1. Nathan Miller, War At Sea, 211; Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 549; Beach, Salt and Steel, 126; Murray and Millett, A War to be Won, 210. The accusations that Fletcher was known as a “traitor” and that he was tried and convicted of “cowardice” appear in Schom’s The Eagle and the Rising Sun, 324, 335–36, 339, 362.
2. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 1:ix.
3. Letter Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson, USN (Ret.), to Lundstrom (13 October 1974).
4. Interview of Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher by Walter Lord (17 February 1966), courtesy of the late Walter Lord.
1. Deck logs Minneapolis (CA-36) and Astoria (CA-34) 4–13 December 1941, National Archives, Record Group 24 (RG-24). Morison, United States Naval Operations 3:212, erred in keeping Fletcher in the Minneapolis on 7 December, whereas he switched to the Astoria on 4 December. Fletcher corrected Morison on 9 October 1948 (in Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher Papers), but Morison never amended his text. Description of Pearl Harbor on 13 December 1941 from Abercrombie and Pratt, My Life to the Destroyers, 9–10. For an early assessment of the Pearl Harbor attack, see message 081015 December 1941 Cincpac to Opnav, in Cincpac Secret and Confidential Message File (hereafter CSCMF), RG-38, microfilm roll 521.
2. Interview of Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher by Dr. Gordon Prange (17 September 1966), courtesy of Robert J. Cressman. Letter Commander, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet (Combatfor), to Cincpac, Appointment of temporary vice admirals (30 July 1941), in RG-313, Cincpac Secret Correspondence, box 4498, noted, “Commander Battleships has under his command the major fighting power of the U.S. Fleet.”
3. For the development of the Japanese carrier force, see Peattie, Sunburst, chapters 3 and 6. For Japanese naval strategy, Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, chapters 8 and 13. Both are superb.
4. The principal source for Cincpac’s strategic views and decisions is: War Plans, Cincpac Files, Captain Steele’s “Running Estimate and Summary,” also known as the “Cincpac Greybook” (hereafter Greybook), in the Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center (hereafter NHC), microfilm NRS-1971-58. McMorris quote from Briefed Estimate of the Situation as of 10 December, in Greybook, 8.
5. For the life and family of Frank Jack Fletcher, see first of all his papers at the American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming–Laramie. Regan’s In Bitter Tempest is based largely on these papers. The Fletcher Papers are reasonably comprehensive until 1939. Also useful are the available extracts from his service record (6132 Fletcher, F. J.) furnished under a freedom of information request by the National Personnel Records Center. For Fletcher’s first fifteen years in the navy he officially signed his name “Frank J. Fletcher.” The first known document signed “Frank Jack Fletcher” is an application dated 8 February 1917 requesting leave to get married. Thereafter he used all three names. “Jack” was the maiden name of Fletcher’s grandmother Nancy Jack Fletcher, and Fletcher’s father’s name was Thomas Jack Fletcher. For Frank Friday Fletcher see Reynolds, Famous American Admirals, 122–23. For general information on the movements and promotions of naval officers, U.S. Navy, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Directory of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Officers (1920–1942) and U.S. Navy, Bureau of Navigation/Bureau of Naval Personnel, Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps (1906–1947).
6. National Archives, RG-24, deck log Dale (DD-4); letters Secretary of the Navy to Ens. F. L. (sic) Fletcher, “Gunnery Trophy awarded for Spring Battle Practice 1911” (17 July 1911) and Frank Friday Fletcher to Thomas Jack Fletcher (12 October 1911), in Fletcher Papers. On the Veracruz expedition, see Sweetman, The Landing at Veracruz, and Fletcher Papers.
7. On the Maggie, Medical Officer, USS Margaret, to Squadron Commander, Patrol Force, Sanitary Inspection of Vessel and Personnel (10 December 1917); CO [Commanding Officer], USS Margaret, to Secretary of the Navy (Secnav), Report of Material Readiness of Ship for War (20 December 1918), both in Fletcher Papers. Buranelli, Maggie of the Suicide Fleet, quote, 18. For the Benham (DD-49), see her deck log in RG-24, and in RG-45, Subject File, box 1037, USS Benham, which includes her war diary, combat reports, and Judge Advocate General, Court of Inquiry to inquire into the Collision of the USS Benham and the USS Jarvis, July 26, 1918 (28 August 1918). Fletcher’s Navy Cross citation was the boilerplate version given to wartime skippers who had not sunk any U-boats.
8. Text of the New Mexico’s commendations in Fletcher Papers. Duncan, Rickover, 61–62. Capt. Frederick A. Edwards, oral history, 219–22; and Rear Adm. Charles E. Loughlin, oral history, 34, 36–37 (quote).
9. Sweetman, 164. Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffett, 47–48.
10. Richardson and Dyer, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor, 125–26.
11. Nineteen members of the class of 1906 made flag rank before 7 December 1941 and three more during the war. For Fleet Problem XXI see RG-313, Records Relating to the U.S. Navy Fleet Problems I to XXII, 1923–1941, National Archives, microfilm M964. Fletcher’s quote is from roll 36. Richardson and Dyer, 223.
12. For the general activities of Crudiv Six, see Cincus to Secnav, Annual Report for the period 1 July 1940–30 June 1941 (15 August 1941) in U.S. Congress, Pearl Harbor Attack (hereafter PHA), part 33, 1243–78; and Commander, Scouting Force, Annual Report 1 July 1940–30 June 1941, in NHC, microfilm NRS-403. Letter Wilson Brown to Chester Nimitz (14 November 1941), in Vice Adm. Wilson Brown Papers; message 272107 November 1941 Bunav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 508.
13. Messages 272337 November 1941 Opnav to Cincpac and Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet (Cincaf), PHA, part 33, 1176; 280447 Cincpac to CTF-2 and Commander, Fourteenth Naval District (Com 14), 280627 Cincpac to Opnav, 282153 CTF-8 to Cincpac, 282200 Cincpac to CTF-8, 290348 Cincpac to CTF-8, all November 1941, in CSCMF, roll 521.
14. Messages 040237 Cincpac to CTF-3, 020750 Cincaf to Opnav (info Cincpac), 031850 Opnav to Cincpac, all December 1941, in CSCMF, roll 521. For Halsey’s trip to Wake, see Comairbatfor war diary, and for TF-12, Comcruscofor war diary, both in RG-38, war diaries.
15. Seattle Times (22 November 1942); Vice Adm. George C. Dyer, oral history, 182; letter Dyer to Lundstrom (19 January 1977).
16. Letter William Ward Smith to Elliott Buckmaster (23 April 1966), in Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson Papers; Prange, Miracle at Midway, 97; William Ward Smith, Midway, 61.
17. For the development of naval aviation: Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation; Van Deurs, Wings for the Fleet; and Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers.
18. Richard K. Smith, First Across!, 128, 136–37, 158, 183.
19. Wilson, Slipstream, 138. On the Morrow Board, Turnbull and Lord, 249–58.
20. Cdr. Thomas G. W. Settle’s memo to captain, Naval Air Station (NAS) Lakehurst (31 May 1939), in Robinson and Keller, “Up Ship!”, 200–202. The outspoken Settle (USNA 1919) qualified as a lighter-than-air naval aviator in 1927 and retired a vice admiral. Letter Vice Adm. H. S. Duckworth to Lundstrom (13 May 1972). On JCLs, Reynolds, Towers, 223; also King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, 187–93.
21. For the early development of carrier tactics, Wildenberg, All the Factors of Victory.
22. Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, to Chief, Bunav, Physical Examination for flying of F. J. Fletcher, Commander, USN (12 March 1928), noted “defective visual acuity” and “depth perception” (Fletcher Papers). Reynolds, Towers, 284.
23. For the evolution of U.S. carrier aviation from the 1920s up to 7 December 1941: Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, American and British Aircraft Carrier Development 1919–1941; Grossnick, U.S. Naval Aviation 1910–1995; Larkins, U.S. Naval Aircraft 1921–1941; Lundstrom, The First Team; MacDonald, Evolution of the Aircraft Carrier; Reynolds, Towers; and Wildenberg, Destined For Glory. See also Hone, “The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922–1941.” The carrier tactical documents in force on 7 December 1941 were: Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet: Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet, Aircraft Volume One—Carrier Aircraft—USF-74 (Revised) and Current Tactical Orders, Aircraft Carriers, U.S. Fleet, USF-77 (Revised), both issued in March 1941, in Operational Archives, NHC.
24. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s Story; and Potter, Bull Halsey.
25. Richardson and Dyer, 220–22. Cincpac to Secnav, Annual Report for 1 July 1940–30 June 1941 (15 August 1941), PHA, part 33, 1243–78, including 1245, 1257, the establishment of permanent task forces. The later reorganization and establishment of the task forces is covered in Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter 14CL-41 (31 October 1941), in PHA, part 33, 1291–94.
26. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 3:236–37. For Fitch’s movements, see Commander, Carrier Division One, war diary, 7–15 December 1941.
27. Vice Adm. Vincent R. Murphy, USN (Ret.), a Cincpac war planner in 1941, wrote an official review of Morison’s volume 3 (7 September 1951) in a letter to Rear Adm. Charles C. Hartman, DCNO (Administration), in the Office Files of the Director of Naval History, box 20. Murphy stated that Kimmel’s choice of Fletcher was “not perfunctory by any means” and that “this whole account is a travesty of history and should not go unchallenged.” Prodded here as in other instances by Murphy’s comments, Morison added in later editions of volume 3 that “today, with the record before us, it is evident that the failure to relieve Wake resulted from Admiral Pye’s decision not to risk the loss of any of his three precious carriers and not from any lack of aviation knowledge.” Letter Kimmel to Stark (15 December 1941), Adm. Harold R. Stark Papers. Kinkaid, Four Years of War in the Pacific: A Personal Narrative, 30–31, an uncompleted memoir in the Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid Papers.
1. Greybook, 4, 19, 28, 30; message 091812 December 1941 Opnav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 522. Briefed Estimate of the Situation as of 10 December, Greybook, 8.
2. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange, 238–46; Cressman, A Magnificent Fight, chapters 1–2. Quotes from the text of Cincpac to CNO, Wake Island—Policy in regard to construction and protection of (18 April 1941), courtesy of Robert J. Cressman. Cincpac to Opnav, Survey of Conditions in Pacific Fleet (26 May 1941), in PHA, part 33, 1208–14.
3. For the heavy bomber mystique and the Philippines, see Harrington, “A Careless Hope,” quote from Henry Stimson, 223; memo, Marshall to Stark (12 September 1941), in PHA, part 33, 1170; and Bartsch’s exhaustive study December 8, 1941.
4. Message 171458 October 1941 Opnav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 521. Cincpac to Comairbatfor, Commander, Patrol Wing (Compatwing) Two, Preparations to base aircraft at Wake (10 November 1941), in RG-313, Cincpac Operation Orders, box 19. Kimmel testimony, in PHA, part 22, 397.
5. For Wake Island operations, see especially Cressman, Magnificent Fight; quote from Edward Miller, 289; McMorris testimony, in PHA, part 22, 530.
6. William Ward Burrows (AP-6) deck log. Messages 080142 Com 14 to William Ward Burrows, 100915 William Ward Burrows to Com 14, 101425 Com 14 to William Ward Burrows, all December 1941, CSCMF, roll 522. CO, William Ward Burrows AP-6, Enemy Action against Johnston Island, December 15, 1941, Report of, in Ships History, NHC. On the radar transported in the William Ward Burrows, letter Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to Cincpac, Radar Installation on Wake (27 November 1941), in RG-313, Cincpac Secret Correspondence, box 4853.
7. For the operations of TF-12, see the war diaries of Comcruscofor, Commander, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet (Comscofor), and the Lexington (CV-2); for TF-8 see the Comairbatfor war diary.
8. Draft operations order in Greybook, 41–44, also memo on page 75.
9. Comscofor war diary, 11 December 1941. Abercrombie and Pratt, 8. Messages 110453, 112125, 121707, 130823, and 140106 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-12, CSCMF, roll 521; 111900 and 112244 December 1941 CTF-12 to Cincpac, 121657 December 1941 CTF-12 to CTF-9, all CSCMF, roll 522; 130039 December 1941 CTF-12 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 523.
10. Beatty, “The Background of the Secret Report.” Kinkaid memoir, 29. Message 130707 December 1941 Cincpac to NAS Wake, CSCMF, roll 521.
11. Greybook, 45. USS Tangier (AV-8) deck log. For the Tangier, see Wukovits, Devotion to Duty, 64–70. “Mixed bag,” from letter Rear Adm. Berton A. Robbins to Dr. Lloyd J. Graybar (11 November 1976); also Rear Adm. George H. DeBaun, USN (Ret.), to Graybar (1 August 1976), both in Dr. Lloyd J. Graybar Papers. Heinl, “We’re Headed for Wake,” is useful but unreliable as to chronology and must be used with caution. For the diversion of the William Ward Burrows, see her deck log, which cites message 132230 December 1941 from Com 14.
12. McMorris testimony, PHA, part 22, 530; Kimmel testimony, PHA, part 22, 396. Cunningham with Sims, Wake Island Command, 104–5. Letter Com 14 to NAS Wake, Evacuation of personnel and unloading (17 December 1941), in RG-313, Cincpac Secret Correspondence, box 4499.
13. Greybook, 13 December 1941.
14. Greybook, 13 December 1941; McMorris testimony, PHA, part 22, 530–32; Murphy letter to Hartman (7 September 1951).
15. Rochefort testimony, in PHA, part 23, 680–83. On 11 December Washington had estimated ten Japanese carriers were in the Pacific, of which six in several groups were reported east of the longitude of Wake. Counting these carriers, there were in home waters or “in position for offensive operations,” about seven battleships, twelve cruisers, and twenty to forty destroyers. Opnav warned that the “Mandates bases also may be serving strong striking groups including [those] carriers which operate Eastern Pacific.” Message 120040 December 1941 Opnav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 522.
16. Brown, From Sail to Carrier Task Force, chapter “The Battle of Salamau-Lae,” 6, an unpublished memoir; also Brown’s review of Morison’s volume 3, Rising Sun in the Pacific, 5, both in Brown Papers. Cincpac Op-Ord 40–41 (2000, 13 December 1941) in RG-313, Op-Ords. According to an intelligence memo submitted on 14 December 1941 to Brown, B-17 bombers might be moved up (presumably to Midway) to bomb the Marshalls to “divert attention when we move in to attack,” Brown Papers. Basic source for the Jaluit diversion is CTF-11 (Comscofor) to Cincpac, Operations of Task Force Eleven December 14–27, 1941 (26 December 1941), in RG-313, Action Reports.
17. On Brown’s appearance while superintendent of the Naval Academy, see letter Bennett to Graybar (17 August 1976), Graybar Papers. Bennett (USNA 1941) described how Brown’s “head jerked from some kind of malady. It wasn’t reassuring.” Brown memoir, 6, Brown Papers. Appreciation of orders received from the commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, on December 14, estimate of the situation and preliminary conclusions (15 December 1941), appendix to CTF-11 action report (26 December 1941). Vice Admiral Pye, Discussion of decision to retire task forces 14 and 11 (22 December 1941), PHA, part 23, 1062.
18. Ugaki, Fading Victory, 47–48, 54; Goldstein and Dillon, Pearl Harbor Papers, 164–65, 227, 230.
19. McMorris, PHA, part 22, 531. For the oilers, see Wildenberg’s Gray Steel and Black Oil.
20. Comcardiv One war diary. On the Saratoga’s condition, see interview of Cdr. Alfred M. Pride (former executive officer, Saratoga) by Buaer (16 June 1942), NHC, 4; Vice Adm. Paul D. Stroop, oral history, 69–70; Stroop letter to Graybar (19 January 1977), and Capt. Corben C. Shute, USN (Ret.), to Graybar (27 July 1976), both in Graybar Papers. The Saratoga’s total fuel capacity prior to her 1942 refit was about 2,365,000 gallons (56,300 barrels), roughly 360,000 gallons (8,700 barrels) of which were required for stability and not used since commissioning. When she entered Pearl on 15 December, she had about 400,000 gallons still on board, but could not draw upon them because of the layout of the fuel tanks, the fear of losing suction, and the salt water in the tanks. For an excellent analysis of the Saratoga as a carrier, see Stern, The Lexington Class Carriers.
21. Astoria deck log, 4 December 1941.
22. Cincpac Op-Ord 39–41 (15 December 1941). Primary sources for TF-14 in the Wake relief are: CTF-14 to Cincpac, Report of Operations 16–29 December 1941 (28 December 1941); Comcardiv One war diary, 16–29 December 1941; deck logs of the ships; the messages in CSCMF; and the remarkable collection of letters from TF-14 veterans and others written in 1976–77 to Dr. Lloyd J. Graybar of Eastern Kentucky University for his excellent article, “American Pacific Strategy after Pearl Harbor.” Messages 152325, 160029 Cincpac to Comdesron 5, 160355 Cincpac to CTF-11, all December 1941, CSCMF, roll 521. Cincpac Op-Ord 41–41 (15 December 1941) to USS Drayton.
23. Kimmel testimony, in PHA, part 22, 456.
24. McMorris testimony, PHA, part 22, 531. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:102, 196–97, 298. Messages 142231 December 1941 Com 14 to Cincaf, CSCMF, roll 523; 150555 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-11, CSCMF, roll 521.
25. Op-Ord 39–41, Greybook, 47. Vice Admiral Murphy recalled in 1951 that it was “his impression” Fletcher was “given a definite day to fuel so that all ships would be full for the run in and, possibly, for the run out,” letter to Hartman (7 September 1951). Likewise Vice Adm. W. W. Smith thought Fletcher’s fueling was geared to the operations plan (Op-Plan), (c. 1950) review of Morison’s volume 3 (Office Files of the Director of Naval History, box 20). Review by Rear Adm. John D. Hayes, USN (Ret.), of W. Scott Cunningham’s Wake Island in Shipmate (September–October 1961). The fuel capacity of the New Orleans–class cruisers was only about 14,900 barrels as opposed to 20,000 for the other heavy cruisers. Admiral Hayes once told Frank Uhlig Jr. that nobody really knew the extreme range of any ship (Frank Uhlig, personal communication with Lundstrom). Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 18CL-41, 16 December 1941, “Excessive Fuel Consumption,” in PHA, part 24, 1493. Because peacetime steaming efficiency was grossly overestimated, Kimmel became deeply concerned over his depleted fuel stocks. On 16 December he informed Stark that the fleet had used more than four hundred thousand barrels of oil in just one week. That exhausted his issue stock and compelled him to dip into his reserve. He urgently requested four more Cimarron-class oilers in December and another four in January just to transport fuel from the West Coast to Pearl, not to mention what was required to fuel task forces at sea. That comprised all of the modern oilers then in service in the U.S. Navy. Message 162137 December 1941 Cincpac to Opnav, CSCMF, roll 521.
26. Text of CTF-14 Op-Ord 1–41 (19 December 1941) illustrated in Wukovits, Devotion to Duty. See also the letters Capt. John F. Miller, USN (Ret.), to Dr. Lloyd Graybar (23 July 1976 and 27 September 1976), Graybar Papers, that also include a copy. Message 180336 December 1941 Cincpac to NAS Wake, CSCMF, roll 521; Cincpac Op-Ord 42–41 to CTF-8 (18 December 1941).
27. Saratoga deck log; letter V. R. Murphy to Hartman (7 September 1951). When dealing with naval ships, “full capacity” is always considered 95 percent of the actual volume of the fuel tanks. The Saratoga left San Diego on 8 December fueled to about 73 percent of full capacity (68 percent of her radius oil) and virtually ran out of fuel eight days later after several days of high-speed runs.
28. Letter Rear Adm. Ralph E. Mills, USN (Ret.), to Dr. Lloyd Graybar (12 September 1977), Graybar Papers.
1. Messages 152149 Opnav to Cincpac, 152301 Cincpac to Opnav, 160050 Opnav to Cincpac, all December 1941, in Greybook, 50–51. Messages 162105 Secnav to Cincpac and 170057 Cincpac to Secnav, both December 1941, in CNO Top Secret “Blue” File microfilm (hereafter CNO TS Blue File). Messages 171307 Bunav to Cincpac and 171358 Secnav to Combatfor, both December 1941, in CSCMF, roll 523. Message 171307 relayed Admiral Nimitz’s desire to retain the Cincpac staff in their present assignments. The message was seen and initialed by every staff department.
2. Message 180328 December 1941 Cincpac to Pacific Fleet, CSCMF, roll 521. Quote on Pye from Vice Adm. William W. Smith, USN (Ret.), original draft of Midway book, 62, in Vice Adm. William Ward Smith Papers. Kimmel described Pye on 26 May 1941 as “able, vigorous, and loyal,” PHA, part 33, 1210. Quote from King in Whitehill memo, 31 July 1949, in Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King Papers, box 7, Naval War College (hereafter NWC). On Pye bringing in his own staff, message 180407 December 1941 Cincpac to Opnav and Bunav, CSCMF, roll 521. That move was not popular as witnessed by the file copy that bears the notation “Horse Sh!” Letter Rear Adm. M. F. Draemel to Gen. W. E. Riley, USMC (28 January 1948), in S. E. Morison Office Files, box 18, Operational Archives, NHC.
3. Rochefort testimony, PHA, part 23, 680–83. Secret Message 161615 December 1941 Opnav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 523. The estimate gave Japanese carrier plane strengths as Akagi, Kaga, Shōkaku, Zuikaku sixty planes each, Sōryū and Hiryū forty-two planes each, and Hōshō and Ryūjō thirty planes each. Messages 172133 and 172301 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-14, in CSCMF, roll 521.
4. Messages from the 5th Carrier Division and 1st Destroyer Squadron war diaries in Goldstein and Dillon, 228–30, 248–49; Rear Adm. Kusaka Ryūnosuke, Nagumo’s chief of staff, expressed his regrets for having broken radio silence, 166.
5. Comairbatfor (CTF-8) war diary. Message 191850 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-14, CSCMF, roll 521. Cincpac Op-Ord 43–41 (18 December 1941) sending TF-17 to Midway and Op-Ord 45–41 (22 December 1941) for TF-13 to go to Johnston and Palmyra.
6. CTF-11 action report (26 December 1941) and appendix “Appreciation of orders received . . .” (15 December 1941). Message 182146 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-14, in CSCMF, roll 521. Adm. Harry D. Felt, oral history, 104.
7. Saratoga deck log, 18 December 1941; Pride interview by Buaer (16 June 1942); Comairbatfor, Current Tactical Orders Aircraft Carriers U.S. Fleet, USF-77 (Revised), March 1941. Messages 182146 and 200339 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-14, in CSCMF, roll 521. CTF-14 action report (28 December 1941).
8. Message 202300 December 1941 Wake to Com 14 and Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 523. Saratoga deck log, 20/21 December 1941.
9. Estimate by Admiral Pye on 20 December, Greybook, 76; Pye’s Discussion of decision to retire task forces 14 and 11 (22 December 1941), in PHA, part 23, 1062–63; Letter Draemel to Riley (28 January 1948), in Morison Office Files, box 18. Messages 202337 and 21057 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-8, CTF-11, and CTF-14; 210147 December 1941 Cincpac to Opnav; all in CSCMF, roll 521.
10. Message 210157 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-8, CTF-11, and CTF-14. Sprague’s comments appear on his copy of CTF Op-Ord 1–41 (19 December 1941) in Wukovits. Letter DeBaun to Graybar (1 August 1976), Graybar Papers.
11. CTF-11 report (26 December 1941). Vice Adm. George Dyer’s account in Stillwell, Air Raid Pearl Harbor!, 4546. Dyer was executive officer of the Indianapolis. Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, memo to Chief of Staff [Capt. M. C. Robertson] (21 December 1941), in Brown Papers. Also Brown testimony, in PHA, part 23, 763.
12. Cressman, Magnificent Fight, 176–77; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:175, 191. Letter Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton to Graybar (29 August 1976), Graybar Papers.
13. McMorris, PHA, part 22, 531. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 3:243–44. For Fletcher’s response, see his letter of 19 October 1948 to Morison, in Fletcher Papers. Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, author of The Defense of Wake, the official Marine Corps account, wrote (11 February 1948) that on 22 December 1941 the TF-14 destroyers had “adequate fuel.” According to their “average daily consumption” in the previous week the destroyers “had from 11 to 12 days’ fuel on hand” and could be fueled from the oiler and the cruisers. Of course Heinl did not take into account that the destroyers would burn much more fuel if compelled to steam at high speed for extended periods. Morison wrote that a destroyer “could easily surpass 15,000 gallons per diem in a running fight,” but even he vastly understated fuel expenditure under such conditions. Admiral Murphy commented in his official review of Morison’s volume 3, “The footnote figures on fuel are misleading.” At twenty-five to thirty knots, “The fuel consumption might well be three times the figures given,” letter to Hartman (7 September 1951).
14. Fuel figures from deck logs on the individual ships. Fuel expenditure data from the invaluable U.S. Fleet, War Service Fuel Consumption of U.S. Naval Surface Vessels, FTP-218 (1 September 1945), NHC, microfilm NRS-275.
15. Letter Vice Adm. Ralph Earle Jr., USN (Ret.) to Graybar (1 August 1976), Graybar Papers. Of the seven former TF-14 destroyer officers (including Earle) whom Graybar contacted in 1976, all but one agreed with Fletcher fueling the destroyers on 22–23 December 1941 before approaching Wake.
16. FTP-218, 1.
17. CTF-14 report (28 December 1941). Letter Capt. Richard D. Shepard, USN (Ret.), to Graybar (29 July 1976), in Graybar Papers. Fueling on 22 December went as follows (amounts in gallons):
*For the Ralph Talbot and Jarvis, the amount of fuel delivered tallies with the entry in the Neches deck log. The Henley’s log notes the receipt of 39,938 gallons, whereas the Neches shows 30,060 gallons, possibly a misprint. The Bagley’s log shows 52,459 gallons delivered, but the figure for fuel on hand required interpolation because of errors in arithmetic.
18. Wildenberg, Gray Steel, 171; Pye quote, PHA, part 22, 549. For fueling deficiencies see documents in File S55 in RG-313, Cincpac Secret Correspondence, box 4853, and in RG-19, Bureau of Ships, box 699. Letter Shepard to Graybar (29 July 1976) and Capt. Joel C. Ford, USN (Ret.), to Graybar (2 August 1976), in Graybar Papers. On 10 February 1942 the Pacific Fleet issued its first general instructions for fueling at sea in its Tactical Bulletin 2–42.
19. Messages 220901 and 220917 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-8, CTF-11, and CTF-14, CSCMF, roll 521.
20. In condemning Fletcher for not taking direct action to prevent Wake’s fall, Morison, United States Naval Operations, 3:251, cited four “conflicting” orders Pye supposedly sent on 22 December. The first called for him to push the Saratoga ahead to within two hundred miles of Wake and attack any ships located there, but Pye soon canceled that move. Pye is said then to have directed Fletcher to send the Tangier completely unescorted to evacuate Wake, but again countermanded the order. Morison even declared such obvious “irresolution” at Pearl all the “more reason why Fletcher should have pressed forward to meet the enemy”! These four dispatches never existed, but arose from Morison’s faulty interpretation of recollections of Pye’s 20 December (21 December, east longitude) orders that merely canceled Brown’s Jaluit attack and forbade Fletcher from providing air cover to the Tangier. Nothing was said about sending Sprague ahead without escorting destroyers or having him evacuate Wake. The Cincpac Message File shows that Pye actually issued no other orders to TF-14 until late on 21 December (22 December, Wake time).
21. For Ensign Murphy’s flight, Cressman, Magnificent Fight, 168–70, 174–76. Cunningham’s 20 December 1941 report that Murphy delivered is in PHA, part 24, 1467–78. Pye’s Discussion of decision to retire task forces 14 and 11 (22 December 1941), PHA, part 23, 1063.
22. Message 221035 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-8, CTF-11, and CTF-14, CSCMF, roll 521.
23. CTF-14 report (28 December 1941).
24. Messages 221621 and 221649 December 1941 Cincus to CTF-14, in CSCMF, roll 521. For the invasion of Wake, Cressman, Magnificent Fight, chapter 8. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 3:247, wrongly assumed that Gotō’s 6th Cruiser Division cruised on its own 150–200 miles east of Wake, “as if tempting Admiral Fletcher to come in.” Actually those cruisers operated close to the island.
25. Message 221801 December 1941 CTF-11 to CTF-14, CSCMF, roll 523; CTF-11 report (26 December 1941).
26. Message 221941 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-8, CTF-11, and CTF-14, in CSCMF, roll 521.
27. Message 221706 December 1941 Opnav to Cincpac, Greybook, 72.
28. Sources on the deliberation of recalling the Wake relief expedition: (1) Estimate by Admiral Pye regarding enemy investing Wake—0700—December 22, 1941, Greybook, 77–78; (2) Decision by Admiral Draemel as to action regarding enemy investing Wake—0700—22 December 1941, Greybook, 82; Pye’s Discussion of decision to retire task forces 14 and 11 (22 December 1941), PHA, part 23, 1062–64.
29. Message 221800 December 1941 Wake to Cincpac and Com 14, CSCMF, roll 523. Estimate of Captain McMorris as to action regarding enemy investing Wake (0800 December 22), Greybook, 79–81.
30. William Ward Smith, 13–14, whose account is based on information from Vice Adm. Vincent Murphy. Message 222256 December 1941 Cincpac to Opnav, Greybook, 72, noted: “Wake is a liability. In view present extensive operations I am forced to conclude that risk of one task force to attack enemy vicinity of Wake is not justifiable.” Smith recalled he was “astounded” that morning to learn of the recall. Kimmel told Smith, “You and I are not in on this one. Keep out of it.” Kimmel wrote Smith that he had only restrained himself with “difficulty.” “I kept my mouth shut. I am sorry now that I did so.” Smith, 14; letter Kimmel to Smith (2 November 1964), Smith Papers. Message 221952 December 1941 Wake to Cincpac and Com 14, in CSCMF, roll 523. For the surrender of Wake, see Cressman, Magnificent Fight, chapter 9.
31. Letter Capt. Jack E. Gibson, USN (Ret.), to Graybar (10 August 1976), Graybar Papers. Interview of Rear Adm. Harry Smith, USN (Ret.), by Dr. Stephen D. Regan (13 July 1986), furnished by Dr. Regan. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 3:254. Letter Fletcher to W. W. Smith (7 December 1964), Smith Papers, and also Smith’s undated (c. 1950) review of Morison’s volume 3 in Office Files of the Director of Naval History, box 20. Kinkaid memoir, 48. Hoyt’s How They Won the War in the Pacific, 33, pointed out that Lord Horatio Nelson had the luxury of having his enemy in sight, and had Fletcher failed to win a “clear-cut victory,” he would have “undoubtedly been court-martialed.” Morison also cited Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, a former commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and carrier expert who served on the Roberts Commission. Reeves derided the relief as a “disgrace to the United States Navy” and exclaimed, “By Gad! I used to say a man had to be both a fighter and know how to fight. Now all I want is a man who fights.” Kinkaid lashed back in his unpublished memoir by describing the Nelson quote as “beyond publishable comment” and that Reeves “should have known better.” Vice Admiral Murphy likewise decried such histrionics. “Responsible and competent officers are not paid to play to the galleries—the stakes are too high,” Murphy letter to Hartman (7 September 1951).
32. Lt. Col. R. D. Heinl, USMC, Notes on an interview with Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch, USN (Ret.) (13 June 1947), USMC Historical Section, via Cressman. On Douglas, see letter Fletcher to W. W. Smith (7 December 1964), Smith Papers. Letter Vice Adm. P. D. Stroop to Graybar (19 January 1977), Graybar Papers.
33. Saratoga deck log. Here is the schedule of fueling on 23 December (amount in gallons):
The amount of fuel delivered is from the Neches deck log. Message 230839 December 1941 Cincpac to CTF-14, CSCMF, roll 521. For the reinforcement of Midway, see Tangier deck log.
34. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 3:243–44.
35. Lundstrom, First Team, 35.
36. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:202. Yokohama Air Group Kōdōchōsho (Combat Log), 22 December 1941, Japan, War History Office, via Dr. Izawa Yasuho.
37. Sherman, Combat Command, 74.
38. Greybook, 81.
39. Letter Murphy to Hartman (7 September 1951).
40. Kinkaid memoir, 43–44. Stroop to Graybar (19 January and 17 June 1977), in Graybar Papers.
41. Pye’s Discussion of decision to retire task forces 14 and 11 (22 December 1941), PHA, part 23, 1063. Commander, Scouting Force (Brown) war diary, 22 December 1941; Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force (Halsey), war diary, 22 December 1941. Morison, United States Naval Operations, map, 3:238–39, wrongly placed TF-11 bearing 125 degrees, 744 miles from Wake. This was on Wake’s side of the date line, which Brown actually never crossed, and is in fact more than 230 miles west of Brown’s actual position. Fitch interview by Heinl (13 June 1947).
42. Chitose Air Group Kōdōchōsho, 23 December 1941, via Dr. Izawa Yasuho.
43. Letter Nimitz to W. W. Smith (27 December 1964), letter Rear Adm. Harold C. Train, USN (Ret.), to W. W. Smith (30 December 1964), both in Smith Papers; also Smith’s undated (c. 1950) review of Morison’s volume 3. On Nimitz’s arrival, see also Rear Adm. Harold C. Train, oral history, Columbia University, 267–68. Admiral Stroop came to believe that the recall was “wise,” commentating that a desperate carrier battle at that time would likely have proven disastrous for the U.S. Navy. Letter Stroop to Dr. Lloyd Graybar (17 June 1977), Graybar Papers. Kinkaid memoir, 49.
44. Memo FDR to Capt. J. R. Beardall (16 December 1941), Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President, Map Room File, box 36. Letter Vice Adm. Frank E. Beatty, USN (Ret.), to Harry Elmer Barnes (21 December 1966), Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes Papers. Churchill, The Second World War, 667. Messages 271810 December 1941 Opnav to Cincpac, and 280147 December 1941 Cincpac to Opnav, both Greybook, 120. Pye testimony, PHA, part 23, 1062–70. Whitehill memo (31 July 1949), King Papers, box 7, NWC.
45. The exceptions are Graybar, “American Pacific Strategy after Pearl Harbor”; Cressman, Magnificent Fight; and Urwin’s Facing Fearful Odds, which have brief but favorable treatments of Fletcher.
46. In Washington, Rear Adm. John Towers had as early as 16 December recognized the need for more than one carrier to be committed to the relief of Wake (Reynolds, Towers, 370).
47. Heinl, Defense of Wake, 37, averred that Fletcher was to be at Wake on “23 December, east longitude date,” but he never acknowledged that Kimmel had postponed D-Day for twenty-four hours. However, Heinl’s bibliography, 64, cited Cincpac Op-Ord 39–41, which clearly called for Fletcher’s arrival on 24 December, east longitude date. Morison knew the actual D-Day as well as Heinl. It appears in his papers at the NHC. Yet he chose not to discuss it at all in volume 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, and indeed adduced no evidence of any kind of relief plan other than simply a mad rush to Wake. Morison also declared (United States Naval Operations, 3:237) that Brown’s Jaluit diversion was to take place “on or before 22 December,” but that phrase appeared nowhere in Brown’s orders and the day itself was wrong. In fact according to Cincpac Op-Ord 40–41, Brown was to attack “as near to local daylight D minus one day as practicable.” When Kimmel postponed D-Day by twenty-four hours, D-1 Day became 23 December east longitude date (22 December, Hawaiian time), so Morison, like Heinl, cited the wrong date. Brown enjoyed discretion to switch targets or call off the attack altogether, but not to change the day. In the first edition (1948) of volume 3, 237, Morison judged the “failure to relieve Wake” resulted from “poor seamanship and a want of decisive action, both on Fletcher’s part and on Pye’s.” The charge of “poor seamanship” arose from his caustic perception of Fletcher’s fueling delays, very unfair because the whole fleet suffered such woes in December 1941. Subsequent editions omitted that reference, but Fletcher’s reputation was already harmed. Because of Vice Admiral Murphy’s criticisms, Morison attempted to backpedal by singling out Pye’s caution as the reason why TF-14 did not fight for Wake and asserting, wrongly, that Fletcher was “ordered by dispatch to fuel when and where he did because it was hoped to have Admiral Brown’s task force join him.” The timing of the refueling arose from planning prior to Fletcher’s departure and not to any subsequent Cincpac “dispatch.” In 1963 in the popular condensation Two-Ocean War, 138, Morison changed his mind, even largely exonerating Pye. “This fiasco, however, was more the fault of Admiral Fletcher, who wasted time on unnecessary refueling, when he should have pressed on to relieve Wake.”
48. Letter Kimmel to W. W. Smith (2 November 1964), Smith Papers.
49. Layton, And I Was There, 334, 340–41. Layton, the former Cincpac intelligence officer, died early in the process of writing his memoir, which coauthors Capt. Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret.), and John Costello completed. The Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton Papers at the NWC show that he personally wrote very little of And I Was There. He spoke of the Wake relief on 11 May 1983 to his coauthors, but simply stated that he did not wish to delve into the matter of Fletcher and Wake, “Because I am not first hand with that.” However after Layton’s death, Pineau and Costello drew upon the sentiments Layton expressed in his 1970 oral history that upbraided Pye as a “Nervous Nellie,” who recalled the Wake relief “the minute he had an excuse” and “deprived the Navy of the chance to catch the enemy unawares in much the same circumstances as we were able to do at Midway six months later.” Their discussion of the relief completely confused the original concept, which certainly sought no “decisive” battle, with the “bait” role Wake was to assume after it was reinforced. Layton was actually ambivalent over the prospects of success by the Wake relief. By the mid 1970s after reading extensively in Japanese sources, he had certainly changed his mind about a December 1941 battle between U.S. and Japanese carriers and offered unequivocal opinions about Japanese carrier superiority at that time. He wrote often of the value of the early 1942 raids in preparing the U.S. carriers for the eventual crucial battles to regain the initiative in the Pacific. For an example of Layton’s revised thinking on Wake, see Layton to Graybar (29 August 1976), Graybar Papers, in which he stated “the decision to abandon Wake was the wiser decision.” Yet in 1983 Layton told his coauthors that Pye should have gone ahead to “recover some national morale” and intimated that Fletcher “had a yellow streak down his back.”
50. Beach, 65–67.
51. Manchester, Goodbye, Darkness, 169.
52. Letter Murphy to Hartman (7 September 1951).
1. Message 292229 December 1941 Cincpac to All Ships Present in Hawaiian area, CSCMF, roll 524.
2. For Nimitz, see above all Potter, Nimitz. A short biographical sketch, this author’s, is in Bradford, Quarterdeck and Bridge, 327–44. On Knox’s January offer to Nimitz, Potter, Nimitz, 3–5. For Stark’s comment to King, King, 357. Copies of the lamentably few surviving letters from Nimitz to his wife Catherine are in the Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz Papers.
3. The principal biography of King is Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power. See also the chapter by Love in his edited collection, The Chiefs of Naval Operations, 137–79. For King becoming Cominch, Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 126. King’s comment on “fixers” is from the Muir memorandum (31 July 1949), in King Papers, NWC.
4. On Samoa, Coletta, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas, 332–40. Greybook, 50; message 142346 December 1941 Opnav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 523.
5. Greybook, 53–67, 73, 121. Messages 220301, 281631, 300035 Cincpac to Opnav, 261908 and 291431 Opnav to Cincpac, all December 1941, in CSCMF, roll 524.
6. Message 301740 December 1941 Cincus to Cincpac, in Greybook, 121.
7. Messages 310123 and 310515 Cincpac to Opnav, 300501 Cincpac to Bunav, all December 1941, CSCMF, roll 524; 040131 January 1942 Cincpac to Opnav, CSCMF, roll 1.
8. Messages 302005 Cincpac to CTF-11, 310315 and 310703 Cincpac to Comcruscofor, all December 1941, in CSCMF, roll 524. Comcruscofor war diary. Potter, Nimitz, 19–21.
9. Officer Bio File, NHC. USS Yorktown (CV-5), deck log.
10. Frank and Harrington, Rendezvous at Midway, and Cressman, That Gallant Ship.
11. Conversation with Rear Adm. William N. Leonard, USN (Ret.), 30 August 1996. Bill Leonard fought as a fighter pilot in the Yorktown and was assistant operations officer of TF-38 in 1944–45 and later a carrier captain and a carrier division commander. Officer Bio File, NHC. Clark with Reynolds, Carrier Admiral, 77–78, 82–83.
12. Letter Rear Adm. William N. Leonard to Lundstrom (27 August 1996); conversations 30 August 1996 and 25 September 1997. He described Clark as a “congenital nose-out-of-joint guy.” Clark, 77–78, complained that Buckmaster was “too easygoing” and put “too much faith in his heads of departments.” Rear Adm. Hubert E. Strange, the Yorktown’s aerologist, wrote in A Full Life, 58–59, that Clark “tried to run the ship with the chief master-at-arms” and Buckmaster “kept the peace and avoided confrontation.” Smiley comment in a questionnaire to Robert Cressman.
13. Cincpac Op-Ord 48–41 to CTF-17 (31 December 1941), in RG-313, Cincpac Op-Ord File. Letter CTF-17 to Cincpac (5 January 1942) and enclosed TF-17 Op-Ord 1–42 (5 January 1942), in RG-313, Op-Ord File, Crudiv Four.
14. Conversation in 1997 with Capt. Vane M. Bennett, USN (Ret.).
15. Cincpac Op-Ord 48–41; CTF-17 5 January 1942 letter. Messages 042049 Cincpac to Cominch, 090625 Cincpac to CTF-17, both January 1942, in CSCMF, roll 1.
16. Messages 062046 Comcruscofor to Cincpac and 090625 Cincpac to CTF-17, January 1942, in CSCMF, roll 1. TF-17 (Comcruscofor) war diary. CTF-17 to Cincpac, Reinforcement of Samoa (5 February 1942), in Op-Ord File, Crudiv Four.
17. Messages 021748 Cominch to Cincpac, 022235 Cincpac to Cominch, both January 1942, in Greybook, 122.
18. Greybook, 123–35, 143–53. Message 140411 January 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 153.
19. Message 090445 January 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 142. Halsey and Bryan, 85. Comairbatfor (CTF-8) war diary. Cincpac Op-Ord 3–42 (9 January 1942) and Cincpac Op-Plan 4–42 (9 January 1942). Messages 090445 January 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 142; 110735 January 1942 Cincpac to CTF-8 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 1.
20. Ugaki, 61–62.
21. Message 111520 January 1942 Navsta [Naval Station] Tutuila to Opnav and Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 1. Comcrubatfor (CTF-14) war diary. Greybook, 156. Messages 170121 Cincpac to Navsta Samoa and 170529 Cincpac to Cominch, both January 1942, in CSCMF, roll 2. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:306, 49:39. Ugaki, 73–74.
22. TF-17 war diary. CTF-17 report (5 February 1942). For the refueling incident, see CTF-17 (Comcruscofor) to Cincpac, Damage sustained by USS Yorktown while fueling from USS Kaskaskia (22 January 1942) in RG-313, Cincpac Flag Files; and CO USS Kaskaskia, Fueling at sea operations conducted by this vessel with USS Yorktown on January 17, 1942 (30 March 1942), in RG-313, Cincpac Secret Correspondence, S55, box 4840. Fletcher was surprised to learn the Kaskaskia’s commanding officer, Cdr. Walter L. Taylor, supposedly gave the helmsman responsibility for maintaining position rather than conning the ship himself. Later Taylor vehemently denied that was the case, explaining that he “regretted” that Fletcher “apparently inferred such” from his “somewhat hastily prepared despatch.” He blamed the placement of hose connections on the Yorktown.
1. CTF-8 to CTF-17, Letter of Instructions (17 January 1942), in Op-Ord File, CTF-8. Message 221825 January 1942 CTF-8 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 2. Halsey flew this message, a summary of his plans, to be radioed from Samoa.
2. CTF-8 Letter of Instructions (17 January 1942), in Op-Ord File, CTF-8. TF-17 Op-Ord 2–42 (25 January 1942), in Op-Ord File, Crudiv Four.
3. Messages 172135 Com 14 to Cominch, Cincpac, and all CTFs; 202145 Cincpac to all CTFs; both January 1942 in CSCMF, roll 2. Messages 202150 Cominch to Cincpac, and 212217 Cincpac to CTF-11, both January 1942, in Greybook, 179–80. Messages 220055 Cincpac to all CTFs, and 242000 San Francisco to Cincpac, both January 1942, in CSCMF, roll 2.
4. Clark, 83–84.
5. Messages 230941 CTF-17 to CTF-8, 232115 CTF-8 to CTF-17, 241135 CTF-17 to Cincpac and CTF-8, and 242257 CTF-17 to Cincpac, January 1942, in CSCMF, roll 2.
6. Layton, “24 Sentai—Japan’s Commerce Raiders,” 53–61.
7. Comscofor (CTF-11) war diary. Greybook, 183. Messages 252227 Cincpac to all CTFs; 270143 Com 14 to Cominch, Cincpac, and all CTFs; both January 1942, in CSCMF, roll 2. Messages 271945 Cominch to Cincpac and 280311 Cincpac to CTFs, both January 1942, Greybook, 193. Letter Nimitz to Catherine Nimitz (29 January 1942), in Nimitz Papers.
8. Interview of Cdr. Leonard J. Dow by Buaer (29 September 1942), Operational Archives, NHC. Fleet Adm. William F. Halsey Jr., Life of W. F. Halsey Jr.—Memoir, 333, in Virginia Historical Society; also Halsey and Bryan, 89. TF-8 Op-Ord 1–42 (28 January 1942), Op-Ord File, CTF-8.
9. CTF-8 to CTF-17, Letter of Instructions No. 2 (28 January 1942), in Op-Ord File, CTF-8.
10. CTF-17 to TF-17, Modification of Attack Plan (29 January 1942), in Op-Ord File, Crudiv Four. CO USS Yorktown to Cincpac, Attack of Yorktown Air Group on Jaluit, Mili, and Makin in Marshall and Gilbert Islands—Report of (5 February 1942), in Action Report File.
11. CTF-17 to Cincpac, Report of Engagement January 31, 1942 (9 February 1942), Action Report File. Message 220137 January 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 2. CTF-17 Modification of Attack Plan (29 January 1942).
12. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:368, 370–71, 384, 405.
13. Comairbatfor (CTF-8) war diary. For convenience despite crossing the date line Fletcher kept TF-17 on west longitude time unlike Halsey’s TF-8, which skipped ahead a day to east longitude time. Here to avoid confusion, the dates for TF-17 will be converted to east longitude time. Message 302000 January 1942 CTF-8 to Cincpac, Greybook, 203. TF-17 war diary.
14. Greybook, 194. Message 310138 January 1942 Cincpac to CTFs, CSCMF, roll 3.
15. TF-17 war diary. Halsey and Bryan, 89–90.
16. The title for this section comes from the Enterprise Plan of the Day, 1 February 1942. Basic source on TF-8 raids, CTF-8 to Cincpac, Action in the Marshall Islands, 1 February 1942 (9 February 1942); also Lundstrom, First Team, 63–77. For TF-17: CTF-17 to Cincpac (9 February 1942); CO USS Yorktown to Cincpac (5 February 1942), which includes the Report of the Air Group Commander and of the pilots who participated in the Jaluit, Makin, and Mili raids; CO USS Louisville to Cincpac, Engagement Report (6 February 1942); CO USS St. Louis to CTF-17, Report of Operations January 6 to February 6, 1942 (6 February 1942); Comdesdiv Three to CTF-17, Report of Action (7 February 1942); CO USS Hughes to Cincpac, Action Report (6 February 1942); CO USS Sims to Cincpac, Action off Mili, Marshall Islands, report of (5 February 1942); CO USS Walke to Comdesdiv Three, Report of Action 31 January 1942 (5 February 1942); CO USS Russell to Cincpac, Action in Gilbert and Marshall Islands, participation in (5 February 1942); TF-17 war diary; Yorktown deck log; also Lundstrom, First Team, 77–80. Strange, 60; Leonard letter to Lundstrom (6 June 1997); Yorktown report (5 February 1942).
17. Yorktown report (5 February 1942). Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:392–93.
18. Yorktown report (5 February 1942), TF-17 war diary, Comdesdiv Three report (7 February 1942).
19. TF-17 war diary, CTF-17 report (9 February 1942), Yorktown report (5 February 1942), Comdesdiv Three report (7 February 1942). Clark, 85.
20. Yorktown report (5 February 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:392.
21. Comdesdiv Three report (7 February 1942); Hughes report (6 February 1942); Russell report (5 February 1942); Sims report (5 February 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:400–401; Clark, 85.
22. CTF-17 report (9 February 1942); message 010040 February 1942 CTF-17 to CTF-8, CSCMF, roll 3; Louisville report (6 February 1942).
23. Yorktown report (5 February 1942), Yorktown deck log; Frank and Harrington, 61; message 010133 February 1942 CTF-17 to CTF-8, CSCMF, roll 3; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:401.
24. CTF-17 report (9 February 1942); messages 010221 CTF-8 to CTF-17 and 010736 CTF-8 to Cincpac (info CTF-17), February 1942, in CSCMF, roll 3. Potter, Halsey, 47. To the cry, “Haul ass with Halsey,” the Yorktowners later retorted, “But fight with Fletch!” Frank and Harrington, 65.
25. Messages 010626 CTF-8 to CTF-11, 010901 Cincpac to CTF-8, 011941 Cincpac to all CTFs, and 012231 Cincpac to all CTFs, February 1942, CSCMF, roll 3. Halsey and Bryan, 96. Fletcher interview by Prange (17 September 1966).
26. CTF-8 report (9 February 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:438; Greybook, 209; message 070453 February 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 3. In the first edition of volume 3, Morison referred to the “more cautious” Fletcher, a comment he later removed after criticism by Vice Adm. Poco Smith and Vice Adm. Vincent Murphy (who called it “again a dirty dig at Admiral Fletcher”) in their reviews in Office Files of the Director of Naval History, box 20; Potter, Nimitz, 40; Halsey and Bryan, 96.
27. Cincpac to Secnav, Report of Action, Marshall–Gilbert Island raids, by Task Forces Eight and Seventeen (10 February 1942); message 082219 February 1942 Cincpac to Secnav, CSCMF, roll 3. Navy Dept. Communiques No. 39 (12 February 1942, released 13 February 1942) and No. 40 (13 February 1942); Potter, Halsey, 51. On the Japanese pursuit, Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 38:405–6; and reaction: Ugaki, 81, 84; and Layton, “Flea Bites Dog,” 5, an undated paper on the early carrier raids furnished to the author by Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton, USN (Ret.).
28. CTF-8 report (9 February 1942), message 060833 February 1942 CTF-8 to CTF-11, CSCMF, roll 3.
1. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign, chapter 4.
2. Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, 55–59; messages 070015 January 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 141; 191815 January 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 2; 241740 January 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 185; 292110 January 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 203; and 292200 January 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, in CSCMF, roll 2. Coulthard-Clark, Action Stations Coral Sea, a groundbreaking study based on Adm. John G. Crace Papers (including a superb diary) in the Imperial War Museum.
3. Greybook, 184. Messages all January 1942: 241740 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 185; 261721 Cominch to Cincpac, 270103 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 192; 272333 Cominch to Cincpac, 282117 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 197; 301707 Secnav to Comcrubatfor, CSCMF, roll 3. On Leary, see interview of Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton by Capt. Roger Pineau and John Costello (11 May 1983), in Layton Papers, 109.
4. Greybook, 209–10. Messages 020126 February 1942 Com 14 to Opnav, CSCMF, roll 3; 051555 February 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File; 080245 January 1942 Cincpac to Combatships (Commander, Battleships, Battle Force), CSCMF, roll 1. Greybook, 227–39, with text of Briefed Estimate of Situation, 5 February 1942.
5. Message 061513 February 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 220; 062352 February 1942 Cominch to Cincpac and Comanzac, Greybook, 221; 050401 February 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 3. Comscofor (TF-11) war diary and CTF-11 to Cincpac, Cruise of Task Force Eleven, from January 31 to March 26, 1942 (23 March 1942), copy in Brown Papers.
6. Greybook, 210–12. Messages February 1942: 080139 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 3; 080239 Cincpac to Cominch and 092245 Cominch to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File. Frank Uhlig personal communication with Lundstrom. Fuquea’s “Task Force One,” strongly differed with Nimitz’s decision not to commit the battleships to action, but his reluctance to use the old battleships was wise given strategic, tactical, and logistic considerations.
7. Greybook, 212–13. Message 120459 February 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File.
8. Greybook, 214. Halsey and Bryan, 96–97. Cincpac Op-Ord 15–42 to CTF-16 (11 February 1942).
9. TF-16 Op-Ord 2–42 (12 February 1942), TG-16.2 Op-Ord 1–42 (14 February 1942), in Op-Ord File. Messages 130405 Cincpac to Cominch, 140007 Cincpac to Comairbatfor and Comcruscofor, February 1942, CSCMF, roll 4. Greybook, 214.
10. Messages 122200 Cominch to Comanzac, 141835 Cominch to Cincpac and Comanzac, both February 1942, in CNO TS Blue File. Message 140022 February 1942 CTF-11 to Comanzac, CSCMF, roll 4. Messages 140336 Comanzac to Cominch, 150244 Comanzac to CTF-11, both February 1942, in Greybook, 223–26. Coulthard-Clark, 48.
11. Greybook, 216. Messages 151830 Cominch to Cincpac and 152225 CTF-11 to Cincpac, both February 1942, in CNO TS Blue File. Message 160135 February 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, in CSCMF, roll 4. For the Wake raid, Lundstrom, First Team, 111–17.
12. W. W. Smith, 15–16, also letter Col. W. W. Smith Jr., U.S. Army, to Lundstrom (28 October 1999). Messages 292200 January 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 2; and 070055 February 1942 Cincpac to St. Louis and Astoria, CSCMF, roll 3.
13. Messages 032107 Bunav to Cincpac, 050221 Cincpac to Bunav, and 070117 Cincpac to Com 11, all January 1942, in CSCMF, roll 1. Messages 072235 Comcruscofor to Bunav, 072357 Com 11 to Cincpac, and 091820 Combasefor (Commander, Base Force) to Cincpac, all February 1942, in CSCMF, roll 3. Officer Bio Files. Yorktown deck log.
14. CTF-14 report (28 December 1941). Biard, “The Pacific War Through the Eyes of Forrest R. ‘Tex’ Biard”; also numerous personal communications from Biard. Biard’s memoir is scathingly critical of Fletcher, asserting he was totally incompetent and indecisive, lacking any appreciation of the value of radio intelligence that he, Biard, was supplying. He also charged that Fletcher was personally abusive when he refused a direct order to discuss radio intelligence in front of the staff and the enlisted flag complement, and that Fletcher complained about him to Nimitz. Every effort is made in the present work to address Biard’s criticisms point by point to determine if they are sustained by other documentation. For Radio Intelligence Unit assigned to the Yorktown, see also P. E. Seaward, RM1c, USNR, and W. W. Eaton, RM2c, USN, Final Report of the R.I. Unit of the USS Yorktown covers period 16 February 1942 to 22 May 1942 (23 May 1942), RG-457, SRH-313, Pacific Fleet Mobile Intelligence Unit Reports.
15. U.S. Naval Administration in World War II, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Administrative History, 15–17. Message 052303 January 1942 Cincpac to Comscofor, CSCMF, roll 1; 030323 February 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 3. Greybook, 244.
16. Clark, 86–87. Messages 122108 Yorktown to Cincpac, 122247 Cincpac to Yorktown, February 1942, in CSCMF, roll 4. Officer Bio Files. On Kiefer, see Cressman, Gallant Ship, 153; on Arnold, Leonard letter to Lundstrom (6 June 1997).
17. Messages 160135 Cincpac to CTF-16 (info CTF-17), 160301 Cincpac to CTG-16.2, and 160331 Cincpac to Comanzac and CTF-11, all February 1942, in CSCMF, roll 4. TF-17 war diary.
18. Messages 200237 CTF-11 to Cincpac, 200753 CTF-11 to Chicago and Cincpac, both February 1942, CSCMF, roll 4; and 232146 February 1942 CTF-11 to Cincpac and Comanzac, CSCMF, roll 5. For the 20 February action, see CTF-11 to Cincpac, Report of Action of Task Force Eleven with Japanese Aircraft on February 20, 1942 (24 February 1942) and Lundstrom, First Team, 85–109.
19. Brown report (23 March 1942); Greybook, 242, 244. Messages 232214 CTF-11 to Cincpac and 251209 Cincpac to Cominch, February 1942, in CNO TS Blue File; 250100 February 1942 Comanzac to Cincpac, Greybook, 254; and 260450 February 1942 CTF-11 to Cincpac, in CSCMF, roll 5.
20. Greybook, 246. Message 261630 February 1942 Cominch to CTF-17, CTF-11, and Comanzac, Greybook, 255–56.
21. TF-17 war diary. Message 250249 February 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CNO TS Blue File. Message 271939 February 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 5. The messages Fletcher could not break were 272045 Cominch to Cincpac, CTF-11, CTF-17, and Comanzac; and 280255 Cincpac to Neosho (info CTF-11 and CTF-17); both February 1942, in CSCMF, roll 5.
22. Greybook, 246. Message 280417 February 1942 Cincpac to CTFs, CSCMF, roll 5; 280559 Cincpac to Cominch and 270542 CTF-11 to Cincpac, February 1942, in Greybook, 256–57. Brown later reflected on the trouble he would have faced had the Lexington sailed from Pearl with only the regulation month of provisions instead of the second month her supply department had squirreled away in defiance of fleet orders, review of Morison’s volume 3, Brown Papers.
23. Task Force 17 war diary. Message 272045 February 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CTF-11, CTF-17, and Comanzac, in CSCMF, roll 5. The second message, 280255 February 1942 Cincpac to Neosho (info CTF-11 and CTF-17), CSCMF, roll 5, proved trivial—Cincpac arranging for army passengers to go south on the oiler Neosho’s return trip. Pearl rebroadcast it on 9 March.
24. Letter Leonard to Lundstrom (27 August 1996). Leonard stressed the isolation of admiral and flag captain should not be overstated, because “sweet reason says it would be normal and worthwhile for these experienced gents to get their heads together freely & frequently & in my experience they did.” Interview of Raymond W. Kerr, one of the marines in the TF-17 flag complement, by Lundstrom (12 July 1999).
25. Correspondence and conversations with Frank W. Boo and Thomas I. Newsome, former CTF-17 flag yeomen. USS Yorktown Roster of Officers, May 1942, and deck log. Commander, Cruisers, Pacific Fleet (Comcrupac) Flag Allowance Muster Roll, July–September 1942. Letter Vice Adm. W. G. Schindler, USN (Ret.), to Lundstrom (4 June 1972). Letter Vice Adm. E. Buckmaster, USN (Ret.), to Vice Adm. W. W. Smith, USN (Ret.) (22 August 1964), in Smith Papers.
26. Conversations with Thomas Newsome and Norman W. Ulmer, a former TF-17 signalman. Newsome conversations. Biard, “The Pacific War,” 5, likewise described the layout of the Yorktown’s flag bridge. Boo letter to Lundstrom (17 February 1996). In Hailey’s Pacific Battle Line, 150, and from anecdotal accounts Fletcher was also called “Whiskey Jack,” but neither Tom Newsome nor Norman Ulmer (e-mails to Lundstrom, 7 February 2000) ever recalled hearing that epithet. In March and April 1942 in the Coral Sea Fletcher did designate some of his rendezvous as Points Rye, Gin, Scotch, Bourbon, etc. (William Ward Smith, 19–20). Perhaps that is where that particular name might have got started.
27. Interviews and correspondence with Hollis C. Hollis and Norman Ulmer, both former TF-17 signalmen, and George E. Clapp, one of the four TF-17 communication watch officers. Interview of Lt. Cdr. Clarence C. Ray, Communication Officer, USS Yorktown, by Buaer (15 July 1942), Operational Archives, NHC.
28. Letter Newsome to Lundstrom (7 August 1996), conversation (11 December 1997). Boo letter to Lundstrom (17 February 1996), relating that he had retired as a chief warrant officer after twenty years of service. Norman Ulmer conversation (10 December 1997). Raymond Kerr conversation (12 July 1999).
1. Message 021615 March 1942 Cominch to CTF-11 and Comanzac, in National Archives, RG-38, Cominch 00 File; 030100 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 5.
2. Letter CTF-11 to CTF-17 (5 March 1942), in Cincpac Flag Files. Comscofor (CTF-11) war diary, CTF-11 report (23 March 1942). CTF-11 (Comscofor) to Cincpac, Report of Attack on Enemy Forces in Salamaua-Lae Area, March 10, 1942 (25 March 1942).
3. CTF-11 Op-Ord 5–42 (6 March 1942), attached to CTF-11 report (25 March 1942).
4. CTF-11 Op-Ord 5–42 (6 March 1942); letter CTF-11 to CTF-17 (5 March 1942), in Cincpac Flag Files. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers, 25.
5. Comscofor (TF-11) war diary; CTF-11 report (23 March 1942); Yorktown deck log; memo CTF-17 to CTF-11 (6 March 1942), in Brown Papers. F. C. Sherman’s personal diary, reconstructed beginning 19 May 1942, typescript copy in Adm. Frederick C. Sherman Biographical File, Officer Bio Files, NHC. I am indebted to Jeffrey Barlow for providing me a copy of this invaluable document. CTG-11.5 Air Op-Ord 2–42 (7 March 1942), enclosed in CTG-11.5 (CO USS Lexington) to CTF-11, Report of Bombing attack on enemy shipping and shore establishments in Salamaua-Lae area, March 10, 1942 (15 March 1942).
6. Letter Fletcher to Brown (“My dear Wilson”) (11 March 1942), in Brown Papers. W. W. Smith, 18; also undated (c. 1950) review of Morison’s volume 3. Diary of Rear Adm. J. G. Crace, RN, in Crace Papers (hereafter Crace diary). Crace wrote in his diary on 6 March that he had a “horrid feeling” the Anzac Squadron might end up with the carriers instead of forming part of an attack force. “That will be too awful.” Notes of Crace’s meeting with Brown 7 March in Crace diary (7 March 1942). Coulthard-Clark, 52. CTF-11 report (23 March 1942).
7. Crace diary; HMAS Australia war diary, AWM 124 [4/216] in Australian War Memorial.
8. Messages 060355, 060518, and 060805 Comanzac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, all March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 5; 062015 March 1942 Com 14 to Cincpac and all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 5.
9. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:28–31, 104–7.
10. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:107–13, 117–18.
11. Comscofor (CTF-11) war diary; CTF-11 report (23 March 1942); message 070115 March 1942 CTF-17 to CTF-11, in Brown Papers. Messages 070506 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, 071026 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 5. Brown memoir, 22, Brown Papers. CTF-11 report (25 March 1942).
12. It is interesting that the detailed TF-11 war diary did not record the changes of course and speed at 0200 on 8 March, but it appears in the Yorktown’s deck log and the Australia’s war diary. Crace diary (8 March 1942); Sherman diary (19 May 1942).
13. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:118–20, 130. Message 072040 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 5. Annex B to CTF-11 Op-Ord 5–42 (6 March 1942); Comscofor (CTF-11) war diary, Sherman diary (19 May 1942).
14. CTF-11 report (25 March 1942), visual message 080555 March 1942 CTF-11 to TF-11. Crace diary (8 March 1942); Lt. (jg) Floyd. E. Moan (VB-5, Yorktown) diary (11 March 1942), from Capt. Floyd E. Moan, USN (Ret.), via James C. Sawruk.
15. CTF-11 report (25 March 1942); messages 090315 and 091300 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 6. CTG-11.5 Air Op-Ord 3–42 (9 March 1942), attached to CTG-11.5 report (15 March 1942).
16. CTF-11 Op-Ord 6–42 (9 March 1942). Crace diary (9 March 1942).
17. CTG-11.5 report (15 March 1942); CO USS Yorktown to Cincpac, Attack made by Yorktown Air Group against Enemy Forces at Salamaua and at Lae, New Guinea (12 March 1942); and CO USS Yorktown to Cincpac, The Attack made by the USS Yorktown Air Group, March 10, 1942 (15 March 1942). Ludlum, 30–34. Cressman, Gallant Ship, 67–69. Lundstrom, First Team, 126–32. The Lexington had long since immobilized the tiny aft elevator, letter Duckworth to Lundstrom (9 March 1972). Message 212115 February 1942 Lexington to Comairbatfor, CSCMF, roll 4, had urged that the after elevators in the Lexington-class carriers be modernized, “In order to facilitate deck spotting of fighter planes and offensive plane operations.”
18. CTF-11 report (25 March 1942); Biard, “The Pacific War,” 7; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:123–26.
19. CTG-11.5 report (15 March 1942); CTF-11 report (25 March 1942). Ludlum, 34; Moan diary, 11 March 1942; message 100216 March 1942 Yorktown to CTG-11.5 (info CTF-11), Brown Papers; Brown’s review of Morison’s volume 3, 10, Brown Papers.
20. CTG-11.5 report (15 March 1942), CTF-11 report (25 March 1942). Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:124–25.
21. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:126.
22. Letters Fletcher to Brown (11 March 1942) and Brown to Fletcher (12 March 1942), visual message 122342 March 1942 CTG-11.1 to CTF-11, all in Brown Papers. Smith undated review of Morison’s volume 3.
23. Brown memoir, 25–26; Greybook, 267, 271; messages 151520 and 151525 March 1942 CTF-11 to Cominch, Greybook, 289, 292. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:163–65. Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, 1:415–16. Also text in Brown Papers. Message 031855 April 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 8. Ted Sherman gloated in his diary (19 May 1942) that King did not even mention TF-17, although in retrospect King does not seem to have deliberately insulted Fletcher.
24. Messages 120335 March 1942 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 6; 071820 March 1942 Cominch to Cincpac (info CTF-11), in Cominch 00 File. Buell, Master, 174–75.
25. Crace diary (12–13 March 1942); W. W. Smith 20–21, and undated review of Morison’s volume 3; Astoria deck log; Coulthard-Clark, 58–59.
26. Comscofor (TF-11) war diary; TF-17 war diary. Message 130025 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-17 and Chicago, CSCMF, roll 6.
27. Messages 201940 February 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 4; 011847 March 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 5; 070315 April 1942 Cincpac to Pacific Fleet, CSCMF, roll 8. Whitehill memo (14 August 1949), in King Papers, NWC. For Brown’s subsequent service, see Brown, “Aide to Four Presidents.” The oft-repeated story that King directed Nimitz to relieve Brown as CTF-11 has no basis in fact but appears to have arisen from an error in Hoyt, 72, where Brown is confused for Fletcher as the target of King’s 31 March 1942 rebuke. Potter, Nimitz, 44, then built upon Hoyt’s mistake by stating that King “insisted that Brown was not aggressive enough to lead combat forces.” In fact Brown lacked the stamina and agility for a wartime sea command. The Lexington’s flag bridge, high up in the island over the navigation bridge, had no emergency sea cabin for the admiral because that space now housed the YE aircraft homing transmitter and receiver. Brown suffered from having to climb a half dozen decks every time he was called from his flag quarters up to the flag bridge. Brown memoir, 9, 14; letter Duckworth to Lundstrom (9 March 1972). When the Lex went into the navy yard in April, the flag emergency sea cabin was restored (message 240423 March 1942 Navy Yard [NY] Pearl Harbor to NY Puget Sound, CSCMF, roll 7).
1. Message 131535 March 1942 Cominch to CTF-17, Greybook, 288.
2. Messages 130025 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-17, Greybook, 287; 130339 March 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, Greybook, 288.
3. Message 160821 March 1942 CTF-11 to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File. Fletcher explained his strategy for March and April in his 28 May 1942 letter to Nimitz, in Nimitz Papers.
4. Messages 161635 February 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 226; and 222200 February 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 243. Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign, 48–56.
5. CTF-11 report (23 March 1942); message 131433 March 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 6; Crace diary, 21 March 1942.
6. Messages 130307 March 1942 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, Greybook, 287; 132145 Cincpac to Comdesron 2 and Platte, 132235 CTF-17 to Comanzac and Cincpac, 142236 CTF-17 to Tippecanoe, 142355 CTF-17 to Comdesron 2 and Platte, all March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 6.
7. Greybook, 271. Messages 130339 March 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, Greybook, 288; 132141 March 1942 CTF-17 to Comanzac, Greybook, 271; 160217 March 1942 CTF-17 to Comanzac, Greybook, 292. Messages 150159 Cincpac to TF-13, 182330 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 192301 Cincpac to CTF-19, 172211 Cincpac to CTF-17, 182300 CTF-17 to Tippecanoe, and 190625 Tippecanoe to CTF-17, all March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 6.
8. TF-17 war diary. Messages 190015 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 6; 210833 March 1942 CTF-17 to Comanzac, etc., Greybook, 313; 200733 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 7; 191400 March 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 311–12; 210535 March 1942 Cincpac to CTF-13, Greybook, 314; 220520 March 1942 Comanzac to Flag Officer Commanding Australian Squadron, CSCMF, roll 7. Crace diary, 22 March 1942.
9. TF-17 war diary; Astoria deck log; Ralph V. Wilhelm personal diary, 22 March 1942, courtesy of Ralph Wilhelm, who was a lieutenant junior grade and SOC pilot in the Portland.
10. Message 201830 February 1942 Cominch to Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Cinclant), and Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 4. For Mitscher, see: Taylor, The Magnificent Mitscher, and Coletta, Admiral Marc A. Mitscher and U.S. Naval Aviation. On McCain: Reynolds, Admirals, 206–7; and the portrait in his grandson John McCain’s Faith of My Fathers, 3–46. On McCain becoming CTF-18, message 122059 March 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 6.
11. Greybook, 270; messages 122059 Cincpac to Cominch, 131430 Cominch to Cincpac, 142155 Cincpac to Cominch, all March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 6; 162043 March 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 293.
12. Admiral Duncan’s account is in Mason, The Pacific War Remembered, 63–69. Halsey and Bryan, 101. Potter, Nimitz, 67; Hoyt, 71–72; Mason, 68; message 220119 March 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 6. Duncan recalled the message as, “Tell Jimmy to get on his horse.”
13. Messages 191905 Cominch to Cincpac, 161238 Admiralty to Opnav, 171820 Cominch to Admiralty, all March 1942, in CNO TS Blue File.
14. Greybook, 297–99; message 222157 March 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 7; 131955 and 150451 Cominch to Cincpac, both March 1942, CSCMF, roll 6; 232130 March 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File. Floyd Beaver, a former signalman in the TF-11 enlisted complement, recalled in his fine memoir how Fitch, “an unusually short man for a Naval officer,” had a “a brisk, no-nonsense manner and an impressive nose,” soon “fitted into the Lexington in a way Brown never had” (Floyd Beaver, Chief, 168).
15. Potter, Nimitz, 47. Memorandum Frank Knox for the President (9 March 1942), Safe Files, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, brought to my attention by Jeffrey Barlow. The nine selectors were Stark and King, Joseph Reeves (former Cincus), Claude Bloch (former Cincus and also Commander, Fourteenth Naval District), James O. Richardson (former Cincus), Harry Yarnell (former commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet), Edward C. Kalbfus (former Combatfor), Rear Adm. Randall Jacobs (Nimitz’s successor at Bunav), and Rear Adm. Richard S. Edwards (Cominch deputy chief of staff).
16. Message 272000 March 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Cominch 00 File.
17. TF-17 war diary. Greybook, 295; messages 250035 Comanzac to CTF-17, 220211 Cincpac to Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet (Comserforpac), 250033 Cincpac to CTF-17, all March 1942, CSCMF, roll 7.
18. Message 270604 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 7; TF-17 war diary; W. W. Smith, 21–22; Astoria deck log; messages 280119 Cincpac Intelligence Bulletin (hereafter Cincpac Intel. Bull.) and 280715 Tangier to Cincpac, both March 1942, CSCMF, roll 7.
19. Greybook, 304; messages 281322 Comanzac to CTF-17 and 281635 Cominch to Comanzac, both March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 7.
20. Letter Fletcher to Nimitz (28 May 1942), in Nimitz Papers; Fletcher Memorandum to Cincpac, Operations of Task Force Seventeen in the Coral Sea Area—March 16 to April 20 (23 June 1942), in action report file; W. W. Smith, 22; TF-17 war diary; messages 282151 Cincpac to Comanzac, 290109 Comanzac to CTF-17, 290512 Comanzac to Cincpac, 290635 Comanzac to CTF-17, 290158 Comanzac to CTF-17, and 290119 Comanzac to CTF-17, all March 1942, CSCMF, roll 7.
21. Letter Fletcher to Nimitz (28 May 1942), in Nimitz Papers; Greybook, 304–5; messages 291325 Comanzac to CTF-17, 292346 CTF-17 to Comanzac, 300233 Comanzac to CTF-17, 300435 Comanzac to CTF-17, 300855 Comanzac to CTF-17, all March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 7.
22. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:130–35.
23. Messages 301400 and 301715 March 1942 Comanzac to CTF-17, in CSCMF, roll 7.
24. Message 301930 March 1942 Cominch to CTF-17, in Greybook (322), CSCMF (roll 7), and original with King’s notation in Cominch 00 File. Messages 302359 Comanzac to CTF-17, 310106 Comanzac to Cominch, and 310230 Comanzac to CTF-17, all March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 7.
25. W. W. Smith, 61–62; letter Fletcher to Nimitz (28 May 1942), in Nimitz Papers; TF-17 war diary; messages 310245 CTF-17 to Cominch and 311455 Cominch to CTF-17, March 1942 in CSCMF, roll 7; letter Fletcher to W. W. Smith (1 September 1964), in Smith Papers.
26. Messages 310315 CTF-17 to Cincpac and 312051 CTG-17.2 to Comanzac, March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 7; TF-17 war diary; Desron Two war diary; Commander, Cruisers (Comcru) TF-17 war diary; Greybook, 306.
27. Crace diary, 31 March 1942.
28. Message 311455 March 1942 Cominch to CTF-17, Greybook, 324; message 010323 April 1942 Cincpac to Navsta Samoa, CSCMF, roll 8; Crace diary, 1 April 1942; messages 012327 CTF-17 to CTF-19, 012328 CTF-17 to Bridge, 012348 CTF-17 to Tutuila, all April 1942, CSCMF, roll 8; 011040 April 1942 Sumner to Cincpac, Greybook, 326.
29. Message 020250 April 1942 CTF-17 to Comanzac, Cominch 00 File; TF-17 war diary; Yorktown deck log.
30. Greybook, 307; messages 012228 Comanzac to CTF-17, 021227 Comanzac to CTF-17, 030427 Cincpac Intel. Bull., 031800 Cominch to CTF-17, all April 1942, in CSCMF, roll 8.
31. TF-17 war diary; Comcru TF-17 war diary; Greybook, 333; message 040145 April 1942 Comanzac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 8; 040650 April 1942 CTF-17 to Comanzac, Greybook, 347.
32. TF-17 war diary, Comcru TF-17 war diary, Astoria deck log, Crace diary, 8–10 April 1942.
33. Messages 100100 CTF-17 to unknown (retransmitted as Comanzac to Cincpac), 100320 CTF-17 to Comanzac, and 100348 CTF-17 to Comanzac, all April 1942, CSCMF, roll 8.
34. Cincpac Administrative History, 17–18, with Cincpac’s 23 March 1942 letter in Appendix II-1, NHC. Messages 311830 March 1942 Secnav to All Navy (Alnav), Greybook, 325; 091307 April 1942 Bunav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 8; 100505 April 1942 Cincpac to Pacific Fleet (Pacflt), Greybook, 347.
35. Fletcher speech of 27 October 1946, Fletcher Papers; Frank and Harrington, 73–74; Linzey, God Was at Midway, 56–58.
36. Crace diary, 11–14 April 1942; messages 110641, 111056, 111155, 120700, and 121453 Comanzac to CTF-17, 090107 Cincpac Intel. Bull., all April 1942, in CSCMF, roll 8; Coulthard-Clark, 61–68.
37. Letter Fletcher to Nimitz (28 May 1942), in Nimitz Papers; messages 130725 April 1942 Yorktown to Commander, Carriers, Pacific Fleet (Comcarpac) Material Officer, Pearl, CSCMF, roll 8; 140147 April 1942 CTF-17 to Cominch and Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 9; 120145 Comanzac to Tippecanoe, 112027 Cincpac to Comanzac, both April 1942, CSCMF, roll 8; Yorktown deck log.
38. Message 142027 April 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, Greybook, 346. TF-17 war diary.
39. Greybook, 344; letter Fletcher to Nimitz (28 May 1942), memo Fletcher to Nimitz (23 June 1942), letter Nimitz to King (29 May 1942), all in Nimitz Papers.
1. Messages 042048 April 1942 Combatfor to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 8; 270247 Cincpac to Cominch, 280049 Cincpac to Cominch, 310415 Cincpac to Opnav, all March 1942, in CSCMF, roll 7.
2. Great Britain, War With Japan, 2:120–31; Macintyre, Fighting Admiral, chapter 13.
3. Messages 051400 and 081315 Cominch to Special Naval Observer London, both April 1942, in CNO TS Blue File; Kimball, 1:442–43; Greybook, 308; messages 082307 Cincpac to Cominch and 091825 Cominch to Cincpac, April 1942, in CNO TS Blue File; messages 110335 and 110351 April 1942 Cincpac to CTF-1 and CTF-11, in Cominch 00 File.
4. Message 091750 April 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 8.
5. Hayes, 96–98; messages 041725 Cominch to Cincpac and Comanzac, 070451 Cincpac to Cominch, March 1942, CSCMF, roll 5.
6. Hayes, 98–100; messages 171640 March 1942 Cominch to Comanzac and Comsowespac, CSCMF, roll 6; 041300 April 1942 Cominch to Comsowespac and Comanzac, Greybook, 330.
7. Message 031905 series April 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 328–30; Greybook, 332, 341; 041850 Cominch to Cincpac and 051849 Cincpac to Cominch, April 1942, Greybook, 331.
8. On Stark’s resignation, see: Simpson, Admiral Harold R. Stark, 126–32; Brodhurst, Churchill’s Anchor, 216–17; and for a different version, Richardson and Dyer, 441–42, which is much less flattering to Roosevelt. Whitehill memo (31 July 1949), King Papers, NWC.
9. Greybook, 341–42; message 110535 April 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, in Cominch 00 File; 141416 April 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 9.
10. For code breaking in the Pacific, see: Parker, A Priceless Advantage; Benson, A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II; Layton, “America Deciphered Our Code”; Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets; Layton, And I Was There; Budiansky, Battle of Wits; Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded; and Michael Smith, The Emperor’s Codes. It is useful to list here the relevant versions of Naval Codebook D designated by the Allies as “JN” for Japanese naval code and when they were instituted: JN-25A, June 1939; JN-25B, 1 December 1940; JN-25C, 27 May 1942; and JN-25D, 14 August 1942. An excellent analysis of the early JN-25 versions appears in Budiansky, “Too Late for Pearl Harbor.”
11. Layton and Rochefort most often communicated by secure telephone (interview of Rear Adm. Donald M. Showers, USN, by Lundstrom [14 May 2002]). Layton noted in a letter (10 January 1974) to Lundstrom: “My advantage was that I talked each day, many times a day with those directly responsible for traffic analysis, for the sketchy & incomplete descriptions, and could follow up, or cause to be followed up the incomplete pieces, the questioned areas.” Parker, 21; letter Layton to Lundstrom (7 April 1975).
12. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:164–65; Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway, 48–54.
13. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:165–66; Fuchida and Okumiya, 54–62; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:96.
14. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:166–67, with extract of Combined Fleet Secret No. 694, Second Operational Phase, First Stage Strength Allotment (10 April–end May 1942).
15. Message 212235 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 16, reported that prisoners taken in the Battle of Midway identified the carrier sunk at Coral Sea as the converted carrier Shōhō and stated the Ryūkaku did not exist. Greybook, 341; message 110641 April 1942 Comanzac to Comsowespac and Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 8.
16. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:167–68; message 152049 April 1942 Opnav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 9.
17. Greybook, 352; message 170626 April 1942 Comanzac to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File; 172015 April 1942 Cincpac to Comanzac, Cominch 00 File; Greybook, 364; Potter, Nimitz, 67; message 172035 April 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, in Cominch 00 File.
18. Biard, “The Pacific War,” 10; letter Halsey to Doolittle (24 April 1942), copy in King Papers, NHC.
19. Ugaki, 111–12; Greybook, 365; memo Capt. F. C. Dickey to Commo. R. W. Bates, NWC (14 October 1946), relaying Dickey’s conversation with Fletcher, in Bates Papers, series II, box 12.
20. Message 182032 April 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, in Cominch 00 File; Greybook, 365; messages 190457 Cominch to Cincpac, 190535 Cincpac to CTF-1 and CTF-11, 192109 Cincpac to CTF-11, 220345 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, and 220541 Cincpac to CTF-17, all April 1942, in Cominch 00 File.
21. Interview of Adm. Arthur Davis by Dr. Gordon Prange, 30 January 1963, via Robert J. Cressman; Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy, 171, citing Lt. Cdr. F. M. Beasley, RN, who visited Nimitz on 22 January 1942. On Draemel: Hoyt, 91.
22. Layton interview by Pineau and Costello (11 May 1983), 90; Cincpac Enemy Activities File in April–May 1942, in RG-457, SRH-272; Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton, oral history, 17, 28; Potter, Nimitz, 80; Pacific Fleet Administrative History, NHC, 144–45.
23. Greybook, 366; text of the 22 April 1942 Estimate of the Situation in Greybook, 371–407.
24. Greybook, 375; message 230051 April 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File.
25. Gwyer and Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. 3, part 2, 503. Clark G. Reynolds has presented the case that King deliberately adopted a “fleet-in-being” strategy with his carriers to avoid decisive battle and harass the enemy with raids until the time was right to concentrate the fleet and engage the enemy under advantageous strategic conditions. See his “U.S. Carriers and the Fleet-in-Being Strategy of 1942.” It is questionable, though, that King indeed was following a coherent fleet-in-being strategy. Nimitz, not he, initiated the necessary concentration of the fleet for battle, first in the South Pacific and then at Midway. Instead King seems to have preferred keeping his carriers dispersed and not risk heavy battle. He simply adopted a raiding strategy of nonconfrontation and delay until his South Pacific bases were fully capable of defending themselves. After the Battle of the Coral Sea, King sought to limit the direct involvement of the carriers themselves in the defense of key South Pacific bases, preferring to employ their aircraft ashore. Before Midway he recommended sending the Yorktown directly to the West Coast to reduce the participation of the U.S. carriers. During the early stages of the Guadalcanal campaign he restricted the number of carriers committed to battle to three, and Nimitz had to press him to commit the Hornet and retain the Wasp. The impetus to battle, rather than strategic advances, came from Nimitz not King.
26. Minutes of Conversations between Cominch and Cincpac, Saturday, April 25 (26 April 1942), in Pacific Conferences, King/Nimitz, 1942–1945, in NHC microfilm NRS-1972-22.
27. Minutes of Conversations between Cominch and Cincpac, Sunday, April 26, 1942 (27 April 1942), NRS-1972-22. King’s declaration regarding MacArthur was wishful thinking. He was unaware of MacArthur’s backdoor wheedling of Marshall for carriers of his own by complaining that without them his Sowespac naval force was “unbalanced,” message 24 April 1942, MacArthur to Marshall, in General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Papers, roll 593.
28. Minutes of Conversations April 26, 1942, NRS-1972-22.
29. Minutes of Conversations between Cominch and Cincpac, Monday, April 27 (27 April 1942), in NRS-1972-22. Message 272058 April 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File; 282047 April 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, in Cominch 00 File; Greybook, 416; 291530 April 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File.
30. Cincpac Op-Plan 23–42 (29 April 1942), in Op-Ord File; letter Cincpac to CTF-16, Carrier Task Forces, Future Employment (29 April 1942), in NA, RG-38, Headquarters Cominch Records, box 258; message 020641 May 1942 Cincpac to Comsowespac, Greybook, 453.
31. Message 011108 May 1942 Com 14 to Opnav, Belconnen, Com 16, and “written up for Cincpac info,” CSCMF, roll 10. Message 011108 May 1942 Com 14 to Opnav, etc. The history of radio intelligence has been affected by selective editing. The wartime SRH-012 The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War (August, 1941–June, 1942), 239–40, in RG-457, offered an edited version of the Com14 011108 message that conveniently omitted the text of this estimate of raids against Samoa and Fiji. Comint historians have neglected this extremely important message showing that as of 30 April Midway was not yet believed to be an imminent Japanese target. For a recent iteration of the Midway myth, see Beach, 107–10. For Layton’s view at that time, see SRH-272, Cincpac Enemy Activities File, 27 April, 30 April, and 2 May 1942.
32. Message 021430 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac and Comsowespac, Greybook, 453.
1. TF-17 war diary; Yorktown deck log; messages 162023 Cincpac to CTF-17, 192147 Cincpac to CTF-17, 211016 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 240128 CTF-17 to Navobs (Naval Observer) Suva, and 250240 Comcarpac Admin to CTF-17, all April 1942, CSCMF, roll 9. Strange, 60–61; W. W. Smith, original draft of Midway book, 129–30, in Smith Papers.
2. Messages 192109 April 1942 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, in CNO TS Blue File; 210207 and 220109 April 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 9; 220345 Cincpac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, and 220541 Cincpac to CTF-17, both April 1942, in Cominch 00 File.
3. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:16.
4. Messages 200915 April 1942 Comsowespacfor to Anzacfor (Anzac Force), CSCMF, roll 9; 220410 April 1942 Comsowespac to Cominch, in CNO TS Blue File; 250357 April 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, Greybook, 412; 270653 April 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, Greybook, 414; 262000 April 1942 CTF-17 to Comsowespacfor, CSCMF, roll 10.
5. Message 150411 April 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 350; 162220 April 1942 Cominch to Comsowespacfor, Greybook, 358; 180135 April 1942 Comanzac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 9; Crace diary, 19 April 1942; 262205 April 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 10.
6. The basic source on Brett’s air operations is Air Commo. Francis W. F. Lukis, OBE, Air Officer Commanding North East Area, Report on Coral Sea Engagement (29 May 1942), in Australian Archives, series AA1969/10/0/119, item 273/25A. For organization, see Ashworth, How Not To Run An Air Force!; and Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division, Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 9, The AAF in Australia to the Summer of 1942 (July 1944). Messages 222158 CTF-17 to Comsowespacfor and 250418 Cincpac to Comsowespacfor, both April 1942, CSCMF, roll 9.
7. Message 250357 April 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 9; 262010 April 1942 CTF-17 to Tangier, CSCMF, roll 10; Tangier war diary; U.S. Naval War College (Capt. Richard W. Bates), The Battle of the Coral Sea May 1 to May 11 Inclusive, 1942 Strategical and Tactical Analysis, 24–27 (hereafter Bates, Coral Sea).
8. War Plans 22 April 1942 Estimate of the Situation, Annex on fuel situation, TF-16, 17, 18, 11 in Southwest Pacific, Greybook, 395–99; messages 250100 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 251921 Cincpac to CTF-17, and 250229 Comsowespac to Cincpac, April 1942, CSCMF, roll 9.
9. Messages 260251 Cincpac to Comsowespacfor, 260327 Cincpac to CTF-17, and 260329 Cincpac to Tippecanoe, April 1942, CSCMF, roll 10.
10. Messages 242215 Comdesron 2 to Commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet (Comdespac), 250100 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 280041 Cincpac to CTF-17, April 1942, CSCMF, roll 10.
11. Letter Leonard to Lundstrom (26 August 1996) and conversation (25 September 1997). Letter Rear Adm. Murr Arnold, USN (Ret.), to Lundstrom (9 April 1972). Arnold replied to W. W. Smith (7 March 1965): “First of all I would like to clarify any possible doubt that you might have concerning my opinion of Adm. Fletcher. I liked him, and I liked working for and under him.” Letter Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson, USN (Ret.), to Joseph Harrington (21 July 1964), Pederson Papers.
12. CTF-17 Op-Ord No. 2–42 (1 May 1942), in Commander Task Force Seventeen to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 4–8, 1942 (27 May 1942).
13. CTF-17 Op-Ord 2–42 (1 May 1942). Fletcher considered shifting his flag either to the Indianapolis, which left San Francisco for Australia on 15 April, or the Chester (message 310307 March 1942 Cincpac to Indianapolis, CSCMF, roll 7). Letter Fletcher to Nimitz (28 May 1942), in Nimitz Papers; message 280925 April 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, Greybook, 414; Cominch to Cincpac, etc., Commander Task Force 17 (Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet) Report of Action, The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 4–8, 1942, Comments on, (18 November 1942), Forwards comments of Rear Adm. Edward C. Kalbfus, president of the Naval War College.
14. Base Air Force operational strength as of 1 May (after the arrival of the Genzan Air Group) amounted to twenty-three Zero fighters, forty-two land attack planes, and thirteen flying boats, a total of seventy-eight planes (Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:205).
15. Message 181915 April 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, in Greybook, 362, gives the estimated numbers of aircraft on Japanese carriers. The Ryūkaku was thought to be another Shōkaku-class carrier. The attribution of forty-two dive bombers is apparently a typographical error for twenty-one. A converted submarine tender, the light carrier Shōhō had twenty aircraft (ten Zero fighters, four Type 96 fighters, and six Type 97 carrier attack planes).
16. Messages 290309 Cincpac Intel. Bull., 300426 Comsowespac to CTF-11 and CTF-17, April 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10.
17. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:169–76, summarizes Japanese planning for the MO Operation. The text of South Seas Force Order 13 (23 April 1942), is in pp. 176–85, and the orders of the MO Attack Force in 194–98.
18. For Inoue, see Evans and Peattie, 482–86, and Peattie, 159–61.
19. Planning for Support Force and the Tulagi Attack Force is in Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:200–202.
20. See Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:189–91, for the formation of the MO Kidō Butai, including text of Order No. 1 (28 April 1942). The Tōhō Maru was an excellent requisitioned ten-thousand-ton tanker built in 1936 with a capacity of ninety-three thousand barrels of oil and a top speed of twenty knots.
21. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:176–85, 194–98, 214–19, 221–25.
22. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:12–13.
23. For career details on the Japanese admirals, I am indebted to Jean-François Masson, who is translating the wartime issues of the IJN’s Register of Officers on the Active List, and also to Andrew Obluski; for Hara see also Prange, At Dawn We Slept, 200–201.
24. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:186–87, with text of Combined Fleet Secret Radio No. 907 of 29 April 1942, and p. 192 for the text of 5th Sentai Secret Radio 838 of 30 April 1942. See also Lundstrom, “A Failure of Radio Intelligence.”
1. Principal documentary sources on the Battle of the Coral Sea include: CTF-17 to Cominch, The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 4–8, 1942 (27 May 1942), with reports of group, unit, and ship commanding officers (in RG-38, Action Reports, and also in NHC microfilm NRS-459); Comcrudiv Six (CTG-17.2) to Comcrupac (CTF-17), Engagement with Japanese Force 7–8 May, 1942 in Coral Sea (28 May 1942); H.M. Australian Squadron, Operations in the North Coral Sea—5th to 11th May, 1942, copy in Crace diary and in AWM [393/1] HMA Sqdrn Reports of Proceedings; war diaries, including Comcardiv One (Fitch), Comcru TF-17 (Smith), Crudiv Six (Kinkaid), Desron One (Early), and Desron Two (Hoover); Air Commo. Francis W. F. Lukis, OBE, Air Officer Commanding North East Area, To HQ, Allied Air Forces, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, Report on Coral Sea Engagement (29 May 1942), in Australian Archives, series AA1969/10/0/119, item 273/25A; and message #AG 719, May 13, 1942, Melbourne to Chief of Staff, summary of air ops 2–12 May 1942, in RG-165, OPD Exec File 2, Item I1. Official analyses include: U.S. Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander In Chief, Secret Information Bulletin No. 1, Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway December 1941 to June 1942 including Makin Island Raid 17–18 August (15 February 1943); U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, Publication Section, Combat Intelligence Branch, Combat Narratives, The Battle of the Coral Sea: Consisting of the actions at Tulagi, May 4th; off Misima, May 7th; and in the Coral Sea on May 8th, 1942; Bates, Coral Sea; and Admiralty Naval Staff, Historical Section, Battle Summary No. 45, Battle of Coral Sea 4–8 May 1942. Serious studies of Coral Sea include: Morison, United States Naval Operations, vol. 4, chapters 2–4; Gill, Royal Australian Navy, vol. 2, 1942–1945, chapter 2; Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign, chapter 11; Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, chapters 5–8; Lundstrom, First Team, chapters 10–12; Coulthard-Clark, chapters 6–8; and the indispensable Japanese source, Japan, Senshi Sōsho, vol. 49, chapter 5.
2. Message 300907 April 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17 and CTF-11, in CSCMF, roll 10; in fact the Shōei Maru was one of the ships assigned to build the Deboyne base. Message 010830 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, in CSCMF, roll 10, informed Fletcher that the Saipan Base Force was thought to include nine transports and cargo ships, about eight “Marus,” eight converted patrol craft, two converted minesweepers, and other auxiliaries.
3. Neosho deck log; W. W. Smith, 26. Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 1 criticized Fletcher for fueling at all in possible sub-endangered waters.
4. Messages 020044 and 020335 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, in CSCMF, roll 10.
5. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942).
6. Bates, Coral Sea, 31.
7. Air Officer Commanding North East Area, Report on Coral Sea Engagement (29 May 1942); Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939–1942, 516–17; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49: 227–29.
8. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); CO USS Yorktown to Cominch, U.S. Aircraft Action with Enemy, Report of (26 May 1942); Ludlum, 39–40; Biard, “The Pacific War,” 11; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:235.
9. Messages 020745, 021037, and 021525 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10; TF-17 report (27 May 1942); statement Fletcher to Bates (September 1946), in Bates, Coral Sea, 28. Rear Adm. Edward C. Kalbfus, president of the Naval War College, declared that Fletcher here “demonstrated” the “extreme importance” of topping off destroyers whenever possible.
10. Message 030213 May 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 10; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:228–30.
11. Message 030230 May 1942 Comsowespac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10; CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); memo Dickey to Bates (14 October 1946). Gill, 2:44. Feldt, The Coast Watchers, 109, noted that Donald G. Kennedy on Santa Isabel sighted and reported two ships at Thousand Ships Bay.
12. Bates, Coral Sea, 31, 33, and 16, where he referred to the plan as a Japanese “Cannae”; message 030300 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10. The message Fletcher could not break was 030241 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10.
13. W. W. Smith, 26. Aerology Section, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Battle of the Coral Sea (April 1944). The principal source for the Tulagi strike is CO USS Yorktown to Cincpac, Attack made by Yorktown Air Group on Enemy Forces in Tulagi and Gavutu Harbors (11 May 1942). Strike reports are in Yorktown report (26 May 1942). Schindler’s Memorandum to Cincpac, Notes on the Coral Sea Action May 4–8, 1942 (22 May 1942); for his pleading to go, conversation (6 August 1996) with TF-17 flag yeoman Thomas Newsome.
14. Interview of Lt. Cdr. William O. Burch by Buaer (3 September 1942), Operational Archives, NHC; see also pilot accounts in Ludlum, 40–46.
15. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:230–34.
16. Messages between Fletcher and Smith in Comcru TF-17 war diary; also W. W. Smith, 28–29; Moan diary, 9 May 1942. Bates asserted (Coral Sea, 41), based on the recollections of Capt. Thomas M. Shock of the Chester, that not until twilight did Fletcher first mention the idea of a cruiser foray against Tulagi, but this is corrected by the messages in Smith’s war diary noted above.
17. Lundstrom, First Team, 174–78; Ludlum, 43–65; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:28.
18. Ens. Harry A. Frederickson (VB-5) diary (4 May 1942), via James C. Sawruk. Message 180200 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 12, noted “further confirmation” of nine ships sunk on 4 May in the vicinity of Tulagi. The source was Leif Schroeder, a planter who became a petty officer in the Royal Australian Navy, Feldt, 109. Coast watchers on Guadalcanal also watched the distant attack; see Clemens, Alone on Guadalcanal, 106–7. For actual damage, Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:233.
19. Cincpac to Cominch, Naval Action in Coral Sea Area 4–8 May 1942, First Endorsement (17 June 1942); Schindler memo (22 May 1942).
20. Messages 040145 Cincpac Intel. Bull.; 040236 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17; 040950, 041102, and 041402 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, all May 1942, CSCMF, roll 10. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:239.
21. Crace diary, 4 May 1942; Bates, Coral Sea, 33, 39.
22. Crace diary, 5 May 1942. Messages 030241 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, 042002 CTF-17 to Cincpac, and 042135 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10. For the importance of the unbroken message 030241 first transmitted on 3 May, see below.
23. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:235.
24. Messages 042226 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 050321 Cincpac to CTF-17, 050042 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, 050241 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, 050245 Comsowespac to CTF-17, and 050121 Cincpac Intel. Bull., all May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10.
25. Ludlum, 66; messages 182348 CTF-11 to Bunav, 222008 Bunav to CTF-11, April 1942, in CSCMF, roll 9.
26. Ted Sherman claimed in a review of Morison’s volume 4 (letter Sherman to Rear Adm. Charles Wellborn, 16 August 1950, DNC, Office Files, box 20) that he never saw CTF-17 Op-Ord 2–42 and “had no idea of the plans, orders and directions under which we were operating in the Coral Sea.” According to Sherman, Fitch informed him after visiting the Yorktown on 5 May that “there was no operation order, that the only information he received from Fletcher was that it was to be a ‘day to day affair.’” Sherman further stated that “although Fitch was designated Commander, Air, in the Task Force organization, this lack of information as to the OTC’s plans and mission handicapped us severely during the entire battle.” No one else ever mentioned this specific criticism (not even Sherman in his private diary in May 1942). It is inconceivable that Fitch did not received a copy of Op-Ord 2–42, particularly as on 6 May he took over as CTG-17.5 (Commander, Air) when Fletcher amalgamated the three task forces. Also it is hard to understand given the fluid situation how Fletcher could have done anything other than a “day to day affair.” CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); Biard, “The Pacific War,” 11; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:235.
27. Messages 050528 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17 and 050249 Comsowespac to Cincpac, May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10; Greybook, 435; SRH-272 Cincpac Enemy Activities File 4–5 May 1942. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:233–34.
28. Messages 030241 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, rebroadcast as 050355, and the original decrypt in 020344 series Com 14 to addressees Copek messages, all May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10; Lundstrom, “A Failure,” 103–6; Greybook, 432.
29. Message 050345 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, in CSCMF, roll 10; Greybook, 435. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:230.
30. Message 050329 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10; Lundstrom, “A Failure,” 107–10, 111–12; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:233.
31. Message 050823 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10.
32. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942).
33. Comcru TF-17 war diary, 6 May 1942.
34. Messages 060145 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, 060211 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, 060025 and 060107 Comsowespac to CTF-17, May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:239–40.
35. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:241–43. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:31, wrongly stated Takagi never learned Fletcher was to the south and that his subsequent movement toward TF-17 was only a coincidence. Also Fletcher did not enjoy “bright sunlight,” but instead operated under a thick overcast.
36. Messages 060246 and 060744 Comsowespac to CTF-17, 060925 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, May 1942, CSCMF, roll 10; Crace diary, 6 May 1942; messages 060145 and 060330 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, in CSCMF, roll 10.
37. Fuel data for all TF-17 ships either has not survived (Lexington and Yorktown) or is not available (HMAS Australia and Hobart). From their deck logs, the cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans had about 85% fuel; the Astoria, Chester, and Portland more than 95 percent; and the Chicago 72 percent. The destroyers of Early’s Desron One had between 70 and 80 percent, except for the Phelps at 89 percent, whereas Hoover’s newer but shorter-ranged Desron Two destroyers had more than 92 percent fuel.
38. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); CTG-17.5 report (18 May 1942).
39. CTG-17.5 report (18 May 1942); Crace diary 6 May 1942.
40. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:243–45; Lundstrom, “A Failure,” 112–13.
41. In his official National Security Agency monograph A Priceless Advantage, Frederick Parker took issue with my earlier iteration of the 6 May 1942 comint blunder discussed in my April 1983 article in Cryptologia: “A Failure of Radio Intelligence.” Parker saw no conflict between the picture created by comint and air searches and the actual Japanese dispositions. He described (28) that at dawn on 7 May, Fletcher knew of one carrier sighted west of Bougainville and that the invasion convoy and “protective covering forces were also loitering in the Solomons Sea west of Bougainville.” Fletcher supposedly directed his air search “east of the Louisiades where COMINT had foretold, and aerial reconnaissance had already located, Japanese transports, a carrier, and other warships that represented a threat to Crace.” Of course this completely ignored the presence of MO Striking Force northeast of TF-17.
Parker did not address the perilous situation that actually faced TF-17 on 6 May brought about by erroneous interpretations by the code breakers of incomplete Japanese messages. As noted, he asserted “there is no indication that erroneous decisions were made on partial message texts.” Instead for 6 May, he claimed (32), “It is difficult to imagine what more the combat intelligence centers might have contributed concerning the Japanese forces prior to the engagement.” Parker then noted my ignorance in 1983 of Capt. Forrest Biard’s memoir, which in truth is not even germane to the situation on 5–6 May, and concluded (32): “In the context of the total intelligence picture available to Admiral Fletcher, there may never be another situation in which a single source of information proves more supportive. Moreover, it is equally difficult to imagine a situation in which the two intelligence sources proved more complementary than COMINT and aerial reconnaissance were on 5 and 6 May 1942.” The interpretation of the events of 6 May here differs fundamentally with Parker, who did not have the benefit of studying the crucial Japanese documents on the Battle of the Coral Sea that provide the essential background for the decrypts. The true measure of the contribution of code breaking requires comparison of its findings with Japanese sources and an in-depth analysis of the circumstance that commanders actually faced. Parker did not discuss the key discrepancies between code breaker prognostications and the actual tactical situations and rarely mentioned any mistakes on the part of the code breakers. Instead he believed that errors were most often the result of commanders not properly using the intelligence information that was provided them. The brilliance of the technical achievement of breaking the Japanese code should not obscure the dangerous failures of interpretation by the code breakers and intelligence analysts that on occasion imperiled the forces in action.
1. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:271–74.
2. Air Officer Commanding North East Area, Report on Coral Sea Engagement (29 May 1942).
3. Visual message 060600 May 1942 CTG-17.5 to Lexington and Yorktown, in Coral Sea, Battle of, Dispatches, Task Force 17 and Task Group 17.5, RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files, hereafter Lexington dispatches. Fitch saved these messages while abandoning the Lexington on 8 May and they are vital for reconstructing the events of 7 May.
4. Letters Arnold to Lundstrom (9 April and 24 April 1972); letter Arnold to W. W. Smith (7 March 1965), in Smith Papers.
5. Messages 060754 and 060925 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, 061226 and 061335 Comsowespac to CTF-17, May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10.
6. W. W. Smith, 22.
7. Message 061655 May 1942 CTF-17 to CTG-17.3 (info CTG-17.2 and CTG-17.5), copy in Crace’s diary. Fletcher also told Crace to monitor NPM 128 and NPM 122 for radio messages on the Cincpac Fox Schedule, but apparently Crace had trouble doing so. See his report Operations in the North Coral Sea—5th to 11th May, 1942.
8. Bates, Coral Sea, 54; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:37, 39; Gill, 2:49; Willmott, 233–34. The most unusual criticism of “Crace’s Chase” appeared long afterward in the bitter memoir of TF-17 radio intelligence officer Forrest Biard, “The Pacific War,” 12. He claimed that on the morning of 7 May Spence Lewis (the “dovish” chief of staff) inexplicably confided that Fletcher detached Crace solely because he did not want to share the glory. Fletcher parked the Anzac Squadron “well south of Jomard Passage” and “out of the area in which we will in all probability meet the Japs” simply to deny “medals” to “Britishers and Australians.” Biard then professed suitable indignation to Lewis, not only at Fletcher’s crass (“almost criminal”) behavior, but also because he himself already divined the danger of air attack to Crace. “Here I knew finally,” Biard declared, “that all the serious misgivings I had gathered about our professionally almost senile task force commander were valid.” Far from keeping Crace out of the action, Fletcher placed the Support Group precisely where he thought the Japanese must go to assault Port Moresby. There would have been medals aplenty for Crace’s force had things gone according to plan. Biard obviously did not understand the reasons behind the Jomard stratagem. His manifest disdain for Fletcher led him, as always, to think the worst of everything. Perhaps Lewis, renowned for his sense of humor, simply pulled the overly serious lieutenant’s leg.
9. Letter Adm. Sir John Crace to Maj. C. S. Goldingham (17 November 1957), copy in Crace diary. Coulthard-Clark, 145. Letter Schindler to Lundstrom (28 June 1972). The Chicago had the weakest antiaircraft armament of the U.S. cruisers present: eight 5-inch/25 antiaircraft guns, four 1.1-inch quad mounts, and eight .50-caliber machine guns, whereas the other cruisers had a dozen 20-mm cannons in place of the .50-calibers. The Australia wielded eight 4-inch antiaircraft guns in twin mounts, two 2-pounder (40-mm) quad mounts and eight .50-cal. machine guns; the Hobart carried eight 4-inch antiaircraft guns in twin- mounts, two 2-pounder quad mounts, and twelve .50-caliber machine guns. The Farragut had five 5-inch/38 dual purpose guns and eight 20-mm cannons; the Perkins and Walke each had four 5-inch/38 and four 20-mm each (Bureau of Ordnance, Armament Summary, December 1941).
10. Point Option is the spot where pilots could expect to find the carriers on their return. It is always expressed as a course and speed. Point Option moves constantly (as do ships).
11. Message 060050 (sic, the logged time of receipt was 2058 GCT or 0758, 7 May, Z-11) May 1942 CTF-17 to CTG-17.2 and CTG-17.5, in Lexington dispatches.
12. Ludlum, 67–68.
13. According to the Biard memoir (“The Pacific War”), 12, Fletcher then turned over tactical command of TF-17 to Fitch, but the evidence does not support this assertion. Fitch never acknowledged receiving tactical command on 7 May. Nor did he issue any orders beyond those to the Lexington and Yorktown to execute his air operations order No. 1. No ships in TF-17 noted a change of command on 7 May. It could perhaps be construed from Biard’s account that Fletcher might have thought he turned over tactical command but inexplicably Fitch never got the word. However, Fletcher never ceased issuing orders to TF-17, including all course changes, nor did he reassume tactical command later. It could be argued Fitch might have anticipated receiving tactical command. Sherman noted in his diary on 20 May 1942 there was a “confusion of command” on the afternoon of 7 May. However, it appears from what he subsequently wrote in Combat Command, 100, that he actually meant unwarranted delay in reaching a decision. Sherman never stated that Fletcher had or ever considered relinquishing tactical command on 7 May. Fitch was surprised on 8 May when Fletcher did suddenly turn over tactical command to him. According to Poco Smith, 22, during the evening of 7 May Fletcher gave tactical control to Fitch, who ordered all combat air patrol fighters into the air. Later after the skirmish over TF-17, Smith stated that Fletcher resumed command and declined to make a night surface attack. No evidence exists for that either. It appears that Biard confused 8 May with 7 May. As will be seen certain of his recollections better fit the circumstances on the eighth.
14. Lt. Frank F. Gill, The Battle of the Coral Sea, Report of Action 7–8 May, 1942, by Fighter Director, in “Lexington Papers,” RG-38, Action Reports.
15. Comcru TF-17 war diary, 7 May 1942, also Minneapolis war diary, 7 May 1942. Fullinwider’s radio log has not survived, nor has the complete TF-17 message file for 7 May 1942, so it is not possible to state precisely his findings. However, Hypo’s daily intelligence report (Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, Communication Intelligence Summary, May 7, 1942, in RG-457, SRMN-012, p. 256) does give readings undoubtedly based on some of the same transmissions possibly intercepted by Fullinwider. Hypo, at least, was aware that at 0840 a Japanese search plane radioed that enemy ships bore 170 degrees and eighty-two miles from Rossel. Another report at that time identified one battleship, two cruisers, seven destroyers, and “what appears to be a carrier” on course 030 degrees, speed twenty knots. If Fullinwider indeed read these transmissions, he was certainly justified in warning that TF-17 had been located. At 1121 Nimitz radioed Halsey and Fletcher: “Enemy radio broadcast received Hawaii 0710 Item Quote Enemy one battleship 2 cruisers 7 destroyers and one probable carrier sighted course 030 speed 20” (message 070021 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, 17, CSCMF, roll 10). It is not certain from Biard’s memoir, which includes excerpts from his personal radio log, how much of this radio traffic his team actually intercepted. Significantly, he never did acknowledge that the Japanese in fact sighted TF-17 that morning. Indeed he based much of his charge of Fletcher’s incompetence by asserting the Japanese had not done so. Biard’s account of his radio intercepts and advice to Fletcher will be analyzed in a separate note.
16. CO USS Neosho to Cincpac, Engagement of USS Neosho with Japanese Aircraft on May 7, 1942, Subsequent Loss of USS Neosho, Search for Survivors (25 May 1942). The actual distance between the two forces was 285 miles not 325, and the difference was due to poor navigation on the part of the Neosho. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); Bates, Coral Sea, 56. Willmott, 243, wrongly stated that Fletcher knew at this time that the Neosho and Sims were under heavy attack.
17. Visual message sent at 1031 from CTF-17 to CTG-17.5 and CTG-17.2, in Lexington dispatches. There is some confusion as to what exactly Nielsen thought he saw. The Yorktown action report (16 May 1942) stated that he had actually meant to send four heavy cruisers (CA) and two destroyers, but that error occurred with the wrong encoding of two aircraft carriers (CV) instead of two destroyers. The Lexington report (15 May 1942) gave the amended total as two cruisers and two destroyers. Nielsen himself later related that he saw two cruisers and four destroyers (Ludlum, 69). Biard, “The Pacific War,” 13; Cressman, Gallant Ship, 96; Newsome conversation, 6 August 1996.
18. Subsequently it was thought the carriers lurked in the sector McDowell had not completely searched. MO Striking Force was too far south to be found by the Yorktown’s morning search.
19. Nimitz called this decision “courageous” (Potter and Nimitz, The Great Sea War, 216).
20. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); message 062345 May 1942 CTF-17 to CTG-17.5, Lexington dispatches.
21. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:276–77.
22. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:273–74. I am most indebted to James C. Sawruk for identifying Captain Horgan’s flight as responsible for this vital report.
23. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:20, stated the contact that Nielsen made was Marumo’s Support Force that included two old light cruisers. In fact, the position of Nielsen’s contact, northeast of Misima, and its southeasterly course conformed exactly to MO Main Force. Having fled Deboyne for safer waters, Marumo was about forty miles southwest of Goto and withdrawing northwest toward the Trobriand Islands. Nielsen missed the Port Moresby convoy because it had already gone on past to the southwest. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:280–81, 287.
24. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:280–81.
25. Bates, Coral Sea, 56, stated that at 0930 (Z-11) the Neosho reported “many planes” in latitude 16° 05´ south, longitude 159° 08´ east. The source of this citation is a summary of events in the Minneapolis war diary. The timing is odd, because according to the Neosho action report (25 May 1942) and war diary, the enemy planes were not even sighted until 0935 (1005 Z-11.5). Also the position is the same that was included in the message sent at 1021 (1051 Z-11.5). The supposed 0930 message does not appear in another, much more detailed summary notes compiled on 7 May by the Minneapolis and also included in the war diary. No other ship in TF-17 recorded the 0930 message, nor is it in the Cincpac Secret and Confidential Message File. There is no indication it actually existed. Had Biard known of it, he would certainly have cited it because it would have bolstered his case that the 5th Carrier Division was attacking the Fueling Group.
26. Neosho report (25 May 1942); Commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, to Secretary of the Navy, Sinking of the USS Sims (DD-409) by Japanese Bombers in the Coral Sea on May 7, 1942 (8 July 1942).
27. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:278–79; Neosho report (25 May 1942), Sims report (8 July 1942).
28. Message 062369 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10: “Our aircraft bombed with damage not observed enemy force consisting 10 AP [transport ship] 1 CV 16 warships posit 10–34 South 152–36 East course 285 at 2048 GCT 6th [0748/7]. Also sighted 3 AP 4 DD posit 10–41 South 152–30 East course 285 at 2100 GCT 6th [0800/7]. Another report 11 enemy vessels including 5 AP position 10–43 South 152–13 at 2055 GCT 6th [0755/7th].”
29. Captain Biard’s account of 7 May 1942 in his Cryptolog article (“The Pacific War”), 12–14, is presented in the form of an annotated chronology drawn from his contemporary notes, memory, and Morison’s account. TF-17 used Zone-11.5 time until 1700, which the NWC Analysis and Morison converted to Zone-11 by subtracting thirty minutes. It is not always clear whether Biard referred to Z-11.5 or Z-11 time. (All times noted herein are Z-11.)
Biard asserted that quite early that day he deduced from radio intercepts that certain Japanese units, which he soon identified as the 5th Carrier Division, threatened the Neosho and Sims well to the southeast of TF-17. Therefore the Shōkaku and Zuikaku had to be east of TF-17 and not northeast, north, or northwest. Biard stated that he furnished this evidence, which he deemed incontrovertible, to Fletcher and Lewis, who chose to disregard it. It is not possible without consulting the original log of intercepts kept by Biard’s radio operators to determine exactly what Japanese messages he read and when he did so. That log, if it still exists, has not been found. Other than Biard, the only other sources of direct information on the 7 May 1942 radio intercepts are the “Final Report of the R.I. Unit of the USS Yorktown” (23 May 1942) (hereafter “Final Report”), submitted by the two radio operators, P. E. Seaward, Radioman first Class, and W. W. Eaton, Radioman second Class, in RG-457, SRH-313, Pacific Ocean Mobile Radio Intelligence Unit Reports 1942, and an incomplete list of messages and translations included in the Hypo daily summary (SRMN-012).
The problem with Biard’s account is that he included information and deductions that were, in fact, not made until later, in some cases much later. His 0903 entry described a Japanese surface unit “soon to be identified as an aircraft carrier and later established to be the large aircraft carrier Zuikaku” that was in touch with search aircraft. Significantly Biard did not say when these identifications were made, but structured his account as if such already occurred on the morning of the seventh. Similarly, Biard mentioned the carrier Shōkaku as originator of several messages that morning, but it was not until either very late on 7 May or early 8 May that the Shōkaku and Zuikaku were tentatively linked to specific call signs. Hypo advised Halsey (and also apparently Fletcher) at 0552 on 8 May (message 071852 May 1942 Com 14 to CTF-16, CSCMF, roll 10) that the radio frequency 7035 was “used by carrier believed Shokaku also 6630 by carrier and planes giving homing info 0900 GCT [2000 7 May].” That message still referred to the enemy carriers by their call signs “Siso” and “Suso” instead of conclusively identifying them by ship names.
Another example of where Biard might have wrongly ascribed a definite identification is the entry for 0916, which gave an important message from a search plane to an addressee “later identified tentatively (and correctly)” as commander of the 5th Carrier Division. Biard also attributed several subsequent messages to that officer. However, Hypo did not note the 5th Carrier Division as an originator or addressee among the aircraft messages intercepted on the morning of the seventh, so again it is not known when that particular identification was first made.
To justify his conclusion that enemy carriers were to the east, Biard stated: “We had received reports from other Allied search units in the prior two days that enemy forces were headed our way from the east of us. The chances were very good that the planes which discovered Neosho and Sims were from carriers now to the east of us.” No such reports placing Japanese forces in that direction can now be found.
Biard did acknowledge intercepting messages from a source different from the one he believed was shadowing the Neosho and Sims. One message received at 0957 mentioned one battleship and two cruisers. He related that he told Fletcher that this message referred to a sighting of Crace’s detached force, and that intercepts revealed that the 5th Carrier Division was sending a strike group against the Neosho and Sims. Again there is considerable doubt whether these identifications had actually yet been made at that time or presented in that way. According to Biard, Fletcher then asked him whether he should “recall” the Fueling Group and have it “join us,” but Biard argued against the move, noting it was too far away. Biard advised keeping radio silence because: “So far no one had found us.” He added: “This time the Admiral took my advice. I think I can say it was the only time he did so during the entire Battle of the Coral Sea. Perhaps it was the only time that our radio intercept work influenced him in his decision making.” Of course the record shows that Fletcher already knew, not only from radio intelligence but also from actual radar contacts, that the Japanese had sighted him, not just Crace or the Fueling Group. Biard never acknowledged that enemy search planes found and shadowed TF-17 on the morning of 7 May. Further it is highly unlikely that Fletcher would have ever considered “recalling” the distant Neosho and Sims, which would have meant bringing them closer to the enemy.
Biard cited another flagrant instance that morning when Fletcher stubbornly refused to accept that the two Japanese carriers were east of TF-17. At 1043 he recorded that Comcardiv 5 advised at 1040 that he would change course to 280 degrees, speed twenty knots, the order to be executed at 1045. In essence the Japanese commander was providing his strike group a new Point Option course. Biard was correct. That was Takagi announcing the change of course to MO Striking Force to head west toward the Louisiades. However, there then occurred, in Biard’s words, a “calamitous misfortune.” Fullinwider in the Lexington reported the gist of that message as an enemy search plane giving course and speed of TF-17 as 280 degrees at twenty knots. According to Biard, Fletcher then asked why the two radio intelligence teams did not agree, to which Biard replied that a contact report would not include an execute order set for five minutes hence. He recalled that he also asked Fletcher to come to the chart with him to see that TF-17 was only going about ten knots (and, Biard stressed, no carrier search pilot would ever mistake a ten-knot wake for a twenty-knot wake). “At no time recently had we been on any course approximately 280 degrees.” To Biard, “Even a cretin would have been convinced of the correctness of my arguments, but not Fletcher.”
Again Biard, although later shown to be correct in his basic assumption, greatly overstated in his memoir any case that he could possibly have made to Fletcher. The “Final Report” acknowledged Biard’s reading of the change of course and execute signal, but noted that the message “looked very much like it was a report of our course and speed.” Indeed unlike Biard’s assertion, TF-17 was, at that exact instant, steering a course and speed almost identical to what the enemy had seemingly reported. Since 1024 TF-17 steamed on 290 degrees, and at 1041, just before this discussion supposedly occurred, Fletcher increased speed from twenty-three to twenty-five knots. How could Biard have told the admiral any differently? Biard also did not mention that Fullinwider could be excused for misreading the message, because it was known Japanese search planes had certainly sighted TF-17.
Given such obvious contradictions with the contemporary record, it is impossible to say precisely what Biard actually did tell Fletcher on the morning of 7 May 1942 as opposed to what he might have added later because of hindsight. For an example of how an uncritical acceptance of Biard’s memoir has led historians astray, see Prados, who referred to him as “Baird.” Prados asserted, 309, that on the morning of 7 May Fletcher was “scared silly to learn from the Neosho attack that the Imperial Navy strike forces were behind him as well as in front.” In truth, though, Fletcher did not perceive a threat to the east at that time and did not learn until late afternoon that air attacks had badly damaged the Neosho. Prados chided Fletcher for throwing away Biard’s “priceless gift” of vital radio intelligence on the location of the enemy carriers solely because of his “animosity toward his radio intelligence officer.” According to Prados, Biard also undertook radio direction finding (actually a function of the Yorktown communicators) and was “plotting the coordinates of the Zuikaku’s broadcasts until her planes landed about 2:00 PM.” Supposedly that precious intelligence “went completely to waste” by Fletcher’s inaction. The record supports none of Prados’s suppositions.
30. Comcru TF-17 war diary, Minneapolis war diary, Crace diary. Unlike the famous quote in Stanley Johnston, Queen of the Flat-Tops, 181, Dixon did not use “Dixon to carrier.” Aside from advising the results of the strike, he wanted to warn the Lexington that the strike had expended its ordnance and that preparations to rearm aircraft should begin. Unlike the more modern Yorktown, the Lex lacked adequate bomb elevators and ammunition hoists, greatly slowing down the process. Letter Duckworth to Lundstrom (9 March 1972).
31. Ludlum, 73–74; message 070318 May 1942 CTF-17 to CTG-17.5, in Lexington dispatches.
32. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:282–84.
33. In addition to the relevant action reports, see Lundstrom, First Team, 197–205. Since writing that book, I spoke with Ishikawa Shiro, who flew one of the Shōhō’s Type 96 carrier fighters in the battle. He provided additional evidence that demonstrates that eight fighters defended the Shōhō, not six as is commonly accepted even in Japan.
34. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:285–86.
1. Visual message 070306 May 1942 CTG-17.5 to CTF-17, in Lexington dispatches. The latest summary by Comsowespac of sightings in the Louisiades area was sent at 1240 (070140 May 1942 Comsowespac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10). Sherman diary, 20 May 1942; Sherman, 100. In his review of Morison’s volume 4, Sherman wrote that Fitch “desired to launch a second attack at targets in the vicinity of the sunken Shōhō but this was disapproved by Fletcher,” letter Sherman to Wellborn (16 August 1950, DNC, Office Files, box 20). Given Fitch’s 070306 message to Fletcher cited above stating that “target prospects are poor” there, it appears that Sherman overstated Fitch’s enthusiasm for that course of action. Burch interview by Buaer (3 September 1942); CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:287.
2. Sherman diary, 22 May 1942. Biard, “The Pacific War,” 13–14, described a fervent thirty-minute discussion in flag plot down on one knee brandishing radio intercepts to Fletcher seated on the transom. Biard claimed that Fletcher sat inert, making no effort to consult with Fitch, supposedly in tactical command. Fletcher then declared: “Young man, you do not understand. I am going to attack them tomorrow,” to which Biard replied, “But Admiral, they are going to attack you today” (Biard’s emphasis). If Fletcher had turned over tactical command, as Biard asserted, that would have been Fitch’s decision. “The picture being painted by our radio intercepts just could not permit this inertia, this indecision, this divided command.” Biard never forgave Fletcher for not taking his advice, and the incident is the centerpiece of his anti-Fletcher philippic. Former Yeoman Thomas Newsome, who was Fletcher’s combat talker, vividly remembered the conversation. He recalled that Biard, “A bantam rooster,” differed with the admiral and repeatedly punctuated his rejoinders by a sharp, “With respect, sir!” To Newsome it appeared neither man gave an inch. Newsome conversation, 6 August 1996. Again it is vital to stress that Fletcher had not turned over tactical command but exercised full control of TF-17. Far from ignoring Fitch or leaving everything to him, he sent at least two messages requesting possible options while the strike planes were landing. Rather patiently given the circumstances, he gave the fiery Biard the chance to state his case, but chose not to accept his counsel. Biard consistently ignored other factors that might have contributed to Fletcher’s decisions and failed to acknowledge that Fletcher constantly consulted with others.
3. Messages 070329 CTF-17 to CTG-17.5, 070350 CTG-17.5 to CTF-17, May 1942, both in Lexington dispatches. Sherman diary (22 May 1942); Sherman letter to Wellborn (16 August 1950, DNC, Office Files, box 20); Lexington action report (15 May 1942). In Combat Command, 100, Sherman opined that because there was no second strike to Deboyne, the carriers must search again, but Fletcher hesitated too long making his decision and wasted the opportunity to do anything more that afternoon. The timing of the signals between Fletcher and Fitch, however, do not bear out Sherman’s charge that Fletcher dawdled. Kinkaid memoir, 96; Bates, Coral Sea, 60; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:43.
4. Lt. Frank F. Gill, The Battle of the Coral Sea, Report of Action 7–8 May, 1942, by Fighter Director, Lexington Papers. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:288–89; Kōdōchōsho (combat logs) of the Fourth, Tainan and Genzan air groups. Messages 070220 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17 and 070426 CTF-44 to Comsowespacfor, May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10; Biard, “The Pacific War,” 14.
5. For the activities of the Support Group on 7 May, see Crace diary; his report Operations in the North Coral Sea—5th to 11th May, 1942; and CTF-44 to Secretary, Naval Board, Attack by Torpedo Bomber and High Level Bomber Aircraft—7th May, 1942 (21 May 1942), copy forwarded by Comsowespacfor to Cominch (26 May 1942); CO USS Chicago to Cincpac, Action Against enemy aircraft, May 7, 1942—Report of (11 May 1942); also Coulthard-Clark, 90–107.
6. Ens. John W. Rowley from VB-5 attacked the Shōhō but became disoriented after chasing an enemy plane. Fortunate not to have run afoul of the Zeros, he later ditched off the New Guinea coast and was rescued along with his radioman. Frank and Harrington, 101.
7. CTF-44 report (21 May 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:288; personal diary and information from Lt. Col. Wallace Fields, USAF (Ret.), a copilot in one of the B-17s. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:39, rightly praised the Support Group’s efforts, but went too far in stating, “Japanese attack was of the same type and strength as the one that sank the H.M.S. Prince of Wales and Repulse” on 10 December 1941. In that case the Japanese employed fifty twin-engine torpedo bombers and sixteen level bombers, whereas Crace faced twelve torpedo planes and twenty-two level bombers, counting the three B-17s. Also the skill of the Japanese on 7 May was much diminished compared to 10 December.
8. Message 070440 May 1942 Comsowespac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10; Crace diary.
9. Lundstrom, First Team, 210. Messages 070449 CTF-17 to CTG-17.5, 070505 CTG-17.5 to Yorktown and Lexington, and 070615 Lexington to Yorktown, all May 1942, Lexington dispatches. Letter Arnold to Lundstrom (9 April 1972).
10. Messages 070418 Neosho to [All U.S. Naval Vessels], 070545 Cincpac to Tippecanoe, 070618 Neosho to Radio Wahiwa, 070405 Naval Observer Suva to Opnav, and 070605 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, all May 1942, CSCMF, roll 10. Message 080755 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Cominch 00 Files, noted that it was in the “late afternoon” the Neosho and Sims were “heavily bombed” and the “Sims sunk.” Message 070621 May 1942 CTF-17 to CTG-17.5, Lexington dispatches.
11. Crace diary; Operations in the North Coral Sea—5th to 11th May, 1942.
12. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:289–90.
13. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:290–91. The message announcing the change in course of the U.S. carrier force to 120 degrees was attributed to an Aoba float plane temporarily operating out of Deboyne. It is not clear whether this report referred to Crace or Fletcher. Certainly the Support Group never changed course to 120 degrees, but the carriers occasionally did when conducting air operations.
14. Yorktown report (16 May 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:302.
15. Fitz-Gerald was gunnery officer of the New Orleans and an astute observer of events. Flatley comment in “Fury in Air over Coral Sea Win Glory for Fliers Here,” Kansas City Star (18 March 1951). Lundstrom, First Team, 209–15.
16. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:292–93.
17. Lundstrom, First Team, 214–16. Comdesron One (CTU-17.2.4) to Cominch, Engagement with Japanese Force 7–8 May 1942 in Coral Sea (22 May 1942); Capt. A. R. Early, Memorandum for Admiral Theobald, U.S. Navy, USS Dixie (11 May 1942), RG-313, Comscofor General Correspondence, box 59; Lt. Frank F. Gill, The Battle of the Coral Sea, Report of Action 7–8 May, 1942, by Fighter Director, Lexington Papers.
18. Messages 070131 Cincpac Intel. Bull., 070828 Comsowespac to all CTFs, May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10.
19. Lundstrom, First Team, 216–17; letter Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson to Joseph Harrington (21 July 1964), in Pederson Papers.
20. The Biard memoir, “The Pacific War,” 14, included the text of many intercepted transmissions from the Japanese strike group. In numerous instances he specifically identified the senders and addressees, that is, ComCardiv 5, Shōkaku, Zuikaku. Again there is a strong question whether these detailed identifications only occurred after the fact. The Hypo summary for 7 May simply referred to the individual carriers by their call signs Siso and Suso, which is very likely all that Biard knew at that exact time. Stroop, oral history, 97–98; Ray interview by Buaer (15 July 1942); messages 071031 and 071253 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 10.
21. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:292–94.
22. Message 071051 May 1942 CTG-17.5 to CTF-17, Lexington dispatches. Stroop, oral history, 97; letter Sherman to Wellborn (16 August 1950, DNC, Office Files, box 20). Sherman wrote in Combat Command, 102, “We reported [Japanese carriers only thirty miles east] to Fletcher, but he was inclined to discredit it. It was confirmed after the war that the Japanese carriers were very close to us. It might have been an excellent opportunity for a night torpedo attack by our destroyers or by the Lexington torpedo plane squadron, which was trained in night landings. But, instead, Fletcher decided to head south to avoid a chance encounter with the enemy during the hours of darkness.” Sherman chose not to mention in his book the long delay in informing Fletcher and that the Japanese carriers were never in fact nearer to TF-17 than about one hundred miles, which was hardly “very close.”
23. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); message 160200 May 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, Greybook, 468–69; Kinkaid memoir, 99; Cincpac First Endorsement (17 June 1942); Biard, “The Pacific War,” 15.
24. Ludlum, 77; letter Vice Adm. Turner Caldwell to R. J. Cressman (20 April 1984), courtesy of Robert Cressman; letter Caldwell to J. C. Sawruk (18 January 1987), courtesy of James Sawruk.
25. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:295–300.
26. Messages 071245 CTG-17.5 to CTF-17 and 071339 CTF-17 to CTG-17.5, May 1942, in USS Yorktown, List of Dispatches and Signals sent, received, and intercepted in May 8, 1942, enclosure to CO USS Yorktown to Cincpac, Report of Action of Yorktown and Yorktown Air Group on May 8, 1942 (25 May 1942), hereafter Yorktown dispatches.
27. Messages 071245 CTF-17 to Comsowespacfor, 071024 CTF-17 to Cincpac, and 071219 Comsowespacfor to all CTFs, all May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 10. The Bishopdale was a large (17,357 tons), modern (1937) fleet oiler with a top speed of only 11.5 knots. Built in 1916, the Kurumba, an “oil supply vessel,” displaced only 7,930 tons, with a top speed of ten knots. Neither ship had trained for underway refueling (Straczek, Royal Australian Navy).
28. Crace diary; message CTF-17 to CTG-17.3, no date and time group, is included in Lexington dispatches. The fact that Fitch had it meant that it must have at least been sent over by the Yorktown.
29. Ugaki, 122; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:300–303; Potter and Nimitz, 216; letter Duckworth to Lundstrom (29 October 1972).
1. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); letter Duckworth to Lundstrom (29 October 1972).
2. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:46; message 071835 May 1942 Comsowespac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 10. Principal documents for 8 May operations include CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); CTG-17.5 report (18 May 1942); CO USS Lexington to Cincpac, Report of Action—The Battle of the Coral Sea, 7 and 8 May 1942 (15 May 1942); Lexington Papers (including reports of VF-2, VB-2, VS-2, and VT-2); Yorktown report (25 May 1942); Commander Cruiser Division Six (Commander Task Group 17.2) to Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet (Commander Task Force Seventeen, Engagement with Japanese Force 7–8 May, 1942 in Coral Sea (28 May 1942). CTU-17.2.2 to Cincpac, Action Report (17 May 1942); Comdesron One (CTU-17.2.4) to Cominch, Engagement with Japanese Force 7–8 May 1942 in Coral Sea (22 May 1942); and CTG-17.5.4 (Comdesron Two) to Cominch, Action in Coral Sea Area on May 8, 1942, report of (18 May 1942); Crace diary, 8 May 1942; and H.M. Australian Squadron, Operations in the North Coral Sea—5th to 11th May, 1942. For a detailed account of air operations, see Lundstrom, First Team, chapter 12.
3. Aerology Section, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Battle of the Coral Sea (April 1944).
4. Lt. Frank F. Gill, The Battle of the Coral Sea, Report of Action 7–8 May, 1942, by Fighter Director, Lexington Papers; Biard, “The Pacific War,” 16; Sherman diary, 20 May 1942; Sherman, Combat Command, 103.
5. Messages in Yorktown dispatches.
6. Yorktown dispatches; CTF-17 report (27 May 1942); messages 072209 Cincpac to CTF-17, 072030 Tangier to Comsowespacfor, and 072332 Comsowespacfor to Cincpac, May 1942, CSCMF, roll 10.
7. Stroop, oral history, 115–16; CO Scouting Squadron Two Report for May 7, 1942 and May 8, 1942, in Lexington Papers.
8. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:303–6.
9. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:306–7.
10. Japan Times & Advertiser (14 March 1942).
11. The Lexington had twelve 5-inch/25 guns, twelve 1.1-inch quad mounts, thirty-two 20-mm cannons and twenty-eight .50-caliber machine guns; the Yorktown had eight 5-inch/38s, four 1.1-inch quads, twenty-four 20-mm and eighteen .50-cal. machine guns. The heavy cruisers each had eight 5-inch/25s, four 1.1-inch quads, and twelve 20-mm guns. The destroyer leader Phelps had two 1.1-inch quads and four 20-mm guns (her eight 5-inch/38s were single-purpose only); the Dewey and Aylwin had five 5-inch/38s and four 20-mm cannons, and the four Desron Two destroyers (Anderson, Hammann, Russell, and Morris) each had four 5-inch/38s and four 20-mm cannons. Some ships had additional machine guns beyond the official authorization listed here (Bureau of Ordnance, Armament Summary, December 1941, and supplements). For a description of the guns, see Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War Two. For how they were employed at Coral Sea: USS Yorktown Air Defense Doctrine, enclosure to Yorktown report (25 May 1942), and Comcrupac to Ships Operating in my Command, Antiaircraft Defense of Task Forces (15 June 1942), in RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files.
12. Yorktown dispatches.
13. Lundstrom, First Team, 245–46. Sherman took the criticism of Gill’s fighter direction as a personal affront: “As I was Commanding Officer of the Lexington at the time and the fighter direction was under my supervision. I considered I was in a better position to judge than the Captain of the Yorktown” (letter Sherman to Wellborn, 16 August 1950, DNC, Office Files, box 20).
14. Stroop, oral history, 103; Ralph Wilhelm diary, 8 May 1942, courtesy of Ralph Wilhelm; conversation with Thomas Newsome (6 August 1996).
15. Early memo for Theobald (11 May 1942), RG-313, Comscofor General Correspondence, box 59.
16. Newsome conversation (15 July 1999); W. W. Smith, 42, and Smith unedited Midway manuscript, 154.
17. W. W. Smith, 46. Message 072356 May 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 10. The date and time group for this message is 072356, that is, 1056 on 8 May, Z-11 time, but that was before the attack, so the message was actually composed and sent later.
18. Lundstrom, First Team, 269–70.
19. Yorktown dispatches; Lt. Cdr. Phillip F. Fitz-Gerald diary, 8 May 1942, via Kenneth Crawford.
20. Yorktown report (25 May 1942); Schindler memorandum (22 May 1942); messages 080137 CTF-17 to Comsowespac, 080204 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 080215 Comsowespac to CTF-17, and 080244 CTF-17 to Comsowespac, May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 11.
21. Message 080101 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 11. The position for the convoy Leary gave was latitude 11° 44´ south, longitude 151° 35´ east on course 210 degrees, whereas the original sighting report made by a B-25 was latitude 7° 44´ south, longitude 151° 35´ east, course 310 degrees (see Air Officer Commanding North East Area, To HQ, Allied Air Forces, Report on Coral Sea Engagement [29 May 1942]).
22. In Biard’s memoir, “The Pacific War,” 16–17, the Zuikaku and Shōkaku are again specifically identified, but it is still not certain whether he knew at the time. The Final Report of the R.I. Unit of the USS Yorktown (23 May 1942) simply noted that it was believed the carrier using the call sign Siso was the one hit, because “Suso started taking Siso’s planes aboard.”
23. W. W. Smith, 46; Yorktown dispatches.
24. Yorktown dispatches; message 080252 May 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 11.
25. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:313–15; Hara quote from U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey “Truk Report,” Supplemental Report, Truk Naval and Naval Air Team No. 3. U.S. intelligence also heard the rebroadcast of Takahashi’s signal (see below). At 1217 Takahashi, who stayed behind to assess damage, advised: “Cancel Saratoga sinking report, wait.” Later returning VF-42 escort fighters shot down the brave strike leader, whose warning would be ignored. Lundstrom, First Team, 271. The latest research on Coral Sea by James C. Sawruk and this author has revealed the hitherto unsuspected attacks on the Zuikaku by Lt. (jg) William S. Woollen of VF-42 and Ens. Marvin M. Haschke and Ens. John D. Wingfield of VS-2.
26. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:317–18.
27. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:323–24.
28. They were the last of the Lexington strike planes to land. Still aloft were two or three SBDs of the command escort, including Commander Ault who was wounded, and also probably a VF-2 F4F from the torpedo escort. Only Ens. Harry Wood’s SBD crew survived. Stroop, oral history, 105.
29. Yorktown dispatches; message 090355 May 1942 CTG-17.5 to CTF-17, Lexington dispatches; messages 080332 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 080348 CTF-17 to CTG-17.3, 080235 Cincpac Intel. Bull., and 080344 CTF-17 to Cincpac, May 1942, CSCMF, roll 11.
30. Yorktown dispatches. Some questioned whether Sherman should have got some planes over to the Yorktown. In his diary on 9 May Commander Fitz-Gerald related how he spoke with several Lexington aviators who said they wanted to fly over to the Yorktown “but were not allowed to.” Thus “Sherman’s refusal to fly those planes off the Lex just because he thought he could control the fires, was sheer bull headed stubborn stupidity.” Lt. Noel Gayler of VF-2 stated in his Buaer interview (17 June 1942) that he and several other fighter pilots wanted to try to fly over to the Yorktown, even though some F4Fs were so low on gasoline they might not make it. It is unfortunate that Fitch had not instructed the Lex strike planes to land on the Yorktown, but neither he nor Sherman realized the grave danger the fires forward posed to the Lexington. It seems in retrospect the Lex might have got a half dozen more F4Fs and eleven VB-2 SBDs to the Yorktown before her steering failed, but that is strictly hindsight.
31. Yorktown dispatches.
32. Early memo for Theobald (11 May 1942), RG-313, Comscofor General Correspondence, box 59; at noon the Phelps was at 63 percent and the Aylwin 57 percent, but the Dewey only 43 percent. A day’s hard steaming reduced them on the ninth to 47 percent, 45 percent, and 23 percent respectively.
33. Yorktown dispatches; Biard, “The Pacific War,” 17.
34. Message 080532 May 1942 Comsowespac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 11; Crace diary.
35. W. W. Smith, 47; Lundstrom, First Team, 282.
36. Lexington report (15 May 1942); Commander Cruiser Division Six (Commander Task Group 17.2) to Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet (Commander Task Force Seventeen), Engagement with Japanese Force 7–8 May, 1942 in Coral Sea (28 May 1942); Comdesron One to CTG-17.2, Sinking of USS Lexington (14 May 1942); Early memo for Theobald (11 May 1942), RG-313, Comscofor General Correspondence, box 59.
37. Message 080713 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 11; 080838 May 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, in Cominch 00 File.
38. Message 080935 May 1942 Cincpac to Commanding General (CG) Bobcat etc., CSCMF, roll 11 (“Bobcat” is the code name for Bora-Bora); 080755 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Cominch 00 File; Greybook, 443. The next day Cominch ordered VF-5, VF-72, and the VT-8 Detachment equipped with new Grumman TBF-1 torpedo bombers to proceed from Norfolk to Alameda, message 081900 May 1942 Cominch to Cinclant, CSCMF, roll 11.
39. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:326–27. On 9 May the Zuikaku had available twenty-four fighters, nine carrier bombers, and six carrier attack planes, with another fighter, eight carrier bombers, and eight carrier attack planes expected to be ready in a couple of days.
40. Sherman diary (22 May 1942); Sherman, 116; Biard, “The Pacific War,” 16–17; Parker, 30.
41. Yorktown report (25 May 1942); message 090355 May 1942 CTG-17.5 to CTF-17, Lexington dispatches. The Lexington and the Yorktown tried to guide the wounded Ault back to TF-17 but never had him on radar. At 1454 Ault gave his farewell: “OK, So long people. We got a 1000 lb. hit on the flat top.” He and his radioman were never found. Yorktown dispatches. Biard, “The Pacific War,” 14.
42. CTF-17 report (27 May 1942).
43. Parker, 30. Message 080110 May 1942 Belconnen to Combined Addressees, CSCMF, roll 11; Yorktown dispatches; Biard, “The Pacific War,” 16. The quoted text of the Tokyo message relayed at 1315 (Z-11) is Hypo’s version from SRH-278, 262–63. Message 080235 May 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 11. Biard, “The Pacific War,” 16.
44. Messages 080856, 080912, 082028, and 082156 Com 14 to Combined Addressees; 082301 Opnav to Combined Addressees, all May 1942, in CSCMF, roll 11.
45. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:63; Sherman, 63; Fitz-Gerald diary (9 May 1942). Prados, 290, proposed a dramatic new interpretation. “Though it is not clear from available sources,” Combined Fleet never intended to employ the Shōkaku and Zuikaku in the Midway Operation. He cited Professor Michael Barnhart as his authority. There is no documentation supporting Prados’s assertion. The 5th Carrier Division appeared in the Midway planning documents cited in Senshi Sōsho, volume 43. On page 96 of that volume is Combined Fleet Secret Radio 29 of 8 May 1942, which provided the first timetable for the MI Operation. In it the damaged Shōkaku is removed from Nagumo’s 1st Kidō Butai. Furthermore, Professor Barnhart in an e-mail to Lundstrom (8 September 2000) did not confirm the statement Prados had attributed to him.
1. Russell war diary; Early memo for Theobald (11 May 1942), RG-313, Comscofor General Correspondence, box 59. Conversations of Capt. Frederic L. Faulkner, USN (Ret.), and Capt. Laurence C. Traynor, USN (Ret.), with James C. Sawruk.
2. Fitz-Gerald diary, 9 May 1942.
3. Ludlum, 92–93; Capt. Joseph G. Smith, USN (Ret.), phone conversation with Lundstrom, 23 November 1984. The four VS-2 pilots who flew the mission were Dixon, Smith, Lt. Hoyt D. Mann, and Ens. John A. Leppla. Frederickson diary, 9 May 1942. Kinkaid memoir, 115; W. W. Smith undated (c. 1950) review of Morison’s volume 3. Comcru TF-17 war diary.
4. Vice Adm. W. G. Schindler, USN (Ret.), “The Finale of the Battle of the Coral Sea,” enclosed in his 4 June 1972 letter to Lundstrom.
5. Message 090117 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, Greybook, 452. In 1947 Fletcher told Capt. Fred C. Dickey at the Naval War College that he recalled receiving orders on 8 May from Cincpac to withdraw from the Coral Sea, but he was mistaken as to the day; Bates, Coral Sea, 103.
6. Messages 090301 CTF-17 to CTG-17.2, 090347 CTF-17 to CTG-17.2 and CTG-17.5, 090355 CTG-17.5 to CTF-17, and 090445 CTG-17.5 to CTF-17, all May 1942, in Lexington dispatches. Message 090355 May 1942 Comsowespacfor to CTF-17, Greybook, 447. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:60–61. Ludlum, 93; Frederickson diary, 9 May 1942.
7. Messages 091116 CTF-17 to CTF-44 and 092102 CTF-17 to Cincpac, May 1942, in Cominch 00 File; Fitz-Gerald diary, 10 May 1942; Sherman diary, 22 May 1942. Anderson and Dewey logs.
8. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:328–30, 250–54.
9. Messages 100303 CTF-17 to CTG-17.2, 100835 Cincpac to CTF-17, 110450 CTF-17 to CTG-17.2, and 110525 CTG-17.2 to CTF-17, May 1942, in Lexington dispatches; 100830 CTF-17 to Cincpac and 100845 Cincpac to CTF-17 and CTG-17.5, May 1942, in Cominch 00 File; Smith, 48–49.
10. SRH-272, 7–8 May 1942; messages 090117 Cincpac to CTF-17 and 090207 Cincpac to Cominch, May 1942, Greybook, 452; 090031 May 1942 Cincpac to NY Puget Sound, CSCMF, roll 11.
11. SRH-272, 7–9 May 1942; message 090054 May 1942 Com 14 to Combined Addressees, CSCMF, roll 11.
12. The Greybook entry, 472, for 8 May 1942 noted “distressing news from the Coral Sea,” but this must have been written early on the ninth, otherwise the timing is inexplicable. Layton, oral history, 28; message 091507 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, Cominch 00 File; 092219 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 11; 111325 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Cominch 00 File.
13. Message 100045 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 11; Greybook, 473.
14. TF-16 war diary. Messages 120041 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, 120429 Cincpac Intel. Bull., May 1942, CSCMF, roll 11.
15. Buell, Master, 200; Brodhurst, 224–25, with the text of King’s communications with the Admiralty; message 121945 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 11.
16. Messages 121950 and 132140 Cominch to Cincpac, May 1942, Greybook, 464, 467.
17. Greybook, 479; message 140319 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, CSCMF, roll 11; letter Layton to Lundstrom (12 June 1974); Layton interview by Pineau and Costello (11 May 1983). Lundstrom, First South Pacific Campaign, 144–49, 154–55.
18. Message 140639 series May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 465–67; Greybook, 481.
19. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:255–58; TF-16 war diary; message 150445 May 1942 CTF-16 to CTG-17.2, CSCMF, roll 11.
20. Message 152130 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 468.
21. Greybook, 482; messages 160307 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, Greybook, 469; 160325 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 471; 170025 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 12.
22. Messages 132043 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, Greybook, 458; 122113 Cincpac to CTF-17, 140439 Cincpac to CTF-17, 142330 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 142348 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 152358 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 160105 Cincpac to CTF-17, 160905 Cincpac to CTF-17, all May 1942, CSCMF, roll 11; 170320 May 1942 Fletcher to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 12. Frank and Harrington, 136.
23. Letter Adams to Crace (29 May 1942) in Crace diary, 4 June 1942.
24. Message 110439 May 1942 CTF-17 to CTG-17.2, Lexington dispatches; 110216 May 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, Cominch 00 File; 112100 May 1942 CTF-11 to Cincpac, Greybook, 463.
25. Messages 131412 Cominch to Cincpac, 140125 Cincpac to CTF-17, May 1942, CSCMF, roll 11; 152126 May 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, Greybook, 471.
26. Messages May 1942: 142100 series Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 460–61; 170508 Comsowespacfor to Cincpac, Greybook, 470; 170537 Cincpac to Comsowespacfor, Greybook, 469–70; 190345 Comsowespac to Cincpac, Greybook, 493.
27. Message 200359 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 486–87.
28. Message 111245 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 468; Greybook, 475; 141826 May 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 11; 150825 Cincpac to CTF-17, 160200 CTF-17 to Cincpac, May 1942, Greybook, 468–69.
29. Message 180357 Cincpac to CTF-17, 182322 CTF-17 to Cincpac, and 180403 Cincpac to CTF-16, May 1942, CSCMF, roll 12; 171927 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, Greybook, 491.
30. Greybook, 483; message 170407 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 490; 172220 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 489–90.
31. Messages 172220 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 489–90; 182030 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 492; 210137 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 488; 220135 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, and 240543 Comsowespac to Cincpac, May 1942, CSCMF, roll 12.
32. Comcru TF-17 war diary, 26 May 1942.
1. The basic U.S. documentary sources for the Battle of Midway are: Cincpac to Cominch, Battle of Midway (28 June 1942) with the enclosures CTF-17 to Cincpac, Battle of Midway—Forwarding of Reports (26 June 1942); CTF-16 to Cincpac, Battle of Midway; forwarding of reports (16 June 1942); Comcru TF-17 to Cincpac, Report of Action (12 June 1942); and CO NAS Midway to Cincpac, Report of Engagement with Enemy, Battle of Midway, 30 May to 7 June 1942 (18 June 1942). Cincpac to Cominch, Battle of Midway, Second Supplementary Report (8 August 1942) covers submarine operations. See also CO USS Yorktown to Secnav, Loss of Ship—Report on (17 June 1942). In 1947 the Office of Naval Operations published The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway, which is a translation of the battle report of Vice Adm. Nagumo Chuichi’s First Air Fleet (1st Kidō Butai), hereafter Nagumo report. The original text is in NHC microfilm JD1 along with the Midway battle reports of the Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū, translated excerpts of which are in WDC Document 160985B.
Official studies include: U.S. Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander In Chief, Secret Information Bulletin No. 1, Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway December 1941 to June 1942 including Makin Island Raid 17–18 August (15 February 1943); U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, Publication Section, Combat Intelligence Branch, Combat Narratives, The Battle of Midway (Washington, 1943); U.S. Naval War College (Commo. Richard W. Bates), The Battle of Midway including the Aleutian Phase June 3 to June 14, 1942 (hereafter Bates, Midway); and U.S. Army, Headquarters Far East Command: Japanese Monograph No. 88: Aleutian Naval Operation March 1942–February 1943 and Japanese Monograph No. 93: Midway Operations May–June 1942.
The literature on the Battle of Midway is vast. Serious analyses include: Morison, United States Naval Operations, vol. 4; Fuchida and Okumiya; Tuleja, Climax at Midway; W. W. Smith; Lord, Incredible Victory; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, vol. 43; Barde, The Battle of Midway; Prange, Miracle; Willmott; Lundstrom, The First Team; Cressman et al., “A Glorious Page in Our History”; and Parker. Cressman et al., Glorious Page, offers the most accurate chronological narrative of the entire battle from the U.S. side, and Senshi Sōsho, vol. 43, the most comprehensive Japanese account. Unfortunately the classic Fuchida and Okumiya must be used with caution.
2. Fuchida and Okumiya, 95–97, 99; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:92–94.
3. Lord, 15; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:71–77.
4. Combined Fleet Secret Radio 29 of 8 May 1942, text in Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:96–97.
5. Fragmentary decrypts relating to the Second Operation K, the so-called #2 King Campaign, caused considerable consternation among U.S. code breakers and planners, some of whom thought it portended a major assault on Oahu. See RG-457, SRMN-005, Op-20-G Files of Memoranda and Reports relative to the Battle of Midway, and also Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton’s unpublished paper, “2nd Operation K,” copy furnished by Admiral Layton.
6. Combined Fleet Operation-Order 14 (12 May 1942), cited in Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:106–14; Fuchida and Okumiya, 86–87; Prange, Miracle, 70; Japanese Monograph No. 88, 25–29.
7. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:114; Prange, Miracle, 47–48; Ugaki, 127; Fuchida and Okumiya, 105–9.
8. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:119–21; Ugaki, 128; Layton, “2nd Operation K”; Ugaki, 131.
9. Ugaki, 128, 142.
10. Enterprise deck log.
11. Fletcher interview by Prange, 17 September 1966; W. W. Smith, 55; Fletcher interview by Lord, 17 February 1966; letter W. W. Smith to “Mark” (3–9 June 1942) in Smith Papers. Captain Biard, the former language officer with the TF-17 radio intelligence unit, claimed in his memoir, “The Pacific War,” 17, that even before TF-17 returned to Tongatabu, Fletcher was receiving voluminous reports regarding the upcoming Midway offensive. That led him to consult Biard, who explained all about Hypo and assured him “the information could be trusted.” There is no evidence at all that any of this ever occurred. Nimitz told Layton not to mention Midway in the daily intelligence bulletins: “Don’t even hint about it,” and “Hold this one real close” (Layton interview by Pineau and Costello, 11 May 1983). Only the high-level messages between King and Nimitz, occasionally also with MacArthur and Halsey, discussed the impending Midway offensive. Fletcher lacked the ciphers to read them. None were ever addressed to him. The message files demonstrate that Fletcher indeed knew nothing about the threat to Midway before he entered Nimitz’s office on 27 May.
12. Halsey and Bryan, 106; W. W. Smith, 55; letter Rear Adm. William H. Buracker, USN (Ret.), to Walter Lord (10 March 1966), copy in Adm. Raymond A. Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 2; letter Rear Adm. William H. Ashford Jr., USN (Ret.), to Cdr. Thomas B. Buell (24 November 1971), Rear Adm. William H. Ashford Papers.
13. NHC, Officer Biographical File; Buell, Master, 116; quotes from King in Whitehill memo, 14 August 1949, in King Papers, NWC, box 7; personal communication from Lt. Cdr. Richard H. Best, USN (Ret.); letter W. W. Smith to “Mark” (3/9 June 1942) in Smith Papers.
14. Messages all May 1942: 070155 Cincpac to Bunav, CSCMF, roll 10; 082359 Cincpac to Bunav, 150105 Cincpac to Bunav, 162221 Bupers (Bureau of Naval Personnel) to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 11; and 281929 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 13. Coletta, Patrick N. L. Bellinger and U.S. Naval Aviation, 297, 302.
15. Letter Ashford to Buell (24 November 1971); letter Comcarpac to Comcrupac (25 May 1942), Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 1. The specific recommendation for Draemel’s relief does not appear in either the King or Nimitz papers. The only relevant dispatch is 261525 of May 1942, “Connav” [Chief of the Bureau of Navigation?] to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 12. It was sent in reply to a query by Nimitz on 24 May whether action was taken on his serial 01354 of 7 May 1942. Unclear as to what he meant, King replied in message 261525 if the query “relates to officers Nos. 28 [Brown], 65 [Draemel] and 74 [Spruance], necessary approval obtained & appropriate orders issued in each case.” In fact Nimitz’s letter (in NHC, Nimitz Papers) referred to the problem of the large population of Japanese aliens residing in Hawaii. E. B Potter, Nimitz’s close associate and biographer, alleged in Nimitz, 84, that Spruance’s sterling qualities were already so obvious that Nimitz “must have suspected” that switching him for Halsey “was not altogether for the worse,” because “Halsey’s impulsive boldness might have invited disaster.” That is hindsight at its worst. Prange, Miracle, 81; message 280339 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 13.
16. Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior, 133–34; Forrestel, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, 35. Letter Vice Adm. Victor D. Long to Cdr. Thomas B. Buell (7 November 1971), Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 2; W. W. Smith, 62.
17. Letter Nimitz to King (29 May 1942), Nimitz Papers.
18. Message 280233 May 1942 Cincpac to NY Pearl Harbor, CSCMF, roll 13; Greybook, 512; letter W. W. Smith to “Mark” (3/9 June 1942).
19. Potter, Nimitz, 86.
20. Fletcher interview by Prange (17 September 1966); letter Spruance to Potter (1 December 1964) in Potter Papers.
21. Cincpac Op-Plan 29–42 (27 May 1942), in RG-38, Op-Ord File; messages 211930 and 251735 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File; Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Command History (1946), Naval Administrative Histories, 74.
22. Message 250215 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 528.
23. Text of the 26 May situation estimate in Greybook, 506–21; letter Nimitz to Draemel (23 May 1942), text appended as D1 in Unit History, NAS Midway (14 September 1945).
24. Cincpac Enemy Activities File, 21 May 1942, SRH-272. Letter Nimitz to Davis (undated, but 24–25 May 1942) and Compatwing Two (Rear Admiral Bellinger) memorandum (23 May 1942), text appended as D3 and D4 in Unit History, NAS Midway (14 September 1945). On 18 May a decrypt (181900 May 1942 Com 14 to Combined Addressees, CSCMF, roll 12) revealed that a staff officer of the First Air Fleet was requesting that weather reports be made three hours prior to takeoff from N-2 Days to N-Day, “As we plan to make attacks roughly from the (northwest?),” and that “on the day of the attack we will endeavor to blank at a point 50 miles northwest of Afirm Fox [AF] and move pilots off as quickly as possible.” Nimitz took that warning seriously and immediately (182145 May 1942 Cincpac to Midway, Greybook, 496) changed the submarine Cachalot’s orders to “patrol that area until further orders.” The Japanese message originated prior to the change in Nagumo’s plan that delayed the first carrier strike on Midway from N-3 to N-2 day.
25. Letter Davis to Nimitz (26 May 1942), text appended as D2 in Unit History, NAS Midway (14 September 1945).
26. Op-Plan 29–42 (27 May 1942); Cincpac Letter of Instruction delivered 28 May 1942 by War Plans to CTF-16 and CTF-17; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 134.
27. Greybook, 508, 516.
28. Letters Fletcher to Nimitz (28 May 1942), Nimitz to King (29 May 1942), Nimitz Papers.
29. Message 290205 May 1942 Cincpac to TF-17, CSCMF, roll 13; letter Buckmaster to W. W. Smith (22 August 1964), Smith Papers.
30. TF-16 war diary; Enterprise war diary. Indeed on 31 May after receiving an authorizing dispatch from Bupers, Mitscher took the oath and accepted the appointment as temporary rear admiral to date from 4 December 1941 (Hornet deck log). However, he remained in a captain’s billet and continued to be regarded as such. CO USS Hornet to Cincpac, Report of Action—4–6 June 1942 (13 June 1942).
31. Biard, “The Pacific War,” 15, 17; Capt. Forrest R. Biard, oral history 98. Fullinwider’s new radio operators were W. H. “Tack” Walvoord, M. G. Albertson, and Raymond A. Rundle, radiomen, first class. See RG-457, SRH-313, Memo for Cdr. P. P. Leigh, USNR, Task Force Sixteen (USS Enterprise—Flag (Midway Battle, 3–6 June 1942) (11 September 1945); and also Raymond A. Rundle, oral history, Naval Security Group (September 1983), RG-457.
Captain Biard never ceased to revile Fletcher, whom he repeatedly accused of gross incompetence and of trying to harm his career. However, his unremitting portrait of an hysterical, profane, and inept Fletcher is nowhere evident in any of the other available primary sources and completely contradicted by surviving members of the staff and flag complements. For example, Rear Adm. Murr Arnold, USN (Ret.), former Yorktown air officer, wrote W. W. Smith (13 September 1965), “Fletcher was all right [Arnold’s emphasis] in my book and didn’t deserve any criticism from Morison” (Smith Papers). Nor do Biard’s charges stand after a detailed analysis of all the events. Discussing the unpublished memoir that Biard furnished him, Rear Admiral Layton told coauthors Roger Pineau and John Costello: “I wouldn’t want to quote any of this.” Layton added: “That’s Biard’s problem. I think he’s pretty inclined to think that he is always right. I may suffer from the same disease” (11 May 1983 interview transcript, 96, Layton Papers). Perhaps Vice Adm. Walter Schindler from the TF-17 staff made the fairest evaluation: “We had a Japanese language officer (I’m not sure of his name) on our staff with four [sic] Japanese language radio operators. They did an excellent job in intercepting enemy radio traffic. However, this traffic was not always timely or correctly translated or interpreted. Thus this intelligence was sometimes most useful and at others, confusing” (letter Schindler to Lundstrom, 4 June 1972).
32. Letter Pederson to Joseph Harrington (21 July 1964), Pederson Papers; letter Pederson to Lundstrom (16 September 1974); Fletcher interview by Lord (17 February 1966).
33. Lundstrom, First Team, 318, and The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, 7, 10, 13.
34. Rear Adm. Harry A. Guthrie questionnaire (c. 1966) to Walter Lord, courtesy of Walter Lord; letter Buckmaster to W. W. Smith (22 August 1964), W. W. Smith Papers.
35. Letter Capt. M. B. Laing, RN, to Col. Robert E. Barde, USMC (6 December 1966), via Mark Horan; details of Laing’s career from Commo. Bruce Loxton, RAN (Ret.); Vice Adm. W. G. Schindler questionnaire (c. 1966) to Walter Lord.
36. Letter Nimitz to King (29 May 1942), Nimitz Papers.
37. Frank and Harrington, 147; letter W. W. Smith to “Mark” (3/9 June 1942), “Mark” to W. W. Smith (23 May 1942), Smith Papers; Time (18 May 1942), 18.
38. Lundstrom, First Team, 319; Lt. Joseph P. Pollard, oral history.
39. Messages 300227 and 300231 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, CSCMF, roll 13; Cincpac Op-Plan 29–42.
40. Messages 300050 and 301745 May 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Cominch 00 File.
41. Message 310221 May 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 13. The substance of this secret dispatch appeared on the front page of the 7 June Chicago Tribune in the celebrated security leak involving reporter Stanley Johnston. Message 310357 May 1942 Cincpac to NAS Midway, Greybook, 533; 280428 May 1942 Belconnen to Combined Addressees, Greybook, 545.
42. Message 282150 May 1942 CTF-1 to TF-1, CSCMF, roll 13; Greybook, 564; messages 290408 May 1942 CTF-1 to Cincpac, 292010 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-1, 012341 June 1942 Cincpac to Comcarpac Admin, and 022053 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-1, all in CSCMF, roll 13.
43. Messages 022039 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17; 302055 May 1942 Cincpac to Saratoga; 011733 CTG-11.1 to Cincpac, 030141 Fitch to Cincpac, both June 1942, CSCMF, roll 13.
44. Messages 022205 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, Cominch 00 File; and 022319 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-4, CTF-9, CTF-17, CTF-16, and Midway, CSCMF, roll 13.
45. Letter Fletcher to Morison (1 December 1947), Fletcher Papers; Bates, Midway, 62–63; Interview of Rear Adm. George D. Murray by Buaer (25 November 1942), NHC. Murr Arnold wrote: “The bald truth is that we simply didn’t know how to maneuver 2 or 3 carriers in one formation” (letter to W. W. Smith, 18 February 1965, Smith Papers). Adm. John Thach remained highly critical of the decision to operate the carriers in two separate task forces (Thach, oral history, 273–75).
46. Letter Davis to Nimitz (26 May 1942), NAS Midway history.
47. Cincpac Op-Plan 29–42 (27 May 1942). “Cocked and primed” from M. R. Browning Memorandum for Admiral Spruance (13 June 1942), in RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files.
48. Pollard, oral history.
1. Message 310357 May 1942 Cincpac to CTF-4, CTF-9, CTF-16, CTF-17, and NAS Midway, Greybook, 533; SRMN-012 with the daily fleet intelligence summaries noted on 31 May (p. 458), “It is still believed that initial attack by the striking force will be on Midway and the Aleutians on 3 June (local),” and on 3 June (p. 485), “It had been expected that this attack [on Dutch Harbor] would take place simultaneously with the attack on Midway.”
2. Pollard, oral history; letter Laing to Barde (6 December 1966).
3. Message 031637 June 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 13; Layton, oral history, 48.
4. Midway contact reports in CO NAS Midway to Cincpac, Report of Engagement with Enemy, Battle of Midway, 30 May to 7 June 1942 (18 June 1942). See also Pertinent Extracts from Communications Logs Relative to Midway Attack, in Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers as President, Map Room File, box 36. This undated communication log (hereafter TF-16 communication log) is absolutely invaluable in providing radio messages recorded nowhere else. Messages 032513 and 032207 June 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 13.
5. Ugaki, 137.
6. Messages 040017 Cincpac to all CTFs and 040245 Cincpac to Cominch, June 1942, in CSCMF, roll 14.
7. Messages 040711, 040811, 041035, and 041203, June 1942, Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 14.
8. Fletcher interview by Prange (17 September 1966); TF-16 communication log; messages 041505 and 041617 Cincpac to all CTFs, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
9. VP-44 Op-Ord No. 13–44 (4 June 1942), courtesy of James Sawruk; message 041803 June 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 14.
10. Comcrupac to Cincpac, Battle of Midway (14 June 1942), RG-38.
11. Layton, oral history, 30. It has been reported that Layton made his celebrated prediction as early as 27 May (see Potter, Nimitz, 83, and Prange, Miracle, 102). Prange, 408, even discounted Layton’s direct testimony that the remark occurred on the morning of 4 June only an hour before he and Nimitz learned of the sighting of Nagumo’s carriers. Unfortunately the description of the incident in Layton’s posthumously published And I Was There, 430, 438, compounds the error of Potter and Prange. Likewise Parker, 53, was misled.
12. The principal sources for the 1st Kidō Butai include: the Nagumo report; the four carrier reports in WDC Document 160985B; Japanese Monograph No. 93; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, vol. 43; Fuchida and Okumiya; and Prange, Miracle.
13. Prange, Dawn, 107–9; Evans and Peattie, 529; Fuchida and Okumiya, 112. Capt. Hara Tameichi in Japanese Destroyer Captain, 34–35, described Nagumo, under whom he served in the early 1930s, as a “brilliant and aggressive naval officer and a most kind-hearted man.” For a comparison of U.S. and Japanese command styles, see Layton, oral history.
14. Bates, Midway, 86.
15. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:297; Ugaki, 141; Prange, Miracle, 214–15. Vital new research on Nagumo has recently appeared in the Naval War College Review: Isom, “The Battle of Midway,” and Parshall, Dickson, and Tully, “Doctrine Matters.” The forthcoming book Shattered Sword by Parshall and Tully will revolutionize interpretations of the Battle of Midway and refute many currently held myths. Isom is also writing a book on Midway.
16. CO NAS Midway to Cincpac, Report of Engagement with Enemy, Battle of Midway, 30 May to 7 June 1942 (18 June 1942).
17. TF-16 communication log; Layton, oral history.
18. TF-16 communication log; message 041823 June 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 14.
19. Letter Buracker to Lord (10 March 1966) in Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 2; interview of Lt. Robert J. Oliver by Thomas B. Buell (5 October 1971), in Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 3. Bates, Midway, 122; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 144–46.
20. Letter Spruance to Forrestel (14 December 1962), Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 7: “I wanted to hit the Japanese carriers as early as possible with all the air strength available for this purpose.”
21. Mears, Carrier Combat, 52–53; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 146. TF-16 war diary.
22. Bates, Midway, 122–23. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:113; Citation File, NHC. See my introduction to the 1987 reprint of Buell’s Quiet Warrior, x–xv.
23. Letter Oliver to Buell (5 August 1971), in Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 3; TF-16 war diary and communication. Basic procedures and definitions were set down in Comairbatfor, Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet Aircraft, Vol. One, Carrier Aircraft, USF-74 (Revised) of March 1941, and in Comairbatfor, Current Tactical Orders, Aircraft Carriers, U.S. Fleet, USF-77 (Revised) of March 1941.
24. Air Operations Officer to CO USS Hornet, Defects Observed During the Action Off Midway on June 4, 1942 (12 June 1942); letter Arnold to W. W. Smith (18 February 1965), Smith Papers; letter Henry Salomon Jr., to S. E. Morison (13 August 1947), in Morison Office Files, box 23; USF-77 (Revised); Murray interview by Buaer (25 November 1942); CTF-16 [Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid] to Cincpac, Recent Operations of Task Force Sixteen (10 September 1942), in RG-38, Action Reports.
25. CO USS Hornet to Cincpac, Report of Action—4–6 June 1942 (13 June 1942); Lundstrom, First Team, 333; Gay, Sole Survivor, 115. Photos exist of the Hornet planes arrayed on deck, National Museum of Naval Aviation Museum, NAS Pensacola.
26. CO USS Enterprise to Cincpac, Battle of Midway Island, June 4–6, 1942—Report of (8 June 1942) and CO USS Enterprise to Cincpac, Air Battle of the Pacific, June 4–6, 1942—Report of (13 June 1942). For the procedures used at Wake, see CO USS Enterprise to Cincpac, Report of Action on February 24, 1942 (Zone Minus Twelve) Against Wake Island (8 March 1942). For details of the Enterprise launch, Mark Horan has graciously shared his unparalleled knowledge of the Enterprise Air Group in the Battle of Midway.
27. On 24 February the launches were slowed by poor visibility when halos of water droplets stirred up by propellers encircled each SBD as it ran up the deck. One SBD pilot crashed due to the disorientation. Murray interview by Buaer (25 November 1942).
28. This was the sighting report transmitted by the Tone Number Four search plane at 0740, although the message was timed 0728. Ugaki, 149, confirmed Yamamoto monitored that message at 0740. Slonim’s “A Flagship View of Command Decisions,” 85, stated this message was “a plain language contact report” that gave “our position and the composition of our force.” Potter, Nimitz, 94, asserted that Hypo at Pearl deciphered it. However, Hypo’s Running Log of Midway Operations, 4 June 1942, in SRMN-012, 500, related that at 0740 an enemy plane (call sign Meku 4) “sends on 7110 to Mari a 4 kana nigori despatch, his number 3.” Hypo did intercept a plain language from Mari at 0747.
29. Letter Rear Adm. M. R. Browning to S. E. Morison (8 October 1947), Morison Office Files, box 23; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 147. Bates wrote Morison (31 August 1948) claiming the Enterprise was “not too slow in launching VT” because torpedo planes always had to be brought up from the hangar. Thus this “delay was purely carrier operation and not mismanagement.” Bates also erred that the “Enterprise completed her launch about the same time as the Hornet.” The Hornet finished eleven minutes ahead. Bates Papers, series I, box 2.
30. Comcrudiv Six to CTF-16, Report of Action, June 4, 1942 (11 June 1942).
31. Lundstrom, First Team, 335–36; letter Capt. C. W. McClusky to S. E. Morison (c. 1947), Morison Office Files, box 23.
32. Comcrupac to Cincpac, Battle of Midway (14 June 1942); CO USS Yorktown to Cincpac, Report of Action for June 4, 1942, and June 6, 1942 (18 June 1942); CTF-17 to Cincpac, Battle of Midway—Forwarding of Reports (26 June 1942); Comcru TF-17 war diary.
33. Bates, Midway, 125; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:114; Morison, Two-Ocean War, 154.
34. Lord, 154; letter Arnold to W. W. Smith (18 February 1965), Smith Papers; letter Capt. O. Pederson to S. E. Morison (5 December 1947), Pederson Papers.
35. Letter Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson to Lundstrom (13 October 1974), where he noted the Yorktown was “mildly criticized” for taking that risk; Lundstrom, First Team, 340.
36. Comcrupac report (14 June 1942); Arnold letter to W. W. Smith (18 February 1965). Letter Arnold to Morison (30 October 1947), in Morison Office Files, box 23.
37. Pollard, oral history.
38. Letter Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson to Lundstrom (16 September 1974); Thach, oral history, 273; letter Rear Adm. M. F. Leslie to W. W. Smith (15 December 1964), Smith Papers.
39. Basic air reports include: CO USS Yorktown report (18 June 1942), Commander Bombing Squadron Three [Lt. Cdr. M. F. Leslie] to Commander Yorktown Air Group, Attack Conducted June 4, 1942, on Japanese Carriers Located 156 miles NW Midway Island—Narrative Concerning (7 June 1942); Commander Bombing Squadron Three [Lt. D. W. Shumway] to CO USS Enterprise, Report of Action—period 4 June 1942 to 6 June 1942, inclusive (10 June 1942); CO, Fighting Squadron Three, to CO USS Yorktown, The Battle of Midway—Combat Report (12 June 1942). For VT-3: Report by Wilhelm George Esders, Combat Air Patrol, U.S. Navy (6 June 1942); and Statement by H. L. Corl, Mach., USN (15 June 1942), copies in Pederson Papers. TF-16 communications log.
40. Nagumo report, 14, 2; Cressman et al., Glorious Page, 69–73.
41. Nagumo report, 14; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:313–14. The articles by Isom and Parshall, Dickson, and Tully provide invaluable new information and insights for the discussion of Japanese carrier rearming techniques and their impact on Nagumo’s decisions.
42. Prange, Miracle, 214–15. Tomonaga’s message did not actually use the words, “There is need for a second attack wave,” but “Kawa Kawa Kawa,” SRMN-012, 500. That appears to have been a predetermined code recommending a second attack and adds to the impression that Nagumo had considered this contingency all along.
43. Nagumo report, 15; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:304–12; Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral, 314 (Agawa read Amari’s given name as “Hiroshi”); Gakken Pacific War series, Shōkaku-kei Kūbō, 155. Amari later converted to night fighters and died on 13 May 1945 over Okinawa (Hata and Izawa, Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II, 402).
44. Comparing the message log in the Nagumo report and Hypo’s running log in SRMN-012 shows that Nagumo’s call sign was “Mari,” Abe’s “Seso,” and Amari’s “Meku 4.” Isom’s stirring defense of Amari’s actions is not warranted given the facts. Also his assertion, based on statements in the Nagumo report (7, 42), that Nagumo himself only received word of the sighting “about” 0800, is contradicted by the message Nagumo indeed sent Amari at 0747: “Ascertain ship types and maintain contact.” That time is independently confirmed by Hypo, which logged it at 0747 as “Mari comes back to Meku 4 with plain text: ‘Retain contact,’” SRMN-012, 500.
45. Nagumo report, 15; Willmott, 388.
46. Cressman et al., Glorious Page, 75–82.
47. Nagumo report, 15; Fuchida, 169–70; Prange, Miracle, 232; DCNO (Air), Administrative Histories, Vol. XVI, Aviation in the Fleet Exercises, 1911–1939, 163.
48. Nagumo report, 7; Prange, Miracle, 232–33.
49. Prange, Miracle, 225, 231–33; Ugaki, 161; Fuchida and Okumiya, 163.
50. Nagumo report, 16–17.
51. Nagumo report, 17.
52. Letter Laing to Barde (6 December 1966). Jon Parshall personal communication.
53. NAS Midway report (18 June 1942); Cincpac rebroadcast the message at 1007 (042151 June 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 14).
54. TF-16 communication log; TF-16 war diary; Lundstrom, First Team, 343–44. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:122, quoted McClusky’s retort: “Wilco, as soon as I find the bastards,” but that is apocryphal. McClusky sighted distant Japanese ships at 1002, CO USS Enterprise report (13 June 1942).
55. TF-16 communication log, TF-16 war diary.
56. TF-16 communication log; message 042301 June 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 14.
57. Comcru TF-17 war diary.
58. Letter R. A. Spruance to C. W. Nimitz (8 June 1942), in RG-38, Action Reports. Spruance included a copy in his 8 June 1942 letter to Fletcher, Spruance Papers, coll. 12, series 1, box 2. Mark Horan, coauthor of “A Glorious Page in our History,” brought this important letter to my attention. Letter Arnold to W. W. Smith (18 February 1965), Smith Papers. Lundstrom, First Team, 341–64, and Cressman et al., Glorious Page, 91–110.
59. Lundstrom, First Team, 344–48.
60. Mears, 68.
61. TF-16 communication log; the original of Leslie’s report (10 June 1942) in Pederson Papers; letter Leslie to W. W. Smith (15 December 1964), Smith Papers.
62. Fuchida and Okumiya, 177, stated the Akagi had her full strike on deck and that in five minutes would have launched them all. That is false, as research by Parshall and Tully has established. The Japanese Official History noted that aside from a few fighters no carriers had any planes on deck. Lt. Cdr. Richard Best, the first to dive on the Akagi, recalled to this author seeing only six or seven Zeros spotted far aft. One combat air patrol Zero took off during his dive. Also Leslie’s report (7 June 1942) stated that he did not see any planes on the deck of the carrier [Sōryū] that VB-3 attacked. TF-16 communication log.
63. Research by Parshall and Tully shows that instead of having drawn off to the north prior to the SBD attack, the Hiryū was actually positioned in the middle of the other three carriers.
64. Ugaki, 149.