13

 

Guilty

After a trial of almost 21 months Eugene was found guilty and sentenced by Judge Willem van der Merwe on 30 October 1996. He was found guilty of 121 charges, including six of murder, one of kidnapping, one of culpable homicide and many charges of fraud. For these, the following sentences were handed down:

›Charge 1 (murder), 20 years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 2 (murder), 20 years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 3 (murder), 20 years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 4 (murder), 20 years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 5 (murder), life imprisonment.

›Charges 6 to 8 (infringement of section 32(1)(a) and (e) read with sections 1, 39 and 40 of Act 75 of 1969, taken together for purposes of sentence), five years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 9 (fraud), two years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 10 (fraud), four years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 12 (conspiracy to infringement of section 18(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956), 20 years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 13 (obstruction or defeating the ends of justice), six years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 14 (murder), 20 years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 15 (attempted murder), five years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 16 (culpable homicide), ten years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 17 (fraud), four years’ imprisonment.

›Charges 18, 19 and 21 (fraud, taken together for purposes of sentence), six years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 20 (fraud), two years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 22 (fraud), two years’ imprisonment.

›Charges 23 to 42 (fraud, taken together for purposes of sentence), four years’ imprisonment.

›Charges 43 to 57 (fraud, taken together for purposes of sentence), three years’ imprisonment.

›Charges 88 to 93 (fraud, taken together for purposes of sentence), two years’ imprisonment.

›Charges 94 to 97 (fraud, taken together for purposes of sentence), two years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 98 (fraud), two years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 99 (fraud), three years’ imprisonment.

›Charges 100, 101 and 102 (infringement of section 32(1)(b), section 32(1)(c) and section 32(1)(e) read with sections 1, 39 and 40 of Act 75 of 1969, taken together for purposes of sentence), five years’ imprisonment.

›Charges 103, 104, 105 and 106 (infringement of section 32(1)(b), section 32(1)(c) and section 32(1)(e) read with sections 1, 39 and 40 of Act 75 of 1969, as well as an infringement of section 6(1) read with sections 1, 6(2), 6(3) and 29 of Act 26 of 1956, and further read with Government Notice R1603 dated 8 September 1972, taken together for purposes of sentence), five years’ imprisonment.

›Charges 107 to 117 (fraud, taken together for purposes of sentence), two years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 118 (kidnapping), two years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 119 (assault with the intention of inflicting serious injury), four years’ imprisonment.

›Charge 120 (conspiracy to infringement of section 18(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956), life imprisonment.

›Charge 121 (accessory to culpable homicide), 12 years’ imprisonment.1

I struggle, sometimes, to reconcile the soldier and assassin for the state with the man who sits so calmly before me during my visits to him in jail. However, when I read the judge’s summary of Eugene’s crimes, I shudder at their brutality. The 44-page summary of the imposition of sentence and some of the remarks made by the judge drive home the reality of who Eugene once was. Among others:

Charges 17 to 22, 98 and 99: All these charges of fraud, as with charges 9 and 10, were planned, calculated and executed with cunning. In most cases stories about events were fabricated with an imagination that testifies to sharp-witted originality … Whether the proceeds of this fraud were used for an individual’s personal gain or for other police activities makes very little difference. The fact remains that money that was placed in the hands of the state by citizens was illegally acquired and wasted. The calculated way in which the fraud was planned and executed fills one with revulsion.

Charges 118 to 120: Japie Maponya’s sin was having a brother who the police were after. To interrogate him about his brother, he was kidnapped, badly assaulted and killed.

The kidnapping, charge 118, was not of short duration. Maponya was so heavily outnumbered that he stood no chance of evading abduction. The assault he suffered was cruel and cold. It was perpetrated, once again, by a multitude of people while he was powerless. The accused was charged with, and found guilty of, conspiracy to kill Maponya. As was the case with [Brian] Ngqulunga, the events prior to, during and after the killing could not be excluded when establishing the seriousness of the crime.

After it had been decided to end Maponya’s life, regardless of whether permission to do so was given from ‘above’, the Vlakplaas members acted in a cold and calculated way and every precaution was taken to ensure the murder could not be traced back to the police. Clearly, he was killed in Swaziland for this reason. The journey to Swaziland with Maponya in the vehicle, with him knowing and hearing what his fate was to be, speaks of callousness …

The way in which Maponya’s life was ended and his body left in a plantation fills one with repugnance. The lack of compassion for him as a person is also evident in the reaction after the murder. After allegations of the involvement of the accused and other members of Vlakplaas in Maponya’s death became known and were investigated inter alia by the Harms Commission, it was covered up with lies and deception.

This incident, in which the deceased launched no attack on any member of the force, deserves serious censure. A dedicated worker who could have provided for his future wife and child was unceremoniously kidnapped, assaulted and killed, merely because he could reveal that the offences of kidnapping and assault had been committed against him.2

In her evaluation report for mitigation of sentence, criminologist Professor Van der Hoven wrote that the police was more than simply a career for Eugene – it was a ‘calling to defend his country and his people and also to protect them from communism’.

‘The reason he joined the police was to help fight terrorists. The ANC and Swapo were seen as communists and worse than wild animals (they were criminalised). The accused made up his mind that he would not allow white people in South Africa to be wiped out as had happened, for example, in the Congo, Angola and Mozambique. Therefore, he focused his efforts on combating terrorism. The SAP was seen as the personification of what was right and just; it had to protect the community at any cost.’3

Eugene told her how he had realised that becoming a master of counter-insurgency makes one ‘become an even greater master of terrorism’. Whereas a counter-insurgent is bound by the country’s laws and codes of behaviour, a terrorist has ‘no inhibitions and sees himself as not bound by any laws or norms’. This in fact gives a terrorist a higher success rate than a counter-insurgent, he said.

‘In the process you become a terrorist yourself,’ he stated.4

Van der Hoven also maintained that Eugene’s childhood experiences taught him to repress and hide his emotions. As a result, he came across as emotionally cold. ‘This also contributed to the relentlessness and determination he displayed when tracking down and killing the enemy. Working for such a long time in a war situation caused progressive emotional blunting.

‘Due to the changes in personality that take place, the individual becomes a very efficient murderer. Such a person learns to repress feelings of guilt and views people in terms of diametric opposites – his subordinates are good and worth saving; the enemy is bad and must be killed. During combat, the person emotionally represses events and feels empty, detached and alienated. Later he is only capable of a limited range of feelings.’5

According to Van der Hoven, Eugene stressed that killing his enemy gave him no satisfaction. ‘He could not simply kill people; he had to know why he had to do it … his objective was to halt the enemy. The risks he ran in these operations were getting tortured, murdered or maimed himself’.6

Dr Annemarie Novello is a clinical psychologist who was also approached to evaluate Eugene in light of the signs of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) he displayed. She reported that there were, indeed, ‘significant symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder’ in Eugene’s behaviour. According to Novello, he had a strong belief system. In the context of this he attached a certain significance to ‘especially the traumatic events to which he had been exposed in his work situation’.7

Van der Hoven also believed that Eugene had PTSD and should receive psychological treatment for it in prison.8

In the sentencing proceedings Judge Van der Merwe mentioned that Dr JA Plomp, the psychiatrist for the state, doubted whether Eugene suffered from PTSD. However, according to Van der Merwe, Plomp could not consult with the accused and had to rely on what he had heard while Eugene and the other experts gave their testimonies. According to Van der Merwe, Plomp did, in fact, say that even if Eugene did not suffer from PTSD, he accepted ‘the accused experienced blunting [of the emotions]’.9