1. Dykes Diary, 6 September 1942.
2. Smith to Moseley, 4 July 1942, Moseley Papers.
3. Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 August 1942, EP, #429; Marshall to OPD, 19 August 1942, The Right Man for the Job, #282.
4. CCS Directive, 24 July 1942, Butcher Diary; Eisenhower to George Patton, 31 August 1942, EP, #468.
5. Handy to Eisenhower, 23 August 1942, Butcher Diary. Patton was another who saw Torch as political and therefore ill-fated. Patton traveled to London for talks on Torch. His friend Hughes visited him on 8 August and found Patton behind a desk with his head buried in his hands. “Without taking his head out of one hand,” Hughes later remembered, “he tossed me a document and said, ‘Read that.’ I did. It was the order to P[atton] to return to the US and organize the Western Task Force for the N[orth] A[frican] campaign.” For his entire career, Patton had longed for the opportunity to lead a major force in battle, and now he commanded an operation he saw as a forlorn “political” operation. Death—he never feared defeat—would defuse the great destiny he believed lay before him. Patton’s views, though typically more extreme, mirrored the sentiments of most senior American officers. Hughes, “Notes of Patton,” n.d., Hughes Papers; Hughes Diary, 8 August 1942.
6. MG Joseph Haydon, Mountbatten’s vice chief, made these complaints on 8 August. Mountbatten passed Haydon’s memo on to Eisenhower. On 11 August the JCS approved Clark’s appointment as deputy supreme commander; Eisenhower instructed Clark to focus on Torch. Eisenhower to Mountbatten, 11 August 1942, EP, #421; Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 August 1942, The Right Man for the Job, #3204; Eisenhower Manuscripts, Cable File, DDEL.
7. Mark Clark, Calculated Risk (New York, 1950), 48.
8. Butcher Diary, 11 August 1942.
9. Reginald MacDonald-Buchanan, “Notes on General Marshall,” MacDonald-Buchanan Papers, GCMRL.
10. Eisenhower to Mamie, 26 August 1942, in Letters to Mamie, ed. John D. Eisenhower (Garden City, NY, 1978).
11. Butcher Diary, 27 August 1942; Eisenhower to Charlie Harger, Moseley, and Vernon Prichard, 27 August 1942, EP, #456–57, 459.
12. Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 September 1942, EP, #484.
13. Butcher Diary, 3 September 1942, EP, #473.
14. The chief sources for the rest of this chapter are the published and unpublished Butcher diaries.
15. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 91,104.
16. Eisenhower used the “one man navy” expression repeatedly. Butcher Diary, 10 August 1942.
17. Eisenhower recommended Smith’s promotion at the end of July and again early in October. Eisenhower to Marshall, 27 July and 3 October 1942, EP, #395, 534.
18. Butcher Diary, 11 August 1942; Eisenhower to Operations Division, 16 August 1942, EP, #433.
19. Eisenhower’s insistence that he alone determined the structure of his headquarters emerged as a leitmotif throughout his tenure as supreme commander. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 45; Eisenhower to Smith, 31 December 1943, EP, #1469.
20. Butcher’s account of Smith’s first day is in Three Years with Eisenhower, 90–93.
21. FUBAR is army slang for “fucked up beyond all repair.”
22. Eisenhower to Handy, 7 September 1942, EP, #488; Somervell to Eisenhower, 8 September 1942, EP, #490, n. 1.
23. Lee, BG Thomas Larkin, and Hughes put together the list. Hughes [for Eisenhower] to War Department, 8 September 1942, Hughes Papers; Butcher Diary, 9 September 1942.
24. J. C. H. Lee, Service Reminiscences, unpublished manuscript, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (a copy is in MHI); Somervell to Marshall, 24 September 1942, The Right Man for the Job, #334, n. 4.
25. Leroy Lutes, who headed operations and planning in ASF, provides some of the best insights into the logistical and organizational problems experienced by the U.S. Army in World War II. Lutes to Lee, 12 September 1942, Hughes Papers; Lutes, “Army Supply Problems,” 23 September 1946, Industrial College of the Armed Forces lecture; “The Effects of Logistics upon Strategy,” 29 January 1951, Army War College lecture; “Supply in World War II: The Flight to Europe in 1942,” Antiaircraft Journal 95 (May–June 1952): 8–10, Leroy Lutes Papers, DDEL. Hughes’s unpublished manuscripts also offer firsthand insights. See Hughes, “Organization,” “Impetus of Supply from the Rear,” and “Supply from the Rear,” Hughes Papers. See also Carter Magruder, Recurring Logistical Problems as I Have Observed Them (Washington, DC, 1991), 27, and Magruder oral history, MHI. The confused state of American logistics is discussed in Millett, Organization and Role of Army Service Forces, 60–61; Roland Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 2 vols., USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1953), 1:96–99; and Richard Leighton and Robert Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1955), 368–73.
26. Butcher Diary, 4 September 1942.
27. Ibid., 6 September 1942; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 1:96.
28. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 and 19 August 1942, EP, #434, #437; Butcher Diary, 17 August 1942.
29. Eisenhower to Handy, 31 August 1942, EP, #468.
30. Butcher Diary, 2 September 1942.
31. Eisenhower to OPD, 4 September 1942, EP, #479.
32. Hughes Diary, 12 September 1942; Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1968), 104.
33. Eisenhower to Handy, 7 September 1942, EP, #488.
34. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 10 September 1942, EP, #491.
35. Hughes to Kate Hughes, 10 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
36. Eisenhower to Somervell, 26 June 1942, EP, #355.
37. Eisenhower to Somervell, 27 July 1942, EP, #398.
38. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 7.
39. Eisenhower to OPD, 16 August 1942, EP, #433; Butcher Diary, 16 August 1942.
40. Marshall to Chaney, “Organization Services of Supply,” 14 May 1942, cited in GBR, “Organization and Function of the Communications Zones,” annex. See also Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 1:36.
41. Lee, Service Reminiscences, 81.
42. GBR, “Organization and Function of the Communications Zones,” 1; Hughes, “Organization,” Hughes Papers.
43. GBR, “Organization of the European Theater of War,” 84.
44. Marshall to Chaney, “Organization Services of Supply.”
45. The administrative services were Adjutant General, Senior Chaplain, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Provost Marshal, and Special Services Office. The supply services were Army Exchange, Chemical Warfare, Depot Services, Engineers, Finance, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Medical, Signal, and Transportation.
46. Historical Division, U.S. Forces, European Theater, “Organization and Command in the European Theater of Operations,” in The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations, 2 vols. (Paris, 1946), 1:64.
47. The field manual issued less than a week after Eisenhower assumed command directed as follows: “The theater is organized for tactical control and administrative control to the extent dictated by War Department instructions.” “Theater of Operations,” 29 June 1942, FM 100–15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, para. 11. For three weeks, Eisenhower issued no directive on theater organization. Finally, on 20 July, he issued General Order 19, preserving Chaney’s structure. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 1:44.
48. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 7.
49. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Lee, 10 September 1942, EP, #494.
50. Gale to Smith, 15 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
51. Hughes to Clark, 14 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
52. Gale to Smith, “Ability of SOS to Meet Initial Supply Demands,” 15 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
53. Eisenhower Diary, 15 September 1942, EP, #502.
54. Lee, Service Reminiscences, 81.
55. Murphy tells his own story in Diplomat among Warriors. Leon Blair, “Amateurs in Diplomacy: The American Vice-Consuls in North Africa, 1941–43,” Historian (August 1973): 607–20.
56. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 104–5.
57. For an account of Murphy’s diplomatic maneuvering, see Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 124–61; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 86–88; George Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1957), 77–83.
58. The account of the meeting comes from Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 103–4, 106–10, and Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 155.
59. “Minutes of Conference, SOS Headquarters,” and Lee to Hughes, 18 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
60. Lee to Clark, 18 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
61. Hughes to Clark, “Estimate of Supply and Administrative Aspects of Proposed Operation,” 14 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
62. Eisenhower to War Department, 19 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
63. Hughes’s marginal note, Lee to Clark, 18 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
64. Butcher Diary, 19 and 21 September 1942.
65. Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 September 1942, EP, #509.
66. Butcher Diary, 18 September 1942; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 113.
67. Smith, “Outline Plan, Operation TORCH,” 20 September 1942, in “Operation TORCH,” Combined Chiefs of Staff File, WBSP.
68. Butcher Diary, 18 September 1942; Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 October 1943, EP, #534.
69. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 104.
70. Eisenhower to Charles Gailey, 19 September 1942, EP, #510.
71. Lee to Lutes, 21 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
72. Butcher Diary, 24 September 1942.
73. Eisenhower, “Staff Requirements, Future Operations,” [27] July 1942, EP, #397; Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 August 1942, EP, #435; Smith to Marshall, 22 October 1942, Chief of Staff’s Official Correspondence File, 1942–1944, WBSP. An entire file is devoted to the Smith-Marshall correspondence from the time of Smith’s arrival in the theater until after he moved to London.
74. COL Ben Sawbridge, “Organizational and Functional Chart, AFHQ,” 26 August 1942, AG AFHQ: 323 35–1, in Allied Force Headquarters, Historical Section and U.S. Army, North African/Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Historical Section, History of Allied Force Headquarters, ed. E. Dwight Salmon, Paul Birdsall, et al. (1945).
75. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 2:90–91.
76. Ismay, Memoirs, 262–63.
77. Brooke Diary and “Notes for My Memoirs,” 26 June 1942. Between 1951 and 1956, Brooke wrote commentaries on his diary (“Notes”), presumably for an eventual biographer. Danchev inserted these notes in War Diaries; they do not appear in Bryant’s books based on the Alanbrooke diaries.
78. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 117.
79. Smith to Marshall, 22 October 1942, Personal Correspondence File, WBSP.
80. Carter Burgess interview by author, 19 November 1988, Roanoke, VA. Burgess, Smith’s aide who came to London with him, later served as secretary of the general staff.
81. Hughes to Kate, 30 September 1942, Hughes Papers.
82. For an account of Smith’s hospitalization, the escape, and the birthday party, see Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 124–27, 132, 143.
83. Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 October 1942, EP, # 534.
84. Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 October 1942, EP, #544.
85. Marshall to Smith, 19 October 1942, and Smith to Marshall, 22 October 1942, Chief of Staff Correspondence, WBSP.
86. Butcher Diary, 27–28 September and 3–4, 6 October 1942.
1. Chynoweth to George Pappas, 24 October 1987, and Chynoweth to Patton, 16 July 1926, both in Chynoweth Papers, MHI. See also Chynoweth, Bellamy Park, 100, 121–25.
2. MacArthur made these observations to BG Gerald Wilkinson, the British liaison officer to MacArthur’s command in Australia in 1942. N. Gerald Hugh Wilkinson, “War Journal,” CAC.
3. Eisenhower Diary, 21 March 1942, Eisenhower Diary, January 1-July 6, 1942 File, Eisenhower Diaries, DDEL.
4. Eisenhower to Hughes, 9 September 1934, Hughes Papers.
5. Eisenhower to Conner, 21 August 1942, EP, #442.
6. Oliver Warner, Cunningham of Hyndhope, Admiral of the Fleet: A Memoir (London, 1967), 185.
7. Eisenhower to Somervell, 31 October 1942, EP, #574.
8. Wilkinson, “War Journal.”
9. AG AFHQ to Commanding Generals of American Task Forces and Air Forces, 3 October 1942, in Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters, and European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army Historical Division, The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC, 1946).
10. Butcher Diary, 8 October 1942.
11. Ibid., 9 August 1942.
12. Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 July 1942, EP, #399.
13. Eisenhower to OPD, 16 August 1942, EP, #433.
14. Eisenhower to AG WDGS, 3 September 1942, EP, #474.
15. Butcher Diary, 24 September 1942.
16. Eisenhower to OPD, 16 August 1942, EP, #433; Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 August 1942, EP, #435; Butcher Diary, 27 August 1942.
17. Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 October 1942, EP, #534.
18. Eisenhower believed the failure to create a unified air command was one of the errors of the North African campaign. Eisenhower, “Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatch, North African Campaign, 1942–43,” copy in WBSP. Frank Craven and James Cate, eds., Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942-December 1943, AAFWWII (Chicago, 1949), 56–60.
19. Eisenhower to Ismay, 10 October 1942, EP, #541; Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 October 1942, EP, #559; Eisenhower to Handy, 23 October 1942, EP, #563.
20. Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters.
21. Eisenhower to AG WDGS, 21 August 1942, EP, #443; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 68.
22. Eisenhower to Charles Gailey, 1 January 1943, EP, #751.
23. An American major, Joseph Phillips, held the position.
24. Smith to Marshall, 22 October 1942, Marshall Correspondence File, WBSP.
25. AFHQ Operational Memo #30, 24 October 1942, AFHQ, 1942–1944 File, WBSP.
26. AFHQ to War Department, 26 October 1942, Cable R 4129, AFHQ, 1942–1944 File, WBSP.
27. Marshall to AFHQ, 25 October 1942, Cable R-2409, and Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 October 1942, Cable R 2593, AFHQ In-Coming Cable Log, WBSP.
28. Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 October 1942, EP, #572, n. 1.
29. Smith’s views are thoroughly laid out in GBR, “Organization of the European Theater of Operations,” 63–64, 78–84.
30. Sawbridge, “Staff Study,” 2 November 1942, AG AFHQ: 323.35–66, AFHQ File, WBSP.
31. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 466–67.
32. Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 October 1942, EP, #572.
33. Sawbridge, “AFHQ Memo #37,” 2 November 1942, AFHQ 0100/21/144, stated: “Effective at once, no additional requests for personnel or troop units for service in TORCH area will be made upon the War Department without the personal approval of G-1 and the Chief of Staff.”
34. Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 September 1942, EP, #509; “Minutes of Chief of Staff Meeting,” 13 October 1942, Hughes Papers; Eisenhower to Anderson, 7 November 1942, EP, #584; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 159.
35. Butcher Diary, 2 and 5 October 1942.
36. Eisenhower to Hartle, 27 October 1942, EP, #568; Smith to Handy, 29 October 1942, AFHQ, Out-Going Cables, WBSP.
37. Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 October 1942, EP, #569; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 152–56. The Axis had no troops in Tunisia and only a few understrength and immobile Italian divisions in western Libya.
38. Eisenhower to Marshall, 1 November 1942, EP, #576.
39. Marshall to Eisenhower, 5 November 1942, RG 492, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, NARA; Smith to Eisenhower, 7 November 1942, Eyes Only Cable File, WBSP; Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 November 1942, EP, #585; Butcher Diary, 7 November 1942. See also ETOUSA Historical Section, Pre-& Invasion Planning File, WBSP.
40. Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 November 1942, EP, #585.
41. Smith to Eisenhower, 7 November 1942, EP, #579, n. 1.
42. Smith to Mountbatten, 7 November 1942, Smith 201 File, WBSP. As was the practice among senior officers, Smith removed a number of sensitive letters and placed them in his 210 File.
43. Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (Garden City, NY, 1950), 9.
44. Eisenhower to Marshall [through Smith], 7 November 1942, EP, #585.
45. Eisenhower to Smith, 9 November 1942, EP, #592.
1. Eisenhower to Smith, 11 November 1942, EP, #609.
2. Eisenhower to Smith, 16 November 1942, EP, #631.
3. Eisenhower to Smith, 6 November 1942, EP, #583.
4. Eisenhower to CCS, 14 November 1942, EP, #622.
5. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 136–38.
6. Murphy forwarded three letters; the other two involved meetings with Mast concerning command arrangements between Eisenhower and Giraud. Mast told Murphy the general did not trust Darlan and dismissed any cooperation between the two men. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 October 1942, EP, #557.
7. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 October 1942, EP, #558; Brooke Diary, 17 October 1942.
8. Cited in Howe, Northwest Africa, 81.
9. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 251; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 116.
10. Eisenhower to Smith and Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 November 1942, EP, #592, #594.
11. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 188.
12. Ibid., 190. Macmillan told Smith that Nogues possessed “a wonderful skill in grazing the edge of treason.” Macmillan to Smith, 15 April 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
13. Eisenhower to Smith, 11 November 1942, EP, #609.
14. Eisenhower to Marshall, 11 November 1942, EP, #607.
15. Eisenhower to Churchill, 11 November 1942, EP, #604.
16. Eisenhower to Marshall, 11 November 1942, EP, #606; Eisenhower to Smith, 11 November 1942, EP, #609.
17. Eisenhower made these intentions clear to Smith before Torch commenced. Eisenhower to Smith, 6 November 1942, EP, #583.
18. Brooke Diary, 10 November 1942.
19. Smith to Eisenhower, 11 November 1942, Chief of Staff, TORCH, November 8-December 9, 1942 File, WBSP. Smith had his staff collect all the correspondence in a single file.
20. Eisenhower to Clark, 12 November 1942, EP, #613.
21. Bipolar disorder is so common among the general population that there is no great stigma attached to those who suffer from it. Noted British psychiatrist and author Anthony Storr makes the valid point that, had Churchill been “stable and equable,” he “could never have inspired the nation. In 1940, when all the odds were against Britain, a leader of sober judgment might well have concluded that we were finished.” Churchill revisionists make the same argument, without the psychological categories. Anthony Storr, Churchill’s Black Dog and Other Phenomena of the Human Mind (New York, 1997).
22. Smith to Eisenhower, 12 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP.
23. Eisenhower to Smith, 12 November 1942, EP, #615, #616.
24. Smith to Eisenhower, 12 December 1942, TORCH, WBSP; Brooke Diary, 13 November 1942.
25. Eisenhower to Marshall, 13 November 1942, EP, #619.
26. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 190–93.
27. Brooke Diary, 13 November 1942.
28. Eisenhower to CCS, 14 November 1942, EP, #622.
29. Eisenhower to Smith, 14 November 1942, EP, #625.
30. Smith gave a complete account of the Chequers meeting to Eisenhower. Smith to Eisenhower, 16 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP. See also Brooke Diary, 15 November 1942.
31. Smith to Eisenhower, 16 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP; Eisenhower to Smith, 17 November 1942, EP, #638.
32. Cited in Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography (New York, 2001), 702–3.
33. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 651.
34. Pogue, Marshall Interviews, 488–89.
35. Smith to Eisenhower, 16 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP.
36. Churchill to Roosevelt and British Foreign Office to British Embassy in Washington, 17 November 1942, FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1942, Europe, 2:445–47; Eisenhower to Clark, 19 November 1942, EP, #645.
37. Eisenhower to Smith, 16 November 1942, EP, #631.
38. Ibid., #634.
39. Brooke Diary, 19 November 1942.
40. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 November 1942, EP, #640; Eisenhower to Smith, 17 November 1942, EP, #638; Eisenhower to Smith, 11 November 1942, EP, #609; Smith to Eisenhower, 16 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP.
41. Eisenhower to Smith, 16 November 1942, EP, #631; Eisenhower to Smith, 17 November 1942, EP, #638.
42. Eisenhower to Clark, 19 November 1942, EP, #645.
43. Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 November 1942, Marshall Correspondence File, DDEL.
44. Eisenhower to Smith, 18 November 1942, EP, #641.
45. Ibid., #642.
46. Aside from Gale, Smith brought MG F. H. N. Davidson, director of British Military Intelligence; Brigadier Cecil Sugden, the British G-3 in AFHQ; and Dykes’s old friend Colonel Stirling, now assigned as Eisenhower’s military assistant. Smuts flew down separately and also attended the conference.
47. Eisenhower to Clark, 19 November 1942, EP, #645.
48. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 November 1942, EP, #640.
49. In fact, AFHQ had only 403 officers attached (313 American and 90 British), with another 200 British logisticians detached from headquarters for service with the First Army and the British line of communications command. Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters.
50. Eisenhower to Clark, 20 November 1942, EP, #649.
51. Somervell to Eisenhower, 11 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP; Sawbridge [for Eisenhower] to Somervell, 21 November 1942, EP, #655; Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters.
52. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 201.
53. Brooke Diary, 21 November 1942.
54. Smith to Marshall, 24 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP.
55. Marshall to Smith, telephone transcript, 25 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP.
56. Smith to Eisenhower, 25 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP; Eisenhower to Smith, 25 November 1942, EP, #665.
57. “Minutes, BCOS Meeting” and Smith to Eisenhower, 25 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP. See also Brooke Diary, 25 November 1942.
58. Smith to Eisenhower, 26 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP. The full text of Darlan’s letter is reproduced in Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 206–7. Butcher also reported that Marshall instructed Eisenhower to write a note to Darlan expressing his own appreciation but not that of the American government.
59. Brooke Diary, 26 November 1942.
60. Smith to Eisenhower, 27 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP; Eisenhower to Smith, 27 December 1942, EP, #672.
61. Brooke Diary, 30 November 1942. Three days later he presented a new paper. Churchill repeatedly said that “North Africa must act as a ‘springboard’ and not a sofa to future action! After urging attacks on Sardinia and Sicily he is now swinging away from these for a possible invasion of France in 1943!” Reflecting back on this period, Brooke remembered Churchill saying, “You must not think that you can get off with your ‘sardines’ [referring to Sardinia and Sicily] in 1943, no—we must establish a western front, and what is more we promised Stalin we should do so when in Moscow.” Brooke Diary and “Notes,” 3 December 1942.
62. Marshall to Eisenhower, 1 December 1943, The Right Man for the Job, #430. On 7 January Ismay confirmed the BCOS had arrived at a “definite decision” to exploit the situation in the Mediterranean. Ismay to Smith, 7 January 1943, Chief of Staff Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, WBSP.
63. Leahy, I Was There, 137.
64. Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 December 1942, EP, #681.
65. Smith to Eisenhower, 3 December 1942, TORCH, WBSP.
66. Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 December 1942, FRUS, Washington and Casablanca, 499.
1. Smith to Ismay, 15 December 1942, Chief of Staff Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, WBSP.
2. Eisenhower to Churchill, 5 December 1942, EP, #692.
3. Eisenhower to Handy, 7 December 1942, EP, #698.
4. Eisenhower to Robert Littlejohn, 12 December 1942, EP, #712.
5. K. A. N. Anderson, “Home Forces, Subject: Administrative Lessons of the Campaign in North Africa,” 27 July 1943, in Allied Interoperability File, MHI.
6. Gale sporadically kept a diary in which he chronicled his efforts to disentangle the supply lines. War Diary of Chief Administrative Officer, Allied Force Headquarters, Papers of LTG Sir Humphrey Myddleton Gale, LHCMA.
7. Smith to Ismay, 15 December 1942, WBSP. For a discussion of this question, see U.S. Army, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, Supply (G-4) Division, Logistical History of NATOUSA/MTOUSA (Naples, 1945), chap. 1, and Leo Meyer, “Strategy and Logistical History: Mediterranean Theater of Operations,” MHI.
8. Eisenhower to CCS, 12 December 1942, EP, #711. The high attrition rates for vehicles in Tunisia—many of them bogged down in a sea of mud—were not anticipated.
9. Eisenhower to Churchill, 16 December 1942, EP, #724.
10. Eisenhower to Paul Hodgson, 4 December 1942, EP, #687.
11. Butcher Diary, 12 and 20 December 1942. For Eisenhower’s estimate of Smith, see Crusade in Europe, 54–55.
12. “Minutes, Chiefs of Staff meeting,” 10 December 1942, AFHQ, WBSP.
13. Ruth Briggs interview with William Snyder, cited in “Walter Bedell Smith,” Military Affairs (January 1984): 9–10.
14. Carter Burgess and Dan Gilmer oral histories, DDEL; Vittrup and Burgess interviews. Gilmer served as Smith’s secretary of the general staff in AFHQ. A graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, Burgess served as Smith’s aide in Washington and traveled with him to London and Algiers; he later acted as Smith’s secretary of the general staff. Vittrup also served in the secretariat in Washington and later in AFHQ.
15. Smith, “Problems of an Integrated Headquarters,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (November 1945): 455–62; original transcript in WBSP.
16. Smith to Truscott, 15 December 1942, Personal Correspondence, WBSP. Truscott tried unsuccessfully to retain one of his prized staff officers and keep him out of the big headquarters. He argued that a staff appointment would curtail a promising career. It did not; the officer in question, Theodore Conway, rose to four-star rank. Conway, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI.
17. Jacob Diary, “Operation Symbol,” 30 December 1942, unpublished personal diary of LTG Ian Jacob, cited in Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York, 2002), 379.
18. Nevins oral history, DDEL.
19. Russell Gugeler, unpublished biography of Orlando Ward, and Ward Diary, Orlando Ward Papers, MHI. See also Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943 (New York, 2002), 279.
20. This quote appears in several sources but not in Macmillan’s account, The Blast of War (London, 1967). See Nigel Fischer, Harold Macmillan (New York, 1967), 100–101. The recipient of this advice was Richard Crossman, who headed AFHQ’s psychological warfare section and became a prominent voice of the Labour Left in the postwar period.
21. Smith, “Problems of an Integrated Headquarters.”
22. Eisenhower to Marshall and Eisenhower to Churchill, 16 December 1942, EP, #711, #724.
23. Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 and 9 December 1943, EP, #700–701; Smith to Marshall, 13 December 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
24. A meeting was held on 12 December between a member of Darlan’s staff and GEN Georges Catroux, the most noteworthy Vichy officer to join the Free French. This meeting planted the seed of hope for a rapprochement between the French factions in Churchill’s mind. Eisenhower to Harold Stark, 13 December 1942, EP, #713.
25. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 226; Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 21 December 1942, EP, #733.
26. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 225–26; Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 149–51.
27. Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 December 1942, EP, #748.
28. Smith to Marshall, 24 December 1942, Eyes Only, WBSP.
29. Eisenhower later related to his friend Robert Eichelberger, “I knew a man who had received one for sitting in a hole in the ground and [I] refused to accept it.” Unpublished Eichelberger manuscript, Eichelberger Papers, MHI. See also D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life, 372–73.
30. Roosevelt to Churchill, 1 January 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:23–24.
31. Butcher Diary, 4 January 1942.
32. Eisenhower to Portal, 4 January 1943, EP, #757.
33. Eisenhower to Gailey, 1 January 1943, EP, #750.
34. Interrogation of GEN Walter Warlimont, in Historical Section, USFET, “Interview statements General Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff (German General Staff), and Generals Jodl, Keitel, Field Marshal Goering, and other German General Staff Officers,” copy in WBSP (hereafter cited as Interviews of Senior German Officers).
35. Macmillan, Blast of War, 346.
36. Hamblen stood in for Gale during his extended absences from headquarters.
37. AFHQ Staff Size
| Date | Total | Officers | Enlisted Men |
|---|---|---|---|
| September 1942 | 2,068 | 549 (205 U.S., 344 British) | 1,519 (793 U.S., 726 British) |
| November 1942 | 1,646 | 507 (217 U.S., 290 British) | 1,139 (362 U.S., 777 British) |
| Actual strength | 1,270 | 403 (313 U.S., 90 British)* | 867 (90 U.S., 777 British) |
| January 1943 | 3,052 | 1,060 | 1,992 |
| April 1943 | 3,604 | 1,480 | 2,124 |
| October 1943 | 4,782** | 2,066 | 2,716 |
| November 1943 | 4,072 | Relative parity: U.S. 2,012; BR | 2,060 |
* In addition, 200 British officers, chiefly logisticians, served on detached duty to First British Army and the British line of communication.
** The entire increase—586 officers and 592 enlisted personnel—consisted of Americans.
Figures compiled from Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters.
38. Smith to Hughes, 24 December 1942, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
39. Truscott to Smith, 30 December 1943, in Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters. See also Truscott, Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York, 1954), 129.
40. Gale to Smith and Hamblen to Smith, 3 January 1943; Whiteley to Smith, 4 January 1943, in Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters.
41. Butcher Diary, 12 January 1943.
42. Hughes Diary, 8–10 January 1943; Patton Diary, 9 January 1943, GSPP.
43. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 29 December 1932, EP, #744; Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 January 1943, EP, #765. Smith delegated most of these responsibilities to his aide, Major Burgess, who had performed many of the same responsibilities during the Washington conferences. Patton, always looking for ways to impress his superiors, took charge of the preparations for and management of the conference, even though Clark, as Fifth Army commander, was the official host. Burgess interview.
44. Brooke Diary, 31 December 1942, 15 and 16 January 1943. All the minutes of the Symbol conference are in CCS, ANFA File, WBSP.
45. Patton Diary, 15 January 1943.
46. CCS 163, “System of Air Command in the Mediterranean,” 18 January 1943, ANFA, WBSP. Eisenhower to Arnold and Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 January 1943, EP, #778, #779.
47. CCS 171, “Operation HUSKY, Directive to Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa,” 21 January 1943, ANFA, WBSP.
48. During the Casablanca conference, Brooke noted in his diary his apprehension that Eisenhower lacked the “basic qualities required from such a Commander.” He expressed these views earlier and held them throughout the war.
49. Brooke Diary and “Notes,” 20 January 1943.
50. Eisenhower Memorandum, 23 January 1943, Butcher Diary.
51. Butcher Diary, 23 January 1943. Eisenhower’s stock fell pretty low in the estimate of both the president and Marshall. When Marshall asked the president if Eisenhower should be promoted to four stars, Roosevelt replied that “he would not promote Eisenhower until there was some damn good reason for doing so.” Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 688.
52. Marshall interview by Matthews, Smyth, et al., 25 July 1949, Interview III: Part 2, GCMRL.
53. Smith to Mrs. Dykes, 30 January 1943, Danchev, Very Special Relationship, 25.
54. Marshall interview by Matthews, Smyth, et al., 25 July 1949, Interview III: Part 1, GCMRL.
55. Ibid.; Butcher Diary, 26 January 1943; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 247–48.
56. Butcher Diary, 27 January 1943.
57. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 14 January 1943, EP, #768.
58. Somervell’s long undated memo, “Matters to Be Discussed with General Eisenhower,” ANFA, WBSP; Eisenhower to Somervell, 27 January 1943, EP, #795.
59. The U.S. First Division in Oran, the Thirty-fourth in Algiers, and the Second Armored and Third and Ninth Divisions in Morocco.
60. Leroy Lutes to Hughes, 16 March 1943, Hughes Papers; Lutes, “The Effects of Logistics upon Strategy,” Lutes Papers; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 149.
61. Wilson to Smith, 18–19 January 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
62. Wilson was busily campaigning for the job of deputy theater commander. Wilson to Smith, 1 February 1943, Chief of Staff Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, and Smith to Wilson, 3 February 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
63. Eisenhower to Somervell, 27 January 1943, EP, #795.
64. Smith discussed his views on organization in a long letter to Marshall. Smith to Marshall, 8 July 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
65. Eisenhower to Handy, 28 January 1943, EP, #796.
66. Soon after returning to Washington, Marshall authorized the formation of the North African Theater of Operations (NATO). Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 February 1943, WBSP.
67. Eisenhower frequently used the term ritualistic to denigrate other officers. It had a number of applications. For example, a ritualistic officer depended on fixed chains of command, enforced martinet discipline, unthinkingly relied on conventional methods, and refused to delegate authority to the men he selected as his subordinates. Commanders too attentive to logistical constraints—to tidying administration—he also categorized as ritualistic. He considered “the slow, methodical, ritualistic person … absolutely valueless in a key position.” Eisenhower saw none of those traits in himself. Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 November 1942, EP, #673; Eisenhower Manuscript [in Butcher Diary], 10 December 1942, EP, #705; Eisenhower to Handy, 19 January 1943, EP, #782; Eisenhower to Somervell, 19 March 1943, EP, #896.
68. Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 February 1943, EP, #811.
69.Ibid.
70. Eisenhower to Somervell, 28 January 1943, EP, #795.
71. “Minutes of Chief of Staff Meeting #19,” 29 January 1943, AFHQ Secretariat, Chief of Staff Conference File, WBSP.
72. Eisenhower to Mamie, 2 and 3 February 1943, in Letters to Mamie.
73. Hughes to Eisenhower, 6 February 1943, Chief of Staff NATOUSA: Organization File, Hughes Papers.
74. Eisenhower to Hughes, 9 February 1943, Hughes Papers.
75. Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 February 1943, EP, #811.
76. Hughes Diary, 10 February 1943.
77. Eisenhower to Connor, 22 March 1943, EP, #902.
78. As late as the end of February, U.S. service troops in North Africa numbered a mere 2,500; the complement of ground and air forces in the theater stood at 180,000.
1. Eisenhower to Handy, 28 January 1943, EP, #796.
2. Basil Liddell Hart, ed., Rommel Papers (New York, 1995), 328. Along the same lines, another German general called the campaigns fought in North Africa “a tactician’s dream and a quartermaster’s nightmare.”
3. Eisenhower manuscript, Butcher Diary, 25 February 1943, EP, #843.
4. Brigadier Edgar Williams, Montgomery’s chief of intelligence in northwest Europe, cited in Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Man behind the Legend (London, 1987), 114. Hamilton steers clear of any speculation about Montgomery’s psychological makeup in his three-volume biography. But in a book published in 2001, Hamilton portrays Montgomery as an emotional cripple, tormented by barely repressed “homosocial” desires and deep-seated feelings of inadequacy produced by a physically and psychologically abusive mother (who dressed him up as a girl and briefly sent him to a girls’ school) and by the brutalizing boarding school environment marked by “the English vices” of bullying and buggering. To what extent Montgomery was affected, if at all, by these influences remains pure speculation and of no great import, but there is no question of Montgomery’s bullying traits. Nigel Hamilton, The Full Monty: Montgomery of Alamein, 1887–1942 (London, 2001).
5. Montgomery to Brooke, 12 April 1943, in Montgomery and the Eighth Army: A Selection from the Diaries, Correspondence and Other Papers of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, August 1942 to December 1943, ed. Stephen Brooks (London, 1991), 207.
6. Montgomery to Brooke, 15 February 1943, ibid., 135–36.
7. Montgomery to Brooke, 16 and 23 February 1943, ibid., 150, 153–54.
8. Harmon to Smith, 26 February and 5 March 1943, Chief of Staff Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, WBSP. Harmon also took the opportunity to defend Ward. He complained it would be a “cruel injustice to relieve Ward” of the First Armored Division. Patton later relieved Ward after the fighting at El Guettar and Maknassy. Others also got the sack in what was fast becoming “a professional graveyard.” COL Alexander Stark, a regimental commander in the First Infantry, and BG Raymond McQullan, who commanded a combat command in First Armored, were relieved.
9. Harmon’s account of his meetings with Eisenhower and his assessment of Fredendall are in Ernest Harmon, Combat Commander (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970), 111–21.
10. Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, 135.
11. LTC L. Gayer to Smith, 11 May 1944, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP.
12. Patton Diary, 5 and 7 March 1943; Butcher Diary, 7 March 1943. As an indication of Marshall’s obtuseness, he asked Eisenhower on 4 March if Fredendall merited consideration for promotion to lieutenant general. Fredendall went home in grade and received his promotion and command of a training army. Amazingly, in 1944, Marshall even proposed Fredendall to command the First Army in France. Eisenhower tactfully declined the offer. Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 and 4 March 1943, EP, #680–81.
13. Eisenhower to Patton, 6 March 1943, EP, #865.
14. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Brooke, 20 September 1943, EP, #831.
15. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 266.
16. Smith requested the change be made “without prejudice.” Mockler-Ferryman went back to London and a post in SOE there. Mockler-Ferryman did have experience dealing with the Germans; he had served as head of the German intelligence section of the War Office in 1939–1940. Mockler-Ferryman’s version is contained in a typescript account of his service in AFHQ, Eric Mockler-Ferryman Papers, LHCMA.
17. Smith to Pownall, 23 November 1943, Correspondence File, WBSP.
18. Alexander to Montgomery, 5 March 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 164.
19. Alexander to Montgomery, 29 March 1943, ibid., 188.
20. Montgomery to MG A. F. Harding, 25 February 1943, ibid., 156.
21. Patton Diary, 31 March 1943; Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 203.
22. Arthur Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder (London, 1966), 411.
23. Patton Diary, 11 and 12 April 1943; Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 207–8, 211. Privately, Eisenhower scolded Patton, telling him “the great purpose of complete Allied teamwork” would not “be furthered by demanding the last pound of flesh for every error.” Eisenhower to Patton, 5 April 1943, EP, #928.
24. Montgomery to Brooke, 12 April 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 207.
25. Eisenhower and Smith told Brooke the entire story when the CIGS visited Algiers in early June. Brooke Diary and “Notes,” 3 June 1943.
26. Montgomery to BG F. E. W. Simpson, 5 April 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 195–96; Hanson Baldwin oral history, “Reminiscences of Hanson Weighman Baldwin,” U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Department, Annapolis, MD. In March and April, Baldwin toured North Africa as the military correspondent for the New York Times and succeeded in worming his way into the major headquarters. He “accosted” Montgomery on 28 March, telling the British general that American soldiers lacked “heart in the war, & were not fighting properly.” Montgomery concluded Baldwin was “a dangerous chap” and got rid of him. Alexander replied, “Perhaps Mr. Baldwin is right.” Montgomery to Alexander and Alexander to Montgomery, 29 March 1942, cited in Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 186, 367–68 n. 68.
27. Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 April 1943, EP, #927.
28. Eisenhower Diary, 11 June 1943, Butcher Diary.
29. Montgomery, “The Basic Need if Operations Are to Be Successfully Carried Out,” August 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 264–65.
30. Montgomery to Simpson, 8 September 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 279–80.
31. Cited in Colin Baxter, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, 1887–1976: A Selected Bibliography (Westport, CT, 1999), 5.
32. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 239.
33. Montgomery to Percy Grigg, 14 October 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 303.
34. Nigel Hamilton interview with Ian Jacob, cited in Hamilton, Full Monty, 490.
35. Merrill, “Notes on Burma Campaign,” in Marc Bernstein, “A ‘Black and Dismal’ Record,” Quarterly Journal of Military History (winter 2004): 81.
36. Brooke’s diary is littered with references to doubts about Alexander’s intelligence. Even more pointed are the views of some of Alexander’s subordinates. LTG Jacob served under Alexander for a year immediately after the war, when Alexander succeeded Brooke as CIGS. Jacob could not remember Alexander ever “once producing a single idea, or suggestion during the entire time I served as his chief staff officer.” Hamilton interview with Jacob, in Hamilton, Full Monty, 490. A Canadian division commander who fought under Alexander in Italy thought the field marshal “was bone from the neck up.”
37. He told Hughes, “Alex isn’t as good as he thinks he is.” Hughes Diary, 1 May 1943. As Eisenhower recalled to Ismay in 1960, “Shortly before I left the African Theatre—but after I had been informed that I was to be commander of OVERLORD—I learned that Montgomery was to be my British ground commander, even though I had told the Prime Minister, who earlier had said I could have my choice between Alexander and Montgomery, that I should prefer to have Alexander.” Eisenhower to Ismay, 3 December 1960, Keeping the Peace, #1722. See also Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 211.
38. Montgomery, “The Basic Need,” 207.
39. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 285.
40. Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 April 1943, The Right Man for the Job, #603.
41. Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 and 16 April 1943, EP, #945–46. McClure not only managed public relations and military and political censorship, but he also oversaw psychological warfare and propaganda. He brought six censors, both British and American, to Algiers with him in December. He and his overburdened office could never keep up with the demands of the press.
42. A copy of Gaskill’s draft article is contained in the Butcher Diary.
43. Eisenhower to Alexander, 29 January 1943, EP, #799; Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 January 1943, EP, #800.
44. Ambrose, Supreme Commander, 214.
45. Eisenhower to Alexander, 23 March 1943, EP, #906.
46. In British practice, a commander had two or more chiefs of staff in addition to a chief administrative officer. Montgomery received command of the Eastern Task Force on 16 February. He sent BG Freddie de Guingand—soon promoted to major general—to Cairo to plan the Eighth Army’s part in Husky. Meanwhile, he retained BG Charles Richardson as chief of staff in Eighth Army headquarters.
47. In the question-and-answer segment of Smith’s lecture to the Royal United Services Institute, Tedder talked about his relations with Spaatz and Smith. Smith, “Problems of an Integrated Headquarters,” 16.
48. “Minutes of Conference, Smith, Spaatz, BG L. S. Kuter,” 12 November 1942, TORCH, WBSP; Arthur Ferguson, “Origins of the Combined Bomber Offensive,” in Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, 65.
49. Tedder’s comments in Smith, “Problems of an Integrated Headquarters”; Tedder, With Prejudice, 404–5; Eisenhower to MG Frank Andrews, 19 February 1943, EP, #828.
50. The basic problem remained the shortage of lift, both at sea for the landings and in the air for airborne operations. Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 March 1943, EP, #888.
51. Tedder, With Prejudice, 433–34.
52. Eisenhower to Marshall and Eisenhower to Churchill, 17 February 1943, EP, #821, #824.
53. Bonesteel oral history, MHI; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 168; Mayo, Ordnance Department, 156–57, 162. Bonesteel and Besson both went on to earn four stars. Smith was not always so open to suggestions. Before Torch, Bonesteel approached Smith and pointed out that American troops had no training in the use of camouflage. Smith dismissed him, claiming a chief of staff had bigger concerns. Then, when the Germans held air superiority in North Africa and inflicted serious losses on exposed American troops, a hue and cry went up for camouflage nets and training.
54. Eisenhower, “Notes,” 7 March 1943, EP, #867.
55. Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 March 1943, EP, #888.
56. Eisenhower to Somervell, 19 March 1943, EP, #896.
57. Gairdner Diary, 1 April 1943, in Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 369.
58. Montgomery, “The Basic Need,” 207.
59. Montgomery to Alexander, 3 April 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 191; Montgomery to Brooke, 17 March 1943, ibid., 176.
60. Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey, 536–37.
61. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 20 March 1943, EP, #898.
62. JCS to ETOUSA AG, 10 April 1943, EP, #942, n. 1.
63. Tedder, With Prejudice, 429–30.
64. Brooke Diary, 9 April 1943.
65. Montgomery to Simpson, 5 April 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 196.
66. Betts oral history; David Irving interview with Clark, 4 January 1970, in David Irving, Papers Relating to the Allied High Command, 1943–1945, copy in author’s possession.
67. Montgomery discussed his trip to Cairo in Montgomery to Mountbatten, 12 August 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 263; Montgomery to Alexander, 24 April 1943, ibid., 217–18.
68. Montgomery to Brooke, 30 April 1943, ibid., 221–23.
69. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 234–37.
70. Cited by MG Brian Horrocks, one of Montgomery’s corps commanders, in Horrocks, A Full Life (London, 1971), 159.
71. Montgomery gave his own account of his trip to Algiers and the famous “lavatory conference” in Montgomery, Memoirs, 153–65.
72. Sidney Matthews interview with Smith, n.d., MHI.
73. Montgomery to Alexander, 2 May 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 223.
74. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 236–40.
75. Montgomery to Alexander, 5 May 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 224–26.
76. Montgomery, “Diary Notes, 3–6 May 1943,” ibid., 226–27.
77. Blumenson, Patton Papers, 1940–45, 244.
78. Montgomery, “Diary Notes, 7–17 May 1943,” Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 229.
79. Montgomery, “Basic Points: For a Talk with CIGS in June 1943,” ibid., 230–31.
80. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 299.
81. By the end of the campaign, 250 locomotives and 4,500 railcars were added to the Transportation Corps’ inventories.
82. Cited in John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York, 1990), 525.
83. Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, 417.
84. Howe, Northwest Africa, 498–99; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 474–75; Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1957), 148.
1. Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 April 1943, and Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 May 1943, EP, #968; Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 May 1943, EP, #970. In mid-April Marshall floated the idea of attacking Sicily in June—according to the original timetable—to the BCOS, even if the Allies were stalemated in Tunisia. Brooke thought the proposal “quite mad and quite impossible,” but the prime minister was delighted, calling the idea “a high strategic conception.” Brooke Diary, 17 April 1943.
2. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 301. On 27 April Marshall emphasized to Eisenhower that expanded operations in the Mediterranean “are not in keeping with my ideas of what our strategy should be” and warned him of the possibility of moving “a large part of your forces to the United Kingdom.” Marshall to Eisenhower, 27 April 1943, Marshall File, DDEL.
3. Ismay offers a full account in Ismay, Memoirs, 293–300.
4. Allied Force Headquarters, “Memorandum by Chief of Staff,” 14 May 1943, with attachments; BG Lowell Rooks to Smith, 7 May 1943; and Tedder to Eisenhower, 8 May 1943, in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, 253–55.
5. Smith to Eisenhower, 14 May 1943, Correspondence File, WBSP.
6. Eisenhower to CCS and BCOS, 11 May 1943, EP, #982; Smith to Eisenhower, 15 May 1943, WBSP.
7. Smith pointed out that enough materiel reached the theater each month to equip a division to 50 percent of requirements, sufficient for training. The French had eleven divisions in formation. “Minutes of CCS Meeting,” 18 May 1943, TRIDENT, WBSP. See also FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 103–4.
8. Brooke Diary, 18 May 1943.
9. FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 281–82, 367.
10. Roosevelt to Churchill, 8 May 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:111.
11. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 801.
12. Giraud and de Gaulle would serve as copresidents. De Gaulle insisted on the separation of civil and military affairs. If Giraud chose to serve as “first president,” he forfeited control of the military. The American ambassador in London, John Winant, recognized this as a device “to shelve” Giraud. The executive committee would have five to seven members, including the first and second presidents. Winant to Hull, 15 April 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:94–95.
13. Hull to Wiley [for Murphy], 17 May 1943, ibid., 118.
14. Wiley [for Murphy] to Hull, 20 April 1943, ibid., 97–98.
15. Roosevelt to Churchill, 8 May 1943, ibid., 111.
16. Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 February 1943, EP, #812.
17. “Directive on Organization and Operation of Military Government for HUSKY,” 21 May 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 187.
18. The twists and turns of organizing the civil affairs section are covered in Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1964), 160–68.
19. William Hayter, “Memorandum by the First Secretary of the British Embassy,” 21 May 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 284.
20. Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 May 1943, and Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 May 1943, EP, #1012.
21. Eisenhower to CCS, 17 May 1943, Eyes Only File, WBSP. The initial plan, authored by Strong, emerged in mid-April. “Psychological Warfare Plan for HUSKY,” 16 April 1943, WBSP. Eisenhower expressed himself “exceedingly irritated” by the “peace with honor” incident. Sidestepping any responsibility, he informed Smith it fell to him to vet all such future communications. Eisenhower to Smith, 30 May 1943, EP, #1030.
22. Smyth interview with Smith, 13 May 1947.
23. Smith to Eisenhower, 20 May 1943, Chief of Staff’s visit to Washington, May 1943 File, WBSP.
24. CCS to Eisenhower, 24 May 1943, TRIDENT, WBSP.
25. “Minutes of CCS,” 19 May 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 118.
26. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 314.
27. Wilhelm Styer, “Proposed Organization of Service Activities,” 21 May 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
28. Smith filled in Butcher on all he had learned in Washington during a flight from Casablanca to Algiers. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 313–14.
29. Ibid., 314–15.
30. Kate Hughes to Everett Hughes, 21 May 1943, Hughes Papers.
31. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 810–11.
32. Cited in John Pearson, Citadel of the Heart: Winston and the Churchill Dynasty (London, 1991), 141.
33. Pogue, Marshall Interviews, 552–54.
34. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 316.
35. Proceedings in “Minutes of a Meeting Held (May 31-June 3, 1943) at General Eisenhower’s Villa (dar el Ouard),” AFHQ Subseries, WBSP. Churchill’s account of the three meetings was based on these minutes (The Hinge of Fate, 817–30).
36. Brooke Diary, 3 June 1943.
37. “Minutes of a Meeting Held at General Eisenhower’s Villa,” 31 May 1943, AFHQ, WBSP; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 314.
38. “Minutes of a Meeting Held at General Eisenhower’s Villa,” 3 June 1943, AFHQ, WBSP.
39. Smith to Truscott, 6 June 1943, Chief of Staff Personal Papers, 1941–1944, WBSP.
40. Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 March 1943, EP, #860.
41. Smith, “Problems of an Integrated Headquarters,” 5.
42. Ibid., 5, 8.
43. Smith’s views on staff organization and functions derive chiefly from three sources: a long letter he wrote to Marshall expressing his views on the proposed reorganization of the War Department, the explanatory letter he wrote to Pownall, and his lecture to the Royal United Services Institute. Smith to Marshall, 21 June 1943; Smith to Pownall, 23 November 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP; Smith, “Problems of an Integrated Headquarters.”
44. Smith, “Problems of an Integrated Headquarters,” 3–4.
45. Smith to Pownall, 23 November 1943, WBSP.
46. In addition to the oral histories and insights gleaned from Forrest Pogue’s interviews conducted for The Supreme Command, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1954), housed in the MHI, much of the preceding material comes from a detailed summary of AFHQ’s staff mechanisms and Smith’s role in fashioning and running them written by Smith for LTG Henry Pownall, chief of staff in the Southeast Asia Theater of Operations. Mountbatten solicited a similar description of the roles of a supreme commander from Eisenhower. Smith to Pownall, 23 November 1943, WBSP.
47. In terms of seniority, on the major generals list, Smith stood 226th in the U.S. Army and 12th in North Africa. The roster appears in Hughes Papers.
48. Hughes Diary, 10 February 1943.
49. Styer, “Proposed Organization of Service Activities.”
50. Smith, “Reorganization Plan,” 2 June 1943, Hughes Papers.
51. Hughes Diary, 9, 12, 28, and 29 March 1943.
52. Smith to Hughes, 6 April 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
53. Smith to Marshall, 8 July 1943, ibid.
54. Hughes Diary, 23 April 1943.
55. Sawbridge to Hughes, 25 April 1943, AG NATOUSA: T/O Hq NATOUSA; Davis to Smith, 29 April 1943, AG AFHQ:323.35–1; Roberts to Hughes, 24 April 1943, AG NATOUSA:321–87, in Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters.
56. Hughes to Huebner, 25 April 1943, Hughes Papers.
57. Hughes, “Memo to Myself,” 26 April 1943, Hughes Papers.
58. Hughes, “Notes for My Diary,” April 1943, Hughes Papers; Hughes Diary, 26 April 1943.
59. Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 December 1942, EP, #691; Eisenhower to Hughes, 14 October 1941, Hughes File, PPP.
60. Patton to COL Kent Lambert, 12 May 1943, GSPP.
61. Hughes, “Notes for My Diary.”
62. Hughes, “Draft of Memo,” April 1943, and Hughes to Kate Hughes, 26 April 1943, Hughes Papers.
63. Hughes Diary, 5 May 1943.
64. These subsections were G-1 NATO with Civil Affairs and Psychological Warfare; G-3 NATO with Civil Defense; and liaison sections to AFHQ G-4 to coordinate planning and cooperation with the Petroleum and North African Shipping Board and the North African Economic Board. Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters.
65. Hughes provides the only account of the lead-up to the 25 June meeting and the meeting itself in Hughes to MG Virgil Peterson, 25 June 1943, Hughes Papers. Material in the following paragraphs is taken from there, supplemented by Hughes Diary, 24 and 25 June 1943.
66. Hughes Diary, 24 June 1944. The next day he noted, “Ike puts stop on Beadle.”
67. Smith, “Proposed Organization of Service Activities in a Theater of Operations,” June 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP. Smith wrote this in response to Marshall’s soliciting his advice on Somervell’s proposed reorganization. Marshall to Smith, 21 June 1943, ibid. Smith’s undated memorandum, attached to Styer’s 21 May proposal, was obviously written after Eisenhower made the decision not to alter the headquarters structure. On 8 July Smith replied more specifically to Marshall, and his ideas on staff organization remained the same. “I have always believed that the Commanding General Army Service forces should be a commander just as the Commanding General AGF is a commander”; he agreed “in principle to the general idea of grouping administrative and service functions under a staff officer who also has administrative authority” but opposed abolishing general staff supervision. Smith to Marshall, 8 July 1943, ibid.
1. Eisenhower to Patton, 4 June 1943, EP, #1038.
2. “Minutes of Meeting,” 3 June 1943, AFHQ File, WBSP.
3. The fact that he enjoyed Communist Party support did nothing to elevate de Gaulle in the eyes of Roosevelt and Hull. Hull to Roosevelt, 10 May 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:113.
4. FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:134–35.
5. Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston, 1951), 173–76.
6. Eisenhower to CCS and BCOS, 10 June 1943, EP, #1050.
7. For de Gaulle’s motives, see Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 3 vols. (New York, 1955–1960), 2:126–27.
8. All three communications are in Roosevelt to AFHQ, 11 June 1943, Eisenhower Manuscripts, DDEL.
9. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Roosevelt, 12 June 1943, EP, #1054.
10. Winant to Hull, 6 April 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 90–91.
11. Macmillan, Blast of War, 364.
12. Roosevelt to AFHQ, 17 June 1943, cables 493 and 511, Roosevelt Correspondence, Eisenhower Manuscripts, DDEL. See also Murphy to Roosevelt and Hull, 16 June 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:152–55.
13. Roosevelt to Churchill, 17 June 1943, with the first letter to AFHQ attached, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:155–57.
14. Smith to Marshall, 17 June 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
15. Eisenhower to Roosevelt, 18 June 1943, EP, #1057. Murphy’s stock fell again. As Eisenhower told Marshall, “My two strongest and able assistants in this matter are General Smith and Mr. Macmillan. They are both sound, respected by everybody, and are not hysterical.” Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 June 1943, EP, #1075.
16. Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 June 1943, EP, #1058.
17. Hopkins to Monnet, January 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP. Monnet was in London, representing France on an economic mission, when Paris fell. He went to Washington and served on the Combined Munitions Board under Hopkins. Roosevelt dispatched him to Algiers to help steer the rearmament program.
18. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 224.
19. Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 June 1943, EP, #1064; de Gaulle, Memoirs, 2:131–33.
20. Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 June 1943, EP, #1069. Boisson resigned “out of the clear blue sky” on 24 June.
21. Eisenhower to Roosevelt and Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 June 1943, EP, #1068–69; Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 22 June 1943, EP, #1070.
22. Smith to Marshall, 23 June 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
23. Jack Belden, Still Time to Die (New York, 1943), 269; Mayo, Ordnance Department, 163.
24. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 4 August 1943, EP, #1163.
25. Matthews interview with Alexander, MHI.
26. Patton Diary, 24 July 1943, based on his 16 July conversation with de Guingand.
27. Eisenhower to CCS and BCOS, 18 July 1943, EP, #1119.
28. Marshall to Eisenhower, 5 July 1943, in The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, June 1, 1943-December 31, 1944 (Baltimore, 1996), #37; Tedder, With Prejudice, 186–87; Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 9 July 1943, EP, #1005.
29. Montgomery to Brooke, 27 July 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 254–55.
30. Montgomery to Alexander, 19 July 1943, ibid., 249.
31. Patton to Beatrice Patton, 24 July 1943, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 300–301.
32. For Patton’s account of the meeting, see Patton Diary, 25 July 1943, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 301–302.
33. DDE to CCS and BCOS, 26 July 1943, EP, #1138; Butcher Diary, 27 July 1943; Macmillan, Blast of War, 307; Harold Macmillan, War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean, January 1943-May 1945 (London, 1984), 164.
34. DDE to CCS and BCOS, 27 July 1943, EP, #1141.
35. Albert Garland and Howard Smyth, Sicily and the Italian Surrender, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1965), 269.
36. Churchill to Roosevelt, 26 July 1943, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 2:348–49. Devers forwarded the cable from London, which is in AFHQ, Capitulation of Italy, 9, WBSP. Capitulation of Italy is a set of bound folios, a compilation of telegrams and other documents relating to the Italian surrender assembled for Smith by Gilmer. See also Churchill, Closing the Ring, 55–56.
37. Cited in Herbert Feis, Churchill—Roosevelt—Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, NJ, 1957), 157.
38. Macmillan, War Diaries, 164.
39. Churchill to DDE, 29 July 1943, Eisenhower Manuscripts, DDEL; Brooke Diary, 26, 28, and 29 July 1943.
40. Macmillan, War Diaries, 29 July 1943.
41. Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 July 1943, EP, #1147.
42. Brooke Diary, 30 July 1943.
43. Roosevelt to Churchill, 30 July 1943, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 2:366; Churchill, Closing the Ring, 64.
44. Roosevelt to Churchill, 2 August 1942, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 2:372.
45. Marshall to Eisenhower, 29 July 1943, Eisenhower Manuscripts, DDEL.
46. Churchill to Eisenhower, 29 July 1943, ibid.
47. Eisenhower to CCS and BCOS, 27 July 1943, EP, #1141; Tedder, With Prejudice, 456–63.
48. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 3 August 1943, EP, #1159–61.
49. Marshall relayed Churchill’s complaints to AFHQ. Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 August 1943, EP, #1164 n. 1.
50. Eisenhower to Alexander, 4 August 1943, EP, #1167.
51. Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 August 1943, EP, #1164–65; Macmillan to Churchill, 3 August 1943, Eyes Only Cable File, WBSP.
52. Eisenhower to Churchill, 4 August 1943, EP, #1166.
53. Hughes Diary, 6 August 1943.
54. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 5 August 1943, EP, #1168. On 7 August a reply went forward from AFHQ, written by Smith, suggesting a simultaneous Baytown and Buttress, complete with British X Corps. At the next commanders’ conference on 9 August, despite the decision on Buttress, they agreed on Avalanche, with a target date of 7 September. Barracuda was canceled.
55. Eisenhower’s blood pressure registered 142/90. Thomas Mattingly and Live Marsh, “A Compilation of the General Health Status of Dwight D. Eisenhower,” Mattingly Collection, DDEL. Hughes recorded that although Eisenhower was “satisfied with doctor; he didn’t follow Dr’s orders. What would Mamie say? Ike says high blood pressure, too many cigarettes. He had a lot of alibis but concluded that he had to take care of himself and do what the Dr. said. But all has to be so secret.” Hughes Diary, 12 August 1943.
56. Cited in Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Italian Surrender, 67.
57. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 372.
58. Ibid., 386–87.
59. Hughes Diary, 17 August 1943.
60. D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life, 438. As Montgomery scathingly remarked, “The truth of the matter is that there is no plan.” Fixated on the invasion of the peninsula, Eisenhower and the senior commanders never discussed means to obstruct the German escape. Montgomery cited in Ralph Bennett, Ultra and the Mediterranean Strategy (New York, 1989), 234–35.
61. “Summary of Recent Correspondents with AFHQ,” 19 August 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1065.
62. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, 2 vols. (New York, 1981), 1:106–8.
63. “Summary of Recent Correspondence with AFHQ,” 10 August 1943, and Smith to Whiteley, 10 and 14 August 1943, FRUS, Washington and (Quebec, 1065–67; Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 12 August 1943, EP, #1181; Smith to Whiteley, 22 August 1943, in Martin Blumenson, From Salerno to Cassino, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1967), 41. Whiteley made these same points in his presentation in Quebec. See Minutes, “AFHQ Briefing to QUADRANT,” 24 August 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 956–57.
64. Smith to Whiteley, received 17 August 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1068; Eisenhower to CCS and BCOS, 16 August 1943, EP, #1185.
65. Hughes Diary, 16 August 1943. For a number of complex sociological reasons, American troops were far more likely to be psychological casualties than their British counterparts. In North Africa, American casualties of this sort were six times higher than British losses: 66 per 1,000 in II Corps, compared with 11 per 1,000 in Eighth Army.
66. “Report of Lt. Col. Perrin H. Long, M.C. to the Surgeon, NATO,” 18 September 1943, Patton File, PPP. Blessé had already received a report from COL Richard Arnest, II Corps’ chief surgeon. Bradley placed a separate report in a sealed envelope in his safe. Upon receipt of similar reports, Alexander steered clear of the affair and told Patton: “George, this is a family affair.” D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War, 533–36. For Eisenhower’s receipt of the news and his initial reaction, see Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 390, 395–96. On 21 August Butcher recorded, “Ike is deeply concerned and has scarcely slept for several nights, trying to figure out the wisest method of handling this dilemma.”
67. Gay is not an unimpeachable source. Although his handwritten diary entry reads 17 August 1943, he refers to Lemnitzer as “now a 4 star general.” Lemnitzer did not achieve four-star rank until 1955. Gay obviously edited his diary and engaged in some after-the-fact character assassination aimed at Smith. Gay’s intense antipathy derived from Smith’s supposed role in Patton’s removal from Third Army command after the war. Gay Diary, 17 August 1943, Hobart R. Gay Papers, MHI.
68. Patton Diary, 17 August 1943, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 323–24.
69. Patton Diary, 10 and 20 August, 21 September 1943; Patton to Hughes, 21 September 1943, Hughes Papers. In November Patton wrote a letter of explanation to Stimson in which he affirmed his belief that he had saved the souls of the two soldiers he attacked. Hughes talked him out of sending it. Hughes to Kate Hughes, 30 November 1943, Hughes Papers.
70. Gay finally told Patton the story in May 1944. Patton Diary, 22 May 1944; Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 324. Patton never used the story against Smith; he never even told Hughes, who would have loved getting some dirt on his bête noire.
1. Hoare to Foreign Office, #1404, #1406, 15 August 1943, as repeated in Devers to Eisenhower, 17 August 1943, in AFHQ, Capitulation of Italy, 76–77, 79–80, WBSP. See Samuel John Gurney Hoare, Viscount Templewood, Ambassador on Special Mission (London, 1946), 212–16.
2. Smith to Mountbatten, 21 September 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP. Little read today, Oppenheim, a self-styled “prince of storytellers,” wrote 150 novels and invented the “rogue male” school of spy thrillers.
3. Smyth interview with Smith, 13 May 1947, MHI.
4. The exchanges among Madrid, London, and Quebec and AFHQ’s four replies are contained in Capitulation of Italy, 76–82.
5. Eisenhower to CCS, 17 August 1943, EP, #1187.
6. CCS to Eisenhower, 18 August 1943, Capitulation of Italy, 82–83; the Quebec Memorandum is printed in full in Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Italian Surrender, 556–57.
7. Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of a British Intelligence Officer (Garden City, NY, 1968), 145.
8. Macmillan, Blast of War, 313.
9. This account of the secret meeting in Lisbon is based principally on the minutes recorded by George Kennan. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS, 21 August 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1070–74. A condensed summary of the first phase of the meeting is in “Minutes of a Conference Held at the Residence of the British Ambassador at Lisbon on August 18, 1943 at 10 P.M.” Kennan wrote the summary but got the date wrong; the meeting took place on 19–20 August. For the military portion of the conference, see Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 20 August 1943, EP, #1200; Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, NAF 335, 21 August 1943, all in Capitulation of Italy, 85–88, 112–17, 126–27. See also Eisenhower, “Allied Commander-in-Chief’s Report, Italian Campaign, 1942–1943,”116–18, copy in WBSP; Smyth interview with George F. Kennan, 2 January 1947, MHI; Smyth interview with Smith. Neither Smith nor Strong kept minutes, but both jotted down salient points in their respective notebooks. Strong wrote a complete account of the Lisbon meetings and subsequent AFHQ negotiations with the Italians in Intelligence at the Top, 137–59.
10. Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 148.
11. Smyth interview with Strong, 29 October 1947, MHI.
12. Smyth interview with Smith.
13. Ibid.
14. Smith told Whiteley and Rooks in Quebec, “The Italians expect bitter reprisals from the Germans, whom they both hate and fear.” Smith to Whiteley and Rooks, 22 August 1943, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, NARA.
15. The military discussions were outlined in Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 21 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, 126–27; Smyth interview with Smith.
16. Smith to CCS, 22 August 1943, Capitulation of Italy, 126–27; Smyth interview with Strong.
17. Smyth interview with Kennan; Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 147.
18. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 20 August 1943, EP, #1200.
19. Smyth interview with Smith.
20. Ibid.; Adrian Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs of Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart (London, 1950), 230.
21. In Zanussi’s testimony before a 1944 Italian commission, he stated that Campbell “informed me that Castellano had performed his mission and had left with a draft armistice of which I had a copy.” Cited in Elena Agarossi, A Nation Collapses: The Italian Surrender of September 1943 (Cambridge, 2000), 160 n. 77. Given the prevarications offered by the leading Italian players in the memoir literature and before various Italian commissions, it is exceedingly difficult to determine who knew what and when. In addition, highly charged and ideologically slanted histories dealing with the events leading up to Italy’s surrender skew interpretations. Agarossi collected documents pertaining to the Italian surrender for the Italian State Archives and published them as L’inganno reciproco. L’armistizio tra l’Italia e gli anglo-americani del settembre 1943. From these documents, as well as British and American sources and a careful sifting through the memoirs, she constructed a convincing and balanced analysis of the period between the fall of Mussolini and the collapse of the Italian state in September, known in Italian historiography as “the forty-five days.” Since her research in Italian sources postdates and surpasses similar work performed by Garland and Smyth, Agarossi’s book is employed to supplement the official history and color Italian participation in the events covered in this chapter.
22. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 28 August 1943, EP, #1213.
23. CCS to Eisenhower, 27 August 1943, CCS Cable File, PPP, with text of the long terms; Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 28 August 1943, EP, #1213; War Department to Eisenhower, 29 August 1943, all in Capitulation of Italy, 137, 160–64.
24. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Mason-MacFarlane, 28 August 1943; AFHQ to Gibraltar, 28 August 1943; Gibraltar to Lisbon, copy to AFHQ, 28 August 1943, all in Capitulation of Italy, 156–57, 160–64; Smyth interview with Smith.
25. Smyth interview with Smith; Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Italian Surrender, 463–65.
26. AFHQ forwarded three cables to Washington relating the information provided by Zanussi. Eisenhower to Marshall and Hull, 30 August 1943, EP, #1217–19. Smith told a postwar interviewer, the “long terms were a source of annoyance to us at AFHQ and we tried as much as possible to avoid using them.” Smyth interview with Smith.
27. Murphy kept a record of the meetings he attended and gave the president a lively account of the Cassibile negotiations. Murphy to Roosevelt, 8 September 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1275–83. The most complete narrative is provided in Howard Smyth, “The Armistice of Cassibile,” Military Affairs (spring 1948): 12–35. Smyth’s account draws heavily on Castellano’s version of the story and the reprint of his notes taken at Cassibile, Come firmai l’armistizo di Cassibile (Milan, 1945), 135–37, 219–23. Castellano came under a great deal of fire in Italy for his actions leading to the armistice. He wrote a sixteen-page discussion, really a justification, of his actions. Smith read “Report on the Activities Explicated by General Castellano during the Negotiations which Brought about the Conclusion of the Armistice” and confirmed the veracity of Castellano’s account. Smith to Castellano, 5 December 1943, Official Correspondence, 1942–1944 File, WBSP.
28. Murphy cited in FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1276.
29. Smith to Eisenhower, 1 September 1943, Capitulation of Italy, 202–3; Eisenhower to CCS, 1 September 1943, EP, #1221; Eisenhower to Alexander, 2 September 1943, EP, #1227.
30. Murphy to Roosevelt, 8 September 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1277.
31. A summary of the conference and its conclusions are in NAF 346, 1 September 1943, Capitulation of Italy, 198–202. Castellano reprinted his minutes in Come firmai l’armistizio, 219–23.
32. Smyth interview with Smith.
33. Murphy to Roosevelt, 8 September 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1277–78.
34. Smith, aided by Strong, Murphy, and Macmillan, described the outcome of the 31 August conference with Castellano and Zanussi. Smith to Eisenhower, 1 September 1943, Capitulation of Italy, 202; Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 1 September 1943, EP, #1221.
35. Castellano, Come firmai l’armistizio, 223–24, cited in Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 78–79.
36. AFHQ to War Department, 1 September 1943, Capitulation of Italy, 205.
37. Smyth, “The Armistice of Cassibile,” 17.
38. Murphy’s account of the 2–3 September meetings is a good narrative of events. Murphy to Roosevelt, 8 September 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1279–83.
39. Smyth, “The Armistice of Cassibile,” 18.
40. Alexander to Eisenhower, 2 September 1943, Earl Alexander of Tunis Papers, War Office 214/36 File, National Archives, Public Record Office, Kew. The War Office 214 File contains Alexander’s papers for April through December 1943.
41. Whiteley [for Eisenhower] to Smith, 2 September 1943, EP, #1228; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 405.
42. Macmillan, War Diaries, 187; Macmillan, Blast of War, 322; Sidney Matthews interview with Alexander, 10 and 15 January 1949, MHI; Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 157; Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 240–41; Murphy to Roosevelt, 8 September, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1279.
43. ADM Raffaele de Courten kept notes that clearly dispel, in Agarossi’s words, “the network of lies constructed by Badoglio and the senior military leaders,” who claimed the heads of the armed services knew nothing of Allied intentions before 8 September. Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 82–83.
44. AFHQ Advanced to AFHQ, 3 September 1943, Capitulation of Italy, 252.
45. Smyth interview with Lemnitzer, 3 March 1947, MHI.
46. “Report of General M. B. Ridgway to C in C.A.F.,” 25 October 1943, in Smyth, “The Armistice of Cassibile,” 23. Taylor told an interviewer that Castellano “was under great pressure from Beedle Smith—who said, ‘Of course you can do it: You know you can!’ I suspect that while there was no physical arm-twisting there was a lot of psychological arm-twisting. Castellano may well have been agreeing to things which in his heart he knew couldn’t happen.” Nigel Hamilton interview with Taylor, 17 October 1981, in Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942–1944 (London, 1983), 390.
47. Eisenhower got even with Butcher; he refused to bring him along to witness the historic event. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 405.
48. Smyth interview with Smith.
49. Copy in Capitulation of Italy, 221–23.
50. Marshall to Eisenhower, 1 September 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP; Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 September 1943, EP, #1225.
51. Hughes Diary, 10 September 1943.
52. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 237; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 405.
53. Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 September 1943, EP, #1233.
54. Eisenhower to Brooke, 29 July 1943, EP, #1149, n. 1.
55. Eisenhower to Dan Gilmer, 6 September 1943, EP, #1236; Hughes Diary, 4 September 1943.
56. Smith to Ismay, 12 September 1943, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP; Murphy to Roosevelt, 8 September 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1282.
57. Strong to Smith, 22 September 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
58. Eisenhower to Whiteley for CCS, 3 September 1943, EP, #1229.
59. David Brown, “The Inside Story of Italy’s Surrender,” Saturday Evening Post, 9 and 16 September 1944.
1. Murphy to Roosevelt, 8 September 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1280.
2. Ridgway to Smith, 5 December 1955, and Ridgway to Castellano, 20 December 1955, Clay Blair Collection, MHI; Smyth interview of Smith, 13 May 1947; Clay Blair, Ridgway’s Paratroopers (Garden City, NY, 1985), 126. In his memoirs Ridgway wrote, “I knew in my heart [the Italians] could not, or would not, meet the commitments they were making.” Ridgway, Soldier, 80.
3. James Gavin, “Airborne Plans and Operation Giant,” Infantry Journal (August 1946): 22.
4. Ridgway, “Development of Operation Giant,” 9 September 1943, Blair Collection; Ridgway, Soldier, 81.
5. Alexander, “Tasks in Order of Priority,” 7 September 1943, Alexander Papers, cited in Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 82.
6. De Courten’s memorandum, housed in the Italian Navy Archive, is cited in Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 83. The Italians had four infantry and two armored divisions, organized in three corps, in the environs of Rome, plus two coastal divisions and numerous auxiliary units. Two other divisions of the Fourth Army were not expected to deploy until 12 September.
7. Castellano, Come firmai l’armistizio, 170–71, cited in Smyth, “The Armistice of Cassible,” 25. Smith confirmed Castellano’s version in his interview with Smyth.
8. Roatta, Memoria sulla difensa di Roma, cited in Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 84–85.
9. Capitulation of Italy, 281–82, 311–17.
10. Cited in Smyth, “The Armistice of Cassible,” 30–31.
11. The outline plan provided for two days of rations and enough gasoline for a single day. Aside from Italian units actively fighting the Germans, the entire operation depended on the Italians providing the necessary logistical support. The Italians made no provisions to supply the Eighty-second Airborne with anything.
12. The Italians controlled a large POL reserve, but not for long. Within one hour of the armistice’s announcement, the Germans seized it from a corporals’ guard of defenders.
13. History repeated itself. At Caporetto, the 1917 defeat that nearly knocked Italy out of World War I, Badoglio had retired to his bed without redeploying the Italian artillery, contributing to the Italian rout.
14. The story of the secret mission received a great deal of press. On the first anniversary, the first installment of two articles appeared in the Saturday Evening Post. The next month Harper’s Magazine carried the story. Earlier, in England, it appeared in book form. David Brown, “The Inside Story of Italy’s Surrender,” Saturday Evening Post, 9 September 1944; Richard Thruelsen and Elliott Arnold, “Secret Mission to Rome,” Harper’s Magazine (October 1944): 462–69; Alfred Waggs and David Brown, No Spaghetti for Breakfast (London, 1943). See also Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Italian Surrender, 480–84.
15. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 8 September 1943, CCS Cable File, DDEL.
16. “Our greatest asset now,” Eisenhower reported on the day of the landings, “is confusion and uncertainty which we must take advantage of in every possible way.” Eisenhower to CCS and BCOS, 9 September 1943, EP, #1246.
17. David Hunt, A Don at War (London, 1990), 224.
18. Eisenhower to Badoglio and Eisenhower to CCS, 8 September 1943, EP, #1244, #1248.
19. Smyth interview with Lemnitzer, 4 March 1947, MHI; L. James Binder, Lemnitzer: A Soldier for His Time (Washington, DC, 1997), 113–14.
20. John Hull, unpublished autobiography, MHI.
21. Agarossi based her account on the memoir literature of participants on the Crown Council. De Courten’s version, written immediately after the flight from Rome, is reproduced in the notes. Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 95–96, 166.
22. Smith to Ismay, 12 September 1943, Personal Correspondence, WBSP.
23. Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini: A Biography (New York, 1983), 289–90, 293.
24. Ralph Mavrogordato, “Hitler’s Decision on the Defense of Italy,” in Command Decisions, 56.
25. Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier’s Record (Westport, CT, 1970), 212. Amazingly, at the Bologna conference on 15 August, the Germans surrendered the defense of central Italy and Rome to the Italians, only to be refused. Even though Roatta and Ambrosio recognized the Germans intended to stage a coup, and Ambrosio knew Castellano had been dispatched to Madrid to open talks with the AFHQ, they requested more German troops. As Roatta weakly explained, he did not desire “our game be known.” Roatta, Storia di un armistizio, cited in Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 62.
26. Giacomo Dogliani, Relazione sugli avvenimenti dell’8 settembre 1943 dal tenente colonnello Giacomo Dogliani, cited in Agarossi, A Nation Collapses, 99.
27. Smith to Castellano, 5 December 1943, Chief of Staff Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, WBSP. As Smith told a postwar interviewer, an officer with real authority should have been sent to Rome—someone who would have threatened to line the Italian leadership up against the wall and shoot them if they did not live up to their bargain. His intelligence chief, Strong, believed Smith was the ideal man for that job. Smith thought otherwise but agreed that sending Taylor had been an error. “It is a good example … that it is a mistake to send a specialist when what is needed is someone who can make a decision and enforce it.” Taylor thought Giant II was the perfect example of why staff officers should not exercise control over operations. Eisenhower told Smyth in 1949, “I wanted very much to make the air drop in Rome, and we were all ready to execute that plan…. Certainly we were prepared—all ready to make the drop in Rome. I was anxious to get in there.” Smyth interview with Smith; Smyth interview with Strong, 29 October 1947; Smyth interview with Eisenhower, 16 February 1949, MHI; Hamilton interview with Taylor.
28. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 9 September 1943, EP, #1246.
29. Samuel Elliot Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, 1964), 280.
30. Eisenhower to Marshall, 16 September 1943, EP, #1261.
31. AFHQ G-3, “Operations against Italy,” 15 September 1943, Arthur Nevins Papers, MHI; C. J. C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol. 5, The Campaign in Sicily, 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944, History of the Second World War (London, 1973), 252.
32. Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 September 1943, EP, #1271.
33. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 424–25; Marshall to Eisenhower, 22 September 1943, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #115; Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 September 1943, EP, #1284.
34. Hughes Diary, 20 September 1943.
35. Smith to Ismay, 12 September 1943, Chief of Staff Personal Papers, 1942–1944, WBSP.
36. Smith to Mountbatten, 21 September 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
37. Eisenhower to McNarney, 16 September 1943, EP, #1262.
38. McCloy to WBS, 17 September 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP; Watson to Smith, 19 September 1943, Personal Correspondence, WBSP.
39. Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin, 19 August 1943, Hopkins Papers, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1062.
40. AFHQ first suggested its own set of policy guidelines for Italy on 19 July; the CCS did not sanction them until 6 September. AFHQ had already implemented its own AMGOT plan in Sicily; the CCS merely endorsed the program after the fact.
41. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 10 September 1943, Cable File, PPP.
42. Rooks [for Eisenhower] to Smith, 10 September 1943, EP, #1247. Smith forwarded the letter to Badoglio.
43. Smith to Ismay, 12 September 1943, WBSP.
44. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 18 September 1943, EP, #1264.
45. Eisenhower to Smith, 19 September 1943, EP, #1266; Butcher Diary, 21 September 1943.
46. Churchill to Roosevelt, 21 September 1943, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 2:458–59.
47. Roosevelt to Churchill, 21 September 1943, ibid., 470. McCloy passed on the story of Stimson’s role in deflecting the president. McCloy to Smith, 17 September 1943, WBSP.
48. Smith to Mason-MacFarlane, 24 September 1943, Capitulation of Italy File, WBSP.
49. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 25 September 1943, EP, #1287.
50. Chargé in the Soviet Union to Hull, 26 September 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:377–78.
51. De Gaulle, Memoirs, 2:158–66; Milton Viorst, Hostile Allies: FDR and Charles de Gaulle (New York, 1965), 180–81.
52. Mason-MacFarlane to Smith, 26 September 1943, Capitulation of Italy File, WBSP.
53. Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 September 1943, EP, #1288.
54. Smith gave his account in his interview with Smyth.
55. Press conference transcript, 30 September 1943, WBSP.
56. Eisenhower to Dill, 30 September 1943, EP, #1301.
57. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Badoglio, 29 September 1943, EP, #1298.
58. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 30 September 1943, EP, #1299.
59. Churchill to Roosevelt, 4 October 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:383–84.
60. Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 and 7 September, Eyes Only, WBSP.
61. Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 October 1943, EP, #1316; Eisenhower to Marshall, 13 October 1943, EP, #1335.
62. Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 October 1943, EP, #1311; Eisenhower to Marshall, 13 October 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
63. Eisenhower Diary, 6 December 1943, EP, #1408.
64. Hughes to Kate Hughes, 5 October 1943, Hughes Papers.
65. Butcher Diary, 5 October 1943; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 428.
66. Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 October 1943, EP, #1311.
67. Eisenhower to Smith, 2 and 3 October 1943, EP, #1310, #1312.
68. Smith, “Questions for Discussion,” 12 October 1943, Chief of Staff Conference Notes, Washington Trip, October 1943 File, WBSP.
69. Smith to Eisenhower, 10 October 1943, Conference Notes, WBSP. On 7 September the United Press carried a story entitled, “Report Marshall to Head Big Push,” Patton File, PPP.
70. Hughes Diary, 8 October 1943.
71. Eisenhower to Smith, 13 October 1943, EP, #1333.
72. Eisenhower to Ethel Wyman, 16 October 1943, EP, #1341.
73. Smith to AFHQ, 11 October 1943, Conference Notes, WBSP.
74. Smith to Eisenhower, 13 October 1943, Conference Notes, WBSP.
75. Whiteley [for Eisenhower] to CCS, Smith, and BCOS, 18 October 1943, EP, #1343; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 246.
76. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 253–55.
77. Hilldring asked Smith to “soft pedal the use of AMGOT…. It will be useful in taking the heat off me.” Hilldring to Smith, 7 August 1943, Chief of Staff Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, WBSP.
78. Hilldring to Smith, 20 September 1943, Official Correspondence, WBSP.
79. McCloy to Smith, 17 September 1943, WBSP.
80. Smith to Taylor, 7 November 1943, Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, WBSP.
81. Marshall warned Eisenhower that at the end of October, Congress would open investigations into the replacement system. Marshall to Eisenhower, 21 October 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP. On 13 December 1942 the WDGS G-1 categorized the replacement channel as suffering from “confusion, complication, inefficiency, serious lack of coordination.” So it would remain until the end of the war. The War Department never established which agency—WDGS or ASF—was responsible for the overseas replacement system until 29 June 1945; ASF got the job. U.S. Army Center of Military History, The Personnel Replacement System in the US Army (Washington, DC, 1954), 263–65. See also Kent Greenfield, Robert Palmer, and Bell Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1947), 300–318.
82. Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 and 14 October 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP; Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 October 1943, EP, #1339.
83. Smith to Eisenhower, 13 October 1943, Conference Notes, WBSP. As deputy theater commander, Hughes absorbed most of the beating for the theater’s problems with replacements, promotions, and the formation of service and support provisional units and for the failure of the rotation policy for officers. Sawbridge [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 22 May 1943, EP, #1017; Hughes [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 3 July 1943, EP, #1099; Eisenhower to Hughes, 31 August 1943, EP, #1220; Sawbridge to AFHQ, “Review of Replacement Situation in NATO,” 11 October 1943, in U.S. Army Center of Military History, Personnel Replacement System, 275.
84. Smith to Eisenhower 14 October 1943, Conference Notes, WBSP.
85. Spaatz to Eisenhower, 14 October 1943, Conference Notes, WBSP.
86. Eisenhower to Smith, 13 October 1943, EP, #1337; Smith to AFHQ, 13 October 1943, Conference Notes, WBSP.
87. Smith to Russell Reynolds, 22 August 1943, and Paul Stone to Smith, 25 October 1943, Personal Papers, 1942–1944, WBSP.
88. Eisenhower, “Associates,” unpublished memo, 5 July 1967, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Post-Presidential Papers, DDEL.
89. Smith to Eisenhower, 13 October 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
90. One such example occurred in July and August. Donovan complained about the lack of support for OSS operations in the theater. The Mediterranean Air Command refused to free up aircraft for airdrops to resistance groups in the south of France. Smith replied, “We work here as one force without a dividing line between British and American units or functions.” Smith intervened to get the OSS the necessary aircraft. He categorized the responsible air officer as an ass. Donovan to Smith, 21 July 1943; Smith to Donovan, 29 July 1943; Donovan to Smith, 5 August 1943, Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, WBSP.
1. Hughes to Kate Hughes, 24 October 1943, Hughes Papers.
2. Smith, “Chief of Staff Notes, Washington Trip,” Conference Notes, WBSP; Butcher Diary, 28 October 1943. On his way back to Washington from China, Somervell could offer no insider hint as to Marshall’s thinking. Butcher Diary, 30 October 1943.
3. Eisenhower Diary, 6 December 1943, EP, #1408.
4. Patton to Beatrice Patton, 22 October 1943, GSPP.
5. AG WDGS to Smith, “AFHQ Organization and Its Relationship to NATOUSA and the British L of C,” AFHQ File, WBSP.
6. Crane to Smith, 28 September 1943, AFHQ File, WBSP.
7. Hughes Diary, 27–29 October and 3 November 1943.
8. Moses to Smith, 8 and 19 September 1943, Raymond G. Moses Papers, MHI. Smith’s two letters could not be located, but their contents were thoroughly discussed in Moses’ memoranda.
9. Hughes Diary, 9 and 10 November 1944.
10. Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 October 1943, EP, #1359. Four days later, anxious about Smith’s future appointment, Eisenhower asked Marshall if he had received the message. Marshall replied, “Yes,” but offered nothing further. Butcher Diary, 28 October 1943.
11. Smith [for Eisenhower] to COS and BCOS, 25 October 1943, EP, #1360.
12. Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 October 1943, EP, #1316; Eisenhower to CCS, 29 October 1943, EP, #1369.
13. Montgomery Diary, 27 October 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 313–14.
14. Dominck Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943–45 (New York, 1986), 99.
15. Eisenhower to Mamie, 2 December 1943, in D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life, 457
16. Eisenhower to Hughes, 10 May 1950, in The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: Columbia University (Baltimore, 1984), 797.
17. Summersby, Eisenhower Was My Boss, 108.
18. Eisenhower to Mountbatten, 14 September 1943, EP, #1256.
19. Eisenhower’s daily appointment log, in “Chronology,” EP, 5:104–40.
20. Based on letters published in The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, between 22 October (Smith’s first day back from Washington) and 6 December, Eisenhower wrote eight official and nineteen personal letters; Smith, Whiteley, G-3, and the military government section wrote sixteen official letters, signed by Eisenhower. Also noteworthy is the diminished volume of correspondence. Thirty-six pieces of correspondence went out in Eisenhower’s name in the slightly more than two weeks Smith spent in Washington; the same number was produced in the six weeks after his return.
21. Smith to Ismay, 12 September 1943, Chief of Staff’s Official Correspondence File, 1942–1944, WBSP.
22. Smith to Theodore Roosevelt, 30 December 1943, and Smith to Earle, 3 October 1943, Personal Correspondence, WBSP.
23. Summersby, Eisenhower Was My Boss, 50; Kay Summersby, Past Forgiving: My Love Affair with Dwight D. Eisenhower (London, 1986), 88–89.
24. Pogue interview, 8 May 1947.
25. Interview with Burgess.
26. Smith to Paul Stone, 21 November 1943, and Smith to Ed Merkle, 14 February 1944, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 441.
27. Smith to Huebner, 21 September 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
28. Salmon et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters.
29. Smith to Eden, 2 November 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
30. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Mason-MacFarlane, 1 November 1943, EP, #1371.
31. Churchill to Roosevelt, 8 November 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:420.
32. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 440.
33. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Roosevelt, 10 November 1943, EP, #1382.
34. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 15 November 1943, EP, #1389; Smith to Mason-MacFarlane, 15 November 1943, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP.
35. Butcher Diary, 17 November 1943; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 442.
36. All the various permutations are in Eisenhower Diary, 6 December 1943, EP, #1408.
37. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 770–71; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 445–49.
38. Smith to Patton and press transcript, Seymour Korman, 23 November 1943, Patton File, PPP.
39. Patton Diary, 23 November 1943, Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 377.
40. Butcher Diary, 23 November 1943.
41. Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 November 1943, EP, #1396.
42. Demaree Bess of the Saturday Evening Post wrote a thoroughly investigated report and handed it to Eisenhower on 19 August 1943. Bess, “Report of an Investigation,” submitted 19 August 1943, Patton File, PPP.
43. Clarkson to Hughes, “Report of Colonel Herbert Slayden Clarkson,” 18 September 1943, Patton File, PPP. Hughes’s handwritten marginal note on Clarkson’s report read: “Read by Gen. Eisenhower at La Marsa on 22 Set. 43. He directed these papers be placed in AG’s secret file.” Hughes Diary, 18 and 21 September 1943.
44. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Patton, 24 November 1943, EP, #1397.
45. Smith to Patton, 25 November 1943, Smith 201 File, WBSP.
46. Hughes Diary, 26 November 1943.
47. Patton Diary, 28 November 1943.
48. The Office of War Information sent excerpts of press coverage of the fallout in Congress. WAR OWI—43/2, n.d., Patton File, DDEL. Truman chaired the powerful Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Interestingly, Pepper gave Truman only lukewarm support in 1948, instead petitioning Eisenhower to run on the Democratic ticket.
49. Herron to Eisenhower, 30 November 1943, Patton File, DDEL.
50. Patton to Hughes, 9 December 1943, Hughes Papers.
51. Smith to K. A. N. Anderson, 15 December 1943, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP.
52. FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, 359–62.
53. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 454. On Churchill’s request for Smith’s retention in the Mediterranean as dual deputy supreme commander and chief of staff, see Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 December 1943, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #172.
54. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 206–7; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 454–55.
55. G-2 [for Eisenhower] to CCS, 29 October 1943, EP, #1369.
56. Butcher Diary, 5 December 1943.
57. Eisenhower reviewed his initial choices in consultation with Smith in Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 December 1943, EP, #1423.
58. Burgess interview.
59. Brooke Diary, 4 December 1943.
60. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 458.
61. Carlo D’Este, Warlord: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874–1945 (New York, 2008), 635–37.
62. Smith to Bull, 19 December 1943, COSSAC File, WBSP.
63. Eisenhower to Marshall, 16 and 17 December, EP, #1422–23; Smith to Hull, 19 December 1943, COSSAC File, WBSP.
64. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 December 1943, EP, #1423.
65. Smith to Truscott, 15 December 1943, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP.
66. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 460.
67. Montgomery Diary, 6–8 November 1943, Montgomery and the Eighth Army, 317–18.
68. Burgess interview.
69. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Roosevelt, 22 December 1943, EP, #1425.
70. Churchill to Roosevelt, 21 December 1943, Hull to Council General in Algiers, 22 December 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:193–95.
71. Roosevelt to Churchill, 21 December 1943, text of exchange in Matthews, “Memo,” 22 December 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:195.
72. Churchill to Roosevelt, 23 December 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:196.
73. Pogue interview with Smith, 8 May 1947.
74. Smith to Marshall, 24 December 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
75. Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 26 December 1943, FRUS, Europe, 1943, 2:197.
76. Marshall to Eisenhower, 4 November 1943, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #155; Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 December 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
77. Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 December 1943, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #172.
78. Eisenhower to Marshall, 25 December 1943, EP, #1428.
79. Morgan to Eisenhower, 20 December 1943, and Eisenhower to Morgan, 26 and 27 December 1943, Morgan File, PPP.
80. Devers to Eisenhower, 27 December 1943, COSSAC File, WBSP.
81. Pogue interview with Smith, 9 May 1949.
82. Eisenhower to Ismay, 3 December 1960, Keeping the Peace, #1722.
83. Réne Massagli to Wilson, quoted in Eisenhower to CCS, 4 January 1944, EP, #1489, n. 1. Hughes also attended the conference. Hughes to Larkin, 27 December 1943, Hughes Papers.
84. Pogue interview with Smith, 8 May 1947; Hughes Diary, 27 December 1944.
85. Eisenhower to Smith, 30 December 1943, COSSAC File, WBSP.
86. Hughes to Moses, 28 December 1943, Hughes Papers.
87. Devers to Eisenhower, 27 December 1943, COSSAC File, WBSP.
88. Eisenhower to Marshall, 28 December 1943, EP, #1445.
89. Marshall to Eisenhower, 29 December 1943, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #187; Eisenhower to Smith, 30 December 1943, COSSAC File, WBSP.
1. Eisenhower to Smith, 31 December 1943, Eyes Only, WBSP.
2. Smith felt so strongly about the faulty air command issue that he sent two cables to Eisenhower that day. Smith to Eisenhower, 30 December 1943, COSSAC File, WBSP. See also Pogue interview with Smith, 9 May 1947.
3. Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 December 1943, EP, #1470.
4. Eisenhower to Smith, 31 December 1943, EP, #1469.
5. F. H. N. Davidson to Smith, 22 December 1943, Chief of Staff Official Correspondence, 1942–1944, WBSP. Major General Davidson served as deputy head of military intelligence.
6. Smith’s account is found in his interview with Pogue, 8 May 1947. Brooke Diary and “Notes,” 31 December 1943. Butcher provides a blow-by-blow description of the meeting. Eisenhower thought Smith “certainly would not intentionally be rough with the CIGS.” Butcher Diary, 20 January 1944; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 472.
7. Smith to Eisenhower, 1 January 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
8. Smith to Eisenhower, 30 December 1943, ibid.
9. Eisenhower to Smith, 31 December 1943, EP, #1469.
10. Pogue interview with Smith, 8 May 1947.
11. Smith to Eisenhower, 31 December 1943, COSSAC File, WBSP.
12. Smith to Eisenhower, 2 January 1944, ibid.
13. Pogue interview, 9 May 1947.
14. Smith to Eisenhower, 2 January 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
15. Pogue interviews with MG Raymond Barker, 16 October 1946; MG K. G. McLean, 13 February 1947; and MG C. A. West, 19 February 1947, MHI.
16. Smith had all the cables, memos, minutes of meetings, telephone summaries, and documents related to the Anvil debate for the period December 1943 to April 1944 in one file, Overlord-Anvil Papers, WBSP.
17. Smith provided a full version in Smith to Eisenhower, 5 January 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP. Ramsay gives his account in “Report by the Allied Naval C-in-C, Expeditionary Force on Operation Neptune,” November 1944, copy in WBSP; Pogue interview with West.
18. Churchill to Roosevelt, 7 January 1943, FRUS, Cairo and Teheran, 865.
19. Pogue interview, 9 May 1947.
20. Smith to Eisenhower, 5 January 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
21. Eisenhower to Smith, 5–6 January 1944, EP, #1473.
22. Moran, Diaries of Lord Moran, 170.
23. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 465.
24. Brooke Diary, 7 January 1943.
25. H. M. Wilson, “Report of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean,” 7, copy in WBSP.
26. Roosevelt to Churchill, 28 December 1943, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 2:638.
27. Clark oral history, Senior Officers Oral History Program, MHI.
28. Brooke Diary and “Notes,” 5 January 1944.
29. Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 177; Matthews’s interview with Strong, 30 October 1947, MHI.
30. Smith to Eisenhower, 9 January 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
31. Michael Carver, Harding of Peterton, Field Marshal (London, 1978), 123.
32. Butcher Diary, 20 January 1944.
33. Churchill to Roosevelt, 8 January 1944, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 2:657.
34. Smith to Eisenhower, 9 January 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
35. Smith to Eisenhower, 5 January 1944, McCarthy [for Eisenhower] to Smith, 10 January 1944, and Smith to Eisenhower, 11 January 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
36. Smith to FREEDOM, 9 January 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
37. Eisenhower to Marshall, 25 December 1944, EP, #1427.
38. Butcher Diary, 9–10 May 1943.
39. Smith to Ivan Cobbald, 15 July 1943, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP.
40. Butcher Diary, 8 February 1944.
41. Butcher Diary, 20 January and 8 February 1944. Smith considered Truscott the best American division commander. Smith to F. B. Shaw, 29 February 1944, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP.
42. Hughes Diary, 15, 17–18 January 1944.
43. Butcher Diary, 20 January 1944. Burgess accompanied Smith on the flight. Burgess interview with author.
44. Butcher Diary, 16 January 1944.
45. Marshall Directive, “Designation of SHAEF,” 15 January 1944, in GBR, “Organization of the European Theater of Operations,” 20.
46. Eisenhower related all this to Butcher the day after he arrived in London. Butcher Diary, 16 January 1944.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 27 January 1944.
49. Eisenhower to Marshall, 28 December 1943, EP, #1445.
50. Eisenhower to Marshall and Eisenhower to Devers, 19 January 1944, EP, #1487–88. Eisenhower told Marshall that he found Devers’s attitude “a great disappointment.”
51. Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 January 1944, EP, #1484.
52. Pogue interview, 9 May 1947; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 472–74.
53. Butcher Diary, 20 and 28 January 1944. The promotion dated from 13 January.
54. Eisenhower to Marshall, 18–20 January 1944, EP, #1486–87, #1492; Marshall to Eisenhower, 18 January 1944, Eyes Only, WBSP.
55. Patton Diary, 27 January 1944; Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 410.
56. LTC Frank Osmanski, “The Logistical Planning for OVERLORD,” Military Review (November 1949): 31–40.
57. SHAEF, SGS, History Sub-Section, “History of COSSAC,” copy in WBSP.
58. “Minutes, Supreme Commander’s Conference,” 23 January 1944, Supreme Commanders File, WBSP; Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 January 1944, EP, #1496; Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS and BCOS, 23 January 1944, EP, #1497.
59. “Neptune Initial Joint Plan,” 1 February 1944, SGS Files; Smith to Secretary, BCOS, 10 February 1944, SHAEF War Diary, both in WBSP. The Smith Collection has the whole run of Neptune plans.
60. CCS to SHAEF, 12 February 1944, “Minutes, Supreme Commander’s Conference,” 18 January 1944, in GBR, “Organization of the European Theater of Operations,” 20.
61. Smith told Montgomery in December in Algiers about his plans to create a large headquarters. Montgomery to Brooke, 23 December 1943, in Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 465. Pogue interview with Brownjohn, 28 March 1947, MHI.
62. Eisenhower and Smith discussed their thinking behind SHAEF’s organization in Eisenhower conference with Moses, 27 September 1945, and Smith conference with Moses, 25 September 1945, GBR, “Organization of the European Theater of Operations,” 36.
63. GBR, “Organization and Function of the Communication Zone,” 78.
64. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 474.
65. For Smith’s views, see Pogue interviews, 8, 9, and 13 May 1947.
66. Butcher Diary, 20 January 1944.
67. Pogue interview with Brownjohn, 28 March 1947. Pogue conducted interviews with all the major actors in COSSAC and SHAEF in preparation for his official history, The Supreme Command; that excellent volume and many of those interviews are relied on here.
68. Jackson, a former executive for Time, later joined the SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division. Jackson to Henry Luce, 3 April 1944, J. D. Jackson Papers, DDEL.
69. Betts provides the best insights into the creation of SHAEF and the planning phase. Pogue interview with Betts, 19 May 1950, MHI. There are also three oral history interviews with Betts, 18 October 1973, 20 November 1974, and 25 June 1975, all in DDEL. The oral history of Arthur Nevins, also in DDEL, is valuable as well. Betts remained as deputy G-2; Nevins headed a subsection of the Operations Division.
70. Pogue interview with Ford Trimble, 17 December 1946, MHI.
71. Pogue interview with COL James Gault, 13 February 1947, MHI.
72. Pogue interview with Group Captain Leslie Scarman, 25 February 1947, MHI.
73. Pogue interview with Crawford, 5 May 1948, MHI.
74. Pogue interview with Group Captain T. P. Gleave, 9 January 1947, MHI. Gleave served as chief of the air mission to France.
75. T. J. Davis to H. V. Roberts, 12 February 1943, Thomas J. Davis Papers, DDEL.
76. COSSAC, “Operation OVERLORD—Command and Control,” 11 September 1943, “History of COSSAC.” In May Morgan suggested that the British home forces be combed to contribute troops for a strategic reserve for Overlord. Morgan to BCOS, 21 May 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
77. Ruppenthal interview with Smith, 14 September 1945, MHI. After the war the British treated Morgan very shabbily. In 1963 C. D. Jackson reported to Eisenhower that Morgan “was living in a state of abject poverty … without heat, without money to buy more than a few pieces of coal … a half frozen old man.” Jackson to Eisenhower, 28 February 1963, C. D. Jackson Papers, DDEL.
78. Betts oral history; Barker oral history, 15 July 1972, DDEL.
79. Pogue interview with Smith, 13 May 1947.
80. One such officer was his longtime aide, Colonel Burgess. Burgess interview; Pogue interview with Smith, 9 May 1947.
81. Pogue interview with Smith, 9 May 1947.
82. Betts oral history.
83.Ibid.
84. SHAEF transferred Rankin planning to headquarters, Scottish Command, on 4 March.
85. Gale [for Smith] to Ramsay, 6 March 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
86. Betts oral history.
87. SHAEF to FUSAG, “Operation OVERLORD,” 10 March 1944, and Lee to Deputy Commanding General, Communications Zone, 14 March 1944, GBR, “Organization of the European Theater of Operations,” 53.
88. Smith to Chiefs of All Divisions, “Organization of US Forces (Administration),” 8 February 1944, SHAEF War Diary; Smith to Bradley, 18 February 1944; SHAEF Directive, 10 March 1944, in GBR, “Mechanics of Supply,” 8, 73.
89. JCH Lee to Somervell, 8 February 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
90. Smith to CCS, 9 March 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
91. Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 March 1944, EP, #1585.
92. Smith to Strong, 7 February 1944, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP.
93. Morgan, Overture to Overlord (New York, 1950), 227–28; Pogue interview with Morgan, 3 February 1947, MHI.
94. Smith to Hilldring, 7 January 1944, Official Correspondence, WBSP.
95. Signed by Eisenhower to CCS and Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 19 January 1944, EP, #1489. Smith sent a copy to Ismay.
96. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, 227–29.
97. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 674–75. For an examination of the formation of the Civil Affairs Division, see Earl Ziemke, The U. S. Army in Occupation of Germany, USAWWII (Washington, DC, 1975), chap. 4.
98. Hilldring to Smith, 27 January 1944, and Holmes to Smith, 29 January 1944, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP. Smith instructed the secretariat to collect all pertinent files in a folio, “Civil Affairs Northwest Europe.” The two volumes are in WBSP. Other documents appear in COSSAC, Civil Affairs Diary, in SHAEF G-5, SHAEF Selected Records, RG 331, Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, NARA.
99. For Smith’s views, see Smith to Hilldring, 7, 12, and 22 January 1944, Eyes Only, WBSP.
100. In the COSSAC structure, the Civil Affairs Division consisted of six advisory groups composed in part by staffs designated by the governments in exile—France, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium-Luxembourg. These groups offered guidance on legal, fiscal, supply, intelligence, governmental, and economic affairs. Because the FCNL enjoyed no official recognition, relations with the French proved more difficult. The German section not only prepared plans for post-hostilities Germany but also served as a nucleus for a military government staff.
101. Lumley to Smith, 5 February 1944, and Smith to Lumley, 7 February 1944, Civil Affairs Northwest Europe, WBSP.
102. Smith to Hilldring, 6 February 1944, Eyes Only, WBSP.
103. Lumley to Smith and Smith to Lumley, 8 February 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
104. Smith memo, 11 February 1944, SHAEF War Diary; Pogue, Supreme Command, 347.
105. Smith to Director, Civil Affairs, War Office, 25 February 1944, and SHAEF Directive, 3 March 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
106. Pogue, Supreme Command, 347.
107. Smith, “Organization of Civil Affairs Section,” 14 March 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
108. Smith to Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 18 March 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
109. Donovan to Smith, 8 February 1944, 1944 Chief of Staff’s Personal Correspondence, WBSP.
110. Smith to McClure, 29 March 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
111. Pogue, “U.S. General Staff,” MHI.
112. “Minutes of Meeting,” 4 May 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
113. Butcher Diary, 20 January 1944.
114. Pogue interview with Smith, 9 May 1947.
115. Jackson to Henry Luce, 3 April 1944, Jackson Papers, DDEL.
116. Pogue interview with Trimble.
117. Davis to Roberts, 12 February 1944, Davis Papers, DDEL.
1. Eisenhower Diary, 22 March 1944, EP, #1601.
2. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 January 1944, EP, #1483.
3. Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 February 1944, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #232.
4. Eisenhower Diary, 7 February 1944, EP, #1536.
5. Summaries of the conversations between Smith and Handy are in Marshall, “Memo for FM Dill” and “Memo for Admirals Leahy and King,” 9 February 1944, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #233–34.
6. Churchill to Roosevelt, 6 February 1944, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 2:705.
7. Lucas’s diary entry cited in Lloyd Clark, Anzio: The Friction of War: Italy and the Battle for Rome, 1944 (London, 2006), 76; Churchill’s remark cited in John Colville, The Fringes of Power—Downing Street Diaries, 1939–1955 (London, 2004), 456.
8. Brooke Diary, 19 February 1944; Pogue interview with Portal, 7 February 1947, MHI.
9. Marshall to Eisenhower, 10 February 1944, EP, #1558, n. 1.
10. Montgomery to Eisenhower, 19 and 21 February 1944, Montgomery File, PPP.
11. Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 February 1944, EP, #1556.
12. Transcript, “Conference between General Handy and General Smith,” 20 February 1944, OVERLORD-ANVIL File, and Smith to Handy, 21 February 1944, COSSAC File, WBSP.
13. Pogue interview, 9 May 1947.
14. Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 February 1944, EP, #1557.
15. Charles Corlett, Cowboy Pete: The Autobiography of Major General Charles H. Corlett, unpublished manuscript, 245–46, 248, 250, Corlett Papers, MHI.
16. Roosevelt [through Leahy] to Eisenhower, 21 February 1944, Roosevelt File, PPP.
17. Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 February 1944, EP, #1562.
18. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 494–95.
19. Eisenhower to Cunningham, 23 February 1944, EP, #1564, n. 1.
20. “Minutes, Supreme Commander’s Conference,” 26 February 1944, OVERLORD-ANVIL, WBSP; Pogue interviews with Smith, 8–9 May 1947; Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 474.
21. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 497; Butcher Diary, 29 February 1944.
22. Tedder, With Prejudice, 508–12.
23. Eisenhower to Tedder, 29 February 1944, EP, #1575.
24. Both these comments were marginal notes made on the letter Portal wrote outlining the agreement. EP, #1577, n. 1.
25. Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 March 1944, EP, #1585.
26. Marshall to Eisenhower, 16 March 1944, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #296.
27. Transcript, Smith to Handy, 17 March 1944, OVERLORD-ANVIL, WBSP; Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 March 1944, EP, #1591.
28. Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 March 1944, EP, #1593; Eisenhower Manuscript [in Butcher Diary], 22 March 1944, EP, #1601.
29. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 21 March 1944, EP, #1595.
30. Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 March 1944, EP, #1596.
31. Smith to BCOS, 14 March 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
32. Eisenhower Manuscript, 22 March 1944, EP, #1601; Smith to Handy, telephone transcript, 17 March 1944, OVERLORD-ANVIL, WBSP.
33. Tedder, With Prejudice, 519–20.
34. Spaatz Diary, 23 April 1944, Papers of Carl Spaatz, LOC.
35. Eisenhower to Marshall, 27 March 1944, EP, #1608.
36. Patton Diary, 27 March 1944.
37. Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 April 1944, EP, #1641.
38. Brooke Diary, 1 April 1944.
39. Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 April 1944, Eyes Only, WBSP.
40. Handy reported that Wilson promised to give Anvil priority after completion of the link with the Anzio beachhead. Handy to Eisenhower, 5 April 1944, Eyes Only, WBSP; Churchill cited in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 424–26.
41. Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 April 1944, EP, #1645.
42. Butcher Diary, 17 and 18 April 1944.
43. Eisenhower had an unlikely ally in Wilson. Devers reported, “Wilson never has indicated that he desired to put troops into Balkans, but rather that he expected to make that an air war.” Devers to Eisenhower, 9 May 1944, Devers File, PPP.
44. Betts oral histories, 18 October 1973 and 20 November 1974, DDEL.
45. SHAEF Planning Staff, “First Draft,” 11 April 1944; War Department from Joint Staff Planners to U.S. Planners, SHAEF, 13 and 17 April 1944; SHAEF G-3, “Post-NEPTUNE Planning Forecast,” 15 April 1944; SHAEF Forward G-3, “ECLIPSE Plan,” 16 April 1944; SHAEF G-3, Plans Sub-Section, “Progress Report,” 19 April 1944, in Historical Division, U.S. Army Force, European Theater, The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations, pt. 5, vol. 2, Survey of Allied Planning for Continental Operations, 71–80. The planners produced multiple revisions of “Post-NEPTUNE, Courses of Action after Capture of Lodgment Area.” The first section, “Main Objective and Axis of Advance,” went through three revisions on 17 and 25 April and 3 May; the second section, “Method of Conducting the Campaign,” was also revised three times, on 27 April and 12 and 20 May. GBR, “Strategy of the Campaign in Western Europe, 1944–1945,” 42–48.
46. Smith to McCarthy, 15 April 1944, Frank McCarthy Collection, GCMRL.
47. Jackson to Henry Luce, 3 April 1944, Jackson Papers.
48. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 667–68.
49. Smith to Leigh-Mallory and McClure, 8 March 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
50. Smith [for Eisenhower] to d’Astier, 17 March 1944, EP, #1590.
51. Minutes of Meeting, 3 April 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
52. Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 5, 8, and 9 April 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
53. Smith, SHAEF Directive, 13 April 1944, and Smith to McClure, 15 April 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
54. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS, 19 April 1944, and Smith, SHAEF Directive, 20 April 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
55. Cited in Pogue, Supreme Command, 82 n. 26.
56. Smith [for Eisenhower] to Marshall, 26 April 1944, EP, #1653.
57. Forrest Pogue, “High Command in War: Two Problems from the Second World War,” Military Affairs (December 1951): 332.
58. The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, 13 April 1943, FRUS, 1944, General, 507–9; Butcher Diary, 14 April 1944. The first draft of the “unconditional surrender” terms emerged in late January, authored by the European Advisory Council. Smith commented, “This is counting chickens before they are hatched.” Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 481.
59. Stettinius, “Report on Conversations in London, April 7 to April 29, 1944,” FRUS, 1944, British Commonwealth and Europe, 6–7.
60. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 518.
61. Hilldring to Smith, 22 April 1944, 1944 Chief of Staff Personal Correspondence, WBSP.
62. Minutes of Meeting, 23 April 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
63. SHAEF to AFHQ, 26 and 27 April 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
64. Smith [for Eisenhower] to CCS, 8 and 11 May 1944, EP, #1675, #1681; Eisenhower to McNarney, 11 May 1944, EP, #1682.
65. Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 12 May 1944, GCMP.
66. Butcher Diary, 18 May 1944.
67. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 538.
68. Eisenhower to Churchill, 5 April 1944, EP, #1630.
69. Robb to Spaatz and Harris, “Direction of Operations of Allied Air Forces against Transportation Targets,” 17 April 1944, and Robb to Spaatz and Harris, 20 April 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
70. Cunningham Diary, 2 May 1944, A. B. Cunningham Papers, British Library, London; copy in the author’s possession.
71. Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 April 1944, EP, #1658.
72. Robb to Spaatz and Harris, 30 April and 6 May 1944, SHAEF War Diary.
73. Smith to Marshall, 14 and 16 May 1944, Eyes Only, WBSP; Butcher Diary, 16 May 1944.
74. Eisenhower to Marshall, 16 May 1944, EP, #1691.
75. Marshall to Smith, 16 May 1944, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #386.
76. Smith to Marshall, 17 May 1944, Eyes Only, WBSP.
77. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 531.
78. Smith to Marshall, 27 April 1944, Eyes Only, WBSP. Eisenhower related his conversation with Smith in Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 April 1944, EP, #1657. Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 April 1944, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, #372.
79. Patton Diary, 18 February and 2 March 1944; Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 417, 420.
80. Paul Munch, “Patton’s Staff and the Battle of the Bulge,” Military Review (May 1990): 46–54.
81. Patton Diary, 27 April 1944; Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 444.
82. Patton to Smith, 6 March 1944, Chief of Staff’s Personal Papers, 1942–44, WBSP; Patton Diary, 24 May 1944.
83. Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 April 1944, EP, #1657–58.
84. Hughes Diary, 29 April 1944.
85. Butcher Diary, 9 May 1944.
86. Patton Diary, 30 April 1944; Patton Papers, 1940–1945, 447–48.
87. “Some Personal Memoirs of Justus ‘Jock’ Lawrence, Chief Public Relations Officer, European Theater of Operations,” 4, 145–47, Miscellaneous Box, Patton Papers, GSPP.
88. Hughes Diary, 2 May 1944.
89. Ibid., 6, 14, 16, 17 May and 6, 28 June 1944. Gunmakers to the Royal Family, James Purdey and Sons proudly displays photographs of its more noteworthy patrons. Amidst the photographs of kings and royalty hangs one of Smith. Drew Middleton, “A Home of Guns Fit for a King, New York Times, 9 June 1985. On 18 June Eisenhower told Smith, “There is nothing to indicate a need for disciplinary measures against any officer, although I hope that a number [presumably including Smith] have received good lessons in good judgment. Eisenhower to Smith, 18 June 44, EP, #1762.
90. Butcher, Three Years with Eisenhower, 538.