In the two weeks from just before to after the Battle of Midway, Nimitz changed his mind with amazing frequency as to who would run his carrier task forces. On 28 May he sought King’s approval for the scenario devised after Halsey (Comcarpac) suddenly became ill. Spruance was only to have the Enterprise for Midway, then relieve Draemel as chief of staff. Fletcher would relinquish the Yorktown for repairs but apparently was earmarked for the Enterprise until Halsey’s return. Fitch was already set for the Saratoga and Noyes the Hornet. Ted Sherman would receive the Wasp group when it reached San Diego. Rear Adm. Charles A. Pownall (another JCL) was to relieve Noyes as shore administrator for the absent Halsey. On 30 May the Bureau of Naval Personnel (Bupers) issued the necessary orders to Noyes and Sherman. King, though, refused to release Pownall, whom he wanted to run the patrol plane replacement squadrons being set up on the West Coast. Nimitz could only tap Capt. James M. Shoemaker, commanding officer of NAS Pearl Harbor, for the Carpac administrative chores. King threw another monkey wrench into Nimitz’s plans on 1 June when he tabbed Sherman as deputy Cominch chief of staff for operations. Certainly evaluating the captain who lost the beloved Lexington also crossed his mind. Eagerly anticipating a carrier task force, Sherman learned the daunting news of “permanent duty” in Washington. Nimitz could only console, “Better luck next time.”1
On 5 June, in the midst of the battle, Nimitz offset Sherman’s unavailability by nominating Mitscher for the Hornet task force and giving Noyes the Wasp. Still in need of an aviator of flag rank to substitute for Mitscher as Commander, Patrol Wing (Compatwing) Two, he again asked King for “Baldy” Pownall. On 8 June, the day after the Yorktown sank, Nimitz informed King that Fitch would get the Saratoga as originally planned, but Fletcher “will be given a rest and probably take Wasp group.” Nimitz gave no indication where Noyes was to go, but the Enterprise task force would be open when Spruance came ashore. The “probably” in reference to Fletcher indicated Nimitz’s unease whether he blundered in losing the Yorktown. By 12 June Nimitz returned Fletcher to his good graces by reinstating plans for Noyes to the Wasp. The next day he requested permission to promote Fitch to vice admiral and name him Comcarpac if Halsey could not return.2
The Pacific Fleet staff changed again, as Nimitz turned “from those I found to those I choose.” On 14 June Draemel relinquished his post as chief of staff to relieve Wilson Brown in the Amphibious Force. Although very disappointed to leave, Draemel was exhausted from the strain of the first six months of the war. Nimitz gave Spruance a few days rest before assuming his new duties as chief of staff. Some insiders believed it was a great shame that Spruance had to give up his task force and very likely lose a well-merited promotion to vice admiral. For him personally, it was the best thing that could have happened. Spruance stayed clear of the Solomons vortex that consumed so many careers, and Nimitz came so to value him that he became Cincpac’s closest associate in the Pacific campaign. Spruance would return to combat to lead the central Pacific offensive when the fleet’s margin of superiority was not only already decisive, but also constantly growing.3
On 15 June Nimitz formally reorganized the carrier striking force along the lines dictated by King at the April conference. Each task force was centered on a single carrier, the antithesis of Japanese practice. Fitch took over TF-11 in the Saratoga, with Kinkaid in charge of cruisers Minneapolis, New Orleans, and Astoria. Fletcher received TF-16 and the Enterprise, with Smith leading cruisers Louisville, Portland, Chester, and Atlanta. Admiral Mitscher became CTF-17 in the Hornet, screened by cruisers Northampton, Salt Lake City, Pensacola, and San Diego under newly promoted Rear Adm. Howard H. Good (former captain of the New Orleans). Noyes was slated for TF-18 and the Wasp (due at San Diego on the ninteenth); Rear Adm. Norman Scott would lead its cruisers Quincy, Vincennes, San Francisco, and San Juan.4
Although Fletcher, senior among the active carrier task force commanders, broke his flag in the Enterprise as CTF-16, he did not inherit, as one might expect, Halsey’s vaunted aviation experts. Instead they went to the Hornet to join Mitscher. Browning himself departed on 18 June to the States, and former operations officer Commander Buracker went to NAS Pensacola. Buracker’s reassignment was long in the works, but Nimitz temporarily detached Browning, evidently because no one but Halsey could manage him. Spruance appears not to have criticized Browning’s performance, having written on 8 June with characteristic tact, “Halsey’s splendid staff have made my job easy.” Thirty years later Spruance’s former flag lieutenant, Capt. Robert Oliver, revealed the full truth about Browning’s misadventures on 4–5 June. As noted, the citation for Browning’s DSM included fulsome praise for his decisive contribution to the Midway victory, but it is vital to note the recommendation did not come from Spruance, but Halsey after he and Browning returned in September to Pearl. If Spruance differed with that description of Browning’s role at Midway, he did not hurt his close friend Halsey by contesting it.5
The evidence is strong that Spruance did confide to Nimitz his bitter dissatisfaction for Mitscher and the Hornet. One suspects Spruance learned more of reasons behind the Hornet Air Group’s misadventures on 4 June than have ever been revealed. Except for Waldron’s VT-8, it failed to go to the designated target. On 5 June Nimitz had slated Mitscher to get TF-17 permanently, but after 13 June that prospect faded. Nimitz advised King that Mitscher would only be CTF-17 for one cruise, then follow his original orders. Instead he again asked King to part with Ted Sherman, this time to relieve Mitscher as CTF-17. In case King declined, Nimitz eyed another possible successor. The loss of the Yorktown deprived Capt. Arthur Davis of a billet. The carriers other than the Enterprise all had new captains. Thus Nimitz asked King whether Davis could relieve George Murray, “when or if” Murray was promoted to flag rank, which Nimitz urged be soon. Ironically on 7 December Murray faced summary relief after the Enterprise nearly collided with the battleship Oklahoma in November, but his star rose swiftly due to his excellent war performance. At the same time Elliott Buckmaster’s fortunes waned, despite the Yorktown’s solid claim as the best wartime carrier to date. Unlike Ted Sherman, the loss of his ship permanently tainted him. Selected for rear admiral, Buckmaster left Pearl on 18 June to run NAS Norfolk. After two years in the training command, he finally returned to the Pacific in charge of the western Carolines and later naval forces in South China.6
Award ceremony on board the Enterprise, 17 June 1942. Front row (left to right): Vice Adm. William L. Calhoun, Admiral Fletcher, Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, Rear Adm. William Ward Smith, Rear Adm. Marc A. Mitscher, Rear Adm. Robert H. English.
Courtesy of U.S. Navy, via Col. W. W. Smith Jr.
On 17 June Nimitz placed TF-16 and TF-17 on forty-eight-hour notice for “rest, reorganization and training.” Although the carriers were available for an emergency, “This period of readjustment is very seriously needed and every day of training for the next ten days and not to exceed two weeks will pay great dividends later.” Noyes concurred with regard to his new flagship Wasp, in San Diego reequipping with more modern aircraft. He advised Nimitz that he could sail on 25 June, but stressed even two more days of training would make a great difference. Nimitz approved. He also ordered alterations to the Enterprise’s arresting gear to allow her to operate the big TBF torpedo bombers. That would take about two weeks. The Hornet likewise would get the CXAM radar that formerly belonged to the battleship California. In the meantime, on 22 June Fitch took the Saratoga force out to Midway to deliver army fighters and marine dive bombers to beef up that much depleted air garrison.7
The ink was barely dry on the latest carrier task organization before Nimitz scrambled it again. On 21 June he proposed to King that Mitscher immediately take Patrol Wing (Patwing) Two. With Ted Sherman still off limits, he desired Fitch as CTF-17 in the Hornet after his Midway ferry trip. At the same time he gave Fletcher the Saratoga as CTF-11, while Kinkaid, erstwhile TF-11 cruiser commander, warmed Halsey’s chair in the Enterprise as CTF-16. Rear Adm. Mahlon S. Tisdale (USNA 1912) would take the TF-16 cruisers. Nimitz tabbed Poco Smith to command Fuzzy Theobald’s surface forces in the Aleutians. Cominch approved all the changes and detailed Carleton H. Wright to the TF-11 cruisers. Another newly frocked rear admiral from the class of 1912, “Boscoe” Wright was an ordnance specialist who was captain of the Augusta, King’s Atlantic Fleet flagship. On 24 June Nimitz announced the latest carrier reorganization, effective 30 June after the Sara’s return from Midway. With the Saratoga the most combat-ready carrier, Fletcher moved to the head of the pack. At the same time Davis relieved Murray in the Enterprise, which freed Murray for promotion. Nimitz brought him onto his staff for temporary duty while reserving him for future carrier command. Mitscher’s fate was in Nimitz’s hands after King advised on 25 June, “Recent orders to Murray intended to enable you to make such assignment of Mitscher as you may see fit.” Nimitz saw fit to put Mitscher ashore. Fortunately his banishment from the carriers did not last forever. Stricken by grief over the loss of his aviators, Mitscher thought his career was over, but in the next eighteen months he patiently worked his way back into Nimitz’s trust (if not Spruance’s) to lead the fast carrier task forces to victory in the Pacific War. Mitscher’s performance at Midway surely played a part in Spruance’s decisions in June 1944 during the Battle of the Philippine Sea.8
To go ahead of the narrative, it is useful here to note that Nimitz tasked Murray to look into revising the cumbersome organization of naval air in Hawaii and San Diego, with its bifurcated carrier and patrol wing commands. Halsey’s inconvenient absence proved especially detrimental. His acting administrative surrogate lacked the rank and authority of a true type commander. On 11 July Nimitz named Fitch acting Comcarpac, which numbered his days as CTF-17. Again Fitch, so valued as an aviation administrator, could not escape being Halsey’s understudy ashore. Three days later Nimitz formally recommended to King that the carriers and patrol wings be merged into a single entity under a vice admiral designated “Commander, Air, Pacific Fleet.” It is interesting that at this juncture Nimitz envisioned this officer (Halsey if healthy, otherwise Fitch or possibly Bellinger) strictly as an administrator. In the meantime Bellinger left for Washington as Cincpac’s emissary to detail the proposed reorganization to Cominch. While there a physical exam showed a mild heart condition. On 16 July to his disgust Bupers recommended he be relieved. Nimitz designated Mitscher temporary Commander, Patrol Wings, Pacific Fleet, in Bellinger’s place. Yet desiring to “withhold recommendation for [Bellinger’s] relief,” he queried Washington as to when Halsey could resume his duties as Comcarpac. Bupers responded that Halsey could not return to work until after 15 September. At the same time King co-opted Bellinger as deputy chief of staff, not exactly an assignment that boded much rest. That reduced yet again the number of aviator admirals available to Nimitz. Therefore in the absence of both Halsey and Bellinger, he recommended to King that Fitch be promoted to vice admiral and take over Patrol Wings Pacific, as well as Carriers Pacific. Without waiting for a reply he had Fitch relieve Mitscher and Murray replace Fitch as CTF-17 in the Hornet. Thus by the end of July the Pacific Fleet’s carrier task force commanders comprised two non-aviators (Fletcher and Kinkaid), one JCL (Noyes), and one authentic pioneer aviator (Murray), the first to rise that high.9
The fatigue of a long campaign and devastating losses compelled reorganization of the carrier air groups as well. Both Fletcher and Spruance stressed the need to replace exhausted personnel and to continue training. The long-term solution was to create a replacement command on the West Coast to hasten formation of carrier replacement air groups and ensure their swift readiness for combat. Nimitz reassigned seventy-four carrier pilots who fought in the early raids, at Coral Sea or Midway. That was a much more comprehensive program of pilot replacement than in Japan, where most of the former Nagumo force carrier aircrews bolstered the air groups on the remaining carriers. Nimitz’s policy would eventually pay huge dividends in enhanced combat effectiveness as U.S. carrier aviation vastly expanded. Even so, he retained a leaven of combat veterans. On 16 June he advised King that the available rested pilots would rebuild depleted squadrons on the active carriers. Browning, on the West Coast, would “assist expediting all necessary action connection [with the] formation and training [of ] replacement carrier air groups” until Halsey could return to Pearl.10
Restoring the carrier groups in Hawaii to full combat effectiveness proved difficult. At Midway three torpedo squadrons suffered virtual annihilation. Only VT-8 easily reformed around an existing nucleus. At the same time a surfeit of VF pilots filled out the VT squadrons. The two Enterprise dive bombing squadrons also sustained terrible losses. By contrast VB-3 and the two Hornet dive bombing squadrons came through tolerably well. From Fletcher’s old team in the Yorktown only VS-5 remained. Priority went to venerable Saratoga, whose air group under highly respected Cdr. Harry Donald “Don” Felt (USNA 1923) comprised perhaps the best-trained squadrons remaining in the fleet. Two were old-line Saratoga outfits: VB-3 of proud Yorktown veterans who sank the Sōryū and helped finish the Hiryū, and VS-3, which trained at San Diego since February. The largest of the new fighter units, VF-5, joined the Saratoga, along with rebuilt VT-8. The Enterprise Air Group changed greatly after Midway. Lt. Cdr. Wade McClusky went home for a rest, replaced by Lt. Cdr. Max Leslie, former VB-3 skipper and another hero of the battle. The two dive bombing squadrons were VB-6 and the original VS-5 from the Yorktown. VT-3 coalesced around a few experienced pilots, while VF-6 returned with new faces but many seasoned pilots. The Hornet kept her two dive bombing squadrons but received VF-72 in place of hapless VF-8, and a restored VT-6. Cdr. Walter F. Rodee (ex–VS-8 commanding officer) replaced Commander Ring who went ashore with Mitscher.
Although considerably smaller than the Yorktown-class carriers, the Wasp wielded an air group nearly as large. Her design featured an innovative folding deck edge number one elevator located port side forward in contrast to center line lifts on all the other carriers. Since commissioning in 1940, the Wasp spent all of her time in the Atlantic. In spring 1942 she twice delivered British Spitfires to besieged Malta but encountered no Axis aircraft or submarines in the Mediterranean. Winston Churchill quipped on 11 May: “Who said a Wasp could not sting twice?” Lt. Cdr. Wallace M. Beakley, former commanding officer of VF-5, led the Wasp Air Group. Capt. Forrest Sherman’s first task at San Diego was to reequip his two scouting squadrons with SBDs and a recently formed VT-7 with TBFs. He also initiated what one of the squadrons described as “a high pressure training schedule which crowded a month’s training into a week’s time.”11
An interim solution to the carrier fighter woes was to increase their strength yet again from twenty-seven to thirty-six F4F-4 Wildcats, nearly double the number just two months before in the Coral Sea. Comcarpac expanded the Saratoga’s VF-5 by stripping pilots from VF-3 and VF-8 training ashore and soon beefed up the Enterprise and Hornet VF squadrons as well, but the smaller Wasp could only handle thirty F4Fs. Authorized strength for the groups in the Saratoga, Enterprise, and Hornet grew to eighty-eight planes (thirty-six fighters, thirty-six dive bombers, and sixteen torpedo bombers); the Wasp seventy planes (thirty fighters, thirty dive bombers, and ten torpedo bombers). The additional airplanes hurriedly crammed on board these flattops proved a mixed blessing. They imposed severe limitations, particularly for the elderly Saratoga with one slow operating elevator and smaller enclosed hangar. All the carriers now required more time to conduct air operations, because of the increased numbers of planes, especially those with folding wings, and the longer takeoff runs necessary for the heavier aircraft. The massive TBFs especially proved a handful.12
By early July Fletcher and three carriers received a mission of great strategic importance. Left behind at Pearl, the Hornet continued experimenting. Still stung by the Enterprise’s poor performance in the first 4 June launch, Murray amalgamated the two Hornet dive bombing squadrons into one flying twenty-four SBDs and similarly restricted the fighting squadron to thirty-two F4Fs and the VT squadron to twelve TBFs. The other aircraft were spares. Including the group commander’s TBF, that made for a much more easily handled operating strength of sixty-nine planes. Murray and the Hornet’s Capt. Charles Mason devised a series of deck load strike scenarios. The fighters customarily deployed in eight-plane flights to be used in the following manner: the first for combat air patrol, the second with the first wave deck load strike (SBDs and TBFs) spotted on the flight deck, the third waiting in the hangar with the second strike wave, and the fourth as reserve combat air patrol. These reforms went a long way to increase flexibility and reduce launch times, but they did not address the failure to coordinate attacks by air groups from different carriers as the Japanese already did. Thus they risked reducing offensive action to a series of small, unsupported strikes that might not be decisive in battle. The U.S. Navy would not rectify that deficiency until long after Fletcher relinquished his carrier command.13