The Bladensburg RacesThe Bladensburg Races
BRIG. GEN. TOBIAS STANSBURY felt more than slightly isolated as he ordered his men to take positions covering the bridge over the Eastern Branch just west of Bladensburg. Stansbury was already tired after spending all of August 23 marching to, then preparing to leave, and then finally pitching camp, at Bladensburg. He went to sleep around 2 a.m. only to awaken a half hour later when a messenger arrived with news of Winder’s retreat into Washington. He roused his men and clattered over the bridge, taking up a defensive position on the west side of the river opposite Bladensburg. The militia moved slowly, and it was nearly daybreak by the time the Baltimore brigade was across the river. Stansbury sent a messenger to Winder to find out what was happening and ordered his men to cook their rations and “refresh themselves.”1
Bladensburg was an obvious access point to Washington. Not only was the bridge over the Eastern Branch of the Potomac there, but just upstream the river was shallow enough to ford. The town also sat at a crossroads. Its prominence came not just from being the uppermost deepwater port on the Eastern Branch but also from the roads that snaked through the town—roads that led to Georgetown and Washington to the southwest, Baltimore to the north, and Annapolis to the east.
The first sliver of daylight was already visible when Major General Ross ordered his army to move out. Their destination was Bladensburg, about seven miles to the north. The marching was easy as the British moved along shaded roads in the early morning. As the sun rose higher in the sky, however, the column began to show signs of exhaustion. The march slowed to a crawl, then came to a complete halt “to give time for the stragglers to overtake the column.”2
News of the British advance soon reached Washington, although Winder continued to vacillate over just where Ross was headed. He still believed the target was Annapolis or possibly Fort Washington. Because he wanted to cover every possible contingency, however, he agreed to let Secretary of State Monroe ride to Bladensburg to tell Stansbury the British were on the move. Uncertain of his next move, Winder turned to Secretary of War Armstrong for advice, sending him a note at about the same time Ross ordered his men to move out. “I should be glad of the assistance of counsel from yourself and government,” Winder wrote to Armstrong. “If more convenient, I should make an exertion to go to you the first opportunity.”3 The note actually went to Madison—the courier could not find Armstrong—and the president himself rode over to Winder’s headquarters to see what had the general so vexed.4
He arrived to find confusion rampant. No one had any coherent idea of what was happening. Rumors abounded. Some claimed the British were headed to Bladensburg, others said toward Washington, and still others toward Fort Washington. Winder was worried about the remaining southern bridge into the city, which young Captain Burch and his thirty artillerymen currently guarded. He had yet to hear from Capt. Thomas Tingey, commander of the Washington Navy Yard, who was supposed to provide explosives to destroy the bridge. Winder sent a frantic note to Tingey asking him to send powder to the bridge and decided to send Commodore Barney and his force of four hundred tough flotillamen to guard it as well.5
The entire city was awake before daybreak. Couriers dashed from place to place while the few residents still in town tried to find wagons and horses to cart their belongings to the countryside. Winder still had no idea where Ross was headed. Armstrong wanted to take a force of three thousand men and hole up in the Capitol building.6 Madison was already arranging where government officials should meet if the city fell. He decided on Frederick, Maryland. By 8 a.m. the situation was bedlam. Rumors, conjecture, and outright guesses completely paralyzed command and control. At 10 a.m. a courier arrived with definitive news. Ross was headed for Bladensburg.7
Winder finally made his decision. He ordered Burch and Maj. George Peter to take their artillery to Bladensburg along with Laval’s dragoons, Brig. Gen. Walter Smith’s District of Columbia militia, the battalion of 350 Regulars under Col. William Scott, and Captain Stull’s riflemen, who were still armed with muskets. He left behind only Col. George Minor and his eight hundred Virginia militiamen. Minor had arrived late on August 23 with no weapons or equipment and spent much of the day on August 24 trying to find Colonel Carberry of the 36th Infantry, who was supposed to equip the Virginians. His unit would play no part in the day’s events.8
Also left behind, guarding the bridge into Washington near the navy yard, were Barney and his 400 flotillamen and Miller and 113 Marines. Barney was livid. He knew his men and the Marines were the best and most experienced fighters at Winder’s disposal, and yet they were guarding a bridge. When Madison rode to the bridge to inspect its defenses around 11 a.m., Barney exploded. Why, he demanded to know, should his tough sailors and Marines—“500 of the precious few fighting men around,” as he put it—stay put at the bridge to “do what any damned corporal could do better with five men?”9
Madison agreed. He ordered Barney, Miller, the sailors and Marines, and their two 18-pounder and three 12-pounder artillery pieces to head for Bladensburg. It would prove an especially difficult march for the sailors, who had just been issued new shoes.10
Armstrong’s obstinacy continued to impede General Winder’s efforts. Madison suggested that Armstrong speak with Winder and offer some advice before the general issued his men their marching orders. Armstrong went to Winder’s headquarters but apparently did nothing to help plan for the coming battle. “I took it for granted that he received the counsel he required,” Armstrong told the president, “for to me he neither stated doubt nor difficulty nor plan of attack nor defense.”11
Armstrong’s attitude stunned the president. Pushed by Treasury secretary George Campbell, Madison begged Armstrong to ride to Bladensburg. Winder needed all the advice he could get, the president said, and Armstrong’s help was vital to the success of the defense of the city. At first, Armstrong resisted. Madison promised to resolve any disputes over command if they arose. Believing that Madison had just given him command of the army, Armstrong immediately set out for Bladensburg. The president, Benjamin Rush, and a few aides followed soon afterward.12
Stansbury and his Baltimore militia could see the dust cloud of the approaching reinforcements but had no idea whether they or the British would arrive first. He decided to set up his defenses on the west side of the Bladensburg bridge, using an emplacement Col. Decius Wadsworth had built the previous day as the centerpiece of his line. He ordered his artillery, composed of six 6-pounder field guns, into the emplacement. To their right he placed Maj. William Pinkney’s battalion, and on their left he put Stull and Capt. John Doughty and their companies of riflemen. Doughty’s men, like Stull’s, had muskets instead of rifles.13 The position was a strong one, bordered by a ravine on the left and a large tobacco warehouse on the right, which would act as a funnel. The British would likely cross the bridge in front of the emplacement, where the cannon and supporting infantry could sweep the field.14
About fifty yards behind this first line Stansbury ordered Col. Jonathan Schutz’s five-hundred-man regiment to take up a position on the left flank in a field that bordered an apple orchard. Stansbury put Col. John Ragan’s regi-ment on the right flank, also covered by the orchard. He placed Lt. Col. Joseph Sterrett and his 5th Baltimore on the right. The positions would allow the infantry to easily support the front line while the orchard would shield them from view.15 Stansbury wanted to place Col. William Beall and his eight-hundred-strong contingent of Annapolis militia on his far left flank, where they could cover a ford over the river and protect the soldiers in the orchard. Unfortunately, he never got the chance.
Secretary of State Monroe, just back from another scouting mission, arrived in the camp around the time Beall’s footsore militia came jogging onto the field. Monroe rode along the lines Stansbury had established and decided, on his own authority, to change the positioning of the troops. He ordered Schutz and Ragan to move their men to a hill five hundred yards behind the riflemen and artillery—much too far back to offer any kind of cover to the gunners.16 The change completely exposed the right flank of Stansbury’s position and unnerved the militiamen, who had to leave the cover of the orchard to stand in the open on top of a hill that was in plain view of the enemy.17
Monroe was not finished playing general. Realizing Schutz and Ragan were exposed, he ordered Sterrett to take the 5th Baltimore and join the other two regiments on the hill. As Beall arrived after a sixteen-mile forced march—before Stansbury even knew the Annapolis regiment was on the field—Monroe grabbed the militia colonel and ordered him to take a position not on the left but on a hill to the right of the front line and nearly a mile behind the Baltimore units at the gun emplacement. Finally, Monroe buttonholed Laval as he and his troopers rode up and ordered him to take a position in a small ravine to the left of the new militia emplacement on the hill. Satisfied, he went in search of Stansbury and Winder.18
Stansbury was looking for Monroe as well. The general, after inspecting the artillery and Pinkney’s and Stull’s positions, looked in horror at the now deserted orchard and wondered where his men were. He quickly spotted the three regiments on the hill and raced to move the men back to their original positions. Just then Brig. Gen. Walter Smith rode up with his district militia, as did Winder. The army commander had arrived around noon and, like Stansbury, was inspecting the positioning of the troops. Stansbury and Monroe reached Smith at about the same time, but before the Baltimore general could complain about Monroe’s meddling, the secretary of state rather proudly told Winder he had been “aiding” Stansbury with arranging the defense. Stansbury was about to demand that Winder do something when a cloud of dust on the horizon drew their attention.19 Time had run out. The British had arrived.
Ross’ column moved into Bladensburg hot, tired, and incredulous. The British had expected to run into opposition throughout their march. Eighteen-year-old Lt. George Robert Gleig of the 85th Foot was especially surprised that American riflemen had not taken up positions among the buildings in the town. Ross sent in his advance guard to reconnoiter, and the light infantrymen came under fire from the emplacement across the river. The British halted to decide on their plan of attack.20
While the British planned, Winder’s army continued to stream onto the field. Benjamin Burch came pounding up with his artillery and looked for a place to set up his five guns. One of his men spotted Winder, who gave the unit a rather grim order, “When you retreat, take notice you must retreat by the Georgetown road.”21 Winder had Burch place three guns near the now-abandoned orchard in a last-ditch effort to support the front line of troops. Colonel Wadsworth, who arrived on the field with Winder, grabbed the other two cannon and set them up on the Washington road to cover the Baltimore artillery at the emplacement. What Wadsworth did afterward is a mystery. No reports mention him being on the field during the battle.22 Remarkably, no one in the first line of defense had any idea that Winder’s army had arrived. Stansbury said the first time he realized he was not alone on the field was when Commodore Barney’s flotillamen, who were the last units to arrive, opened fire on the British.23 Major Pinkney was also under the impression that his were the only troops on the field and said he did not know the rest of the army was behind him until the battle was nearly over.24
The soldiers from Washington were now arriving en masse. General Smith began placing the units as each came onto the field. Maj. George Peter’s six-gun artillery unit went into a battery near a small bluff about a mile from the bridge. Smith put a six-hundred-man Maryland militia unit to the right of Peter’s guns and ordered Colonel Scott with his battalion of Regulars to take up a position to the left of the cannon. George Magruder’s 1st District of Columbia militia took station 100 yards behind Scott. Col. William Brent and the 2nd District militia, and Capt. John Davidson’s company of riflemen moved to a ridge to the left of Peter’s guns. Well off to the right were Beall’s men, still without orders, standing on their hill and watching the commotion from 250 yards away.25
Winder did his best to take control of the army, but Monroe’s meddling in the placement of the front line all but doomed the Americans. Now, Winder had Madison, Armstrong, and Rush as well as several congressmen converging on the scene. Armstrong had one final chance to work with Winder but again refused when he realized he would not command the army. His ego bruised, Armstrong peremptorily left the field, leaving Winder to his own devices. Madison and his party made their way to the front line and settled in to watch until the first British volley sent them scurrying for the rear.26 His precipitous retreat aside, Madison, who had no military experience, was the first chief executive to take the field with an army in a position to execute his duties as commander in chief. Madison, however, demurred from exercising command, telling Armstrong and Rush “it was proper” to leave such matters to military men. (Abraham Lincoln helped orchestrate the recapture of Norfolk during the Civil War, but he was not present when Union troops went ashore to retake the city.)
Confusion remained rampant. None of Stansbury’s men knew that the bulk of the army was behind them. They could see the heavy column of British just across the river and even let out a cheer when the first volleys of cannon fire sent the red-coated scouts running for cover among the buildings of the town.27 It was short-lived bravado.
Col. William Thornton, commander of the 85th Foot and the first brigade of Ross’ army, led his men across the bridge and was greeted by a blast of grape and canister. Thornton urged his men on as a group of Royal Marine artillerymen set up the launchers for their Congreve rockets. A second volley from the Baltimore artillery momentarily stopped the advance, but Thornton quickly had his men moving “at the double quick toward the head of the bridge.” As the light infantry crossed the wooden structure, the American infantry and Wadsworth’s two guns opened fire. The effect was “tremendous,” Gleig reported. “For at that first discharge, an entire company was swept down.”28
The British kept coming. The infantrymen of the 85th fanned out as they crossed the bridge, using the shrubs and bushes along the riverbank as cover. At the same time, the Royal Marines launched their first salvo of rockets, which whooshed well over the American line but clearly startled the defenders. The next salvo was much better aimed and streaked through the line. The rockets unnerved the riflemen and gunners, whose next volley was far less effective.29 Wadsworth’s pair of guns, deployed on the road to the left of the emplacement, opened fire and again drove the British back. Thorton, however, urged his men forward, with the 85th in the van while the light companies of the 4th, 21st, and 44th Foot followed. The heavy column continued to envelop the right and left flanks of the first American line and also bore down on Wadsworth’s little battery. They were the first to break, abandoning their guns before the British could get within bayonet reach.30
On the right of the emplacement, a company of skirmishers fled as the redcoats approached, causing a domino effect on the line. The Baltimore artillery suddenly ceased firing and began limbering their guns with a speed few had ever seen the unit execute. Major Pinkney’s riflemen, stationed adjacent to the artillerymen, were next. As the gunners fled, the riflemen simply began to run toward the orchard and the hill on which Sterrett and the 5th Baltimore stood. It was the first inkling Winder, who was also on the hill, had that his front line was disintegrating. He ordered Sterrett to move to support the now-fleeing Baltimore artillery.31 Winder wanted the 5th to retake the orchard, which would secure the far right flank of the position, but after marching just fifty yards Sterrett could see that the British were already among the apple trees and halted his men. His unit now held the right flank of the army while Burch’s battery, which continued to engage the redcoats, held the far left.32
At this stage Winder actually saw opportunity. Despite the huge gap in his line, he still had two full regiments at his immediate disposal and all of the District militia. If he could move Ragan’s and Schutz’s men into the now vacant center to support Sterrett and link up with the two companies still supporting Burch, he might just be able to salvage the battle.33 He did not factor in the rockets. Lt. John Lawrence and his Royal Marine artillerymen found the range, and Congreve rockets streaked over the battlefield. After unnerving the center, Lawrence concentrated on the American units he could see on the hill—the regiments of Sterrett, Ragan, and Schutz. Sterrett moved his men before they came under fire. The other two regiments took one salvo and ran madly down the hill to escape the rockets.34
The 5th Baltimore held its ground, briefly. The British in the orchard opened fire on the Americans and, despite the efforts of Burch’s artillery, continued firing on the militiamen, who returned fire but could not see their assailants. Winder ordered the 5th to fall back, then countermanded the order. He quickly reversed that decision and again ordered the Baltimoreans to withdraw. The series of orders, as well as the increasing fire from the orchard, was too much even for the “elite” men of the 5th, and they broke and ran for the rear, following the other two city units.35
There was no stopping the panic now. Winder, Stansbury, and Sterrett all tried to stem the flight of the frightened militia, only to become engulfed in the tide of fleeing men. Winder attempted to funnel the mass toward the troops still pounding up the road from Washington, but the militiamen nearly all turned down the Georgetown road instead, which led in a different direction.36 The horde of panicked troops ran so fast the day would become known as the “Bladensburg Races.”
The stampede signaled to President Madison and his party that it was time to leave, and they rode past a bewildered Winder and headed back toward the city. Winder got a boost when Commodore Barney rode up at the head of his sailors and Miller’s Marines. Winder had him take up a position in the center of the third defensive line, on the road to Washington.37
The British now moved to exploit their rout of the Baltimore militia. They first attacked the Maryland militia positioned near Beall. After receiving one volley the Marylanders broke and joined Beall on his isolated hilltop position. The British advanced and ran smack into the concentrated fire of Peter’s six-gun battery and Barney’s five guns. Peter’s battery fired a volley that staggered the redcoats, and Barney unleashed a salvo from his 18-pounders that swept them from the road. The light infantry regrouped and tried again, only to run into a second hail of fire. They tried a third time and were again driven back, this time into a field near the road, which gave Miller and his Marines their chance. Miller opened up with his 12-pounders, and his Marines poured volleys of musket fire into the clump of men. With cries of “Board ’em,” the flotillamen and Marines charged and sent the 85th Foot reeling. Colonel Thornton went down with a thigh wound. His replacement, Lt. Col. William Wood of the 85th, was also wounded. The entire British first brigade reeled from the combined Marine-flotillamen charge and looked ready to break.38
Ross and Cockburn, observing the battle from the east bank of the river, immediately ordered Col. Arthur Brooke to push forward with the second brigade, made up of the battalion companies of the 4th and 44th Foot. Brooke was to lead the 4th around the American left flank while Ross himself took command of the 44th and attacked on the right. The reinforcements stiffened the light infantry, which again surged forward. Brooke and the 4th slammed into Beall’s men, who crumpled from the blow. The Annapolis militia melted away, running, a flotillaman said contemptuously, “like sheep from dogs.”39
On the left, Colonel Magruder’s 1st District militia exchanged fire with Ross and the advancing 44th Foot. The district regiment stood its ground until receiving an order to withdraw. At first the militiamen refused, but when a second order came they moved back about sixty yards and turned to engage the British once more. Another order came in to retreat still more. The 1st moved back another six hundred yards before receiving an order to withdraw all the way to Washington Heights.40
All over the field, American units were running. On the far left, Lieutenant Colonel Laval and his dragoons found themselves nearly crushed by the Baltimore artillery. “They poured in torrents by us,” he reported. “An artillery [battery] drove through. . . . [S]everal of my men were crushed down, horses and all and myself narrowly escaping, my thigh broken by one of the wheels, which shook me off my horse.”41 Major Peter and his battery and Colonel Scott and his Regulars held their ground until Winder ordered both, along with the 2nd District militia, to join the retreat. All three at first refused. The Regulars were just about to engage the 4th Foot when the order came to withdraw, and they howled with rage at being told to pull back. The men of the 2nd were equally outraged, but they did not know that the American left flank had disintegrated in a panicked mass of men and horses. Winder wanted to save as many men as he could before the British could turn their flank yet again. Reluctantly, Peter limbered his guns while Scott’s Regulars and the 2nd District militia joined the general retreat. The infantry never fired a shot.42
The retreat left only Barney and Miller to face the entire British army. Neither the Marines nor the flotillamen flinched. Each time the British attacked, concentrated artillery and musket fire greeted them. Ross’ favorite mount, the Arabian charger he rode during the Peninsular War, was shot out from under him. He barely escaped capture as the Marines and sailors counterattacked with vicious efficiency.43 The British regrouped and charged again, the Marines meeting them with the bayonet, the sailors with cutlasses. Their valor earned them the praise of their enemies. “It would be an injustice not to speak of them in the terms which their conduct merits,” said Gleig. “They were employed as gunners, and not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision which astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands.”44
The sheer weight of numbers was against Barney and Miller. The Marines slowly began giving ground as more of them fell dead or wounded. Miller engaged in personal combat with one British soldier, who fired at him and missed. Miller fired back and also missed. Before he could reload, the redcoat snapped off another shot that shattered Miller’s arm. He dropped wounded onto the field and was eventually captured. Despite spending ten months in the hospital, he never regained full use of the arm.45
The flotillamen too were now hard-pressed. Barney remained at the guns, directing fire. When a sharpshooter killed his horse, he fought on foot. Another round struck the fifty-five-year-old in the thigh. He dropped to the ground and saw the British now working their way into his rear.46 The flotillamen and Marines fought on, stubbornly holding their positions. The Marines were down to about seventy men; the sailors continued to work the big guns. Barney watched as one gunner fought hand to hand with a British officer, slashing at the Englishman with his cutlass only to die at the officer’s hand.47 The British closed in, and the non-flotillamen in charge of Barney’s ammunition trains scampered off, taking the sailors’ last rounds with them.
There was nothing left to do. Barney ordered his men to spike their guns and withdraw. Unable to walk because of his wounds, he told his men to leave him on the field. Three of his senior officers tried to carry him but were unable to move him. He told the trio of sailing masters to leave him behind, but they refused. He ordered them to leave; two reluctantly complied while the third stayed with him. That officer, Sailing Master Jesse Huffington, remained with Barney and helped flag down a young officer for help.48 Barney thought the young man was a midshipman, but he was actually Cockburn’s aide, Lt. James Scott. The lieutenant assured Barney he had nothing to fear and immediately fetched Vice Admiral Cockburn and General Ross. Both British officers were extremely gracious to their fallen enemy. Barney quipped to Cockburn, “Well, Admiral, you have got hold of me at last.” Cockburn quickly replied, “Do not let us speak of this state now, Commodore; I hope you are not seriously hurt.” Cockburn and Ross granted Barney and Huffington paroles and gave permission to move the commodore to any abode he chose. Ross’ personal physician tended to Barney’s wound. Barney would remain grateful for the kindness Ross and Cockburn bestowed, while the affection the flotillamen showed for their commander moved the redcoats.49
The British officially reported losses of 64 dead and 185 wounded. The Americans reported 30 dead and 41 wounded, most of them Marines and flotillamen.50 Dr. Hanson Cartlett, regimental surgeon of the 1st District militia, had the chance to survey the battlefield before burial parties cleared it and put British losses at 180 dead and 300 wounded.51
Barney’s capture brought the battle to a close. The British, already tired from their march to Bladensburg, needed a rest. The American force had vanished. Only the flotillamen and Marines maintained their cohesion as they headed for Washington. The Baltimore militia units were, for all purposes, gone. Most of the men from Stansbury’s line took the road leading to Baltimore and never looked back. The cavalry and Regulars, along with the district units, were on their way to Georgetown, although they straggled through Washington throughout the night of the twenty-fourth. Winder was also on his way Georgetown. He had decided to abandon Washington rather than risk his remaining soldiers in a slugfest within the city. He conferred with both Armstrong and Monroe before making the decision, and later reported, “Both men concurred it would subject the whole of my force to certain capture” had he attempted to defend the capital.52 Washington, D.C., and the few people still in the city were on their own.