During most of the journey back from Ligny, Wellington had become more and more concerned as the sounds of firing from the direction of Quatre Bras had increased in intensity. With a small cavalry escort, he travelled along the Namur road and must have been spotted by some of the 2nd légère in the area of Piraumont. Having secured this hamlet some time before, a little more adventure shown by the commander here could well have made Wellington’s return to the crossroads rather more problematic; however, whoever it was, he had been content with consolidating his position there and made no effort to control access along the main road, and it was only after the passage of Wellington and his staff that the French skirmish line advanced and appeared to want to occupy the wood (Bois des Censes) which was to the north of the main road.
Wellington approached Quatre Bras at about three o’clock. A quick examination of the battlefield was sufficient for him to judge that the situation was close to desperate. He later said:
By God if I had come up five minutes later the battle was lost; I found the Prince of Orange just after twenty French had made a spirt [sic] at two of our guns and he said, ‘it is all over, they are driven back.’ ‘Over! But what are those in that wood?’ ‘They are Belgians.’ ‘No by God, but they are French – and the wood is full of them and they will be on you directly – aye, and the emperor is there too’, for I heard them just then shout, ‘Vive l’empereur!’ – but I was wrong, he was not there. But I just had time to save it . . .1
Things were about to get worse before they got better. There were virtually no fresh troops in reserve at Quatre Bras, but Wellington was well aware that the first British units were marching south from Genappe as he had passed them earlier in the morning. He clearly felt that his only chance of salvation was the arrival of these fresh troops, so despite the desperate situation he personally set off up the road to hasten their arrival.
It was at about this time that heavy gunfire was heard from the direction of Sombreffe. Napoleon had finally concentrated the right wing and had begun his attack on the Prussians. The heavy and constant cannonade from the east should have served to remind both the commanders at Quatre Bras that their action was only a sideshow to the main event that was being fought elsewhere, and that they both had a potentially vital part to play in the outcome of the day.
Wellington was not the only commander waiting for reinforcements. Ney too was anxiously awaiting Prince Jérôme’s infantry division; at over 7,000 men it was the strongest in the Armée du Nord. Jérôme had a mixed career as a formation commander, and was not highly regarded by his fellow generals. No doubt aware of this, Napoleon allocated General Guilleminot to the division to second his brother. To many senior officers, Guilleminot was the real commander. It was at about 3pm that this division approached the battlefield. Ney immediately ordered the emperor’s brother to advance on the left flank towards the Bossu wood. Jérôme sent Soye’s brigade (1st and 2nd Line) forward, leaving Bauduin’s (1st légère and 3rd Line) back in reserve. This seems a strange choice, as Bauduin’s brigade contained the divisional light infantry regiment, which was perfectly suited to the type of fighting inevitable in such close country; small groups of determined men fighting in close contact with the enemy under loose control and having to use their own initiative.
The deployment of Jérôme’s division freed up Gauthier’s brigade of Foy’s division, who had been covering this flank as the reserve, and they were able to march forward and join the rest of their division, extending the French line to the west of the main road. Lieutenant Puvis of the 93rd Line wrote:
At 3 o’clock we deployed our masses and our whole line moved off, covered by our skirmishers. We marched thus into the middle of some rye which, because of its height, hid us from the enemy that was in front of us, but whose balls did not slacken, just as ours did not let up firing back.2
Ney now had almost 20,000 infantry, over 2,500 cavalry (4,500 including the guard) and fifty pieces of artillery (including the guard’s) available; with this latest reinforcement surely nothing could stop him securing the vital crossroads. Until reinforcements arrived, Wellington had no cavalry at all and only the exhausted remains of Perponcher’s 8,000 or so infantrymen and sixteen guns (of which only eleven were still in action) to oppose them.
It was only with Jérôme’s arrival, and coincidentally in Wellington’s temporary absence, that Ney felt strong enough to mount an attack in earnest. He decided to push his columns forward across the Gémioncourt stream and break through the thin and crumbling allied line. On the left, Jérôme’s division would clear the Bossu wood, and on the right, the 2nd légère would advance and cross the main road, finally cutting communications between the two allied armies. Once again the columns started their advance with the usual cloud of tirailleurs preceding them, and with Piré’s cavalry following up, poised and waiting for an opportunity to charge. This was a well coordinated attack of all arms. The shaken allied battalions had no chance of stopping the French juggernaut and immediately began their withdrawal covered by the guns on the heights above and behind them, pressed by the French skirmishers. The farm of Gémioncourt, although very strong, had not been prepared for defence and thus, although it was difficult to get into, there were very few positions inside to fire from and thus beat back an assault. As the French skirmishers pushed their opposite numbers back, Jamin’s brigade of Foy’s division advanced against the farm. There appears to have been little resistance; the companies of the 5th Militia and 27th Ja¨gers that were defending it quickly retired to join the main bodies of their units.
Once this retirement had begun and the heights just to the south of Gémioncourt were secure, the French artillery was brought forward to this new position from which they could reach further towards the crossroads. Coming quickly into action they began to bring the retreating allied troops under increasingly accurate fire.
Once again the Dutch artillery began to feel the power of their rivals and as their own infantry withdrew towards them another limber was destroyed. It was soon time for them to hook up their own guns and once more fall back to another position in depth. However, with its limber destroyed, one of the remaining two howitzers had to be abandoned to the French as there was no means of moving it. The hard-pressed batteries withdrew with difficulty and took up a new position just 200 metres south of the crossroads; another retrograde move and the position of Quatre Bras would be lost.
On the French left, Prince Jérôme advanced Soye’s brigade against the Bossu wood. It quickly became evident that the Nassau troops which occupied this flank were not going dispute the ownership of the twin farms of Petit and Grand Pierrepont. Covered by a strong force of skirmishers and with supporting fire from the divisional artillery battery, the battalion columns approached the wood itself to loud cries of ‘Vive l’empereur!’ The allied skirmishers fell back offering little opposition, but as the French skirmishers entered the wood they were met by several well coordinated and disciplined volleys from the two Nassau-Usingen battalions deployed amongst the trees.
However, the fire was insufficient to stop the momentum of the French columns, which now burst into the wood and began to push the Nassauers back. But the thick undergrowth did not allow movement in closely packed columns, and the fight was continued between two strong forces of skirmishers fed from the main battalion bodies held further back on the edge of the woods. This was a fight almost impossible to coordinate, follow or control and officers relied on the individual initiative and experience of their NCOs and troops to maintain pressure on the enemy.
With the situation in the Bossu wood hidden by the trees, the Prince of Orange was more concerned by the situation in the centre. He could not afford for the French to reach the crossroads and it was evident that if the withdrawal of his infantry continued there would be insufficient time to establish a viable line of defence before the French were on them. He therefore took the courageous decision to call on the battered troops of the 5th Militia and three companies of the 27th Ja¨gers, and to lead them in a desperate counter-attack against Gémioncourt.
By the time he had organised the attack, the French skirmishers were well established in the orchards and gardens and behind the hedges that surrounded them. With the buildings also occupied by French troops it would prove a formidable objective for the already exhausted and weakened Dutch troops. Advancing with apparent enthusiasm, they were met by a withering fire and quickly brought to a standstill. Although some of the more determined troops reached the hedges held by the French, they could get no further. It had been a brave but futile attempt, although it had bought a little more time for allied reinforcements to arrive. Suffering a constant trickle of casualties and with one eye on the columns of infantry and cavalry formed up beyond the farm, they hesitated and then started to fall back in some confusion. This was the opportunity Piré had been waiting for; two weak battalions falling back in disorder across open ground.
The Prince of Orange, however, had also realised how vulnerable the retiring infantry were and at last some vital reinforcements had arrived; the Dutch cavalry brigade of General van Merlen, a very experienced ex-officer of the French imperial guard. Although they had not had time to prepare for battle, the Prince ordered the 6th (North Netherlands) Hussars to charge the threatening French cavalry that were forming up astride the main road. Despite not being fully deployed, the hussars charged forward. The charge was spirited but, having insufficient time to get properly organised, it lacked the cohesion and order that might have brought success. The French counter-charge broke up the already splintered Dutch formation and in a short time the hussars were fighting for their lives against better-organised and more disciplined troops. The combat was short lived; the Dutch hussars were broken and turned to flee.
It appears that it was Hubert’s chasseur brigade (the 1st and 6th Regiments) that met and broke the charge of the hussars forward of Gémioncourt and just to the west of the chaussée; Wathier’s lancers had initially been held back in reserve. Seeing the Dutch cavalry in disordered flight, they now launched their own charge against the fleeing Dutch infantry. These troops had no chance; lacking the cohesion to be able to form square and individually focussed on saving themselves, they were easy prey to the French lancers who were ideally armed for such a fight. Smashing into the running men, many were struck down, incapable of putting up any resistance. Others were rounded up and sent to the rear as prisoners. The 5th Militia and 27th Ja¨gers had effectively been destroyed as a fighting force and were to take no further part in the fighting. Two companies of the 8th Militia also dispersed into the woods.
The disaster was not yet complete: beyond the scattered battalions, Stevenaart’s artillery had advanced to support the Dutch hussars and been left exposed. Seeing the vulnerable guns, Wathier’s lancers charged forward and attacked the crews that tried desperately to protect them. Beyond the guns was the 7th Belgian Line, who hurriedly tried to form square. The gunners were overwhelmed, and those that did not escape were cut down or captured; the four guns were left in the possession of the victorious lancers. The following lancer squadrons continued the charge against the Belgian infantry who, having witnessed the merciless and ruthlessly efficient destruction of the forward battalions, and faced now by the terrifying sight of charging lancers, spontaneously disintegrated and ran. Some formed a rallying square, a small cluster of determined men who stood back to back with their bayonets presented to the victorious cavalry, but the lancers were not interested in those who wanted to resist; they concentrated their efforts against the defenceless men who had discarded their muskets in order to reach the safety of the Bossu wood unhindered. The battalion was scattered and crippled; it would take the rest of the day to rally the survivors and get them back into some sort of order.
The Prince of Orange, who had moved forward to organise and motivate the original counter-attack, now found himself isolated in the middle of the disorder. Lieutenant Henckens takes up the story:
Piré’s division, with the 6th Chasseurs at its head, threw itself on the enemy cavalry which was broken and put to rout, whilst the gunners of the cannon that had been deployed were largely killed and the caissons and the horse attendants followed the cavalry in rout; the guns remained in place and were not secured, probably because the means were lacking. It was at the end of this attack that Captain Estève and I saw on a height an isolated group of officers that our instinct told us was the enemy’s commanders which rushed off at great speed, leaving us with an officer’s horse which we took with us. At that moment, being exposed to musket fire from a square that was in position behind a hedge, the division was called to rally.3
The captured horse belonged to Major Count Van Limburg Stirum, ADC to the Prince of Orange. In the confusion he had been obliged to abandon his wounded horse and found himself surrounded by a group of French horse-men who mercilessly cut him down as one of them shouted: ‘Kill him, it’s the Prince!’ Van Limburg Stirum suffered serious wounds and remained on the battlefield until he was found in the evening.4
Piré’s troopers found one last target. A half battery of Dutch artillery had arrived on the battlefield with van Merlen’s cavalry and this now also found itself vulnerable to the victorious French cavalry. Although their momentum had been lost, some individuals attacked the guns and caused some disorder and casualties before turning bridle and rallying with their units. Piré’s cavalry had scored a notable success; the 6th Hussars, Stevenaart’s battery and three Dutch-Belgian battalions had been put hors de combat.
Some French infantry from Campi’s brigade of Bachelu’s division followed up the cavalry and, seeing the abandoned Dutch guns, ran forward to secure them. The citation for Sous-lieutenant Chapuzot of the 72nd Line relates:
Sous-lieutenant Chapuzot, with three soldiers of his regiment, under fire from two enemy battalions, captured an ammunition caisson, harnessed with two horses and took it back to the divisional artillery park. This action, in which this intrepid officer received two wounds, was close to the farm of Quatre Bras, and has remained without reward.5
Up to four guns were also captured – the number varies with different sources – but it appears that at least two were brought back to the French lines, whilst others were taken but then recaptured by a rush forward by the Dutch gunners. This small counter-attack also retrieved other guns that had been abandoned during the cavalry combat.
Much of the French cavalry were now over-extended and their horses were tired; they too were vulnerable to a well-timed counter-attack and could not maintain themselves so far forward. The Prince of Orange had one uncommitted cavalry regiment available: the Belgian 5th Light Dragoons. This regiment had a number of very experienced officers who had fought in the French army, including two who had served in the imperial guard. Nearly a quarter of the men had also served with the French army. Although tired from their march they were no doubt keen to avenge the humiliation of the 6th Hussars. Having had time to properly organise themselves they were better placed to deliver a well-formed and controlled charge.
The two chasseur regiments of Hubert’s brigade were quickly rallying when the 5th Light Dragoons bore down on them. Despite the tiredness of their horses, the chasseurs met the charge, which quickly deteriorated into a mass of individual combats. The Belgians held their own for a considerable time and it appears there were a number of charges and counter-charges. The fight was marked by the number of combatants from each side that personally knew the men they were fighting against, since a number of the Belgian dragoons had served in the 6th Chasseurs-à-Cheval in the previous years and they had again met each other several times during picket duty at the border in the previous months. The uniforms were not that different either, both being green with yellow facings. Old comrades in arms recognised each other and the French appealed to the Belgians to join them once more, while they lowered their sabres to indicate that they weren’t enemies, crying out, ‘À nous, Belges, à nous’ [‘To us, Belgians, to us!’]. It appears that no one accepted the invitation and old friends exchanged blows.6
Captain Delienne found himself face to face with Devielle, his old brother-in-arms in France, Captain Van Remoortere* received a sabre blow to the stomach from one of his old NCOs and Senior Sergeant Beauce fought with one of the senior sergeants of his old squadron.7
The fighting was fierce and the advantage swung from one side to the other until the intervention of the 5th Lancers, which finally broke the Belgian resistance. Colonel de Mercx was seriously wounded and the light dragoons rushed towards the perceived safety of their own lines. Intoxicated by their success, the French chasseurs pursued their beaten opponents, but were stopped by a shattering volley from a Scottish regiment (the 92nd) deployed on the Namur road. This regiment had mistaken the fleeing Belgians for Frenchmen and, believing themselves threatened, had opened fire. The accuracy of their fire caused considerable casualties amongst their allies; the 5th Light Dragoons lost forty men to this single volley.
The 92nd had come up with General Picton’s 5th British Division that had arrived under cover of the chaotic fighting that was taking place between Gémioncourt and Quatre Bras. There seems little doubt that without this timely reinforcement, Quatre Bras would have fallen to the French. Isolated, tired and facing steady infantry, the French cavalry turned bridle and moved back towards Gémioncourt to rally.
The effect of the French cavalry actions was not limited to those involved in the fighting; a senior British officer recorded:
The French cavalry charged the Belgian Cavalry and dispersed them – they went to the rear. The carts, etc coming up along the highroad from Brussels took the alarm, turned round and went back with followers etc in the greatest confusion. Many of the Belgic cavalry went to Brussels and spread the alarm. The Duke and Lord Fitzroy Somerset were in front when the French cavalry charged the Belgic cavalry and with difficulty got back to the 92nd, posted at Quatre Bras. The Duke leaped a bank and ditch, and on a worse horse he might not have escaped.8
Piré’s cavalry had effectively destroyed the Dutch-Belgian cavalry as a fighting force and come close to killing or capturing Wellington himself. As the French cavalry withdrew, the tirailleurs continued their own advance and continued the pressure on the very centre of the allied line.
In the Bossu wood, things had also been going well for the French. Although the advance was slow, the Nassau battalions seemed reluctant to come to close quarters. In a French infantry battalion, a company of about 100 men had only three officers; a ridiculously small number to exert any control over small groups of men who could see only a few metres to each side. It is impossible to follow what happened with any accuracy during this fighting, but slowly the overwhelming numbers of French infantry, more experienced and motivated than their opponents, gradually gained ground. In places the undergrowth was so dense that swords and bayonets had to be used to penetrate it. Small groups of men found themselves cut off and surrounded; no doubt individuals, separated from their friends, quietly made their way out of the wood and the fighting, whilst others, in small groups, fired at point-blank range at those hidden amongst the trees and fought hand-to-hand.
Combat at such short ranges almost always results in the most desperate fighting as the instinct for survival motivates each individual. Best use was inevitably made of the trees and bushes for cover and observation was no doubt further impaired by the thick smoke that built up below the roof of foliage. All control must have been lost and the best that could be hoped for was to maintain a thick line of skirmishers advancing almost like beaters on a game shoot. The battle here swung one way and then the next as one side and then the other committed fresh troops or was able to infiltrate behind their adversaries. Slowly, but surely, Jérôme’s men pushed the allied troops back and the Nassauer battalions were finally forced out of the western edge of the wood onto the Champ du Sarti from where they began to fall back to the north.
Ney must have felt everything was going to plan. Up to this point, he had only engaged his skirmishers, artillery and cavalry; apart from Soye’s brigade in the Bossu wood, the main body of his infantry had still not been committed and had suffered negligible casualties. Perponcher’s division were taking a battering, the Dutch-Belgian cavalry had been crushed and a high proportion of the Dutch artillery had been destroyed or captured. The Namur road, along which he was to march to the emperor’s support, was not secure, but this must be only a matter of time. All that was required was a resolute march on Quatre Bras itself and surely victory would be his. Little did the marshal know was that things were about to take a dramatic turn for the worse.
* Van Remoortere had joined the French chasseurs in 1805, had made eight campaigns from Austerlitz to that of 1814 and had twice been decorated with the Legion d’Honneur. He died in 1847 as a general.