Patricia Rodi
Introduction
Populism is a hotly debated topic, and is perceived by politicians and academics alike as a great threat to Western democracies. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission (2014–), warned that the European Union is in a battle with ‘galloping populism’ (Charter 2016) while Martin Schulz, the erstwhile president of the European Parliament (2012–17), declared that ‘Unscrupulous populists, who have no solutions to offer, are taking advantage of the situation to prey on the fears of ordinary people’ (Banks 2016). In the media, journalists argued populism is ‘a real threat to mainstream democracy’ (Painter 2013).
There is an alleged ‘populist zeitgeist’ emerging across Europe (Mudde 2004), where politicians of right and left, on the fringes and in the mainstream, from Jeremy Corbyn to Nigel Farage and Donald Trump to Bernie Sanders, have adopted and imitated populist forms of expression and communication. However, the extent to which populist methods and practices have been adopted by mainstream parties varies widely. Some contributors identify only a minimal effect on mainstream parties’ political programmes (see Rooduijn et al. 2014), while others have shown – largely by anecdote – that a handful of mainstream politicians have actively adopted populist means of communication and action since the 1990s (Mudde 2004; Hawkins 2009).
The present chapter investigates populist political communication and its potential impact on centre-left parties, with specific focus on adaptation by centre-left parties to the distinct communicative characteristics of populism. This is necessary, not only in the light of recent populist backlashes in many Western democracies against mainstream governments and given political and economic developments since 2008, but because centre-left parties have been dominant within Western European political systems since World War II (Keating and McCronne 2013). There is, as such, a need to give attention to the possible reasons and consequences of such ‘populist contamination’, and to further explore whether these centre-left parties have become more populist in their communication activities. As populism remains a widely-debated topic, it is essential that the term is handled with care and precision. As such, the chapter will focus on pinpointing the main characteristics of populist political communication, and provide a straightforward guide to identify where it does occur.
The contribution compares the British Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democratic Party and examines the potential contagion of populist political communication in these cases. These two parties are of particular interest due to the countries’ different forms of democracy. For example, it has been argued that majoritarian democracies provide fertile ground for populism (cf. Stanyer et al. 2017; Rooduijn et al. 2014). In view of this relationship I anticipate that different forms of democratic models – as seen in the UK’s majoritarian and Sweden’s consensual forms of government – can condition whether or not the mainstream centre-left will incorporate populist means of communication.
The chapter proceeds by discussing the emergence of populist parties in Western Europe and the effects this has on centre-left parties. The subsequent section provides an introduction to populism in a communicative context and pinpoints the distinct characteristics of populist political communication. Lastly, the chapter explores whether populist political communication now appears in the communication channels and messages of the dominant centre-left mainstream parties in Sweden and the UK, before drawing conclusions regarding the wider implications of these findings.
Centre-Left Parties and Populism in Western Europe
On the face of it, social democratic parties have experienced falling support in countries across Europe. Some have even argued that there is a ‘crisis of social democracy’ (Keating and McCrone 2013). Before moving on, let’s briefly take stock of the position that was held by left-wing politics and political parties in recent decades.
The transformation of capitalism has undermined many social democratic ideas and practices. Specifically, the decline of the manual working class during the 1960s changed the class structure, and old class divisions became increasingly blurred (Oskarsson 2005; Keating and McCrone 2013). As a result, class as a determining factor in voter preferences was, by the late 1990s, in decline (Evans et al. 1999; Evans and Tilley 2012). Globalization, de-industrialization and growing inward-migration in Europe made way for the emergence of new political cleavages in relation to socio-cultural and religious issues. Such cleavages gained relevance in the context of party competition and party affiliation. New parties rejected the traditional class-based orientation of politics in the form of Green parties in the 1970s, followed by radical right parties in the 1980s and 1990s (Meguid 2008). In light of this, many political parties, especially those on the left, were faced with a shrinking core base of voters. This led some social democratic parties to re-think their electoral strategies and to develop new responses and programmes to ‘catch’ a wider voter base (Evans and Tilley 2012). The result was a shift towards the ideological centre and, in extreme cases, even towards the right (as seen with Tony Blair’s New Labour). Some have argued that many social democratic parties gave up their fundamental scepticism about the free market (although to varying degrees), allowing socio-economic issues to give way to socio-cultural issues (cf. Mudde 2014; Kitshelt 1994). Others (see Mair 1995; Kitschelt and McGann 1995) felt that the lack of recognisable differences between traditional parties contributed to the growing division and remoteness that some electorates felt, and may even have increased the chances for populist parties to rise.
More recently however, growing migration has come to challenge the boundaries of welfare regimes in Europe that have often been tied to citizenship (Keating and McCrone 2013). Alongside the rising discontent with current politics and traditional parties, this has become a powerful tool for populist parties. These parties, as seen both on left and right, have capitalized on such sentiments, claiming, in the name of the people, to better understand and express the feelings of marginalization than the traditional established parties. The established parties are described as a cluster of self-interested elites who do not care about the people’s wishes and interests (Mudde 2004). It is therefore not surprising that we have witnessed populist parties rallying under the slogan: They do not represent us (with respect to the traditional political parties), as seen by Podemos in Spain.
One of the most notable challengers to centre-left mainstream parties in Western Europe has come from the populist radical-right (Keating and McCrone 2013). These parties pose a particular danger with their appeal to those who feel threatened by a combination of foreign elites, European integration and globalization (Keating and McCrone 2013). Although the two political families are very different, they often compete for the working-class vote (Rydgren 2004). In fact, populist radical-right parties have made an impression with many voters due to their ability to communicate with the ‘man on the street’ (Betz 1994). Take UKIP’s Nigel Farage, who casts himself as a ‘man of the people’. Such an image stands in stark contrast to the leaders of the mainstream political parties in the UK, who are criticized, by Farage, of acting and speaking in a manner that is entirely detached from ‘ordinary people’.
Others have noted that the increased presence and electoral successes of the populist radical right has had a contagious effect, driving mainstream parties to copy some of the policy positions of the populist radical right on immigration, multiculturalism and populism (Meguid 2008; Bale and van Spanje 2010; Green-Pedersen et al. 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogsturp 2008; Rooduijn et al. 2014). As populism is not considered a coherent ideology, but a thin-centred-one, it is devoid of concrete and specific policy solutions (Mudde 2004). If populism is contagious, I suggest that we need to move away from policies, and focus on where populism is most likely to be manifested – in the written and oral communication of political parties and actors (Wirth et al. 2016; Aalberg et al. 2017). In fact, many experts have already presented evidence that mainstream political actors have adopted the communication strategies and practices of populist parties to address the competition from rival political projects (cf. Mudde 2004; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Leaders of European mainstream centre-left parties such as Tony Blair, Steve Stevaert and Wouter Bos have all been identified as displaying populism in how they communicate (Mair 2002; Mudde 2004).
In light of this, one would expect that, if there is a contagion effect from the presence of populist parties, this should play a part in whether or not mainstream parties adopt populist political communications. When populist parties become successful there is a possibility that mainstream parties will react by trying to exclude populist actors from political power, but will include populist themes and ways of communicating (Mudde 2004; Rooduijn et al. 2014). As far as centre-left parties are concerned, there is no reason to believe such parties will remain entirely immune to the populist surge. In fact, all political parties regularly face decisions about strategy (Bale et al. 2010). Poor electoral performance and the increased presence of populist parties can therefore play a part in how political parties decide to strategically communicate to voters. Since political actors can shape and re-shape their communication more easily than policy positions, it seems reasonable to expect that if the mainstream parties believe that populism is the main driver for the populist parties’ success, then they might be compelled to adopt degrees of such communication to fight off competition. Take the Brexit referendum. Some have argued that the former Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron might never have called a referendum had it not been for the rise, and the perceived threat, of UKIP. In this regard, I anticipate that the stronger populist parties are in terms of electoral success,1 the more likely the centre-left parties are to adopt degrees of populist communication. Likewise, as long as populist parties are relatively unsuccessful in electoral terms, mainstream centre-left parties would not be inclined to adopt populist forms of communication.
An additional factor that has been highlighted within the populist debate is the effect that different forms of democracy can have on the opportunities and limitations of populism (Mudde 2007). For example, majoritarian systems, as seen in the UK, pose particular difficulties for new parties to successfully enter the political arena. Due to such obstacles, new parties have a stronger incentive to initiate demands that will find a place in the programmes of the established parties. In a recent study, Rooduijn et al. (2014) found that countries including the UK were more prone to adopt programmatic populist claims than those with more consensual models such as Sweden. Since there are only two major parties in the UK, the mainstream parties were more likely to frame their competitors in terms of opposition versus government or ‘us’ versus ‘them’. With this in mind, I posit that the UK Labour Party is more likely to adopt populist political communication than the Swedish SAP.
What, though, is the potential danger posed by populism? The main threat from a communication perspective is that populist politicians often present overly-simplified, black and white views, and take uncompromising stands which can lead to polarization in society. Another factor is that many contemporary actors have been classified as populist – from Jeremy Corbyn and Farage to Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen. The consequence of classifying any politician as populist if they appear popular, controversial or if they step outside the ‘norms’ of politics, is that everyone ends up in the same ‘populist pool’. It is therefore important to distinguish between different degrees of populism and between what specifically characterizes populist communication, so that we can more easily distinguish populism from placing an emphasis on national empowerment and nationalism.
Into the Mainstream? Populism as a Form of Political Communication
To discuss the current impact of populism on the mainstream centre-left in Europe, it is important to provide a tighter definition of the concept of populism. The mark of populism is the separation of society into two homogenous and antagonistic warring camps: the ‘good people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’; populism claims to defend the unrestricted sovereignty of the people (Wirth et al. 2016; Mudde 2004).
Populism is described as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ in that it lacks few concrete policy-related solutions. It often rails against the political establishment, but does not necessarily specify what should replace it. It is therefore often the case, as mentioned previously, that populism in practice is usually found alongside ‘thicker’ left- or right-wing ideologies, such as nationalism or socialism (Midde 2004; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Because of this, populism has a number of distinct communicative characteristics. For example, a left-wing party may employ means of populist communication by calling out the corrupt elite and by decrying the exploitation of employees, while the radical right often shifts attention to immigrants and the ‘foreign’ elite.
So how do we identify populist communication and what are the main characteristics? Firstly, let’s turn our attention to ‘the people’. At the core of populism lays a positive reference to the people. Although the people are described as an underdog against the elite, it always includes a positive image of a homogenous people. Populism frequently talks and justifies actions by identifying with and appealing to the people (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). The phrase ‘the people’ is a ‘catch-all’ concept used to connect with voters (Hawkins et al. 2012; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000).
In opposition to the people are ‘the elite’. The elite are separated from the people. Populists antagonize this relationship by arguing that the elite do not share the peoples’ values and interests, and that they do not act on behalf of the people (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000). A clear separation is therefore at work, distancing the ‘us’ (the people) from the common enemy established by ‘them’ (the dominant elite). The elite may sometimes be identified by the use of metonymy (alternate names) e.g. Brussels, Wall Street or the IMF (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Wirth et al. 2016).
The antagonism between the two groups (the people vs. the elite) is crucial. Populism is essentially structured around these elements and it is only when they are combined with one another that they classify as populist. This is of crucial importance, since there is an overuse and misuse of the term populism. On the basis of this, there are a number of communicative characteristics of populism that stand out and can be summarized in the following way:
The first characteristic consists of stressing the people’s virtues. This is connected to the importance and construction of the people (Mudde 2004; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). The people are perceived as obtaining the ability to solve problems and to make correct decisions. Populists try to appeal to the people by stressing their positive qualities and virtues, emphasising past achievements in particular (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008).
Second, populism is based on two further core dimensions, namely: the empowerment of the people, and the betrayal of the people by the elite. These two elements are only possible if the people are perceived as homogeneous, having no internal differences, with common understandings, longings, feelings, wills and opinions (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Taggart 2000). Hence, describing the people as a homogenous entity makes up the second communicative characteristic.
Third, populism also attempts to unite with the people by claiming to represent or embody the people. Paradoxically, many political actors who use populist political communication and rhetoric reject political representation, but at the same time, most of them are actually political representatives themselves (Taggart 2000). Actors who use populist communication must therefore be able to ensure they are perceived as of the people. By doing so, they communicate in a way that portrays them as acting in the name of the people.
The fourth characteristic concerns the idea of the people as the democratic sovereign. The idea is that the people should have sovereignty while the elite are portrayed as depriving the people of their rights (Mudde 2004). Political actors can communicate support for popular sovereignty either in a general sense by arguing for more power for the people, or in relation to institutional reforms, such as introducing direct democratic elements in the decision-making process.
For populists, the only cleavage that exists is the one between elites and the people. Attacks on the elite therefore lay the ground for the fifth communicative characteristic. This can be achieved through emphasising what I call ‘elite negativity’. Elite negativity can take its expression by portraying the elite negatively, as being corrupt or unresponsive to the people (Mudde 2004). In its essence, displaying the elites in a negative light is about reinforcing the view that the elites do not represent the people but only themselves.
Lastly, the idea of popular sovereignty holds with the notion that the will of the people should be favoured over the preference of the elite. For populists, this can only be achieved by supporting the limitation of elite power in terms of decision-making, and by denying the elites power altogether, or by arguing for a replacement of the political class in the name of the people.
This chapter sets out two expectations that can potentially affect whether or not mainstream centre-left parties adopt populist political communication: firstly, the success of a populist party and secondly, the type of democratic system that prevails. The communicative characteristic, as identified above, will act as a tool to judge when centre-left parties adopt populist communication strategies. In doing so, the chapter will establish whether parties use populist communication more frequently.
Labour, the Social Democrats and the Populist Contenders
This chapter focuses on two cases, the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the British Labour Party. The two parties offer an ideal testing ground, as the amount of populist influences and political systems differ markedly between these countries.
As far as the background of the two selected parties is concerned, Sweden was long described as the European exception (Demker 2012) in relation to populist influences. For years, populist parties were unsuccessful in Sweden. But the last decade saw a rise in the fortunes of political populism. During the 2010 general election, the populist radical right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats (SD) surpassed the four-percentage threshold necessary for entering parliament, and are today Sweden’s third largest party.
For the UK, populism has only posed a relatively small oppositional threat to the mainstream parties. One reason is the nature of the two-party system and the limited chances this allows for populists and smaller parties to break onto the current electoral scene. However, the success of UKIP as seen in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, where the party came first with 26.6 per cent of the vote, and in the 2015 general election where the party got 3.8 million votes (but only one seat), has led some to suggest there is a growing populist influence (both directly and in-directly) on British politics, which was seen most clearly in the context of the 2016 Brexit referendum (Stanyer et al. 2017).
To establish if populist political communication is used in the communication of the British Labour Party and Swedish Social Democratic Party, we have analysed2 a total of 14 political party documents (manifestos3 and speeches) from the period between 2006 and 2017. Election campaigns are of particular interest as they relate to an intensified and narrow time period of political communication: The adaptation of populist political communications can be expected to be higher than during ordinary political periods.
Populist Political Communication going Mainstream?
The British Labour Party 2010
During the 2010 general election, Labour made use of populist political communication through which they provoked the Conservative Party – framing the Tories as the political elite, and the Labour party as the true representatives of the people: ‘…the decisions they seek to make for our country would favour the privileged few over the many. They would isolate Britain…’ (2010, 0:5). This was followed by: ‘We speak for the ordinary people of this country who work hard, want their kids to do better than them, and worry about the economic, environmental and social challenges we face. We are on their side, it is their voice, needs and hopes…’ (2010, 0:5). There is a clear elite negativity in evidence, in that Labour claim the elite are not acting on behalf of the people but of a select few at the top. In this framing, the Labour party are the ones who speak for the people (uniting with the people).
The speeches given by the then Labour leader, Gordon Brown, in 2010, contain a higher degree of populism than seen in the party’s manifesto of that year. Brown repeatedly unites with the people by pledging: ‘…myself and my party to fighting each and every day for a fairer future for the people of Britain … We will always put the British people first – before personal interest, our party interest, or any vested interest. We will renew this nation – not for our own benefit or the benefit of a narrow section or clique – but for all the people of this country we love. We are the people’s party – and we are pledged to serve the people’ (27 March 2010). Indeed, as stated in the manifesto, Brown emphasizes the interests of the people should be put before the interest of the elite.
An additional characteristic of populist communication is to claim the popular will (the communicative characteristic of a homogenous entity). This is apparent in Brown’s speeches where he stresses ‘British values’, describing the British people as having similar traits: ‘For whenever we see injustice, we want to end it. Whenever we see suffering, we want to relieve it. Whenever we see unfairness, we want to rectify it. These are Britain’s values and these are Labour values – not the values that spring from markets, but the values that spring from our hearts’ (4 May 2010).
Moreover, Brown frequently uses a communication style that praises the achievements of the British People and simultaneously downplays both his own and other politicians’ role: ‘No – it is not our achievement – it is your achievement. And it’s the achievement of the people of Britain’ (4 May 2010).
Despite the minor electoral increase obtained by the populist radical right in the 2010 election (+0.9 per cent for UKIP and +1.2 per cent for the BNP) (Rooduijn et al. 2014), the communication channels of Labour are characterized by a high degree of populist political communication, specifically within public speeches by key figures. The 2010 general election resulted in a major loss of parliamentary seats for the Labour Party.
2015
In the run up to the 2015 general election, support for UKIP was predicted to grow significantly (YouGov 2015), which could potentially cause Labour to use more populist communication within their political platform. In fact, the 2015 manifesto and speeches, as expected, have a higher degree of populist political communication than 2010. Labour figures and Labour material repeatedly describe the people as homogenous, and present the people as sharing common attributes: ‘The British people are known for tolerance, responsibility to others and for our belief in the value of hard work. We look confidently outward to the world. These are great British traditions’ (2015: 8).
Similar to the 2010 manifesto, in 2015 the Conservatives were portrayed by Labour as representing the political elite, who conspired with the people at the top, at the expense of the people: ‘We can continue with a Conservative plan based on the view that success comes only from a privileged few at the top. Or we can change direction, begin to return power to people and build an economy together in which everyone can contribute to a shared and enduring prosperity. We believe that Britain only succeeds when working families succeed’ (2015: 9).
The speeches given by the 2015 Labour leader Ed Miliband were also characterized by higher degrees of populist communication. There is a strong emphasis on targeting the political elite (the Conservatives) and claiming they are self-interested, only looking after the people at the top (the rich and powerful) while neglecting working people. This reoccurs in statements such as: ‘Because for too long, you have been told something that simply isn’t true. That’s what’s good for the richest and most powerful is always good for the whole of our country. That as long as a few individuals and companies are OK, we can just wait for the wealth to trickle down to everyone else. With one rule for the few and another rule for the many’ (13 April 2015) followed by: ‘I am ready. Ready to put an end to the tired old idea that as long as we look after the rich and powerful we will all be OK. Ready to put into practice the truth that it is only when working people succeed, that Britain succeeds … Because I believe the wealth, the success, the future of our country does not simply come from a few at the top. It comes from every working person’ (13 April 2015). Miliband stressed the fundamental importance of working people, and of their importance for Britain and for the success of the country, while pressing an economic anti-establishment communication that targeted the rich. Miliband further criticized media tycoons, ‘Rupert Murdoch’, ‘tax avoiders’ and ‘multinationals’ stating: ‘Who do you want standing up for you? The answer will never be David Cameron’ (13 April 2015).
The characteristic of uniting with the people is apparent in most speeches, where Miliband stresses, on numerous occasions, the importance of ‘…giving power back to those to whom it really belongs: The British people’ (13 April 2015). Evidently Labour increased its use of populist communication since 2010; this was more apparent in the speeches than the manifesto, however. Labour lost the general election, and secured only a minimal increase of +1.5 per cent in vote share compared to the previous election.
2017
The 2017 snap election was called by Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May, with the hope of securing a convincing majority which could bolster her position in the context of the Brexit negotiations. YouGov (2017) polling in advance of the vote indicated only 5 per cent support for UKIP – a significant decline since the 2015 election.
In light of this, the 2017 manifesto contains few populist references, in contrast to its 2015 predecessor. Regardless, Labour still portrayed the Conservatives as corrupt and unresponsive to the people, thus deploying elite negativity during the campaign. Such populist communication can be found in subsequent statements: ‘…the Conservatives’ attempt to balance the books on the backs of the poorest’ (2017: 56) and ‘workers are being forced into self-employment by unscrupulous employers to avoid costs and their duties to workers’ (2017: 51). There is reference to, ‘This wasted potential is holding us all back’, implicitly presuming some degree of closeness to the ‘us’ – the unspecified people – seeking to embody what the party and the people feel.
Similarly, speeches by key figures are also characterized by elite negativity. Jeremy Corbyn, Labour leader in 2017 said: ‘…a Tory party intent on managing the decline of our public services, a Tory party that cuts support and services to working people while cutting taxes for the very rich and for the biggest businesses … They (the Conservatives) won’t reverse the tens of billions in tax giveaways to their wealthy friends but they will impose on working people another big dose of austerity’ (Glasgow 2017).
The Swedish Social Democratic Party 2006
For the 2006 general election, the SD obtained only 2.9 per cent of the national vote, and were unable to break the 4 per cent threshold necessarily for entering parliament. Nevertheless, the success that they experienced locally was identified as a parliamentary breakthrough. The 2006 election constituted a turning point in Swedish politics, as for the first time since 1994, a centre-right coalition government was elected to power.
In contrast to the British Labour Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party rarely displays populist rhetoric within their communications. In fact, the 2006 manifesto contains no populist communicative characteristics at all. The 2006 Social Democratic leader, Göran Perssson, displayed minimal populist communication within his speeches. Notably though, Persson uses the word ‘human beings’ when addressing the voters and only on very rare occasions uses the phrase ‘the Swedish people’: ‘The Swedish people gave a firm no! We do not want that type of politics and the opposition lost again’ (Almedalen 2006).
Although negativity towards the opposition is apparent, direct criticism against a party or the ‘Alliancen’4 is rarely found. Notably, elite negativity is mostly directed towards conservative ideology (to which the opposition adheres) or policies regarding reducing taxes on income and capital, for example.
2010
Similarly to 2006, only a handful of statements within the 2010 manifesto can be characterized as populist. This is particularly interesting since the voting intentions for the SD were predicted to be 4.66 per cent.5 During the election, the SD managed to break the threshold, entering parliament for the first time with 5.70 per cent of the national vote.
Elite negativity and uniting with the people can be found within the manifesto under the statement: ‘We want to see a development towards a health care system that does not benefit those with the most money. Advantages for those who pay more should not be happening. We want to protect the taxpayer’s money’ (2010: 6).
Elite criticism is not very apparent throughout the manifesto. On the rare occasions the party do direct criticism it is mostly applied without pointing the finger at anyone in particular: ‘We have tried the other way for four years now. Where the richest are gaining from lower taxes and borrowed money’ – addressing the parties (coalition) in government.
Similar to its manifesto, the 2010 Social Democratic Party leader, Mona Sahlin, rarely uses populist communication in her speeches. The single occasion when she describes the people as homogenous, she does so by describing the people as having a common understanding and opinion: ‘Equal societies are better societies. Not only for the worst off, but also for the best off. Equal societies are better to live in for everyone … Such a society has the support of the Swedish people’ (Almedalen 2010).
The general election resulted in a loss for the Social Democratic Party and a win for the centre-right block.
2014
Prior to the general election of 2014, there was a great debate amongst politicians, the media and the public, regarding the increased support for the SD. Polls prior to the election indicated +10.1 per cent voting intention for the SD, a major increase in support since the last election (Sifo 2014). However, this seemed to affect Social Democratic Party communication only minimally. Once again, the party displayed only a small element of populism within speeches and the party’s manifesto.
The manifesto displays the populist characteristics of elite negativity and of the party seeking to unite with the people. This can be found in statements such as: ‘Risk capitalists with short-term interests do not belong in the welfare state. The privatization of welfare activities that have been built up with taxpayers’ money is a theft from Swedish taxpayers’ (2014: 34).
Turning our attention to the speeches made by key figures, the 2014 Social Democratic leader, Stefan Löfven, uses rhetoric that attempts to unite with the people urging that: ‘Sweden’s voice will be heard in the whole world. We find strength in each other. And I long for the day when we can start realizing Sweden’s potential, together’ (Almedalen 2014).
Löfven stresses the peoples’ virtues by demonstrating the positive attributes of the people: ‘You make demands, but you also give a helping hand to others, because you know that you will receive a helping hand back. Together we help each other to succeed’. This was combined with elite negativity towards the current government perceived as acting in an unlawful manner: ‘During eight years we’ve had a government that have put all their waking hours and all our new resources into reducing taxes. They have privatized … and outsourced our friends and families’ (Almedalen 2014).
Comparative Analysis
Comparatively, the British Labour Party displayed a higher degree of populist political communication than the Swedish Social Democratic Party. The chapter began with the assumption that the impact of populist challenger parties would prompt centre-left mainstream parties to adopt populist styles of communication. The analysis, however, suggests that the expectations are only partially borne out. While the presence of the populist radical-right has increased in Sweden, it appears that the Social Democratic Party displayed only minimal populist communication, despite both the predicted and actual success of the SD in elections and polls. Although it appears slightly higher in the party’s communication from 2014, it remains an exception to the rule. One potential reason for the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s lack of populist political communication could be that the success of the SD has only recently started to gain significance. It might be that we have not yet witnessed the potential mainstreaming of populist political communication into the SD.
The British Labour Party, on the other hand, displayed a greater degree of populist political communication when the presence of UKIP increased. Notably, in the run up to the 2015 election, voting intentions for UKIP were predicted to rise and it is specifically in this context that communications from Labour contain a high degree of populist communication. In fact, it does to some extent validate the claim that higher degrees of populist success can act as a contagion for mainstream parties to take on the communicative elements of populism.
In fact, Labour was more likely to frame their competitors in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and more frequently displayed elite negativity – blaming the Conservative party for society’s woes – while deploying communications that sought to unite the party and the different leaders (Brown, Miliband and Corbyn, respectively) with ‘the people’. Indeed, because it is harder for new parties to break into the electoral arena in majoritarian models such as the UK, populist parties have a stronger incentive to initiate demands that will be incorporated in the programmes of the existing parties. A Labour defeat coupled with the rise of UKIP acted as an incentive for the party to adopt more populist political communication to win back votes.
The Swedish Social Democratic Party, however, rarely reinforce any direct antagonism between the elite and the people. Instead, they appear to direct criticism towards policies that would be disadvantageous for the Swedish people (without using anything that anchors in the word ‘the people’), even in speeches.
Conclusion
This chapter has investigated populism, with a specific focus on the distinct communicative characteristics of populist parties, and considered the implications for centre-left mainstream parties in Western Europe, and how they communicate with voters. While populist communication is used to varying effect by the centre-left parties under consideration, the chapter has only scratched the surface. It does identify the fact that that the mainstream parties adopted populist means of communication on an ad-hoc basis, at different points when it was seen to fit specific circumstances. Interestingly, populist political communication, although used to a greater extent in the UK, is not that prominent. Take Jeremy Corbyn – a politician who has been labelled as ‘the torchbearer of British populism’ (Gray 2017) – who in fact only uses populist communication fleetingly. As a consequence, we clearly need to be more accurate and careful in who and what we label as ‘populist’.
So how can centre-left mainstream parties counteract populism? One potential option is the cleaving of many social democratic parties to the centre. Instead of imitating populist discourses or trying to ‘catch all’, social democratic parties should focus on reclaiming their ideological appeal by focusing on class and solidarity. Another important point is that the alienation many citizens now feel towards politics and the establishment must be taken seriously. That is not to say that political actors should downplay complex issues, or they should use populist communication to counteract populist influences. Rather, mainstream centre-left politicians ought to engage with citizens in language that can be understood by the electorate, and addresses the issues that matter to people – reflecting true social democratic values.
Notes
1. Gaining influence refers to electoral success and increasing poll results before new populist parties compete in an election.
2. All material has been analysed using a qualitative content analysis schema, built according to the populist political communicative characteristics as illustrated above.
3. All available positive cases of speeches during the GE periods in each country were collected. Thereafter three speeches from each GE period were selected at random. The research has included speeches from the party conferences – Almedalen week - in the Swedish case made by the party leaders during the GE period. The event is considered to be one of the most important forums in politics where representatives from the major political parties take turn to set out their agenda.
4. The Alliance is a centre-right political alliance in Sweden, consisting of the four centre-right political parties, Moderata samlingspartiet, Liberalerna (former Folkpartiet), Centerpartiet and Kristdemokraterna.
5. Results from Novus, United Minds, Skop, Sifo, Sentio Research and Novis (August 2010).
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