CO-OPERATION WITH THE ADVANCE OF THE SECOND ARMY AND THE FINAL STAGE OF THE MAIN DEPLOYMENT.
[Charts B 2 and M 2.]
THOUGH the disasters of May 15th and the fogs that accompanied them forced the Admiral to cancel nearly all his arrangements for assisting the advance of the army, General Oku did not hold his hand. Putting his force in motion on the 15th, he drove in a strong Russian reconnaissance and on the morrow had occupied their advanced post at the village in front of Kinchau. Immediately to the eastward of it on his left front lay the foothills of Mount Sampson and it was to this point that the naval brigade had hoped to push its way from Kerr Bay and the Taa-ku-shan peninsula; but owing to the failure of the attempt to land the position had to be occupied by the left of the Army. The effect of the day’s work nevertheless was that by nightfall General Fok had withdrawn his division into the Dalny-Talien-hwan area, leaving only the 5th regiment to occupy the Nanshan position as well as Kinchau, and General Oku was established astride the railway, completely cutting off Port Arthur from the North.
It was not only from Kerr Bay that naval assistance was not forthcoming. Owing to the disturbance caused by the disasters, Rear-Admiral Togo failed to appear on the other flank. According to his programme he was up at Kaiping. About midday on the 16th he had rejoined his gunboats off Tower Hill, a point some 12 miles south of Kaiping where the railway runs within two or three miles of the shore. While the Chiyoda was detached to look into the mouth of the Liau River, the squadron in sections searched the coast with their guns from Kaiping to the south of Tower Hill where they tried ineffectually to damage the railway by shell fire. A few parties of General Shtakelberg’s cavalry which had been told to watch the coast were seen and driven off. The material effects were in fact trifling, but as a demonstration the movement was an entire success. A report had just been received by General Kuropatkin that the Japanese had landed on the west coast of Liau-tung and were making a rapid advance on Kaiping. It was of course false, but the appearance of the squadron on the coast could only increase the apprehension that such a movement might take place at any time. Indeed it now was regarded as more certain than ever that the Japanese were about to break into the concentration area of General Shtakelberg’s corps and that their immediate object was to seize the railway junction at Ta-shih-chiao and isolate Newchwang. It was thus more than ever out of the question to move him, and in this way Rear-Admiral Togo’s manœuvres had the effect of securely holding him off from General Oku’s rear.1
Next day the impression which he had raised was confirmed by information that on May 12th 10,000 men escorted by four cruisers had left Japan for Newchwang. This report was presumably due to the sailing of the first group of reinforcements which General Oku was expecting, and to deepen the Russian bewilderment there was intelligence that the Japanese ships had reappeared off Kaiping. This also was not true. At 5.0 p.m. on the 16th, having re-assembled the squadron, the Rear-Admiral moved back to Kinchau Bay for the second part of his programme, which involved tactical assistance on General Oku’s right; but now the tale of disaster continued. After midnight the fog which was causing the confusion on the other coast set in so thick that he had to pass the word to anchor as convenient. In performing the evolution the gunboat Akagi ran into her sister the Oshima. All efforts to save her proved ineffectual and with the usual ceremony she was abandoned. All hands were saved but she sank almost immediately, making with a destroyer which fouled a mine the same day off Dalny the seventh total loss in five days.
By 7.30 a.m. on the 17th it was clear enough for the detachment to proceed and throwing out one cruiser to Iron Island to get in touch with the main fleet through what was known as the Central Observation Station in the Liau-ti-shan Channel, the Rear-Admiral with the rest of his force, reached Kinchau Bay about noon.2 He proceeded at once to bombard the enemy’s observation posts on Wedge Head, which forms the southern limit of the bay, while under a hot fire a detachment hastily swept for mines inside. This done he moved boldly in and began to bombard in the direction of Kinchau.
But of the combined movement in which he was to take part there was no sign. Neither the battle-fleet nor the cruisers with the Naval Brigade had appeared and the army was motionless. How far General Oku’s immobility was due to the news of the Russian concentration north of Kai-ping on the 15th and how far to the breakdown of the naval arrangements is uncertain. All we know is that he contented himself with strengthening the position he had occupied astride the railway and pressing back the Russian outposts till he was in possession of the whole range of hills facing the Nanshan position. There he entrenched himself and all further movement was postponed till his reinforcements should arrive.
On realising the situation Rear-Admiral Togo stopped the bombardment of Kinchau and moved to the western side of the bay near the Sha-oe river. Here the railway runs again close to the shore and having ascertained there were no mines he sent in the Akagi and Uji to bombard the bridges. No harm was done, but the moral effect was curious. It so happened that General Stessel was just then returning by rail to Port Arthur from an inspection of the Nanshan position. The engine-driver put on full speed but the gunboats turned so heavy a fire on the train that the engine was hit and he had to stop. The General with his Staff had to take to their horses and only escaped under a galling fire. Believing he was in presence of an attempt to land, he gave hasty orders to resist it and with all speed troops were hurried to the spot both from Port Arthur and by General Fok. But the alarm soon passed. At sundown Rear-Admiral Togo withdrew his force and the next evening (the 18th) was back at the base to report his loss, but to find no rest.
On the 19th he received orders to proceed, so soon as he had coaled and watered, to Yentoa Bay and take over disembarkation duties. In his absence, General Oku’s reinforcements had begun to arrive. The first batch had appeared on the 15th, and on the 17th the landing had commenced. By the 23rd all the transports were in the bay, and again with the assistance of the fleet, the work of disembarkation went on from day to day.
At the same time Admiral Hosoya was completing the deployment of the army by landing the Xth Division as a connecting force in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku-shan on the Ta-yang-ho, which was to be its base. He had sailed, it will be remembered, on the 14th for the Ping-yang rendezvous with the Fuso and Haiyen and the armoured gunboat Tsukushi. His third coast-defence ship Saiyen and two more gunboats, Atago and Uji, were to join at the Tunguz Capes and thither the Banjo had already been detached for a final reconnaissance. With so small a force he could do little to assist the actual landing. Admiral Togo had warned the Imperial Staff that this would be so, and in acknowledging the order for the operation had clearly intimated that so far as boats were concerned the Army would have to shift for itself.
Accordingly Lieutenant-General Baron Kawarhura, who commanded the landing force, had arranged for a number of large sampans to move up the coast to the Yalu and thence to a rendezvous at an island which lies off the mouth of the Ta-yang-ho. The Rear-Admiral did however charge himself with the new naval duty of seizing the landing place and for this purpose organised from his crews one small-arm company and a field gun section.
On the 17th, when all was ready, the Banjo came in to Chinampho with the depressing report that she could find no place fit for a landing. So urgently, however, did the military situation demand the execution of the movement that General Kawamura agreed with the Admiral to proceed, and the Banjo was sent to try again. At 4.0 next morning (the 18th) the first group of transports and its escort followed. On the way they were joined by the Saiyen and at dusk they anchored out of sight of land, off the island where the sampans were to meet them. The place they now decided to try was Nan-chien—on the west side of the promontory which terminated in East Tunguz Cape and about 15 miles south-west of Ta-ku-shan. As soon as it was light the Banjo worked close in shore and searching the place with her guns drove off the few scouts that were there. Under cover of her fire and supported by two armed steamboats, the naval landing party got ashore and seized the neck of the promontory. By 8 o’clock the Japanese flag was flying on its summit and the landing of the troops began at once. The mud flats were even worse than at Yentoa Bay and so exposed was the beach that almost any wind would make a landing impossible. Fortunately the day proved calm and clear, and assisted by the two other gunboats, Atago and Uji, which had just arrived, the disembarkation proceeded rapidly. By dark all the infantry (six battalions), one battery, and a company of engineers, were ashore, besides a third of the horses. The surprise had been complete. There was not so much as a patrol to oppose or observe them. General Mishchenko, whose duty it was to watch this part of the coast with his cavalry, had fallen back inland towards Feng-whang-cheng as the main Eastern Force was pushed back by General Kuroki. It was not what General Kuropatkin intended and on hearing of it he had at once issued orders for the cavalry observation to be resumed. Nevertheless at the critical time the coast was unwatched. The result was that the landing was not known to General Kuropatkin till three days later, and even then there was no trustworthy report of the Japanese strength.
On the 20th, the day after they had appeared, the landing was complete. The naval party was recalled and General Kawamura pushed forward a company to seize Ta-ku-shan and join hands with a detachment of cavalry from the First Army which General Kuroki had thrown out for the purpose.3 This done, General Kawamura was able to proceed at once to concentrate his force about Ta-ku-shan while the landing of his own cavalry, artillery, engineers and baggage proceeded. It was completed so far as the first group was concerned by the fourth day, but it had to be done by the Army Disembarkation Staff alone. By this time there was pressing need for the supporting squadron elsewhere. Admiral Togo had work before him that demanded every pennant he could come by, and by the evening of the 20th the Imperial Staff informed him that further naval assistance at Ta-ku-shan could be dispensed with. Thereupon he promptly recalled Admiral Hosoya to his flag. The small gunboats were sent away next day, and on the morrow (the 22nd) when the first group of troops was practically all ashore the Admiral followed with the rest, leaving the Army to manage the second group with their own resources.
There was nothing else to be done. When Admiral Hosoya reached the base he found everything in a fever of preparation. General Oku’s advance was about to be renewed and the arrangements demanded his taking over at once the disembarkation at Yentoa Bay from Rear-Admiral Togo. That officer was thereby set free to take alternate spells of duty with Admiral Dewa in the cruiser watch off Port Arthur, which promised to be now more arduous and responsible than ever.
The meaning of it all was an urgent order from the Imperial Staff. The arrest of General Oku’s advance before Kinchau was not at all to their mind. The recent losses, coupled as they were with knowledge that the blocking had at least partially failed, and that a new squadron was actually taking shape in the Baltic, emphasised the need of more rapid progress towards Port Arthur. General Oku had made his southward advance with two divisions only, while with the rest of his force he pushed forward his northern front to the Pu-lan-tien—Pi-tsu-wo line and was supplying it from the depôt he had established at the latter place.
At Tokyo, however, this arrangement appears to have been disapproved. “At this moment,” we are told, “the Imperial Staff considered that the first necessity for the next operations was the occupation of Talien-hwan. On the 18th they gave General Oku the order to occupy it with the troops which had been first landed and to use every available man to clear away the enemy on his Kinchau front at the earliest possible moment.” On this the General massed three divisions and a brigade of artillery on his southern front and drew back the right of his northern force to the Ta-sha-ho without, however, entirely abandoning Pi-tsu-wo.
That these orders indicate a change in the Japanese war plan from an original intention merely to mask Port Arthur would be too much to assert. We know that Admiral Togo at least had always regarded Dalny as the primary objective of the combined operations, but its possession was as essential for the masking of Port Arthur and an advance on Liau-yang, as it was for the siege. There is, however, a further official declaration on the real significance of the new orders. “The Imperial Staff,” we are told, “on account of the news they had of the enemy’s relief squadron [that is, the Baltic squadron] and in view of the actual condition of their own fleet considered it as indispensable that the fortress of Port Arthur should be captured and its squadron destroyed at the earliest possible moment.”4 This may have been the intention from the first. If it was not—and some modification of plan is certainly implied—we can well understand how the Imperial Staff regarded the recent naval losses as “fraught with far-reaching strategical consequences,” In any case it may be safely affirmed that, if the order to take Port Arthur at once did mean a change of plan, the Japanese did not realise the magnitude of the task. From the first they under-estimated the power of resistance which the fortress was to display. Emboldened by the memory of their brilliant assault in the Chinese War, they expected it to fall quickly and to prove little or no encumbrance to the concentric advance on Liau-yang.
1 Russian Military History. Vol. II., Part I., pp. 302, 303. N.I.D. Diary, page 83.
2 Japanese Confidential History, page 332. Beyond a casual mention of this Central Observation Station no details are available of the system of communication with squadrons in the Liau-tung Gulf. The Central Observation Station seems to have been occupied by a cruiser or destroyer of the Third Division whose normal blockade station was off Liau-ti-shan. On three occasions we are told the Akitsushima “became guardship at Position Z. (N.W. of Iron Island) with duties of being prepared against the enemy and of communicating with the main force off Port Arthur.” No overland communication is referred to till later when the real advance on Port Arthur began.