The Battle of St. Leonard CreekThe Battle of St. Leonard Creek
COL. DECIUS WADSWORTH arrived at the anchorage of the Chesapeake Flotilla with orders to take command of all ground forces. He spent most of the day on June 24 scouting the ground near the mouth of St. Leonard Creek for the best position on which to place his guns and build a shot furnace. That night Wadsworth, Captain Miller, and Commodore Barney met to discuss strategy. All three agreed there was no possibility of making an attack on June 25. Wadsworth and Miller needed time to set up gun emplacements, and Barney wanted at least a day to ready his barges. The three commanders agreed to launch a breakout attempt on June 26. The meeting over, Wadsworth began to acquaint himself with the troops he would command. His opinion of the largest contingent of soldiers, the 2nd Battalion of the 36th U.S. Infantry, apparently was not much higher than Barney’s opinion of its commander, Col. Henry Carberry.
Wadsworth and Carberry met on June 24 after the conference. The meeting between the two Army colonels was icy at best. Wadsworth barely acknowledged Carberry’s presence when the battalion officers presented themselves at Wadsworth’s headquarters. He peremptorily dismissed Carberry, giving him orders to return to his camp at the head of St. Leonard Creek to guard the ammunition and “utensils” stored there. This was Carberry’s only face-to-face meeting with his commander. Wadsworth never consulted Carberry about troop movements or the plan to attack the British.1
Wadsworth and Barney met again on June 25 on board the Scorpion to discuss their final plan for the breakout attempt. Wadsworth did not have enough men to properly serve his 18-pounders and asked Barney if he could spare any of his flotillamen. The commodore promised to send Sailing Master John Geoghegan, whom he called one of his best officers, and twenty sailors.2 Wadsworth wanted to ensure that he had control over the land aspect of the assault, so he asked the commodore to have Miller’s company ready in the morning to support the Army troops. Barney’s answer stunned him. He had no authority over Miller, Barney explained. The Marines were an independent command, and Wadsworth would have to work out any concerted effort with Miller on his own. It was the first in a series of command breakdowns that would have serious implications as the attack unfolded. Wadsworth, in fact, had believed he was to command all of the infantry and Marines as well as the overall attack, and appeared miffed that it was to be a cooperative effort.3
Wadsworth returned to his headquarters, still determined to control the attack on the British blockaders. He spent much of the day developing a plan for the location and erection of his battery and shot furnace. Miller, meanwhile, set out from his camp overlooking the flotilla at 3 p.m. and began hauling his three guns to Petersons Point near the mouth of St. Leonard Creek, which he had selected as his battery site. Two hours later he ran into Wadsworth’s aide, Capt. J. S. Marsteller, who told Miller the colonel wanted to borrow some Marines to help build a gun platform for the 18-pounders. Marsteller brought Miller to Wadsworth to work out the details. Miller agreed to provide fifteen Marines to protect the work parties as soon as Wadsworth asked for them.4
Sailing Master John Geoghegan and his flotillamen marched out of the anchorage about 5 p.m. to join Wadsworth. Shortly after 6 p.m. they encountered Marsteller, who told Geoghegan the colonel was down the road near a plantation house. The flotillamen hurried forward and arrived at Miller’s camp around sunset. Wadsworth arrived soon afterward and, after detailing a sentry guard of ten men to watch the Marines’ equipment, the force totaling 117 moved out in the darkness to set up their batteries. Wadsworth galloped ahead, scouting the ground while the marching men collected wood for the shot furnace. After finding a good location near Petersons Point for the furnace, the column halted at 11 p.m. at the spot Geoghegan thought best for the 18-pounders. He reported his position to Wadsworth and asked the artilleryman what he thought of the emplacement. Wadsworth sent Geoghegan a curt reply: “You are to command and fight them, place them where you please.”5
While the ground forces mustered, Barney’s barges silently moved out of their anchorage. The lack of masts and spars made the boats much lighter and easier to row, and the vessels quickly moved to a position about a mile from the mouth of the creek. The sailors muffled their oars with cloth to keep noise to a minimum, “that [they] might be near the enemy at the appointed hour next morning.” Although the barges were lighter, the wet cloths made the oars heavier, and the sailors had to strain at their work. As they moved down the creek, Barney again divided his forces into red, white, and blue divisions under the same officers as on June 10. Once in position, the flotillamen settled down to grab some sleep before the coming battle.6
Barney might not have had his men exert themselves to remain quiet had he known that the British were not only aware of his reinforcements but also expected the breakout attempt. Newspapers had broadcast word of Wadsworth’s movements almost as soon as he set out. Inhabitants of Calvert and St. Mary’s Counties also provided the British with valuable intelligence. What nobody could tell Capt. Thomas Brown, the commander of the two-ship blockading force off St. Leonard Creek, was when the Americans would strike. “Should the enemy possess a decent proportion of spirit and enterprise I imagine from the thick woods near the entrance of the creek, and on the opposite bank of the River, they might get guns that would oblige us to drop further out, and perhaps eventually out of the river,” Brown wrote to Cockburn. “I learn also that at a place about five miles below, called Point Patience, they are beginning to erect batteries.”7
To counter the Americans’ breakout attempt Brown had the frigates Loire and Narcissus, several barges and ships’ boats, and a rocket barge. He could land slightly more than one hundred Royal Marines and appealed to Cockburn for reinforcements, warning “all further attempts on Commodore Barney” would be “hopeless, without a considerable land force, as well as vessels calculated to carry long Guns, and not to draw more than eight feet water.”8
Sailing Master Geoghegan and his twenty flotillamen began work on their gun emplacements slightly after midnight on June 26. A company of the 36th Infantry under Capt. Thomas Carberry (no relation to the colonel) stood by and watched as the mariners started digging. Several times Geoghegan asked the soldiers to help because they appeared to have an abundant supply of shovels, planks, pickaxes, and equipment for building shot furnaces. “I got seven spades and the same number of pick axes and commenced heaving up a breast work,” Geoghegan reported. “My men continued digging without any assistance from the soldiers, although frequent application was made for help and for more shovels, but without effect.” The flotillamen had been working for three hours when Wadsworth arrived with the cannon. The emplacement, Geoghegan said, “Was not so deep as intended . . . for want of assistance. The guns came soon after and the necessary preparations were made.”9
Geoghegan had selected a position atop the hill from which he could sweep the creek and river. When Wadsworth walked the position, however, he disapproved of the spot. Apparently forgetting his earlier refusal to advise the sailor, Wadsworth told Geoghegan the site was “too much exposed to the enemy’s fire.” He ordered Geoghegan to move the guns several feet behind the emplacement he had already dug, where they would be on the reverse slope of the hill. Geoghegan protested, pointing out that the position Wadsworth selected was not only in soft sand but would make it impossible to engage the British with any accuracy. Wadsworth, however, was adamant and ordered Geoghegan to change the position. The sailing master quelled his misgivings and obeyed.10
The weary flotillamen once more started digging, and once more received little help from the Regulars stationed nearby. Barney’s sailors could see similar frustration in the Marines, who were also hard at work and who were now somewhat exposed by the move of the 18-pounder emplacement. Some of the soldiers milling around near the Marines belonged to Maj. George Keyser’s 2nd Battalion, 38th U.S. Infantry. Raw recruits made up most of the 260-man unit, and after a 30-mile forced march to get to the creek they were in no shape to do much of anything. They joined up with Captain Carberry’s soldiers and took up a position on a flat field behind the batteries. To Keyser’s horror, the plain was completely exposed to fire from the river. Lt. Thomas Harrison arrived with his three 12-pounder field guns from the District of Washington and began unlimbering next to Keyser’s position, but the guns did little to allay the major’s concern.11
Nor did Colonel Carberry do much to boost Keyser’s confidence. Carberry sent Lt. Marcus Latimer to find Wadsworth and ask him to confirm the soldiers’ position on the plain. But when Latimer found Wadsworth, the colonel was busy setting up the shot furnace and dismissed him with a wave of the hand, telling the young officer, “The 36th must take position behind that hill.” Latimer had no idea which hill Wadsworth meant, and when he reported back to Carberry, the colonel decided to move his men away from the battery and into a small ravine near the river where a thick copse of woods would conceal them from the British. Keyser asked Carberry where he should put his men. He pointed out the Marines’ position and asked for permission to move to that spot. Carberry agreed. By then it was 3 a.m., and Latimer again went in search of Wadsworth, who ordered Carberry to move to a position astride the road that led to the battery. This position, too, was wide open to possible enemy fire, and Carberry decided, on his own, to move to the original proposed battery site, where the slope would protect his soldiers.12
Capt. Samuel Miller and his Marines were the last to arrive on the battlefield. Miller and his men broke camp at 1 a.m. and began marching toward Petersons Point but ran smack into Keyser and the 38th, which was moving very slowly down the only road that led toward the battlefield. Miller decided to ride ahead to his chosen position, leaving Capt. Alfred Grayson, his quartermaster, to lead the Marines. The column, numbering ninety-four officers and men, included the fifteen men Miller had agreed to loan Wadsworth for guard duty.13
The slow-moving infantry prevented the Marines from reaching the battery site as quickly as Miller wanted. When Carberry decided to shift his position, the move brought the Marines to a complete halt. At 3:30 a.m. they finally reached the battery site, where Miller, who had scouted the position in daylight, pointed to the spot where he wanted to emplace his guns.14
By then, Wadsworth was incensed with Miller and his men. The colonel had expected the Marines to arrive much earlier and had never received the fifteen guards he had asked for—although he never sent orders for them to report to him. Wadsworth wanted Miller to set up his guns in a position to cover the 18-pounders because he did not believe the two battalions of Regulars, in whom he admitted to having no confidence, would hold their ground if the British landed troops. Because Miller had an independent command, however, Wadsworth had no authority to give him orders. Miller, knowing that Secretary Jones expected his Marines to aid the flotilla, ignored Wadsworth’s “suggestion” and decided to place his cannon next to Geoghegan’s position.
Map 3. The Second Battle of St. Leonard Creek
This map, taken from an original drawing by Stanley Quick, names St. Leonard Creek without the possessive. During the War of 1812 the creek was always called St. Leonard’s Creek, and that spelling was used until the U.S. Geological Survey decided to drop possessives from topographical maps. Most state highway maps followed suit, and today most maps spell the name St. Leonard Creek although historians use both versions. The map also uses an alternative spelling of the names of Sailing Master John Geoghegan and Lt. William Nicoll (perhaps confused with Maj. Edward Nicolls of the Royal Marines).
Miller set his men to work, racing to place the guns before dawn. He had Grayson set up his cannon immediately adjacent to Geoghegan but slightly forward, on the top of the hill. Lt. Benjamin Richardson and Lt. William Nicoll placed their guns to the right of Grayson, spaced about eight yards apart. Thanks to an almost herculean effort, the Marine battery was ready in the space of half an hour.15
On board the Loire the watch was striking the bell to mark 4 a.m. Belowdecks, sailors, Royal Marines, and officers were still asleep, resting up for what they thought would be another long, tedious day on blockade duty. The situation was the same on the Narcissus, which swung easily at anchor at the confluence of St. Leonard Creek and the Patuxent River, about one hundred yards from the Loire. The light of a waning moon sparkled off the river and silhouetted the two British ships against the background.
On Petersons Point, Sailing Master Geoghegan sighted his big 18-pounder cannon. The two British frigates were perfect targets as they lay some six hundred yards away. Satisfied, Geoghegan prepared to fire his first salvo. He touched his portfire—a paper tube filled with powder that smoldered for thirty minutes—to the vent hole on his gun. It was slightly after 4 a.m.16
On board the Narcissus, the cannon blast from the American battery atop Petersons Point came as a complete surprise. The sleeping sailors stumbled to their stations, reacting more by instinct than any awareness of what exactly was happening. The log of the frigate noted, “At 4:10 a.m. battery on top of a hill opened fire on us.”17
Geoghegan fired the first round, and the 18-pounder under Master’s Mate William Carter fired the second. Then the Marines opened fire. Each American gun fired in sequence rather than in unison as the gunners adjusted their fire. There were also safety concerns. If the gunners, who were trained to fire up to three rounds per minute, fired too quickly, the vent in which the gun commander inserted the firing tube could become too hot, prematurely igniting the primer and cooking off the round, which could kill or injure the crew. The flotillamen fired methodically, sending one round per minute per cannon at the British warships.
The crewmen of the Loire and the Narcissus were now fully awake and scrambling to bring their ships into position to reply to the fire coming from the point. Both ships had anchored and set spring lines that kept their guns aiming up the creek in expectation of Barney attacking. The fire from the hill forced them to haul in the springs, reset the lines, and shift the frigates by hand so they could engage the hidden batteries. It took the British more than fifteen minutes to open fire, and even then they could not see their enemy. Instead, Brown instructed his gunners to “fire where the smoke issued from.”
The Marine gunners, manning lighter cannon than the flotillamen, quickly found their rhythm and began pumping round shot at the British. Miller proudly reported that his men fired four shots for every one that came from Geoghegan’s battery. Nevertheless, Miller could see that the batteries had yet to score any hits. The heavier guns, Barney bitterly recalled, “being placed on a declivity, must either fire directly into the hill, or be elevated so high in the air, after the matter of bombs [mortars], they were rendered useless. At the very first, the guns recoiled halfway down the hill and in this situation they continued to fire in the air at random.”18
Despite the ineffective fire of Geoghegan’s battery, Wadsworth refused to admit that his placement of the guns was faulty. Each time the flotillamen fired, the heavy 18-pounders rolled downhill from the recoil and Geoghegan’s weary men had to haul them back into place. Wadsworth defended his placement of the guns, saying, “In every respect it answered admirably. The enemy found it impossible to hit us; every shot either fell short and struck the bank or flew clear over us.”19
On the Loire, Captain Brown watched as his shots slammed into the hillside, causing no damage to the American battery. When he elevated his guns, his shots sailed over the hill. He ordered his gunners to use the ship’s carronades with a reduced powder charge and watched with satisfaction as his rounds began landing on top of the hill. The gunners on the Narcissus quickly followed suit.20
Wanting an unobstructed view of where his gunners’ rounds were landing, Captain Miller rode down to the river’s edge, ordering several men to trail him. From this vantage point he could see that his shots were falling short while those of the 18-pounders were overshooting. He sent word to Geoghegan about the heavy guns and ordered his own gunners to elevate their cannon slightly. The file of Marines relayed Miller’s directions to Grayson, Richardson, and Nicoll, who quickly found the mark. One shot from the Marine battery carried away the mizzen topgallant mast of the Loire while others smashed into the frigate’s hull. As the Marine gunners bored in on the British ship, they scored more hits, crushing the Loire’s bridle ports and forward chain plates.21
Meanwhile, Wadsworth ordered Geoghegan and Carter to concentrate their fire on the Narcissus. Because the Marines maintained a faster rate of fire than the flotillamen, smoke soon obscured Wadsworth’s line of sight and he was unable to adjust his fire. He obstinately refused to ask Miller for help; nor did he copy Miller’s example of posting a line of messengers to relay information. Wadsworth also had the handicap of working with crews who had never handled hot shot. Early in the engagement, a round cooked off in Carter’s gun, injuring Carter and severely wounding Seaman William “Billy” Monday. Carter was able to remain in action, but Monday lost both of his arms below the elbow. The flotillamen applied tourniquets and laid him down out of harm’s way.22
As American shot whistled around his vessel, Capt. Thomas Brown on the Loire ordered his men to form a landing party. He filled his ships’ boats with marines and sent them upriver along with the rocket barge to flank the Americans’ position. Two barges carrying the Royal Marines also carried 18-pounder carronades, which opened fire as the sailors rowed them around the point.
Joshua Barney stood on the deck of his barge roughly a mile from the mouth of St. Leonard Creek. He was running late. Barney and Wadsworth had set the time for the attack at 4 a.m., but Wadsworth had sent him a note late in the night saying he did not think his guns would be ready at the agreed-upon time. The opening salvo of Wadsworth’s cannon was supposed to signal the attack, so Barney was surprised when Geoghegan fired his first round at 4:10 a.m. His flotilla took another forty-five minutes to get into position to attack.23
The flotilla moved quietly toward the mouth of the creek. The knowledge they would soon engage their enemy seemed to propel the men on the oars, and “the barges now seemed to fly under the rapid strokes.” Just before 5 a.m. Barney signaled his barges to open fire. Although the delay cost the Americans the ability to coordinate their attacks, the opening salvos from the flotilla completely surprised the British. The fire from the barges was dead on target, with seven rounds piercing the hull of the Loire. The flotilla advanced to within four hundred yards of the two enemy frigates, the guns continuing to pour shot after shot into the warships. The closer the Americans advanced, however, the more exposed the barges were to deadly grape and canister fire from the British frigates. As they rowed down the creek, the Americans lost their formation when the waterway narrowed to a point at which only eight barges could advance abreast.24
The sudden appearance of the Chesapeake Flotilla caught Brown completely off guard. Once more, sailors hauled on lines to swing the frigates so gunners could direct broadsides at the new threat. The British ceased firing on the land batteries and reloaded with grape and canister. The moment they could train their cannon on the approaching barges, they opened fire, unleashing a hail of lead that struck boats and water, churning the creek into a froth.25
The strength of the British fire stunned Barney. “They poured it into us, seeming to have just waked,” he said. “It was a scene to appall the inexperienced and the faint hearted; but there were few of these among the daring spirits of the flotilla.” The lack of bulwarks on the barges exposed the flotillamen to the brunt of the enemy fire, and the losses mounted with each successive broadside.26
Miller and Geoghegan maintained their bombardment when the flotilla joined the engagement, but the fire soon slackened because the Marines had used up their supply of round shot. Geoghegan’s men began to use hot shot, trying to set the two frigates on fire. Once more, faulty aim cost the Americans as their rounds whistled harmlessly past the Loire and the Narcissus. As Carter, who remained at his gun despite his wounds, fired a shot, a chance 32-pounder carronade shot smashed into the American ball, sending red-hot shrapnel flying. One piece set an ammunition box on fire, which sent splinters scattering everywhere. Geoghegan went down with a knee wound but stayed with his gunners.27
As his men used the last of their solid shot, Miller spotted the rocket barge and two barges full of Royal Marines in the river and decided to move his guns to a position where he could engage the new threat. He consulted briefly with Geoghegan and for the first time saw the effect of the fire from the British barges and frigates on the infantry massed behind the hill. Nearly every shot that arced over the hill hit the area in which the men of the 36th and 38th Regiments stood. Miller also saw that the three 12-pounders from the Washington Artillery under Lieutenant Harrison were “injudiciously permitted to remain in a distant part of the field, without orders for firing a single shot, or instructions to be placed in a battery to resist an attack from the barges.”28
Miller decided his best course of action was to limber his guns and move to the plain so he could engage the British barges, telling Geoghegan that he only had grape and canister rounds remaining in his ammunition chests and there was nothing more he could do to engage the frigates. Miller ordered his horses forward and began to limber his guns.29 Unknown to Miller, however, the plan for the land force to coordinate its action with the flotilla had already unraveled.
Commodore Barney noticed the slackening in fire from the hill as his barges continued to blast away at the Loire and the Narcissus. He was “surprised and mortified to observe that not a single shot from the battery fell with assisting effect, and that the whole fire of the enemy was directed against his boats: shortly afterwards the battery, from which so much had been expected, became silent altogether.” Barney was certain the storm of British grape and canister had cut his force apart and expected to learn that his flotilla had suffered more than a hundred casualties. He ordered his barges to pull back, for “it would have been an act of madness in such a force, unassisted, to contend against two frigates, a brig, two schooners, and a number of barges, in themselves equal to the force that could be brought into action from the flotilla.” As his men rowed to a position roughly three quarters of a mile from the mouth of the creek, Barney received the pleasant news that his force had lost just six men dead and four wounded. Among the dead was a young midshipman, George Asquith, who had just joined the flotilla.30
As the Marines began moving from the hill to the plain to thwart a British landing, Miller realized his intended position was dangerously exposed to fire from both the British landing barges and the frigates. “I was compelled once more to seek a position sanctioned by military propriety,” Miller reported. “One presented itself to my rear, near the defile which entered upon the road.”31
Colonel Carberry’s battalion of the 36th Infantry was almost completely exhausted. The foot soldiers had moved three times since midnight, and their position behind Geoghegan’s battery had exposed them to overshots from the frigates. Although the shots caused no casualties, Carberry’s officers deluged him with requests to move. As the British guns found the range and more shots careened toward their position, Carberry’s battalion was “more exposed to severe cannonading than I ever saw troops [endure] in my life before.” He ordered his men back to the ravine they originally occupied, the same ravine in which Miller wanted to place his guns.32
The 260 men of Maj. George Keyser’s 38th Infantry also suffered under the British fire. Keyser finally received the opportunity to do something when Wadsworth, who was shuttling from position to position, ordered him to move his battalion closer to the river to meet any British landing. Keyser complied. Why Wadsworth gave Keyser the order instead of Carberry, who was senior in rank and had a larger force, is unknown. Wadsworth, however, completely ignored Carberry, who had already decided to act on his own and shift his men from their “exposed” position.33
Wadsworth was oblivious to the Carberry’s predicament or his subsequent movements. So was Miller, who found to his surprise that Keyser’s men were gathered at a gate in a fence and unable to deploy while Carberry’s men were apparently in retreat. Miller had no idea what was happening. Carberry claimed the Marines precipitated his retreat when they began marching toward the river to repel a British landing. Carberry’s men had already started to leave the field before the Marines shifted position.34
The British barges maintained their fire, sending rockets, grape, and canister toward any cluster of troops they could see. One of those clusters was the column of Marines making their way toward the river. The British gunners raked the Marines, killing at least one and wounding several others. It was one of the last acts of the flanking party. Slightly before 6 a.m. the three British boats received orders to withdraw, most likely to help counter the flotilla’s attack.35
Commodore Barney had no idea what was happening on land. He knew fire from the battery had stopped and the British were giving his barges their full attention. As he withdrew, using a bend in the creek to cover his boats, he conferred with his commanders. Sailing Masters Henry Worthington, James Sellers, and John Kiddall all reported heavy but reparable damage to their barges. Barney was momentarily unsure of what to do. Smoke still obscured the creek. He expected Brown to attack with his force of barges and ships’ boats, and decided to ready a defense for when the British came.36
The sailors on the Loire had more than the flotilla on their minds. The combined American attack, especially of the flotilla, had hit the frigate hard. American fire pierced the Loire’s hull at least fifteen times; other rounds peeled away some of her copper sheathing; and other shots smashed her whaleboat, gig, and yawl. The crew was “hard at work pumping, in plugging the shot holes to keep her from sinking and painting them over as fast as plugged.” The story was similar on the Narcissus, which had also suffered from the American fire and was “very much cut up below the bends.”37 The Narcissus’ crew was kept busy pumping the ship out to keep her afloat. After assessing the situation, Brown decided he had just one course of action. “The ships having been frequently hulled, and part of the rigging shot away, I thought it most prudent to weigh and drop down the river.”38 Slowly, the two British warships began to withdraw.
It was now fully daylight, and Wadsworth and Miller could see the confusion all around them. Carberry’s men, whether prompted by the Marines’ imaginary retreat, British fire, or both, were now marching away from the field, taking with them Keyser’s battalion. “Every description of troops were leaving the field and the battery was abandoned,” Capt. Alfred Grayson later testified. Miller returned to Geoghegan’s battery, where he found Wadsworth and just sixteen men. Carter’s gun had rolled all the way down the hill from the recoil of one shot, leaving only one 18-pounder left to fire. Wadsworth, seeing what looked like the beginnings of a rout, wanted to withdraw his guns, but he could not find his horse teams and decided to spike them instead.39
Several of Geoghegan’s flotillamen now joined in the retreat and ran into the withdrawing infantry. They found the horse teams for the heavy guns and returned with the limbers for their cannon. Wadsworth had already left. He rode ahead of his gunners to stop the retreating Regulars and managed to halt at least some of Keyser’s men to form a rearguard, and then was able to stop the entire column in some woods. There he ran into Miller, who had gone in search of the colonel. “I have saved my guns but you have lost yours,” Miller yelled at Wadsworth, who bristled. Miller spun his horse and organized sixty Marines to return to the hill to help save the 18-pounders.40
Sailing Master Carter, suffering from multiple wounds, was among the last men to leave the battery site. As he painfully made his way down the hill, Carter ran into Miller and told him Seaman Billy Monday lay wounded in the bushes near the cannon. Miller ordered several Marines to collect Monday and bring him to the Marines’ surgeon, who was set up at Miller’s headquarters, and then took his men on to the battery to limber the 18-pounders.41
Carter continued on his way down the hill and met Midn. T. P. Andrews, Barney’s aide-de-camp, who had volunteered to go ashore from the Scorpion to assist in repelling any British attack. Carter asked Andrews to help him return to the flotilla, which was still in the creek. Seeing the British were not planning to land, Andrew took Carter by the arm, and together they returned to the flotilla and boarded Barney’s barge. Only then did Barney learn of the breakdown in command and the confusion among the land forces.42
Capt. Thomas Carberry’s company of the 36th Infantry spent most of the battle in the woods on Petersons Point. The young officer was able to hear the battle but could not see what was happening. When the battery stopped firing, he decided to move his company to the field. As he ascended “Battery Hill,” Captain Carberry found the position deserted except for Seaman Monday. Carberry commandeered a cart and put Monday on it and, with his infantry, limbered the artillery and carried the guns from the field. He caught up with Miller and Wadsworth just as the Marines were about to march to the battery site. Wadsworth cried out ecstatically, “I make you a colonel on the spot!” but never mentioned Captain Carberry in his official report.43
Barney was digesting the news of the confusion among the land forces when he heard a lookout say he thought the British were retreating. The commodore watched as the British pulled away from the creek and Petersons Point, and he also noticed the list of the Loire. The wind, which had allowed the British to maneuver the ships, suddenly died. The only way to move now was by oar, and Barney seized his chance. He ordered the entire flotilla—except for the two useless gunboats—including the Scorpion, the Lookout Boat, and the Vigilant, to move forward. The mariners pulled at their oars as hard and as fast as they could, and the flotilla quickly exited the creek and rounded Petersons Point, heading up the Patuxent. Barney had finally broken out.44
Capt. Thomas Brown of the Royal Navy could only watch in mounting frustration as the American flotilla, oars frothing the water around each boat, pulled away from his two frigates. He had the “mortification to observe them rowing down the creek, and up the river,” knowing he had failed in his mission to either keep the Chesapeake Flotilla bottled up or destroy it.45
Triumph reigned on board the boats of the Chesapeake Flotilla. No one was happier than Barney, who once again had outthought and outfought his old adversary, the Royal Navy. “We have again beat them and their rockets, which they did not spare,” Barney wrote to his brother Louis. “You see we improve. First, we beat a few boats which they thought would make an easy prey of us, then they increased the number, then they added schooners, and now behold the [two] frigates, all, all, have shared the same fate, I next expect, ships of the line; no matter we will do our duty.”46
Six of Barney’s men were killed in the battle, including Midshipman Asquith, and four were wounded, including Monday, who survived the loss of both of his arms. Brown reported just one man wounded on the Narcissus.47