CHAPTER XXIII.
MOVEMENTS AFTER THE ACTION.
(Map F 1.)
It would seem that Admiral Togo in his disappointment at failing to bring the enemy to decisive action had under-estimated the check he had given them. That he had actually driven them back to Port Arthur was beyond his hopes, and it does not appear to have entered his calculations that he might deal them another blow before they could reach its shelter. So much at least is to be inferred from his subsequent operations.
When Admiral Yamada, off Round Island, was vainly calling him up he was far away in a state of complete bewilderment as to what had become of his enemy. As he steamed south from the battlefield he had heard the sound of firing when the 4th destroyer division made its premature attack. Then all was silent and the situation remained wrapped in impenetrable fog. So precarious indeed was the prospect for the morrow, and so probable a renewal of the action, that, regardless of the danger from Vladivostok, he decided as his first step to call up the Second Squadron from the Straits. At 10.30 the Yaeyama found him and he sent her off at once to get in touch with the wireless station at Peng-yong-do in the Sir James Hall Group, with the following message: “The fleet has had a fierce engagement. Sunset position 910. The enemy are still near there. Our destroyer flotilla is attacking them. The fleet is making for Position 475 to arrive there to-morrow morning.1 Telegraph to the Second Squadron at Takeshiki to come to Ross Island.”
The wording of the message should be noted, for it appears to be incomplete. There is evidence that the order he signalled to the fleet added words to the effect that on reaching the assigned position in the morning he would turn back.2
From the order to Admiral Kamimura we must conclude that the Commander-in-Chief was concentrating his attention on the probability of the Russian Squadron, or so much of it as escaped his flotilla, making the best of the darkness to resume the course he had checked. On this appreciation a renewal of the action was the vital eventuality to be considered, and his main effort must be to ensure that it should be fought with the utmost force he could concentrate. But, as luck would have it, this all-important message was most seriously delayed. Peng-yong-do was no more than 80 miles to the eastward, but it would seem that wireless worked very badly that night. It was 6.0 next morning before the despatch-vessel could make the station hear, and as she was then only six miles distant she ran in and at 7.10 sent off a telegram.3
The consequence was that long before this telegram was on the wires it was overridden. Two hours earlier Admiral Togo had changed his plan, but on what reasoning or information we do not know. Nothing is recorded except that at 2.0 a.m. on the 11th—two hours after he had rounded Shantung Promontory—he took in a message from Rear-Admiral Togo, who was then about 15 miles ahead, to say that the Askold and Novik had got away to the southward, and that he was chasing them without the Suma, which he had had sent to the base for repairs. Three hours later the battle squadron, which was steaming at 14 knots, had reached a position 75 miles S.S.E. 
E. of Shantung Light, 60 miles short of the assigned rendezvous.4 Yet here at 5 a.m. Admiral Togo turned back for another rendezvous 35 miles about E.S.E. from Shantung Light.5 His two cruiser divisions were supposed to be coming down on either hand of him, but Rear-Admiral Togo was apparently right ahead, and Admiral Dewa some 40 miles on his port beam.6 In conveying to them his intention of turning back at once for the new Shantung rendezvous he signalled an order for Admiral Dewa to spread in line of search to the eastward of him, and to Rear-Admiral Togo to do the same to the westward. Admiral Dewa was also to send a ship to look round Peng-yong-do, presumably to see the enemy were not trying to steal away by the convoy track along the Korean coast.
Neither of the cruiser divisions appears to have taken in the signal, at least for some time. Rear-Admiral Togo held on, till at 5.40 he was about 12 miles to the S.S.E. of the point where the Commander-in-Chief had turned back.7 Day was just breaking and it brought an agreeable surprise. “At dawn,” he says, “we had the good fortune to sight the Askold about 6 miles on our port bow steaming S. by E. parallel to us. All rejoiced that our labours had not been wasted and spirits ran high.”8
The reason of his being able to recover contact was that Admiral Reitzenstein had slowed down during the night to let the other cruisers overtake him. Now, however, he put on speed again and was heading S. by E. for the Tsushima Strait, in accordance with the pre-arranged programme for getting through to Vladivostok.9 Rear-Admiral Togo promptly gave chase at his utmost speed. The Akitsushima had a breakdown in her engine-room and had to be left to follow on as she could, but he went away with his other two cruisers. No sooner, however, had he started than the Commander-in-Chief’s order to turn back came through. In reply the Rear-Admiral signalled what he was doing and from the Mikasa came back the welcome order to carry on. “Chase the Askold” the message ran, “and inform the Second Squadron if possible.” Then followed this curious statement, “The enemy’s main force is now apparently E. by S., 26 miles.”10
The explanation is that Admiral Togo must have been feeling the Third Division, which was actually in the direction indicated. Admiral Dewa, after abandoning the field of battle at 8.30 on the previous evening, had proceeded to the eastward at 12 knots till 10.0. He had then altered to S.E. and at 11.0 had altered to S.S.E. On that course, which diverged from that of the battle division, he was still proceeding in spite of the Commander-in-Chief’s signal. According to his own report he did not take it in till after 6.0 a.m.; at 6.5 he says he sighted several columns of smoke W. by S. He was just detaching the Takasago to investigate when he found it must be the battle division. It was evidently the signal which cleared the matter up. Similarly, it would seem Admiral Togo quickly ascertained his mistake, for although according to the Track Chart he turned at 6 a.m. sharply to the eastward, as though to close the supposed enemy, he resumed his northerly course again in about 20 minutes. By that time, therefore, it would look as though he had got into communication with the Third Division, and at 6.25 Admiral Dewa says he turned north, implying that he had just received his chief’s order to that effect.11 Ten minutes later, however, he took in a message from Rear-Admiral Togo which told of the Askold’s position and he turned south again to chase, increasing to 14 knots. “After a little time, however,” we are told, “he realised the impossibility of overtaking her, and reducing to 12 knots, turned back north.” This was at 6.48, and he continued thus till 7.40 when in accordance with his chief’s order he began to spread his division in line of search east and west. His decision was probably due to a new piece of information as to the enemy’s whereabouts which he intercepted at this time. It was a message from the Mikasa to Rear-Admiral Togo confirming the order to chase, and informing him that the enemy’s position, instead of being as stated in the first signal, was to the northward.
The cause of this belief must have been a report just to hand from the Asama. After making good her escape she had taken a big sweep round the Russian fleet to starboard and then gone S.E. “to try to get to Shantung Promontory before the enemy.” Finding nothing there she held on S. by E. and about dawn was in sight of the First Division. She was soon in touch, and in answer to the Admiral’s inquiry as to the whereabouts of the enemy replied, “Probably north of Shantung Promontory.”
The impression that the enemy might be in the neighbourhood was increased by the presence of three Russian destroyers. Smoke had been seen ahead of the First Division not long after it had turned north. Shortly before 7.0 the Nisshin, which had been sent forward to investigate, reported a destroyer crossing their course to the westward and the Kasuga was ordered out of the line to cut her off. But the destroyer was too fast for the cruiser and she got away. She was apparently the Bezshumui, who ran into Kyau-chau late that night. To assist in the chase Admiral Togo had been calling up the Takasago and Chitose from the Third Division, but it was not till about 8.0 that Admiral Dewa got the message, though it had been first made at 6.30, that is immediately after the two divisions got into wireless touch. By that time he too had discovered smoke to the north-east, which proved to be two other destroyers running S.E. and he altered course E.N.E. to cut them off. He replied, therefore, that he himself was in chase, but that he would send the Takasago. It was not, however, till 8.30 that she started, far too late to be of any use.
Admiral Dewa’s chase proved no more successful than the other. Taking advantage of the extended formation of his three cruisers he made an effort to surround the two destroyers but at 9.0 they turned eastward for the Korean shoals and in spite of his 18 knots they got away. For another half-hour (9.25) he continued the chase till Te-chong-do in the Sir James Hall Group came into sight a point before his port beam and it became doubtful whether he ought to be getting so far from his assigned position. The last he had heard of the battle division was shortly before 8.0 when he had intercepted the message from the Mikasa to Rear-Admiral Togo which ended with the words, “The enemy’s main force is apparently N. of us.”12 There was reason enough therefore not to carry on too far and at 9.50 he turned to the north-westward with the Yakumo and Kasagi, leaving the Chitose strict orders to devote herself to the destroyers.13 This was highly necessary since they were now directly on the transport route and transports could be seen on the way. Admiral Dewa therefore took the additional precaution of passing close enough to the Peng-yong-do wireless station to give warning it was dangerous for transports to proceed.
As for the Chitose she soon found she had not speed enough and about 11.15 lost sight of the chase. Still she held on after the smoke till at 11.30 the Yonpyon islands off Haiju Bay came into view. Then seeing smoke to the north she altered for it till finding the outer Korean shoals were close ahead, she was forced to turn west. Then a leak in her condenser brought her speed down to 12 knots, and unable to continue the chase she decided the best thing to do was to take a position 10 miles south of Soi-chong-do where she could at least do something to secure the transport route.14
All this time the Commander-in-Chief had been proceeding on his northerly course, while Rear-Admiral Togo with the two remaining cruisers of his division continued to chase the Askold to the southward. Being thus without either of his cruiser divisions to make good the ground on either side of him he altered course to the N.N.E. in order to stretch wider from Shantung. Between him and the Promontory the Kasuga, on losing the destroyers, was ordered to search, while the Asama was thrown out on his starboard bow to try to get touch with Peng-yong-do; and the Takasago, when she arrived, was made to prolong the line of search in the same direction. So he continued sweeping round Shantung for two or three hours, but still without a word of information about the enemy. Nor was it till 2 p.m. that he was able to deduce, as he says, from various reports that reached him that the bulk of the defeated fleet was back at Port Arthur.
How the news came or why it was so long in reaching him we do not know. It should have come long before through Peng-yong-do from the Fuso at Dalny. Admiral Yamada too after sighting the last of the retiring enemy near Encounter Rock had done his best. As early as 8.15 a.m. when from the neighbourhood of Cap Island he had seen the last of the Russian ships entering Port Arthur and found no response to his wireless signals he had detached the Matsushima with orders to steam to the south-eastwards till she got into touch with the Mikasa; but it was not till nearly 3.0 that she succeeded in getting her news through to the flagship.15 In any case on receiving the information Admiral Togo at once determined to return to Round Island and resume the blockade. The Takasago was sent forward to order the whole flotilla from Dalny to keep night guard, but as yet no steps were taken to countermand the order for the Second Squadron to come into the Yellow Sea.
Admiral Kamimura’s position was indeed one of great doubt and difficulty. At 5.0 p.m. on the 10th he had been informed by the Staff at Tokyo that the Russian fleet had been sighted off Liau-ti-shan at 10.0 that morning. He at once ordered bunkers to be filled up and all preparation to be made for raising steam. During the night rumours reached him that made it certain a battle was proceeding, but he seems to have been almost forgotten by the Staff at Tokyo and as he says, he received no really definite intelligence on which it was possible for him to decide how to act.
In view of what afterwards occurred it is well to see exactly what his position was. He had returned to Osaki from his wild-goose chase to Tokyo Bay on August 4th and had then issued a general order that in view of the pressure on the Russian Squadron in Port Arthur it was probable the Vladivostok cruisers would fill up rapidly and reappear on the Japanese coasts. “The main duty of my squadron,” he added, “is as before to secure the safety of the Tsushima Straits, chiefly against the Vladivostok Squadron.”
With this object on orders from the Imperial Staff he then busied himself with completing the arrangements for extending his land observation posts to the northward, which had been interrupted by Admiral Bezobrazov’s raid the first week in July. By this time the island of Matsushima had been connected by cable with Chukupen Bay and it remained to establish a look-out station on the island and a wireless post at the Korean terminal. For this purpose a storeship was sent forward under flotilla escort, and to cover the operations he took his armoured division on August 7th and cruised to the northward in touch with O-Ura, throwing out the Niitaka to keep communication with Chukupen and leaving the rest of the Fourth Division to carry on the guard of the Straits. The work was complete by the 9th and at 3 p.m. on the 10th he returned to Osaki. On the way he had heard from Tokyo that a Russian cruiser and eight torpedo-boats had been seen off Song-chin on the Korean coast above Gensan. He therefore ordered fires to be banked for full speed at an hour’s notice. It was in this state of high expectancy that two hours later he had received the first intimation that the Russian fleet had left Port Arthur and so he passed the night.
It was not till 8.15 next morning that he heard anything of the result of the action. Then came a telegram from Tokyo to say that “some of the cruisers which came out of Port Arthur yesterday have got through our gun fire and may run for Vladivostok.” In view of this it concluded “the guard of the Strait must be very strictly kept.” Half-an-hour later came a message from Admiral Togo. It was the first he received from his Chief and to some extent it contradicted the order from Tokyo. It was apparently the long delayed message despatched by the Yaeyama, but as received it is not identical. Indeed it contained an important difference. After informing him of the “fierce engagement” and the sunset position it proceeds: “The enemy remained near the north of Shantung Promontory and were attacked by our destroyers. We are making for lat. 35° 30′ N., long. 124° 10′ E. (Position 475—the mid-sea rendezvous) and will turn back to-morrow. The Second Squadron must come at once.” There is nothing, it will be seen, about his coming to Ross Island, and Admiral Kamimura could only infer that his assistance was required for a renewal of the action north of Shantung.16
How the difference arose we have no means of knowing, but its gravity is plain. By the fundamental conception of the war-plan a squadron in the Hakko area (within which Ross Island lay) was in a position to secure the command of the Straits, but if the Second Squadron were to go to Shantung it meant abandoning its special defensive function altogether. What then was Admiral Kamimura to do? On the one hand, as the Commander-in-Chief’s message reached him, it implied that the whole strategy of the war was focussing in an impending fleet action, and that the overmastering consideration was a complete concentration of the fleet at the given time and place. On the other hand there was the Naval Staff order to maintain a strict guard of the Strait against the Vladivostok cruisers. In the judgment both of Admiral Kamimura and the Staff an immediate diversionary movement from the north was practically certain, and the appreciation was right. On the evening of the 10th, so soon as it was dark, a destroyer, Ryeshitelni, had stolen out of Port Arthur and made for Chifu in order to telegraph to the Russian Head-quarters the news of the sortie, and although this was not yet known to the Japanese the message to the Viceroy was already on its way.17 Added to this consideration was the condition of public opinion in Japan caused by the recent successes of the Russian cruisers. “Admiral Kamimura,” wrote our Attaché, “had been made the object of strictures and acrimonious criticism among the uninformed, and his private residence even is said to have been attacked, and its windows broken. The Minister of Marine himself had received formal expostulations that meant more than they expressed in words, and a general state of moral tension had been produced much greater than the real damage done by the raids warranted.” Clearly then it was impossible to leave the Straits unguarded. It was equally impossible for the Admiral to turn a deaf ear to a call for the decisive time and place. His solution was a compromise. To Admiral Uriu with the Fourth Squadron and the flotilla he committed the guard of the Straits and telegraphed to Hakko and Peng-yong-do a message both for the Commander-in-Chief and Admiral Hosoya that at 10 a.m. on the 12th he would be at the given mid-sea rendezvous (Position 475) with his armoured division.18
Accordingly, with the Idzuma (flag), Adztima, Tokiwa and Iwate, and the despatch-vessel Chihaya, he started westward at 10.40 a.m. Up till 5 p.m. he was in touch with the Tsutsu wireless station at the south end of Tsushima and collating various pieces of information which he kept receiving he came, so he says, to the conclusion that four Russian battle-ships had returned to Port Arthur, but that the Retvizan and Pallada were unlocated, and the Askold and Novik had got away south. With this imperfect light he was off Port Hamilton at 7 p.m., and in view of the appreciation he had formed he felt it necessary to divide his squadron in order to make good the ground south of Quelpart. Rear-Admiral Misu, his second in command, was therefore ordered to take the second sub-division, Iwate and Tokiwa, round the south of the island and search for the enemy. He himself would make for the west of Ross Island, where Admiral Misu was to meet him in the morning.
Proceeding on this course in two hours’ time, being then south of Montravel, he began to feel something ahead of him, and an hour later it proved to be the Akashi trying to communicate with Hakko. At 10.25 that morning, having completely lost the Askold, Rear-Admiral Togo had decided in pursuance of his last instructions to run for the north of Ross Island “to try to let the Second Squadron know what was happening.” This point he reached at 4.30, but finding no trace of Admiral Kamimura he carried on, till at 7.0 he was 30 miles east of Ross Island. Here he stopped, but as there was still no sign of the Second Squadron at 8.0 he steamed slowly south. Thus about 10.0 the two divisions came within the 50 mile range, and Admiral Kamimura then informed his colleague that in obedience to orders he was proceeding into the Yellow Sea, and asked for information. It was some hours before the reply came in, and then the Rear-Admiral could only tell him the little he knew. He gave the enemy’s position when the fleets had parted the night before, and told how he had chased the Askold and lost her that morning at Position 470, 75 miles N.W. by W. of Ross Island. He also said the Russians had 7 destroyers with them. Both divisions then made for the west of Ross Island, and at 4.30 a.m. on the 12th, as Admiral Kamimura passed north of Quelpart, his anxieties were increased by another message from the Commander-in-Chief, through Hakko. It was to say that not only the Askold and Pallada and several destroyers, but also the armoured cruiser Bayan had got away south. This of course was incorrect. The Bayan had never left Port Arthur, and the Pallada, which had returned there, must have been a mistake for the Diana, which was now making the best of her way to Saigon.
The message must have made things in the last degree difficult for Admiral Kamimura. It seemed to indicate that he was expected to deal with the escaping cruisers. To do so he must resume his guard of the Straits, and in fact an order to this effect had dropped out of the message. This, of course, he could not know. So far as he could tell, his original order to concentrate on the battle division stood. Without doubt it was the higher call, and he decided to carry on to Ross Island.
Few will question the soundness of his decision, although as things stood, it was directly opposed to the intentions of his Chief. For Admiral Togo the need of aid from the Second Squadron had passed. For some hours he had been comfortably anchored at the base, shifting his wounded and doing repairs. Admiral Dewa was there too. He had come in with the Yakumo to make good the damages of the action, having left his other two cruisers, who had suffered very little, to proceed to their guard stations, and re-establish the blockade. Admiral Togo knew, therefore, that so far as concerned the enemy’s battle fleet the situation was well in hand. Consequently when he sent Admiral Kamimura the information about the escape of the enemy’s cruisers he had added an order for him to return to the Straits and resume his old position, and prevent anything passing. The message had been despatched as early as 6 p.m. on the 11th through the Takasago (which it will be remembered Admiral Togo had sent forward to get touch with the Fuso at Dalny when at 2 p.m. he had decided to return to the Elliot Islands). Thus when Admiral Kamimura reached his Ross Island rendezvous at 6 a.m. on the 12th he was still without the orders which had been despatched 12 hours before. At 7.50, while he waited for his second sub-division and Rear-Admiral Togo to join, he received a wireless message from Tokyo giving certain information that five battleships and one cruiser had retired into Port Arthur, but that the Askold and Novik were unlocated. Then at 9.30, just as the Sixth Division joined to give him details of the action, Admiral Togo’s instructions came through correctly, telling him the Askold, Novik and Pallada, and several destroyers had got away and that he was “to return to the Strait and keep a strict guard.” An hour later his second sub-division rejoined having seen nothing and he headed back east for the Straits at 15 knots, while Rear-Admiral Togo turned northwards, extending as he went, to rejoin the First Squadron “and resume his duties against the defeated enemy.”
The main anxiety was now the missing battleship. It had been ascertained that she was the Tzesarevich and there was some hope she had sunk. The 10th torpedo-boat division reported having attacked her and the Retvizan close to Encounter Rock, and on going to examine the spot in the afternoon of the 11th Admiral Yamada had found there some wreckage and one of her life buoys. Consequently, when during the 12th rumours were heard that she had put into Kyau-chau they were received with incredulity. The doubt was increased by the contradictory reports that had been coming in from the local Japanese Intelligence Officer. The first intimation that the Russians were using the port was sent to Admiral Togo at 8.45 a.m. on the 12th but the ships which had appeared in the bay were then supposed to be only cruisers. It was said that the Askold, the Novik and one other cruiser had been at Tsing-tau at the entrance of the bay and had left again, “after completing their preparations.” He was accordingly requested by the Naval Staff to attach a division of destroyers to Admiral Dewa, and send him away at full speed to Kyau-chau to watch the hostile squadron. Admiral Dewa was instructed accordingly and the force placed at his command was the Yakumo, Asama, Takasago, Chitose and the auxiliary cruiser Nippon Maru. In view of the uncertainty of the intelligence this ship and the Takasago were sent away at 2.10 to get into touch with Peng-yong-do and Hakko for the latest news from Tokyo as to the situation at Kyau-chau, and there they were to meet the rest of the squadron, not off Kyau-chau, but at a rendezvous near Ross Island.
Admiral Dewa started at 2.40 p.m., but he had not been gone more than two hours and a half when a message reached Admiral Togo that the Novik and the destroyers had left Kyau-chau but that the Askold was still there. This information he forwarded to Admiral Dewa by wireless and shortly after it was followed by an order—apparently suggested from Tokyo—that he was to keep a look-out near Shantung Promontory. The idea, of course, was that the Novik might be trying to steal back to Port Arthur. Admiral Dewa, however, was now so far advanced on his way that he felt that if this was her intention it was useless to try to get off Shantung before her. He therefore took upon himself to ignore the order, and carried on for Ross Island to make sure of the Askold if she tried to pass the Strait.
Meanwhile at 3.30 p.m. the Foreign Office had located Admiral Vitgeft’s missing flagship. Their information was that she had put into Kyau-chau the previous evening and was landing her wounded as though preparatory to leaving again. The Naval Staff at first seem to have doubted the news, but in a few hours they informed Admiral Togo he must take it that the Tzesarevich was certainly at the German port, and apparently not very seriously damaged. They suggested, therefore, that he should reinforce Admiral Dewa with the Sixth Division. He sent the news on to Admiral Dewa, it would seem, without conviction, for he told him to get in touch with Hakko by midnight. Admiral Dewa received the message through the Takasago, but not till 9.30 next morning, the 13th. The instruction to remain in touch with Hakko he apparently took to mean that he was not to proceed without further orders; for although since 4.0 p.m. he had his whole force except the Chitose concentrated at his Ross Island rendezvous he continued to wait where he was, instead of carrying on to Kyau-chau.
By this time the guard of the Straits had been restored. Admiral Uriu had been patrolling the southern approach of the Eastern Channel ever since he learned that his Chief was coming back by the other. Admiral Kamimura had passed through the Western Channel at dawn on the 13th, when he turned east and was now patrolling with his armoured division between Mitsushima (at the north extremity of Tsushima) and the island of Tsunoshima on the opposite coast of Japan, where he calculated to catch the Askold and the other two cruisers at dawn if, as was expected, they ran the Straits in the night. But, as he says, “they never came.”
This then was the position of the Second Squadron when at 8.50 a.m. on the 13th Admiral Kamimura received his first intimation of what was going on at Kyau-chau and it came not from the Staff at Tokyo but from Admiral Togo at the Elliott Islands. It was a message the Commander-in-Chief had sent off at 12.45 p.m. the previous day when Admiral Dewa was about to leave for Ross Island, and it was thus 20 hours old. “You must do your utmost,” it ran, “to attack in the Straits the enemy’s cruisers from Kyau-chau Bay and at the same time be on your guard against a descent of the Vladivostok squadron. Part of the Third Division is leaving this afternoon to act against the Kyau-chau enemy.” Then followed this highly important intimation, “The Port Arthur enemy need not be taken into consideration.” At the same time a report reached him from Takeshiki that the Novik and one or two torpedo-boats had left Kyau-chau before daylight on the 12th, but that the Askold and Tzesarevich were still there. The battleship had asked for workpeople and was then under repair. Thus the missing flagship was finally located and could be regarded as off the board for the moment. But at the same time it must be remembered there was no guarantee she would not put to sea again when her necessary repairs were complete.
Admiral Kamimura thus knew that for the present he would have nothing but cruisers to contend with, and his appreciation was that the Novik would shortly try to run the Straits and that the Vladivostok squadron would come down to assist her. “I decided, therefore, he says,” “to stretch a watch-line with my full force between Ulsan and Tsunoshima.” Admiral Uriu, who was then near Tarasaki, was ordered to come to him at Position 362 (which was 20 miles distant from where Admiral Kamimura then was, and approximately on the Mitsushima—Tsunoshima line) and he was to send one ship to Position 222, in the middle of the southern approach to the Strait, about 20 miles W.S.W. of Tsushima. There she was to watch for the enemy’s cruisers coming from Kyau-chau till 8 p.m. and then to proceed so as at dawn next day to join her division at Okinoshima, speaking the Ko-zaki station on the way.19 The six divisions of his flotilla he intended to spread across either channel at the southern approaches and if they saw nothing by 3 a.m. they were to come to him at Position 367, which was 55 miles about N.E. from Tsushima a little beyond the Ulsan—Tsunoshima line. This order was sent off to Takeshiki at 2.30 p.m., but it was never delivered. “Owing to the congestion of messages,” we are told, “it arrived late at Takeshiki and there was no opportunity of passing it on to the divisional commanders of the flotilla.”
This remarkable statement confirms the impression we get that since the crisis began Admiral Kamimura had been treated by Headquarters with surprising neglect and that the organisation of the wireless and cable communication left much to be desired. His orders were blocked and no care was taken to keep him posted with the information that came in. Such neglect is remarkable when we consider the importance of his squadron in view of a highly probable movement from Vladivostok. It had been known for some time that the destroyer which had been sent from Port Arthur on the night of the sortie had reached Chifu in safety. The information had reached Dalny at 1 p.m. on the 11th, before Admiral Togo had returned with the fleet, and Admiral Hosoya had taken upon himself to send two destroyers under Commander Fujimoto to look after her. She had begun to disarm during the afternoon under the surveillance of the Chinese naval authorities, but when Commander Fujimoto arrived the Japanese consul handed him orders from Headquarters that he was “to disregard totally any disarmament, and, acting in accordance with previous instructions, must capture or sink her.” From this it is clear the Japanese government had long decided to disregard Chinese neutrality if the Russians sought refuge in Chinese ports: at least if such refuge were sought in order to escape the consequences of defeat in action or in hot chase. This at any rate is suggested by what took place. After conferring with the consul, Commander Fujimoto went in and sent an officer on board the Russian destroyer to demand that she should leave in two hours or surrender. Her commander protested he was disarming, and that having a defect in his engines he could not leave, and further that he claimed the inviolability of a neutral port. To this the Japanese officer replied as he had been instructed, that as the battle was still in progress a belligerent had no right to such inviolability. As the Russian officer remained obdurate the destroyer was seized after a desperate struggle, in the course of which one of her crew attempted to sink her by exploding the magazines. She still floated, however, and Commander Fujimoto, in spite of the protest of the senior Chinese naval officer, proceeded to tow her out, and eventually brought her safely into Dalny.20
Still, in spite of these high-handed proceedings, the captured destroyer had done what was required of her for bringing about a combination of the two Russian squadrons, and it was obvious that the sortie from Port Arthur must have been known at Vladivostok some time on the 11th. In all probability, therefore, Admiral Iessen would promptly endeavour to carry out the concentration which the Japanese had anticipated from the first. Yet at Tokyo they seem to have been preoccupied with other matters, and were issuing orders and counter-orders that the admirals must have found not a little disconcerting. On the evening of the 12th it was known that the Askold was not at Kyau-chau at all. During the afternoon she had put into Shanghai, where the destroyer Grozovoi was already lying. Admiral Ijuin, the Vice-Director of the Staff, quickly reported the matter to the Commander-in-Chief, expressing a pious hope that the government would take no steps in the matter till they knew what the Chinese authorities intended to do, and what Admiral Togo’s plans were. But the hope was not realised. There was a rumour that another ship had appeared off the Yang-tse at the Saddle Islands. This was apparently the Diana. About 1.0 a.m. on the night of the battle she had rounded Shantung Promontory, barely an hour behind the Japanese fleet, but by hugging the shore she had slipped by them unperceived, steering S. 23 W. (true) out of the direct route for her destination. She was still bent on making her way to Vladivostok, but with daylight it became clear that she had not coal enough for the voyage, and her captain decided to make for the French port of Saigon. At 9 a.m., while the matter was still under discussion, she sighted a cruiser apparently chasing her, and she ran from her. Suddenly, however, the stranger turned east, and was seen to be the Novik, but as she did not answer the Diana’s signal the destroyer Grozovoi, which was then in company, was sent away to speak her. The destroyer returned at 1.0 to say the Novik was going to Kyau-chau for coal and stores, and that she then meant to make for Vladivostok round the east of Japan. Great pressure was now put upon the Diana’s captain to do the same, but in his opinion such a course meant certain capture, and he refused. So after giving the destroyer permission to join the Novik he held on for Saigon, and on the evening of the 12th appears to have been off the Saddle Islands outside Shanghai.
The Grozovoi, having been headed off from Kyau-chau by a Japanese cruiser was also forced to make Shanghai21, and her arrival there at the same time as the Diana gave the situation so serious an aspect, that the government at Tokyo felt that something must be done to deal with it without loss of time. Accordingly, during the morning of the 13th, the Chief of the Staff had to tell Admiral Togo that to delay action at this juncture for a single day would greatly complicate the situation to the disadvantage of Japan, and he must take measures at once. Here it is to be presumed we see the hand of the Foreign Office still harping on the idea that if the enemy’s ships were attacked in neutral ports soon enough to preserve continuity with the battle the violation of neutrality would be condoned, and “hot chase’’ could be pleaded “to save the Chinese face,” and to mollify the other neutral Powers.
Whatever the origin of the order it was one not easy to obey and there was considerable delay in acting upon it. The fact was that owing to the previous suggestions from the Staff, hurriedly made on inaccurate information, Admiral Togo had nothing available for the work required. As we have seen, Admiral Dewa was at Ross Island, under orders for Kyau-chau, and when the Staff, having finally satisfied themselves that the Tzesarevich was in the German port, had suggested reinforcing him with the Sixth Division, the Commander-in-chief had felt bound to comply. Accordingly he had done his best to convey to Rear-Admiral Togo an order to abandon the district he was then in—which was somewhere in the middle of the Yellow Sea—and to join the Third Division at its rendezvous. Some three hours later Admiral Dewa proceeding south met Rear-Admiral Togo on his way back to the base, but as the orders for them to unite forces had not come to hand they merely communicated and passed on. Thus at 4.0 p.m., an hour or two after the last Staff order for Shanghai reached the Commander-in-Chief, the Sixth Division turned up at the base with its coal and water exhausted and quite unable to move till it had filled up again.
What then was Admiral Togo to do? Not only had the project for reinforcing Admiral Dewa broken down but he had nothing at his command to send to Shanghai. The only possible way of complying with what the Staff required was to draw on Admiral Kamimura and this after some hours’ deliberation he decided to do. Accordingly at 7.40 p.m. he sent him an order to detach Admiral Uriu’s division and a division of torpedo-boats to Shanghai, and in order not to leave him entirely without light cruisers he at the same time directed Admiral Dewa to send to Takeshiki the Chitose and Nippon Maru, as well as the Hong Kong Maru, which being now due from her cruise off Kyauchau, was also added to his command.
At the moment no order could well have been more ill-timed, but as it happened no harm was done. For fortunately the Second Squadron was out of hearing and Admiral Kamimura was spared this last distraction. At 3 p.m. he had met Admiral Uriu at the rendezvous on the Mitsushima—Tsunoshima line and had explained to him the disposition he meant to make to discharge his double duty. During the night Admiral Uriu was to extend a watch line from Position 406 to Position 461,23 covering the Eastern Channel on the Ulsan—Tsunoshima line. At dawn he himself would be in a position midway between the Fourth Division and Ulsan and together they would steam back by the Western and Eastern Channels respectively, each leaving a guard ship behind at the established watch positions A and B on the Fusan—Tsunoshima line.
Having given this order Admiral Kamimura closed up his line and steamed slowly northward for a position 30 miles N.E. of Ulsan.24 This he reached at 1.30 a.m. on the 14th and then turned back S. 34 W. for his dawn position, steaming at 7 knots in line ahead. At this time Admiral Uriu’s flagship, the Naniwa, who was at the north-west end of his line (Position 406) began to find her wireless affected. The indications were at first taken for atmospherics but were soon found to be so like those she had taken in from the Russian cruisers before that a very strict look-out was kept. After 2.30 the indications ceased, but two hours later Admiral Kamimura, who was then coming just abreast of Ulsan, could see a light on his port bow. The morning was misty and nothing could be made out for nearly half an hour, but at 4.50 there could be no mistake. Three of the Vladivostok cruisers were ahead of him and at last his chance had come.
