Near noon on 6 March Fletcher sighted TF-11 on schedule one hundred miles west of Efate. On the way south he copied a message King sent on 2 March to Leary and Brown ordering the augmented force to attack ships and bases in the Bismarcks-Solomons area “about” 10 March. The goal was to check the enemy’s advance and cover the Australia–New Caledonia convoy slated to arrive at Nouméa two days later. King suggested a multipronged approach of carriers from the east or southeast, while Crace’s Anzac Squadron came from the south. Intelligence showed that Rabaul harbor bulged with ships (twenty-four sighted on 2 March alone) gathering for mischief. Brown soon would wield the strongest concentration to date of Allied naval air power in the Pacific and must find the best way to use it. It is unfortunate King mentioned 10 March. Brown took it wrongly as a mandate even though events might compel an earlier attack.1
On the morning of 6 March two Lexington planes thumped down on the Yorktown bearing a sheaf of operational dispatches, battle reports, letters, and Brown’s TF-11 Op-Ord 5–42 for his planned 10 March strike against Rabaul. The alert enemy air search ruled out an approach from the northeast or east. That left only the south, where poorly charted, reef-studded waters and chronic rainy weather precluded accurate navigation. Considering it “tactically sounder” to keep his whole force together, Brown rejected King’s suggestion of synchronizing attacks from different directions. Instead, the combined assault would be launched from almost due south of Rabaul at a point equidistant from Rabaul and Gasmata on New Britain. Simultaneous air strikes would hit both bases, followed by cruiser bombardments. Brown counted on Leary’s aircraft to bomb Rabaul and Gasmata an hour after sunrise on the tenth. With so much U.S. and Australian air strength embroiled in the faltering Dutch East Indies, the B-17s comprised the most powerful land-based air striking force in Australia. Leary also coordinated searches from northeast Australia, Port Moresby, and Tulagi by Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Catalina flying boats and Hudson medium bombers. Such weak numbers precluded any comprehensive air coverage south of Rabaul, so Brown could never be certain whether the Japanese might slip past unseen. The six PBYs at Nouméa, where Captain Sprague’s Tangier recently replaced the Curtiss, guarded the approaches to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. After the attack Brown expected to return TF-11 to Pearl. He named Fletcher his second in command for the current operation (Fletcher would soon discover how little that meant) and assumed that Fletcher would take overall command after he left. The potential complication was Crace’s seniority, although King clearly intended the senior U.S. naval officer to be in charge. Crace’s date of rank was 1 August 1939; Fletcher’s 1 November 1939. Brown described Crace as “most intelligent and co-operative” and “most anxious that his squadron shall operate as an integral part of our force.”2
TF-11 Op-Ord 5–42 explained how Brown planned to unite TF-11, TF-17, and the Anzac Squadron into one large Task Force 11. The main body would comprise the Lexington and Yorktown (Task Group 11.5) under the Lex’s Capt. Frederick Sherman, Admiral Kinkaid’s three heavy cruisers (TG-11.2), and ten destroyers (TG-11.4) under Capt. Alexander R. Early (Comdesron One). Rear Adm. William W. Smith’s TG-11.8 (three heavy cruisers, two destroyers) received the unenviable chore of bombarding Rabaul, while Admiral Crace’s TG-11.9 (two heavy cruisers, two destroyers) did the honors for Gasmata. Following a cautious, fuel-conserving approach, Brown aimed to traverse the Solomon Sea on the afternoon of 9 March in hopes of avoiding the enemy air search and that evening, when 450 miles southeast of Rabaul, commence a twenty-five-knot gallop overnight to the launch point. The carriers would launch before dawn on 10 March when 125 miles from the two targets, while the two cruiser groups steered for their respective objectives. The carriers would make only one attack and swiftly retire. Meanwhile, Crace and Smith were to go in independently without air cover, complete their bombardments by noon, then withdraw and rejoin the carriers two days later 750 miles southeast of Rabaul. Brown promised to cancel their missions if it was discovered enemy ships already decamped. He also gave Crace and Smith the freedom to attack or withdraw at their discretion. They could quickly get in over their heads if the opposition proved formidable.3
Brown’s radical rearrangement of the task forces put Fletcher out of a job unless Brown became incapacitated. Despite the highfalutin title “second in command” (CTG-11.1), Fletcher fit nowhere in the chain of command. No one reported directly to him. He was not even accorded the courtesy of an addressee of the operations order. The reason lay in Brown’s extraordinary handling of the carriers. Far from retaining the Lexington and Yorktown in individual task groups, he incorporated them directly in the same screen. “We may be able to iron out the difficulties of working two carriers together in close proximity to each other.” That was a radical change over U.S. doctrine. Brown’s inspiration was Frederick “Ted” Sherman, the prospective Commander, Air (CTG-11.5). A 1910 Annapolis graduate, Sherman tried his hand at subs and destroyers before earning his wings in 1936 at age forty-seven. Commanding the Lexington for nearly two years enhanced her reputation as a highly efficient, well-run warship. Sherman was a “headstrong, outspoken, and a taskmaster,” who was “also a fearless, extremely skilled shiphandler and tactician” wrapped in an ego the size of the Lex with the ambition to match. The pioneer naval aviator community deeply distrusted him as an uppity JCL, but Sherman proved more farsighted. He was one of the first to realize the importance of concentrating carrier air power. The danger, though, in yoking these two particular flattops involved their disparate tactical (turning) diameters: two thousand yards for the Lexington versus the Yorktown’s one thousand yards. Not only was the Lady Lex about the same size as the RMS Titanic, but also, unfortunately, her rudder was equally nonresponsive. During evasive maneuvers it might prove impossible to keep the two carriers together, but Sherman accepted that risk to enhance coordination.4
Rear Adm. Frederick C. Sherman, 19 December 1942.
Courtesy of National Archives (80-G-34231)
On the afternoon of 6 March the Yorktown dispatched a boat containing Fletcher, Lewis, and Galpin from the TF-17 staff, as well as Buckmaster and Arnold, to visit the Lexington. They conferred with Brown, chief of staff Captain Robertson, Capt. C. Turner Joy (the able TF-11 operations officer), Sherman, and Cdr. H. S. Duckworth (the Lex’s fine air officer). It was a brief and awkward gathering. “Very reluctant to make an attack” but unable to “avoid it,” Brown deplored having to close within 125 miles to permit the short-ranged torpedo bombers and fighters to participate. Fletcher replied the Yorktown experts had set a maximum limit of 175 miles, but that he personally recommended 125 to 150 miles “to be on the safe side.” Buckmaster preferred 100 miles. Brown distrusted the “stereotyped” dawn strike and worried he could be ambushed at sunup with the aircraft still on board. Should weather and visibility permit, he hoped to attack three hours prior to sunrise. Buckmaster and Arnold countered that most of the Yorktown Air Group had yet to qualify at night and expressed little confidence in the accuracy of night bombing, particularly by only a quarter moon. Fletcher strongly advised against a night strike, so Brown reverted to a dawn launch. That afternoon Sherman drew up his air task group operations order. He allocated fifty-three planes to each target, the Lexington group to Rabaul and the Yorktown for Gasmata. Some Yorktown planes could be diverted to Rabaul if necessary. Ironically given Brown’s worries about defense, Sherman aggressively earmarked only a dozen of thirty-two F4F fighters to protect TF-11. To the disgust of their pilots, he equipped the twenty escort fighters with a pair of tiny 30-pound fragmentation bombs to (hopefully) catch enemy fighters on the ground. In another debatable move, he withheld eight SBD dive bombers from the strike for a low level “anti-torpedo-plane patrol” around the carriers.5
Such was the bare bones of the plan. Fletcher did not consider it “tactically sound as it risked too much for the objectives to be gained.” Poco Smith was livid over the prospects of a lonely dash fifty miles up St. George’s Channel to Rabaul harbor possibly under “continuous” air attack, with the additional prospect of unsupported surface action against cruisers. “I could expect no air cover whatsoever.” One strike wave by just one carrier air group could only take out a few of the many ships expected at Rabaul and probably not all of the planes either. Crace was pleased his Anzac Squadron would shell Gasmata and not merely protect the carriers. He explained personally to Brown on 7 March that such an aggressive assignment was of the “utmost importance for the morale of his personnel, who felt strongly that they should take an active part in all offensive operations in the Anzac area.” According to Crace, Brown had “no intention of making this a bald-headed raid and he proposed to take all precautions to safeguard the carriers,” despite the considerable risk to Smith.6
Brown and Fletcher prepared for action. On the afternoon of 6 March the Kaskaskia had completed fueling TF-11 and Crace’s Anzac Squadron. It marked the Australia’s first try at underway refueling from an oiler. Crace noticed her Capt. Harold B. Farncomb did not appear “keen” at the prospect, but “after various struggles with hoses [he] got connected up” and in two hours drew nearly fourteen hundred barrels. Fortunately “it was a fine calm day” and fueling “will come much easier the next time.” The “Americans have made it a fine art.” The Kaskaskia and a destroyer withdrew south to safer waters, while the Guadalupe and a destroyer left for Suva.7
Even as Brown and Fletcher conversed on 6 March, Leary warned of movement westward out of Rabaul toward New Guinea. That evening another Comanzac message placed seven medium transports and a cruiser off Gasmata. The next morning Rochefort’s Combat Intelligence Unit (Hypo) in Hawaii advised that the New Britain area was “fairly quiet,” but air reconnaissance had detected a shift of forces west toward Salamaua in New Guinea. Busy topping off his ships, Brown could not or would not take immediate action.8
Admiral Inoue’s South Seas Force had indeed gotten the jump on Anzac. Prewar strategic planning was remarkably ambiguous regarding the course of the Pacific War after Japan attained its initial objectives in the “Southern Area” (Malaya, Philippines, and Dutch East Indies). Within the “Southeast Area” (that is, south and east of the Mandates), planners had envisioned only going as far south as Rabaul and east to the Gilberts to gain linchpins for their defensive perimeter. They worried about Australia as a focus of Allied resistance and a potential source of counteroffensives but doubted they could do much about it. In January 1942, with the Southern Operation going unexpectedly well, the Naval Section of Imperial General Headquarters daringly looked far beyond Rabaul to isolate Australia and knock it out of the war. “British New Guinea” and the Solomon Islands would come first, but even the capture of distant Fiji and Samoa looked feasible. At the same time Admiral Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet staff seriously considered the invasion of Hawaii once they defeated the Pacific Fleet. “Victory Disease” rendered the Japanese overconfident to the point of recklessness, but they still had to reckon with the Pacific Fleet. Fletcher would personally figure in determining the outcome.9
Inoue’s first step, timed for early March, was the SR Operation: the seizure of Salamaua and adjacent Lae in eastern New Guinea 350 miles west of Rabaul. SR represented “Saramoa-Rae,” the Japanese rendition of Salamaua and Lae. Lae airfield would facilitate an air offensive against Port Moresby 180 miles southeast on the south Papuan coast. The capture of Port Moresby would follow in early April to secure a keystone in the new defensive perimeter and the “gateway” to Australia. Inoue coveted Tulagi in the southern Solomons for its superb harbor. With those two vital locales safely in hand, he could directly threaten northern Australia and New Caledonia. The severe plane losses suffered on 20 February in Brown’s abortive Rabaul strike forced Inoue to postpone the Salamaua-Lae invasion from 3 to 8 March. That significant delay allowed Fletcher to reach the Anzac Area. Despite the demonstrated presence of at least one U.S. carrier and his own lack of carrier support (the light carrier Shōhō only transported aircraft), Inoue nonchalantly proceeded with the SR Operation. On the afternoon of 5 March, Admiral Kajioka, the conqueror of Wake, left Rabaul with his SR Invasion Force of one light cruiser, six destroyers, one fast minelayer, one seaplane tender, five transports, and two minesweepers. That evening Admiral Gotō’s Support Force (four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and three destroyers) sailed to protect his seaward flank. At Rabaul were fifteen fighters, twenty-one medium bombers, and six flying boats, with the Shōhō to deliver nineteen more fighters on 9 March. A small number of Zero fighters would move up near Gasmata, two hundred miles from Lae, to provide air cover for the SR Invasion Force and would stage to Lae as soon as the airfield was ready. Bombers pounded Port Moresby, while flying boats ranged the upper Solomons and the northern Coral Sea on alert for Allied warships that might intervene.10
On the evening of 7 March as TF-11 proceeded northwest across the Coral Sea, Brown received a long-delayed sighting report of a half-dozen transports discovered that morning west of Gasmata. However, he still did not think that sufficient reason to go faster than the leisurely twelve knots required to remain on schedule for his 10 March attacks. Near to midnight word came of a convoy (six transports escorted by one cruiser and four destroyers) sighted 150 miles southwest of Gasmata and bound for the northeast New Guinea coast. Buna, a mission 140 miles southeast of Salamaua, was a possible destination. Brown instantly abandoned Rabaul-Gasmata in favor of Buna and especially Salamaua, the obvious enemy objective. He exulted “this was the very break we had been hoping for and praying for,” the “opportunity to catch Japanese navy and transports away from the concentrated defense of their shore-based planes.” Striking before Japan consolidated its hold on eastern New Guinea would “remove any immediate threat to Port Moresby and go far towards checking the enemy’s advance.” Of course an earlier attack on Rabaul proper might have delayed, if not prevented, the actual leap to New Guinea. Brown headed west at twenty knots. The challenge was to draw sufficiently close (125 miles) for a full carrier strike. With Salamaua and nearby Lae tucked far up Huon Gulf and the way barred by the east-jutting Papuan peninsula, TF-11 would have to cross the narrow gap of 140 miles between Papua’s outlying islands and New Britain in order to approach directly from the east. Should Brown wish to attack there as soon as possible on 9 March, he must run at twenty-five knots for thirty-six hours and consume oil at a prodigious rate, although the destroyers could start with nearly full fuel. However it would be virtually impossible to traverse or even draw near those restricted waters without being sighted on 8 March by air patrols from Rabaul and Gasmata.11
At 0200 on 8 March Brown reduced speed to twelve knots. After careful deliberation he chose to launch his attack on Salamaua and Lae from southeast in the Gulf of Papua near Port Moresby. Roused in the middle of the night, Sherman discovered the Rabaul attack was shelved in favor of New Guinea. “This suited Brown to a tee,” he recalled, “as he didn’t want to get within range of their shore bases but did want to attack their ships from a distance.” Brown’s proposed launch point, two hundred miles southeast of the target, would be well beyond air strike range for all but the dive bombers. Inasmuch as the charts were totally blank inside the shorelines, Sherman was ignorant of the exact topography along the projected strike route. The aircraft must cross the rugged Owen Stanley mountains, whose cloud-enshrouded peaks were reputed to rise as high as fifteen thousand feet. He argued for reinstating the original Rabaul plan or executing a safer strike from east of Salamaua, but Brown refused.12
Before dawn on 8 March two thousand Japanese soldiers stormed ashore at Salamaua and eight hundred naval troops at Lae. Kajioka’s ships began the lengthy process of unloading supplies and base equipment. At the same time Gotō’s Support Force started eastward back across the Solomon Sea toward Buka to survey the area before returning to Rabaul. Late on the morning of 8 March Brown finally received word that Lae and Salamaua had fallen. He consolidated his forces into the one big TF-11. The two carriers slid into the center, surrounded by Kinkaid’s cruisers and Early’s destroyers, while Crace and Smith took station four miles ahead. As yet no one outside the Lexington knew officially that Brown changed the objective, but the westerly course augured differently. Crace wondered what he was up to, and Fletcher did as well. Finally at 1130 Brown increased speed to twenty knots. In the meantime Sherman studied the proposed launch point. Its distance from the target, two hundred miles, ruled out both torpedo planes and escort fighters, not to mention that the lumbering TBDs could not vault over high mountains. They could rarely top six thousand feet when laden with torpedoes and full tanks. Chronic poor weather over the mountains further jeopardized a safe return, especially at such a distance. Drawing a 125-mile semicircle from Salamaua on the chart, Sherman noticed that it cut across the top of the Gulf of Papua almost directly south of the target area. Perhaps the carriers could proceed farther west and launch from there. He needed expert counsel regarding the mountains south of Salamaua and assurance of sufficient sea room in the Gulf of Papua.13
Lae-Salamaua raid, 10 March 1942
Early that afternoon came word of eleven ships off Salamaua, but only near sundown did Brown announce his decision to attack Salamaua from south of Moresby to “check the enemy advance.” Crace was to take charge of his own and Smith’s cruisers (less the Pensacola, to return to Kinkaid) and four destroyers to attack surface forces “when directed.” In fact Brown worried about committing TF-11 so far westward out of position to counter threats to New Caledonia. Because one of his prime tasks was to cover the Nouméa convoy, he thought it wise to position Crace’s four cruisers east of New Guinea to watch the back door and flank any surface force going after New Caledonia. Crace felt extremely disappointed not to continue with the original plan to attack Rabaul. If that was no longer possible, he wanted to cut through China Strait (a perilous trip due to coral reefs) and race up the northeast coast of Papua to Salamaua. “As Rabaul is the nest [Brown] should have maintained it as his chief objective & let the surface forces go for Salamoa [sic] & Lae. If only he had kept on at 20 knots last night & got into the area between New Britain & New Guinea, I’m sure we should have more chances of gaining our objective. I wonder if the last attack shook Brown’s nerve.” On the other hand Fletcher fully agreed with Brown’s decision not to raid Rabaul, although the Yorktown aviators much preferred taking on Salamaua from the east.14
Before dawn on 9 March as TF-11 drew level with the east tip of New Guinea, Cdr. Walton W. Smith, the staff aviation officer, rode a Lexington SBD to the air base at Townsville in northeastern Australia. He delivered Brown’s request for B-17 strikes against Salamaua, Lae, and perhaps even Rabaul on 10 March. Brown soon received an affirmative from Leary, who doubted, though, “much valuable shipping remains Salamaua.” Late that evening he notified Brown that eight army B-17s would bomb Salamaua and Lae about noon the next day. Cdr. William B. Ault, the Lexington Air Group commander, dropped in on Port Moresby between air raids and brought back invaluable information. A seventy-five-hundred-foot pass through the mountains lay almost on the direct line between the Gulf of Papua and Salamaua, and the mountains themselves were generally free of clouds in the morning. Relieved, Sherman secured permission to attack the morning of 10 March, weather permitting, then issued his operations order. Buckmaster shared it with Fletcher. Of special note Sherman cautiously armed the Yorktown’s TBDs for horizontal bombing with two instead of three 500-pound bombs, but risked the Lex’s TBDs with 2,000-pound torpedoes to hurdle the mountain pass. Likewise most SBDs carried one 500-pound bomb against ships and two 100-pounders to drop on the airfields, but again six Lexington SBDs toted 1,000-pound bombs. Sherman provided a detailed schedule of launches and a series of attacks by squadrons at ten-minute intervals, with the Yorktown as a second wave a half hour after the Lex.15
Also on the morning of the ninth Crace’s TG-11.7 (Australia, Chicago, Astoria, Louisville, and four destroyers) doubled back toward the Louisiade Archipelago. Crace was to remain beyond six hundred miles of Rabaul, out of air search range, and stand ready should the Japanese move south into the Coral Sea. Brown told him to rejoin on 14 March in the Coral Sea, 350 miles south of Guadalcanal. Crace read his new orders with “great sadness,” as he believed his force was being wasted. He judged “unlikely” a Japanese move toward New Caledonia, but just in case, at dawn on 10 March he would be in position southeast of Rossel in the Louisiades.16
After dawn on 10 March the rugged New Guinea topography loomed uncomfortably close as TF-11 crossed the confined waters at the head of the Gulf of Papua. With Brown’s permission Sherman advanced the launch almost three hours to 0745 to take advantage of the customary fine mid-morning weather over the mountains. Unfortunately he failed to pass the word to the Yorktown in timely fashion, causing Fletcher and Buckmaster last-minute anxiety. From 0749 to 0850 the carriers lofted two strike groups totaling 104 aircraft (eighteen fighters, sixty-one dive bombers, and twenty-five TBDs). The burly Lexington, burdened with only one very slow working flight deck elevator amidships, could only ever commit one true deck load to any strike. In this case Sherman took the highly unusual step of launching his short-legged fighter escorts first along with the combat air patrol F4Fs, followed by all the SBDs and TBDs. When the deck was finally clear he recovered the eight escorts, topped off their tanks, and rushed them off a second time to catch up with the rest of the strike that already departed. Sherman told the Yorktown to handle her fighter escort the same way but need not have bothered. CV-5 possessed three fast elevators and thus ready ability to stage planes out the hangar. Buckmaster therefore employed three convenient deck loads: the first of twenty-five planes (thirteen VS-5 SBDs and twelve VT-5 TBDs), the second with seventeen VB-5 SBDs, and last the ten VF-42 escort F4Fs whose higher cruising speed allowed them to overtake the others in an innovative “running rendezvous” en route to the target. The entire launch went smoothly. One Yorktown pilot insisted on flying the mission with a balky engine, an indication of the high morale in the air group. That was despite the forbidding terrain and very primitive survival “gear,” a meat cleaver and a bottle of aspirin.17
From the Yorktown’s flag bridge Fletcher watched his squadrons climb bravely toward the dark green mountains and disappear from view. Even before they reached the target, coast-watcher reports relayed via Australia placed about thirteen transports, two cruisers, and three destroyers off Lae. Around 0922 TF-11 copied the first radio messages from attackers over the target. Almost simultaneously Forrest Biard, the TF-17 radio intercept officer, monitored frantic air raid warnings at Salamaua. The radio chatter signaled the aviators were having a field day. Buckmaster relayed the joyous clamor over the Yorktown’s loudspeakers. At 1014 eight B-17s passed high over TF-11, and eight RAAF Hudson medium bombers also headed north to Salamaua. A half hour later the first Lex strike planes reappeared, eager to come on board and report. Eventually all returned except one SBD downed by antiaircraft fire at Lae. By 1201 all fifty-two Yorktown planes landed safely with much happier tidings than on 1 February. Several pilots briefed Fletcher, who was thrilled they surprised so many ships. The weather turned out to be “excellent,” antiaircraft was weak, and only two float planes showed up, both of which were swiftly shot down. Luckily poor weather kept a half dozen Zero fighters from advancing on the ninth to Lae.18
Lexington aviators first estimated that five transports were sunk or beached, a cruiser and a destroyer also sunk, and one cruiser and two destroyers badly damaged. The Yorktown aircrews counted thirteen or fifteen ships off Salamaua-Lae, as well as a seaplane tender and a destroyer twenty-five miles east in Huon Gulf, and an additional transport and destroyer glimpsed at Hanisch Harbor northeast of Lae. They also noted the five sunken transports or cargo ships off Lae and Salamaua, a medium-sized cruiser that swallowed at least four bombs, and two destroyers dead in the water. The VT-5 TBDs bombed the seaplane tender and supposedly left her drifting without power. Returning Yorktown aviators warned of “many ships retiring to eastward at high speed.” Commander Armstrong, commanding officer of VB-5, and last to leave the target, radioed: “Recommend second attack immediately.” Burch of VS-5 personally urged Fletcher to strike again. Biard advised that a preliminary analysis of enemy radio traffic failed to confirm numerous sinkings. Fletcher directed Buckmaster to rearm and refuel the Yorktown attack group and to suggest another wave to Brown and Sherman. Buckmaster sent the message at 1316, but Brown refused. “No second attack was made because damage to enemy shipping found in the attack area was considered to be decisive and complete,” so “we had accomplished our mission.” Brown worried the crucial mountain pass usually filled with clouds in the afternoon, which Fletcher and Buckmaster did not know. Sherman, like Brown, was not eager to test fate again. He speculated had the good visibility disappeared, both carrier air groups might have suffered catastrophic losses recrossing the mountains. “I do not recommend that this kind of an operation for carrier planes be repeated very often.” Yet such conditions should not have ruled out the long-ranged, high-flying SBDs from going back again. The Yorktowners disputed the “decisive” nature of the attack and were very disappointed not to go again. They took the measure of the weather and the terrain and were confident they could strike again without difficulty.19
Sherman concluded the Lex and Yorktown planes thrashed fifteen ships off Salamaua and Lae. Some twenty-five miles east another force appeared with at least one cruiser, four destroyers, one seaplane tender, and six transports. Its escorts raced ahead to Salamaua only to encounter more Yorktown SBDs, while VT-5 TBDs caught up with the seaplane tender farther out to sea. Sherman knew numerous ships had not been attacked or cripples finished off. Following the carrier strike, the eight B-17s claimed hits on at least two transports and damaging near misses against several warships, including a cruiser, while RAAF Hudsons tallied six hits on large ships left burning. At first it was thought they bombed newly arriving forces, but Leary later conceded they attacked ships that TF-11 had already pounded. Brown’s final assessment listed five transports or cargo ships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and one destroyer sunk, and one auxiliary minesweeper probably destroyed. Two destroyers and one gunboat were “seriously damaged, probably sunk,” whereas another gunboat and a seaplane tender were badly damaged. Nimitz believed at least two units of the 6th Cruiser Division sustained heavy damage if not sunk outright, but no heavy cruisers were there. Actually three transports and one converted minesweeper went down; a transport, seaplane tender, fast minelayer, and two destroyers suffered medium damage. This was much less than Brown claimed. Nevertheless, the loss to Inoue’s South Seas Force was significant.20
TF-11 retired southeast at twenty knots until nightfall, then east at fifteen knots. Events prevented more than a feeble gesture of retaliation. The horde of carrier-type planes over Salamaua certainly horrified the South Seas Force. For a time the high command feared enemy carriers were about to strike Rabaul. At first it was uncertain whether the attacking planes came directly from a carrier or staged through Port Moresby. That question was resolved at 1720, when a flying boat located a Saratoga-class carrier and escorts ninety miles east of Port Moresby. Daylight was too fleeting for an air strike, especially with the enemy headed away. Inoue ordered air searches for the next day and held land attack planes in reserve, but in vain, for TF-11 soon retired well out of range. Neither Biard’s radio intelligence unit or other radio intelligence analysts in Australia and Hawaii picked up the Japanese sighting report.21
Fletcher wrote Brown on 11 March to offer his “personal congratulations for the splendid job your force did yesterday.” He fully agreed with shifting the objective from Rabaul and Gasmata to Lae and Salamaua and called it a “fine plan and well executed.” However, he revealed his misgivings regarding the original Rabaul-Gasmata attack plan and concurred with a fiery letter (which has not been preserved) that Poco Smith had sent Brown regarding the proposed Rabaul bombardment. Fletcher commended Smith’s “moral courage” for writing it. “I do not hesitate to tell you this because it seems probable that you issued the order reluctantly in order to execute the desires of the high command.” The next day Brown replied rather icily that he felt he had no choice but to attack Rabaul and Gasmata and affirmed “our plan was the best way to handle it.” Fletcher responded: “Your point is well taken and I accept the correction.” However, one has the impression that this cruise did not exactly enhance their relationship. Smith subsequently learned that Sherman had written the original operations order directing the cruiser bombardment and that Turner Joy, Brown’s operations officer, had not approved that plan.22
Brown exulted that he had stopped the “immediate attack” in New Guinea. Never realizing that TF-11 had been sighted, he thought the Japanese remained mystified over the source of the massive air strike and believed they must stop and regroup before proceeding further. “Any such delay was to our advantage,” he later explained. At first Nimitz was surprised to learn that Brown struck New Guinea and not Rabaul, and Soc McMorris opined, “It is doubtful if the enemy will be greatly retarded.” However from Brown’s additional reports, it seemed apparent at Pearl that the “damage inflicted was really great,” a point of view fully shared by Inoue and his army counterparts. Brown inflicted the greatest loss of ships yet suffered by the IJN during World War II and either sank or crippled key amphibious ships needed for several pending invasions, including not only Moresby and Tulagi (the so-called MO Operation), but also Ocean and Nauru islands northeast of the Solomons. Now truly aware he needed carriers, Inoue petitioned Yamamoto for the loan of a carrier division for the MO Operation. However, his request ran afoul of other Combined Fleet commitments, including a foray into the Indian Ocean and ordinary upkeep that would tie up the carriers for the next two months. Therefore Inoue postponed the MO Operation until he could count on strong carrier support. In the meantime he would reorganize and greatly bolster his land-based air, secure the area around Rabaul, and reconnoiter the route to Moresby. In the interval the Allies, too, would grow stronger. Brown’s Lae-Salamaua strike had indeed done its job. Roosevelt crowed to Churchill on 17 March that it was “by all means the best day’s work we have had.” Cominch sent a rare “well done” for all hands in TF-11, not only for the successful raid but also the “seamanship, endurance and tenacity of purpose” of its lengthy cruise that was “inspiration and incentive” for the entire navy.23
On 12 March as TF-11 moved southeast into the Coral Sea, Nimitz offered Brown and Fletcher a hearty “well done.” He also instructed Brown to detach the Pensacola to TF-17 and retire to Pearl, while Fletcher continued to operate in the Anzac Area. Nimitz reiterated King’s message of 7 March for TF-11 to “make good whatever plane and/or armament munitions personnel deficiencies may exist in TF17.” Despite Brown’s concern about provisions for his return voyage, King told him to dine on “beans and hardtack” instead of drawing upon the few supplies already in the South Pacific. That amused Secretary Knox, but it was no laughing matter for TF-11. The Lexington was down mainly to canned spinach and beans, and the cuisine on the cruisers and destroyers was much worse.24
At dawn on 14 March Crace’s TG-11.7 hove into view. His mission had gone well, with no enemy contacts, but routine searches had cost the U.S. cruisers an appalling five missing Curtiss SOC Seagull float planes. To add to his troubles, two sailors killed a petty officer on board the Australia. That crime would eventually alter Crace’s plans. On 13 March he had stationed the cruisers ten miles apart to sweep a huge area, but found nothing and left for the next day’s rendezvous with Brown. Crace’s “signal of sympathy” to Poco Smith elicited “a very nice reply.” Smith theorized that a squall had forced the Seagulls to set down on the sea. That morning one of them had radioed for the bearing and course of the ship, but Smith steadfastly refused to break radio silence and risk revealing his position to the Japanese. The SOCs were stout aircraft, he told Crace, and he hoped they would reach land somewhere. Indeed Smith’s faith in his cruiser aviators was buoyed when he later learned how that very day TF-11 had retrieved the San Francisco’s missing SOC adrift since 7 March.25
At noon on 14 March the heavy cruiser Portland, oilers Neosho and Kaskaskia, and four destroyers joined the conclave of ships in the eastern Coral Sea. The Lexington transferred six fighters, five dive bombers, and one torpedo plane to the Yorktown in return for her two oldest fighters. Before reaching the Yorktown one Lex Wildcat ditched from engine trouble—an ominous hint of troubles to come. Later that day Brown dissolved the combined task force into its component parts, which returned TF-17 to Fletcher’s command. The Portland took the Louisville’s place in TF-17 to release her for a much-needed West Coast refit. Crace’s Anzac Squadron left for Nouméa to fuel from one of Leary’s auxiliary fleet oilers and would then come under Fletcher’s command. Before going their separate ways, TF-11 and TF-17 greedily drained the two oilers. Finally on the morning of 16 March, Fletcher headed southeast, leaving Brown to complete his fueling and start northeast for home.26
Wilson Brown reached Pearl on 26 March to a tumultuous welcome. Nimitz gave him until the twenty-eighth to bask in the glory, then gently informed him he would no longer have either the Scouting Force or TF-11. Instead he was to go to San Diego to form the Amphibious Force of the Pacific Fleet. On 20 February King had directed the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets each to form its own amphibious force. Nimitz proposed Brown as his amphibious commander and that Vice Adm. Bill Pye, another black shoe and even older, relieve him as CTF-11. Given his role in Pacific Fleet amphibious planning in 1941, Brown was the logical choice. His departure from carrier command had nothing to do with any perceived impression of lack of “aggressiveness.” He received the DSM for his tenure as CTF-11, and certainly retained the good wishes of King, who after the war rated him “pretty good” and deplored that his health was not better. Indeed King always treated Brown more considerately than he did Fletcher, possibly because he never gained a true picture of Fletcher’s accomplishments. The courtly Brown soon passed from the Pacific scene to command a naval district on the East Coast. In early 1943 he happily returned to the White House as FDR’s naval aide and served in that capacity until 1945.27
Fletcher remained to face a resolute and aggressive enemy in the vast southwest Pacific. If he was alone, at least he was in charge. Up to this point he was one of the supporting cast, but with the spotlight turned directly onto him, the top commanders wondered how he would fare.
