THE LANDING AT CHEMULPHO AND DESTRUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN GUARD SHIPS.
[Charts B 2 and C.]
AS Admiral Togo anticipated in falling back “to start a fresh course of action,” the movement he had been charged to cover was complete. It had been carried out with entire success but not without anxiety. When at 4.30 on February 7th the transports and their escort parted company with the Main Fleet at Single Island it was believed that three Russian battleships were at sea, and, although the last information was that the Varyag and Koreetz were still the only enemy’s ships at Chemulpho, there was a possibility of the unlocated units joining them at any time. To Admiral Uriu, therefore, had to be left the responsibility of deciding at what point the troops could be landed safely. His decision would depend upon what he heard when he reached Baker Island next morning, where at Admiral Togo’s suggestion the Stationnaire Chiyoda had been instructed to meet him, if possible, with the latest report of the situation at Chemulpho and the last word over the wires from Tokyo and Chifu.
Except for the menace of the three Russian battleships he had little to fear. His squadron consisted of his own four cruisers1 (three of the second class and one of the third), besides the armoured cruiser Asama and his two divisions of tòrpedo-boats with their depôt ship and a collier. In the event of meeting an enemy on the way the transports and merchantmen were to fall out, and if they lost company were to take refuge in Shoal Gulf, a deep inlet whose entrance is some thirty miles to the south-eastward of Baker Island, where they would await orders.
Unless the unlocated battleships had already gone to Chemulpho there was not much prospect of interference, seeing how strong was the cover which the Commander-in-Chief had arranged. To seawards and a little ahead of the transport squadron were Admiral Dewa’s cruisers making for the Sir James Hall Group by way of Clifford Island, about twenty miles west of Admiral Uriu’s track at this point; and by the time he reached it next morning Admiral Togo with the Combined Squadron would be off Rooper Harbour. To make his own ground sure he sent forward one of his torpedo divisions in two sections to search Asan Bay and the Prince Imperial Archipelago which lies off the approach to Chemulpho. The other division he kept with him, but as it came on to blow in the night it lost company.
Meanwhile at Chemulpho the Chiyoda under cover of the British cruiser Talbot was clearing for action and making every preparation to get away to Baker Island, or to sell her life dearly if a Russian expedition appeared. She had been passing some anxious hours, endeavouring, as the two Russian ships from time to time shifted their berths, to secure a position which would enable her to watch them both and at the same time give her a chance of getting to sea. In the afternoon of the 5th her Commander, Captain Murakami, knew war was decided on and that the Main Fleet was under orders to sail. Next day about noon he was informed by telegraph from Tokyo that the fleet had sailed and that he was to meet Admiral Uriu at Baker Island at 8.0 in the morning of the 8th. Later on his position was made still more anxious by news that hostilities had actually commenced with the capture of two Russian merchantmen. In fear that the enemy would get to hear of it and attack before he could execute his orders, he appears to have telegraphed to Tokyo for permission to torpedo them in the night. He actually got his torpedo gear ready, but the attack was forbidden on the ground that there were neutral men-of-war in the harbour. And not only this, for he was strictly charged to convey to Admiral Uriu a special order that nothing must be done to violate international law.
The night had, therefore, to be passed under intense strain. At any moment the announcement of hostilities might come to the ears of the Russians. But in the morning of the 7th there was no sign of anything unusual, and in the afternoon Captain Murakami began quietly to raise steam. After nightfall he sent off his last telegram to say the situation was unchanged, and then, under cover of the Talbol, he began to hoist in his boats in dead silence without pipes or lights. Having accomplished this without attracting attention he weighed with equal care and was able to steal away to sea unmolested.
About dawn on the 8th as he approached Baker Island he got into wireless touch with Admiral Uriu and conveyed to him the last news and instructions. To the prohibition against attacking the Russians in the presence of the foreign men-of-war he added a message which appears to have decided the Admiral in the difficult and responsible question which had been left to him. It had been forwarded by the Japanese Naval Attaché at Seoul from his military colleague and expressed a hope that the troops would be landed at Chemulpho, since for political reasons and for the sake of preserving order it was necessary they should enter Seoul without a moment’s delay.2 He added a rumour, which he did not credit, that the Russians were landing near Choppeki Point, the promontory just north of the Sir James Hall Group. By 8.30 the Chiyoda met the transport squadron at Baker Island. The lost torpedo division had rejoined and on hearing Captain Murakami’s report Admiral Uriu quickly made up his mind to proceed immediately and endeavour to land the troops as desired in order to forestall the threatened Pro-Russian outbreak.
To understand the difficulties to be faced and the method he meant to adopt, it must be recalled that the approach to the port lies between two islands, Richy to the north and Yung-hung-do to the south. Off the south of Richy is the small Philip Island, and north of Yung-hung-do are reefs ending in the Pender Rock. Between this rock and Philip Island is a fairway nearly four miles wide. About three miles inside this line lies the Island of Yodolmi, and here begins the real entrance to the port, a channel nearly 10 miles long running roughly north-east up to the landing place. About six or seven miles above Yodolmi the Varyag and Koreetz were lying, and in the same anchorage was the Talbot, with the other three neutrals, French, Italian, and American. In this situation the Admiral appears to have decided the landing was feasible. If the Russians remained where they were in the midst of the neutral ships they could scarcely attack the transports, and if they came out he had ample force to overwhelm them. Accordingly, shortly after noon, when he reached the mouth of Asan Bay, he summoned his commanding officers on board the flagship, and issued his plan of operations.
Yodolmi Island was to be regarded as the limit of the port. If the Russians appeared outside it they were to be attacked and sunk, but above the island no attack was to be made unless the Russians fired the first shot. Subject to this proviso the Asama, Chiyoda, and one second-class cruiser, with one torpedo division, were to take the transports straight in. On passing Yodolmi the torpedo-boats would go ahead, and taking care to avoid any hostile demeanour two of them would anchor in a position screened from fire, and two where they could instantly deal with the enemy’s ships. The two smaller cruisers would take berths close to the one the Chiyoda had been occupying, while the Asama would carry on with the transports and anchor in the most favourable position for disembarkation. The landing would commence immediately, so as not to lose the evening tide, and would continue without cessation till all the troops were ashore. The rest of the squadron would eventually anchor off Philip Island, and there before sunset the Asama was to rejoin the flagship. Of the other torpedo division two boats would remain with the Admiral, and two lie in wait during the night at Yodolmi in case the Russians should try to steal away. Before daybreak the Admiral would move the main squadron to Asan Bay, and there the two cruisers from Chemulpho were to join him as soon as the landing was complete. Finally, if the torpedo division that accompanied the transports noticed the enemy going down the channel they were to give chase and to attack them so soon as they were past Yodolmi.
By the time these arrangements were complete information reached the Admiral which convinced him there was not an hour to lose. It was brought by some army officers in a small Japanese steamer direct from Chemulpho. During the past 48 hours the situation at Seoul had grown so critical that the Japanese authorities felt that nothing but the prompt arrival of the troops could save it, and the officers had been hurried out to ascertain where the transports were. They were also able to report that the Russian ships had made no movement, and as at the same time the torpedo-boats that had been searching Asan came in and reported all quiet, the Admiral decided to start at once. Such risk as there was must be taken, and all he asked of General Kigoshi, who was in command of the troops, was that on reaching Chemulpho everything would be done to get them ashore with the utmost despatch.
Here we touch a point where the Japanese practice for combined operations differed essentially from our own, and it must be clearly understood, for the difference goes to the root of the matter. Up to the time of the war with China, when Japan was mainly under British influence, the transport of troops oversea was in the hands of the Navy as with us. From that time it was taken over by the Army, and was regarded as an operation generically identical with the transport of troops by rail. A Transport Department was created under the General Staff, which was charged with the entire work of transporting and landing. The function of the Navy became purely maritime. After consultation with the Army in the manner we have seen, it still determined, within the arranged limits, the place of landing, the order of sailing, and the courses to be adopted. It was also charged with protection of the transit and of the landing, but there its duties ended. The army provided its own landing flotilla (mainly in the form of ship-borne sampans which took the place of our own flat-boats) and its own disembarkation and shore gear. There was indeed a general understanding that the transport flotilla would be supplemented by the boats of the fleet when they were available, but fundamentally the duty of the fleet was protective, and the whole work of disembarking the troops, and of establishing their base, was left to an Army Disembarkation Staff. Such an arrangement was, of course, at variance with our own traditional view of that intimate co-operation in spirit and in action which makes a combined force a single entity. It is to be conjectured that so complete a disregard of the methods of a country whose experience and success in such work is unrivalled, was due to German tuition and German neglect of British war history. On the whole by dint of practice and the careful selection and training of officers for the Transport and Disembarkation Staffs the system appears to have worked well—that is so long as the difficulties of weather or navigation were not too great for landsmen to overcome. But, as we shall see, where difficulties of this kind occurred it did break down, and recourse had to be had to something more like our own system. For the present operation the Japanese system stood, and Admiral Uriu had nothing to do with getting the troops ashore. Consequently his arrangements for the anxious situation in which he found himself must depend on the celerity with which the Army Disembarkation Staff could do its work. His authority over the operation, however, did extend so far as to permit him to issue an order to the transports that they were to leave not later than 6.0 a.m., even if the disembarkation was not quite complete.3
For the Russians in the harbour the tension of the situation, which had sent the Japanese army officers out, was no less disturbing. Every indication pointed to the crisis being at hand and for a fortnight, it is said, M. Pavloff had been without any telegraphic communication from Port Arthur. He decided, therefore, this same afternoon to send away the Koreetz with despatches for the Viceroy to explain the state of affairs and ask for instructions. Consequently after Admiral’s Uriu’s advanced squadron had passed Yodolmi they saw her coming down. The Japanese went to battle quarters endeavouring, not with entire success, to conceal an appearance of hostility. Still the Koreetz held on quietly, the guard saluting as she passed between the cruiser line and the torpedo-boats. The Japanese ships took no notice except that the Asama sheered a little to port and got between the Russian and the transports. The torpedo-boats, however, mindful of their orders to attack anything they saw coming down channel promptly turned 16 points and gave chase. When close up with Yodolmi one of them took the ground, but two of the others each discharged a torpedo at about 300 metres (330 yards). Both missed and the Koreetz began to fire. Thereupon the Asama, which was 5,000 metres (5,500 yards) away up the river with the transports, turned and began to bring them back. By this time, however, the Koreetz had observed that the Admiral’s division was barring her way outside, and ceasing fire after a few shots she turned and began to run back towards Chemulpho. Thereupon the Asama signalled to the transports to resume their course up channel and turned again herself to accompany them.
The incident was serious enough to alter Admiral Uriu’s intention of anchoring at Philip Island. Instead of remaining outside he brought his three ships close up to the Chemulpho anchorage to display his force. Then leaving the third-class cruiser Akashi with the transports he went out again to take up his night station outside. All this time the Varyag gave no sign of opposition and from the moment the transports were anchored the sampans, each capable of holding 50 men, were lowered and at 6.15 the disembarkation began.
The whole affair was of a most abnormal kind and for the neutral officers the situation was hardly less delicate than for the Russians. All they knew, beyond the attempt to torpedo the Koreetz, was that early that morning the American Military Attaché had arrived . from Shanghai on board the Russian ship Sungari and had announced that war was to be declared that day. The captain of the Varyag had no orders except that he was not to oppose a Japanese landing before declaration and on no account to leave Chemulpho without orders. As soon, therefore, as he had made all preparations for repelling an attack in the night, he put off to consult the captain of the Talbot.
Assuring him he did not mean to commit any hostile act he suggested that, as the senior neutral officer present, he should call on the Japanese commanding officer and endeavour to secure a like assurance from the enemy. This the British Captain did, and after making a formal protest against any violation of the neutrality of the port and informing the Japanese officers that the Russians had no intention of breaking the peace, he received an assurance that no attack would be made unless the Russians began. This guarantee was at once conveyed to the Varyag, and the night passed quietly.
The landing was not expected by the Admiral to be completed till 6.0 a.m. But with a regular port at the disposal of the Army Staff the Japanese system had worked excellently. So active indeed had been General Kigoshi in response to his colleague’s last signal that the landing was finished by half-past two, and in the course of the morning the transports were clear away. The Asama had rejoined the flag as arranged the previous evening, the Akashi and the torpedo-boats followed, leaving only the Chiyoda in the harbour in order to make the necessary communications to the enemy and the neutrals in view of the actual commencement of hostilities. The tranquillity did not outlast the night. At 7.0 in the morning the Captain of the Talbot received from Admiral Uriu a formal notification that war had begun and that it was his intention, if by midday the Russians refused to leave the port in response to the invitation he was sending them, to attack them where they lay. The attack would not take place before 4.0 p.m. and he requested that before that time the neutrals would shift their berths out of harm’s way. This request was ignored, the British Officer replying with a formal acknowledgment of the Japanese communication and an intimation that he would hold the Admiral responsible for any damage to British ships and property. A subsequent request that he should convey the Admiral’s letter to the Varyag was refused altogether.
Each of the neutral captains received an identical intimation, and about an hour later all except the American came on board the Talbot to concert common action. The Captain of the Varyag, who meanwhile had received the Japanese summons to leave, also arrived with a suggestion that the neutrals should escort his two ships clear of territorial waters, but it was a course they felt it would be improper to adopt. The right of neutrals to defend the neutrality of a foreign port is far too shadowy to permit any measure which would improve the position of one of the belligerents. They were forced to decline, but agreed, as the Korean flag was still flying in the harbour, to forward a joint protest against the breach of Korean neutrality which an attack in the anchorage would entail. The protest was endorsed and repeated by the diplomatic agents ashore. The naval officers further agreed that in case the Russians sailed they would remain at anchor where they were with steam up and the boats ready to succour the wounded of either side. If, however, the Russians did not move, they would weigh at 2.0 and follow the Talbot clear of the fall of projectiles and work together to save life, after the action was over.
Accordingly about 10.0 the Talbot’s cutter was sent away with a lieutenant to carry the joint protest to the Japanese Admiral. All anxiety, however, was quickly at an end. Before leaving the Talbot, the Russian Captain announced his intention of meeting the Japanese challenge with an attempt to break out. Whatever happened he would never surrender and never fight in a neutral roadstead. On reaching his ship he called his officers together and communicated his intention. It was received in both ships with enthusiasm and all agreed unanimously when the ships could no longer be fought to blow them up.
Shortly after 11.0, in pursuance of this heroic resolution, the Varyag weighed and, followed by her consort, stood down the channel, the neutral ships turning up the guard to salute as they passed.
As she neared Yodolmi, the Varyag could see the six Japanese cruisers disposed apparently in line of bearing athwart the entrance. This was not the actual Japanese disposition. Admiral Uriu indeed was not expecting an attempt to break out. After delivering his communication in the harbour, the Chiyoda had rejoined him at the Philip Island anchorage reporting there was no sign of the Russians moving. He was in consequence busy elaborating a scheme for sinking them at their moorings without injury to the neutrals. He had, however, previously made dispositions for a complete blockade. The Naniwa, his flagship, and the Niitaka were to watch in a position north of Humann Island (some 7 miles S.E. of Yodolmi) where they would block the main channel through the islands to the open sea. The armoured cruiser Asama was to take station alone nearer in, at a position south of Philip Island. The other two cruisers with the Chiyoda were to form a second line six miles south of the Admiral, near Cat Island, while beyond them the Chiyoda was to keep a look-out to seaward.
When just before noon, the Asama signalled the enemy coming out, the Admiral hurriedly ordered the squadron to proceed to their stations. The two Cat Island cruisers held away to the southward, but the Chiyoda was ordered to follow the Asama, who had slipped. The flagship did the same with the Niitaka, but instead of making for her assigned position, she led after the Asama. The Asama was quickly within range and at 12.204 opened fire with her 8-inch guns at 7,000 metres (7,700 yards). Two hits were soon recorded; then the 6-inch began to tell and a few minutes later others of the nearest Japanese ships joined in at long range and everything was concentrated on the Varyag. For a quarter of an hour she stood up to it with the greatest gallantry and then about 12.45, with her steering gear gone, on fire in several places and with most of her guns disabled, she ran for the shelter of Yodolmi to try to repair damages. The Asama was at once ordered to close and the rest were signalled to turn and stand in. Seeing this the Varyag gave up. The Asama was still hitting her and other ships were getting the range. Both her range-finding stations were now gone; another 8-inch shell made a huge hole below water, a fresh fire had broken out in the sick bay and she had only her two after guns left. Besides splinters from shells bursting in the water she had received all told three 8-inch hits and eight 6-inch and 4·7. The Koreetz, moreover, in trying to escape north of Yodolmi had been driven back by the Chiyoda seriously damaged and about 1.0 o’clock both ships ran in again for the Chemulpho anchorage. They were not pursued. The Asama and one or two others held after them for a while, but at 1.15 when the two Russian ships had nearly reached the anchorage they were recalled and the whole squadron re-assembled at Philip Island.
Seeing how delicate was the situation the affair could scarcely have been more unskilfully managed. By Admiral Uriu’s original disposition his aim was apparently to get his enemy well to sea, clear of neutral complications, and there to have entrapped and destroyed them. By his hasty departure from this sound plan he not only failed to destroy the enemy but had driven them back into the arms of the neutral warships and the situation was as thorny as ever.
At Chemulpho the reception of the Russians was highly sympathetic. The foreign warships sent off boats with medical assistance under the Red Cross. One officer and 30 men had been killed and eight officers and 185 men wounded. An examination of injuries soon showed that to renew the fight was out of the question. More than enough had been done for honour, and it was decided to destroy both of the ships. The neutral officers, excepting the American, consented to receive the crews on board their ships on condition they came unarmed and by 4.0 o’clock, the Varyag was scuttled and the Koreetz blown up.
Outside, Admiral Uriu, as yet unaware of the completeness of his success, was making arrangements for a close blockade of the port during the night and for renewing the attack next morning upon the injured ships in the anchorage. In the midst of the work was heard the explosion in the Koreetz and a cruiser and a torpedo-boat were immediately sent up to investigate. They reported the Koreetz destroyed and the Varyag in flames and apparently abandoned. As night fell the flames burned more brightly and the Admiral felt he had nothing to fear but a desperate torpedo attack from the boats of the lost ships. All precautions were taken to meet it and a strict watch was kept to seaward. At dawn a wireless message came in of the success of the destroyer attack at Port Arthur and there being no sign of smoke from the Russian ships the Admiral, after sending another cruiser and torpedo-boat to reconnoitre, took the squadron, according to the prescribed plan, to the general rendezvous at Asan. There at midday he was joined by the victorious destroyers. Two hours later the Commander-in-Chief came in with the Combined Fleet and the full extent of their success was known.
1 Naniwa (flag), Takachiho, Niitaka, Akashi.
2 The meaning of this seems to have been the alarming activity of a formidable Secret Society which had for its object the overthrow of the existing dynasty in order to free the country from the influence of the Japanese and to admit the Russians in their place. Their leader was believed to be in constant communication with M. Pavloff and their plans ripe for execution.—British Military Attaché Reports, I., page 9.
3 Japanese Confidential History, I., p. 66. For the Japanese system see our Military Attaché Reports I., page 61; II., page 547; III., p. 579; and especially V., page 174.
4 Japanese time is used throughout.