After Wilson Brown’s TF-11 departed on 16 March, Fletcher’s TF-17 came under the direct operational control of Cominch in Washington. King formally defined Fletcher’s mission as “offensive action against enemy activities [in the] New Guinea area and eastward,” especially Port Moresby and the Solomon Islands. He gave Fletcher discretion to attack as he saw fit “to cripple and destroy enemy forces.” Leary again would coordinate land-based Army Air Forces (AAF) and RAAF bomber support that seemed “so effective” on 10 March at Lae and Salamaua. Despite rosy appraisals of the 10 March counterattack, Japan still held the initiative. Any lull would only be temporary, inasmuch as Java had fallen and the Philippines were completely isolated. The enemy could strike southward from Rabaul whenever he chose to commit the necessary strength.1
The prime Japanese objective in the region was Port Moresby, the indispensable Australian air base located on the southeast coast of New Guinea. Geography largely shielded Moresby from direct assault by land and sea. The harsh Owen Stanley mountains appeared virtually impenetrable to troops marching south across Papua. To seaward beyond New Guinea the Louisiade Archipelago, a barrier of islands and reefs, extended nearly 250 miles into the Coral Sea. Although Moresby was 440 air miles southwest of Rabaul, skirting the Louisiades added five hundred more miles to the sea route. Only two true gaps existed: poorly charted Jomard Passage in the center (840 miles) and narrow China Strait off the east tip of New Guinea (670 miles). Because of reefs and fast currents, U.S. planners judged the full detour around the Louisiades the only safe convoy route. Tulagi, a fine harbor in the lower Solomon Islands eight hundred miles east of Moresby and 550 miles southeast of Rabaul, was another logical goal. Although valuable as a flying boat base for searches northward beyond Rabaul, the Australians left Tulagi undefended due to its exposed position. Japanese air power at Tulagi would ease the way for task forces that could threaten not only the rest of the Solomons, but also New Caledonia and the New Hebrides beyond. Its capture would be simpler than Port Moresby. The Japanese already opened a limited bombing campaign against Port Moresby and Tulagi.
Fletcher had to defend both Port Moresby and the Solomons with the Yorktown, heavy cruisers Astoria, Portland, and Pensacola, and six destroyers, barely half the strength of the old combined TF-11. Leary directed Crace’s Anzac Squadron (heavy cruisers HMAS Australia, USS Chicago, and two U.S. destroyers) to operate “as desired by Fletcher,” but three weeks would elapse before they would actually be available. Anzac air reconnaissance was poorly organized, and B-17 bombers in northeastern Australia dwindled through attrition. Strong air reinforcements were en route from the United States, but the first of the new AAF groups would not be in place before early April. For additional guidance, Fletcher followed the Cominch general directive of 26 February that deplored “offensive sweeps,” intended to deter the enemy by merely allowing the task force to be spotted, and raiding shore bases that lacked significant ship targets.2
Perhaps the most dramatic way for Fletcher to delay a brewing southwest Pacific offensive was to revive Brown’s original idea of a carrier raid and cruiser bombardment of Rabaul. For his own part Brown now emphasized that growing enemy air power in the region prevented U.S. carriers from operating with impunity. On 16 March he advised King, Nimitz, Leary, and Fletcher that the alert air warning network no longer permitted surprise carrier raids on major bases such as Rabaul. Yet TF-17 simply lacked the strength to bull its way in. The geography that isolated Port Moresby to eastward formed a bottleneck that worked both ways. Starting with the 350-mile gap between the Louisiades and Solomons, access to Rabaul from the south grew more restricted the closer a carrier force neared air strike range. To attack Rabaul from the east beyond the Solomons would entail a radical detour that could uncover distant Moresby. Thus Fletcher ruled out preemptive attack on Rabaul. The necessity of defending both New Guinea and the Solomons constrained him to deploy in the center in the Coral Sea, where the enemy’s necessarily long voyage to Port Moresby should offer favorable opportunities for ambush. Likewise ships attacking Tulagi could be vulnerable to a carrier counterstroke.3
King considered the defense of New Guinea and particularly the Solomons a holding action while he built up a series of South Pacific bases behind them. In February and March he fought his own battles with General Marshall and General Arnold over the allocation of precious resources to the South Pacific. These three top leaders comprised a command body soon to be known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. King chose Suva in Fiji and Tongatabu (later the name was changed to Tongatapu) in the Tonga Islands as advance bases in the South Pacific, backed up by Auckland in New Zealand as the main operating base. Efate in the New Hebrides was to be the first stepping stone of a projected advance up the New Hebrides and the Solomons to Rabaul itself. That became the cornerstone of King’s offensive strategy. In contrast the army sought to restrict its involvement in the South Pacific in favor of an early cross-channel assault in Europe. By mid March Marshall succeeded in limiting troop commitments just to Efate and Tongatabu. King could not afford the delay even to wait for those small army garrisons to arrive from the West Coast. Instead he tapped Nimitz’s limited number of marines for Tongatabu, while the army commander on New Caledonia sent a few soldiers to Efate.4
Both communications and logistics seriously constricted Fletcher’s role as the first line of defense for King’s nascent South Pacific bases. Brown urged that task force commanders be accorded more flexibility to accomplish their missions. They, not Cominch or Comanzac, should decide exactly when and where to attack. The nature of radio communications compelled that essential independence. Strict policy and common sense dictated a commander dare not break radio silence except in an emergency, or else risk alerting his foe of his presence and being located by radio direction finders. The only exceptions were the TBS VHF voice radios, thought undetectable beyond short range, and the much less secure medium-range high-frequency voice radios the carrier fighter director officers used. Instead, cruiser float planes periodically flew outgoing dispatches to the nearest shore base for radio transmission but could do so only if they were within flying range and the weather cooperated. Unavoidable delays in getting the word out caused King and Leary considerable exasperation and colored their perception of Fletcher. As yet Fletcher could not even read all the radio messages addressed to him in the highest flag cipher systems. He asked Cincpac to vet his radio traffic and retransmit those sent in a system he did not hold. Crace, his senior subordinate, did not even possess a U.S. ECM, but depended on the Chicago to forward his messages. Nonetheless, Leary refused to issue Crace an ECM because King restricted them to U.S. ships. Crace lamented, “It’s a great pity if the U.S. aren’t going to trust us completely.”5
The shaky logistical situation in the remote southwest Pacific forced Fletcher to pay close attention to supply, with fuel always the dominant concern. The next oiler in the rotation was Cdr. Atherton Macondray’s venerable Tippecanoe, older and at 10.5 knots even slower than the late Neches. That and her modest cargo (sixty-five thousand barrels, about 60 percent of a Cimarron) severely limited her service to a fast carrier task force. Better news was expected appearance at Fiji about 26 March of the crack oiler Platte, along with Capt. Gilbert C. Hoover, Comdesron Two, in the destroyer Morris. Fletcher calculated that TF-17 expended about fifty-eight hundred barrels of oil per day at patrol speed (fifteen knots). That did not count the Anzac Squadron, whose fuel was to come from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) fleet auxiliary tankers Falkefjell and Bishopdale that Leary shuttled between Sydney and New Caledonia. Those slow ships were not equipped or trained for underway refueling. Fletcher knew he might have to provide fuel to Crace’s ships in a pinch, but the reverse was also true. He instructed Macondray to join him at Point Moon one hundred miles southwest of Efate. From 19 to 21 March TF-17 would make daily visits to Moon, but if Macondray could not make it he was to proceed instead to Nouméa. No destroyer could accompany the Tippecanoe beyond Suva, a calculated risk that a sub would not pick her off. To save time Fletcher instructed Hoover to bypass Fiji and bring the Platte straight out to Nouméa.6
Indeed Fletcher much preferred Nouméa as a supply base over either Fiji (675 miles from Nouméa) or Samoa (nearly thirteen hundred miles distant), but Nimitz advised that a base at Tongatabu (code name Bleacher) was to be established about 26 March. A thousand miles northeast of Nouméa, Bleacher was almost as inconvenient as Samoa. Now more than a month out of Pearl, TF-17 urgently needed provisions and other supplies. The stores ship Bridge and destroyer tender Dobbin were at Samoa, with the hospital ship Solace expected shortly. Nimitz authorized Fletcher to move them elsewhere, but only in an emergency. For his own part Fletcher desired Leary to run his support ships and make them more accessible, preferably at Nouméa. Samoa was too far from the “probable scene of operations” in the Coral Sea, and he especially needed the Bridge’s food. Unwilling to risk valuable auxiliaries more than absolutely necessary, Nimitz allowed them to come forward for limited intervals, provided Fletcher returned them “promptly” to Samoa. A large convoy, TF-13, had just left Pearl to reach Tongatabu on 28 March with supply personnel and a marine defense battalion, but that was too late to do Fletcher any immediate good. He requested the Bridge be at Nouméa on 1 April to provision TF-17 and then return to Samoa. Nimitz issued the necessary orders. Fletcher was surprised to learn that the Tippecanoe discharged nearly half her cargo into storage facilities at Suva, leaving only thirty-five thousand barrels on board. Although the Kaskaskia gave the Tippecanoe additional fuel (fourteen thousand barrels, in fact), Fletcher did not know how much. Before conducting any offensive operations, he must be sure of a ready fuel supply, but now he had considerably less than expected. On 19 March he ordered Macondray to proceed directly to Point Moon and advise his earliest time of arrival. If TF-17 was not there, he was to take the Tippecanoe northwest an additional four hundred miles into the Coral Sea, then turn around and head southeast for Nouméa. Macondray replied that he would arrive at Moon on 22 March. Fletcher definitely intended to be there.7
Fletcher received great news on 19 March that the RAAF discovered safe at Rossel, on the eastern tip of the Louisiades, all five SOC seaplanes lost from Poco Smith’s cruisers the week before. That certainly justified Smith’s confidence in his sturdy Seagulls. Told the SOCs might be able to fly back to their cruisers, Fletcher factored that contingency into his future plans. On the evening of 21 March as he steamed toward his rendezvous with the Tippecanoe, he composed a radio message to inform King, Nimitz, and Leary of his plans to patrol the Coral Sea. After fueling on 22–23 March north of New Caledonia, TF-17 would sail west to approximately longitude 153° east, south of the Louisiades and just beyond air search range (six hundred miles) of Rabaul. To Leary’s request for forty-eight hours notice prior to action to arrange bomber strikes, Fletcher promised “as much advance information as possible,” but that depended on circumstances. He again cautioned he must soon break off the patrol and reach Nouméa by 1 April to provision ships. TF-17 operated without Crace’s Anzac Squadron, which certainly weakened its chances in the event of a surface action. King abruptly decided that the small army detachment at Efate (code name Roses) must be reinforced immediately and had Nimitz redirect the troop convoy from Tongatabu to Efate. That delayed the establishment of the advance base at Tongatabu and forced Nimitz to scramble for an escort to bring TF-13 safely west to Efate. In turn Leary detached the entire Anzac Squadron to that task, which put Crace beyond immediate support of TF-17 until at least early April.8
At noon on 22 March Fletcher met the Tippecanoe on schedule west of Efate and spent that day and the next fueling while moving slowly northwest into the Coral Sea. He counted on sending cruiser float planes to Nouméa to deliver radio messages, including his plans for the Coral Sea patrol, but a heavy overcast intervened. With engines turning over, two SOCs sat on catapults for a half hour before Fletcher reluctantly called off the flight. Finally that evening he detached Smith with the Astoria and a destroyer southeast toward New Caledonia.9
Nimitz anticipated a welcome reinforcement from the Atlantic, the Hornet. He would then have four carriers on line for the first time since 11 January. Along with two cruisers, four destroyers, and a fleet oiler, the Hornet reached San Diego on 20 March in Task Force 18, led by her Capt. Marc A. “Pete” Mitscher (USNA 1910), a well regarded pioneer naval aviator already selected for rear admiral. As far as Nimitz knew, the Hornet needed only upgrade aircraft and qualify pilots to be ready for battle. He decided to give TF-18 to Rear Adm. John S. McCain, Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force, who administered the patrol wings from San Diego. A classmate of Fletcher and Fitch, “Slew” McCain, a profane, disheveled warrior, was another JCL latecomer to naval aviation, having qualified in 1936 at the age of fifty-two. Admiral Halsey’s TF-16 (Enterprise) returned on 10 March to Pearl after the far-flung raids on Wake (24 February) and Marcus (4 March), while Admiral Brown’s TF-11 (Lexington) was to arrive before the end of March. Admiral Fletcher’s TF-17 (Yorktown) alone patrolled in the far South Pacific. As noted above, Nimitz desired Admiral Pye, his most trusted strategic advisor, to relieve Brown as CTF-11. For the Saratoga, completing repairs in late May, Nimitz penciled in Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes as task force commander. He reached Pearl on 13 March following a stormy tour as director of naval communications.10
Nimitz contemplated operating his four available carriers as two pairs, each under a vice admiral. His most pressing problem was to replace Fletcher’s Yorktown in the Anzac Area. Halsey with the Enterprise could depart Pearl on 21 March and relieve TF-17 on station. How Nimitz intended to use McCain and the Hornet is not known. McCain could either come out to Pearl or, more likely, proceed directly to the South Pacific, just as the Yorktown did in January. He could escort convoys, deliver aircraft, and otherwise support the South Pacific bases before joining Halsey in the Coral Sea. Meanwhile, Pye’s Lexington would be in the central Pacific, soon to be joined by Fletcher and the Yorktown. A brace of carriers each in the South Pacific and central Pacific would achieve the balanced deployment Nimitz sought in January. Whatever plans he had for his carriers soon became superfluous. On 12 March he informed Cominch of his intention to place McCain in charge of TF-18, but King mysteriously replied the Hornet was instead to go in Halsey’s TF-16, so McCain was out. King also directed Halsey to fly to the West Coast for a conference after the Hornet reached San Diego. That certainly ruined Cincpac’s timetable for carrier deployment. On the fourteenth Nimitz responded that TF-16 would be ready to sail on 21 March and TF-17 to leave the Anzac Area about 5 April. The proposed conference, however, required him either to delay the departure of TF-16 or assign a new commander in Halsey’s place. King told Nimitz to put everything on hold until his personal representative could brief him.11
Nimitz finally got his answer (not the one he wanted) on 19 March. Capt. Donald B. Duncan, Cominch air operations officer, arrived at Pearl with King’s secret plan to bomb Japan in mid April. After approaching (hopefully undetected) within 450 miles of the enemy homeland, the Hornet was to launch army North American B-25 Mitchell medium bombers under Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle for a one-way night mission against Tokyo and other large cities. They were to land in China. King designated the Enterprise to protect the Hornet, and Halsey, Nimitz’s best carrier commander, to lead the combined task force. The raid had been in the works since January. Asked if he thought he could attack Japan, Halsey responded with enthusiastic affirmation. Far from being excited at the prospect of raiding Japan, Nimitz felt “dubious” at best. Such a grandstand play appeared to serve no strategic purpose other than a dramatic gesture of defiance. He fretted about committing so much effort, half his carriers, to a dangerous raid that would also tie them up in the North Pacific for six weeks. The temporary unavailability of the Lexington would leave Fletcher without support in the remote South Pacific. No one knew what effect that might have on fleet strategy. Nimitz’s chief of staff Draemel was also opposed. Whatever Nimitz’s reservations, he could do nothing about the Tokyo raid. “This was not a proposal made for him to consider but a plan to be carried out by him.” At Duncan’s behest Nimitz radioed King: “Captain Low to tell Jimmy [Doolittle] to move on. Dates we agreed on are OK.”12
Cincpac sustained yet another body blow on 19 March, when the whole question arose again of employing TF-1, Admiral Anderson’s seven old battleships based at San Francisco. King wanted TF-1 brought out to Pearl, then used in some sort of combat operation, perhaps to advance to where search planes could sight them, presumably off the Marshalls or Gilberts. He had received an urgent personal plea from the Royal Navy’s First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, who cautioned the fall of Java and the assault on Burma left the Indian Ocean and Ceylon wide open. Some sort of powerful diversion in the next few weeks by the Pacific Fleet “may make all the difference.” King told Pound he “can depend on us to do all that we find ourselves in any way able to do to keep the enemy interested in the Pacific.” King certainly kept the knowledge of the impending Doolittle raid close to the vest, declining to give even Roosevelt and Knox any details, let alone the British. Thus bringing the old battleships forward to where the Japanese might sight them came to mind. In addition to drawing attention away from the Indian Ocean, TF-1 might usefully support Halsey’s withdrawal from Japanese waters. How the slow old battleships could shield Halsey’s carriers when their ability to protect even themselves was in doubt, King did not say. The discovery of battleships prowling the central Pacific could be expected to provoke a powerful Japanese response.13
While considering his reply to King, Nimitz completely changed his mind over Pye’s future assignment. If King was sending the battleships into action, Pye must command them. On 22 March Nimitz named Pye to succeed Anderson as CTF-1, certainly a more suitable appointment than a carrier command. Nimitz even proposed the fleet comprise a “covering force” under Pye and Brown’s Amphibious Force. Fitch would take Brown’s place as CTF-11 on the thirty-first, and the Lexington could not be in better hands. Nimitz counseled on 23 March, in a message that Duncan carried personally to King, that it might be wiser to keep the battleships on the West Coast at least until mid April, when Halsey neared Japan. The last thing he desired was to stir up the central Pacific before bombs actually fell on Japan. The Tokyo raid should provide enough of a diversion for the Indian Ocean. Mid April was also when Nimitz anticipated having Fitch’s TF-11 ready to sail from Pearl. Until then he could provide no carrier air cover for the slow battlewagons, protected by only a weak screen of destroyers. Pye could bring TF-1 out toward Pearl later in April and join TF-11 for operations westward “to intensify enemy concern.” Nimitz also warned King that if Fletcher remained in Anzac that whole time, TF-17 must rest and refit in a port. He suggested Sydney.14
The events of the past few days deeply depressed Nimitz, although characteristically he never betrayed his worries to his subordinates. King’s truculent meddling he took for granted, but Secretary Knox (and by inference the president) snubbed him. Nimitz confided to his wife on 22 March: “I’m afraid [Knox] is not so keen for me now as he was when I left—but that is only natural. Ever so many people were enthusiastic for me at the start but when things do not move fast enough—they sour on me. I will be lucky to last six months. The public may demand action and results faster than I can produce.” There was powerful reason to doubt Secnav’s support. In February Knox secretly formed an “unofficial selection board” of nine senior officers, active duty and retired, to name the forty “most competent” flag officers in the navy. Five or more votes would constitute selection. Stark and King, on the panel, were the only two serving officers exempted and thus automatically included in the magic forty. Among those directly concerned here, Halsey and Robert Ghormley received eight votes; Royal Ingersoll, Fletcher, Fitch, Richmond Kelly Turner, and Mitscher seven; Leary, McCain, and Smith six; and Draemel and Theobald five. Incredibly Nimitz was not selected, having not received five votes. Nor did Pye, Brown, Noyes, Spruance, or Kinkaid. Knox submitted the results to Roosevelt on 9 March. Almost certainly Nimitz learned of the “selection board” via back channels.15
On 27 March King backed down regarding TF-1. Using the battleships to cover the Tokyo raiders was now “not contemplated.” He approved Nimitz’s suggestion to join TF-1 with TF-11 later in April. Fletcher could have a respite in port, but definitely not Sydney. That move “would inspire political demands to keep him in Australian waters.” King shrewdly recognized such “political demands” would originate with the Australian government abetted by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur arrived there on 17 March from the Philippines eager to carve out a major piece of the Pacific command. In place of Sydney, King offered Nimitz either Tongatabu, where his new advance base was to be established, or even more remote Auckland.16
By late March Cominch had much to worry about, not only in the Pacific, but also the Atlantic, where U-boats ravaged American shipping. Halsey’s carriers were preparing to leave for the Tokyo raid. In the desperate days of January what was a good idea to avenge Pearl Harbor might not have been so wise in late March. In the interval King had matured a strategy to hold and fight in the South Pacific. If the Japanese got wind of the carriers on the way in, or the raid otherwise miscarried, the results could be catastrophic. Conversely if Doolittle actually bombed Tokyo, American morale would soar, but even a successful raid would prevent the Enterprise and Hornet from deploying elsewhere until mid May. Even if King agreed, Fitch and the Lexington could not reinforce Fletcher in the South Pacific before the end of April. Thus King gambled that the Japanese would remain quiet in the South Pacific until Nimitz could reorient the rest of his carriers southward. That was all the more ironic because that network of South Pacific bases had become the foundation of King’s Pacific strategy. Despite his great fear of a Japanese offensive there, he now contrived to leave the door ajar. For a while it appeared the Japanese would not take advantage, but at the end of March they unwittingly gave King a tremendous scare, causing him to vent his nervous anger on the hapless Fletcher.
On the evening of 23 March, Fletcher welcomed Smith back from his pony express run to Nouméa then got on with the patrol. Nothing critical in terms of enemy action appeared imminent. Recent RAAF air searches of the northern Coral Sea were negative. The Pacific Fleet War Plans Section noted on 18 March how “the enemy seems to be occupied in reorganizing.” Fletcher’s long-delayed 21 March message finally reached Pearl on 23 March (24 March in the Coral Sea). Already perturbed that Fletcher had not hitherto revealed his intentions, Nimitz was surprised he was not attacking anywhere. Doubtless King and Leary reacted the same way. On 25 March Leary advised Fletcher that a bomber group had apparently moved from Rabaul to Gasmata on New Britain’s south coast. To avoid its presumed search radius of six hundred miles, Fletcher curtailed his patrol on 26 March a hundred miles short of longitude 153° east. Thereafter TF-17 marked time in the center of the Coral Sea, waiting for the Tippecanoe to catch up so she could be emptied and released to refill from a chartered tanker that Nimitz redirected to Samoa.17
On the twenty-seventh Fletcher learned that the five SOCs stranded at Rossel would soon be ready to go. Leary planned to fly them out via Port Moresby to Australia but told Fletcher he could alter that plan by sending a plane directly to Rossel. Inasmuch as TF-17 was already in the neighborhood and things were quiet, Fletcher acted to retrieve the SOCs straightaway. That evening he directed Smith to take the Astoria and Russell northwest to within flying distance of Rossel and fetch the wayward Seagulls. In the meantime the rest of TF-17 would top off from the Tippecanoe and await his return on the morning of 29 March. The daily Cincpac intelligence bulletin reinforced the impression of a quiescent period. “Indications [are] that losses in New Britain area have restricted activity to air patrols and bombing attacks.” Also Fletcher received welcome word that the Platte and Morris were at Nouméa after having made excellent time from Pearl.18
The tranquil situation abruptly changed early on 29 March, when Leary broadcast to King, Nimitz, and Fletcher the startling results of the Anzac air search conducted the previous day. Thirty transports crowded Rabaul harbor. Alarm bells sounded in Washington and Pearl Harbor. To make matters worse radio intelligence analysts at Pearl had just got wind of some sort of Japanese offensive they thought might start on 30 or 31 March—a supposition not vouchsafed to Fletcher. Both King and Nimitz understood Anzac’s vulnerability. Unless King immediately canceled the Tokyo raid, no additional carrier could reinforce Fletcher before 1 May.19
In turn Fletcher, the man on the spot, again considered attacking the concentration of ships at Rabaul. If he immediately bent on twenty knots he could close to 150 miles (carrier strike range) of Rabaul after sunrise on 30 March. Some of his staff recommended that aggressive move. However, he believed that if he rushed north, the alert air search network would sight him on 29 March, just as happened with Brown. Presumably much of the shipping at Rabaul would then scatter out of range, while the Japanese turned the tables and sent bombers to stalk TF-17. The best Fletcher might do was to damage some merchant ships while risking perhaps catastrophic damage and hence the whole Allied position in the South Pacific. He resolved to provision TF-17 at Nouméa as planned, then regroup and hit the Japanese if they came south. On 29 March, right on time, the Astoria and Russell hove into view. To Fletcher’s inquiry about the missing aircraft, Smith replied, “All on board.” Fletcher responded, “As I expected.” He pointed TF-17 southeast toward Nouméa and the Bridge’s long-awaited food. Later that morning he detached the Tippecanoe to Samoa with the Russell as escort as far as Efate. In the meantime Nimitz queried Leary about the transports sighted the day before and received various estimates based on photographs. By the evening of 29 March Leary settled on thirty-one ships at Rabaul, including four cruisers, five destroyers, perhaps seventeen transports or merchantmen, and other auxiliaries. More significant for Fletcher was Leary’s negative for all the other Anzac air searches on the twenty-eighth. Leary vowed six B-17s would strike Rabaul on 30 March. Thereafter, “maximum sustained attack that area . . . will continue.”20
Shortly after midnight on 30 March as Fletcher drew nearer to New Caledonia, it was his turn to be startled. Leary belatedly notified him that the previous afternoon a search plane placed TF-17 only 228 miles southeast of Rabaul and one hundred miles southwest of Bougainville. That was news to Fletcher. At the time of the purported sighting, he was actually five hundred miles southeast of there and subsequently moved farther away. He did not get unduly excited. “Our experience had been that the Army aviators’ reports were apt to be incorrect as to types[,] and I thought it probable that they had sighted an enemy auxiliary with two or three destroyers.” (In fact an RAAF Catalina flying boat made the wrong evaluation.) Such a target was too small to alter his plans. Unwilling to break radio silence, he would “clear the situation” that afternoon when within range of Nouméa. Nimitz, for one, was certainly surprised that TF-17 was seen so close to Rabaul, nearly within striking range, meaning Fletcher should have attacked.
In the early afternoon of 30 March, Fletcher dispatched a pair of SOCs to Nouméa with guard mail for the Tangier’s radio. Message 292346 of March 1942 gave his correct position on the previous afternoon and restated his intention to arrive at Nouméa on 1 April to provision his ships. He requested Leary to verify the sighting report. “If force reported is enemy heading south I will proceed toward enemy.” Should that indeed be the case, he asked that the Platte and Morris depart Nouméa at once for Point Corn, 325 miles south of Guadalcanal, so he would know where to find them. At this juncture the situation did not seem especially urgent, at least to Fletcher. In the meantime Leary’s daily report stated that no RAAF air reconnaissance flights on the twenty-ninth sighted enemy ships. However, at 1535 he offered the first tangible indication that the Japanese might actually be up to something. An RAAF PBY Catalina flying another shuttle search between Port Moresby and Tulagi discovered three cruisers and a transport lurking at Shortland off the southern coast of Bougainville. At 1955 Leary relayed a coast-watcher report that placed a few cruisers, destroyers, and small ships at Shortland that morning. He speculated they were the same ships the Catalina spotted.21
In fact Admiral Inoue’s South Seas Force had begun a modest, three-pronged operation to occupy positions in and around Buka and Bougainville. It was part of a housekeeping effort to secure the immediate territory around Rabaul, while preparing for the much bigger offensive against Port Moresby and Tulagi that Inoue hoped to reschedule to late May. The Bougainville Invasion Force sailed on 28 March with three destroyers, an ammunition ship, and a few troops. The same evening Admiral Gotō’s Support Force left Rabaul with four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and three destroyers. His ships were those mistaken for TF-17 on the afternoon of the twenty-ninth. Later that day the Buka Invasion Force of three gunboats departed Rabaul for Buka, only 160 miles to the south, to construct an auxiliary airfield. At dawn on 30 March the Bougainville Invasion Force landed base personnel at Shortland and left by dark for Kieta on Bougainville’s east coast. At the same time the Buka force delivered its contingent and promptly returned to Rabaul. At sunrise on the thirtieth Gotō patrolled about 130 miles south of Shortland, then retired north, passing between Bougainville and Choiseul. By the next morning he was north of Buka and inbound to Rabaul. As of 31 March, the Bougainville-Buka operation was over, although the Allies did not know it. All of this, of course, illustrates just how fleeting was the opportunity to catch small detachments of Japanese shipping south or southeast of Rabaul.22
Before dawn on 31 March Leary forwarded more coast-watcher reports of cruisers and destroyers seen in Shortland harbor on the thirtieth. Also nine warships (Gotō’s Support Force) had gone off to the northeast that evening. Leary’s flyers discovered no enemy forces actually south of Bougainville. Thus Fletcher learned of Japanese activities at Shortland. His orders from Cominch dictated offensive action in the event they established bases in the Solomons. The objectives lay well within the Rabaul air umbrella. Fletcher could either turn north immediately and maneuver into attack range or continue to Nouméa. At that time he was more than 750 miles southeast of Shortland. The Yorktown could launch a strike late on the afternoon of the thirty-first after a full day’s run at twenty-five knots, but risked being sighted that morning and afternoon. A more leisurely twenty knots could mean a dawn strike on 1 April, but again it was likely TF-17 would be detected on the thirty-first. In either case the enemy ships could have moved on. Such a detour also would greatly delay getting TF-17 ready to fight for the long haul. With Nouméa so close, Fletcher carried on with his original plan, but kept a watchful eye should the Japanese keep moving south.23
In remote Washington King fretted over the havoc Japan might wreak in the South Pacific. Was TF-17 already fighting? What had Fletcher accomplished? What were his losses? About fifteen hours elapsed from the time Fletcher’s 292346 message left TF-17 until Cominch and the others received it. King’s temper finally boiled over. At 0630, 31 March (Z-11; Washington local time was 1430, 30 March), he radioed Fletcher, information Nimitz and Leary: “Your 292346 not understood if it means you retiring from enemy vicinity in order to provision.” On King’s handwritten rough also appears the gibe: “Why not use dry stores and keep after the enemy?” Leary hopped on the Cominch bandwagon by exhorting Fletcher and Crace (who was stuck near Efate covering the convoy): “Jump boys[,] vessels Solomon New Guinea area last two days are enemy.” That was not exactly news, but Leary offered no further insight as to the kinds of ships or where they might be going. At noon he noted to King: “Fletcher has been fully informed [of ] enemy concentration Rabaul area and of enemy forces located at sea south and west of Bougainville on 29 and 30 Mar.” Leary soon admitted that no B-17s in fact bombed Rabaul on 30 March (so much for his promise of air support), but his search planes still sought the ships reported south of Bougainville the last few days.24
Fletcher and Poco Smith read Cominch’s affront after dawn on 31 March, as TF-17, nearly a thousand miles southeast of Shortland, approached the west coast of New Caledonia. Livid at its tone and the implication that his boss was “fleeing in the face of the enemy,” Smith empathized with Fletcher by semaphore: “That is the stinkingest message I have ever read.” Fletcher merely responded: “I am not perturbed.” For his own part he wondered just what was going on in Washington and Melbourne. He noticed that Leary had not included Cominch as an addressee of the 30 March message that wrongly placed TF-17 just south of Rabaul and surmised that omission caused the “misunderstanding” in King’s mind. Actually Cincpac forwarded Leary’s dispatch to Cominch as a matter of course. Fletcher was not about to let King’s evident “misunderstanding” stampede him into some ill-advised course of action. He did not grasp at the time how the false impression created by the erroneous RAAF sighting report of TF-17 had prejudiced his standing with King and Nimitz. With Nouméa on the horizon, Fletcher directed Smith to go on ahead with the Astoria, Portland, and two destroyers to fuel, retrieve the goods, and rejoin the main body on 2 April. That afternoon Fletcher composed a number of radio messages for Smith to take in with him. One was a quietly defiant reply to Cominch. Fletcher deemed it “mandatory” to provision some ships that had been at sea since 16 February and again referred to the message he sent to King on 22 March. “Consider fact that no enemy forces moving to southward makes this opportune time to provision. Returning Coral Sea April Second.” Smith greatly admired Fletcher’s equanimity in the face of such a provocation from King and later cited it as an example of his “strength of character.” King, though, neither forgot nor forgave. Fletcher surmised that the acerbic Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, then Assistant Cominch Chief of Staff for War Plans, composed the offending dispatch, and that mild-mannered Vice Adm. Russell Willson, the chief of staff, wrote a more temperate message sent the next day. The episode still rankled Fletcher in July when he saw Turner and teased him about it. Turner laughed and said no, King had written both messages.25
Not informed whether a relief task force headed south from Pearl, Fletcher certainly realized that he would not soon be leaving the South Pacific. Other messages that he vouchsafed to Smith secured his tenuous logistics. He again wheedled Nimitz to keep the Bridge at Nouméa. TF-17 would need more provisions by 5 May, and Nouméa was a convenient place to replenish. That issue soon became moot. Fletcher also summoned the Tippecanoe to Nouméa after she had refilled at Samoa. At dawn on 1 April Smith entered Nouméa harbor. The Bridge soon hove in and opened her ample food lockers. Leary offered nothing further on Japanese movements other than a report of enemy ships seen off Kieta the previous day. The War Plans analysts at Pearl likewise noted such sightings in the Bougainville area, but “nothing definite has developed in that area, nor have the first steps of the other enemy advances been reported.”26
At the same time, Crace’s Anzac Squadron stood off Efate covering the TF-13 convoy. On 31 March the Australia fueled a U.S. destroyer for the first time while under way. “She took some time,” Crace noted, “but arrangements are good.” Captain Farncomb used only one fuel hose, but Crace thought there would be no problem with two the next time. The Australians were receiving a useful introduction to the refueling techniques of the U.S. Navy, though Crace still required a quiet anchorage for his own auxiliary oiler Falkefjell to fuel his cruisers. She was to meet the squadron on 4 April at the Uvéa atoll off the northeast coast of New Caledonia and southwest of Efate.27
On 31 March, even before he received Fletcher’s reply, King ordered TF-17 to replenish at Tongatabu “upon completion current operations” and to prepare for “further operations to northwestward.” He then scolded: “The situation in the area where you are operating requires constant activity of a task force like yours to keep the enemy occupied.” Because the other carriers were tied up, Fletcher must continue “active operations south of equator” for the time being. Nimitz endorsed King’s orders for Tongatabu and gave Fletcher leave to concentrate the auxiliaries there. Because Crace knew Fletcher preferred to replenish in Nouméa, he called “most obscure” King’s message directing TF-17 to distant Tongatabu. “I should imagine [Fletcher] was pretty annoyed.” Annoyed or not, Fletcher spent the balance of 1 April recalculating all his logistical requirements, now that Tongatabu was to be his advance base rather than Nouméa. He estimated TF-17 could stay in the Coral Sea until about 24 April, when dwindling supplies would compel him to break off to reach Tongatabu around 1 May. Fresh dispatches ordered the Bridge, Dobbin, Solace, Platte, and Tippecanoe to proceed there. The survey ship Sumner relayed welcome news of a good airfield for the Yorktown Air Group while the carrier was at anchor.28
On the morning of 2 April with his long-range requirements covered, Fletcher considered his next move in the Coral Sea. As yet he could not decide on a definite target. The situation around Bougainville appeared confused. Leary’s latest word was a coast-watcher report sent on 1 April of two cruisers and a transport seen off Kieta the previous afternoon. According to Fletcher’s tentative offensive plan later transmitted via the Tangier at Nouméa, he would attack “enemy surface forces” somewhere in the “Solomon area” at dawn on 6 April. He could not be more specific because he depended on future sighting reports to determine his objective. Thus it was “essential” beginning 4 April that Leary rebroadcast all enemy contact reports immediately, rather than hold them for a routine daily summary that TF-17 often did not copy until noon the following day. “Radio silence will preclude informing you location my target and details of plan.” Fletcher desired, if possible, a simultaneous B-17 strike against the Rabaul airfields, with the hope of catching enemy bombers on the ground. Because the submarine Tambor might be patrolling in New Britain–New Ireland waters, he asked that she be instructed to keep clear for the time being. “Will base in Coral Sea and operate against enemy in Solomon area until further notice.” During the second the Platte refueled the Yorktown, Pensacola, and three destroyers. Lt. Cdr. Sam Latimer, the previously ill flag secretary, returned to the Yorktown for an enthusiastic homecoming. In turn the Yorktown sent across to the Platte the dispatches Fletcher wished the Tangier to radio on his behalf. That evening Smith returned with the Astoria, Portland, and two destroyers, while Fletcher released the Platte to Nouméa. She arrived at 0900 on 3 April, but again it took another day to get the messages through to Washington, Pearl, and Melbourne.29
On the evening of 2 April as TF-17 ventured northwest at fifteen knots, it looked as if the only viable ship targets short of Rabaul itself clustered around Bougainville. Fletcher knew from Leary that a small force supported by five warships had occupied Buka on 1 April, whereas four warships were said to have entered Faisi harbor at Shortland only that afternoon. At the same time, McMorris at Pearl wrote that TF-17 “might find some worthwhile objectives” off Bougainville. Fletcher hoped for concrete and timely information on enemy movements, but he was disappointed. News of the RAAF daily search (in this case, negative) still only reached him at noon the following day. On the third Cincpac opined that the enemy continued to mop up the New Britain area with all or parts of the 6th and 18th Cruiser Divisions, the 6th Destroyer Squadron, and auxiliaries. Indications were strong that air units at Rabaul were reorganizing with reinforcements from the Marshalls and the Philippines. Indeed, the Japanese created the headquarters of the 5th Air Attack Force (25th Air Flotilla) at Rabaul and added a fresh fighter group to the bomber and flying boat groups already there. Quoting Lt. Gen. George H. Brett (MacArthur’s deputy), King pointedly warned Fletcher that the Japanese could now attack Tulagi and Port Moresby simultaneously, and that they could commit a whole infantry division against Moresby.30
On 4 April Leary could reveal no enemy movements to Fletcher. Air reconnaissance was again negative, as were coast-watcher reports. The ships off Bougainville faded away, leaving no worthwhile targets south of Rabaul. It could not even be confirmed whether the Japanese actually left a garrison at Shortland. That afternoon as TF-17 neared Point Corn, Fletcher decided against an attack on 6 April. He prepared a message for King, Nimitz, and Leary informing them that he was postponing his attack “until I have definite location enemy.” TF-17 would remain in the vicinity of Corn, so Crace, who completed fueling on 5 April at Uvéa, and also the Chester, another reinforcement, would know where to find it. Roughly halfway between the Solomons and the Louisiades and two hundred miles beyond the Rabaul air search, Corn was as good a place as any to keep watch on the northern Coral Sea. That evening Fletcher detached the Portland westward to go within five hundred miles of Townsville and fly the dispatches there. Two SOCs delivered the goods the next afternoon and stayed while the Portland rejoined TF-17. Leary went ahead with the Rabaul air attack. On the sixth just one B-17 and six army Martin B-26 Marauder medium bombers bravely bombed the harbor and surrounding airfields. The Chester caught up with TF-17 shortly after dawn on the seventh to relieve the Pensacola, which Cincpac desired for convoy escort duty. The Platte and Russell returned soon after. By 8 April Fletcher had patrolled the center of the Coral Sea for three days without incident. No enemy action appeared on the immediate horizon. The Japanese now seemed to be busy securing the northern approaches to New Britain, mainly the Admiralty Islands. The real hot spot was the Bay of Bengal, where Japanese carriers bombed Ceylon and raised havoc with the British Eastern Fleet. Dudley Pound’s prognostications sadly came to pass.31
Events on 8 April offered more reason to admire the unsung cruiser aviators. The Astoria and Portland each sent two SOCs on routine dawn patrol in low visibility. TF-17 was supposed to hold its base course until the Seagulls returned, but before the last Astoria SOC turned up Fletcher changed course into the wind for a Yorktown launch. He quickly made amends by releasing the Astoria to look for the overdue aircraft. Smith soon had it on board and rejoined the force that afternoon. Choppy seas and winds up to thirty-nine knots made fueling difficult. Crace brought the Australia, Chicago, Perkins, and Lamson to Corn that afternoon. “Glad to have you with us,” Fletcher signaled. “Hope you will come on board tomorrow.” He had not met—indeed never would meet—his senior subordinate. Crace was curious about him as well. Fletcher designated the Anzac Squadron Task Group 17.3 and stationed it five miles ahead. The seas were no better on the ninth, as TF-17 turned southwest just short of the six-hundred-mile search line from Gasmata. Even so, the Platte topped off the Chicago and Australia.
The weather on the tenth still was not conducive to small boat travel, so Crace sent across a letter asking for permission to return to Nouméa unless Fletcher planned to attack “soon.” In fact Crace already arranged for a full-scale court-martial on 14 April of murder suspects in the Australia and was determined to hold it. Fletcher responded with what Crace called “a very nice reply,” stating that he had hoped to attack ships at Rabaul on 6 April, but called off the raid because of a lack of targets. Now he planned to stay in the Coral Sea until 24 April. Crace thought the court-martial was vital and “a chance I didn’t think I should miss because it might not recur.” In the spirit of Allied amity, Fletcher acceded to his vigorous entreaty. Technically Crace was senior to him, and their tricky command relationship had yet to be completely defined. Crace’s own staff officers actually gave their chief a harder time over his timing of the court-martial, reminding him of Leary’s order of 4 April directing the Anzac Squadron to report to TF-17 for an offensive operation. Crace disagreed. Because Fletcher was apparently not going to attack anywhere in the next few days, he felt free to go if released. Further, Leary made no objection. Of course everything would change if the Japanese actually appeared in the Coral Sea.32
Fletcher had much more on his mind than Crace’s court-martial or the sad news of the fall of Bataan. On 10 April Buckmaster brought to his attention a potentially disastrous problem with the rubber fuel tanks, actually bladders, fitted in the Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighters. They could seal bullet damage and prevent fuel from leaking and igniting, thus offering much greater safety than the plain metal types used by the Japanese. In March some tanks installed in VF-42 F4Fs leaked on their own accord and grounded three F4Fs. Now seven of nineteen Yorktown F4Fs showed signs of faulty tanks. Fletcher detailed the problem to Cincpac and requested “urgent air shipment” of more leak-proof tanks. The Pensacola had already left for Samoa, so he again deputized the Portland to run messages to Townsville and also recover her two SOCs. The cruiser departed at dusk. In addition to the fuel tank dispatch, Fletcher informed his superiors that he would remain on station until 24 April, then leave for Tongatabu. He notified Leary should enemy ships “move to southward [I] will probably be unable to notify you in advance of my attack.”33
USS Yorktown (CV-5), April 1942. The carrier was Admiral Fletcher’s flagship from January to June 1942.
Courtesy of National Archives (80-G-640553), via Jeffrey G. Barlow
Almost as an anticlimax, Fletcher received a message on 10 April that implemented the major administrative overhaul of the Pacific Fleet under consideration since February. On 23 March Nimitz had recommended to King to abolish the Battle Force and Scouting Force and organize their ships into individual type commands for administration and training. The Service Force would take over maintenance. Secretary Knox approved on 31 March, and Bunav issued new orders to all concerned commanders. Fletcher now became Commander, Cruisers, Pacific Fleet (Comcrupac), responsible for Cruiser Divisions Three, Four, Five, Six, Nine, and Eleven. Comcrupac represented a promotion over his previous post and again reinforced his status as one of the senior admirals in the Pacific Fleet.34
On the evening of the tenth Fletcher was surprised to see “a big crowd of cheering and laughing young sailors parading and frolicking around the flight deck.” Guarded by armed marines and serenaded by the band, a host of hopeful celebrants escorted the last five remaining T-bone steaks to be raffled off for charity. Positioned just above the hangar deck, the number two elevator made a handy stage where the band played the latest swing music. Two sailors gave a rousing display of jitterbugging, and a young seaman dolled up as a “buxom waitress” served the steaks to the lucky winners. The spectacle of the Yorktown’s “jamboree” gave the crew a great morale boost as they resumed their monotonous diet of “baked beans, canned Vienna sausage, canned corn beef, canned salmon, and chipped beef and rice,” while cruising in dangerous waters.35
On 11 April while TF-17 continued draining the Platte, Fletcher released the Australia and Lamson to Nouméa but kept the Chicago and Perkins with him. Soon afterward the Australia experienced heavy knocking in the outer starboard propeller shaft. Only in port could divers safely examine the hull and determine the extent of the damage. Two interesting pieces of intelligence reached Fletcher from Leary. The first warned an enemy carrier expected shortly at Truk and that the long-awaited offensive against eastern New Guinea might begin around 21 April. That intelligence, derived from analysis of deciphered radio traffic, was the first definite indication offered to Fletcher of a possible upcoming battle in the Coral Sea. The second message, prefaced “urgent,” informed Fletcher that more than twelve hours before, air search had discovered a carrier already at Rabaul. Five B-26s would hit her on the morning of the twelfth, while “all additional planes” advanced from Townsville to Moresby. An hour later Leary described the carrier at Rabaul as Sōryū-class, with ten other ships, including three “fairly large” transports, also in harbor. He clearly hoped Fletcher would swiftly strike but again was disappointed. On the twelfth Fletcher marked time in the middle of the Coral Sea watching developments. TF-17 was certainly in no condition to storm Rabaul. Leary now judged the enemy carrier to be the “Kusuga (sic)” and speculated, correctly, that she transported fighters to Rabaul as part of the general strengthening of land-based air. On 9 April Cincpac warned that eighty bombers and additional fighters were expected to operate there. Leary’s B-26s bombed Rabaul on the twelfth and claimed damaging the carrier, which they called the “Kaga.” Even so, the flattop was last seen disappearing northwest at high speed. Indeed the Kasuga Maru had been at Rabaul on the eleventh and twelfth delivering aircraft and supplies. She sustained no damage. The Portland rejoined TF-17 on the evening of 13 April, while Crace arrived in Nouméa. Because of a worn shaft bracket, the Australia required ten days refit at Sydney. Crace would accompany, but if needed before repairs were finished, he could shift his flag to light cruiser Hobart refitting at Sydney after hard times in the Mediterranean and the Far East.36
On 14 April as TF-17 topped off just beyond search range from Gasmata, the fighter fuel tank situation worsened. Six F4Fs were no longer usable, gone “sour” according to Fletcher. For the other thirteen it was only a matter of time. Fletcher could no longer consider TF-17 battle worthy. Without reliable fighters it simply could not defend itself from air attack. Should more fighters succumb, he decided he must depart immediately for Tongatabu, where, hopefully, replacement tanks would be waiting. That evening the Chicago and Perkins left the main body to fly dispatches to Nouméa that updated Cincpac regarding the appalling fighter fuel tank dilemma. Fletcher requested twenty-two new tanks be shipped by air to Fiji from where they could be forwarded to Tongatabu. At least VF-42 now knew why the fuel tanks leaked. Aromatic aviation gasoline actually dissolved the rubber self-sealing layers in that particular model, allowing particles to flake off and clog fuel strainers and gas lines. The effect ranged from a momentary drop in power to complete engine failure that had caused the loss of F4Fs on 14 March and 1 April. The only remedy was to replace all the tanks with an improved version, but none were to be found short of Pearl Harbor. Fletcher’s oil supply, at least, seemed secure. He anticipated having the refilled Tippecanoe at Nouméa on 18 April, from where she could easily reach the designated rendezvous north of New Caledonia. On her way back south from Pearl, the Kaskaskia should be in Nouméa by 20 April. On the morning of the fifteenth Fletcher released the Platte and Hughes directly to Pearl. That same day Lt. Cdr. Alexander Thorington, the Cruisers, Pacific Fleet (Crupac) assistant operations officer, transferred over from the Astoria, finally restoring Fletcher’s staff whose workload had increased greatly in the past month. Things were not expected to get any easier.37
Fletcher’s worry over possibly breaking off his Coral Sea patrol because of ailing fighters suddenly dissolved on the morning of 15 April. To his delight he learned that TF-17 had again come under Cincpac’s direct control, “effective immediately.” Nimitz directed him to Tongatabu for upkeep and told him to prepare to depart there on 27 April for further operations in the Coral Sea. Fletcher could deploy the Tippecanoe and Kaskaskia as necessary, while Cincpac brought the Dobbin and Solace to Tongatabu. Fletcher turned southeast to jog south of New Caledonia before swinging northeast for Tongatabu. Ironically on the fifteenth another fighter fuel tank failed, meaning he would have had to leave the Coral Sea in any event. On 17 April Capt. Howard Bode took the Chicago and Perkins to Nouméa to await the Anzac Squadron. They would stay in Nouméa the next two weeks. TF-17 looked forward to reaching Tongatabu on 20 April. Fletcher welcomed the rest. He was itching for a crack at the enemy under halfway decent conditions.38
Fletcher’s lone sojourn in the Coral Sea was over, seemingly with little to show for it. King’s taunt on 31 March has been noted previously. Nimitz, too, became apprehensive over what appeared to be Fletcher’s indecision and lack of an aggressive response to the enemy advance into the Solomons. On 13 April, for example, the War Plans Section noted “no indication that Task Force 17, operating in the Coral Sea, has had any enemy contacts for some time.” In late May when Fletcher returned to Pearl he was surprised to learn from Nimitz that his handling of TF-17 from 16 March to 20 April had been impugned. In defense he pointed to the directives he received from Cominch that decried raids on shore bases without significant ship targets present. The nature of the opposition (or lack of it) certainly dictated Fletcher’s deployment of TF-17. Unlike Wilson Brown, he found “no definite information of any concentration of enemy ships” that he could “attack under directive contained in Cominch 261630 of February.” Thus he chose to wait until the Japanese committed themselves. Once they infiltrated Buka and southern Bougainville at the end of March, however, all the invasion ships swiftly decamped, leaving only a small force ashore that built no installations to speak of. Neither ships nor aircraft yet operated from Shortland or Buka. Of course Inoue only marked time until late in May. Once Nimitz heard Fletcher’s personal explanation, his doubts changed to wholehearted support. Fletcher never had the opportunity to put the same case to Cominch. Besides, it is doubtful King would have listened. He was renowned for writing off a subordinate at the first suspicion of irresolution or timidity. It was likely at this point his evident distrust of Fletcher as a “social admiral” well tuned to Washington politics turned into outright animosity.39
The fault in this particular instance lay with the peculiar circumstances behind Fletcher’s March–April cruise. He suffered under the lack of defined targets and having to conduct a static “offensive” patrol adjacent to enemy-controlled waters on the off chance the Japanese might advance. Ideally a carrier force took shelter in a safe locale until a worthy objective presented itself, struck swiftly and decisively, then speedily withdrew. Fletcher lacked that option. Other than Sydney, or perhaps Nouméa, no such convenient South Pacific refuge yet existed. Nor did he ever wield even half the strength Brown enjoyed in early March. It is obvious that Cominch, especially, desired some belligerent gesture in response to the seizure of southern Bougainville but was unsure what it should have been. If King had wanted Fletcher to raid Shortland, whether or not a suitable target was present, or even to tackle Rabaul, he should have ordered him instead of stewing on the sidelines. That begs the question, however, as to how the Japanese might have reacted had Fletcher actually struck Bougainville or Rabaul simply for the sake of showing some aggressiveness. One wonders if King and Nimitz would have truly desired to provoke them into committing even stronger forces to the South Pacific at a time when the Allied bases there were weak and with no other carriers available to reinforce the Yorktown. As will be shown, the strength Combined Fleet did provide the MO Operation against Port Moresby and Tulagi was enough to cause Fletcher enormous trouble in May. His disinclination to reveal the presence of his carrier task force without good reason was extremely wise.