[Map A.]
SO marked was the détente between Tokyo and St. Petersburg which followed the Russo-Chinese treaty of April 1902, that it was not without promise of permanence. It was not only that the provision for the evacuation of Manchuria had removed the cause of friction; in Russia itself it set up a political situation which made powerfully for peace.
Hitherto the Ministers who presided over the three departments most nearly concerned, though generally in favour of a peaceful development, had not been in full enough agreement to enable them to act as a solid group in the Imperial Council and their influence consequently had not had the weight it deserved.
The first of them was Count Lamsdorf, the Foreign Minister, who in view of the uncertain relations in Europe was anxious for what in Russia was known as “a return to the West.” The second was M. Vitte, the Finance Minister who embodied the idea of a policy devoted to economic development as the true solution of revolutionary unrest and the only means of giving Russia the international prestige she had a right to expect. The third was General Kuropatkin, the Minister of War. He had consistently regarded a policy of high-handed expansion in the Far East, as beyond the resources of the country and as a serious danger to her whole military position. But as yet he had been unable to see eye to eye with M. Vitte. Anxious as he was to preserve the peace in the Far East he could not see his way to withdrawing the army from Manchuria altogether. The continued occupation of Mukden and the southern provinces he felt could only lead to permanent trouble with both China and Japan, but at the same time after his experience of the “Boxer” devastation he could not conceal from himself that as a military question it was impossible to protect the railway without at least retaining a few troops at Kharbin. This source of friction, however, the treaty removed and the three Ministers were at one. Together they now formed what was virtually a peace party and were powerful enough to control Far Eastern affairs in accordance with their ideas.
Their influence was soon apparent. The détente between the two countries began to look so hopeful that Japan was moved to propose a formal understanding about Korea. Her suggestion was that they should mutually guarantee the integrity of both China and Korea and undertake not to use any part of Korean territory for a military or strategical purpose; that Japan should be recognised as having exclusive interests in Korea, and that in return she should recognise the Russian possession of Kwangtung and admit her full liberty of action for the protection of the railway, as well as of her general interests in Manchuria. The note was taken in a serious and friendly spirit and negotiations began. During their continuance the first period of the evacuation treaty came to an end and before it expired Russia had withdrawn her troops from Newchwang and the whole of the specified area, and had handed back the Chinese railways west of the Liau river.
In further indication of the apparent solidity of the new policy very little was done to improve Port Arthur as a naval base. In spite of the fact that the recent Staff studies had revealed that its defects in that respect were the weak point of the whole situation, nearly all available financial resources were devoted, under the influence of the Finance Minister, to the creation at Dalny of a first-class commercial port. Nothing could emphasise more strongly that the influences which were then controlling Russian action were bent on a quiet economical development, and had abandoned at least for the time all idea of adventurous military expansion. So while millions were invested at Dalny in the hope of securing a solid return from the great international highway, Port Arthur was comparatively starved and remained in little better condition than that in which it had been when taken over from the Chinese.
It then had a single small dock which could take nothing larger than a second-class cruiser, and a single basin between the town and the Golden Hill, known as the Eastern Basin, with accommodation for no more than ten moderate sized vessels. The only access was by an awkward gullet about half a mile long, which, having only a depth of four fathoms at low water, was not practicable for large ships at all states of the tide. Outside was an anchorage which, besides being exposed to torpedo attack, was not safe in heavy southerly or easterly weather. An extensive project existed for increasing the dock accommodation and enclosing the outer roadstead. It was also intended to excavate a large basin on the western side behind the Tiger’s Tail promontory which formed the western side of the gullet, and to give it a second entrance by cutting a new outlet direct to the sea, through the neck of the Tiger Peninsula. But little work had been done beyond lengthening the Chinese dock and some dredging for the new basin.
Even less can be said for the defences. On this point there had been endless difficulties, mainly of a political and financial character. The original idea had been that Port Arthur was to be the commercial terminus of the railway. In order to avoid friction and carry out the policy of economical development it was intended to follow the British example and make it a new Hongkong open to all nations. But as soon as Admiral Dubasov saw its lack of accommodation as a naval port he protested strongly against trying to thrust the whole commerce of the railway into it as well. In deference to this view it was decided to make a separate commercial port at Dalny. But here the soldiers protested. To equip a first-class port and railway terminus at the doors of the fortress was simply to provide a siege base for the Japanese. Their protests, well founded as they were, could in the circumstances produce nothing but indefinite plans of eventually fortifying Dalny. The Foreign Office was specially anxious to emphasise the Hongkong idea and was as eager to see the commercial port established as it was averse to alarming the Powers with a first-class naval fortress. The Treasury for financial and economical reasons took the same view, and consequently in 1899 Dalny began to be developed vigorously and on an extensive scale at the expense of Port Arthur.
The scheme of defence for the naval port was planned on very moderate lines, and even then it was difficult to settle the details. For in the absence of any clear determination of what the future Far Eastern policy was to be, and what proportion of the Imperial forces would be devoted to its support, the War Office could not finally fix the strength of the garrison, and it was to the strength of the garrison the engineers must work their plans. Scarcity of labour, due to the “Boxer” disturbances and the outbreak of cholera that followed, further delayed the work even when it began. The result was that of the twenty-two batteries designed for the sea front only two were finished, while the land works, even more backward, were in no condition to secure the place against a coup de main, and still less to promise any lengthy resistance to an attack in form.
In view of this backwardness in repairing the radical defect in her naval position, Russia’s punctual fulfilment of her engagement at the end of the first period could not but have a good effect, in spite of the fact that the Japanese overtures were making little progress at St. Petersburg. It is true also that the evacuation of the first area synchronised with the departure from Russia of two battleships and four first-class cruisers, with some smaller ones, and a division of destroyers to reinforce the Pacific Squadron. Their advent would give it six battleships, besides the two armoured cruisers. But they could not arrive before the end of the second period, which would expire on April 6th, 1903, and that would be the critical time.
As the date approached there were signs that all was not going well. At St. Petersburg the Japanese proposals for a formal entente were definitely pronounced unacceptable. Still, at the same time, Baron Rozen, who has just been appointed Russian Minister to Japan, was charged with “profiting by the friendly dispositions at Tokyo to resume the pourparlers on the subject of Korea, and to use all his efforts to remove existing misunderstandings.” There is no reason to doubt that these instructions were given in all sincerity, but there were influences at work which began to clog the progress of the triumvirate of peace. The influence of Japan at Peking had grown so powerful that the Japanese Press began to talk loudly of a full alliance between the two Powers, and their cry was met not only in the Russian Press but elsewhere in Europe by an alarm of “The Yellow Peril.” From the most exalted quarters the Tsar was encouraged to regard himself as the bulwark of Christendom. It was an evil moment. The head of the Russian State has always shown himself prone to embrace the semi-religious inspirations of mediæval statecraft, and has consequently moved in an atmosphere not the best calculated for the sober solution of a difficult diplomatic situation. That atmosphere becomes doubly dangerous when, as now happened, it was given an ultra-modern reaction by emanations from the Bourse. There was, in fact, an intrusion into the already complex problem of one of those commercial objects already noticed which does not form part of the national policy, but to which the Government itself becomes bound. In this case, indeed, its most sordid aspects were cleverly made indistinguishable from the loftiest national ideals.
Under the obsession of the “Yellow Peril” there were in the entourage of the Court men to whom a continuance of the existing situation seemed full of danger. It would not only mean a solidarity between the Yellow races, but that Japan would rapidly absorb Korea. Once firmly established on the Yalu she would flank the South Manchurian railway, and be in a position to strike a fatal blow at the whole civilising mission of Russia in the Far East. The tenure of the Russian commercial terminus and naval base would be entirely precarious. They would be at the mercy of the Yellow coalition. It could strike when it chose, and, exposed as was Russia’s long line of communication, she would not have the power to strike back.
Amongst the prominent men who shared or saw their opportunity in these views was a certain Monsieur Bezobrazov, who had once held the grade of Councillor of State in the Imperial Civil Service. He appears to have been a man of great personal attraction, of frank and ready speech, and a full measure of those persuasive powers which go to make a successful promoter. To these qualities he added a marked genius for blending politics with finance. His political standpoint was one of pronounced opposition to the views of the three ministers concerned. In his estimation the new situation should be met by opposing to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a Convention with France and Germany. With the balance thus restored sufficient troops should be kept in the Far East to hold the first attacks of the enemy till reinforcements could arrive from Russia, and to this end steps should at once be taken to control the essential strategical points. One of these he considered was the line of the Yalu and Tumen rivers, which constitute the frontier between Manchuria and Korea. This line, once under the control of Russia, would effectually neutralise Korea as a base of attack on the railway. It would further get over the admitted impossibility of occupying the whole of so vast and difficult a territory as Manchuria. For, with the Yalu line in her hands, Russia would be able to ring it about and render it impervious to the vexatious penetration of her adversaries, and even to dispute with counter activities the Japanese absorption of Korea.
How far these views were the mainspring of his action it is unnecessary to inquire. All we need note is that he and his friends had a commercial interest in seeing them prevail. About three years before there had come upon the market a valuable concession for cutting timber on the Korean side of the Yalu. It had been granted in 1896, when the Korean Court was established at the Russian Legation, to a M. Briner, a Vladivostok merchant. The concession was of considerable importance, for it covered the Korean side of the Yalu and Tumen for 500 miles, extending over the whole frontier from sea to sea. Failing to secure the capital necessary to develop so extensive an undertaking Briner decided to sell his concession. In fear, it is said, that it might be acquired by England or Japan, Bezobrazov and a syndicate of his friends, decided to buy it, and then on the representation of its strategical value endeavoured to exploit it as the basis of a great East Asiatic company, something on the lines of our own East India Company.
With this parade of high politics at his back, his talents as a promoter succeeded in enlisting the support of the Grand Dukes and the Court. He was even introduced to the Tsar and rapidly acquired an influence over his judgment that made him one of the most powerful persons in the Empire. A mission was sent out at the public expense to study the concession, and it came back with a glowing report of its enormous latent wealth. The imagination of the whole Court was fired. Capital came forward in plenty from the highest quarters, and from this time onward Bezobrazov began to dominate the Far Eastern policy. To assume, however, that his power was due solely to commercial considerations would be to mistake the situation. It was rather due to his having made these considerations inseparable from the highest national aspirations. He had consequently secured the support of men of the loftiest character whose motives were beyond suspicion. Such men, for instance, as the Imperial Equerry Balashov, who afterwards won the highest reputation as head of the Red Cross Society in Port Arthur and who is described as “an idealist patriot of the old school.”1
In spite of such irresistible backing Bezobrazov’s operations were long delayed. The “Boxer” outbreak closed the whole region for more than a year, nor could anything be settled before the evacuation treaty was signed and bade fair to stop the whole design. Time being urgent Bezobrazov now dropped his ambitious scheme of an East Asiatic Company and concentrated on the Yalu concession. He himself hurried out to the scene of action, and so active was he that by the middle of November, 1902, he had wrung from the local Chinese Governor a concession on the Manchurian side similar to that he already had on the Korean side and the work of development had commenced.
It was obvious, however, that if the evacuation proceeded on the terms of the treaty, the patriotic aspect of the scheme, which had earned him his success, would lose its force. As the period approached there was no sign in St. Petersburg of a reversal of the policy. Bezobrazov was still in the Far East, and on February 28th, 1903, Admiral Alexeiev sounded a note of alarm. In an urgent telegram he begged, in view of the approaching evacuation of Mukden, that the garrison of Port Arthur should be strengthened as the place would now be more than ever insecure as a naval base. He also urged a further reinforcement of the Squadron and the retention at certain strategical points in the area to be evacuated of some detachments of mounted troops to keep watch on the roads leading from Korea into Manchuria, and to prevent the importation of arms. He was particularly anxious to have posts at Liau-yang and Feng-whang-cheng, the key of the direct road which led to it from the Yalu. This request was granted till such time as the land defences of Port Arthur could be completed, and on March 4th our Consul reported that three mounted detachments had secretly left Liau-yang in the direction of Feng-whang-cheng.
Such was the only modification in the execution of the treaty which Bezobrazov could obtain. Orders were issued for the evacuation to go forward, and on April 8th, the day fixed under the treaty, he was hurrying back to St. Petersburg to the fountain head. The day after his arrival a special Council of the three Ministers was held by the Tsar to consider his proposals. He failed to shake their authority. They were as determined that his dangerous activities must be stopped as they were that the treaty must be carried out loyally. The Tsar was convinced, and he informed Bezobrazov that since a policy of restoring tranquility was essential to Russia his company must preserve its purely commercial character; foreigners must be admitted to it, and all officers excluded. To clinch the matter, General Kuropatkin was directed to proceed in person to the Far East and to Tokyo in order to get a direct grasp of the whole situation.
For Bezobrazov it meant not only repulse but a severe counter-attack. Yet undismayed, he only redoubled his activity. He at least believed he had secured Admiral Alexeiev, and with the “patriotic” party at his back he could still hope for ultimate success in spite of the War Minister’s mission. The first report of the General was no light matter to meet. At Tokyo, with Baron Rozen at his elbow, he had been quick to grasp how great was the change that had come over Japan and how impossible it was to ignore her as a formidable adversary. He saw before him a situation which could only develop into one of grave danger unless Bezobrazov’s activities could be stopped. He reported that at Tokyo a very serious view was taken of what was going on on the Yalu. In spite of the Tsar’s orders the military aspect of the company had been in no way modified. Colonel Madritov of the General Staff was even associated with Balashov as manager, and the General submitted that if the danger of a conflict was to be avoided the operations of the Company must not continue as they were.
His views were endorsed by the resolution of a special conference held at Port Arthur when he arrived there from Tokyo. Besides Admiral Alexeiev, there were present M. Lessar, the Russian Minister at Peking, and M. Pavlov from Seoul, while Bezobrazov came by special train from St. Petersburg. All except Bezobrazov were unanimous that any attempt to retain control of Manchuria was impossible, and to occupy even the northern part of Korea inadvisable. Bezobrazov’s managers, Madritov and Balashov, were called before them and informed that the military character of their operations must cease, and as Madritov declined to resign his functions, he was forced by General Kuropatkin to resign his commission.
In all this Admiral Alexeiev’s attitude is difficult to explain. General Kuropatkin got back to St. Petersburg in the first week of August and from the report he presented to the Tsar it is clear he believed the Governor was supporting him. It was Bezobrazov, he said, who had forced the retention of the posts at Feng-whang-cheng and on the Yalu, and Balashov was giving trouble. General Kuropatkin was sure that the Governor shared with the Russian Ministers at Peking, Tokyo, and Seoul his own view, that while a few officers and reservists on the Yalu could be of no use in war they were only too likely to provoke one.
So weighty a consensus of opinion as the Report represented might be expected to settle the matter finally. All the best local knowledge was behind it; its reasoning was unimpeachable; but it might never have been written. During General Kuropatkin’s absence on his mission the power of the peace party had been broken. The word was now with M. von Pleve, M. Vitte’s rival, Admiral Abaza, Bezobrazov’s right hand at Court, and Admiral Alexeiev himself. It was a most critical moment, for as though to enforce the War Minister’s arguments, the Japanese had taken the first step which led to strained relations.
In view of what was going on on the Yalu, and the constant reports that the Russian Asiatic Army was beginning to take ground to the eastward, the failure of Russia to complete the second stage of her evacuation could no longer be ignored. It was impossible for Japan to remain even apparently unconcerned.
At Peking the Russian Minister had actually set on foot negotiations for a revision of the evacuation treaty in accordance with Bezobrazov’s views. It was a direct threat to the status quo which the Anglo-Japanese treaty existed to preserve, and Japan at once approached her ally. She pointed out that apart from the integrity of China the new departure threatened the integrity of Korea, which she was bound to maintain at all hazards. Accordingly she invited the British Government to an exchange of views as provided by the treaty, and explained that unless there was an objection on our part she proposed once more to attempt direct negotiations with Russia with a view to a definite entente. Forbearance she urged had been right hitherto, but now a change was necessary. She had no illusions as to the possible consequences of the overtures failing, but Korea was “a matter of life and death to her,” and she would soon be as fully prepared for war as she could hope to be. The terms she proposed to submit as a basis were concurred in by our Foreign Office, and she proceeded to act at once.
Accordingly, at the end of July, just as General Kuropatkin got back, Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, was instructed to point out that the situation in the Far East was growing more involved every day, and if nothing were done to clear it up it promised to become extremely difficult, and he was to suggest pourparlers with a view to an arrangement.
As a starting point, Mr. Kurino was to submit the following proposals as they had been already communicated to the British Foreign Office:—1. A mutual undertaking to respect the independence and integrity of China and Korea, and to accept the principle of the “open door” in both countries. 2. Mutual recognition of the preponderance of Japan’s interests in Korea and of Russia’s special interests in Manchuria, with the right to take measures to protect them. 3. Neither power to obstruct the industrial developments of the other in their respective spheres of influence. Japan to be permitted to unite the Korean railway which she had already commenced at Fusan with the Russian “Eastern Chinese” system. 4. Neither party to send more troops into the respective areas. 5. Japan to have the sole right of advising and assisting Korea in carrying out internal reforms.
After a short consideration Count Lamsdorf conveyed to Mr. Kurino a friendly intimation that Russia was prepared to treat. Baron Rozen, who had no illusions about the opponent they had to deal with, had just warned him that the Japanese were in a position to land by surprise in Northern Korea, and thus to seize an advanced base of vital importance2; and he knew well enough that as things then stood nothing but a clear understanding could stop them. In pursuance therefore of the consent he had procured, Mr. Kurino on August 12th presented a Note in the above sense. So far it looked as though Count Lamsdorf had succeeded in keeping the old policy alive. But the adverse influences were at work, and revealed themselves with startling suddenness the very day the Note was presented. On the same August 12th it was announced behind the backs of the three Ministers concerned that the whole Far East had been constituted into one province, and that Admiral Alexeiev had been appointed its Governor-General with the rank of Viceroy.
The meaning was plain, not only to the Ministers concerned, but to all the world. The influence of the peace party was obviously at an end, and the policy of expansion had triumphed. General Kuropatkin immediately asked to be relieved of his duties, and was granted a long leave of absence. The Governor of the Amur district resigned, and refused to meet the new Viceroy to hand over his charge. Within a fortnight the Treasury had succumbed. Following Admiral Alexeiev’s appointment a Far Eastern Committee was formed with Admiral Abaza as President, and with its support Bezobrazov was able to involve the Department of Finance in his scheme. At the end of the month M. Vitte had gone, and M. Pleve, Minister of the Interior, was in his place. Only Count Lamsdorf remained. But even he was soon deprived of all power of effectual restraint.
In protesting his ignorance of the whole affair to our Ambassador he had pointed out that the obvious intention of the new departure was to treat the Far Eastern Province on the model of our administration of India. But he was scarcely prepared to see the imitation pushed so far as it was. After studying the Japanese Note for a fortnight the Russian Government astonished the Minister by requesting that the negotiations should be transferred to Tokyo. This meant that they would be conducted by the new Viceroy from Port Arthur, and it came near to placing Japan in the same diplomatic position relatively to the Far Eastern Province as Afghanistan is to India. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government, who as yet scarcely realised the sinister influences under which Russia had fallen and still believed a settlement was possible, consented after a short protest. Thus Count Lamsdorf, the last remaining influence for peace, was out-manœuvred, and as the period of strained relations was entered the counsels of the Tsar were given over to a force that was equally compounded of idealistic imperialism and the Bourse, a mixture than which diplomacy knows nothing more inflammable.
So long as this influence dominated the situation it was certain to drift towards war and Russia was not ready for war. Her pre-occupation then was to temporise till her position in the Far East could be mended. The Viceroy was quite alive to its precarious condition. When General Kuropatkin was at Port Arthur he had submitted to him a Staff study in which was represented frankly how entirely the fortress—the key of the whole position—was at the mercy of Japan. Again, the pessimistic appreciation was built upon the sea factor. The recent reinforcement of the Pacific Squadron had done nothing to change the naval balance, for the Japanese post bellum programme was now consummated. All the ships had been delivered and the last of them was being completed. The Russians had at their disposal six battleships of heterogeneous type and three armoured cruisers, only one of which was not obsolescent. The Japanese armoured squadrons consisted of six new and fairly homogeneous first-class battleships, British built, and one Chinese prize of the second class, besides six good armoured cruisers. Unit for unit they quite outmatched the Russians, while in minor armoured craft and cruisers and particularly in the torpedo flotilla Japan was immensely superior.
Nor was it only in material that the Russian inferiority was felt. Since Admiral Stark had been in command the squadron by general testimony had been going steadily down hill. The new Admiral lived ashore and seems to have set a bad example in keenness. There was, moreover, a continual shifting of officers that broke the esprit de corps which Admiral Dubasov had fostered and the demoralisation was serious and patent.
To intensify the trouble, Port Arthur was still without adequate land defence or basin and dock accommodation, and the air was growing stormier every day. At the moment the whole armoured fleet was away at Vladivostok. After it had been reinforced in April, some manœuvres had been held in the Yellow Sea and the precautionary action which the Japanese took in consequence demonstrated that they were ready for any emergency. After the first evacuation had been loyally carried out the main Japanese fleet, known as the “Standing Squadron,” had been under orders for a cruise to Southern China. These orders were now suddenly cancelled, and it proceeded to the south of Korea instead, while the Russian Manœuvres were going on. When they were over Admiral Stark had to take his squadron up to the northern port for docking. The Japanese withdrew and passing by the east side of Japan and the Tsugaru Strait anchored at Otaru in the Northern Island two days after Admiral Stark entered Vladivostok. There they proceeded to carry out manœuvres in the northern waters till on August 11th the squadron was recalled to Sasebo. The Japanese had in fact decided to place their whole fleet on a war footing, and while the Russian ships were being overhauled in succession at Vladivostok it was assembling in full force at the southern base.
The effect of this new demonstration of the weakness of of the Russian naval position compared with that of the Japanese, was to produce an important conviction in the minds of the Viceroy’s Staff. The impression was confirmed that the security of Port Arthur could not be staked on a fleet action nor could its safety in any way be guaranteed by the operation of the fleet alone. It was taken for certain that even if the Russians succeeded in getting a material superiority their predominance would be neutralised by the interference of the British fleet. It had only to engage in confusing demonstrations, as it most probably would, and the attention of the Russian squadron would be so much distracted that there would be no certainty of stopping a direct attack. The Japanese would be able to take advantage of the British diversionary action to evade the naval defence and strike at Kwangtung in overwhelming force. To complete the depressing outlook, not only had nothing been done to give Port Arthur the power to resist such an assault, but the work at Dalny had made so much progress that already it provided an ideal base for the enemy. If then the position was to be saved, the Viceroy urged that a determined effort must be made to complete the fortress and develop the squadron. Till that was done the garrison must be substantially increased, and above all the Northern Army must he given a scheme of deployment which would prevent the enemy having a free hand against Port Arthur. Provision must be made for a concentration as far south as Liau-yang, and the only means of realising such a concentration was to stop the evacuation of the Mukden Province, so far as to retain a hold on its essential strategical points.
To this idea both the Amur Staff and the General Staff at St. Petersburg were opposed. They considered that the only sound plan was to concentrate about Kirin or even further to the north. The rapidity with which the Japanese could act across a commanded sea would enable them to land where they liked, and in view of the possible blockade of Port Arthur they might even reach the head of the Gulf of Liautung. A concentration at Liau-yang would, therefore, expose the Russian communications in the most dangerous way and the army to a disastrous envelopment. From a purely military point of view General Kuropatkin was of the same opinion. The Viceroy, however, urged that, as a matter of policy, a concentration to the north would be even more certainly fatal. It would enable the Japanese to use their superiority at sea to capture the principal object of all the dispositions by a coup de main. Unless some kind of concentration could be effected at Liau-yang so as to ensure that the attack on Port Arthur should not be undisturbed, the place must fall by the direct oversea operations that were possible and the Japanese would have won the game at a stroke.
It was these considerations, the force of which General Kuropatkin could not deny, if the existing policy were to be persisted in, which apparently induced him to assent to the retention of the strategical positions in Manchuria as, in spite of the political objections, the lesser evil. At the same time provision was made to increase the Port Arthur garrison and orders were issued to bring forward two more battleships, and two more armoured cruisers with several other cruisers and torpedo divisions to strengthen the Pacific Squadron.
Meanwhile, it was essential to prolong the negotiations as much as possible. In Japan it was always believed that this was the purpose for which their transfer to Tokyo was insisted on. This suspicion was not without reason. In spite of the repeated representations of their Minister at St. Petersburg the matter made no progress. Finally at the end of September the Viceroy was informed peremptorily by the Russian Foreign Office that an answer must not be delayed further. Thereupon Baron Rozen was summoned to Port Arthur to attend a conference at which the terms of a reply were to be settled. Thus it was not before October 3rd, nearly two months after the Japanese proposals had been handed in, that he returned to Tokyo with the Russian answer.
It took the form of counter proposals in which the articles relating to the Russian position in Manchuria and that concerning the extension of the Korean railway were entirely dropped. Nor was the Japanese position in Korea recognised, except subject to everything north of the Chinampo-Gensan line being declared a neutral zone. There was a further proviso that no part of the country should be used for strategic purposes nor any military works erected capable of menacing the free navigation of the Straits. The terms were, of course, wholly unacceptable. Their effect would be to restrict the action of Japan in Korea while Russia would enjoy a free hand to establish herself in Manchuria and on the Yalu till she was ready to proceed further.
Public opinion in Japan, even in the more moderate quarters, had been already growing inflamed at Russia’s apparently contemptuous silence, and the effect of the counter-proposals was very bad. The general impatience was aggravated by the fact that the Pacific Squadron had just returned from Vladivostok, and after passing the Straits had been carrying out further manœuvres in the Yellow Sea. Moreover, the last reinforcement which Rear-Admiral Virenius had been ordered to take out was becoming a serious menace. It consisted of the battleships Tzesarevich and Oslyabya, the two armoured cruisers Bayan and Dmitri Donskoi, the Avrora, a first-class protected cruiser, seven destroyers and four torpedo-boats. The two battleships and the Bayan had already reached the Mediterranean, and the rest were on their way from the Baltic. To complete the tension, on October 8th, a week after the Russian counter-proposals were delivered, the third period for evacuation under the treaty expired and there was no indication of any further movement of the Russian troops in Manchuria.
In this highly charged atmosphere it was scarcely possible that war could be avoided and already the Russian Great General Staff had called on the Viceroy for a fresh appreciation in view of his new authority and the recent developments of the situation.3 As before its starting point was the relative power of the fleets. On that still depended the determination of the concentration zone for the army. Time remained the all important factor. The initial question was would the Japanese at the outset be able to obtain such a control of the sea as would enable them to land where they pleased, or would they be compelled to land in the south of Korea? On the first hypothesis the Viceregal Military Staff addressed to the Naval Staff two questions. 1. Have we to consider the possibility of the Japanese landing at Newchwang, at least during the first month? 2. If they land in the Gulf of Korea how long could the fleet, assuming it could obtain no decisive success, delay the landing? It would seem by this that the fear of the British squadron confusing the situation had passed, for the Naval Staff stated with confidence that so long as their fleet was not destroyed a landing in force either at Newchwang or in the Bay of Korea was impossible—an opinion which seems to be based on an exaggerated or erroneous conception of the “Fleet in being.” Rear-Admiral Vitgeft, the Chief of the Staff, added that in his personal opinion, taking the relative naval strength as it stood, the Russian fleet could not be beaten by the Japanese in the Bay of Korea, or indeed anywhere in the Yellow Sea. In other words, he was sure the Japanese could not secure the local control. Neither the Chief of the Military Staff nor the Military Attaché at Tokyo shared his confidence. Nevertheless, the appreciation had to proceed on the assumption that the naval view was correct. It meant that the Japanese would have to land in the east or south of Korea and certainly at no point north of the Chinampho-Gensan line. So far at least the naval appreciation was justified, for, as we shall see, the Japanese did not consider that even Chinampho was possible till they had gained a preponderance by active operations.
This point determined, it became possible to anticipate with some certainty the probable course of the enemy’s operations. It was open to him (1) merely to occupy Korea solidly and to proceed no further; or (2) to use the occupied territory as a base against the Russian troops in South Manchuria and against Port Arthur; or (3) to make Vladivostok and the Maritime Province the principal objective. Operations against Sakhalin and the mouth of Amur had also to be considered, but it was agreed they would be merely diversionary and could not directly affect the issue of the war. In the opinion of the Military Staff, the Japanese, seeing that their effective land forces were double those which the Russians had available, would not rest content with Korea but would advance into Manchuria and the Liautung Peninsula to prevent a Russian concentration in the South. In all probability their first objective would be Port Arthur, and, as had been already settled, the only way to save it from a decisive blow was to concentrate the army between Liau-yang and Hai-cheng. If the fleet could really deny to the Japanese the quick route over the Yellow Sea and force them to use the long and difficult line through Korea and the mountainous region of Southern Manchuria there would be just time. Liau-yang had at any rate too many advantages as a concentration zone for the attempt not to be made on any reasonable chance. It would guard effectually the nearest point at which the Japanese could strike the railway if that were their objective, while if Port Arthur were the objective it would prevent them directing their whole army against the place. For even if in spite of the concentration flanking their line of operations they persisted in it, a large force would have to be detached to contain the Russian army. This plan then was approved. It was in effect the one which was in force when the war opened and which on the assumption that the Japanese could not from the first win command of the Yellow Sea, definitely fixed the concentration zone at Liau-yang, instead of Kirin.
In view of this clear appreciation of the importance of the naval factor, the neglect to reinforce the Pacific Squadron adequately and in time seems unaccountable, and the official explanation is interesting. In the first place, the Far Eastern programme was not completed, and as we have seen it was considered necessary to keep a strong force in the Baltic. In the second place, there was no Naval War Staff. The Admiralty therefore had no means of making an exhaustive study of the problem from a Staff point of view, nor of presenting its conclusions to the Imperial Council with the weight of argument and authority which such expert study alone can give. Nor was this all; so far as the theatre of war was concerned such authority as it possessed had been overridden by the appointment of a Viceroy in the Far East, who in the Pacific area had been made quite independent of the naval headquarters at St. Petersburg. The result was, so the Admiralty contended, that they were never informed as to the extent to which the general war plan depended on the sea, and consequently were unaware of the importance of reinforcing the Pacific Squadron.4 True, shortly before the war a conference of Flag Officers had been summoned at the Admiralty to consider a war plan, but apparently the military aspects of the question were not communicated to them, and they reported that in their opinion it was not necessary for success in naval warfare “to draw up a plan of operations beforehand.” Such a view was perhaps to be expected from a body of men unacquainted with what Staff work means. Preoccupied with the peculiar difficulty of forecasting the trend of events in naval warfare they assume that all preliminary study and appreciation is useless as a basis of action.
The Viceroy had therefore to accept the basis that he must work with a fleet approximately equal to that of the Japanese, and the distribution between Port Arthur and Vladivostok, as originally suggested to enable it to perform its functions, was not altered. Indeed the reasons for division were stronger than ever. The alternative, since the Russians had no central naval position, was to concentrate the whole force at one port or the other. Vladivostok was out of the question. As a fleet base it is true it had advantages which Port Arthur lacked. Its docking accommodation was better, it was roomier, and its double entrance made it more difficult to blockade. But the last consideration gave it no strategical value except as a cruiser and raiding base. The only reason for massing the fleet was to enable it to seek a decision with advantage. There could be no thought of permitting the enemy to attempt to blockade it. If it were massed at Vladivostok it must put to sea the moment war was begun and seek a decision at once. But even for a decision the northern port was a bad point of departure, for the obvious reason that it was situated eccentrically to the vital theatre of operations. The objects of the war determined that that theatre must be the Yellow Sea, and a fleet based outside it and at so great a distance was in a radically false position. Until a successful battle had been fought, the Yellow Sea would be left open for the passage of the Japanese Army to any point they chose. Their fleet could cover its passage by taking a position in the Straits and the Russians would have immediately to seek their decision there. For them no point could be worse. It was their enemy’s zone of highest control. It was a region swarming with his torpedo craft close to his base, and in confined waters with which he was familiar. For a fleet like that of the Russians, which on the fundamental hypothesis of the plan was considered insufficiently strong to hazard a decision for the general command, the issue of such a battle could not be doubtful. Every possible card would be in the hands of the enemy and it was not to be thought of.
If then the fleet was to be massed at all, the base must be Port Arthur. Indeed, it was only in the Yellow Sea it could discharge its assigned function of confining the Japanese to the longer and more difficult line of operations. There at least it could operate to hold in dispute the really vital local command, and if it were forced to an action it would be able to fight in the Russian zone of highest control. If, again, further reinforcements should justify the Russians in taking a frank offensive and staking the issue on an immediate decision they could obtain it at once. They had but to make an attempt, or even a demonstration, to seize a base in the south of Korea and the Japanese must have fought them to a finish.
It is arguable that in any case this would have been their proper course. Even if defeat should result, the victors, it might plausibly be urged, would on their part suffer so severely that they could never again have recovered sufficiently to assert a definite command. But there were many reasons against such drastic action. Apart from the fact that Port Arthur provided no adequate means for refitting a wounded fleet, the Russian war plan had been designed on the assumption that England would never suffer Japan entirely to lose the command of the sea. In the second place, they had decided that they could succeed without getting the command. By merely keeping it in dispute they would gain time enough to bring their vastly superior military strength to bear; whereas, if an unsuccessful action gave Japan the command, she would be able to seize Port Arthur, overrun the whole of the objective territory and establish herself so strongly before the Russian force could assemble that ultimate victory would be far more difficult and far more costly. It was for these reasons that it was decided to adopt the defensive and not hazard a decision, at all events, till further reinforcements arrived.
To work this plan the base for at least the bulk of the Fleet must be at Port Arthur. By no other means could the Japanese be prevented from securing control of the Yellow Sea for the initial operation on which everything turned. But still even on the basis of defensive action should not the whole fleet have been massed there? Against such a course there were two reasons. Firstly, Port Arthur was still without the accommodation or the defences to render it fit to be the base of so large a fleet. For a quick decision this aspect would not have mattered so much, but for a prolonged harassing defensive a free, capacious and secure base, difficult to blockade, is essential. The defects of Port Arthur in this respect alone indicated division. But there was still a higher strategical reason.
In 1782 Kempenfelt laid it down that when it is decided to act on the defensive in any area the fleet in that area should be reduced to the lowest reasonable strength in order to permit the highest attainable development of a counter-offensive elsewhere. If a squadron, he said, “cannot be found of sufficient force to face the enemy’s at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere.” Now the Russian plan of military development demanded not only the defensive dispute of the Yellow Sea but also a counter-offensive in the Sea of Japan. By such a combination they could not only force the Japanese to land in the south of Korea but could also delay their advance still further by harassing their communications with their base of invasion. Nor was this all. If the Sea of Japan were left free to the enemy, he would be able to make such a demonstration against the Maritime Province as would hold the local troops there. They would then be unable to move off in time for their assigned place in the Manchurian deployment and the whole object of the naval distribution would be defeated. On the other hand, an active squadron, based at a port so excellent for the purpose and so difficult to blockade as Vladivostok, would render such a holding diversion impossible. Regarding the whole question then as a combined problem a division of the fleet and the reduction of the Port Arthur section to the lowest defensive point were indicated by strategical no less than physical reasons.
That this was the principle on which the much criticised distribution of the Russian Fleet was based, is no mere conjecture. It is to be deduced plainly from the plan of operations which the Viceroy’s Naval Staff drew up in December for the Vladivostok detachment. Rear-Admiral Shtakelberg, who was in command of it, was informed that his mission in the campaign depended on the activity of his operations on the western coasts of the two main Japanese Islands, Yezo and Nipon, and on the east coast of Korea, as well as upon the routes followed by the enemy’s troops and supplies. Assuming the Japanese decided to assist their main attack by diversion, he was instructed that the objective points would be “Gensan or some bay south of Posiette Bay,” and that the points of departure at least for large steamers must be the Tsugaru Straits, that is, the defile between the two islands where the direct course from the Gulf of Tokyo debouches into the Sea of Japan, and secondly, Wakasa Bay where the new naval port of Maizaru formed the natural base for operations in the northern part of the theatre of war. In view of these possibilities the immediate appearance of the squadron on the Japanese coasts “had an importance of the first order.” It would, therefore, proceed thither the moment hostilities began. “Starting its operations on the north-west coast of Yezo and the west end of the Tsugaru Straits it would proceed down the coast of Nipon destroying all pilotage marks (ouvrages côtiers) lights and signal stations, and taking or sinking all transports it met carrying troops or war material and destroying the coastwise traffic, whether steam or sailing, not even omitting fishing craft.” It was hoped that prompt and energetic operations of this nature, besides their direct effect in cramping the mobility of the Japanese army, would paralyse their important coasting trade and produce a panic in their merchant marine and along all the exposed coasts.5
The general functions then which were finally assigned to the Vladivostok detachment are clear. It was to check the speed of the main invasion by acting on its communications; it was to prevent demonstrations against the Maritime Province being pushed to a point which would disturb the Russian military deployment; and by panic deflection it was to divert as much of the Japanese fleet as possible away from the Yellow Sea. All these results the detatchment did in fact secure to a greater or less extent. By massing the whole Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur they would all have been lost. The Russians would have left their enemy a free hand in the Sea of Japan without being able to secure the command of the Yellow Sea. For Japan the situation would have been greatly simplified, while for the Russians the hope of a favourable fleet decision, the only object of concentration, would have been as remote as ever. Their war plan was based on their ability, not to command the Yellow Sea, but to hold the command in dispute till they could complete their military deployment. Besides its effect in the Sea of Japan the confusing division was better calculated to obtain this object than an inelastic and still inferior mass cramped at so inadequate a base as Port Arthur.
When the main lines of the plan had been approved by the Tsar, that is the division of the fleet and the military concentration at Liau-yang, Admiral Shtakelberg was still at Port Arthur after his cruise with Admiral Vitgeft. But he was sent away directly at high speed with the Rurik and Rossiya to join the Gromoboi which had remained at Vladivostok to be docked. There was every need of haste for the Viceroy was about to take a step which in a sense may be regarded as the first act of war.
The situation into which he plunged was one of peculiar delicacy. It was with great difficulty that the Japanese had brought themselves to consider the Russian Note at all. For a fortnight they had protested to Baron Rozen that negotiations could only proceed on the basis of a complete assurance about Manchuria. Moderate counsels had, however, prevailed and further discussion became possible.
In the midst of them came news that as a result of the strained situation on the Yalu the Japanese and Russian lumbermen had come to blows. Thereupon the Japanese on October 24th sent 150 troops up to Seoul to increase the Legation Guard, and two days later 50 more landed at Chemulpho. The Viceroy seems then to have persuaded himself the time had come to force the situation. He is described as one of those “strong” men who believe that any situation, however delicate, can be solved by “firmness.” He held that concession would only increase the Japanese “arrogance,” and if war was to be avoided they must be made to understand that under no pressure would Russia abandon her position in Manchuria. To maintain it he was prepared to take up arms.
“Firmness” in enforcing this view was for the Viceroy all the more necessary owing to the political situation at St. Petersburg. There Count Lamsdorf was to some extent recovering his influence. Not without effect he was protesting against the danger of a policy, which meant wringing from China a revision of the evacuation treaty that was incompatible with the recent open door treaties with England and America. General Kuropatkin too, had suddenly returned to the War Office and was submitting to the Tsar a memorandum of uncompromising frankness. Its burden was that the policy of the Viceroy would certainly involve Russia in a struggle to which, without serious prejudice to her position in Europe, her military resources were unequal. Unless they kept away from the Yalu, Japan would certainly occupy Korea and a ruinous competition of armaments in the Far East would ensue which nothing but war could bring to an end. Sooner or later Japan would have to be driven from Manchuria and Korea, but even if that were possible it would not settle the situation. Japan would have to be invaded, and not only invaded but “a warlike population of 47,000,000, where even the women participate in wars of national defence,” would have to be conquered. The conviction, in fact, which he had brought back from Tokyo was that before Russia could establish the position at which she was aiming Japan must be so completely subdued as to be deprived of the right and the power to maintain a navy.
With the Viceroy, such considerations had no weight. Entirely destitute of diplomatic experience his truculence bade him disregard consequences. The Japanese reply to the last Note was about to be delivered, and with a blind idea of anticipating it with an unequivocal demonstration he ordered the re-occupation of Mukden.
If his purpose had been to fix the resistance of Japan and render all chance of an accommodation futile, neither the moment nor the move could have been better chosen. It was done on October 30th and the next day the Japanese reply was handed to Baron Rozen. The original proposals were practically re-affirmed. Japan was ready to accept a neutral zone provided it extended for 50 kilometres (30 miles) only, and that a similar zone was established on the Manchurian side of the Yalu. Otherwise her terms were not altered materially. In particular she again insisted on the integrity of China which meant the evacuation of Manchuria, and she dropped the article forbidding her to use any part of Korea for a strategical purpose. In the Japanese Cabinet there seems to have been a real hope that, if only Russia could be made to see that they meant fighting, an arrangement on these lines might yet be reached, but public opinion had no such feeling. As the weeks went by and no answer came from Russia, it grew more and more inflamed and the situation more threatening. In Japan everything was ready. The fleet was completely mobilised, its war commanders had hoisted their flags, and her reply to the Viceroy’s move had been to send it into the Yellow Sea. There under Vice-Admiral Togo and Vice-Admiral Kamimura it was carrying out exercises of the most strenuous kind, with particular attention to practising landing operations in various Korean harbours.6 Under the impulse of the new Commander-in-Chief it was rapidly gaining a high state of efficiency in every branch of its work and the work was incessant.
There seemed then no reason for Japan to wait. It was unlikely her strength at sea could be increased. She was indeed engaged in an attempt to strengthen her fleet but it had failed. Owing to a disarmament convention between Chili and Argentina two battleships and two armoured cruisers just completed were in the market. The cruisers were at Genoa; the battleships at Elswick and Barrow and in the hands of a British firm for sale. The day Mukden was re-occupied and Japan had decided to insist on the evacuation of Manchuria as the basis of negotiation she had made an offer for the battleships. It was not high enough. The Diet was not sitting, and in the inflamed state of public opinion the Government did not care to call it together, and without calling it they could not find the money. There was a power in the Constitution, it is true, for the Emperor in case of urgency to make financial arrangements, if owing to the condition of the country the Diet could not be convoked, but this condition could hardly be said to exist. In the circumstances, therefore, the Cabinet felt unable to increase their bid, and on November 20th the negotiations were finally dropped. Russia then saw her opportunity. On December 2nd it became known that the Tzesarevich and the Bayan had reached Port Arthur and that a Russian Agent was in England with the price the Chilians asked in his pocket. It was a critical moment. The last arrivals at Port Arthur had brought up the Pacific Squadron to seven battleships and four armoured cruisers against the Japanese seven and six.7 Admiral Virenius with the rest of the reinforcing squadron was still in the Mediterranean. His flagship, the Oslyabya, had run on a rock in the Straits of Gibraltar and finding he could not proceed without docking, he had sent on the Tzesarevich and Bayan independently and himself had gone to Spezia for repairs. Her injuries, however, were reported slight. She was now ready for sea and was about to proceed to Bizerta to join the armoured cruiser Dmitri Donskoi, the Avrora and her seven destroyers.8 It was obvious, that if the Russians succeeded in getting two new battleships they would turn the scale against Japan. The British Government therefore, in view of their own responsibilities under the Alliance, determined to come to the rescue, and in order to be fully prepared for any eventuality in the Far East bought them both.
The coup, which had a profound effect upon the war, did little to relieve the tension at the moment. At Port Arthur the defences were continually increasing in strength, and the war fever in Japan rose higher and higher. On December 6th, Admiral Stark appeared at Chemulpho with his flagship and a large cruiser, and some destroyers. The air was full of alarms, and four days later the Japanese Diet met. In response to the speech from the Throne an address was carried which embodied a vote of censure on the Government’s foreign policy. There seems to have been some irregularity in the way in which the vote was obtained, but on the morrow the Diet was dissolved.
It had only sat a day. The seriousness of the step for a Government with the living experience of the Satsuma rebellion behind it, needs no elaboration. To add to the bad effect on public opinion, that same day—that is six weeks after the last Japanese Note was presented—the Russian answer was handed in. It proved to contain no material concession. Manchuria was still excluded and it did nothing to relieve the situation. To the most far-sighted Japanese statesmen it now became finally evident that war was inevitable sooner or later, and that possibly it was better to give way to the almost uncontrollable national temper and let it come at once. Nothing indeed stood in the way, except the imperative need of increasing the fleet. Accordingly, the possibility of an answer was taken under consideration and the Japanese Minister in London was ordered to prefer a request to be allowed to purchase the two Chilian battleships of the British Government. They had, however, already been added to the Royal Navy as the Triumph and Swiftsure and their sale to Japan would be an act so unfriendly to Russia as to be inadmissible. We could only refuse, reminding them that the two Argentine armoured cruisers at Genoa were now in the hands of the same British firm for sale. This time Japan did not hesitate and on December 24th, the day after her answer to the last Russian Note was handed in, she bought them.
In the new Note Japan practically reverted to her original position and gave no hope of a settlement. The Viceroy was for rejecting it on the spot, but more sober counsels were now in the ascendant. The recent action of Great Britain had strengthened the hands of Count Lamsdorf in urging the danger to the whole Russian position which the Viceroy’s policy was entailing. General Kuropatkin had followed his first memorandum to the Tsar with another in which he pointed out that Russian interests in the Far East were negligible and certainly not worth a war. Manchuria was not wanted either as a market or as a field for emigration, and the railway could never be of more than local importance. Port Arthur, therefore, had no real value, and could only be maintained with costly fortifications, a numerous garrison, and a large fleet. The people had no interest in such a war, and its certain effect would be to increase the internal unrest and the growing discontent in the army. Revolution would have a new handle against the Government, and even if Japan could be overthrown it was now obvious that England and America would never permit her obliteration. The proper course then he urged was to restore Kwangtung to China, sell the southern branch of the railway, and fall back on the original position.9
Coming from such a quarter the advice is very remarkable. Drastic, even brutal as it was, it represented a position far better than that which Russia was to achieve after a costly and bloody war. But no one, as yet, could see with the War Minister’s eyes, and his warning had little or no effect. Still peace influences were gaining strength every day. On January 6th, after a delay of only a fortnight, a more conciliatory answer was sent to Tokyo. On the points, however, which were vital to Japan it made no real concession. Onlookers indeed could recognise that the real difficulty of the situation was that each side had taken up a position from which it was almost impossible for either to recede. The least that Japan could accept in Korea gave her in Russian eyes the power to establish a protectorate. She would then be in a position not only to absorb Manchuria, but to secure the domination of the Far East. The minimum that Russia required to protect her railway meant for Japan the practical absorption of Manchuria and the perpetual disturbance of a great military power at her gates, and all it threatened to her international position. There seemed no escape. Manchuria and Korea were more than ever one, and war was expected at any moment. In Japan everything was ready for a landing in Korea, and Russia knew it. There were even continual rumours that the movement had begun, and the view at least of our naval authorities on the spot was that if the Russian reply proved unfavourable, hostilities would probably begin at once.
The Japanese Military Staff were absolutely ready. Their operation orders were drafted, transports had been chartered, the first reserves called up, clothing served out to the three divisions which were to form the expeditionary corps, and every precaution taken at Sasebo, Tsushima, and at other vital points to repel a surprise attack. On January 8th, two days after the Russian reply was received, the sealed orders for the expedition were actually delivered, and there is reason to believe that they expected the word to commence operations on or about that day.
But it was not given, and, according to our reports, the reason was not that there was any hope of a settlement, but because the Naval Staff had pressed for delay. It had to be granted. Everything depended on their ability to control the sea passage, and, in view of the naval situation as it then stood, they asked for a postponement of hostilities till the two newly-purchased cruisers were clear away. The actual situation was by no means satisfactory for Japan. The British Government had been informed unofficially that the movement of the Admiral Virenius’s Squadron from Bizerta would probably be taken as an act of aggression, and it was moving to Port Said. The destroyers had gone to Malta to be docked, and Russian opinion was inflamed by a rumour that they had been compelled to leave within 48 hours. It was not true. Formal representations were made, and our reply was that on December 30th five destroyers had come into the harbour and had been docked the same day. But on orders from home the officer in command had been warned next day that if war was declared (and our Foreign Office seemed to expect it in a few days) they would have to be undocked and to leave according to usage in 24 hours; otherwise they would be interned for the rest of the war. Thereupon they decided to sail at once and proceed to Port Said, whither the Oslyabya and her consorts were making.
In the highly-charged atmosphere it was essential that our attitude should be rigidly correct, especially as we had reason to believe that a certain group in Russia were endeavouring to rouse the national spirit to some real feeling for the war by an anti-British propaganda in the Press. The Malta incident was immediately followed by another concerning the two Japanese cruisers at Genoa. They were expected to sail any day, and the Russian movements to Malta and Port Said indicated an intention to intercept them. Our Consul was pressed to give them a British register and permit them to sail under the British merchant flag. The bulk of their crews were English, and the two commanders, as well as the officer in general charge, were British naval officers whose names were on the Emergency List. The Consul absolutely refused, and not only was he supported by the Foreign Office but all three officers were called upon to resign their commissions. Nevertheless, a report was spread in Russia that they had sailed under the British flag and under British naval officers, and another formal explanation had to be given.
Eventually the two ships sailed in the early hours of January 12th, and hoisted Japanese colours at sunrise when they were well to sea. Their position, of course, was very critical. Admiral Virenius with the Dmitri Donskoi and his seven destroyers had been waiting in Suda Bay, and the Avrora at the Piræus. The cruisers and flotilla had already been ordered to Port Said, and the day the Japanese sailed the Admiral followed with the flagship. Thus when the Japanese reached Port Said, they found that the whole Russian squadron had assembled there and the Dmitri Donskoi was already passing through the canal. Proceeding at once they followed the Russian cruiser and on the 15th passed her at anchor off Suez. The Admiral joined her on the 17th, but the rest of his command did not come through till the 21st. Thus though the two Japanese cruisers got well away into the Red Sea ahead of him, it is clear that had war been declared the first week in January they could scarcely have hoped to escape. Whatever other considerations may have influenced the Japanese Government, this was certainly one that decided them, in spite of the almost uncontrollable state of public opinion, to risk prolonging the situation with an answer to the last Russian Note.
When it came to the Viceroy’s hands he was again for rejecting it on the spot. But in the opinion of the Russian Foreign Office, although it still insisted on the vital points, it seemed to be couched more in the genuine spirit in which Japan had made her first overtures and it contained an article recognising the special interests of Russia in Manchuria and her right to take the measures necessary to preserve them. By the peace party in St. Petersburg it was therefore regarded as conciliatory, and a serious effort was made to find a formula which would permit Russia to give way without loss of dignity. The war party, however, pronounced it an ultimatum. Their line was the “Yellow Peril” and that concession would destroy the legend of the “Great White Tsar “from end to end of Asia. It was impossible they urged for Russia to condescend so far as to admit Japan’s right to ask a guarantee for the integrity of a third power. Count Lamsdorf, however, believed he saw a way and a desperate struggle occurred between the two groups. In foreign diplomatic circles it was understood that war was no longer a question of negotiation but of the conflict of the political parties in Russia. Count Lamsdorf supported by General Kuropatkin, M. Vitte, and even M. Pieve gradually gained ground. Bezobrazov was entirely discredited and after a severe social rebuff retired to Switzerland. The Viceroy was called upon by the Foreign Office to explain the reasons for his attitude. They were held to be unsatisfactory and before the end of the month the negotiations had been restored to the Foreign Minister’s hands.
For him and everyone the situation by this time presented difficulties which were almost insuperable. Mr. Kurino kept pressing for an answer and immediate preparations for war were obviously called for. For Russia time was everything and yet every move to get things forward was only too likely to precipitate hostilities. At headquarters it was fully recognised that if Japan meant to fight she would choose her own moment and as in her war with China would strike suddenly before declaration. Since the first week in January, when it was expected the blow would fall, the Viceroy had been pressing for immediate mobilisation. On the 6th, the day it will be recollected when the last Russian Note was presented, orders were issued for the two European Army Corps to be brought to a war footing and sent forward to Irkutsk; and on the 8th, the day on which the sealed orders of the Japanese expeditionary corps were delivered, the Viceroy was authorised to declare mobilisation in the Far East. Four days later, as the Japanese made no move, it was considered wiser not to take so provocative a step and he was stopped. He must be content to “prepare” for mobilisation, confine the war footing to the two fortresses, and use the utmost care to prevent a conflict on the Yalu.
The Viceroy was in despair. He had just received a fresh report from his Attaché at Tokyo on Japanese mobilisation, and it was clear that it would be so much more rapid than had been previously calculated, that if they landed at Chemulpho and no steps were taken to cover Liau-yang, the concentration could not be effected there. He therefore begged that two brigades for this purpose might be brought to a war footing without official mobilisation and moved into position. On the 22nd he received permission to mobilise one and it began to get forward.
In the naval sphere things were still more difficult. By the fleet alone could the Japanese be prevented from landing well forward in the north of Korea. It must move the instant hostilities began, and yet it was absolutely necessary to keep it quiet till the last hour. It was only on the spot they could tell the moment for it to act and only at St. Petersburg they could fix the moment for hostilities to begin. The Viceroy pressed for instructions. How far was he to interfere with a landing in Korea? In reply he was told on January 27th that if the Japanese landed “in Southern Korea or on the east coast south of the latitude of Seoul” Russia would shut her eyes, and permit an occupation as far north as the watershed of the Yalu and Tumen.10 In the opinion of the harassed Viceroy the reply did nothing to clear up his uncertainty. Not only was the geographical limit of Southern Korea very vague, but the mention of the east coast was particularly confusing. What about the west coast? Chemulpho, which was the most favourable point for a Japanese landing, was on the west coast, but it was also south of the watershed. Accordingly, in complete doubt of what was expected of him he next day telegraphed for more precise instructions. Was he or was he not to permit a landing on the west coast as high as Chemulpho, and what was to be the actual northern limit within which a Japanese occupation was to be permitted? The answer which came to hand next day was as follows: “In the first place a landing of the Japanese will be permitted on the whole extent of the western coast of Korea as high as Chemulpho inclusively. In the second place, the northern limit of the Japanese occupation will be determined exactly by negotiations which are now in progress here. Till their completion you will take as the extreme northern limit of an arbitrary Japanese occupation, the line of the watershed which separates the basins of the Yalu and Tumen from those of the rivers which fall into the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan—that is approximately a line drawn from Cape Kozakof in the Sea of Japan south-west to about Syon-chyon” (Senchon), a place which lies some 35 miles south-east of the mouth of the Yalu.
If anything were wanting to substantiate the sincerity of the Tsar’s desire for peace it would be this order which in effect surrendered to Japan everything she needed for her opening movement. But he would have gone still further. To achieve his purpose he felt the Japanese must be informed of the Viceroy’s instructions. “While shutting our eyes,” he wrote, “to a landing of the Japanese in Korea as high as Chemulpo it is necessary that they too should know within what limits we admit a landing. Otherwise there may arise an irreparable misunderstanding.”11
Now it is clear that if any such intimation were conveyed to the Japanese it would have had a pronounced effect upon their opening movement. Were they told or were they not? All accessible sources of information are silent on the point, but the anxious precautions they took to prevent interference with their landing point conclusively to the fact that they were not told. Still, even without this almost quixotic step we have the fact that at the last moment a bewildering modification had been introduced into the Russian war plan. It was an order that the fleet was to do nothing unless the enemy tried to land on the west coast north of Chemulpho.
It was, indeed, the last moment. Japanese patience and their reasons for holding their hands were alike running out; Russian troops were beginning to stream eastwards along the railway and from Kwangtung towards the Yalu. At Port Arthur the delay had been used to push on the fortifications with a vigour in strong contrast to the previous neglect. There were signs too that the Viceroy was awakening to the value of the Islands. Eighty tons of coal in bags had been landed at Thornton Haven and a jetty had been constructed, while for some time past a surveying vessel had been at work in the Blonde and Elliot Groups.12 More serious still, the squadron at Suez was leaving for the south and four auxiliary cruisers of the Volunteer Fleet were on their way from the Black Sea with troops and material. As for the Japanese their two new armoured cruisers had safely passed Admiral Virenius in the Canal, and while the Russians were still hanging about in the Red Sea looking for pilots they were speeding on their way. By January 28th they had passed Colombo and it only remained for Japan to choose her moment to begin.
On January 30th her Minister at St. Petersburg was instructed to ask Count Lamsdorf to fix a day for the reply. On the result they would judge whether Russia was playing with them or not. Count Lamsdorf could give no definite answer. He was attempting without success to secure a mediation or a formula acceptable to Japan. Even Admiral Abaza was now in favour of concession. The real trouble was in the highest quarters where the request for a guarantee against the violation of Chinese sovereignity had come to be regarded as an inadmissible reflection on Russian honour. Unless this attitude could be turned Count Lamsdorf knew success was almost hopeless. It must in any case take time and the sands were running out.
On February 1st Mr. Kurino telegraphed that Count Lamsdorf, while fully appreciating the gravity of the situation, found it impossible to name a precise day. He would use all possible despatch but the question was very difficult, and the terms when drafted must be submitted to the Viceroy to secure unanimity. For the Japanese Government that was enough. The following day the two cruisers reached Singapore where their crews were awaiting them, and the next news at St. Petersburg was that Japanese subjects were leaving Kwangtung and the Maritime Provinces.
Meanwhile, Count Lamsdorf had been able to secure a real concession. He had been authorised to drop the neutral zone altogether and, as an alternative to guaranteeing the integrity of China, a formula was sanctioned to respect the rights of Japan and all other Powers in Manchuria acquired under their respective treaties with China. On February 3rd a new proposal in this sense was telegraphed to the Viceroy to be forwarded to Tokyo. In St. Petersburg there seems to have been a real hope that the formula would be accepted at least as a basis of further pourparlers. The following evening on Count Lamsdorf’s invitation Mr. Kurino went to see him. His host informed him the Note had gone and added his personal opinion that the key of the whole matter was in fact the old question of Sylvia Basin. Russia he said desired the independence at Korea and “as a matter of necessity” the free passage of the Straits. Ready as she was to make all possible concessions she could not give way on the point of the territory in dispute being used for a strategical purpose against herself. As with Gibraltar in the parallel case of the War of Spanish Succession a growing Imperial rivalry had foccussed itself about a vital naval position and only by arms could the decision be reached.
If Japan was still hesitating, and everything shows she had already made up her mind, the telegram which her Minister sent the following morning explaining what Count Lamsdorf had said was the end of the matter. Whether or not the Foreign Minister really had any hope that he had averted war at least for a time, he quickly knew the truth. Next afternoon, February 6th, at two o’clock, he received from the Japanese Minister two Notes. One explained that in view of the inexplicable delays with which Russia was conducting the negotiations taken side by side with her active preparations for war, he had been instructed to break off relations. The second stated that he intended to leave St. Petersburg with his mission on the 10th.
Admiral Alexeiev was informed the same afternoon, but for some reason he kept the news to himself and his intimate circle. Without a word to the commanding officers he merely summoned them to a special conference for the 9th, at which it is assumed he intended to tell them the secret. This conduct is difficult to explain, since on January 31st the squadron had come out into the roadstead and having put to sea on February 3rd for a short cruise had just returned to the anchorage. But no further measures were taken for its safety beyond an order, issued on February 7th, that special vigilance was to be exercised to seaward.13
Apparently the Viceroy was still pre-occupied with the uncertainty of his orders in view of the sudden change in the situation; for this same day (February 7th) his friend Admiral Abaza begged the Tsar to send him definite orders as to what to do if the Japanese landed in South Korea. There was the utmost difficulty in deciding. The Tsar still hoped war might be averted. A telegram was drafted bidding the Viceroy cancel his previous instructions if he found it necessary, but it was not sent, and the next morning the Tsar called a special Council to reconsider the question. General Kuropatkin brought with him a Memorandum by the Chief of the General Staff.14 It began by pronouncing that for moral reasons alone a Japanese landing anywhere must be prevented if possible. In view of the plan of deployment which had been decided on he urged that any such attempt must be met with every possible resistance, and if it could not be prevented it must be delayed as much as possible. Such resistance would depend entirely on what the fleet could do. Its operations would, of course, be attended with risks, but in war, risks must be run and the outcome of an action could never be foreseen. Even if the squadron did not feel equal to preventing the landing it must do something to give the army time. Whether or not such assistance could be given and what form it should take the Minister of Marine must decide. Then there was added this significant warning. If the Japanese were obstinately bent on war they “may after having proceeded to despatch their troops to Korea, themselves attack our fleet wherever they find it, in order to secure the operation and paralyse the action of our sea forces” at the decisive moment. Better then, it was urged, to take the initiative and let the fleet carry the active operations into the zone where the Japanese were beginning theirs. Admiral Abaza supported the General Staff view and joined in urging offensive operations as well for the security of the fleet itself as for gaining time for the army.
Cogent and irreproachable as was this consensus of opinion the forlorn hope of yet maintaining peace was too strong for it. “It is to be desired,” the Tsar telegraphed to his Viceroy after the conference, “that it should be the Japanese and not we who begin hostilities. Consequently if they do not begin operations against us you should not oppose their landing in Southern Korea or on the east coast as high as Gensan. But if on the west of Korea their fleet, whether with a landing force or not, passes north of the 38th parallel you may attack without waiting for them to fire the first shot.”
Such orders presumably implied that the squadron was to proceed to sea to keep observation on the Japanese movements and prevent them entering the Bay of Korea. They were the last received. If they had been acted on the campaign must have taken a very different course. But they were not acted on, nor, although for weeks past the action of the Port Arthur Squadron was to depend on the movements of the Japanese, were any adequate steps taken to watch them. Since December 10th, a first-class cruiser, the Varyag, had been at Chemulpho. She had been sent as Stationnaire to hold herself at M. Pavlov’s disposal for the safety of the Russian mission. Her orders were to be specially vigilant at night. She was not to interfere with the Japanese if they landed before declaration of war, but to report directly if they did. This was not so easy, for something was wrong with the telegraph, and on January 18th the gunboat Koreetz had been sent to put it right. Both vessels were thus tied to the port and had no power to give the timely warning which the squadron would require for taking such offensive action as the last instructions implied. Under such an impossible situation the Viceroy’s Staff could not rest, and on February 8th their uneasiness took shape in a memorandum urging that further precaution must be taken at least for the safety of the exposed squadron. Since nothing had yet been done beyond establishing an inadequate night guard, they begged him to set up a service of fast cruisers to patrol the neighbourhood of Clifford Island on the Korean coast and Shantung Promontory—even if only one ship were sent to each station—to observe the movements of the Japanese ships and transports. They further pointed out that, as there was no boom to cover the roadstead, the squadron ought to shift its anchorage at night, but they begged permission not to use nets as it would delay the squadron getting rapidly under way if sudden need arose. The desire for active opposition to the Japanese is clear, but the Viceroy would not listen. He would go no further than to permit one cruiser to patrol as desired, and even so the service was not to begin till the 10th. As for the rest, he merely ordered that the Commander of the fleet should be asked to explain why no boom was ready and why no scheme had been drawn up for taking the fleet into the basin, but he insisted that nets were indispensable and must be spread every night when the squadron was in the roadstead.15
Had this simple precaution been carried out how different might have been the story of the war! But it was too late. At 12.40 that night, before the order was given, General Stessel, the Commandant of Port Arthur, rang up the Naval Staff to know what the firing in the roadstead meant. They replied it was practising “Repel torpedo attack,” and it was not till half an hour later the Viceroy knew that the attack was a real one, and that at the first blow, in spite of every warning, the foundations of the Russian war plan had been shattered to pieces.
1 Larenko, Chronicles of Port Arthur.
2 Rozen to Lamsdorf, July 20th,. Russian Military History, I., i., 632.
3 Russian Military History, I., i., 303.
4 “Account of Naval Operations,” Morskoi Sbornik.
5 Russian Military History, I., i., page 329–30.
6 There is no information as to which these harbours were. They may have been some of those mentioned in the operation orders of January 1904. See post, page 80–1.
7 For the war organisation of the Russian Pacific Squadron at this time, see Appendix A, post, page 471.
8 The Oslyabya was at Spezia from October 7th to December 12th. Dmitri Donskoi, which left the Baltic October 26th, was at Bizerta from November 23rd to January 5th, and the Aurora (which left Kronstadt October 10th) from November 11th to December 22nd. The destroyers entered the port November 25th and 26th. Two of the torpedo-boats were at Lisbon and two still on their way there.
9 Kuropatkin. The Russian Army and the Japanese War, I., pp. 188–193.
10 Russian Military History, I., i., pp. 353–4.
11 Russian Military History, I., page 355.
12 Report of the Bramble, June 23rd.
13 Russian Military History, Vol. VIII., Pt. i. Ch. 3.
14 “Note de Général Sakharov.” Ibid. I., i., 356.
15 Military Russian History, Vol. VIII., Pt. i., Ch. 3.