1 Wikipedia: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/60/Corpus_callosum.png.
2 M. S. Gazzaniga (2000), ‘Cerebral specialization and interhemispheric communication: Does the corpus callosum enable the human condition?’, Brain, 123(7): 1293–326.
3 L. Hall, T. Strandberg, P. Pärnamets, A. Lind, B. Tärning and P. Johansson (2013), ‘How the polls can be both spot on and dead wrong: Using choice blindness to shift political attitudes and voter intentions’, PLoS ONE 8(4): e60554. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060554.
4 P. Johansson, L. Hall, S. Sikström and A. Olsson (2005), ‘Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task’, Science, 310(5745): 116–19. Reprinted by permission.
5 P. Johansson, L. Hall, B. Tärning, S. Sikström and N. Chater (2013), ‘Choice blindness and preference change: You will like this paper better if you (believe you) chose to read it!’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 27(3): 281–9.
6 T. J. Carter, M. J. Ferguson and R. R. Hassin (2011), ‘A single exposure to the American flag shifts support toward Republicanism up to 8 months later’, Psychological Science, 22(8): 1011–18.
7 E. Shafir (1993), ‘Choosing versus rejecting: Why some options are both better and worse than others’, Memory & Cognition, 21(4): 546–56; E. Shafir, I. Simonson and A. Tversky (1993), ‘Reason-based choice’, Cognition, 49(1): 11–36.
8 K. Tsetsos, N. Chater and M. Usher (2012), ‘Salience driven value integration explains decision biases and preference reversal’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(24): 9659–64.
9 Tsetsos, Chater and Usher (2012), ‘Salience driven value integration explains decision biases and preference reversal’.
10 The literature is vast. Some classic references include: D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); C. F. Camerer, G. Loewenstein and M. Rabin (eds), Advances in Behavioral Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Z. Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
11 P. J. Schoemaker (1990), ‘Are risk-attitudes related across domains and response modes?’, Management Science, 36(12): 1451–63; I. Vlaev, N. Chater and N. Stewart (2009), ‘Dimensionality of risk perception: Factors affecting consumer understanding and evaluation of financial risk’, Journal of Behavioral Finance, 10(3): 158–81.
12 E. U. Weber, A. R. Blais and N. E. Betz (2002), ‘A domain-specific risk-attitude scale: Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 15(4): 263–90.
13 This ‘constructive’ view of preferences (as created in the moment of questioning) has been persuasively advocated for several decades (P. Slovic (1995), ‘The construction of preference’, American Psychologist, 50(5): 364). Many economists and psychologists have not, though, taken on the full implications of this viewpoint, imagining that there is still some ‘deep’ and stable underlying preference that is merely distorted by the particular measurement method.
