[Chart B 1.]
ON the Japanese war plan we have no authoritative information. It has to be deduced from the nature of the task their policy involved and from the course their operations actually took.
Their problem and the war plan it required for its solution were radically different from those of their enemy and far less difficult. The Russian case was summarised in the clearest way by General Kuropatkin on February 15th, when it was already known that the Japanese had secured a footing at Chemulpho. “The plan of campaign,” he wrote while still Minister of War, “should be simple.”
“1. Struggle of the fleets for command of the sea.
2. Landing of the Japanese—operations to obstruct it.
3. Defensive operations with extensive use of the action of irregulars until the concentration of sufficient forces.
4. Assumption of the offensive—
(a) Expulsion of the Japanese from Manchuria.
(b) Expulsion of the Japanese from Korea.
5. Landing in Japan. Defeat of the Japanese territorial forces. Struggle against a popular rising.”
This broad and clear appreciation no less than the voice of the country designated the General as the man to give it effect, and on the following day, notwithstanding his outspoken disapproval of the policy which had led to war, he received instructions to proceed to Manchuria as Commander-in-Chief.
This final war plan, read with the General’s previous memoranda, serves to bring out the paradox which dominated the contest all through, and placed the Russians in a position where ultimate success had every chance against it. For Russia the war must take the unlimited form in the sense that victory could only be obtained by the complete overthrow of her enemy and the entire destruction of his power of resistance. Yet, as the General had insisted, the object was not of sufficient importance to warrant the expenditure of force which such a war would demand. Neither Manchuria nor Korea formed part of the Russian Empire—they were not even “outlying provinces.” The interest of Russia was, indeed, so remote and small relatively to her great historical interests in Europe and in the Near and Middle East that the object could never arouse the national spirit to a degree necessary for the effort required.
To make things worse the position of Japan was the exact converse. For her the object was vital. It was one that appealed passionately to every Japanese subject. It was at once a material interest that meant life or death to the country and the symbol of the most exalted patriotic aspirations. For an end so dearly cherished they were ready to shed the last drop of blood. Yet, physically, in the strategical sense, the object was strictly limited to a definite piece of territory, and it was obvious the Japanese might obtain it by means far short of entirely overthrowing their enemy. While Russia could only succeed by the complete overthrow of Japan, all that Japan had to aim at was to seize the territorial object and establish herself there so strongly that her expulsion would not be worth the effort it would cost. It was open to her, therefore, to use the lower form of war for an object in which her interest was so great and obvious that it would call forth spontaneously her whole strength and energy as a nation.
For this form of war the territorial object in question was peculiarly well adapted—almost, in fact, an ideal field. Korea is a seagirt and mountainous country capable of being almost entirely isolated by naval action and easy to defend with inferior military force. It was close to her own central base with short and easily defensible sea communications, and it was separated from that of Russia by thousands of miles of difficult and partially settled country in which the attitude of the population must always be uncertain. It reproduced, in fact, on a vast and even more telling scale the strategical conditions which Wellington used so successfully at Torres Vedras.
Now for a war in which these conditions occur the primary objective is not necessarily the armed forces of the enemy, but the territorial object itself. The armed forces become the objective only so soon and in so far as they interfere with the occupation and retention of the territorial object. The method is to seize that object and then assume a general attitude of defence. By this means the initiative is secured, and all the advantages of defence are enjoyed without its moral drawbacks. The enemy is forced to conform with an offensive so weak and attenuated that it will require for success an expenditure of life and treasure which the object may not justify.
In continental warfare this method, for all its advantages, can seldom be used, for the simple reason that as between contiguous continental states it does not lie with the weaker to determine the form of the war. For however dexterously it opens with operations to seize the territorial object it will be exposed to a counter-stroke at its heart which would force the war to develop on unlimited lines.
As between contiguous continental states, therefore, it is held that the limited form can never be used with safety, except where the territorial object is so situated that its occupation serves to cover the heart and prevent a crushing counter-stroke. It is obvious that for geographical reasons this condition can rarely be fulfilled in continental warfare—never completely. Hence, by continental strategists the method is only regarded as a regrettable alternative for a Power that is relatively too weak to use the higher form. But in maritime or mixed warfare it may be quite otherwise. Where the sea factor is of dominant importance, it may be used not only to isolate the, object but also to bar the possibility of an overriding counter-stroke; and Korea exhibited these conditions in their highest degree.
The reason is plain. Where the Power using the lower form is insular like Japan the possibility of the counter-stroke depends, not on the relative amount of military force of the two belligerents, but upon which of them can obtain the command of the sea. Without a base in Southern Korea Russia had no prospect of being relatively strong enough in Far Eastern waters to secure invasion command. So long as Japan held Korea such a base could not be secured, and consequently the seizure of the territorial object, so far from weakening the Japanese position and exposing her to the danger of the counter-stroke, was actually a most potent means of barring it.
Seeing, then, that, on the assumption of Japan’s superiority at sea, all the inherent objections to the lower or limited form were eliminated, it was natural for her to use it, not only because she was the weaker Power, but also because it was the most direct and economical way of obtaining her end. How then should she proceed?
The use of the limited form has always tended to exhibit three stages more or less sharply distinguished. First, there is, as General Kuropatkin pointed out, the seizure of the object. This initial operation, as we have seen, Russia considered it out of her power to prevent. All it required was the local command of South Korean waters which she felt she could not successfully dispute.
Secondly, comes a defensive stage in which Japan would seek to establish herself so strongly that her position would be practically impregnable to any force which her enemy was able or willing to bring against her. It was in this stage that the armed forces of the enemy would become her immediate objective, since her hold on the territory she had gained depended on her power of crushing the armed force which Russia could develop for breaking that hold. In this particular case a merely passive defence would not avail. In order to control, so far as lay in her power, the amount of force which Russia could bring to bear, two offensive operations were necessary. Sooner or later Japan must secure absolute and permanent command of the sea so as to confine her enemy to the feeble land line of communication, and she must weaken that line as far as possible by an advance into Manchuria against the railway. This, it must always be remembered, was the primary strategical intention of the Manchurian operations. Manchuria itself was not part of the territorial object. Its place in the policy of Japan was a buffer to secure Korea. The expulsion of the Russians was an operation for the defence of Korea.
Her position having been secured by these naval and military operations, which, though defensive in intention, would take a vigorous offensive form, the third stage would supervene. This is a stage of general pressure in which she would seek by such offensive operations as lay within her power to demonstrate that her enemy stood to lose more than he could gain by continuing the war. It is the stage in which she would endeavour to induce Russia to recognise the situation she had set up. For this purpose the Island of Sakhalin would serve, while as a satisfaction of another Japanese national aspiration the conquest would more than justify the effort. For its value was not merely strategical—it was part of “unredeemed” Japan. She had once held the whole of it, but half a century before Russia had begun to establish settlements there, and in 1855 Japan had been forced to recognise them, and rest content with the southern half of the island. In spite of this arrangement Russia had steadily continued her encroachments until in 1875, still incapable of resistance, Japan had been completely ousted, and the humiliation had never been forgotten. Its acquisition would, therefore, wipe out a rankling stain on the national honour, and at the same time would complete the chain of her archipelago to the north, as the cession of the Pescadores and Formosa after the war with China had done in the south. If, however, Sakhalin did not prove effective for the pressure stage, she would have to extend her coercive operations to Vladivostok, and this indicated a penetration as deep as possible into Manchuria, so as to threaten the isolation of the fortress by the capture of the Kharbin Junction. Further than that she would probably be unable to go in the face of the vast military power of Russia. Kharbin, in fact, may be taken as the extreme limit of the offensive action possible or even necessary for Japan.
In its broad lines, therefore, the development of her war plan would be obvious and normal. But the whole problem has not yet been stated. For simplicity of exposition we have hitherto eliminated Port Arthur, and Port Arthur introduced a serious and confusing complication; for it had two aspects. In the popular imagination it was a territorial object even more important than Korea. Its occupation by Russia had inflicted a wound to the national self-esteem, a smarting sense of wrong that time could not heal, and it was the burning desire to redress the injury that had most violently inflamed the passion for war. “The sad ghosts of their dead,” as they said, “could never sleep under the Russian flag.”
The recovery of the fortress was for the Japanese the symbol of their power to assert their dignity as a nation and to resist what seemed to them the arrogant insolence of Russia. For the spirit of the people, which is the life blood of war, Port Arthur was thus a primary object as much as Korea. But it had also a purely strategical aspect, which belonged logically to the secondary stage. That stage, as we have seen, involved obtaining absolute command of the sea and such command could not be obtained permanently until the main naval base of the enemy was in the hands of Japan. Here, then, was an element which tended to confuse the clear lines on which the war should proceed. Regarded as a primary object Port Arthur should be attempted at once. Regarded as a means of securing permanent command, operations against it should follow the occupation of Korea. In either case its reduction would seriously complicate the advance into Manchuria. To seize it by a coup de main oversea in the face of the Russian Squadron, as France and England attempted Sevastopol, seems never to have been seriously contemplated. It would, therefore, have to be isolated by a separate army, and while part of that army pushed the siege the other part would have to cover it by offensive operations up the railway. As the advance of the main army from Korea would have to proceed simultaneously, Japan would thus be committed to two widely separated lines of operation—a vicious design, which would give the enemy interior lines and would tend to expose the two Japanese armies to be defeated in detail. Their war plan, therefore, could not stop here. The remedy was sought in a third line of operation. A distinct force must be landed between the other two in a position to support whichever the enemy might select for attack. The arrangement would have the further advantage that, if the Russians were not in time to take the initiative, the three separate lines could be combined into one concentric or enveloping advance against Liau-yang. With that vital point once in her hands Japan would be in a position not only to confirm the defence of her position in both territorial objects but also to push on up the railway to develop the third stage of offensive pressure.
It is obvious that a war framed on these lines demands a very accurate co-ordination of the land and sea forces. This is, indeed, the paramount necessity, and a successful issue must depend upon how far the Staff machinery is adapted for securing a nice adjustment of the work of the two services and their smooth co-operation. Such machinery the Japanese had provided, and a clear grasp of its nature and organisation is required for the right understanding of their higher war direction.
At the head of what we should call the Admiralty was Admiral Yamamoto, whose functions were those of Minister of Marine, with little or no voice in the actual conduct of war. Beside him was a Chief of the Staff, who was directly responsible to the Emperor for war plans. To the Emperor he submitted his schemes, and on the Imperial approval being obtained the Chief of the Staff transmitted them to the Minister of Marine to be put in operation. This department is referred to as the “Naval Staff” to distinguish it from the “General Staff” which had corresponding functions for the Army. The Chief or Director of the Naval Staff was Vice-Admiral Viscount Ito, and his Vice-director, Vice-Admiral Ijuin, who is said to have been the master spirit.
To assist the Emperor in his decisions and to provide for co-ordination between the schemes of the two Staffs, he was assisted in time of peace by two Councils. First, the “Board of Marshals” (Gen-sui-fu), on which sat naval and military officers who had the rank of “Gen-sui,” corresponding to our Admiral of the Fleet and Field-Marshal, and they were regarded as the supreme advisers on all matters relating to war. The other was the “Grand Council of War” (Gunji-sangi-in), on which sat the Gensuis, the Ministers of Marine and the Army, the Chiefs of the Naval and General Staffs, and any other officers who might be specially appointed. But in war time these two bodies were merged in a special Council known as the “Imperial Headquarters Staff” (Dai-hen-yei), of which the Emperor himself was chief. Besides the members of the Grand Council of War it included the whole of the Naval and General Staffs. This was the body directly responsible for the conduct of the war. It prepared and issued the Emperor’s orders to the various Commanders-in-Chief, and it was to its existence that the Japanese attribute the harmonious working of the two services throughout the war.
The Imperial Headquarters Staff was constituted and established in the Palace on the declaration of war. It was, therefore, the Grand Council of War under the presidency of its senior member that elaborated the war plan, but how far the theoretical considerations dealt with above influenced its deliberations we have no means of knowing. All we can tell is that in the war with China the logical progression was followed with precision, and that in its broad lines the present war trod in the footprints of the old. It remains to see how far the opening conformed to what theory would lead us to expect.
About the movement with which the Japanese thought it best to begin there is no doubt. The very first operation was to be the seizure of the vital naval position by the immediate occupation of Sylvia Basin and another base at Hakko Haven on the south-west coast of Korea.1 Then under cover of a holding blow at the Russian Squadron, possession was to be taken of Southern Korea by a combined expedition; if by surprise so much the better. It was to be followed by an occupation of the whole country as rapidly as possible up to the Yalu frontier, and till this stage was complete Port Arthur was to be left alone.
To what extent and how rapidly the occupation could be achieved was by no means so clear. Much depended on choosing the right moment for action and that was an extremely difficult matter. From a military point of view there was nothing to be gained by waiting and much might be lost. The Army Staff were quite ready to strike and were beginning to get anxious, lest the continual movement of Russian troops towards the Yalu would end in the enemy taking the initiative themselves. Politically, however, it was desirable to wait until Russia should be convicted in the face of the world of deliberately prolonging the negotiation for her own ends. Still in the opinion of most people this position had been reached, and the condition of public opinion was such as to make further delay very dangerous. Accordingly, as we have seen, in military and political quarters the first week in January appears to have been regarded as the proper moment.
As already stated, however, the Naval Staff did not see their way to doing with certainty what was expected of them without further strength. The last Russian reinforcement had not only brought up their battle squadron to a numerical equality with their own, but had enabled a fourth cruiser to be detached to Vladivostok, and Admiral Virenius’s squadron was still interposed between the newly-acquired cruisers and Japan. In these circumstances they regarded as essential a postponement long enough to let the two cruisers get clear, and since the whole foundation of the Japanese war plan was the ability of their fleet to dominate that of the enemy the voice of the Naval Staff prevailed. It says much for the Japanese grasp of the problem before them that for a whole month they ran the risk of such another popular outburst as the country had witnessed five and twenty years before, as well as of losing the initiative, rather than make an incorrect opening which possibly they might never have been able to set right.
Let us endeavour, so far as possible, to penetrate what was in the minds of the Naval Staff. The problem before them was, how to land a certain military force as near as possible to Seoul in order to seize it and the neck between Ping-yang and Gensan about a hundred miles to the north of it as quickly as might be. A footing thus obtained, it was scarcely less important to keep the line of sea passage open for a free flow of reinforcements.
Three divisions had been told off for this opening, but in view of the precariousness of the operation it was scarcely to be hoped that the whole force could be pushed up to Seoul by sea without interference. The bulk of it, at least, as the Russian plan assumed, would very probably be forced to land at Fusan and march through Southern Korea; measures had been already taken for supplying the troops as they advanced up the Fusan-Seoul road. Such a move would be necessarily slow, and, according to the information officially given to our military representatives on their arrival, the utmost that was counted on was that the army of occupation would arrive in time to force the enemy to fight the first land battle somewhere close to Seoul.
On the fleet then depended how far and how strongly the first thrust could be pushed, and the manner in which the fleet could perform its functions depended on the action of the Russian squadron at Port Arthur.
If it came out boldly upon the line of passage a general action would have to be fought before the desired military movement could even begin; and the war, as General Kuropatkin expected, would shape itself on the issue of a preliminary struggle for the command of the sea. If the Russians did not come out the Japanese could open with at least the first steps of their military movement by seizing Seoul, and the fleet would take a covering position between Port Arthur and the army’s line of passage. The covering operation might assume the form of a simple blockade or a holding attack on the Russian squadron at its base. Further, there was the necessity in either case of making adequate provision against the interference of the Vladivostok detachment.
How, then, was the problem actually approached? After the conclusion of the November manœuvres on the south Korean coast the fleet had returned to Sasebo, and from that admirable position it continued its exercises—the whole force being a single organisation under Admiral Togo’s flag. It had been under orders for another cruise in South Korean waters, but after the hopeless Russian Note of December 11th was received, and when for a while the Japanese Government refused even to discuss it, these orders were cancelled.
War appeared imminent. It had almost been decided on, as we have seen, and it became imperative to settle finally the naval plan of operation. Accordingly, on December 15th Admiral Viscount Ito, as Director of the Naval Staff, forwarded to Admiral Togo certain questions for his opinion as to the possible action of the Russians.
According to the Japanese Confidential History the general idea of the Naval Staff was to endeavour to determine what that action would be and then to forestall it by taking the initiative themselves. Their primary object would then be to deliver a heavy blow at the enemy’s fleet which would decide the preponderance at the outset. With this orthodox idea of “seeking out” in their minds they submitted to the Admiral’s consideration the following appreciation:—“The Russians would assemble the bulk of their fleet at Port Arthur to draw him thither and would chose a favourable spot to fight and force him to spend his strength in ‘rushing about.’ ” This seems to mean that although they were bent on getting a decision at once they saw the inherent evils of the operation, in that while exhausting the offensive power of their own fleet it would permit the Russians to choose a field of action in their own zone of highest control. They were also of opinion since coal and stores were a very serious consideration to the Russians that if they did move out they would certainly not come as far as the south of Korea.
Their second assumption was that Vladivostok would be used as a base for the detachment of four cruisers and six torpedo-boats that were already there, and that it would be used independently to harass Otaru and Hakodate (in the Tsugaru Strait) and force the Japanese to divide their fleet.
Finally, they were of opinion that “as opportunity offers the Port Arthur and Vladivostok Squadrons combining by arrangement will meet our fleet.” Read with the first clause this seems to mean that the Port Arthur squadron would very likely refuse an action in the Yellow Sea and would seek to avoid a decision until the two squadrons were united. It was so at least that Admiral Togo seems to have read it.
His answer appears to have taken the Staff appreciation to mean that the Russians would come out in order to entice his fleet away from the Straits and leave the line of passage to Fusan exposed; that they would avoid a decision until they had got the two divisions of their fleet together; and that until a decision had been won no control of the Yellow Sea could be obtained sufficient to permit the direct passage of the army to the objective point. The Staff, in short, appeared to be assuming that the desired degree of control could only be gained by regular offensive operations directed to the destruction of the enemy’s armed sea forces in battle.
The Admiral at any rate thought otherwise. With regard to the first two propositions, as to the probable local action of the Port Arthur and Vladivostok divisions, he said he considered them “very near the truth.” But with regard to their combining for a decision he replied “It is my hope to be able to decide the control more quickly.” He then proceeds to elaborate his own view, which shows that what was uppermost in his mind was the combined, and not merely the naval problem.2 On analysis it will be seen that his view was based on the doctrine that when the geographical conditions are favourable, as they were in this case, absolute command obtained by a regular decision is not necessary for the passage of troops. It is enough to secure the necessary local control and such control can be secured defensively, assuming that the enemy has not such a preponderance of naval strength as will enable him to defeat the defending fleet decisively or drive it from the essential positions whenever he chooses to do so.
He first deals with the Vladivostok Squadron explaining that he does not propose to take any steps to counteract its menace beyond ordering the Yokoska destroyer flotilla from Tokyo Bay to guard the Tsugaru Strait. “We had better” he says “let the enemy do what he likes at Otaru.”3
If, however, it became absolutely necessary to deal with the diversion more actively he would send north a squadron with which, as we shall see, it was intended to cover the army’s passage in the Straits of Korea. It consisted of certain obsolescent ships, under Vice-Admiral Kataoka. They included the old Chinese second-class battleship Chinyen, the third-class battleship Fuso, with three second-class cruisers, and the Tsushima torpedo-boat flotilla stationed at Takeshiki.4
As to the Port Arthur squadron he was of opinion that it would not come out and seek a meeting for the present. On this supposition it would be necessary to commence the military movement without first obtaining a decision at sea, and he thought he saw his way to gaining immediately sufficient preponderance to enable him by preventive operations to secure the landing of the army close to its objective.
The method he proposed for securing the necessary local control was as follows:—Asan Bay, immediately south of Chemulpho, should be consituted the advanced fleet base, and about 70 miles away to the north-west he would establish a destroyer base at Suni-do (Rooper Harbour) and connect it by cable with the fleet base. From this advanced position an occasional reconnaissance in force would be made off Port Arthur to try to draw the enemy, but if they still refused, the army should be despatched direct to Korea.
He would further cover the movement with cruisers and destroyers patrolling about the Shantung Promontory and protect the transports with similar patrols extending from the first advanced base at Hakko Haven to Baker Island just south of the entrance to Chemulpho. To complete his covering disposition he would hold the Straits of Korea against the Vladivostok detachment with the special squadron mentioned above which was to be based at Takeshiki in Tsushima.
It will be seen that the cover thus afforded was very strong. His two observation stations rendered a surprise attack almost impossible, nor could the Port Arthur squadron approach the point of disembarkation without passing between two destroyer flotillas and leaving them on its line of retreat. It was equally impossible for it to interrupt the landing without defeating the Japanese fleet.
This plan had the furthur advantage that, while the Admiral enabled the Army to act at once and directly, he was also using it as an inducement to force the enemy to sea and to accept battle in an unfavourable position and as far from their base as the restricted area of the operations permitted. They would in fact be placed in the dilemma of permitting the occupation of Chemulpho and Seoul or fighting Admiral Togo in his zone of highest local control. That the Russians did not intend to prevent the landing was of course unknown.
The weak point of the disposition, as the Admiral was careful to point out, was that it involved considerable dispersion, and as he believed the Port Arthur squadron would come out sooner or later provision must be made for a rapid concentration of all units. But this was by no means the only precaution he wished to take. To make absolutely certain of the local control it was necessary that an effort should be made to ensure, if possible, that the enemy’s fleet should not be able to put to sea till the movement of the troops was complete. He would have no half measures with a back thought to a brilliant offensive with his fleet.
Although he was ready to offer battle and was making every arrangement for it, yet he felt sure it would be refused. If it was so improbable that the enemy would come out, better make certain that they should stay in, and thus the defensive action of the fleet on which the prompt action of the Army depended would be assured. Such at least seems to be the interpretation of the drastic action he now proceeded to propose.
Though his idea was to hold his battle fleet back on the defensive, he intended to give his defence a highly active form, which we should class as a minor counter-attack to prevent an offensive movement on the enemy’s part. He had been given to understand that he was not to move till after war was declared. Nevertheless, he urged that as soon as the Government had decided on a declaration his destroyers should be sent forward to Hakko, and having ascertained how the enemy were placed, that instead of a declaration of war they should deliver an attack on any ships that might be lying outside Port Arthur or Dalny.
To complete the stroke, he added, it would be a clever plan to send their parent ship filled with stones and cement and sink her in the mouth of the Gut. In conclusion, he said laconically that if it were decided to stake the issue on a battle with the whole fleet his tactical scheme would be the same as one he had drawn up in 1900. What that was we do not know. Clearly he did not regard a battle as a likely eventuality.
The Admiral’s view of his functions was characteristic of his unfailing grasp of a combined problem and was in full accordance with our own traditional practice. Where the main offensive movement rests with the army the logical function of the fleet is defensive and was always so regarded in our Service. It may be that it cannot perform that function without destroying the enemy’s fleet and this will always be so if the enemy’s fleet is active and boldly handled. But where it is not so handled and when topographical conditions make it possible to prevent its interfering with the army’s movement, it was never our practice to pospone that movement in order to enable the fleet to carry out elaborate offensive operations with a view to securing a complete decision Desirable and eventually essential as such a decision is, in these cases it is not always the paramount necessity of the opening. For Japan that necessity was the immediate success of the military and not of the naval offensive.
A day or two after Admiral Togo had sent in his plan the Japanese made their second attempt to purchase the Triumph and Swiftsure and within a week they had decided to take the two Argentine cruisers instead.
That same day, December 23rd, their firm reply was sent to the Russian Note, and war was prepared for immediately. As we know, if the Viceroy had had his way it would have come then. The Admiral took in Welsh coal, always the sign of expected action, and a few days later the private secretary of the Minister of Marine arrived to explain to him confidentially the state of the negotiations and the tension of the situation.
During this period of high pressure the plan of naval operations was under the continual consideration of the Naval Staff. Their work was devoted to the elaboration of Admiral Togo’s scheme. It was too obviously well adapted to what the Army Staff required not to be welcomed, and from that time forth it held the field, and the idea of what General Kuropatkin called a preliminary struggle between the fleets for the command fell into the background. Both the Admiral’s ideas—of a torpedo attack before declaration of war and of blocking the port after it—were accepted in principle, and arrangements were made to facilitate their execution.
So long as the crude idea of massing the fleet for a decisive battle had obtained it had been kept as one homogeneous body. On December 28th, however, it was broken up and reorganised into three distinct and self-contained “squadrons.”
The “First Squadron,” under the immediate command of Admiral Togo with his flag in the Mikasa, consisted of (1) the six first-class battleships (known as the “First Division”) and (2) of four second-class cruisers forming the “Third Division” under Rear-Admiral Dewa in the Chitose. To this squadron were attached the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd destroyer divisions, numbering eleven units and five torpedo-boat divisions with four boats in each.
The “Second Squadron” consisted of (1) the “Second Division,” which included the six armoured cruisers under Vice-Admiral Kamimura in the Idzumo, and (2) the “Fourth Division,” comprising three second-class and one third-class cruiser under Rear-Admiral Uriu in the Naniwa. The attached squadron flotilla was two destroyer and two torpedo-boat divisions, giving sixteen units in all.
The “Third Squadron” was formed from Admiral Kataoka’s “Straits Squadron,” and was eventually reinforced with a number of coast-defence units and small cruisers. Thus strengthened it was reorganised in three divisions. The “Fifth,” consisting of the Chinyen and the three Itsukushimas; the “Sixth,” of four third-class cruisers under Rear-Admiral M. Togo, and the “Seventh” of the third-class battleship Fuso wearing Rear-Admiral Hosoya’s flag, two coast defence-vessels, Kaimon and Saiyen, seven gunboats, and a despatch-vessel. To this squadron were attached three divisions of torpedo-boats, twelve in all, and their parent ship.
Besides the above, the First and Second Squadrons had each its own division of auxiliaries. Each had a torpedo parent ship, two armed merchant cruisers,5 a repair vessel, and its own coal, water and provision ships. The First Squadron had besides a hospital ship and five merchant vessels “for special service.”6
The general intention of the organisation was that the First and Second Squadrons should operate together as the “Combined Squadron” in the Yellow Sea to act as a covering fleet for the landing force against the Port Arthur Squadron, while the Third Squadron held the Straits against the Northern cruisers, and provided a squadron for escort and assistance in landing. The system, in fact, was according to the traditional British practice to work with a “covering squadron” and “a squadron in charge of transports,” each distinct from the other.
While thus providing for a bold deployment of his fleet, Admiral Togo provided, as he had suggested, the means of preserving its concentration. The first step to this end was to have everything ready for connecting Hakko with Sasebo by cable; Sasebo being already in connection with Tsushima. Hakko in fact was regarded as the rallying point, the focus of concentration just as Ushant was for ourselves, and arrangements were made for a special squadron of merchant auxiliaries and torpedo-boats to follow the Combined Fleet when it sailed, and establish there an advanced base and intelligence centre. The advantages of its situation made it a natural focus, and the reasons for choosing it were explained by the Staff thus—“In an advance it threatened Port Arthur: in a retreat it protected the Straits,” forming an advanced outpost to the Takeshiki—Sylvia Basin barrier line. Over and above these advantages as a naval position it had a special value for the army as a point d’appui on the route to the west coast of Korea. It was regarded, in fact, as providing invaluable protection for the passage of the transports until they entered the defended area of the Asan fleet base.
The broad strategical design being thus settled Admiral Togo completed his “Battle plan for the Combined Fleet,” that is for First and Second Squadrons under the new organisation. It was designed on the general idea of fighting a nearly equal fleet of inferior speed and the tactics were based mainly on “crossing the T,” and it was strictly enjoined that until the action became a chase the First and Second Divisions were to act in combination. Separate tactical instructions were also provided for each division acting separately.7
The preliminary torpedo attack with which it was hoped to cripple the enemy’s fleet before action was joined, was worked out not by the Commander-in-Chief, but by the Naval Staff at Tokyo. It was regarded as part of the general plan of operations, which was left to the vice-director Admiral Ijuin. The Staff also worked out the idea of blocking the Gut, an idea which had now grown so far beyond the original modest proposal that no less than five merchant vessels had been taken up for the purpose.
The general plan of operations for the Combined Fleet which had thus taken the form of covering the army’s line of passage by preventive action rather than that of seeking out the enemy’s fleet with a view to a prompt decision by battle, was communicated to Admiral Togo by an officer of the Naval Staff. Its text is not known but it was clearly based on the Admiral’s original appreciation.
The Vladivostok cruisers, as he had suggested, were almost ignored so far as regarded their possible operations in the north. The consideration which settled the matter was that the Imperial Staff had come to the conclusion that certain movements of the Russian Far Eastern Army indicated a belief that the Japanese objective was Vladivostok and that their army would land at Posiette Bay. The inference was that the northern cruisers were intended for defensive operations.
There still remained the very delicate question of choosing the moment for action. The last Japanese Note had been delivered on January 13th and the month was coming to an end without any sign of an answer. On the 30th, the day Mr. Kurino was instructed to ask Count Lamsdorf to fix a date for the reply, Admiral Togo was called on for a definite statement of what he intended to do. On the following day he replied that he wished to send forward two destroyer divisions with their parent ships and his despatch-vessel to Hakko two days before the fleet sailed, and he wished to know if there was any objection. He also expressed a wish that Port Arthur should not be blocked at the outset, which looks as though at this time he had some hope of getting a decision after the torpedo attack, and finally he advised that the army should be landed at Asan.
After consultation with the Minister of Marine, the Chief of the Naval Staff informed the Commander-in-Chief that there was no objection to sending forward the destroyers, and that they believed they would be able to give him the two days’ notice he required. But it was not so easy as they thought. There were the Army and the Foreign Office to consider, and neither of them saw their way to give the Navy so free a hand.
The landing place was not to the mind of the General Staff. On January 7th, when the delivery of the last Russian Note rendered immediate preparation for war necessary, sealed orders had been issued for the expeditionary force and their contents communicated to the Naval Staff. They were drafted in alternative forms.8 Draft A contained directions based on a landing at Chemulpho. Draft B was to meet the contingency of the Admiral being unable to guarantee a landing so far north. In that case the General was to disembark at Asan, or at one of four other places, named in succession, to the southward; the last being Basil Bay some 120 miles from Seoul by road. If it proved absolutely impossible to land at any of these points, the troops were to return to Sylvia Basin and await further orders.
With this plan the General Staff had seemed content. All they asked was 24 hours’ notice before the fleet was to sail. But circumstances had changed. During the delay which the Navy had required, the old struggle for the political control of the Korean capital had broken out again. A Russian party seemed to be insidiously gaining strength, Russian troops had been flowing continuously to the Yalu and the General Staff now did not feel sure of getting in their blow quickly enough even from Asan. They pointed out to Admiral Ijuin that Asan would mean a four days’ march to Seoul, and seeing that the expeditionary corps had no organised transport, a whole week must elapse from their leaving Sasebo to their arrival at the objective. In that time the situation in the Korean capital might have so much changed that the opportunity for a coup de main would be lost. It was hoped, therefore, that notwithstanding the increased risk the troops would be landed at Chemulpho. Still Admiral Togo felt unable to give any promise, and finally it was settled that Asan should be fixed as the landing place, but that it should be changed to Chemulpho if circumstances permitted.
With the Foreign Office the difficulty was still more serious and by no means so easy to compromise. In their case the objection arose out of the Admiral’s proposed opening. They felt compelled to point out to the Naval Staff that while from a strategical point of view a surprise attack was essential, diplomacy demanded that nothing should be done to incur the reprehension of other countries before relations were actually broken off. To hit the mean, therefore, the attack must be timed “to a hair’s breadth” and the Admiral must be asked to bring his plan to a finer point. On the heels, then, of the assent which he had received came a telegram from Admiral Ijuin wanting to know what time would elapse between the order for the destroyers to start and the delivery of their attack; also, if the weather prevented its delivery what flotilla would he use for a second attempt, and on what day would it be made.
The Admiral replied that the attack would be between sunset on the second day after the Order and dawn the next day. If the weather interfered and made this impossible the same flotilla would try again.
This would not do. Admiral Ijuin had to insist further that the date of the attack was intimately bound up with the last word of the negotiations. If in view of the possibility of the weather preventing the destroyer attack on the night fixed could he not attack with his battle fleet next morning?
The Admiral replied that he could not use his battleships against the enemy under their forts. If the destroyer attack did not take place on the night of the second day it would the next night. Was that not near enough for the Foreign Office?
Apparently it was not, for on February 3rd an officer of the Naval Staff was sent down to the Admiral “with very important orders”; he was also to explain that the Staff considered it too dangerous to send the destroyers alone, and it was thought better that they should have the escort and the support of the fleet to within striking distance of the enemy and that not till then should they be given liberty to act independently. This was a distinct deflection of the logical defensive plan which had been adopted on the Admiral’s suggestion, and it seems clear that the political exigencies of the situation were blurring the clear line which the Admiral had drawn between an offensive and defensive plan of operations.
The Confidential Japanese History says distinctly that when diplomatic relations were broken off the first operation laid down for the Combined Fleet was “to deliver a lightning stroke on the enemy’s squadron in the Yellow Sea.” Under the Admiral’s plan the stroke was to have been confined to a minor holding attack with the flotilla. It was a fundamental departure from what had been settled, but there was no choice for him but to obey. Soon after the officer had started for Sasebo to explain the new idea, the Imperial Staff came to a final decision, and next morning the Commander-in-Chief received from Admiral Ijuin a telegram which amounted to a positive order. “It has been decided,” it ran, “to give the fleet sailing orders at the same time that we break off diplomatic relations. It is therefore necessary to change your plan of sending the flotilla to Hakko two days in advance.”
If at the last moment the Staff had found it necessary to confuse the lines of the Admiral’s plan, and, indeed, to alter its fundamental conception, it is scarcely a matter of surprise seeing how tense was the situation at the moment and how confusing the diplomatic and military deflections.
On February 1st Mr. Kurino had telegraphed from St. Petersburg that a reply was coming, indicating at the same time what its terms were likely to be; but he had added that Count Lamsdorf could not yet fix a day as it must be referred to Port Arthur for approval before going forward. Was not that then the moment to begin? Any such reply as Mr. Kurino anticipated could not be accepted. It was probably only meant to secure further delay, and if they could begin before it was delivered the long silence of St. Petersburg would throw the onus on Russia and give Japan their fair justification before the world.
There was now no longer any reason for waiting. The army was straining for the spring and the navy was ready. The two Argentine cruisers were known to have reached Singapore on February 2nd and were under orders to leave without fail on the 4th. The whole of Admiral Virenius’s Squadron, except the Oslyabya, which did not leave Suez till the 4th, had reached Jibuti on the 3rd. Fresh movements of troops to the Yalu were being reported, and the volunteer cruisers from the Black Sea with reinforcements and war material were well on their way. During the last week or two the anxiety lest the Russians should anticipate the movement which the Japanese themselves had in readiness had been very great, and on February 3rd a Cabinet Council was held with a view to bringing the tension to an end.
In the midst of their deliberations they were startled by a telegram from the Naval Intelligence Officer at Chifu to say that at 10.0 that morning six battleships and as many cruisers with the minelayers had gone to sea from Port Arthur for an unknown destination. The obvious and alarming deduction was that they had waited too long and the Russians were seizing the initiative. They were credited apparently with a counterpart of the Japanese plan, the seizure of Seoul oversea under cover of a blow at the fleet base. Immediate orders were sent to Sasebo for its flotilla to go out and keep guard, all ships to stand by wireless during the night, mines to be laid at Sasebo and Takeshiki, and an officer of the Naval Staff followed with full orders for the Admiral.
It was not until dawn next day, the 4th, that he was informed that all the ships in Port Arthur, except one battleship under repair, were at sea somewhere. He promptly raised steam and waited for orders to arrive.
In the height of the tension the Grand Council of the Empire met and unanimously decided to break off relations. But it could not be done at once. It must synchronise with the sailing of the fleet, and the War Office must have its 24 hours’ notice to get their advance-guard afloat. At 9 p.m. the General was told to open his sealed orders and the same evening the Admiral was informed that the Russian Fleet was still unlocated, and that if it appeared off Sasebo he was to consider it an act of war and to attack immediately. Otherwise he was not to move till he got the word. He was also informed that the expeditionary troops were under orders to embark with the utmost despatch.
By six o’clock the following morning the advance-guard which was to seize the pied ô terre was entraining. It consisted of four battalions of the XIIth division; that division being chosen as being nearest to Sasebo. To ensure surprise no mobilization had been permitted, and being still on their peace footing they numbered only 2,500 men. In 12 hours the whole were assembled at Hayagi close to Sasebo, where two transports, giving together some 5,500 tons, were in readiness to receive them as well as a third one of 1,200 tons carrying material for a wharf, boats, steamboats and other gear required for a rapid landing.9
Meanwhile, sealed orders had reached the Admiral. Until the Port Arthur Fleet was located it was presumably impossible to give him the final word. In the course of the day it was known from Chifu that it had returned to port the previous evening, but there was a report that three battleships had sailed again on the afternoon of the 5th. It was also known that the ships at Chemulpho and Vladivostok had not moved.
At 5 p.m. as the troops were arriving orders came down to break the seals, and so we are told “Admiral Togo got his instructions to commence warlike operations.”
The text of the instructions is not available but we know their purport from the operation orders which he proceeded to draft. He was held to the Staff idea of covering the landing by an attack in force on Port Arthur as well as upon the two ships at Chemulpho, and he had to reconcile this plan with his own views of defensive cover. His method was, in fact, a compromise. The fleet was to act in two main squadrons, the first consisting of both armoured divisions and Rear-Admiral Dewa’s (second-class) cruiser division, with the five destroyer divisions which were to be under his own command for the attack on Port Arthur and Dalny. This force constituted the true covering squadron. The other was placed under Rear-Admiral Uriu and consisted of his own cruiser division reinforced by one armoured cruiser from the Second Division, and two torpedo-boat divisions. This group formed the “Squadron in charge of Transports” to escort them and support their landing. The Third or Straits Squadron, not forming part of the Combined Squadron, was not under Admiral Togo’s flag. It was at this time an independent command under Vice-Admiral Kataoka in direct communication with Tokyo. Strategically, it formed a second covering squadron against the Vladivostok detachment, an arrangement it will be observed closely analogous of our own normal disposition of the Western and Downs Squadrons during the Napoleonic and earlier wars. To this squadron was naturally committed the important operation of seizing Sylvia Basin and Masanpho. It was the essential step to securing the position it was to occupy and to establishing what the Japanese called the Straits “barrier.” Thus, although its function was purely defensive, it had the honour of the first and fundamental offensive operation—the duty of seizing the focal point about which everything turned.
As for Admiral Togo’s operation orders, they preserved his defensive idea so far as the Staff instructions permitted, that is to say, the main or armoured group was not to move direct on its objective, but to take a course which would give close cover to the military operations up to the last possible moment. The movement was based on six rendezvous:—
No. 1.—West of the island which joins the south of Chin-do.10
No. 2.—West of Baker Island outside Chemulpho.11
No. 3.—Asan Bay.
No. 4.—East of Suni-do (that is Rooper Harbour, where he had intended to have his advanced torpedo base).
No. 5.—About 10 miles south of Soi-chong-do, the southernmost island of the Sir James Hall group.
No. 6.—About 10 miles S.E. of Round Island (30 miles E.S.E. of Talien-hwan).
The second day the Admiral’s rendezvous would be No. 1, the third No. 5, off the Sir James Hall Islands, and the next till further notice, Asan Bay. He thus arranged to cover the movement of the troops close to the line of passage and the objective till the third day, and to return to Asan, the position of his choice, immediately his blow at Port Arthur had been delivered.12
With this programme in his mind his first care was to send away the Akashi of Admiral Uriu’s Division, with orders to proceed at full speed to Hakko and begin passing him back any messages that should arrive over the new cable. Then having completed his draft and the accompanying time table, at one o’clock in the morning of the 6th, he called commanding officers on board the flagship, and spent the greater part of the night explaining what everyone was to do. Meanwhile, the troops had embarked and the transports weighed for an assigned position off Sasebo. At 9 a.m. the whole movement began. The first to start were the two flotillas of destroyers (five divisions) which were to make the attack at Port Arthur, together with two divisions of torpedo-boats and their parent ships and colliers. Under escort of Admiral Dewa’s cruiser division they were to proceed to sea for the first rendezvous, and there to wait and coal. Two hours later the armoured cruisers went off with Soi-chong-do for the rendezvous, and an hour after the Admiral followed with the battle division for the same destination. Lastly, at 2 p.m., Rear-Admiral Uriu’s division weighed, and picking up the transports outside made for Baker Island.
It was not till the Admiral was clear away that the final step was taken. At two o’clock in the afternoon Baron Rozen was informed that relations were broken off. At 4 p.m. Mr. Kurino made the same intimation at St. Petersburg, and the war had begun.13
1 Hak-ko-ho (“Eight-mouthed harbour”) is a practically land-locked roadstead formed by the southern islands of the Naju group (lat. 30° 42' N., long. 126° 2' E.), and is admirably adapted for mine and boom defence. While the enclosed water is some 20 square miles in extent, the width of the entrances scarcely anywhere exceeds half-a-mile.
2 Japanese Confidential History, p. 10 et seq.
3 The VIIth Army Division was established in Yezo.
4 Itsukushima (Flag), Matsushima, and Hashidate. They were all about 4,000 tons and about 14 years old. The first two were built at Toulon and the last at Sasebo. Their main armament was one 12 · 5 and a dozen 4 · 7. Their nominal speed was 16 knots.
5 Their armament was two 4.7 and six 6 pounders.
6 The following table shows the composition of the Japanese active fleet (exclusive of Base guards) on the 5th February 1904:—
Note.—The torpedo parent ship Kumano Maru and the armed merchant cruiser America Maru, being in dockyard hands, did not join.
7 See Appendix B, p. 473.
8 Japanese Confidential History, Vol. I., p. 38.
9 The first two vessels had been hired on January 8th and sent to Kure to be prepared under the direction of the Navy. They were hired by the War Office and then placed under the Admiral’s command. Each was provided with 10 horse boxes, and, as originally arranged, each carried five large sampans (capacity 40 men or six horses) and their boatmen and 50 ft. baulks of timber for pier building. They were to leave Kuré for Sasebo on the 13th, but on the previous day the third transport was hired, to which it would seem the sampans and beach gear were transferred.
10 Chin-do is the large coastal island just south of Hakko. The small island marking the Rendezvous is connected with it at low tide. Lat. 34° 22’ 30”, long. 126° 07’.
11 There are two Baker Islands—one (Taikongon-to) is at the entrance to the narrows that lead up to Chemulpho; the other is some 30 miles about S.S.W. of it in Long. 126°. The expression “outside Chemulpho” used in the original order indicates the former, though other indications leave no doubt that the latter is meant. See Japanese Published History, Vol. I., p. 30.
12 It is usually said that Admiral Togo at this time received orders “to destroy the Russian Fleet,” as though his function was primarily offensive. It is possible such words did occur in the Imperial message, but it is clear that the Admiral did not take them in a strategical sense, but only as an authority to commence hostilities on the lines he had worked out with the Staff. The authoritative passage in the Confidential History (Chapter I., Section iv.), is as follows:—“At Sasebo at 5 p.m. on February 5th, 1904, Admiral Togo received his orders to leave port and destroy the Russian Fleet. On the 6th at 1 a.m. he assembled [his senior officers] and read them the Imperial message, showing them the orders to proceed.” The phrase occurs again, Ibid., Chapter VII., Section i., Subsection 3, “when Admiral Togo received the Imperial orders to destroy the Russian Fleet, &c.” The Imperial orders were always rhetorical in style, and it is necessary to distinguish between them and Staff orders in determining what were the actual strategical ideas.
13 That is 4 p.m. St. Petersburg time, which was 11 p.m. at Tokyo.