ACCELERATION OF THE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN KOREA AND THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO COVER BY BLOCKING.
[Charts B 2, F 1 and M 1.]
HOWEVER unsatisfactory the opening operations were regarded in the fleet, at the Japanese headquarters they were taken as having achieved a strategical success sufficient to remove all doubt as to how to proceed. The Imperial missive which was sent to the Admiral may be taken as giving with precision their view of the result. “We have heard,” it ran, “that the Combined Fleet has completely carried out the duty of landing troops in Korea; has swept the coast clear; has attacked the enemy’s ships at Port Arthur and destroyed several of them; and thereby asserted our preponderance. We are greatly pleased.”
From the order in which the various results are mentioned it may be taken that in the view of the Imperial Staff the primary object of the operations was to secure a military and not a naval success, except in so far as success at sea was essential to success on land. To clear the line of passage and to secure a preponderance sufficient to prevent any immediate prospect of serious naval interference was all that the first stage of the war plan demanded and this had been done without any loss to the fleet. For about 24 hours, it is true, they were in doubt as to how far the enemy’s squadron had been crippled. But the Russians, regardless of the advantage they were giving their enemy, suffered a full account of the damage done to appear in the press and thus gave the Japanese just the information which they wanted and which it was otherwise impossible to obtain. It assured them that at least two of the most powerful of the battleships and one of the best cruisers were damaged, possibly beyond repair, and that in consequence the squadron could not think of engaging in serious offensive operations for a considerable time.
In this they were not mistaken. It will be recognised at once that the effect of the attack had been to break up the foundations of the Russian war plan. That plan had been founded on two assumptions—firstly, that no direct attack on Port Arthur would be made in face of the undefeated squadron; and secondly, that the squadron could dispute the command of the Yellow Sea. Both these postulates had gone. With the squadron paralysed Port Arthur lay open to capture, or at least isolation, by a coup de main oversea, and there could be no thought but of defence. Special apprehension was expressed for a landing at Pigeon, Louisa, or Eight Ships Bays at the extremity of the Kwangtung Peninsula on which side land defences hardly existed. Still it was recognised that without Weihaiwei for an advanced base such an operation would involve the enemy in extreme hazard, and in the opinion of the Viceroy’s Staff the immediate and greatest danger lay in the gateway which, in spite of the military protests, had been prepared for the Japanese at Dalny. That point at least was given the first attention. In the evening after the fleet attack, when a cruiser and destroyer reconnaissance had ascertained that the enemy had withdrawn, the mining vessel Yenesei was sent under escort of the cruiser Boyarin to mine Talien-hwan. But misfortune followed misfortune. All next day she proceeded with her work, but on the morning of the 11th just as it was complete she fell foul of one of her own mines and was destroyed with her commander, who refused to leave his ship. Before the truth was known it was believed another destroyer attack had been made and the Boyarin was promptly sent out again with a division of destroyers. She too fell foul of a mine and was at once abandoned. She did not sink and her captain in strong contrast to his colleague of the Yenisei ordered one of his destroyers to torpedo her. The order was twice questioned and twice affirmed. Two torpedoes were fired. Both failed to hit and the commander of destroyer deciding “it was not the fate of the Boyarin to sink” left her as she was. She was found next day by destroyers in Talien-hwan still afloat. Her mess plate and some other gear were removed and it was not till the following night that a gale finished her. The Court of Inquiry that followed found her commander’s conduct “irregular.”
After these disasters the mining operations were entrusted to a special flag-officer—Admiral Loshchinski—who had just arrived. After having rectified and supplemented the work in Talien-hwan which the Yenisei had left incomplete he was ordered to give his attention, not to the western bays, but to Kerr and Deep Bays immediately to the eastward of Talien-hwan. The reason was anxiety for the position that was being prepared at Nanshan where the Kwangtung Peninsula connects with the mainland by a narrow neck. This was to be the first line of defence against an enemy advancing from Liau-tung, and seeing that it could be turned by a landing force from both Deep and Kerr Bays it was vital to secure them. To this end some 700 mines were laid. The work took twelve days nor was it till it was completed that attention was paid to the inlets on the western extremities of the Peninsula.1
Meanwhile the injured ships had been towed into the harbour, all but the battleship Retvizan which had grounded at the mouth of the gullet. She was found to be immovable and for the present could only serve as a battery to protect the entrance. Cruiser and destroyer patrols were kept up until the gale which had made an end of the Boyarin came on and then everything was recalled inside.
It is needless to dwell in detail on all the evidence of demoralisation and lack of preparedness that existed in the fortress at this time. It will suffice to accept the general Russian view that if the Japanese had attacked at once in any force the place must have fallen. Should they have attempted such an attack? With the fall of Port Arthur the Russian Fleet would have gone. The Japanese would have been in complete command of the Yellow Sea and the game would have been in their hands from the outset. The worst which the Russian appreciations had feared would have been realised, and nothing would have been open to them but a concentration of their army far to the north, and an eventual reconquest of Manchuria against a confident and firmly established enemy.
There is no sign that the idea of a coup de main against Port Arthur in the first stage of the war was ever seriously entertained by the Japanese Imperial Staff. It was not, as will be seen directly, that they flinched from extreme risks, but it is to be presumed that they were not to be tempted into a radical departure from the methodical war plan they had deliberately adopted. To attempt an offensive movement against Kwangtung before they had secured the position in Korea would have been such a departure. To do both simultaneously was out of their power. Owing to the political necessity of postponing the mobilisation of their army till after declaration of war, they had neither troops nor transports in readiness for so sudden and so heavy a call, and the stroke must be delivered at once or not at all. It is true that success would have meant a decisive blow to the armed forces of the enemy, but by all indications it was not on that principle their war plan was designed and failure would have brought it all to the ground.
Nor in the opinion of the Admiral, with whom rested the last word as to the possibility of all landings, was the success they had obtained sufficient to justify any liberties being taken. The flotilla defence of Port Arthur was untouched; he had as yet no authoritative information of the damage he had done to the squadron and he was busy with a plan to tighten his hold. February 11th, the day after the fleet was massed at Asan, was the great national holiday, the festival of Kigensetsu commemorating the foundation of the Empire. It was duly celebrated with the ships dressed and a Royal salute, the men facing eastwards in homage to the Emperor. But there was no rest. Four of the battleships had been more or less seriously injured in their upper works. Three of the armoured cruisers had also been hit as well as the Kasagi of the Third Division. In a bitter north wind all hands were employed in effecting emergency repairs. The destroyers had also to be coaled, and while the work was going on the Admiral issued his new orders for the next series of operations. It was his practice on these occasions to state shortly the general situation and then to announce the object of the orders he was giving. “I have considered,” he began, “the reports of the various sections of the fleet and judge that the enemy outside Port Arthur have undergone a heavy attack from our destroyers and battle squadron. Several of their ships have narrowly escaped sinking and have been with difficulty towed into port.” Then follow the objects of the next move, which he announced to be threefold: (1) to destroy the ships of the enemy remaining outside Port Arthur; (2) to blockade that port and Dalny; and (3) to construct a base on the west coast of Korea, the place intended being Asan. He then proceeds with his detailed instructions.
To achieve the first of these objects, Admiral Dewa with three of his cruisers would at once escort the two destroyer divisions that had been disappointed at Dalny to the Sir James Hall Group, whence they would proceed to Port Arthur, observe the state of the enemy and give the coup de grâce to any ship they could reach. They would then return by Rooper Harbour to Hakko.
To these cruisers of the Third Division and to Admiral Kamimura’s armoured division was committed the second object, that is the blockade of Port Arthur and Dalny, and what the Commander-in-Chief meant by blockade is interesting. In form it was essentially modern and bore no resemblance to what was formerly understood by the term. Admiral Dewa after seeing the destroyers well on their way, was to proceed east of Shantung promontory, throw out a line of search to stop anything passing, and after sunset on the 13th to close on Hakko. Admiral Kamimura with his armoured cruisers would start that day or the next as he could, and look into Port Arthur on the morning of the 13th, that is after the intended destroyer attack had taken place. Then in Admiral Dewa’s place he would establish a line of search from 20 miles due east of Mu-i-tau (the S.E. point of Shantung), sweep to the southward down the Shanghai trade route till sunset on the 14th and then rejoin the flag at Hakko with any prizes he might capture. For thither the Commander-in-Chief intended to take his battle division with the fourth cruiser of Admiral Dewa’s division and the rest of the destroyers to complete his repairs and establish a base for future use.
To Admiral Uriu was committed the third object, that is the preparation of the more advanced base at Asan Bay and the guard of the entrance to Chemulpho, and he for this work was to be reinforced by two of Admiral Dewa’s cruisers as soon as their special service was over.2
It was a heavy programme after the strain of the last few days and in the weather that prevailed, and the Admiral recognised its severity. In a general order he said “All ships, refusing to flinch in the extreme cold, must put their trust in the gods and courageously carry out their several duties and work to obtain a final decision.” It would seem that the feeling which had arisen in the fleet over his late failure to seek a decision was in his eyes an element of danger, for he added these words of solemn admonition. “At the same time they must not despise the weakness of the enemy, but be strictly on the alert, taking care not to leave a hair’s breadth for him to take advantage of. The worst foe is negligence. Even in sleep there must be no forgetfulness.”
His call upon the fleet was destined to evoke a high response. Hitherto, their work had been lightened by ideal weather, but scarcely was the new movement started when the gale, which was driving the Russian cruisers into Port Arthur, was upon them. It came out of the north with blinding snow squalls, intense cold, and very heavy seas. Admiral Dewa lost touch with all his destroyers, and, after reaching the exposed rendezvous at the Sir James Hall Group, was forced to leave one cruiser there to try to gather them and run himself for shelter into Rooper Harbour. Here he found two destroyers of the 5th division, and in the evening he was joined by the cruiser he had left behind, but she had failed to find a single boat. Here, too, he took in a wireless message from Admiral Kamimura to say that in consequence of the gale he had been forced to abandon his reconnaissance of Port Arthur for fear of his coal failing, and that he was going straight to Cape Mu-i-tau on his way to Hakko. In reply, Admiral Dewa reported his position and the break-up of his flotilla, and announced his intention of remaining where he was till it was collected.
Next day, the 13th, the weather had moderated a little, but the temperature was lower than ever and the “breeze bit to the bone.” Still, early in the morning the rest of the 5th destroyer division appeared at Rooper Harbour, and he resolved to proceed in the afternoon. Shortly before he was about to start one boat of the 4th division came in to say her consorts had taken refuge at Asan, and were now on their way to attack Port Arthur independently. She was sent away to overtake them with an order to Commander Nogai, the Senior Officer, to carry on as convenient. With the other division the Admiral remained at anchor where he was. In the night it came on to snow and blow again as hard as ever. Nevertheless, in the morning he put to sea, but the gale increased every hour till it seemed past human endurance, and at half-past ten he decided to put back.
Two of Commander Nogai’s destroyers after a severe struggle did the same, but he himself in the Hayatori was not to be denied, and held on in company with the Asagiri. The two destroyers quickly lost touch with one another, but each carried on alone through the storm. Rolling desperately, and strained by the heavy seas to the limit of what destroyers could be expected to endure, they were completely sheathed in ice, and their crews almost blinded by the snow. Yet nothing would stop them. Both reached Port Arthur, observed destroyers outside, eluded them, discharged their torpedoes into the Gut under a heavy fire, and made away again at full speed—Commander Nogai for the appointed rendezvous at Round Island, where he rode out the gale, and the Asagiri direct for Rooper Harbour.
Admiral Dewa and the 5th destroyer division were still there. But though he had been unable to effect anything the Asagiri’s information left him in no doubt what to do. It was clear that at Port Arthur they were thinking only of defence; the reckless fire of the forts told that, apart from the inshore destroyer patrol, there could be no ships outside, for they had fired at everything they fancied they saw. He determined, therefore, that a torpedo attack on the morrow could do no good, and that it was his duty to return to Hakko with the information he had obtained, and also to send it to Admiral Uriu at Asan. Accordingly, shortly before noon on the 15th he left with his squadron and flotilla to rejoin the Commander-in-Chief at his base.
It was with his arrangements thus upset, and his various divisions he knew not where, that Admiral Togo at Hakko received the sudden information that the Imperial Staff had taken a new and startling resolution. We have seen already how sanguine was their view of the effect of the opening naval operations. In their eyes the control of the Yellow Sea was sufficiently established to warrant the passage of troops across it in force. The advantage of rapid action was great enough to justify any reasonable risk, and without consulting the Admiral as to how great that risk was they had resolved to speed up the occupation of Korea by using the sea line of transit. Instead of landing the rest of the troops at Fusan or Gensan, as had been intended originally, the whole of the First Army was to proceed to Chemulpho, the remainder of the XIIth Army Division to start at once, and the other two divisions to follow as quickly as might be.
At Asan Admiral Uriu received the staggering news through Chemulpho, whither he sent a ship every day to keep an eye on the situation. The rumour that reached him was that the troops might begin to arrive any day. He had not yet received Admiral Dewa’s report of the inactivity of the fleet at Port Arthur, and in serious anxiety he telegraphed for confirmation. “Knowing the weakness of the defence of Chemulpho, and that the enemy’s destroyers were undamaged, he thought that if the troops were really being despatched it was highly dangerous.” The reply he got next day, the 15th, from the Chief of the Staff was as follows: “The XIIth Division will land at Chemulpho. Their despatch began on the 10th. . . . We have decided to take immediate advantage of the crushed state of the enemy owing to our naval victories, and are disregarding whatever danger there may be.”
Admiral Togo was equally surprised. He, too, received the news on the 14th, and without a word of protest at once issued orders to meet the situation. In his last general order he had spoken of “working for a final decision.” If that meant anything definite the idea was at once abandoned. The objects of the Combined Fleet, he announced, would now be to keep the enemy under observation and safeguard the line of the army’s passage; that is, its general line was to be strictly preventive, and on this basis he proceeded to make his dispositions. The first step was to reinforce Admiral Dewa for the work he would have to do. According to the last information he was at Rooper Harbour, and thither the Asama was immediately despatched, with directions to place herself under his command and to inform him that his last orders were cancelled. If he had coal enough he was to carry out a reconnaissance of Port Arthur and to send all his destroyers to join Admiral Uriu at Asan. With these instructions the Asama met Admiral Dewa just north of Hakko on the morning of the 16th as he was coming down to rejoin the flag. He at once decided that in view of the information he had obtained, a further reconnaissance was needless, and ordering the Asama to follow him he carried on to Hakko.
Thus it happened that at the critical moment Admiral Togo had his whole force under his hand and all the information he required. The necessary steps for the coming operations were quickly taken. He had been informed that the XIIth Army Division would sail in six successive groups, an arrangement which appears to have been due primarily to the difficulty of collecting transports for the whole force in the time available since the declaration of war. The group system has, however, the obvious advantage of minimising the risk of troops passing an imperfectly commanded sea, and for this reason, quite apart from the question of transport, it might have been adopted on this occasion, as it certainly was later on. To provide escort for each group was, of course, beyond the capacity of the fleet. The system which the Admiral adopted for securing the route from sporadic interference was that of observation patrols. From Hakko to the point where the line of passage entered the Asan defended area was about 170 miles. To cover it two patrol centres were fixed, one 15 miles west of Amma-to (Nan-san-do), an island about 50 miles north of Hakko, and the other 10 miles west of Ochon-to, about 50 miles further north. At the first was stationed the Admiral’s despatch-vessel Tatsuta, and at the second the second-class cruiser Kasagi, with orders to patrol to a distance of 20 miles. As wireless was then fairly trustworthy up to 60 miles, communication could thus be kept up from Hakko to Asan. In order to establish the defended area around Asan Admiral Uriu was reinforced with two destroyer divisions with orders to maintain a guard off Shopaiul Island at the approach to Chemulpho. To complete the chain Admiral Hosoya, with the Seventh Division from the Straits Squadron, was ordered to the west of Ko-je-do (Cargodo Island). It consisted of the third-class battleship Fuso, in which the Admiral flew his flag, two coast-defence vessels, seven gunboats, a despatch-vessel and its attached torpedo-boat flotilla, and his instructions were to “protect strongly” the line of passage. This would be done by holding the Western Channel of the Korean Straits against the Vladivostok detachment, while Admiral Kataoka from Takeshiki held the Eastern Channel with his other two divisions. The transports would thus not require escort. Instead they would have successive points d’appui, from which each group as it proceeded would receive wireless warning if any danger lay on the route and could retire into safety.
The bulk of the fleet was to be employed in covering operations of a very drastic and even unprecedented kind. The idea of closing Port Arthur by the use of a number of blockships had not originated with the Admiral. He had even deprecated its use in tenderness for the crews, whom he regarded as committed to certain death, and when the project was first mooted he had not gone beyond suggesting the use of the destroyers’ parent ship for the purpose. In the heroic shape it eventually took it was the conception of Commander Arima, of the armoured cruiser Tokiwa, who had submitted it through his captain to the Naval Staff as early as October the previous year. At the end of December he was appointed Flag Commander to Admiral Togo. At that time relations had grown highly strained, and he urged it again, presumably with his chief’s consent. It was then approved, and the Naval Staff, we are told, “decided to carry it out as part of the plan of campaign at a suitable occasion as the naval situation developed.” Five ships, averaging about 2,000 tons, were taken up for the purpose, and Commander Arima was instructed to select officers in secret.
By what process of reasoning it was finally decided to take this far-reaching step, we do not know. The Admiral, it will be remembered, had specially desired that the attempt should not be made at the opening of the war. It may be taken that in putting forward this view he was expressing the natural desire of a naval Commander-in-Chief to settle the necessary control of the sea by a decisive fleet action. But as the naval situation had developed this was for the present impossible. As the Official History says, “the investigation of the state of the enemy showed that they had hidden themselves far back in the harbour; their ships were damaged and their men depressed, and the spirit to come out and fight was not in them.”3 There was, therefore, no near prospect of being able to rectify the unsatisfactory situation by another blow at the fleet. On the other hand, the movement of the troops was urgent. No means that could add to the security of their passage could be neglected, and no available means could be so effective as blocking the harbour. True, if successful, it must for a long time place the enemy’s fleet out of reach of the Japanese Navy, and the final settlement might have to be left to the Army, but the eventuality had to be faced. In the opinion of the Imperial Staff the moment had come; and on February 14th the blockships, which had been ready since the middle of January, were ordered to Hakko.
But the exigencies of safeguarding the army’s passage did not end here. There was still the Vladivostok detachment to consider, and it was just at this moment that the effect of the Russian Fleet having been divided began to make itself felt. On the night of the first attack on Port Arthur Admiral Shtakelberg had received telegraphic orders from the Viceroy to proceed to carry out his special instructions with the proviso that the cruise was not to extend beyond seven days. He at once placed Captain Reitzenshtein in command who in the afternoon of February 9th got all four cruisers to sea by means of the ice breaker, and made as directed for the entrance of the Tsugaru Strait. He was there early on the 11th but it was not till next day that he sighted anything. The first ship he met was the Nagonoura Maru of 1,800 tons bound for Otaru. As soon as she was brought to, her crew were ordered to abandon ship and then she was sunk by shell-fire. The next was a coaster of 300 tons which was also fired at, but suffered to escape in a damaged condition into Fukuyama at the mouth of the Strait. Nothing further was met with, and as the weather was growing very threatening and the Rurik’s engines were not to be trusted he decided to cross at once to Shinpo north of Gensan and commence operations in that area without attempting anything against the Japanese coast. But before he could reach his ground he was struck by the gale that was scattering the Japanese squadrons in the Yellow Sea, and was forced back to Vladivostok, where he arrived on the 14th.
The news of the activity of the Northern Squadron reached the Imperial Staff just as the first section of the troops was sailing and at a moment, moreover, when they had found it necessary seriously to weaken the Straits Squadron. Since the beginning of the year there had been lying at Shanghai the Russian gunboat Mandzhur. Repeated representations had been made to Peking that she should be ordered to leave in accordance with the express terms of the Chinese declaration of neutrality, but they had had no effect. For political, if not for naval reasons, it was necessary to do something more drastic, and in spite of the heavy call on the fleet the Staff now ordered Admiral Kataoka to send away Rear-Admiral Togo’s division to get the matter settled. That the Japanese Government should have thought it necessary to make so serious a diversion of force for such an object is noteworthy as an example of the kind of strategical deflection which is always liable to arise from the attitude of neutrals. From a naval point of view the force detailed was, of course, far larger than the object required. It is only to be explained by the political necessity of over-awing China into a strict performance of her neutrality whatever pressure might be brought to bear on her by other parties. The consequence was a further interference with the Commander-in-Chief’s dispositions. He was informed that during Rear-Admiral Togo’s absence he must reinforce the Straits Squadron from his own fleet, and he had to call away the Akashi, a 20-knot third-class cruiser, from the critical Asan area.4
Sailing on the 17th Rear-Admiral Togo reached the Yangtse next day, and keeping two of his ships in sight outside, he sent the Akitsushinta up to Wusung. She bore a request that the Mandzhur should be ordered to sea in 24 hours and an intimation that she in turn would not sail till 24 hours later. If nothing was done the Chinese Government would be deemed physically unable to give effect to their declaration of neutrality, and the Japanese cruiser would have to take such measures as the situation demanded. By the 22nd, being unable to obtain any satisfaction, she returned to the Admiral who at once shifted his flag to her and went in person to Wusung.
Meanwhile the situation in the main theatre of operations had developed so far that it was impossible for him to be absent from the Korean Straits much longer. At Wusung he received orders recalling him, and on the 26th having coaled, he hurried back leaving the Akitsushima alone to deal with the Russian gunboat. That same night her Commander was officially informed that orders had come from Port Arthur for the Mandzhur to disarm. By the 31st it was done and the Akitsushima was able to rejoin her flag.5
Considering what was going on while the Sixth Division was absent, the movement showed a considerable boldness of judgment. The day after it sailed the Commander-in-Chief had issued his orders for the Combined Fleet.6 The object was stated to be to render the Russian main force useless, before it could repair its damages, by sealing the mouth of the harbour, and to demoralise them further by an indirect bombardment. The general idea of the approach was for Admiral Dewa, with the Third Division and one destroyer division to go ahead to the Sir James Hall Group rendezvous and thence to send his destroyers to reconnoitre and clear the way for the blockships which were to follow him. On the evening of the third day he would guide them to their objective. To each blockship would be attached a torpedo-boat to protect her from attack and rescue the men, and the two Asan torpedo-boat divisions were ordered to the rendezvous for this purpose. The armoured squadron would proceed to Rooper Harbour and there be met by the 1st and 4th destroyer divisions from Asan, and with them in company, would then overtake the blockships on the third day. Admiral Uriu would be left with his division as well as two destroyer and one torpedo-boat division to hold the Asan area and receive the troops.
The same day a kesshitai or forlorn hope to man the block-ships was called for. Fifty-six hands in all were required, but so keen was the competition for the desperate service that no less than 2,000 names were sent in. Of these, 67, besides the ten officers, were eventually chosen and by the 20th all was ready and the movement began.
So great, however, was the anxiety of the Army Staff to secure the situation in Korea that they could not wait for the naval cover to be established before the troops were moved. The occupation of Seoul almost without a blow on the first day of hostilities was a success on which they had scarcely dared to count. Yet it inspired them to make a still greater push. If the neck of the Peninsula which lies between Ping-yang and Gensan could be seized in force, not only would Seoul be safe, but they would have in their possession the whole of the southern part of Korea for which they had originally contended. If it were to be done there was not an hour to lose. The position was already in jeopardy. In spite of the state of something like panic which prevailed at Port Arthur, the Viceroy had been firm enough to refuse to recall the portion of the garrison that had been sent to Feng-whang-cheng and the Yalu to cover the Liauyang concentration. The whole 3rd East Siberian Division was now threatening the Korean frontier besides a brigade of Trans-Baikal Cossacks under General Mishchenko. The cavalry had actually begun to cross the Yalu. It was impossible to wait, and on the 15th the first group of transports sailed from Nagasaki, which two days before had been declared a “defended area.”7 The troops landed at Chemulpho on the morning of the 17th and day by day the other four groups followed in succession. The last two were on their way as the fleet moved off from Hakko by divisions and so were well covered. By midnight on the 22nd while the fleet was lying weather-bound by another gale at the Rooper Harbour rendezvous the whole XIIth Army Division was ashore, and the difficult advance on Ping-yang was well under way. The other two divisions, the Guards and the IInd, were also ready to embark at Hiroshima, but owing to the rapidity with which the campaign had developed there was insufficient transport to carry them. For the present therefore only two regiments of the IInd division were despatched. In spite, however, of the pressure on the transport means were found to convey two other regiments which did not form part of the First Army. They belonged to the IVth division and were required for a special defensive purpose. It was of course essential to the success of the offensive operations of the First Army that its base should be firmly secured and to do this it was necessary that Gensan at the eastern end of the Ping-yang neck should be occupied. This then was the duty for which the two regiments were detailed. But why then did they proceed by way of Chemulpho? The natural course would have been to send them direct by sea. The explanation is to be found in the division of the Russian fleet. As we know, Admiral Shtakelberg’s recent activity was specially directed to disturbing any such movement, and seeing how much reduced was the Straits Guard at the moment the direct transit to Gensan was highly precarious. It would seem therefore that the Imperial Staff rather than run unnecessary risk or make a further call upon the fleet decided to submit to the delay of sending them to their destination by way of Seoul, and it was from Seoul that Gensan was occupied.
Ping-yang on the other hand was occupied by sea. By land it was 12 days’ march from Seoul over country destitute of supplies, and before the Army could advance it was necessary to establish four line-of-communication posts. To expedite and facilitate the operation Admiral Uriu was requested to push forward a party of infantry by sea to Hai-ju which lies at the head of a deep inlet to the eastward of Rooper Harbour. By this means about a week’s march would be saved. This he was able to accomplish and on February 17th the force occupied Ping-yang just in time to prevent the Russian cavalry forestalling them.
As for the naval covering movement everything possible was done to keep it secret. Elaborate precautions were taken to keep even the existence of the Hakko base from being known and on the 16th the Port Arthur—Chifu cable was cut. But in spite of every care information did reach Port Arthur that blockships were being prepared and although no special measures were taken to deal with them the garrison was on the alert. It was another torpedo attack that they were chiefly expecting and with this the operation actually began.
It had been arranged by Admiral Togo that the 5th destroyer division should clear the way for the blockships at the last moment. By the evening of the 23rd his whole force had assembled at Round Island. The destroyers then went ahead to Liau-ti-shan and as soon as the moon set stole towards the harbour. In spite of the searchlights they arrived undetected, and making out the stranded Retvizan and as they believed some cruisers in the entrance they all fired their torpedoes and made away. The range was long, there was no hit and the only effect was thoroughly to awaken the garrison. They had to return in consequence under a hot fire but none of them were hurt. About an hour later the 14th torpedo division escorting the blockships followed to see all clear. Finding nothing they drew off to stand by, but they too, were quickly discovered and subjected to a heavy but ineffective fire. There was obviously little chance of the block-ships getting in undetected, but half-an-hour later they began to creep along under the darkness of the shore led by Commander Arima in the Tenshu Maru of nearly 3,000 tons, the largest of them all. The Tiger Hill searchlights were now thoroughly alive and were sweeping systematically. The moment the blockships entered the light zone they were detected and met with a concentrated fire. Blinded by the beams, Commander Arima kept too close to the shore and took the ground over three miles from the entrance. His second, Hokoku Maru, warned of the mistake, kept a bit to starboard and passed on. Her next astern, Finsen Maru, did the same and both held steadily on for the entrance in spite of the storm of fire. As soon as they had opened the Gut the searchlight and guns of the Retvizan picked them up. A shell from the stranded battleship smashed the steering gear of the Hokoku Maru, set her afire and severed the explosion wires. She immediately grounded just outside the west of the entrance and was abandoned in flames. The Finsen Maru kept to starboard, but just as she was turning to rush the channel she brought up hard on a rock, and there she was abandoned and blown up. The fourth and fifth ships did no better than the first. Unaware of the mistake of their leader and unable in the glare to make out their landmarks they believed they had reached the entrance. Accordingly they blew themselves up in correct relative position alongside her and that was the end of it.
All the men were saved except one killed. From three of the ships they were gallantly rescued by the attendant torpedo-boats. From the other two they escaped in their own boats to Chifu. For some time they were entirely lost, but as soon as their whereabouts was known, so tender was the Admiral for their safety, that he detached his Rear-Admiral with two battleships and an armed merchant cruiser to bring them off.
Daring and nearly successful as the attempt to close the port had been, it had entirely failed. But to the Japanese this was not known. In the morning Admiral Dewa was sent in to reconnoitre. He reported that two of the sunken ships seemed to be blocking the entrance. He had also seen the Bayan outside and the Novik with five destroyers making for the port, but the cruisers were apparently unable to get in. They had, in fact, come out that morning as soon as it was light enough to be safe from their own batteries, which as usual, fired at anything they could see. The Novik and her attendant destroyers had been ordered to Liau-ti-shan to bring in a destroyer, which, in accordance with the established routine, was keeping night guard about Pigeon Bay in view of a possible landing. Sighting Admiral Dewa’s cruisers there and the whole Japanese fleet on the horizon the Novik had turned and run back after exchanging a few shots at ineffective range.
On Admiral Dewa’s report the Commander-in-Chief decided to postpone the bombardment in order to deliver that night a destroyer attack on the cruisers which he supposed to be trapped outside. The work was committed to the 4th destroyer division which had so highly distinguished itself in the gale. It was carried out with great coolness; the guard boats were eluded and several torpedoes were discharged at indistinct lights supposed to mark the position of the cruisers. But no harm was done and in the morning three of them, Bayan, Askold and Novik, came out to protect their own destroyers.
Being still under the impression that they could not get back into the port, the Admiral now decided to combine his bombardment with an attempt to destroy them with the fleet. Admiral Dewa was sent away with his squadron to Liau-ti-shan to prevent their escape that way, and the two armoured squadrons closed in to extreme range on the Dalny side. An action ensued with the ships and the forts with some indirect bombardment of the harbour, but again no harm was done on either side, and about half-past twelve, after the firing had lasted three-quarters of an hour, the Russian cruisers retired into the harbour and the Japanese drew off. For the moral effect, which was all that had been looked for from the bombardment, enough had been done, but it was obvious the blocking had failed.
Admiral Dewa was more fortunate. As he cruised off Liau-ti-shan two of the destroyers which had been doing night guard as usual were sighted creeping back for Port Arthur. He gave chase at once. One escaped, but the other was headed off and ran to Pigeon Bay and hid. There after a short search she was found and sunk by long range fire. With that the whole movement ended.
In the afternoon all sections of the fleet except the armoured cruisers made for Rooper Harbour to prepare for the next operation. It was of high importance, and it necessitated a change not only in the general distribution of the fleet, but also in its organisation; and the first step in the proceedings was that Admiral Kamimura took his squadron direct to Hakko to coal instead of going to Rooper Harbour, and Rear-Admiral Togo, as we have seen, was recalled from the Yangtse.
1 Yenisei laid 400 mines in Talien-hwan, Feb. 9–11.
Amur laid 121 minies in Deep and Kerr Bays, Feb. 16.
Amur laid 119 minies in Talien-hwan, Feb. 18.
Amur laid 60 minies in San-Shan-tau Strait (Talien-hwan), Feb. 20.
2 Combined Fleet Confidential Order No. 124, see Japanese Confidential History, I., p. 106.
3 Japanese Confidential History, Vol. I., page 122.
4 Rear-Admiral Togo’s Division (the Sixth) comprised at this time Idzumi (Flag), Akitsushima, and Suma, all third-class cruisers. The Chiyoda, his fourth ship, had not yet joined his flag from Chemulpho.
5 Japanese Published History II., page 162. The disarmament was done by removing all the ammunition, the breeches of the guns, heads and detonators of torpedoes, most of the small arms and the vital parts of the engines. The crew of 124 were sworn to take no further part in the present campaign and were repatriated in a French liner.
6 See post, Appendix D.
7 These “defended areas” were formally communicated to neutrals. They were supposed to be mined and all ships approaching them were subjected to examination and compulsory pilotage. Tokyo, Hakodate, Otaru, Sasebo, Takeshiki and Maizuru were declared on Feb. 10th; Nagasaki on the 13th, Tsutsu (S. Tsushima) on the 14th; Kii Channel on the 17th. Several others were declared during the course of the war, either to conceal preparations or to raise a false impression that there was something to conceal.