CHAPTER X.
FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MILITARY DEPLOYMENT AND ADMIRAL KAMIMURA’S DIVERSION IN THE SEA OF JAPAN.
April 15th to 30th.
[Charts F 2., G., H.]
THE concentration of the main fleet at Haiju on April 16th marks the commencement of what is, perhaps, the most interesting and instructive and certainly the most original phase of the war. That phase was specially distinguished by the Japanese as the period of “Combined Operations.” Not only do we now enter a new stage in the development of the war plan, but we are also dealing with a new departure in the method of conducting it. From now onward the movement of the two services goes hand in hand and our standpoint must be one from which the operations both on land and at sea can be kept in view as closely and clearly as possible. The war in fact becomes essentially amphibious, and so intimately are naval and military operations knit together in a single theatre that the work of the one service in unintelligible apart from that of the other.
The military situation then when the fleet came to anchor was this. The concentration on the Yalu, which should have been completed on April 19th, had been delayed by the weather, but since the restoration of the bridges on the 11th, it had been proceeding. The whole army was now in motion, and on the 15th General Kuroki had left Anju for the front. The two or three days’ check with which he had met was not without its anxieties. Large bodies of Russians were moving from Liau-yang to swell the “Eastern Force,” and until the Japanese concentration was complete General Kuroki’s advance guard would be in considerable danger. Even when the whole army was assembled the passage of the river could not be attempted until sufficient bridging material had arrived and this was now being pushed up to Chorusan with all speed by Admiral Hosoya.
The date fixed for the first great battle is uncertain. By the general war plan it was to precede the landing of the Second Army in Liau-tung, which, as General Kuroki had just been informed, was to take place on May 1st.1
The inference is that the battle on the Yalu was originally timed two or three days earlier. On this basis, at any rate, Admiral Togo proceeded to make his arrangements. It was understood that the Second Army would begin to leave Japan on the 20th. Chinampho in the Ping-yang Inlet was to be its concentration point and the last group of transports was expected there on the 30th. A few days earlier the whole of the 12 blockships would be ready at Haiju, and the Liau-tung movement could begin the moment the Yalu was passed by the First Army.
The dominant fact then for the fleet was that it had a fortnight in hand, and by arrangement with the Admiralty it was to be employed so far as possible in giving the crews a much needed rest. No further demonstration was to be made against Port Arthur till the critical moment arrived.
This relaxation did not apply, however, to the whole of the fleet. It will be remembered that in the Russian war plan there was a weak spot which had given the Staff much anxiety and caused a considerable difference of opinion. In fixing their concentration point at Liau-yang it had been recognised that it was tainted with a serious drawback. With the advantage of sea transport it would be open to the Japanese to check the flow of troops from the north by making demonstrations against Vladivostok and the Maritime Province. It would seem that in the opinion of the Imperial Staff at Tokyo the need and opportunity for such a demonstration had arisen. The need was the rapid increase of the Russian forces in South Manchuria, and the opportunity the knowledge they had now acquired of how great had been the effect of the last blow at the Port Arthur Squadron. In spite, therefore, of the heavy responsibilities that lay before the fleet in the Yellow Sea and its crying need for rest, it was decided to divide it and send Admiral Kamimura into the Sea of Japan with the two divisions which had been least actively employed in the late operations.
The idea would appear to have come from Tokyo, though it was approved by Admiral Togo. “He judged,” we are told officially, “that the enemy, having lost one battleship, a destroyer, and their Commander-in-Chief, would be greatly demoralised and would not have the courage to come out at present; and with the idea of diverting to Vladivostok the troops which appeared just then to be collecting in Liau-tung and at the same time of destroying the enemy’s ships in that port, should opportunity arise, he gave Admiral Kamimura orders to proceed to Vladivostok as quickly as possible.” It will be observed that according to this statement the primary object of the division of the fleet, as on the occasion of the previous movement against Vladivostok, was military, in just accordance with the general function now assigned to the Navy. It is obvious that as large numbers of troops were on the point of embarking in Japan for a secret destination, the movement, prepared as it was by the recent demonstrations in Posiette and America Bays, was calculated to develop fully the disturbing power which is the most notable feature of such combined demonstrations.
The force assigned to Admiral Kamimura was four of his own armoured cruisers and one of the new ones; Admiral Uriu’s division of four protected cruisers and one from the Straits’ Squadron; one division of destroyers and two of torpedo-boats from the Straits flotilla with their parent ship and two colliers.2 With this force he was to be responsible for the whole of the Sea of Japan and the guard of the Straits. Nothing else was left there. As soon as he reached Sylvia Basin, Admiral Kataoka who, with the Fifth and Sixth Divisions, had been in charge of the Straits station during Admiral Kamimura’s absence in the Yellow Sea, was to bring up both divisions to the main fleet to act as escort and support for the army; and even the Maizuru flotilla was also withdrawn.
With these orders Admiral Kamimura parted company the same day that the fleet assembled at Haiju. On April 18th he was already at Sylvia Basin where he stayed to clear his first collier and for his force to assemble, and Admiral Kataoka could leave for Admiral Togo’s base.
For the rest of the main fleet all was quiet, except for certain minor work which could no longer be postponed. As yet no landing place had been fixed for the connecting force which was to operate between the First and Second Armies. It was the last step in the general deployment and the one point in the Japanese war plan which the Russians had not anticipated.3 It was of the utmost importance that concealment should be maintained till the force was ashore, and to this end the initiation of the movement had been held back till the last possible moment. It could now be no longer delayed and on April 19th Admiral Togo received orders to commence this delicate operation with the utmost attainable secrecy. It was no less important to make sure of the islands which were to serve henceforth as the advanced fleet base for the combined operations, and on the following day Admiral Dewa with one armoured and two protected cruisers, three torpedo-boats and his despatch-vessel was detached to carry out both duties.
His orders were first to sweep Thornton Haven for mines and connect it up by cable with Haiju. He was then to sweep the channels and anchorages in the Elliot Islands.
The section of the coast in which he was to search for the required landing place extended from West Tunguz Cape to the Ta-yang Ho, some 15 miles to the eastward. It was, in fact, a stretch of coast lying approximately midway between the Second Army’s point of disembarkation and the First Army’s concentration point at Wiju on the Yalu.
The work, of course, required the utmost care. Not a ship must appear in sight of land. Taking his division, therefore, to Thornton Haven, Admiral Dewa there requisitioned four junks and towed them as near to Tunguz Cape as was safe. Thence they were taken in a little nearer by his torpedo-boats and then with disguised surveying parties on board they were cast off to make the necessary search. By the evening of the 22nd they returned to the Admiral’s anchorage with a very discouraging report. The best place they had found was a narrow beach under East Tunguz Cape. Even there the transports could only get within 4
miles of the shore, and the natives reported the whole coast was as bad. But the Admiral was not satisfied. Sending away his armoured cruiser and one other to search the Elliot Islands, and the third to report to the Commander-in-Chief, he resolved to stay in his despatch-vessel and examine the place himself. For two days a dense fog brought everything to a standstill, but on the 25th he was able to steal in in a torpedo-boat, and after a search further to the westward found in the West Bay of West Tunguz Cape a long sandy beach where the transports could anchor within four miles, the steam launches could get within half a mile and the boats could reach the beach itself. These results he reported by wireless and next day returned to Haiju.
In the Sea of Japan the fog which had delayed the settlement of the Tunguz landing place had had a much more serious effect. There the scarcely expected opportunity of dealing a blow at the Vladivostok Squadron had arisen. Since the middle of March the northern detachment had had a new commander in Rear-Admiral Iessen, a man whose personality and high reputation put new spirit into the squadron; still it had remained inactive, but this was not from lack of enterprise. It was because under the influence of Admiral Makarov its function in the war plan had been entirely changed. It was no longer charged with secondary operations upon the Japanese lines of communication. He had absorbed it as an integral factor in the vigorous line of action that he had planned. Up to the time of his death, it will be recalled, he had been bent on concentrating everything upon his determination that the Second Japanese army should never be permitted to land in peace, either in Liau-tung or Newchwang; and at any risk the northern detachment was to strike in time with him at the landing place. Admiral Iessen had therefore been ordered to devote himself absolutely to this object. He was not to leave Vladivostok but to keep his force in hand for instant action when the word was given. He would then put to sea in secret; and in secret and by night break through the Korean Straits. This done he was to proceed direct to the point of disembarkation which would be communicated and there he would meet the Port Arthur Squadron.4
For five weeks, therefore, after Admiral Iessen’s arrival he contented himself with taking his ships out for the day for exercises, and it was not till April 22nd that the squadron was surprised with the long-expected order that it was to proceed to sea on the morrow for a cruise. The object was not disclosed. Indeed, according to instructions, it was kept so profound a secret that the ships did not provision till they were out in the Eastern Bosporus Channel. The reason for this sudden decision is not known, but it may well have been connected with the active deployment of the Japanese on the Yalu. General Kuroki had already arrived at Wiju and the previous day his whole army was concentrated. On his arrival he had informed Admiral Hosoya that he meant to cross the Yalu on April 30th and had begged for naval assistance in the river. In response, after consulting the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Hosoya sent him a flotilla consisting of two gun-boats, two torpedo-boats, and four armed steamers,5 and they appeared at Yong-am-po in the estuary early on the day on which Admiral Iessen issued his orders. There were also reports that Japanese vessels had appeared at Gensan and the first purpose of the cruise was to escort torpedo-boats to that place in order to destroy anything they found. This done the squadron was to cross to the Tsuguru Strait and make an attack on Hakodate.
As a matter of fact the whole of Admiral Kamimura’s Squadron had just arrived off Gensan. He had not been able to leave Sylvia Basin till the 20th, and there he had issued his orders which again emphasised the object of the operation. “We have not” they ran “obtained any certain intelligence about the Vladivostok Squadron lately, but according to the most recent information, they sometimes come out of the port during the day, being always in harbour at night. This squadron has the duty of diverting to Vladivostok the Russian troops which seem to be assembling in Liau-tung, and of destroying the enemy’s squadron, should opportunity arise.” Eager as he was to get upon his field of action he found it necessary to go by way of Gensan in order to permit his flotilla to coal and water, and this was the explanation of his presence there, and the modification of his plan to which it led.
On entering the port he was informed that Russian troops had crossed the frontier and been seen at various points on the coast road. About the 19th a party of 250 were reported to be advancing from Kil-tsiou, a place behind Cape Bruat, upon Pouk-tsien, close to Ostolopof Bay, where the Japanese had a signal station.6 This was little more than 100 miles up the road from Gensan, and in conference between the Admiral and the Commandant of the garrison it was agreed that something should be done to deal with the menace. The Commandant had suggested that a combined demonstration should be made at various points up the coast as far as the treaty port of Song-chin, which the Japanese colony had been forced to abandon before the Russian advance, and for this purpose the Admiral consented that the 11th torpedo-boat division should be used as well as his fleet transport, the Kinshu Maru, though she was still full of coal and rice, with the proviso that they must be all back at Gensan by the 28th, when he expected to return with the squadron.
With these arrangements completed the squadron sailed from Gensan in the morning of the 23rd for a rendezvous off Peter the Great Bay,7 as Admiral Iessen was coming out of Vladivostok. To all appearance he was doomed. He was making direct for his enemy, and as the Rurik had to be sent back with some defect in her engine-room, he had only three cruisers with his flag.
No sooner, however, was Admiral Kamimura well clear of the bay than he saw the horizon shrouded in fog, and by mid-day he was into it. All day it continued, and next morning it was worse. Admiral Iessen was, of course, no better off. Twice he had had to anchor before he could get away, and finally did not leave till sunset. Still both squadrons held on and between 8.0 a.m. and 10.0 a.m. on the 24th each was taking in wireless indications from the other. Admiral Iessen judged from the resemblance to signals intercepted at Port Arthur that an enemy’s squadron must be passing him within 20 miles. Still he kept his course, and so did Admiral Kamimura. But to the Japanese Admiral it began to be obvious that in all probability he would be unable to carry out his programme, and that he might have to turn from the land. He therefore called up his flotilla within bugle sound and informed them that when they heard the “Fall in” it would mean he was altering course to south-east, and that they were to carry on independently and do the best they could, meeting him next morning off Askold Island. The fog, however, only grew denser as he advanced northward. By 4.0 p.m., when he judged he was upon his rendezvous, if was hopeless, and he decided to cancel these orders and carry his whole force southward off the land.
Keeping this course till 6.0 the next morning he was by dead reckoning 120 miles east of Cape Bruat, and as the weather was as bad as ever he thought it best to return to Gensan and wait there till it cleared. Three hours later Admiral Iessen was close off the port and sent in his torpedo-boats.
All this time the little Gensan expedition had been waiting for a chance to begin its operations. A company of troops had been placed on board the Kinshu Maru,8 and the intention was to land them near Ni-auen, where, as the place lies just north of Pouk-tsien, they hoped to cut off the retreat of the Russians. But the fog made any movement impossible, and it was not till 6.0 a.m. on the 25th, just as Admiral Kamimura was turning towards the port, that they had managed to get away. Thus, as luck would have it, when the Russian torpedo-boats put in they found nothing but a Japanese merchantman, which they searched and torpedoed.9 At 2.0 p.m. they rejoined the Admiral outside, and the squadron proceeded northward towards Shestakof Point on its way to attack Hakodate. For the Russians the movement was peculiarly happy, for while it carried them safely out of Admiral Kamimura’s way, it brought them directly on the track of the little expedition from Gensan.
Three hours after leaving they encountered another Japanese ship, the Oginoura Maru, of 220 tons, which they sank, and while they were thus engaged the Japanese were re-embarking at Pallada Road. Having found no trace of the reported enemy at Ni-auen, they at once marched back to their ship, and at 6.0 p.m. began to return. As they proceeded the weather grew so threatening that the torpedo-boats had to leave the Kinshu Maru and run for shelter to Ostolopof Bay, a small inlet under Cape Schwartz, just south of Pallada Road. It was a stroke of luck, for five hours later, off Cape Shestakof, she ran into the midst of the Russian Squadron and, mistaking it for that of Admiral Kamimura (or, as some say, for a British Squadron) she stopped, and it was not till an officer went off from her that the mistake was discovered. Escape was then impossible. An attempt was made to conceal the troops in the hold, but while the crew was being removed they were discovered. As they refused to surrender the boarding party left her and she was torpedoed. Thereupon, the soldiers rushed on deck and began to fire at the nearest cruiser with their rifles. The Russians returned it with their secondary guns, but the Japanese kept up their fire with spirit till in a quarter-of-an-hour the transport went down under them. A few of the soldiers, after great privations, got to shore in the boats; a few more were taken prisoners, and from these and the transport crew Admiral Iessen learned, as he suspected, that a Japanese Squadron was really in the neighbourhood of his base.
Without more ado he gave up all idea of Hakodate and ran for a landfall north of Vladivostok to ascertain if the port was open. He found it was, and in the evening of the 27th was able to run in in safety.
As for Admiral Kamimura, owing to the care with which he had to approach the coast it was not till past noon that day as he was about to enter Gensan, that he heard the Russians had appeared, and that the Consul, after every effort to communicate with the expedition, had failed to hear anything of its fate. He also reported that the Russians were believed to have mined the harbour and that it was unsafe to enter. The Admiral’s first idea was to proceed at once northward with his armoured cruisers and destroyers at high speed to endeavour to cut off the enemy from their port. Orders were issued accordingly, but directly afterwards the lost torpedo-boat division came in to report how they had been compelled to leave the transport. Of her there was still no tidings. The torpedo-boats were at once sent back to look for her, and as fresh information convinced the Admiral he could by no means overtake the enemy, he decided to give up the idea of chasing and make some effort to find the missing transport before he resumed his programme. Anchoring for the night outside he started early next morning to search the coast northward. Just then the torpedo-boats came back to report they had been as high as Shestakof Point and had seen nothing either of the enemy or the transport. They were ordered to continue the search with the help of the despatch-vessel, while the Admiral carried on to the northward. During the day wreckage was picked up and subsequently a boat, which left little doubt of the transport’s fate or of the uselessness of further search.
By 5.0 p.m. on the 28th the squadron reached position D, off Peter the Great Bay, and proceeded to carry out the modified programme that had been arranged. The first step was to send away the torpedo-boat division to lay a minefield a mile south of Skripleff Island, while the squadron steamed seawards for the night. At daylight on the 29th it was back off Askold Island, where the torpedo-boats rejoined to report the success of their mission. Then, under escort of the whole flotilla, the Nikko Maru (its parent ship) was sent in to lay another mine-field off Shkota Island, to the southward of the first. This work was to be followed by an indirect bombardment by the Kasuga over the first mine-field, but as the squadron drew in a Russian mine was seen adrift. In view of the danger the Admiral decided to abandon not only the bombardment, but also a mine-field which the Idzumi was to lay. A fourth mine-field was to be laid by the Takachiho off Currie Channel, the western entrance, and this was risked under escort of the flotilla. By 12.30, when the work was finished, 75 mines had been laid, and as it was then obvious that a bad spell of weather was coming on, the Admiral decided to give up all further operations and return to Gensan at once to meet the colliers for which he had telegraphed to Sasebo.
By the evening of the 30th he was back at his anchorage where he heard the fate of the transport, and how complete was the failure of his cruise in securing any tangible result. He also found at Gensan so serious an alarm at the prospect of his leaving the coast that he telegraphed to Tokyo and his Chief for further instructions. The reply from the Admiralty was that he must act in accordance with Admiral Togo’s orders, and when those orders came in they directed him to take over the guard of the Tsushima Straits and make Takeshiki his base. For that station he accordingly left on May 2nd, and his ill-fated operation was at an end.
It had proved to be one of those incalculable games of blind man’s buff which have been so marked a feature in the annals of naval warfare, and the luck had been heavily on the Russian side. With admirable judgment the Japanese had planned their movements at a time when, if ever, the situation must tempt the Vladivostok detachment to venture a counter-stroke. But for a fog the two squadrons must have been in contact on the morning of the 24th, and the escape of the Russians would have been almost impossible. Again, but for the false news on which the Japanese torpedo-boats left Gensan a few hours before the Russians arrived, a flotilla action must have occurred, which might well have delayed Admiral Iessen off the port long enough to enable the Japanese squadron to catch him. Finally if the Kinshu Maru had only taken refuge, as her escort did, the Russians would not have got the intelligence on which they gave up Hakodate and hurried back to their port before Admiral Kamimura had time to close it.
During his absence the situation in the Yellow Sea had developed rapidly. On April 24th General Oku, the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army, had arrived at Haiju to settle the details of the coming operation with Admiral Togo. The transports and blockships were arriving in rapid succession, the former at Chinampho, the latter at Haiju. On the Yalu everything was so forward that the passage had been fixed for the 30th. The flotilla had landed all the bridging material and the howitzer batteries at Rika-ho, and as they were being pushed forward the preliminary operations had begun. While the Yalu flotilla made demonstrations against Antung on the right flank of the Russians, the islands in front of Wiju were seized by the army, and the necessary bridging could begin.
Yet it would seem that the situation was still too uncertain for the actual day to be fixed for the Second Army’s movement. The original date of May 1st had clearly been abandoned. It was not till the 25th, the day after Admiral Togo’s conference with General Oku, that he issued orders for the blockships, and called for volunteers to man them. The response was even more enthusiastic and embarrassing than on the two previous occasions. The men of the Straits Squadron, who as yet had had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves, were especially insistent and clamorous, and many others who had served before again sent in their names. Not a tithe could be accepted. A selection had to be made, and the way it was done throws a curious light on the psychology of the war.
On the last occasion, it will be remembered, the Admiral, in his tenderness for the lives of brave men, would accept none that had gone through the ordeal before, and it was only the importance of having experienced leaders that induced him to permit even the same officers to expose themselves again. On this occasion experience was more than ever necessary. The Russian precautions against such an attack had been perfected, and the success of the operation seemed little short of vital to the safety of the army. Considering, moreover, how severe was the strain already on the Japanese transports, the sacrifice of shipping which the new enterprise involved was very serious. More than 25,000 tons were to be expended, and their cost had been over £300,000. When so much was at stake, it would have been expected that every means of securing efficient handling would have been rigorously adopted. Yet it was not so. An Imperial message had been received which forbade the old hands to be used again. Tried by the highest Japanese ethics to volunteer for such work again and again was no longer a virtue but a vice. It savoured of kesshi—a morbid determination to be killed. It could not be permitted, and the Admiral had to select the whole party from the new volunteers. It went for nothing that the improved skill and coolness displayed in the second attempt showed the vital importance of local knowledge and experience. More than this, the claims of the Straits Squadron were regarded as so strong that nearly all the officers and most of the men were chosen from it. None of them had seen the place, none of them had even been under fire. Yet beneath the practical and methodical conduct which had hitherto characterised the war this lofty sentiment lay undisturbed, and it now asserted itself so strongly that the operation upon which everything seemed to hang, and for which so heroic a sacrifice was being made, was committed to untried men.
The selection once made the practical spirit reasserted itself and steps were forthwith taken to minimise the chances of failure which were being deliberately taken. The new men themselves submitted to the Admiral the importance of their having a sight of the port before the attempt was made. On the 27th, therefore, the officers were distributed in three divisions of destroyers and sent away to Port Arthur in charge of Rear-Admiral Nashiba with his sub-division of the battle squadron. The next night, which fortunately was very clear, they were able to make a close and careful reconnaissance, and on the 29th they were back again at Haiju.
Meanwhile, the final arrangements had been made in the distribution of the fleet for its divers duties. As a result of the conference between the Admiral and General Oku at Haiju on the 24th, it had been settled that the army should sail from Chinampho in four groups, the first of which would be attended with piloting and escort vessels, while the rest would find their own way, except when the navigation began to be specially dangerous. For them no escort would be required, as the main fleet would be in its covering position when they moved. Three days later the Admiral committed the whole of the escort and support duties to Admiral Kataoka, and he in his turn issued detailed instructions to his divisional commanders.
Admiral Hosoya, with so much of the Seventh Division as was not engaged in supporting the First Army at Chorushan and on the Yalu, was then at Chinampho guarding the terminal area of the Second Army’s concentration.10 To him was committed the seizure of the landing place and the actual disembarkation; that is, he had the true support squadron.
Admiral Kataoka with the Nisshin and the Fifth and Sixth Divisions, that is to say, his own and that of Rear-Admiral Togo, would furnish the true escort, and would meet the transports at Choda Island just outside the Ping-yang inlet. The whole of the covering work, including the blocking expedition, would be directly under the Commander-in-Chief, while the new advanced base would be established by Rear-Admiral Miura, who held the post of “Harbour-Master of the Fleet’s War Rendezvous.”
All this was in accord with our own traditional practice. But there remains a feature of the arrangements which calls for special remark as being without precedent. As the selection of the landing place had been left entirely to the Navy, so the fleet was also to be responsible for its seizure without any help from the Army. This was quite new, and special arrangements had been made to give it effect. In the Naval Barracks at Sasebo a large body of reserves had been mobilised as reliefs for the fleet. The call on them had been very small, and so soon as it was decided to land the Second Army in Liau-tung steps had been taken to form from them a naval brigade of a thousand men to seize the landing place. The men selected were at once submitted to a severe course of shore training and “practised daily in the details of land warfare. They were made to double over hills and scramble up cliffs with the idea of rendering them strong in body and smart in their movements.” On April 22nd, that is the day after the First Army was concentrated on the Yalu, two armed merchant cruisers11 had been sent to fetch them, and on the 29th they reached Haiju. There, under Admiral Togo’s immediate directions they were organised into two battalions of three companies each the vacancies in the officer’s list being filled from the fleet. The whole was under the command of Captain Nomoto with a Commander as Staff Officer, and each battalion was also under a Commander. The companies were under Lieutenants or Sub-Lieutenants, with Sub-Lieutenants or Warrant Officers in charge of the three sub-sections of which most of them consisted. In addition, there were attached a Carpenter’s Party, an Ammunition Party, a Sanitary Party, and a Commissariat Party, and to each battalion a Signal Party, and, finally, from the fleet itself were organised two field-gun parties under a Sub-Lieutenant. This done they remained at Haiju to shake down till the word came for the movement which they were to lead.
As yet the day for the landing had not been fixed, but by the 30th General Kuroki had got his army into so favourable a position that he was able to announce his intention of forcing the passage on the morrow. For the rest all was ready. The last of the Second Army’s transports had arrived, the last touches to the blockship gear had been given, even the Maizuru torpedo-boats had just joined, and on the 30th Admiral Togo was able to issue his operation orders for the great movement. The following day, May 1st, simultaneously with General Kuroki’s advance, his own covering movement with the blockships was to begin. The first group of transports was to leave Chinampho on the 3rd, and the actual landing to be made on the 4th, just twelve weeks since the first shot had been fired.12
