LINDNER COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, CINCINNATI, OH, USA
Brand attitudes have been and continue to be one of the most extensively studied topics in consumer research. A brand attitude is an evaluative judgment of a brand, and this chapter focuses on brand attitude structure. Like all attitudes, brand attitudes are influenced by cognitive responses (e.g., beliefs, knowledge), affective responses (e.g., feelings, moods, and emotions), and behavior (e.g., cognitive dissonance reduction following behavior, inferences from behavior). In addition to being influenced by cognition, affect, and behavior, brand attitudes also influence cognition, affect, and behavior (Zanna & Rempel, 1988). These reciprocal relationships explain how one attitudinal component can influence the other two, thereby increasing the predictive and explanatory power of brand attitudes.
Cognitive Influences on Brand Attitudes
Expectancy-Value Models
When consumers are willing and able to devote cognitive effort to brand considerations – usually in high involvement contexts – they may integrate information about many attributes to form evaluations. A person’s brand attitude can be understood as their beliefs about the probability that a brand possesses certain attributes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
The expectancy-value model posits that brand attitudes can be modeled by multiplying a consumer’s evaluations of each attribute by their expectations that the brand possesses each attribute (Baumgartner & Pieters, 2008; Bettman, Capon, & Lutz, 1975). For instance, imagine someone choosing between car A with low maintenance, good gas mileage, and reliability, and car B with quick acceleration, smooth handling, and a state-of-the-art sound system. A marketer might have the consumer evaluate each attribute from very bad (1) to very good (7), then rate the likelihood that each car actually possesses these attributes. The attribute ratings can then be multiplied by the likelihood ratings for each attribute, and each rating is then summed separately for car A and car B. This produces a measure of the consumer’s attitude toward each car.
Mathematical models can be used to understand how consumers form attitudes by integrating multiple pieces of information. We describe two such expectancy-value models here: the theory of reasoned action, and information integration theory. One key difference between these models is that information integration theory is multiplicative (beliefs are averaged), whereas the theory of reasoned action is additive (beliefs about a brand are added to form brand attitudes).
Information Integration Theory
According to information integration theory, attitudes are formed and evolved as consumers receive, interpret, evaluate, and integrate brand attribute information. Thus, attitudes are formed by cognitive algebra, based on brand-related information stored in memory (Anderson, 1981). Information may be more or less likely to be integrated depending on its salience, the manner in which it is presented, and the degree of overall information integration, which may vary from one brand attitude to another (Schmitt, 2012). During the valuation stage, consumers evaluate the implication of each piece of information separately, and assign values to each. During the integration stage, values are multiplied to produce an integrated psychological impression. During the output stage, the brand attitude is represented by the participant’s rating on a 0–100 scale (Anderson, 1981; Lynch, 1985)
This is a useful method of evaluation because consumers are often unable to explicitly tell researchers how important each attribute is to them. Information integration theory weights the importance of an attribute based on overall brand attitude ratings and individual attribute ratings following the formula: A = ∑ws, where
A = the attitude toward the brand
w = the importance weight of each individual attribute
s = the evaluation of each attribute.
These weights (w) must sum to one. According to information integration theory, marketers can change consumers’ brand attitudes by targeting the importance they place on a given attribute (w), their evaluations of a given attribute (s), or both.
Theory of Reasoned Action
The additive model of reasoned action can be represented by the following formula:
A = ∑be, where
A = the attitude toward a brand or toward buying a particular brand
b = the belief that the brand possesses a given attribute
e = evaluation of each attribute, or the extent to which the consumer likes each attribute
Thus, multiple attributes are integrated to form brand attitudes. Based on this model, attitude favorability increases as the number of favorable beliefs increases (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Attitudes are consequential because, according to the theory of reasoned action, attitudes determine intentions, which in turn lead to behavior (Ajzen, 2012). However, behavioral intentions are influenced by both attitudes and norms – the attitudes and beliefs of other people and society as a whole. Consequently, a person’s intention to recommend the Starbucks brand is influenced both by the person’s attitude toward Starbucks and their perception of other people’s attitudes toward Starbucks.
The theory of reasoned action further posits that attitudes have two components: evaluation and strength of belief. Evaluation refers to the direction or valence of a belief. For instance, someone might evaluate the HBO brand positively or negatively. Strength of belief refers to how strongly a person holds their belief. For instance, one might have a very strong, positive attitude toward HBO, or just feel mildly good about HBO (Ajzen, 2012).
Strongly held beliefs tend to be more accessible (Fishbein, 1963), and highly accessible beliefs tend to correlate more strongly with independent measures of attitude than less accessible beliefs (Petkova, Ajzen, & Driver, 1995; Van der Pligt & Eiser, 1984). Multiattribute evaluation models are particularly useful for understanding judgments of new products and unfamiliar products, because consumers are more likely to evaluate each attribute independently (Wyer, 2004). For familiar products, on the other hand, schema-based judgment processes are more likely.
Comparing the Theory of Reasoned Action and Information Integration Theory
The formulation of attitudes based on beliefs and evaluations is an important difference between the theory of reasoned action and information integration theory. Another important difference is that, unlike the theory of reasoned action, which is additive, information integration suggests that simply adding more attributes does not necessarily guarantee better brand attitudes. This is because, in an averaging model like information integration, consumers must rate each new attribute as both important and positive to result in an increase in brand attitude. In other words, an addition-based model suggests that more is better, because brand attitudes increase as the number of favorable attributes increases. However, an averaging model suggests that less is more – marketers should focus consumers’ attention only on the very best brand attributes because those with lower than average ratings pull the overall rating down.
Marketing Implications of Multiattribute Evaluation Models
Multiattribute evaluations are important because they have a profound impact on brand attitudes. Different attributes can influence brand attitudes in a number of ways. For instance, brand attitudes may be influenced by brand alliances (e.g., Starbucks and S’well) such that each brand, and the alliance itself, functions as an attribute in the evaluation of the other brand (Simonin & Ruth, 1998).
Consumers also integrate information from advertisements and product trials to form brand attitudes. The order in which information is received is important to this information integration process. Smith (1993) demonstrated this by manipulating information source (advertisement only, product trial only, or advertisement and product trial) and trial favorability (positive or negative), and varying whether the advertisement preceded product trial or product trial preceded the advertisement. Advertisements reduced the negative effects of unfavorable product trials on brand evaluations, particularly when the advertisement was viewed before trial. However, advertisements were not as influential on brand attitudes after product trial.
Affective Influences on Brand Attitudes
Evaluative Conditioning
Evaluative conditioning refers to attitude formation or change that occurs when a neutral object (the conditioned stimulus) is paired with a non-neutral object (the unconditioned stimulus; Jones, Olson, & Fazio, 2010). When consumers experience two objects at the same time, a cognitive association between the two may form, leading to a conditioned response. This process was illustrated by Staats and Staats (1958), who asked participants to remember lists of words in either a visual or auditory format. Participants were exposed visually to a set of nationality names, including the neutral stimuli Dutch and Swedish. The experimenter then announced a word that was neutral, positive, or negative. The positively or negatively valenced words were systematically paired with the two neutral stimuli such that one neutral stimuli always appeared with positive words and the other with negative words. Finally, the participants were asked to recall the words and then evaluate them. Participants rated the neutral stimuli that had been paired with the positive words (either Dutch or Swedish) as more pleasant than the one paired with the negative words.
Prior research shows that evaluative conditioning is mediated by multiple mechanisms, including Pavlovian conditioning (Zanna, Kiesler, & Pilkonis, 1970), inferential reasoning (Kim, Allen, & Kardes, 1996), and a new mechanism referred to as implicit misattribution (Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009). As eye gaze shifts increased between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus, source confusability increased, and evaluative conditioning increased.
Advertisers and marketers can use evaluative conditioning as a method to induce positive brand attitudes. Research shows that evaluative conditioning is particularly effective for unfamiliar brands (Shimp, Stuart, & Engle, 1991; Cacioppo, Marshall-Goodell, Tassinary, & Petty, 1992). However, evaluative conditioning may also influence attitudes toward mature brands (Gibson, 2008). In one experiment, participants were shown Coke images paired with negative pictures and words, and Pepsi images paired with positive pictures and words. This conditioning process influenced implicit, but not explicit, attitudes toward the mature brands such that participants without strong prior preferences were subsequently more likely to select Pepsi than Coke under cognitive load.
Mood Effects
Persuasion attempts are often accompanied by efforts to change people’s moods (Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). For example, children often say nice things to their parents before making a request, and advertising professionals use funny commercials to persuade consumers. Influencing people’s moods for persuasion purposes is frequently effective due to misattribution or source confusability. That is, extraneous, favorable, affective responses tend to be misattributed to the target brand. Mood can be manipulated by music, videos, pictures, or recall of emotionally involving experiences (Cohen & Andrade, 2004). Experiences such as receiving an unexpected gift can also lead to positive mood, which triggers the norm of reciprocity (Kahn & Isen, 1993), and positive mood induced by a wrapped gift can enhance gift evaluation (Howard, 1992). Favorable affective responses also increase cognitive flexibility and efficiency (Isen, 2008; Kahn & Isen, 1993).
Fluency Effects
Feelings of fluency, or feelings concerning the ease or difficulty with which information can be processed, also influence brand attitudes (Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz, Song, & Xu, 2008). This is surprising because feelings of fluency can be influenced by a host of seemingly trivial variables, such as repetition, font readability, figure-ground contrast, priming, and stimulus duration. Regardless of how they are manipulated, feelings of fluency influence evaluation, familiarity, confidence, truth, risk, beauty, and the predicted amount of effort required to follow a set of directions.
In a classic early study of fluency effects on brand attitudes, Wånke, Bohner, and Jurkowitsch (1997) asked participants to list either one or ten reasons to choose a BMW over a Mercedes Benz. Because listing one reason is experienced as easy, participants inferred that there must be many reasons to prefer a BMW over a Mercedes. By contrast, because listing ten reasons is experienced as difficult, participants inferred that there must be few reasons to prefer a BMW over a Mercedes. As a result, the BMW was preferred more strongly when participants listed one reason to prefer a BMW than when they listed ten reasons to prefer a BMW. Hence, feelings of fluency can override objective information, because objectively, ten reasons are better than one.
Simple repetition increases fluency and increases the perceived validity of a product claim (the truth effect; Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). However, the truth effect is observed only under low-involvement conditions (Hawkins & Hoch, 1992). Recent research also shows that the truth effect is observed only when the need for affect (Maio & Esses, 2001), or the reliance on feelings and intuitive responses, is high (Sundar, Kardes, & Wright, 2015).
Fluency effects are also moderated by the need for cognitive closure, or the preference for a definite answer or solution, any answer or solution, rather than confusion or ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). This leads consumers to seize on information that is easy to process and that has immediate and obvious implications for action. Once a solution is rendered, people high in need for closure freeze on this solution and are unwilling to reevaluate the solution or to consider new information. Hence, the need for cognitive closure encourages consumers to oversimplify complex problems by focusing on the information that is easiest to process. When an answer or a solution is reached, epistemic freezing or closed-mindedness occurs.
Wu, Shah, and Kardes (2016) exposed participants to repeated information or non-repeated information about a product. Participants liked the product better and rated the information as more trustworthy after exposure to repeated information, but only if participants were high in need for cognitive closure. In a follow-up study, participants high in need for closure (or under high time pressure) rated a brand as well known and reputable, regardless of whether the product information was easy or difficult to process.
One way to debias fluency effects is by warning participants about the source of feelings of fluency before they are exposed to the product information. This was illustrated by Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, and Simonson (2007), who reduced the fluency effect by warning participants that the information they were about to see might be difficult to process. Wu et al. (2016) replicated this effect for participants low in the need for cognitive closure, but the effect backfired for participants high in the need for cognitive closure.
Marketing Implications of Affective Influences on Brand Attitudes
Many marketing communications and retail settings are specifically designed to influence feelings, and feelings have an important impact on brand attitudes. Humorous ads, pleasant music in ads and in retail outlets, salespeople who are pleasant to interact with, cobranding, and other marketing tactics produce positive affective responses and lead consumers to form favorable brand attitudes. Other types of feelings, such as feelings of fluency, also influence brand attitudes, brand attitude confidence, and the perceived validity of brand attitudes. Recent research has also shown that feelings of fluency can be used strategically to encourage pro-environmental behavior (Kidwell, Farmer, & Hardesty, 2013).
Behavioral Influences on Brand Attitudes
Attitudes can influence behavior; however, the reverse is also true – consumers’ behavior can influence their brand attitudes. This was illustrated by Albarracin and Wyer (2000), who told participants they were testing a computer instrument that assessed implicit attitudes. Participants were told they were seeing a series of statements presented subliminally on a computer screen, and they pressed one of two keys to express their intuitive reaction to the statement. The computer then “interpreted” the responses. In reality, participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which they were told that they had responded either favorably or unfavorably toward instituting comprehensive exams at the university. Thus, the false feedback led participants to believe that their behavior had indicated either support or opposition to comprehensive exams. After the feedback task, participants reported their attitudes regarding an upcoming vote for comprehensive exams, and their voting intentions. Participants who believed their behavior indicated support for comprehensive exams reported higher intentions to vote in favor of instituting comprehensive exams; conversely, those who believed their behavior in the computer task indicated opposition reported higher intentions to vote against instituting comprehensive exams.
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
According to cognitive dissonance theory, people are motivated to maintain cognitive consistency between their attitudes and behaviors (Festinger, 1957). When there is an inconsistency, for instance if someone who dislikes the Microsoft brand is forced to use the Microsoft operating system on their work computer, this conflict between attitudes and behavior produces dissonance.
Dissonance is an aversive state; therefore, people may seek to eliminate it in one of three ways. One method is to change either the attitude or behavior. For instance, the person in the previous example might change their attitude about Microsoft to reduce the dissonance of having to use it at work, particularly if the behavior has already occurred and therefore cannot be changed. Alternatively, but probably less likely, they could change their behavior by quitting the job in order to avoid having to use a brand of operating system they dislike. Another way that dissonance may be reduced is by incorporating new information that supersedes the dissonant beliefs. For example, new information about how Microsoft is primarily useful for the workplace may reduce the dissonance that an Apple user feels in response to using Microsoft at work. Finally, people may decrease dissonance by reducing the importance of their attitudes. For instance, one could convince oneself that it is better to have a job than to be unbendingly loyal to a certain software brand. In this way, the person decreases the importance of the dissonant attitude that using Microsoft products is awful.
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) demonstrated cognitive dissonance experimentally by asking participants to perform a dull task – turning pegs in a pegboard – for an hour. Participants’ attitudes toward the task were very negative. However, they were paid either $1 or $20 to tell another participant that the task was interesting. When the participants who had lied about the task subsequently evaluated the experiment, those who were paid only $1 rated the tedious task as more fun and enjoyable than those who were paid $20. Festinger and Carlsmith propose that the dissonance caused by the conflicting cognitions – “I said the task was interesting” and “I actually believe it’s boring” – was greater for those only paid $1, because $1 was too small an incentive to justify lying. To overcome the dissonance of having lied for only $1, these participants changed their attitudes toward the task by convincing themselves that it really was interesting and enjoyable. The participants paid $20, however, had a sufficient justification for their behavior, because $20 was sufficient incentive for lying, so they experienced less dissonance, and evaluated the task less highly.
Marketing Implications of Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance theory has important implications for brand attitudes. The more consumers deliberate on a choice, for instance whether to buy a Honda or a Toyota, the more emotionally attached they become to each option. This leads to cognitive dissonance when one option is chosen, and the other forgone (Carmon, Wertenbroch, & Zeelenberg, 2003). To illustrate, in one experiment, participants were told they would receive one of the products they evaluated. Participants then rated a number of products ranging from $15 to $30. Those in the low-dissonance condition chose between a desirable product and a much less desirable product. Those in the high-dissonance condition chose between two similarly desirable products. In the control condition, participants were simply given one of the products. Then all participants rated all of the products again. Those in the high-dissonance condition, who were forced to choose between two similarly attractive products, rated the attractiveness of the chosen product much higher, and the attractiveness of the rejected product much lower, than low-dissonance or control participants, because they were more motivated to reduce the dissonance of having forgone an appealing option (Brehm, 1956).
Self-Perception Theory
Another way in which behavior can influence attitudes is via self-perception. Self-perception theory posits that people develop attitudes by observing their own behavior and concluding that they must hold an attitude that caused the behavior. This is likely to occur when the person does not have an existing attitude on the topic (Bem, 1972). For instance, if a consumer is ambivalent between Colgate and Crest toothpastes, and selects Crest at random, they may then conclude on the basis of their behavior that they must have a positive attitude toward the Crest brand.
To illustrate this effect, Bem (1972) instructed participants to answer questions truthfully when shown a green light, and to lie when shown a yellow light. Thus, participants were conditioned to believe their own statements when the light was green, and to disbelieve their own statements when the light was yellow. After being trained in this procedure, participants were asked to evaluate a series of cartoons that had been previously rated as neutral (neither funny nor unfunny) in the presence of the alternating colored lights. Participants were instructed to say either “this cartoon is very funny” or “this cartoon is very unfunny.” Then they were asked to report their actual attitudes toward each cartoon. When participants had been instructed to say “this cartoon is very funny” in the presence of the green (truth) light, they subsequently reported more positive attitudes toward the cartoon than if they had been instructed to say it was funny in the presence of the yellow (lie) light.
Marketing Implications of Self-Perception
Self-perception theory has many marketing implications, including for sales techniques. For instance, the foot-in-the-door technique involves making a small request, such as answering a short questionnaire about a brand. Someone who grants a small request is subsequently more likely to comply with a larger, related request, such as buying a product made by that brand. This is because people observe their own behavior (e.g., complying with an initial request) and attribute the behavior to a positive attitude toward the brand (Snyder & Cunningham, 1975).
Goldstein and Cialdini (2007) extended self-perception theory by proposing that people sometimes infer their own attitudes by observing the behavior of others with whom they feel a sense of merged identity. Therefore, if a consumer feels a close sense of identity with their spouse, observing their spouse using a certain brand may lead them to form a positive attitude toward that brand.
Self-perception theory is also relevant for retail promotions. Consumers may be more likely to make a purchase when there is a promotion. However, the type of promotion determines the degree to which consumers develop positive brand attitudes and repeat purchase intentions. Price promotions lead consumers to ask themselves after purchasing whether they bought the brand because they like it, or because of the promotion. Since consumers are likely to conclude that they made the purchase due to the promotion, they may infer on the basis of their opportunistic behavior that they do not actually care for the brand very much. Conversely, non-price promotions, such as sampling, can have a positive influence on brand attitudes, because the consumer concludes on the basis of their behavior that they took the sample because they liked it, and therefore like the brand. Consequently, brand attitudes are higher after non-price promotion, or no promotion, than after price promotion purchases (Gedenk & Neslin, 2000).
Self-Perception versus Cognitive Dissonance
Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper (1977) explored the relationship between self-perception and cognitive dissonance and found the two theories to be complementary, with each governing a specific context. Specifically, in the context of small discrepancies between attitudes and behavior, self-perception theory holds, whereas in the context of large discrepancies, cognitive dissonance theory holds. These contexts are described as the “latitude of acceptance,” in which attitude-congruent behavior leads to self-perception effects, and the “latitude of rejection,” in which attitude-discrepant behavior leads to dissonance effects.
Brand Attitudinal Influences on Affect
Although the literature on affective influences on brand attitudes is quite large, relatively few studies have examined brand attitudinal influences on affect. This is surprising given the popularity of affect as a research topic, and suggests that this could be a fruitful area for future investigation. Indirect support for the idea that attitudes can influence affective responses is provided by Hoch’s program of research on interpreting ambiguous product experiences (Ha & Hoch, 1989; Hoch, 2002; Hoch & Deighton, 1989; Hoch & Ha, 1986). Many product experiences are ambiguous, or open to multiple interpretations. In such cases, expectations and attitudes formed on the basis of advertising and other marketing communications guide the interpretation of ambiguous evidence. Selective information processing leads consumers to focus on the aspects of experience that are consistent with prior expectations and attitudes, and to neglect aspects that are inconsistent with these expectations and attitudes. Consequently, favorable brand attitudes frequently lead to favorable affective responses during product consumption. Consistent with the implications of research on transformative advertising, strong and favorable brand attitudes can make an automobile seem to handle and ride more smoothly, make clothes seem more comfortable and fashionable, and even make snack foods seem tastier. Privately consumed products seem more fun and enjoyable, and publicly consumed products seem more chic and sophisticated when brand attitudes guide affective responses.
Brand Attitudinal Influences on Cognition
Multiattribute judgment models suggest that cognitions influence attitudes. The reverse is also possible: attitudes influence cognitions via the halo effect and the placebo effect. The halo effect occurs when overall attitudes are used to draw inferences about the specific properties or characteristics of an attitude object. Favorable (unfavorable) attitudes lead to favorable (unfavorable) inferences, and these lead consumers to overestimate the benefits of products having favorable reputations (e.g., Chernev & Blair, 2015; Schuldt & Schwarz, 2010), and leads regulators to be more lenient toward firms having favorable reputations (e.g., Hong & Liskovich, 2014). Moreover, the halo effect is so powerful that it reduces the effect of perceived attribute variability on inferential beliefs (Sundar & Kardes, 2015). Despite these consequences, little is known about moderating variables. Prior research has shown that the halo effect increases over time (Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Sansone, 1991), but prior attempts to reduce the halo effect have failed completely despite the use of heavy-handed forewarning and introspection procedures (Wetzel, Wilson, & Kort 1981).
However, recent research has uncovered three new moderators of the halo effect (Sundar, Kardes, & Rabino, 2016). Individual differences in critical thinking skills reduce the magnitude of the halo effect because critical thinkers are motivated to process information in an even-handed or unbiased manner and are more likely to question assumptions and consider multiple interpretations of information (Halpern, 2003). Causal reasoning mindsets (Wyer & Xu, 2010), from cause to effect (predictive reasoning) or from effect to cause (diagnostic reasoning; Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2010), also increase critical thinking and decrease magnitude of the halo effect.
Finally, the paradoxical persuasion technique has also been shown to decrease the magnitude of the halo effect. According to self-verification theory (Swann 1987; Swann, Pelham, & Chidester, 1988), consumers rely heavily on stable and strongly held attitudes because such attitudes serve to organize experience, predict future events, and guide behavior. Because of the consequential nature of these attitudes, consumers resist direct persuasion attempts and resist endorsing statements that are misrepresentative. As a result, leading questions that are consistent with but more extreme than their true attitudes encourage consumers to adopt more moderate attitudinal positions, and this leads to more moderate inferential beliefs.
Research on the marketing placebo effect has shown that consumers form more favorable attitudes toward expensive (vs. inexpensive) products, and that these attitudes influence beliefs or expectations, which then influence behavior (Shiv, Carmon, & Ariely, 2005). Subjects consumed an expensive or an inexpensive energy drink, both purported to enhance mental acuity. Subjects indicated that they believed that the drink would be more effective in expensive (vs. inexpensive) experimental conditions. In addition, subjects solved a greater number of intellectual puzzles in expensive (vs. inexpensive) experimental conditions.
Follow-up research replicated these effects with price and demonstrated that these effects generalize to several non-price-related variables (Wright, da Costa Hernandez, Sundar, Dinsmore, & Kardes, 2013). Specifically, more favorable attitudes and beliefs, along with better performance on intellectual puzzles, occurred as set size, or the number of favorable attributes used to describe the product, increased. Scarcity, or limited shelf space availability, also lead to more favorable attitudes, beliefs, and performance. Because consumers believe that bad-tasting (vs. good-tasting) medicines are more powerful and effective, a bad-tasting energy drink increased beliefs about effectiveness, as well as actual memory performance. Finally, because consumers believe that medicines in typical (vs. atypical) packaging are less risky, an energy drink in a typical package led to more favorable beliefs and better memory performance.
Brand Attitudes Influence Behavior: MODE model
Many of our decisions are so routinized that we make them with little thought or effort. For example, consider the last time you went to the grocery store to replace the jar of mayonnaise you just finished. Now contrast this experience with the significant time and effort required when making your first car or home purchase. The more important the purchase decision, the more likely we are to carefully think through the attributes of different possible alternatives prior to making our purchase decision.
In 1990, Russell Fazio first introduced the MODE model of attitude-behavior relation as a means of explaining the wide range in effort that consumers expend when making judgments and decisions. According to this theory, Motivation and Opportunity to deliberate are key DEterminants of the two main processes that influence consumer choice, one involving a spontaneous reaction to perceptions of the situation at hand, while the other includes conscious deliberation prior to decision making (Fazio, 1990).
The spontaneous process focuses on how the strength of specific attitudes can guide behavior with no conscious awareness or reflection on the part of the consumer, working either through an immediate response or the activation of biases in attitudes toward the object’s characteristics, while also being situationally triggered by time pressure. For example, research has shown that when the word flower is presented, for most individuals a positive attitude is automatically activated (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). The deliberative process, by contrast, concerns when consumers take the time to analyze the pros and cons of a particular decision or behavior, carefully contemplating the costs and benefits of alternative choices in their consideration set (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).
Central to the MODE model, the occurrence of deliberative processing hinges on the consumer’s motivation to engage in careful reflection prior to choosing a specific course of action. Central to this motivation is the consumer’s fear of invalidity (Kruglanski, 1989), which focuses on the consumer’s desire to avoid making a wrong decision due to both the importance of the decision and the potential for negative consequences, with a relevant research example including a student’s decision regarding what college to attend (Sherman & Fazio, 1983). However, while motivation is a central tenet of deliberative processing, there must also be the opportunity for thoughtful reflection to occur. More specifically, either a lack of time or resource depletion on the part of the consumer may serve to undermine motivation.
The MODE model’s assumptions of motivation and opportunity as central determinants of processing type were confirmed by a seminal research study involving consumer choice scenarios using two fictitious department stores (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990). In this study, consumers were presented with general information on these two department stores, one largely favorable (Smith’s) when compared to the second (Brown’s). However, details on the camera department reversed this preference, with Brown’s being the preferred choice when purchasing a camera. When participants were asked to state where they would prefer to make a camera purchase, the conditions for decision making were manipulated both in terms of motivation and opportunity for reflection. Specifically, some consumers were motivated to make a correct decision by being told they would have to justify their store selection decision. Additionally, opportunity for thought was limited for a subset of participants by allowing them only 15 seconds in which to make their decision, while the remaining individuals did not have this time constraint. The results of this study were consistent with MODE model predictions, namely that research participants motivated to make the correct choice and having unlimited time chose to shop at Brown’s department store, a decision reflective of deliberative processing due to the store’s overall inferior reputation but superior camera department. Conversely, participants in the other three conditions’ decision to shop at Smith’s, despite its inferior camera department, was based on their overall general impressions of this department store and, thus, reflective of spontaneous (or general) processing.
Marketing Implications of the MODE Model
The MODE model suggests that brand attitude accessibility can be increased through multiple mechanisms, including direct trial of free product samples, repetitive advertising, curiosity-inducing advertising, and exposure to product surveys that encourage repeated attitude activation. Any procedure that increases attitude accessibility also increases the likelihood that the attitude will influence selective perception, and consumers’ interpretation of a situation requiring a purchase decision or a product usage decision.
Returning to our initial examples of purchasing mayonnaise versus one’s first car or home, and using the MODE model as our framework, we now understand that strong implicit attitudes toward the Hellmann’s brand might be all that is necessary when deciding which mayonnaise to purchase. Conversely, consumers are much more likely to invest considerable time and thought when purchasing their first car or home, due to the significance of the purchase and the potential for long-term negative consequences resulting from making the wrong choice. Further research has been conducted, using the MODE model, in the areas of familiar versus unfamiliar products (Arvola, Lähteenmäki & Tuorila, 1999), loyalty to an existing brand despite the advantages of a newly introduced and seemingly superior product (for recent examples see Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001; Kim, Han, & Park, 2001), as well as a host of other marketing-related areas.
Controversies and Future Research Directions
Constructed versus Retrieved Brand Attitudes
Perhaps the greatest controversy in attitude research surrounds the question regarding whether attitudes are summary evaluations stored in memory for later retrieval and use, or whether attitudes are constructed whenever evaluations are needed, and are never retrieved from memory. Some researchers argue that automatic online attitude formation and storage in memory occurs whenever a consumer is exposed to an attitude object (Bargh, 2002; Ferguson & Zayas, 2009), whereas others argue that attitudes are merely constructed epiphenomena (Schwarz, Song, & Xu, 2008).
In one attempt to resolve this controversy, Cronley, Mantel, and Kardes (2010) employed a response-latency-based methodology to distinguish between the retrieval of previously formed brand attitudes versus newly constructed brand attitudes. Accuracy motivation was manipulated and the need to evaluate was measured (Jarvis & Petty, 1996). As the need to evaluate increases, consumers are more likely to form attitudes spontaneously and are more likely to possess a relatively large number of attitudes and opinions. Half of the subjects were induced to consolidate their attitudes via multiple, standard, paper-and-pencil attitude scales, and half were not. When attitudes are formed spontaneously and later retrieved from memory, this consolidation versus no-consolidation manipulation has no effect on response latencies to attitudinal inquiries. Conversely, when attitudes are constructed rather than retrieved, faster response latencies are observed in consolidation than in no-consolidation conditions. The results showed that consolidation had no effect when accuracy motivation or the need to evaluate was high. When accuracy motivation or the need to evaluate was low, however, faster response latencies were found in consolidation conditions. Hence, when consumers follow the central route to persuasion due to high accuracy motivation or due to a high need to evaluate, brand attitudes are formed spontaneously and are subsequently retrieved from memory relatively quickly when an attitudinal response is needed. However, when consumers follow the peripheral route to persuasion due to low accuracy motivation or due to a low need to evaluate, a relatively time-consuming brand attitude construction process occurred in no-consolidation conditions.
In a follow-up experiment (Cronley et al., 2010, experiment 1b), conceptually similar results were obtained using a cognitive load manipulation instead of an accuracy motivation manipulation. Again, when cognitive load was low, subjects were more likely to follow the central route to persuasion and form brand attitudes spontaneously. Conversely, when cognitive load was high, subjects were more likely to follow the peripheral route to persuasion and construct brand attitudes, on the spot, when asked to respond to attitudinal inquiries.
Attitude relevance, attitude accessibility, and incidental processing were manipulated in another follow-up experiment (Cronley et al., 2010, experiment 2). When the need to evaluate was high, consolidation had no effect on attitude latencies across conditions. However, when the need to evaluate was low, consolidation had a pronounced effect on attitude latencies in incidental processing conditions, a weaker effect in high attitude accessibility conditions, and no effect in high attitude relevance conditions. In a final experiment (Cronley et al., 2010, experiment 3), spontaneously formed brand attitudes had a larger effect on non-hypothetical brand choice, relative to constructed brand attitudes.
Additional evidence for the power and functionality of spontaneously formed attitudes was provided by Fazio and Powell (1997). Because accessible attitudes simplify everyday decision making, accessible attitudes serve to reduce stress and maintain mental and physical health, as assessed by the Hopkins Symptom Checklist, the Cohen–Hoberman Inventory of Physical Symptoms, and the Beck Depression Inventory. When initial health was poor, on the other hand, accessible attitudes facilitated recovery. These beneficial effects of accessible attitudes would not be observed if attitudes were merely constructed epiphenomena.
Singular versus Comparative Brand Attitudes
Even when many brands are available, consumers often simplify information processing by evaluating brands one at a time (singular evaluation), rather than by comparing two or more brands (comparative evaluation; Kardes, 2013). Because comparative processing is more effortful than singular processing, consumers often compare brands only when they are explicitly instructed to do so (Wang & Wyer, 2002). Furthermore, comparative processing is likely only when the motivation and the opportunity to process information carefully are high (Sanbonmatsu, Vanous, Hook, Posavac, & Kardes, 2011). Consumers are often cognitive misers, and this encourages the use of singular processing over comparative processing.
The conditions under which singular versus comparative processing are likely to occur can be investigated by orthogonally manipulating the valence of information about a focal target and the remaining alternatives. When singular processing occurs, the valence of the information about the alternatives has no influence on evaluation. When comparative processing occurs, the valence of the information about the alternatives influences evaluation. The valence of the information about the alternatives has no effect when accountability is low or when time pressure is high. In addition, the relative amount of time spent reading about the alternatives is low when time pressure is high (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011).
The direction-of-comparison effect, or the tendency to weigh the unique features of the focal option more heavily than the unique features of the alternative option, also decreases when the singular processing is likely due to an impression set (i.e., instructions to form a global impression of each option; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Gibson, 1991), or due to a low need for cognition, or due to the preference to think as little as possible (Mantel & Kardes, 1999). The direction-of-comparison effect is more pronounced when comparative processing is likely due to a memory set (e.g., instructions to memorize the specific features of each option) or due to a high need for cognition.
Research on the brand positivity effect, or the tendency to overvalue the first satisfactory brand that is encountered, shows that the brand positivity effect is a singular processing phenomenon, and that the effect is diminished when comparative processing occurs (Posavac, Kardes, Sanbonmatsu, & Fitzsimons, 2005; Posavac, Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Fitzsimons, 2004). Singular processing also encourages consumers to rate all brands as better than average, provided that the brands are moderately favorable (Klar & Giladi, 1997). The better-than-average effect disappears when comparative processing is likely.
Implicit versus Explicit Brand Attitudes
Traditional attitude scales ask consumers to evaluate objects on semantic differential or Likert scales. These scales are explicit attitude measures because consumers are well aware that an evaluative response is required. Recently, greater attention and interest has been allocated to implicit attitude measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Perkins, Forehand, Greenwald, & Maison, 2008). This test assesses the strength of an association between a target object and an attribute dimension by measuring the latency with which subjects can press two response keys when each has been assigned a dual meaning. For example, one key could be assigned to two brands (e.g., Coke and Pepsi) and the other key could be assigned to two evaluative categories (e.g., good and bad). As the strength of the association between two concepts increases, response latency decreases. The procedure has been used to study stereotyping and other types of evaluative responses that participants often attempt to control or censor. Implicit attitudes can be consequential for branding; for instance, evidence suggests that nonconscious perceptions based on attributes like the sounds in a brand’s name may influence brand performance in the marketplace (Pogacar, Plant, Rosulek, & Kouril, 2015).
Although advocates of the IAT and related priming procedures argue that the procedure assesses unconscious or implicit attitudes, others argue that it is unclear exactly what implicit measures actually assess (Fazio & Olson, 2003). It also is surprisingly difficult to predict patterns of correlation among explicit and implicit attitude measures, although the MODE model has provided some guidance on this issue. If the motivation or the opportunity to deliberate is low when an explicit measure is administered, explicit and implicit measures should be correlated. When motivation and opportunity to deliberate are high, explicit and implicit measures should diverge. Some evidence for this prediction has been obtained (Koole, Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2001). However, additional research is needed to shed light on the theoretical underpinnings and the appropriate interpretation of implicit and explicit attitude measures. Hence, brand attitude structure will continue to be an important topic of investigation for many years to come.
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