CHAPTER XIII.
[Charts J, M 2, and Diagram D.]
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE ADVANCE OF THE SECOND ARMY. JAPANESE NAVAL LOSSES OF MAY 15TH AND THE CONSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF THE SYSTEM OF BLOCKADE.
ON May 10th, when the Russians were realising the difficulty of their position, Admiral Togo issued the first of a series of orders designed to intensify it and thereby lighten General Oku’s task. On that day Admiral Kataoka was directed with certain units of his squadron to sweep and survey Kerr Bay and was informed that “if nothing unexpected occurred” it was intended to land the Naval Brigade there in order to occupy the Taa-ku-shan Peninsula, the promotory which lies between Kerr Bay and Talien-hwan.
The significance of this order lies in the military situation to the solution of which the fleet had now to devote itself. It was one well adapted to naval assistance. The failure of the Russian “Eastern Force” to delay the advance of the Japanese across the Yalu had apparently caused General Kuropatkin to recur to his original plan of concentrating in Northern Manchuria. When the Japanese were first reported at Yentoa Bay his view was only confirmed. The point of disembarkation showed they had no intention of attempting a coup-de-main at Port Arthur. Had they landed anywhere in rear of the Nan-shan position it had been his intention to march at once to the relief of the fortress. Now he felt he could safely leave General Oku to the long and difficult task of forming a siege and could concentrate at his leisure further north. The evacuation of Liau-yang had actually commenced, when, as we have seen, he found himself compelled by the mystery of the situation to concentrate General Shtakelberg’s “Southern Force” about the head of the Gulf of Liau-tung.
The Viceroy, who had always been an advocate of a concentration as far south as possible, was now at his elbow. The Third Japanese Army was still unlocated and General Mishchenko, who with his cavalry was watching the coast between the Russian Eastern and Southern Forces, sent in a report on the 11th which added to the uncertainty. His intelligence was that the First Japanese Army was taking ground to its left. The reported movement seemed to point to a plan for dealing a rapid stroke through Hsiu-yen at Hai-cheng in conjunction with a landing at Newchwang and possibly also an advance from Pi-tsu-wo. This day the evacuation of Liau-yang was stopped and General Shtakelberg’s Corps was held fast to the area in which it was concentrating, that is, in a position to deal with a landing at Kaiping or Newchwang, but entirely cut off from Port Arthur. Thus the Russians had to accept a situation which, while it barred any immediate interference with the enemy’s operations against the fortress, in no way improved the conditions of their own main concentration.
For the Japanese the whole situation left nothing to be desired. General Oku had now no enemy near him to the northward, and he was in a position to strike at once at Kin-chau to isolate Port Arthur with nothing to fear except a new movement of General Shtakelberg to the south. Accordingly, in sending an A.D.C. to the Admiral to inform him that he had fixed the 15th for the commencement of his movement, he added that he might find in his way troops coming down from Kaiping, and that if the fleet could manage a bombardment in the region of Kaiping or Newchwang it would be rendering a great service to the Army.1 On receipt of this request Admiral Togo proceeded to make certain arrangements, to be detailed presently, to do what was wanted.
By this time General Fok, who had intended to meet the Japanese in front of Nanshan, had moved up the greater part of his division and had established his advanced troops on a line extending from Mount Sampson at the head of Kerr Bay to the first station north of Kinchau.2 This position General Oku said he would attack on the 16th and Kinchau next day. On the 14th the situation was explained to the fleet in a general order, and at the same time the Admiral announced that if the result of the sweeping of Kerr Bay, which was then going on, proved favourable, the Naval Brigade would be landed there on the 16th and 17th. It is to be inferred, therefore, that the movement was designed to turn the enemy’s right flank or at least to act as a diversion in favour of General Oku’s attack on Kinchau. But this was certainly not its sole purpose. The official Japanese explanation is that from the first Yentoa Bay had been found to be a very unfavourable landing place. “Not only was the coast none of the best, but it was too far from Dalny, which was to be the first objective of the Army, and was also difficult to protect against attacks from the enemy, &c. Accordingly Admiral Togo desired to establish a landing place at Kerr Bay.”3 He himself, when the difficulties of the undertaking began to declare themselves, spoke of it as a mere diversion. But he certainly did not abandon the idea of landing the Naval Brigade, and there can be little doubt in fact that the intention was to establish a new base as the Army forced its way forward. In view of General Oku’s lack of transport, it was highly desirable to shorten his line of communications. It was in fact an effort to do for the Second Army what had been done already so successfully for the First Army at the Cho-ru-san Peninsula on the Korean Coast.
The operation began on the 12th, the day the landing of the first section of the Army was practically complete. With a flotilla of torpedo-boats Admiral Kataoka started sweeping the bay, while at the same time he searched the peninsula with the guns of his flagship and the armoured cruiser Nisshin. Simultaneously to confuse the enemy Admiral Nashiba was ordered in the course of his turn of blockade duty to make a demonstration before Pigeon and Louisa Bays on the north-west of the Kwangtung Peninsula and destroy any new batteries he could find.
To prevent “anything unexpected occurring,” Admiral Togo now gave directions for mining the entrance of Port Arthur in earnest. The expressed object was to prevent the exit of the squadron or a junction with the Vladivostok cruisers. It was to be commenced by auxiliary gunboats and ship-borne torpedo-boats which were being specially fitted, but at the same time the regular fleet mining flotilla was called up from the base at Hakko. This step was one of the highest importance, and upon it, as we shall see, turned the whole of Admiral Togo’s covering dispositions as the Army advanced and his difficulties increased.
Already he had to meet two new calls which involved a serious extension of his operations. In the first place, the landing of the Second Army was the signal for getting into place the intermediate force which was to complete the Japanese deployment. The Xth Army Division, which had been detailed for this service, was now in waiting at Chinampho, and the same day the sweeping of Kerr Bay began Admiral Togo received orders to provide a detachment to conduct the transports to the place near Tunguz Cape, which Admiral Dewa had chosen, and to support the landing. That officer’s functions in the blockade were of course too important for him to be spared, and the service was again committed to Admiral Hosoya with his flagship and three of his gunboats. The rest of the Seventh Division Admiral Togo kept with his own flag to assist in meeting the other call which General Oku had made upon him.
In spite of the strain which it involved for the fleet, the Admiral had not hesitated to comply with his colleague’s request. The military situation, indeed, was one which promised success for a naval diversion as surely as it seemed to call for one. At the Russian Headquarters appreciation after appreciation was now pouring from the Viceroy’s pen in an effort to penetrate the fog which shrouded the Japanese deployment. The abiding disturbance for the Russian Staff, as General Oku knew or had divined, was still the apprehension of a landing at Newchwang or Kaiping. For this reason it was in their opinion impossible to move General Shtakelberg’s Corps away from the head of the Liau-tung Gulf; and his troops were deployed from Newchwang to Ta-shih-chiao Junction, where the Newchwang branch left the main line, with the reserve at Hai-cheng and nearly the whole of the cavalry at Kaiping. To hold this force where it lay was, of course, of the utmost importance to General Oku, and to this end he had asked for a demonstration upon the adjacent coast.
It was to Rear-Admiral Togo with the Sixth Division that the Commander-in-Chief entrusted the movement, and to provide him with material for inshore work, the remainder of the Seventh Division was placed under his command. The Rear-Admiral’s instructions were to proceed on the 15th into the Liau-tung Gulf and make a demonstration at Kaiping. But his functions did not end there. Having bombarded the coast he was to return so as to be off Kinchau on the 17th (on which day the place was to be attacked by the Army while the Naval Brigade, if possible, was to be landed on the opposite coast), and there he was to support the main operation with his guns.
On the 16th, when the whole combination was to develop, the Commander-in-Chief in person would make a powerful demonstration before Port Arthur. “I consider,” he said in his general order, “that the last blocking operations successfully sealed up Port Arthur, but nevertheless I am going to use the whole of the First Squadron to carry out a direct blockade.” For this purpose he would join Admiral Nashiba, whose turn of blockade duty it would be, and bring with him Admiral Kataoka’s division and a large flotilla. Admiral Kataoka’s duty would be to threaten and bombard the coast about Dalny, and if the sweeping reports were favourable he would land the Naval Brigade in the Taa-ku-shan Peninsula.
The prospects of success in this operation—the most useful piece of assistance the Navy could give—were already more than doubtful. The sweeping of Kerr Bay had not been encouraging. Indeed it marked the commencement of a series of disasters which had an incalculable effect upon the war. Admiral Kataoka, as we have seen, had begun the work on the 12th with four divisions of torpedo-boats under cover of a bombardment from his flagship and the Nisshin, and the first day one of the torpedo-boats struck a mine and was lost. On the morrow the work was stopped, and it is in his report to Tokyo on the 14th that Admiral Togo speaks of the affair as a demonstration to assist the army which had achieved its purpose.4 On the 14th the sweeping operations were renewed, but this time Admiral Kataoka’s despatch vessel Miyako fouled a mine. All hands were saved, but she went down and again the work was stopped. It was resumed, however, on the following day, but although it was still far from complete it was then abandoned by the Commander-in-Chief’s order for reasons that require no excuse. The unexpected had happened. A day of disasters had changed the whole naval outlook.
In due course Admiral Dewa had left for his turn of blockade duty on the 12th. He had two ships only of his own division—Chitose (flag) and Yoshino. The Kasagi was at Kerr Bay and the Takasago was away with the cable-ship picking up the Port Arthur-Chifu cable. He had been given, however, one battleship, the Fuji, and two armoured cruisers, the Yakumo and the newly joined Kasuga. On the 13th he was off the port as usual, and in spite of shore mists could see destroyers moving outside and sweeping going on in the entrance. When he returned from his night station on the 14th the fog was so thick that he contented himself with steaming to and fro about 20 miles from shore and could see nothing of what the enemy were doing. In the evening he withdrew, and after meeting the night flotilla at Position V. held off to sea giving orders that at 1.30 a.m., when he would be about 35 miles S.E. by S. of Round Island, he would turn to the northward and make back for the base. About 1.0 a.m. a fog suddenly enveloped the squadron, and so dense was it that the Kasuga lost company. In about half an hour she succeeded in recovering touch, but, as ill luck would have it, it was just at the time the squadron was turning. The unhappy result was that she ran hard into the Yoshino and rammed her below the waterline. In a few minutes it was evident she was sinking and the Captain gave the order to abandon ship. The crew fell in on deck and gave three Banzais as the Imperial portrait was reverently borne to the second cutter and sent away. The other boats were then lowered, but the ceremonious delay proved disastrous. While the men were in the act of taking their places the ship heeled over and went down, dragging everything with her except the second cutter. In the darkness and fog little rescue work could be done. Out of her complement of 419 there were lost her Captain, 30 officers and 287 men. Her chief engineer with three other officers and 94 men (two of whom were dead) were picked up by the Kasuga’s boats and a few men by other ships, but that was all. The Kasuga herself was badly injured, her ram being bent 29 degrees to port, the pumps had to be kept going, and while the Admiral stood by the spot where the Yoshino had gone down she was ordered to make her way back to the base. There she was found to be beyond the capacity of the repair ships, and after being patched up she had to be sent home.
Terrible as was the disaster it was trivial to what followed it in a few hours. In the fog, which had prevented Admiral Dewa approaching the Port Arthur coast as closely as usual, the Russians had been taking a measure unprecedented in war. For some time past the idea of laying mine-fields out in the open sea upon the Japanese line of communication had been mooted. Admiral Stark had refused to listen to so ruthless a scheme, and for a while Admiral Vitgeft had also resisted it. But as the strain grew greater he gave way. The Captain of the mining vessel Amur had noted how regular was the parade of the Japanese blockading squadrons and he begged to be allowed to lay a mine-field in their usual track. At length it was conceded he might try at the first convenient opportunity, and it was on the 14th the weather gave him the chance he wanted. The fog was low so that while he could see the Japanese masts he himself was invisible. He was able, therefore, to slip out under escort of the Novik unobserved. Commencing 10 miles S. by E. from the entrance of Port Arthur he laid a line of mines from 50 to 100 feet apart, which stretched for a mile across the Japanese track.5
In the evening of the same day, without any suspicion of so revolutionary a device, Admiral Nashiba put to sea according to programme to relieve Admiral Dewa. He had with him three battleships—Hatsuse (flag), Shikishima, and Yashima, with the cruiser Kasagi and his despatch-vessel Tatsuta. Early in the morning he sent the Kasagi ahead to look into the entrance, and at 6.45, having reached Encounter Rock, he stood in himself N.W. till he reached a point 15 miles S.E. 
E. of the entrance. In the offing was the Takasago in charge of the cable-ship; and not far away was Rear-Admiral Togo’s squadron,, which had left Yentoa Bay at 5.0 that morning on its way to make its demonstration at Kaiping. Here also the Kasagi came in to report all quiet, and, sending her back to watch inshore, the Admiral proceeded to patrol to the E. by N. across the mouth of the port. The usual patrolling course was somewhat further to the south, but he says he took the line he did owing to the report that there was no sign of the enemy. As it happened it was a course which brought him straight in the midst of the mine-field, and at 10.50, about ten miles S.E. of Liau-ti-shan, the Hatsuse fouled a mine. There was a loud explosion and she began to heel over with her steering engine compartment flooded and her port main engine useless. The Admiral at once signalled eight points to starboard together, but in vain. A few minutes later the rear ship Yashima was also struck. Two explosions were heard, but she too kept afloat. The whole thing was inexplicable. The Admiral signalled “Look out for submarines,” and the Shikishima began firing into the water. The Admiral, less disturbed, called up the Takasago, which was still in sight, to leave the cable-ship and go to the Yashima’s assistance, and sent away his despatch-vessel to call back the Kasagi to take his own ship in tow. By 11.30 when she was alongside, the Hatsuse’s stern-walk was under water, and she was heeling four degrees. Still a hawser was passed and the Kasagi was just hauling in when the helpless flagship struck another mine which shattered her main magazine. A deafening explosion was followed by a burst of yellow smoke. Both her funnels fell: her main-mast broke off: her upper deck flew into the air, and in a minute and a half she had gone down with her ram high out of water. So sudden and complete was the catastrophe that the loss of life was appalling. The Tatsuta and Kasagi managed to save the Admiral and Captain with 21 other officers and 313 men. The rest went down with the ship to the number of 38 officers and 458 men.6
As for the Yashima she was still afloat. By the use of a collision mat and desperate exertion at the pumps Captain Sakamoto was able at half-past twelve to move her slowly off under her own steam towards Encounter Rock. His one idea was that if she must sink it should be out of the enemy’s sight.
The catastrophe itself had taken place in full view of the Russian observation station. They had seen the Hatsuse go down. They could see the Yashima staggering off. Within their grasp at last was a chance of reaping the reward of the expectant attitude which Admiral Makarov had instituted, a chance such as he had confidently expected for a counter-stroke which might reverse the whole situation at sea. But no Makarov was there.
Never was such an opportunity likely to recur. Admiral Togo with the rest of the battleships was 60 miles away at his base; Admiral Kamimura was at Takeshiki; and Admiral Vitgeft had at least three battleships fit for sea. Yet not one of them moved. The horror of mines had possessed him, the standing order against operating with the battleships until all were repaired had not been revoked, and he had refused to allow them to raise steam. Not even a cruiser was permitted to stir. Yet for the Japanese the situation was precarious enough. In Port Arthur were now 16 destroyers fit for service, and every one of them was ordered to sea. But even so there was no heart in it. They were organised in two flotillas, and the orders of one of them was to “steam towards the enemy and worry the damaged battleship,” but not to attack. The orders of the other are unknown; but when the two Commanding Officers met they agreed that the second flotilla should keep to the north of the enemy and occupy their attention while the first flotilla attempted to get round them to the southward, so as to reach the Korean coast and operate for 24 hours on the Japanese lines of communication. The inference is that the Admiral had decided to use the splendid opportunity—not for all it was worth to him—but for a feeble blow of an ulterior character.
Looking back with a full knowledge of subsequent events this would seem to be one of the most fatal mistakes the Russians made. The port had not in fact been mined as yet by the Japanese. Had they diligently swept the entrance the day before when the Amur put to sea there seems no reason why the whole squadron should not have gone out the moment the mines exploded. It would then have had at its mercy not only Admiral Nashiba’s squadron, but Rear-Admiral Togo’s as well. The result might perhaps have been a blow from which the Japanese could never have entirely recovered. It must at least have destroyed the local preponderance which they had established, and which was essential to the progress of their military operations. In omitting to have the battleships ready to follow up the success of the mine-field the Russians were in fact guilty of the same error which the Japanese committed in their original attack on Port Arthur.
The fact that Admiral Togo had exposed himself to such a reverse was no doubt due to his belief that he had closed the port. He did not anticipate the possibility of the enemy coming out in force, and his day parades were not so much for the purpose of blockade as for maintaining his moral ascendency by “insulting” the enemy in harbour. The menace of their destroyers, however, had never been minimised, and the stricken squadron realised at once that they had now to face it under the most unfavourable conditions.
As the Yashima laboured to seaward and the cruisers were still busy with rescue work where the Hatsuse had sunk, the Russian flotilla was seen coming out. Admiral Nashiba had resumed command with his flag in the despatch-vessel Tatsuta which had rescued him. The Yashima was heeling more and more and he had just ordered the Kasagi to her assistance. At this moment, however, that cruiser was aware of the second flotilla. On coming into sight of the battleships its leader had inclined a little to port on a parallel course with the intention of getting ahead and then delivering an attack as he ran back. The Kasagi immediately made for the new danger and interposing between the destroyers and her own ships engaged on the opposite course. A few minutes later the Takasago as she was coming up apparently sighted the other flotilla making to the southward, but so seriously did the Yashima continue to heel that she dared not leave her. Fortunately at this moment help appeared from the southward. It was Rear-Admiral Togo with his four light cruisers Akashi, Suma, Chiyoda, and Akitsushima. When the accident occurred he was passing Encounter Rock, and there at 11.0 he took in a wireless from the uninjured battleship Shikishima telling what had happened. He promptly decided to send on his third sub-division (consisting of Admiral Hosoya’s three gunboats) with the two torpedo-boats to carry out the diversion at Kaiping, while he with the other two sub-divisions turned shorewards and went off full speed to Admiral Nashiba’s assistance. Thus in the nick of time he met the remains of the battle squadron, as they steamed out to sea with the Shikishima leading. Ascertaining from her the condition of the Yashima he detached the Suma to stand by her. Then having done all that was required he was about to return and overtake his gunboats when the enemy’s destroyers were signalled.
The Admiral was already engaging them in the Tatsuta, for seeing the Suma coming up he had felt he could leave the injured battleship. The Takasago was also engaged and now Rear-Admiral Togo was called up to join in. The destroyers thus found themselves engaged by six cruisers before they could develop an attack, and things quickly became too hot for them. According to the Russians the Japanese were for the first time using segment shell with time fuses which burst well and covered the destroyers with splinters. Though there was no serious injury done and no casualties, it was obviously useless to persevere, and both flotillas turned back. The cruisers chased till 3.50 and then had to desist for fear of the batteries. As they turned they saw the Novik come out to meet the destroyers, and for the first time the Japanese knew the port was not entirely closed.
For the moment, however, the crippled battleship and the laden boats that were still scattered in her wake were put out of danger, and by this time fresh help was at hand to prevent a renewal of the attack. It was not for three hours that Admiral Togo heard of the disaster. At 2 o’clock, however, besides the usual night guard, he was able to send away three destroyer divisions to the rescue. Proceeding to the spot where the disaster had occurred they, of course, saw nothing of the Yashima. But as they searched for survivors they effectually prevented any revival of the recent peril.
While the danger lasted and, indeed, for some time after it was over, it had been a situation of intense strain, but there had been no panic. True, the apprehension of submarines continued, and to increase it Russians, who had observed the firing into the water, had been making signals by ordinary wireless code to imaginary submarine flotillas. It was excusable, therefore, if from time to time there was some unsteady firing at mysterious objects which were taken for submarine conning towers. After the destroyers were driven in, however, the situation was deemed to be well in hand, and Rear-Admiral Togo, with three of his cruisers, was ordered to carry on with his original mission. The Shikishima was sent away to inform the base, and the Takasago to carry on with the cable ship, while Admiral Nashiba, with the Tatsuta, Suma, and Kasagi, stood by the injured battleship.
Her condition was slowly growing hopeless. For some time past as many of her crew as possible had been got into boats and were towing astern. Still her captain clung to her. At 4.20 she had crawled as far as Encounter Rock, and course was altered for the base. But it was not for long. By 5.0 she was heeling 15 degrees, her screw showed out of water, and she had to stop. Preparations were made to take her in tow, but all to no purpose. In a few minutes Captain Sakamoto had to signal he was sinking, and let go an anchor in 30 fathoms about 5 miles E.N.E. of Encounter Rock. The Admiral and Kasagi were just returning from their chase and order was given to abandon ship. First, the Imperial portrait and the confidential books were transferred to the Suma. Then the crew fell in on the quarter deck and the flag was solemnly lowered with a Royal salute. With three Banzais they took to the boats, and by the Admiral’s orders the Suma left with them for the base. The Tatsuta made off to Position V. to speak the night flotilla, and the Kasagi was left alone to watch over the doomed ship till dark.
No human eye saw the last of her. The Commander-in-Chief, who had just heard by wireless from the Shikishima of her actual position, was sending his remaining destroyer division at full speed “to guard her to the limit of their power.” Two repair ships were also ordered off, but again the fog settled down and they could not find her. So bad was it that the Tatsuta ran aground in trying to enter the anchorage and so completed the misfortunes of the day.7 Next morning Admiral Miura was sent with a detachment to try again, but the fog remained impenetrable. Finally, in the afternoon the Suma, with the destroyers that the Commander-in-Chief had sent, managed to reach the spot where the Yashima had anchored and then not a trace of her was to be seen.
We have only to return to the military situation to grasp all that these losses meant and to appreciate the admirable steadiness with which they were faced. That black Sunday, the 15th, was the day General Oku was to commence his movement against Kinchau.
The two divisions and the cavalry brigade, which were to complete his army, were still on the sea. The first group of transports was timed to arrive on the 17th. His land transport and all that was needed before any further advance could be made were still to come, and the attempt to establish a base nearer to Dalny had proved impracticable. Admiral Hosoya was at Chinampho on the point of moving the connecting force to Tunguz Cape, and the next strategical development must be to shift the Second Army’s base to Dalny itself, well within range of the enemy’s destroyers. If ever there was a moment when the Russians should exert themselves to strike it was immediately ahead. Every unit the Japanese could command afloat would be necessary to ensure the safety of the army and at a blow their battle strength had been reduced by one third. Besides this irreparable misfortune they had one second-class cruiser, a despatch-vessel, and a torpedo-boat total losses and another despatch-vessel and an armoured cruiser disabled, both the latter seriously enough to be out of action during the coming crisis. They had lost, moreover, some 70 officers and nearly 750 men.
Though the Imperial Staff handsomely acquitted the Admiral of all blame the news came as a serious shock. It was realised at once that the losses “would have far-reaching strategical results” and the strictest secrecy was enjoined. “The duties of the Navy,” so wrote the Director of the Admiralty Staff in asking for particulars, “during the coming combined operations with the Army are very heavy and dangerous, and the work of the squadron directly detached for it will be difficult. Moreover, though the accidents of the last few days could not have been prevented, they will give the enemy occasion for recovering their spirit and they will probably seize the opportunity for some definite course of action. I earnestly beg, therefore, that if as the result of the last blocking expedition there is no fear of the enemy’s large ships coming out, you will watch the entrance of the port with light fast vessels capable of maintaining communications with the main fleet.”
In view of this caution what was the Admiral to do? He now knew that the port was not absolutely sealed. Cruisers at least could come out. Yet in effect he adopted the Staff’s suggestion. From this time onward the principle of cover by close blockade was given up and that of open blockade substituted. That is to say, the battle squadron was kept as far away from the port as was consistent with bringing the enemy to action if he put to sea, and the port was watched by cruisers only.
The Elliot Island anchorage, well-placed and defensible as it was, provided an ideal station for the battleships, and there they remained at anchor. The day watch was entrusted to Admiral Dewa, who carried it out with his division by alternate sub-divisions. The flotilla night watch was continued as before. The system so constituted was still imperfect. It was open to the Port Arthur squadron to get away by a sudden dash before Admiral Togo could bring his squadron up to intercept them. It was necessary therefore to provide that no such rapid exit could be made, and for this purpose he now decided to keep the approaches to the port regularly mined. Sweeping would then be requisite before the squadron could get to sea and that would secure the delay that was needed to neutralise the distance between the fleet base and the blockaded port. By the 17th four auxiliary gunboats which the Admiral had been fitting as mine-layers were ready. The weather delayed their work a day, but on the night of the 19th, escorted by Admiral Dewa, they succeeded in well mining the entrance. A few days later there arrived 12 more vessels for the same service which the Admiral had asked for some time before. Crews to man them were organised from the company of the lost Yashima and the whole mine-laying division of 16 auxiliary gunboats was placed under her commander—Captain Sakamoto. It was in vain the Russians replied by sweeping. From time to time as the weather permitted the mine-fields were renewed and henceforth it was rendered impossible for the enemy to get out without Admiral Togo having sufficient warning to be on the spot to meet them. It was a new factor in the strategy of blockade which went far to obliterate any practical distinction between the close and the open form.
It was on the day this system was inaugurated that the Imperial Staff at Tokyo decided to make public the loss of the Hatsuse and Yoshino, taking full advantage of the moral advantage of fixing on their enemy the stigma of “placing mines in public channels.” The loss of the second battleship however, was still concealed with elaborate care. Absolute silence was enjoined. Her crew, it is said, who were manning the improvised mine-layers, were even ordered to continue dating their letters from the battleship, and so loyally were the injunctions obeyed by the hundreds of men who knew the truth, that it was not till long after that her loss was publicly known even in Japan.8
