in the division’s sector will remain to conceal the withdrawal of all the other troops. These three battalions are placed under the command of the 183rd Infantry Regiment’s commander. Displacement of materiel is to begin immediately.⁵⁴

With the capture of the Borne de Cornouiller and the hills beyond, the 79th held a six-mile front, from Hill 329 and Claires Chênes trench in the north, southward through the Bois de la Grande Montagne and then eastward to the Bois d’Etrayes; then southeast through the Bois de Wavrille to Belleu Bois, south again through the Bois des Chênes and across the Samogneux–Crépion road, over the Bois d’Ormont and a bit beyond to the sector of the 26th Division. On November 7 those units not consolidating the position north of the Borne de Cornouiller spent the day strengthening the line by relieving tired battalions and bringing up others to reinforce the positions. The division surgeon reported that the troops were “now in very poor physical condition, due to long continued loss of sleep, and lack of sufficient nourishment combined with a high degree of mental strain.”⁵⁵ But the 79th would not be relieved; it would only change the direction of its attack. West of the Meuse the American divisions had reached the river by the night of the 7th; from First Army came the order for them to halt while operations in the plain of the Woëvre, east of the Heights, continued.⁵⁶ The brunt of the division’s advance would now be borne by the east-facing 157th Brigade, which hitherto had been holding a defensive line.

The 157th had reached its sector on the night of October 30–November 1, taking over from the 26th Division, which side-stepped southward. Its left, bordering the 158th Brigade, was held by two battalions of the 314th Infantry in the Bois de Wavrille and the Belleu Bois. To its right the Machine Gun Company of the 314th held the area straddling the Samogneux–Crépion road, overlooked by the Germans on the crest of Hill 360. From the Bois d’Ormont south, the line was held by the 1st Battalion of the 313th with two battalions in support.

Facing the 79th was the German 1st Landwehr Division, a territorial unit (similar to the American National Guard) that had spent most of the war on the Eastern Front and had arrived in France only the previous February, in time to take part in Ludendorff’s second Spring Offensive, the battle on the Lys River. In October, east of the Meuse, it had lost heavily at the hands of the 29th Division and the French 15th Colonials. American intelligence rated it third class, “a mediocre division composed of old men and of others that have little military value.”⁵⁷ Their own officers were worried about their effectiveness. “These last few weeks with inadequate food and little rest, and constantly being wet, had worn down the troops. The unit was decaying more and more as its soldiers were killed, wounded, or became ill, and no replacements came from home. The old fighting spirit that was so necessary was harder and harder to come by.” In addition to exhaustion, morale was sapped by rumors that socialist political elements in Germany were spreading leaflets calling on soldiers to disobey orders and possibly to kill their officers.*⁵⁸ But although depleted in numbers and sagging in morale, the “old men” knew their business.

* The historian of the 31st Landwehr Infantry Regiment, one of the units of the 1st Landwehr Division, was quick to add, “No such written appeal is ever shown to me, and in any case, if such a leaflet exists, this meaning is not ascribed to it. In our regiment, the officers and men are comrades, and have stuck together as comrades in good times and bad, and they will share their joys and sorrows to the bitter end. If I mention these rumors, I do so only to show how the constant flow of them made everyone so tense.” (Wilhelm Suhrmann, Geschichte Des Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 31 im Weltkriege (Flensburg/Oldenburg/Berlin: Gerhard Stalling, 1928), p. 384.)

Upon reaching their new lines at 2:00 a.m., the 79th let the Germans know they had arrived; within an hour its 52nd Artillery Brigade opened an intense bombardment of the enemy positions. The retaliatory fire was beyond what they expected, saturating the entire Samogneux–Crépion road and the back areas. Many men fell wounded in the 314th and some in the 313th. The Machine Gun Company of the 314th, which had gone down the wrong road, failed to reach the front until the next day. Depot and carrier details, wire stringers, all the rear-area elements were disrupted. One detachment establishing a forward ammunition dump for the 314th was almost wiped out; a sergeant major reorganized the scattered survivors and continued the work. A shell hit an ambulance, killing a wounded man in the front seat. The driver, a private, tried to repair the vehicle but found it wrecked beyond use. Instead, he hiked back to the ambulance park, got another one, went back, retrieved his patients, and evacuated them to an aid station.⁵⁹

The artillery fire continued all day and into the evening as the 314th and 313th were trying to establish their entrenchments. The bombardment included gas, which ruined the hot meals that the cooks were trying to serve. Most feared by the men were the Minenwerfer, large-caliber mortars whose shells, unlike those of the guns, were inaudible as they fell.⁶⁰ As night descended, a large German raiding party attacked an outpost at the left end of the line of the 313th. The outpost was manned by two squads totaling 11 men. Spotting the raiders in the dark, the men of the 313th fired on them with rifles and automatic weapons. Although two of the defenders were killed and one wounded 22 times, they drove the raiders off with heavy losses. Other parts of the line saw similar acts of resistance. By the end of the day the 313th had lost nine men killed; the 314th had lost 29.⁶¹

The next day, as the liaison group of Company C, 313th Infantry, tried to make contact with the 26th Division to its right, the German bombardment caught it in the open. The Liaison Company of the 26th drew back and suggested the corporal in charge of the platoon of the 313th do the same. But the corporal wasn’t taking orders from some other division; he had to hear it from his own officers. He stayed put, and for two days the regiment was unable to reach his detachment. When found, he “had his detail well in hand, all equipment intact, although the men were completely exhausted.”⁶²

The food situation improved. After losing five men of the carrying detail killed and eight wounded on the night of November 2–3, Colonel Oury of the 314th ordered that no more than one party from each battalion should be on the road at a time and that food should be brought up in daylight so carriers could find shelter from the bombardment. The 313th cooked all their food in their rear area near the Meuse. The Supply Company wagons carried it at night to a point behind the lines from which carrying parties took it forward. In this fight, at least the men would not starve.

By November 4, having consolidated its position, the 157th sent out a series of night patrols. Although they lost no men, they found the German positions heavily defended so that it was impossible to take prisoners. Over the next few nights the front-line battalions of the brigade sent out more patrols, locating German machine gun positions and strong points but not engaging the enemy. By then Kuhn had ordered his regiments to maintain contact with the enemy so that they should not slip away unmolested. On the afternoon of November 7 Major Theodore Schoge, commanding the 2nd Battalion of the 314th, led three combat groups of three squads each on a reconnaissance in force. They immediately ran into heavy machine gun fire followed within ten minutes by intense shelling. After holding their position for 45 minutes Schoge ordered them to withdraw. As they did so, eight shells fell among them, “each shell throwing blue flame and sparks around it for a radius of 30 yards, the flame burning for five minutes and giving the impression that the enemy was resorting to liquid fire.”⁶³ Seven men were killed and no prisoners taken. Schoge’s raid established, however, that the German position was too strongly held to be taken by infantry alone and that artillery would be needed.

Kuhn’s efforts on the 7th to relieve tired units and reinforce his line left no battalions in division reserve, so he asked II Corps to lend him two battalions from the 26th Division. This would let him relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 313th, then in line in the Bois d’Ormont, and put it in reserve. Claudel agreed. The relief was done under heavy shell fire that caused several casualties, not least among a supply detail carrying food to the 3rd Battalion. Although the line of the 79th was not shortened it freed up a battalion for use as a mobile reserve.

Until the night of November 7–8 the German 31st Landwehr Infantry Regiment, part of the 1st Landwehr Division, had occupied the Bois d’Haumont and the Bois des Caures opposite the American 26th Division. But on the 7th the American 90th Division crossed the Meuse and broke through at Stenay, threatening the northern flank of the German forces east of the river. The 31st was ordered to withdraw eastward and set up defensive positions on the Côte Morimont and the adjoining Hills 328 and 319, which the Germans called Wettin Hill. Four companies were left behind as a rear guard; their comrades expected never to see them again. This movement brought them opposite the 79th. The regimental historian described the retreat:

The companies’ march to Morimont Hill in the limited light of early morning is very hard on the soldiers, particularly since they take as much equipment and ammunition with them as they can ... The companies wade on through thick mud to Morimont Hill, to occupy the Kriemhild [sic] fortifications there. Regrettably, these positions consist mainly of a single trench, which has begun to fill up with water due to the rain. It does not offer much protection and is not a great place to sleep; there are some tunnels on the northern slope of Morimont Hill, which can accommodate a good number of people ... While this was going on, Second Battalion occupied positions in front of and on Wettin Hill during the night of the 7th and 8th.”⁶⁴

Around 3:00 p.m., to the amazement of the regiment—”We don’t believe our eyes”—the four rear-guard companies appeared on Côte Morimont. Having received the withdrawal order at 1:00 p.m., “They departed while there was still daylight, somehow without an unpleasant encounter with the Americans, who stayed in their bunkers and watched the four companies’ withdrawal, waving at the departing German soldiers. The Americans seem to have no interest in fighting anymore.”⁶⁵

On November 7 Claudel gave Kuhn his orders for a renewed offensive. First, the 158th Brigade would disengage from its northward advance and attack east toward Etraye, Réville and Ecurey. The 315th Infantry on the right was to pass through the lines of the 3rd Battalion, 316th Infantry, in the woods to the east of the Borne de Cornouiller. On the left Burt’s provisional regiment would advance on Réville. That would allow the brigade to catch up with the 157th, already facing east, to form a solid north–south line. The night of November 7–8 was spent preparing for the attack. Heavy artillery was repositioned to fire eastward. Light artillery and companies of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion moved up behind the assault units. Signal corps men laid telephone wire across freshly captured ground to the advance PCs and all the way up to the outposts.

At 6:00 a.m. that morning the 312th Machine Guns let loose their preparatory fire on time; but the infantry had not yet reached the jumpoff line, so it was wasted. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 313th, each leading one of the provisional regiments, did not get to the front line until 11:00 a.m. and did not attack until noon. To their south, the 2nd Battalion of the 315th, which had not been relieved from its former position in the Bois d’Etraye–Bois de Wavrille line until 7:00 a.m., did not reach its starting line until 2:15 p.m. This time, however, the late start hardly mattered. As they advanced, the leading companies quickly discovered that the Germans had abandoned their positions during the night. From time to time German machine guns would fire long, sustained bursts; but when American patrols went forward to scout their positions, they found the guns and the gunners gone.⁶⁶ A newspaper reporter who happened to be in brigade headquarters described General Johnson’s reaction as the telephone reports came in: “We’ve lost contact with ’em! We’re going ahead and can’t find any Boche!” he yelled into the phone. “Keep at ’em! Keep at ’em! Don’t let ’em get away!” To the officers around him he moaned, “If only we had some cavalry!”⁶⁷ At 2:05 p.m. Johnson sent a message to Kuhn who relayed it to Claudel at II Corps:

Lieut. Col Burt went up and took command himself of the left ... and since that time he has been going so fast that I cannot keep in touch with him. He sent back message two or three times that he was going forward without resistance, but has not given definite coordinates. No doubt but that he will gain the objective. In the south area the same way; the troops are pushing right along without resistance.⁶⁸

As the 158th advanced eastward it was quickly obvious that its right would lose touch with the left of the 157th, which had been ordered to stay put and send out patrols. So Kuhn ordered Nicholson to telephone Oury in the 314th ordering him to advance his left wing in conformity with the 158th. They too found that the Germans had withdrawn, so in the mid-afternoon Oury ordered all his battalions to advance on the ridges previously defended by German machine guns. Nicholson ordered the battalion of the 26th Division that had taken over from the 313th Infantry to capture the crest of Hill 360.

By mid-afternoon the entire 79th Division was moving eastward on a more-or-less straight north–south front four and a half miles wide. As the afternoon progressed, the rain, which had been falling all day, turned heavy. The only resistance was German harassing fire and enemy airplanes that flew below the clouds to strafe the advancing columns. A few machine gunners willingly gave themselves up as prisoners. At dusk the 2nd Battalion of the 313th Infantry entered Réville and the 1st Battalion took over Etraye. To their south, the 314th Infantry also found the country ahead of them deserted. By 6:00 p.m. its 3rd Battalion had cleared the Bois d’Etraye and the Bois de Wavrille as far as the bluff south of Etraye. The 1st Battalion had gotten through the Ravin la Hazelle along the Samogneux–Crépion road. The battalion of the 26th Division completed the capture of Hill 360 and passed through the Bois d’Ormont. By 9:45 p.m., all objectives were reached. Units of the 304th Engineers followed closely behind the infantry to clear roads for the supply trains. Both brigades of the 79th had reached the eastern extremity of the Heights of the Meuse and now overlooked the plains of the Woëvre. As they rested, the men could hear the Germans destroying their ammunition. Little shell fire came their way; the front was unusually quiet. Patrols sent out into the Woëvre plain returned with the news that the Germans had withdrawn at least as far as the Thinte River one to two miles beyond the front line. Writing home that night, Kuhn was ebullient:

We have been in a hard push in what the communique has been reporting as a warm corner and a warm one it was. I cannot tell you details but I am proud of my men who stood a very heavy pounding from shells and gas during this time, while desperately endeavoring to gain ground. We inched forward little by little and drew upon ourselves the activity of many Germans. Yesterday we made a fine bulge in their line and today, well, we pretty well shoved them off the map.⁶⁹

On the night of the 8th, II Corps informed Kuhn that his front had changed yet again. The 79th was to turn over the northern half of its sector—that occupied by the 158th Brigade—to the French 15th Colonial Infantry Division and concentrate both of its brigades in the southern half, bounded by Etraye on the north and Moirey on the south. This would require the two provisional regiments of the 158th Brigade to sideslip two and a half miles south, into the sector occupied by the 314th Infantry. The 314th with its two battalions would remain in the front of the division’s narrowed sector, leading the attack. The 315th would fall in to their left as it arrived in the sector, and the 314th would move to its right to make room. The 313th and 316th would come up behind them in support. The machine gun battalions, artillery, and engineers would follow.⁷⁰ The new zone of advance extended eastward to an arc-shaped line of hills in the plain of the Woëvre. From north to south, these hills were the Côte d’Orne, the Côte de Morimont, the Côte de Romagne, and Hills 328 and 319. They formed an amphitheater into which the division would be attacking.

The key to this complicated maneuver was for the 314th to shield the crabwise move of the 158th Brigade by attacking Hill 328, the closest part of the German defensive line. The attack began at 6:00 a.m., preceded by a bombardment of 75s from the 104th Field Artillery Regiment on the assumed position of the German line, as heavy guns shelled important points to their rear and the weapons of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion fired overhead to protect the flanks. As the men left their trenches, they found that the enemy had vanished.⁷¹ Nevertheless, as the regiment moved down from the heights, the 1st Battalion ran into trouble, entering the Bois de Crépion and losing touch with the regimental PC. The 2nd Battalion on its right, meeting no resistance, reached the village of Crépion, an advance of half a mile, at 8:20 a.m. Despite heavy shelling it continued forward; at about 10:15 a.m. it reached the edge of Moirey just as the 26th Division to its right took over the town. Then it lengthened its line to the north, trying to make contact with the 3rd Battalion so the 1st Battalion could retire according to plan. The 3rd Battalion attacked east and south from near Etraye, capturing Wavrille and continuing on to the road and rail line behind the town, where it stopped and made contact with the 2nd Battalion to its right, just as the 1st Battalion took Gibercy.

Although the Germans were in retreat, they professed to be unintimidated by the American advance:

They [the German soldiers] slowly work their way up to the new line, moving as individuals, in groups, and in skirmish lines. We see that we are facing a unit which does not have much combat experience. Individual detachments sometimes appear in the open, not taking cover, and of course this is a gift to our artillery, which takes the advancing enemy under fire. The Second Battalion’s machine guns on Wettin Hill also weigh in substantially from time to time. The Americans’ main objective is Gibercy. They attack in that direction from all sides, and our artillery also directs a heavy volume of fire at Gibercy.⁷²

By 11:00 a.m. the 79th had advanced from one to one and a half miles. But as the 2nd Battalion passed through Moirey and approached Hill 328, it ran into machine gun fire from the slopes; it had finally found the Germans. The regiment’s Machine Gun Company sent out a detachment to drive the enemy off, an action that quickly developed into a full-scale assault with infantry in support. As the infantry advanced past the machine guns, someone cried out that the Germans had gotten behind them and were attacking. Firing broke out in the rear, then stopped—it had been a false alarm. But a few of the machine gunners had been watching the affair, and saw a figure on the hillside behind them fall. They investigated and found it was the body of their commanding officer, Captain Frank Battles, apparently killed by the fire of the American infantry.*⁷³ One platoon of Company G got too far ahead and threatened to be wiped out by the machine gun and rifle fire. Its sergeant carefully showed each man how to maintain cover while getting back to the battalion safely; just as the last man departed, the sergeant was fatally shot. Nevertheless, the 2nd Battalion was able to take the lower slopes of Hill 328, an advance of one and a half miles, before getting stuck and digging in.⁷⁴

* The company’s historian wrote after the war, “To this day, it is a mystery why the infantry fired on Captain Battles. It is thought that the long green slicker he wore for protection from the rain made him resemble a German soldier and caused someone to open fire on him.” (John W. Kress, One of the Last ‘Rugged Individualists’ (privately printed, n.d.), p. 61.) Barber has Captain Battles being killed on November 10 in the attack on Hill 319. (Barber, 79th Division, p. 302.)

By now the Germans were having a hard time of it. Repeated assaults depleted their front-line companies and reinforcements had to be brought forward:

The Americans make further progress. The force on Wettin Hill is not large, and the Americans are able to take ground by exploiting dead spaces. Company 3, which had been attached to Third Battalion, must also be transferred to Second Battalion, and, around 10:00 PM, Machine Gun Company 1, which had also been attached to Third Battalion, must be transferred, as well. The commander on Morimont gives up these forces only reluctantly, since Morimont is supposed to be the main line of resistance, and according to the orders is to be held to the last man, while Wettin Hill, a forward position, is supposed to be evacuated soon.⁷⁵

As the 314th attacked eastward, the 158th Brigade executed its flank march to the southeast, a difficult maneuver in any conditions and especially at night, under fire, and in a hurry. The two battalions of the 313th Infantry got an early start and reached Wavrille just after the 314th captured it. They were then sent further south to bivouac in the Bois de Brabant. The 315th Infantry did not get started until 9:00 a.m., but by 11:00 a.m. its 1st Battalion had reached the railroad line between Wavrille and just south of Damvillers, north of their intended destination, where it and the 2nd Battalion, coming up behind, were hit by heavy shelling that kept it from advancing further. As he surveyed the situation the battalion commander, Major Ward W. Pierson, was killed by a shell. At 7:30 p.m. the 3rd Battalion, 314th Infantry, passed through the 315th on its way to the rear and the position of the 315th became the front line. After dark, both brigades got into position for a morning attack.

Intelligence reports for the day described an enemy in full retreat. “Wounded Prussian prisoner 31st Division reports no prepared line between Crépion and Metz. His unit was ordered to retreat as far as possible. He says there is a stronghold 4 km. from Crépion, where there are 10 batteries of field artillery,” read one message.⁷⁶ II Corps’ Intelligence section reported, “Airplane at 15H reported to Corps that road East and North of Bois Dombras and Bois du Merles were jammed with enemy convoys. 15 kilometers further east, roads were also crowded. These convoys were all going eastward.”⁷⁷ None of this, however, was of immediate help to the two brigades of the 79th, which were once again facing enemy machine guns well entrenched on the arc of hills overlooking their positions. That evening Kuhn sent a message to Claudel at II Corps:

These hills are strongly defended by wire, machine guns, some 77 guns, and the equivalent of 37mm. cannon. Probably defended by comparatively few men. Unless enemy withdraws tonight I do not believe these hills can be taken by frontal attack. Possibly a concentric attack from the North, West, and South might succeed. I recommend that in case an energetic forward movement is contemplated for Nov. 10th, that as much Corps artillery as is available, and such divisional 155’s as can range thereto, concentrate on the following centers of impact from 2H to 6H November 10th [coordinates follow].⁷⁸

But Claudel, in his order for the next day’s operations, said that the resistance his divisions were meeting was likely only a rear guard, citing the reports of roads choked with retreating German columns; he urged the attacking units to overcome local strong points by maneuver and infiltration.⁷⁹ There is no record of a reply to Kuhn’s plea for corps artillery.

Notwithstanding, next morning’s attack by the 157th Brigade started off well. The 52nd Field Artillery smothered Hill 328 with shells from 4:00 to 6:00 a.m., causing many secondary explosions. Then the 2nd Battalion of the 314th charged up the slope. Twenty-five minutes later Major Schoge, the battalion commander, sent a message to Kuhn: He had occupied Hill 328 and was a third of a mile past the crest, on the leading edge of Hill 319. But they could get no farther; machine guns on Hill 319, artillery from further ahead, and airplanes strafing the troops unmolested prevented an advance. Many officers were wounded; as they fell, NCOs took over their platoons and continued the attack. The fight became a series of small-unit contests. A Stokes mortar team from the Headquarters Company advanced under fire a hundred yards ahead of the infantry and destroyed a heavily defended strong point. Enlisted men risked their lives to recover wounded comrades; several were later decorated. But without continual artillery support, Hill 319 could not be taken. By noon the attack of the 157th had bogged down.

While the 157th Brigade attacked Hills 328 and 319, the 158th was to make a demonstration against Côtes d’Orne and Morimont.* Although the Côte d’Orne was actually in the sector of the French division to the north, the French had bypassed the hill, so it still threatened any advance by the 79th and had to be taken. Direct fire from artillery and two companies of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion shelled the hills until 7:30 a.m. Fog in the valley of the Thinte prevented accurate German fire, but machine guns and artillery still struck the leading elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 315th and the 2nd Battalion of the 316th as they advanced at 7:30 a.m. Wading across the Thinte, they reached the lower slopes of the Côte d’Orne but could get no further. They withdrew to the east bank of the river and took shelter, trying again an hour later. The second attack by the 315th stopped in the same place. But the 2nd Battalion of the 316th had got as far as half a mile east of Gibercy when the fog lifted, exposing it to machine gun fire from the front and both sides. Captain Strong, the battalion commander, decided that retiring was as dangerous as advancing so he ordered the men to dig in. Only the Machine Gun Company got back to the railroad line.⁸⁰

* A demonstration is an attack intended to pin down or deceive the defenders but not necessarily to drive them off or capture their position.

By the afternoon of the 10th, Colonel Oury completed his artillery plan that would allow the 314th, in the vanguard of the 157th Brigade, to resume its attack. Shot-up wires hampered coordination with brigade headquarters, so Oury sent a messenger to Nicholson with his plan. At that moment, a runner came from Nicholson saying that the 158th Brigade could not take their objectives until Oury took Hill 319, and please hurry up about it. In the meantime, Kuhn had come forward to Nicholson’s PC to supervise the artillery preparation personally. He approved Oury’s plan, which directed the heavy guns to pound German positions beyond the hill while the 75s hit the hill itself. The opening salvoes fell short but communication to the artillery was good, so the sights were raised 200 yards and the shells hit effectively. As the bombardment ended, six companies of the 314th hurried forward. Lieutenant Joel described the attack:

“Second Battalion, over!” came the command at 4:20, and there followed the most exciting charge the outfit ever made. The first thin wave passed through the machine gun barrage, which was cutting a belt of underbrush half way down the hill. Then right at the heels of the barrage, the thin line crossed the bottom land and charged up 319. Lieutenant Cabla on the right flank was yelling like a crazy Mexican, waving his pistol as they do in the sixteen-reel serials. The men quickly picked up the spirit and rushed the hill, yelling and shooting their rifles, automatics and rifle grenades as they advanced.⁸¹

The German troops in the front lines were starting to hear how their army was collapsing. “The vehicle drivers who come up from the rear tell stories about stores being looted by hordes of rear echelon troops who have suddenly grown bold thanks to the bad example provided at home.” Of course, wrote the historian of the 31st Landwehr, “It must also be noted that none of our drivers, receivers of orders, scribes, or supply handlers are seduced by this awful example, but rather do their duty under the command of their commanders, the logistics officers and sergeants, and in doing so make it possible for the men on the front lines to hold on and not fall apart.”⁸² Nonetheless, the men prepared frantically to meet the assault. “For us, everything depends on getting ammunition to Wettin Hill. Ammunition, ammunition! The constantly firing machine guns consume every resupply as soon as it comes in. Everyone takes part in belting rounds of ammunition for the machine guns.”⁸³ Captain Frohm, commanding the 2nd Battalion on the crest of Hill 328, described the attack:

From our commanding position, our observation posts saw, as on an earlier maneuver field, the approach march of the enemy unit in larger and smaller sections, and as they came closer they sometimes advanced more spread out. We couldn’t believe our eyes when we watched one detachment, with their weapons shouldered, march directly into our machine guns positioned above Gibercy between Wettin Hill and the Morimont road. Soon after they were in range, there wasn’t much left of them ... Despite heavy losses, the enemy kept replenishing their front lines and slowly took ground. They even managed to ascend to the summit of Wettin Hill. Their attempt to bring up a light machine gun to the summit was initially broken up when its whole crew was shot down by one of our light machine guns. One gallant enemy soldier, who managed to advance 40 paces towards the trenches of our blocking position and take cover in a shell hole, discomfited us quite a bit. From the cover of the shell hole, he was able to shoot three of our men in the head, without getting scratched himself, because he immediately disappeared into his hole after each shot. The hand grenades that were thrown at him fell short of the hole where he’d taken cover. As I made my way through the trenches, fairly exposed, he fired an aimed shot at me, as well, but this time he missed. He was finally suppressed by our grenades, when a sergeant, whose name escapes me, sprang at him and threw a grenade into his hole. The sergeant’s comrades killed at the hand of this enemy were finally avenged.⁸⁴

But the hill could not be held. Around 5:00 p.m., as American machine gun fire became stronger, the 2nd Battalion started to give way. Its men drifted rearward to the Côte Morimont, where they were immediately put into the line. Captain Frohm and his headquarters section remained on Hill 319, loading the ammunition onto a truck; Frohm was the last man to leave the hill.⁸⁵

Reaching the crest, the men of the 157th Brigade discovered that the positions on Hill 319 had been destroyed. General Kuhn allocated some of the credit to himself; in his diary he wrote, “[F]inally took hill 328 and 319 after exerting my personal influence with General Nicholson.”⁸⁶ Pressing up and over the hill, the 314th dug in on the eastern slope for the night—the last night of the war.