Prelude to DisasterPrelude to Disaster
THE ABILITY OF THE BRITISH essentially to strike anywhere their boats could reach was a painful fact to President James Madison and his administration. Even before Cockburn began his campaign of subjugation along the Potomac, Madison had concerns about the final British target. On July 1, 1814, he convened a special meeting of his cabinet. Attorney General Richard Rush, Secretary of State James Monroe, Secretary of the Navy William Jones, Secretary of War John Armstrong, and Secretary of the Treasury George Campbell duly arrived at the executive mansion at noon to discuss one topic: Was Washington, the national capital, the next British target?1
Most of the cabinet members had already voiced their thoughts on the subject. Armstrong, a surly, nearly universally disliked New Yorker, believed the British would thrust toward Baltimore, which in his mind was far more important than the Federal District—“this sheep walk,” as he called it. Washington had no military significance, he argued time and again when panic swept through the city over Cockburn’s raids. He believed there was simply nothing in Washington that would entice the British to attack, and nothing could convince him otherwise.2
Jones was almost as sure as Armstrong that Cochrane would hit Baltimore rather than Washington. He put Miller’s Marines on alert when Cockburn made his thrust up the Patuxent, but beyond that Jones did nothing to strengthen the defenses around the Washington Navy Yard, which was a legitimate military target. Rush, Campbell, and Monroe apparently said nothing at the meeting, although Monroe had vacillated somewhat regarding British intentions at previous meetings. He could see the merit to both arguments: Washington might be a target, or it might not.3
Madison apparently was not really interested in what his cabinet thought. He believed Washington was in danger of a British attack precisely because it was the national capital, and to deal with the threat he summarily created a new military district. Up to that point the city had been part of the Fifth Military District, which included Maryland and portions of Virginia and Pennsylvania. Henceforth the city and its immediate environs would comprise the Tenth Military District. To give his new district teeth, Madison ordered the creation of a force of up to three thousand men to cover Washington and Baltimore and wanted them stationed at a point from which they could march rapidly to either city. The president also “suggested” establishing an additional force of 10,000–12,000 volunteers and militia to reinforce that unit in case of attack.4
Madison selected newly minted brigadier general William Henry Winder to command the new district. Winder was thirty-nine and recently returned from captivity in Canada. A political appointee, his military career had started only two years before as the lieutenant colonel of the 14th U.S. Infantry. He fought in one battle—at Stoney Creek on the Canadian border in 1813, where he was wounded and captured. Winder was the nephew of Maryland governor Levin Winder, the powerful Federalist on whom he would have to rely for the bulk of his troops. Although he shared Madison’s concerns about Britain’s intentions, Governor Winder remained cool at best to the war. Madison saw William Winder as a way to bring the Maryland governor more into the conflict.5
The new Tenth Military District looked good on paper. Neither Madison nor Armstrong, however, ordered the construction of trenches, redoubts, or any other type of fortification to protect the city. Fort Washington, twelve miles south of the city and the main fortification guarding the Potomac approach to the capital, had a garrison of just seventy-nine Regular Army artillerymen. There were not even enough muskets to equip the militia in the Tenth District. The Regular Army units within the district—the 36th Infantry under Colonel Carberry and the 38th under Major Keyser—were on their way north toward Annapolis, thirty miles from the capital, because several British warships had anchored in the Severn River off the Maryland capital. Finally, the soldiers assigned to Winder’s command were not on active duty because the government lacked the funds to pay them. The militia and volunteers would report only if and when the British moved.6
It was a difficult situation for Brigadier General Winder, who had no staff, no flints for the few weapons he had, and no real idea of how he was supposed to defend Washington or Baltimore with a mere three thousand men. On July 9 he wrote to Armstrong, “What possible chance will there be of collecting a force after the arrival of the enemy. He can be in Washington, Baltimore, or Annapolis in four days after entering the Capes.”7 Armstrong never replied. In fact, the secretary of war wanted nothing to do with Winder’s or Madison’s plans and dragged his feet at fulfilling any directive regarding the city’s defense. In early August, as Cockburn was burning his way up and down the Potomac, Winder finally got permission to call up the Maryland militia. The turnout was predictably small, just 250 of the 3,000 men called actually reported for duty.8
Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Vice Admiral of the Red, commander of the North America Station, arrived off the mouth of the Potomac River on August 16 with a squadron of twenty-four warships, including his flagship, the 80-gun Tonnant, and the 74-gun ship of the line Royal Oak. Cochrane, Cockburn, and Maj. Gen. Robert Ross, the land forces commander, held a conference on August 17 to decide exactly where to strike. Cockburn remained committed to an attack on Washington, and the ease with which he had been able to strike along the Potomac and Patuxent convinced Cochrane to agree. The only senior officer Cockburn failed to convince was Ross.9
The veteran of the Peninsular campaign in Portugal and Spain pointed to Cochrane’s orders from the Admiralty to avoid marching deep into enemy territory where he could be cut off from naval support. The Chesapeake was supposed to be a sideshow, Ross insisted, a way of easing pressure along the Canadian frontier while also serving as a backdrop to the real prize: New Orleans. He viewed an attack on Washington, at least when he first arrived in the Chesapeake, as an unnecessary risk.10
Cochrane eased Ross’ worries when he revealed his plan. The British would strike using a three-pronged attack, two prongs of which would mask their final destination. Capt. James A. Gordon would ascend the Potomac with the frigates Seahorse, 38 guns, and Euryalus, 36 guns, as well as three bomb ships (brigs converted to carry mortars) and a rocket barge. His target was Fort Washington, although his main role was diversionary. Capt. Sir Peter Parker with the 38-gun frigate Menelaus and two tenders was to sail up the bay toward Annapolis to prevent the Americans from sending reinforcements by way of the Eastern Shore. The main land force, under Ross, was to land at Benedict, move to Upper Marlboro, and from there march on Washington. Cockburn, with his sailors and Royal Marines deployed in ships’ boats, would parallel and support Ross’ movements from the Patuxent.
The British force available to Cochrane was much smaller than the one he had at first envisioned. As late as June he had written to Cockburn that he expected 20,000 of Lord Wellington’s finest troops. Although he did receive some of Wellington’s best men, the actual number was only slightly more than 4,000. In addition to the battalion of 500 Royal Marines that had arrived several days before Cochrane, Ross had a second battalion formed from the ships’ Royal Marines. For British army units he had the 4th King’s Own Lancashire; the 21st, 44th, and 85th Regiments of Foot; about 250 Colonial Marines; and support troops. He did not have horses. The British force would advance without a cavalry screen and would also have to leave most of its artillery behind because there were no horses to pull the guns and limbers. Ross’ troops would instead take Congreve rockets, which were man portable.
The British set their plan in motion on August 18 when Gordon hoisted sail for the Potomac and Parker for the middle bay. Cockburn and the main force entered the Patuxent, where their first target was a cagey enemy who had so far eluded them.
Commodore Joshua Barney had no illusions when his lookouts spotted Cochrane’s force off Benedict on the morning of August 19. He immediately sent a courier to Washington, thirty-five miles away, telling his superiors that the British were coming ashore. He received a reply that afternoon from Navy secretary Jones:
Appearances indicate a design on this place, but it may be a feint, to mask a real design on Baltimore[.] If however their force is strong in troops, they may make a vigorous push for this place. In that case they probably would not waste much time with the flotilla. If you can impede and retard his movements, time will be gained which is all important, but should he advance upon you, with an overwhelming force, you will effectually destroy the flotilla by fire, and with your small arms, retire as he advances, towards this place.11
It was a blow for Barney, who had handed the British a bloody nose on two occasions with the ragtag flotilla he had built and trained. Now the fifty-five-year-old Baltimore native would have to preside over its destruction.
Barney, who had a reputation for action, did not suffer from the indecision that seemed to plague his superiors in Washington. As Ross’ ground forces assembled at Benedict, the commodore sent a terse note to Jones. “No doubt their object is Washington, and perhaps the flotilla,” he wrote.12 It was all Jones needed to act on his own. He issued orders to Barney to
retire before the enemy toward this place opposing his progress as well by your arms, as by felling trees across the road, removing bridges, and presenting every other possible obstacle to his march. Tomorrow morning the detachment of Marines with three twelves and two long light 18-pounders with everything complete will march to join you and will be placed under your command. When combined your men will man the guns and the Marines under the command of Captain Miller will act as infantry under your command.13
That was the first positive step any government official had taken for the defense of the national capital. Jones did not stop there. He sent orders to Capt. David Porter to ready sailors and Marines and transport them by water to the Chesapeake, and also ordered Capt. John Rodgers in Philadelphia to send three hundred men to aid in the defense of Washington.14
The British landing so close to Benedict sent the capital into a frenzy. Many of the district’s 8,100 residents had already left the city, not from fear of the British but because of Washington’s notoriously humid, mosquito-filled summers. Many of those who had stayed home now began packing, looking over their shoulders all the while to see whether a dust cloud from the south signaled the arrival of the British.
Brigadier General Winder, who had been a whirlwind of energy since taking command of the city’s defenses in July, began issuing orders calling out more militia. His problem was that he had no idea where to position his troops if and when they arrived. The dispatches of James Monroe were his best source of information. As soon as word of Ross’ landing reached Washington, the former cavalryman had volunteered to act as a scout for President Madison. Monroe rode down toward Benedict to see for himself just what was happening. Although he forgot to bring a spyglass, he could see the British fleet assembled off the town. Monroe had eleven dragoons with him as an escort, and he sent several galloping back to Washington with his observations.
Ross moved out of Benedict the afternoon of August 20 as soon as his men were assembled. They tramped unopposed for five miles along a mostly uphill sandy road to a crossroads with one fork leading north toward Nottingham. The oppressive heat and humidity made even that short distance wearying for the British troops. Each man carried sixty pounds of equipment and wore a wool uniform. It was an entirely new experience for Wellington’s “Invincibles,” who had fought in the dry heat of the Iberian Peninsula but were unprepared for the sauna-like conditions of a Maryland summer.
Ross was also wary of an ambush. American sympathizers had warned him of the presence of rifle companies ahead of him, and he moved his column deliberately to avoid being surprised. Ross’ target was the thorn in Cockburn’s side—Barney’s flotilla. After bivouacking for the night at a crossroads the British resumed their march on August 21, walking fourteen hot, miserable miles to Nottingham. When they arrived late that afternoon they found the town nearly empty of American forces. Barney and his flotilla had already left. The commodore had moved his barges farther upriver to Pig Point, where the Patuxent narrowed so much it was almost unnavigable. The only other American troops in town were a small force of dragoons the British spotted as they approached the village, but the Americans quickly withdrew after firing a few shots. With Barney gone, Ross again vacillated on his target. He was twenty miles from the fleet and forty miles from the Chesapeake. Washington was still thirty miles away, a hard two-day march, and the lack of opposition worried the general. The Americans had to be up to something.15
Cockburn hurried ashore to allay the general’s misgivings. The Americans, Cockburn told Ross, had not attacked because they lacked the resources to do so. The local militia was completely useless militarily and would never stand up to His Majesty’s troops. Moreover, Washington was undefended and ripe for the picking. Ross was convinced. First, though, the British had a closer target. During the morning on August 22 the naval forces moved to attack Barney.
When Cockburn’s amphibious forces reached Pig Point east of Upper Marlboro they could see the mastheads of Barney’s flotilla sticking up behind a small hill. Cockburn immediately embarked his Royal Marines, ordering an overland attack. The admiral himself led the ships’ boats in a final dash at his elusive foe. As he rounded the point, he could see the Scorpion flying Barney’s pennant along with sixteen barges and thirteen merchant schooners. He could also smell smoke. Before his sailors or Royal Marines could make a move, flames shot out of the Scorpion’s gun ports, followed by a massive explosion that destroyed the cutter. The gun barges and merchant schooners went up next. Barney had again eluded capture, but this time Cockburn no longer had to worry about the threat of the flotilla.16
On receiving orders to scuttle the flotilla if threatened by the enemy, Barney had ordered the bulk of his crews to march to join Winder’s troops, leaving behind a skeleton contingent to destroy the flotilla. He marched his flotillamen overnight to Winder’s camp at Wood Yard, arriving just in time to see Winder and Secretary of State James Monroe conferring. Within minutes of their arrival the flotillamen were on the move once more, this time toward Washington.17
Brigadier General Winder had his hands full trying to organize his disparate troops into a unified command. His call for militia had so far netted barely 1,500 soldiers, although he knew more were on the way. Wood Yard sat astride the main roads leading both to Baltimore and to Washington at a point midway between the two possible targets. Winder had two regiments of militia from Washington: the 1st Regiment under Col. George Magruder and the 2nd Regiment under Col. William Brent. With the British now clearly favoring Washington, Winder sent orders to Maj. Gen. Samuel Smith in Baltimore telling him to send Brig. Gen. Tobias Stansbury’s brigade. Brig. Gen. John Stricker received orders to send his elite 5th Maryland militia, a Baltimore City unit, his rifle battalion, and “two of your most active artillery companies.” Requests for militia also went out to Virginia and Pennsylvania as Winder tried his best to collect enough armed men to face the British.18
Winder had more problems than finding troops. He had asked Armstrong to send one thousand flints to his camp but received just two hundred. He needed axes to fell trees to block the roads and slow the British advance; he had none. He needed horses to haul artillery, limbers, and ammunition wagons, and tents for his solders. One company of riflemen under Capt. John Stull arrived in camp without rifles. Winder sent a constant stream of messages to Armstrong begging for help or advice. He received no replies. The secretary of war remained convinced the British would not attack Washington, telling Maj. Gen. John Van Ness, commander of the district’s militia, “Oh, yes! By God they would not come with such a fleet without meaning to strike somewhere but they certainly will not come here—what the devil will they do here?”19
With Armstrong convinced the British would strike elsewhere, Winder was all but on his own as he frantically tried to cover the approaches to the city as well as maintain mobility in case Ross turned toward Annapolis or Baltimore. He ordered the militia marching from Baltimore to head for Bladensburg, just northeast of Washington. Winder had a hodgepodge of units at Wood Yard—250 Maryland militia, the Federal District regiments, a composite battalion of 300 Regulars from the 36th and 38th Infantries, a troop of 125 dragoons from Virginia, plus Barney’s 400 sailors and 120 Marines under Capt. Samuel Miller. Additionally, Winder had 20 pieces of artillery.20
Winder wanted this force to move to Upper Marlboro, where it could cover roads leading both to the capital and to Baltimore. Ross beat him to it. As the British marched north from Nottingham they had two choices: turn left and head directly for Fort Washington and possibly the two lower bridges over the Eastern Branch of the Potomac (now the Anacostia River) that led to the capital, or continue straight and move toward Upper Marlboro, from which they could strike at either Washington or Baltimore. Ross first turned his force left to attack some American forces he saw there but then turned around and marched north, forcing Winder to again try to decipher just where the British would strike.
Secretary of State Monroe had no illusions or doubts about Ross’ intentions. Monroe and his little band of dragoons had been shadowing the British advance. After arriving at Winder’s camp late on August 21, the exhausted secretary collapsed in a bed. At 9 a.m. the next day at Bellefields, the home of Maj. Benjamin Ogden, Monroe saw the British march toward him down the road leading toward the capital. He sent a message to President Madison: “The enemy are in full march for Washington. Have materials prepared to destroy the bridges.” He added ominously, “You had better remove the records.”21
Indecision continued to plague Winder. At 2 a.m. on August 22 he woke his soldiers and ordered them to head toward Nottingham, where he wanted to strike at the van of Ross’ force. When the British changed direction and marched toward Upper Marlboro, Winder canceled the order and told his troops to march to Long Old Fields, near Forestville. Information was coming into the camp, but much of it was unreliable and contradictory, with reports of the British moving toward both Baltimore and Washington. Winder received no help from Armstrong, who remained utterly convinced that Ross had no designs on the capital other than what he called a “Cossack hurrah”—a minor raid. When solid information came into the American camp that the British were still in Upper Marlboro, Winder concluded the target was Annapolis. He had always believed the Maryland state capital was Ross’ goal because of its excellent harbor, which could act as a base from which to attack Baltimore.22
After news arrived that the British were moving toward Washington rather than Annapolis, Armstrong again pronounced the information wrong. “They have no such intention,” he insisted. “They are foraging I suppose, and if an attack is meditated by them upon any place, it is Annapolis.”23
Winder decided he had to act. He designed a three-pronged attack on Ross at Upper Marlboro. He now had nearly 3,000 men at Long Old Fields. He also knew Stansbury was either on his way or at Bladensburg with 1,400 Baltimore militia while Lt. Col. Joseph Sterrett was on his way with another 800. Winder sent orders to both to meet with the main force on the road to Upper Marlboro. Col. William Beall was somewhere south of Annapolis with an 800-man force of militia. Winder sent gallopers looking for Beall’s command with orders for it to head for Upper Marlboro too.24 Winder’s math told him he had 6,000 men with which to strike. His scouts estimated Ross’ army at 4,000 to 6,000 men.25
What Winder did not know was that Ross was already moving toward the American camp at Long Old Fields. Maj. George Peter knew. His detachment of infantry and artillery was on the road from Long Old Fields to Upper Marlboro when it ran into Ross’ column. The sight shocked the Americans. Winder had said Peter would, at most, meet scouting parties. Instead the major found Ross’ entire force bearing down on him.
The British had set out toward the American capital on August 23 at 2 a.m. They had been tramping along for more than twelve hours when they ran into Peter’s reconnaissance party. Among Peter’s men were Captain Stull’s riflemen, still without rifles. Instead, Winder had issued them muskets. The riflemen cursed their weapons when they fired on the British from two hundred yards and failed to hit anything. Ross ordered his light companies to attack, and the British charged after the Americans. Stull’s men fired a couple more volleys and then retreated, the redcoats in hot pursuit. Lt. Col. Jacint Laval, with 120 Regular Army dragoons, came galloping up but refused to cover Peter’s withdrawal, complaining his horses were not trained.26
The British chased Peter’s men from the road but then stopped to camp instead of following them. Wellington’s Invincibles had yet to acclimate to the heat and humidity, and they could not continue.27 Monroe and Thomas McKenney, a dry goods store clerk turned volunteer scout, watched Ross’ men pitch camp, and then Monroe galloped for Bladensburg while McKenney rode to Long Old Fields to tell Brig. Gen. Walter Smith, whom Winder had left in charge, of the approaching British. Smith ordered his militiamen to form a line of battle across the road and waited. He sent McKenney off in search of Winder while he went to look for Stansbury and Sterrett. McKenney met Winder on the road to Bladensburg, and his news changed everything. Winder rode back to Long Old Fields and ordered Smith to break camp and head for, of all places, Washington.28
Winder later defended his decision by pointing out that his militia would have been no match for the British had they attacked at night, which he greatly feared they would do. A move to Bladensburg would have left the capital wide open—unless someone managed to destroy the two lower bridges that spanned the Eastern Branch. There was nothing to do, the general reasoned, except fall back on Washington.29 He gave the orders and his weary, dispirited soldiers moved out around sunset, marching the eight miles back to Washington at such a brisk pace that one artilleryman called it a “run of eight miles.” The first elements of the army crossed the bridges into the city around 8 p.m. and collapsed exhausted in fields around the navy yard.30
Confusion reigned in both the American and the British camps throughout the night of August 23. Winder still had no real handle on either his army or the British. He believed Ross planned to strike Washington but had no idea which route the British would take. The general spent a sleepless night blundering about the darkened capital, tracking down officers, issuing orders, and, most of all, worrying. His latest concern was the two bridges that spanned the Eastern Branch from Maryland on the road leading directly into the city. Around 1 a.m. he roused young Capt. Benjamin Burch of the Washington Artillery and ordered him to take thirty men and a pair of 6-pounder cannon to cover the southernmost of the two bridges.31
Burch and his men had covered the retreat of Winder’s army into Washington and were dead tired. Nevertheless, he roused himself and his men and set off for the lower bridge. The upper bridge was still completely unguarded. Winder had an answer for that. He ordered a party of soldiers to burn it, and by 4 a.m. both the British around Upper Marlboro and Stansbury’s men in Bladensburg could see the glow of the blaze. Stansbury had arrived in Bladensburg earlier that night, along with Sterrett. The 2,200 men of the combined brigade were also dead tired, having force-marched from Baltimore. About 1 a.m. Stansbury received orders from Winder to prepare for a possible night attack from the British. Stansbury had his men formed in a battle line by 2 a.m., but except for a few shots that nervous sentries fired at nothing, the night was peaceful. At 4 a.m. Winder ordered Stansbury to march his men into Washington. Soon after that he sent new orders telling Stansbury to remain in place in Bladensburg. By then Stansbury could see the glow of the burning bridge near Washington but had no way to know that Winder had destroyed only one of the bridges. As far as the Baltimore militia general knew, the bridge at Bladensburg, which his brigade now guarded, was the only standing bridge over the Eastern Branch. If Ross planned to attack Washington, he would have to cross this bridge or ford the river a short distance upstream.32
Major General Ross could also see the glow of the burning bridge. Like Stansbury, he believed it meant the Americans had destroyed both of the nearest bridges to Washington. Ross awoke about 4 a.m. on the morning of August 24 at the breathless summons of Lt. James Scott, Cockburn’s tireless aide. Scott had delivered messages to Cochrane down on the Patuxent and returned with new orders for Ross and Cockburn. Cochrane expressly forbade an attack on Washington. The news shook Cockburn especially hard. Ross was ready to turn around, but Cockburn argued that they had come too far to turn back now. He assured the general that no matter how big the force that lay ahead of them, it was just militia. Experience had taught Cockburn that militia could not and would not stand up to British Regulars. Washington, he said, was just a few miles away and ready for conquest. All Ross had to do was to march down and take it. Although it was in direct contradiction to Cochrane’s orders, Cockburn told Ross no would argue with success once he had seized the American capital.33
The British commander thought for a minute and then began issuing orders. If the Americans had destroyed the southern bridges that led to their capital, he would march to Bladensburg if necessary and ford the shallow river there. The column pushed out at 5 a.m. Ross had committed himself to taking the city.