1. Comcru TF-17 war diary; Sōryū battle report, WDC 160985B; Nagumo report, 21.
2. Comcrupac reports (14 June 1942 and 26 June 1942); CO USS Yorktown report (18 June 1942); Commander, Bombing Squadron Five (temporarily designated as VS-5) to CO USS Enterprise, Report of action 4–6 June 1942 (7 June 1942), in RG-38, Action Reports.
3. TF-16 communication log. Message 050001 June 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:131, asserted that Thach provided Fletcher “the first visual evidence that three Japanese carriers were burning and exploding,” and that Fletcher then sent out the VS-5 search specifically to find the fourth carrier. Of course, VS-5 left before Thach landed, and Thach never met with Fletcher before Fletcher left the Yorktown. Thach corrected Morison (letter 11 April 1949, in Morison Office Files, box 23), explaining he was speaking with Arnold and that they were about to go to flag plot when the attack came in. Nor did anyone else from the strike brief Fletcher. His subsequent messages that afternoon clearly demonstrate he did not know three carriers had been hit.
4. For the first attack on the Yorktown, see Lundstrom, First Team, 374–87. After witnessing the inferno on the Lexington, Machinist Oscar W. Myers devised an “ingenious CO2 purging system” for the fuel lines above the gasoline stowage tanks and arranged to fill the voids around the stowage tanks with carbon dioxide. It was a tremendous achievement that other carriers adopted but unfortunately not in time to save the Wasp. CO USS Yorktown to Chief, Buaer, Comments on Air Department Material and Equipment (18 June 1942) and citation in CO USS Yorktown to Cincpac, Recommendation for Awards (18 June 1942), copies in Smith Papers.
5. Hiryū battle report WDC 160985B; Lundstrom, First Team, 369–72.
6. Dialogue in Fighter Director School, NY Pearl Harbor, Battle of Midway Island (3 April 1943); Foster Hailey, “Valor at Midway,” New York Times (23 June 1942); Newsome conversation (6 August 1966); Schindler questionnaire to Walter Lord.
7. George Clapp conversation (10 February 2000); Rundle, oral history. In Fletcher interview by Walter Lord (17 February 1966), Fletcher recalled suffering a slight head wound while dropping for cover in flag plot during the dive bombing attack. The cut was bandaged; he remained there working on the charts and was surprised later to receive a Purple Heart. Fletcher confused the attack on 4 June with the torpedoing of the Saratoga on 31 August 1942.
8. Message 050035 June 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac and CTF-16, CSCMF, roll 14; letter Fletcher to Cdr. Joseph Bryan, III, USNR (13 September 1948), in Fletcher Papers; Capt. John E. Greenbacker account of the Battle of Midway (c. 1966) from Captain Greenbacker.
9. CO USS Portland to Cincpac, Action Report (11 June 1942); Bates, Midway, 136–37; letter Salomon to Morison (13 August 1947).
10. Comcrudiv Six report (11 June 1942); CO USS Vincennes to Cincpac, Action Report—4 June 1942 (9 June 1942); Vincennes deck log; CTG-17.4 (Comdesron Six) to CTF-17, Japanese Torpedo Plane Attack on USS Yorktown During Battle of Midway, June 4, 1942—Report of (12 June 1942).
11. Letter Rear Adm. W. G. Schindler to Dr. Thaddeus Tuleja (24 September 1958), furnished by Dr. Tuleja; Astoria deck log; Rundle, oral history; letter Laing to Barde (6 December 1966).
12. Tuleja, 158–59; W. W. Smith, 116; Hailey, 173–74.
13. CO USS Portland report (11 June 1942); CO USS Pensacola Report of Engagement with Enemy Aircraft on June 4, 1942 (8 June 1942); messages 050140 CTF-17 to CTF-16, 050430 Midway to Cincpac, 050145 Cincpac to all CTFs, and 050557 Cincpac to all CTFs, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14; Astoria deck log.
14. Pollard, oral history; W. W. Smith, 118; Comcru TF-17 war diary; Lundstrom, First Team, 367, 395; Sawachi, Middowē Kaisen, 499.
15. Message 050235 June 1942 Yorktown to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14.
16. Nagumo report, 23–25, 41; Ugaki, 145.
17. For details of the air actions involved in the second attack on the Yorktown, see Lundstrom, First Team, 391–411.
18. CO USS Yorktown report (18 June 1942); Hailey, 177; message 050315 June 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14.
19. Message 050204 June 1942 CTF-16 to Cincpac (info CTF-17), CSCMF, roll 14.
20. Buell, Quiet Warrior, 151–52; Barde, 301–2; Prange, Miracle, 283. There is no documentation for the assertion that Browning wanted to launch an immediate second strike but that Spruance refused.
21. Message 050147 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 14. CO NAS Midway report (18 June 1942); TF-16 communication log.
22. It is fascinating to compare the situation facing Spruance at 1300 with TF-17 on the afternoon of 8 May at Coral Sea, where Fletcher is lambasted for not unleashing an immediate second strike against MO Striking Force. After reading a draft of this chapter, Commander Best wrote the author, “Can’t imagine the grounds for that msg [Spruance’s 050204 reporting all four carriers badly damaged] in view of the fact that two hours earlier I reported in Spruance’s hearing that three Japanese carriers would not operate any aircraft that day but that a fourth to the north of the three was untouched. At no time after I left the flag bridge did anyone ask if I had any info on the position of the fourth carrier.” Best believed no one who came back from the mission was asked either. “The staff had the same arrogance about the aviators’ knowledge as the fliers had for the flying savvy of senior aviators (commanders and above),” letter Best to Lundstrom (15 May 2000). Letter Spruance to Fletcher (8 June 1942).
23. TF-16 communication log; message 050247 June 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14.
24. W. W. Smith, 95; Willmott, 406, 450. CO, Bombing Squadron Five report (7 June 1942). Cdr. W. C. Short, in Morison Office Files, box 22, questioned the Japanese estimate of the Hiryū’s position. Short called Adams’s contact report “by far the clearest, most accurate, and deliberate contact report made by any carrier-based aircraft in the entire war.” Bates, Midway, 140, erred in stating that the VS-5 SBD that found the Hiryū was in the extreme left sector. Adams actually flew the next sector to the north.
25. TF-16 communication log; Hornet Air Operations Officer report (12 June 1942).
26. CO USS Hornet report (13 June 1942); Comcrudiv Six report (11 June 1942); and valuable insight from Mark Horan. Buell, Quiet Warrior, 153.
27. CO USS Yorktown report (18 June 1942); Bureau of Ships, USS Yorktown Loss in Action Midway June 4–7, 1942, War Damage Report No. 25 (9 March 1943). Dulin et al., The Loss of the USS Yorktown (CV-5), 31. Letter Buckmaster to W. W. Smith (22 August 1964).
28. CO USS Yorktown to Secnav, Loss of Ship—Report on (17 June 1942), First Endorsement CTF-17 to Secnav (23 June 1942), Second Endorsement Cincpac to Secnav (7 July 1942). Fletcher interview by Prange (17 September 1966); Buckmaster letter to W. W. Smith (22 August 1964) stating, “Admiral Fletcher is one of the finest, and so was Spence Lewis.” Letter Laing to Barde (6 December 1966). Apparently Laing’s report to the Admiralty was so critical of how U.S. Navy fought at Midway it remains classified in Britain today. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:135; Morison, Two-Ocean War, 157; Dulin et al., 32.
29. CTG-17.4 (Comdesron Two) to Cominch, Report of Action, June 4, 1942 (4 June 1942). CTG-17.4 (Comdesron Six) to CTF-17, Japanese Torpedo Plane Attack on USS Yorktown During Battle of Midway, June 4, 1942—Report of (12 June 1942); Hailey, 177; Greenbacker account of the Battle of Midway; W. W. Smith, 123.
30. Comcru TF-17 war diary; Nagumo report, 26–27.
31. CO USS Balch to Cincpac, Report on Japanese air action against Yorktown, June 4, 1942, USS Balch (12 June 1942); CO USS Benham to Cincpac, Action Report—Battle of Midway (10 June 1942); CO USS Russell to Cincpac, Action Report (10 June 1942); CO USS Anderson to Cincpac, Report required by U.S. Navy Regulations, Art. 712, concerning engagement with Japanese carrier based planes, near Midway Island, on June 4, 1942 (5 June 1942); CO USS Hughes to Cincpac, Report of Battle with Japanese Aircraft on June 4, 1942 (11 June 1942); CO USS Morris to Cominch, Midway Island Action of June 4, 1942—report on (13 June 1942); CO USS Hammann to Cincpac, Action Report, 4–6 June 1942 (16 June 1942); letter Buckmaster to W. W. Smith (22 August 1964).
32. Hailey, 177; W. W. Smith, 131; message 050415 June 1942 CTF-17 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14; letter S. E. Morison to Fletcher (10 December 1947), Fletcher Papers; Dorris et al., A Log of the Vincennes, 218; letter Fletcher to Morison (15 December 1947), Fletcher Papers.
33. Letter Leslie to W. W. Smith (15 December 1964); Comcru TF-17 war diary; CO USS Hughes to Cincpac, Operations in Connection with USS Yorktown from time of abandonment about 0301, GCT, June 5, 1942, until sinking at 1659, GCT, June 7, 1942 (11 June 1942).
34. Comcru TF-17 war diary; TF-16 war diary; letter Fletcher to Morison (1 December 1947); Prange, Miracle, 386. In a memo to Bates (copy in Morison Office Files, box 23), Capt. Ralph C. Parker commented: “So while I am no great ‘Fletcher fan,’ I think he was absolutely right in what he did. In modern armies the commander who thinks that he and only he can do his job is too full of self-deception to be wholly trustworthy; while the one who consciously sacrifices what is best for the cause to his own pride and ambition is a scoundrel who ought to be shot!”
35. Letter Spruance to Forrestel (14 December 1962); Buell, Quiet Warrior, 154–55; CTF-16 war diary; Comcru TF-17 war diary. Morison in his usual attempt to deny that Fletcher exercised true tactical command of the carrier striking force stated that with this message Fletcher simply “confirmed” Spruance’s “freedom of movement,” Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:141.
36. Messages 050540 Midway to Cincpac (relayed by Cincpac to all CTFs), 050510 CTU-7.1.6 (Nautilus) to Comsubpacflt (Commander, Submarines, Pacific Fleet), 050621 Midway to Cincpac, 050647 Cincpac to all CTFs, and 050707 Cincpac to all CTFs, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14. Information of Thueson’s contact from James Sawruk.
37. Layton, oral history, 34; Potter, Nimitz, 95; messages 050913 Cincpac to all CTFs, 051225 Cincpac to Cominch and all CTFs, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
38. Messages 050912 CTF-16 to Cincpac, 051135 Cincpac to Midway, 051345 Cincpac to Cominch, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
39. Cressman et al., Glorious Page, 137–39; Nagumo report, 8–11.
40. Ugaki, 145–52; Fuchida and Okumiya, 212–20.
41. Messages 050415 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 050430 Midway to Cincpac, 050500 Cincpac to CTF-17, 050515 Cincpac to Vireo, 050529 Cincpac to Gwin, 042045 Cincpac to Comserforpac, 050621 Cincpac to Fulton, and 050644 Cincpac to Comserforpac, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
42. Messages 050721 Cincpac to CTF-17 and 050645 CTF-17 to Cincpac, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
43. Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 1, Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway (February 1943); Cdr. J. J. Rochefort, Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, Memorandum for Fleet Intelligence Officer, Battle of Midway, Enemy dispatches regarding (15 October 1942), in RG-457, SRMN-005; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 174–75. Bates, Midway, 143; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:142.
44. Bates, Midway, 142; W. W. Smith, 151.
1. CTF-16 report (16 June 1942), letter Spruance to Nimitz (8 June 1942), CTF-16 war diary.
2. Messages 051433 Cincpac to all CTFs, 051500 CTU-7.1.3 [Tambor] to Cincpac, relayed 051559 Cincpac to all CTFs, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14. Comsubpacflt to Cincpac, Battle of Midway—Submarines report of (31 July 1942). CO NAS Midway report (18 June 1942). Ugaki, 151–52; Lacroix and Wells, Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War, 477–78.
3. Messages 051800 CTU-7.1.3 [Tambor] to Cincpac 051847 CTF-7 to CTG-7.1, 051800 CTF-7 to TF-7 (info Cincpac), and 051907 and 051915 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
4. Messages 052036 CTF-16 to Cincpac, 052053 and 052055 Cincpac to all CTFs, 052129 Cincpac to CTF-16, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14. CO NAS Midway report (18 June 1942); copy of Gumz’s report via James Sawruk.
5. TF-16 war diary.
6. Letter Spruance to Nimitz (8 June 1942); Buell, Quiet Warrior, 156; messages 060023 Cincpac to CTF-16 and 060105 Cincpac to all CTFs, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
7. Messages 052130 Midway to Cincpac, 060123 Cincpac to CTF-16, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14. At noon (1430 Hawaii time) Midway cabled its update of Gumz’s sighting report that clearly stated the new position as of 0930 (060000 June 1942 Midway to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14). It then took Cincpac headquarters nearly two hours to get the message out to the task force commanders. Barde, 353; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 157–58.
8. Barde, 353–55; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 157–58; Mark Horan personal communication; TF-16 war diary; TF-16 communication log; CTF-16 report (16 June 1942); CO USS Hornet report (13 June 1942); CO USS Enterprise reports (8 June 1942 and 13 June 1942).
9. Details of attacks in carrier action reports and Cressman et al., Glorious Page, 149–50.
10. Ugaki, 153–54; Fuchida and Okumiya, 199–200, 224–25. Messages 230632 and 230747 June 1942 Midway to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 16. Silver’s sighting helps to resolve a controversy as to the likely location of the Hiryū’s sinking. Nagumo’s report, 10, 54, gives identical positions that differ only by west or east longitude, namely: latitude 31° 27.5´ north, longitude 179° 23.5´. The Japanese official history (Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 43:381) favored the east longitude position, but the location of Silver’s contact argues strongly that west longitude is correct.
11. Messages 060237 Cincpac to all CTFs, 060315 Cincpac to CTF-16, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14; letter Spruance to Nimitz (8 June 1942); letter Spruance to Forrestel (9 February 1963), in Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 7; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 158–59.
12. Messages 060717 Cincpac to Cimarron, 060741 Cincpac to all CTFs, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14; TF-16 communication log.
13. Messages 060625 Cincpac to CTF-16 and 060801 Cincpac to all CTFs, June 1942, CSCMF, roll
14. Cincpac to Cominch, Battle of Midway, Second Supplementary Report (8 August 1942), Nimitz’s endorsement of English’s report, concluded: “Our forces should have destroyed many enemy ships on 5 June. A foremost cause for their not doing so was Tambor’s faulty reporting of contact along with her overcautious maneuvers for the four hours she was in sight of Japanese vessels west of Midway beginning 0215 5 June (Plus 12).”
14. Comcrupac report (14 June 1942); Comcru TF-17 war diary.
15. Comcru TF-17 war diary; W. W. Smith, 139–40; Portland and Astoria war diaries; Worthington, “A Destroyer at Midway,” 6; message 052121 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 14; Boo account to Walter Lord, enclosed in letter to Lundstrom (17 February 1996); letter Schindler to Tuleja (24 September 1958).
16. Messages 060117 Cincpac to CTF-17, 061115 CTF-17 to Cincpac, 061331 Cincpac to Platte, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
17. CO Hughes report (11 June 1942); Nagumo report, 38. Bates, Midway, 101. CO USS Yorktown to Secnav (17 June 1942), Second Endorsement Cincpac to Secnav (7 July 1942). George Clapp, one of the flag communication watch officers, is adamant none of the flag ciphers were compromised because they were secured prior to the shifting of the flag to the Astoria. Radioman W. H. Walvoord did the same for Fullinwider’s RI group (from Rundle, oral history).
18. Messages 050430 CTF-1 to TF-1, 051719 CTF-1 to Cincpac, 060050 Cincpac to CTF-1, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14; Greybook, 571. See also CTF-1 to Cincpac, Report on Cruise 5–19 June 1942 (7 July 1942), RG-313, Cincpac Secret Red 106, box 4563. Pye noted Cincpac’s visit in early July “clarified the situation” and gave “proper direction” to the efforts of TF-1.
19. For the 6 June operations, see TF-16 war diary; TF-16 communication log; CTF-16 report (16 June 1942); CO USS Hornet report (13 June 1942); CO USS Enterprise reports (8 June 1942 and 13 June 1942); and Cressman et al., Glorious Page, 153–56, 162–63.
20. TF-16 war diary; message 062000 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14.
21. TF-16 communication log.
22. TF-16 communication log; message 070756 June 1942 CTF-16 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14. One notation in the communication log described the enemy commander as “C-in-C Orange Fleet,” which meant Yamamoto, but Orange is probably an error for Second.
23. Phelps 27 percent, Aylwin 24 percent, Conyngham 29 percent, and Ellet 29 percent; figures from their deck logs and fuel capacities given in FTF-218, War Service Fuel Consumption of U.S. Naval Surface Vessels (1 September 1945).
24. Messages 070015 Midway to Cincpac, 070121 Cincpac to CTF-16, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
25. Buell, Quiet Warrior, 162; message 070756 June 1942 CTF-16 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14; Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 1, Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway (February 1943).
26. Messages 070224 Com 14 to Combined Addressees; 070629 Belconnen to Combined Addressees; 070705 Cincpac to CTF-11, CTF-16, and CTF-17; 070803 Cincpac to Cominch; 070829 Cincpac to Cominch; all June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
27. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:155. CO USS Yorktown to Secnav (17 June 1942), with First (23 June 1942) and Second Endorsements (7 July 1942); Comdesron Six to CTF-17, Report of Japanese Submarine Attack on USS Yorktown June 6, 1942, and the sinking of the Yorktown June 7, 1942 (14 June 1942); Tanabe, “I Sank the Yorktown”; messages 070305 Benham to Cincpac and CTF-17, 070336 CTG-17.5 to Cincpac and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 14; Cressman, Gallant Ship, 174–79.
28. Layton, oral history, 55; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:154–55; Barde, 347; CO USS Yorktown to Secnav (17 June 1942), with First (23 June 1942) and Second Endorsements (7 July 1942); Potter and Nimitz, 246; W. W. Smith, 151–52; Pacific Fleet Secret Letter 25L-42 (30 June 1942); message 081935 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 559.
29. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:153; letter Spruance to Fletcher (8 June 1942).
30. Comcru TF-17 war diary; Astoria and Portland war diaries; messages 070051 Cincpac to CTF-17 and CTG-11.1, 071915 CTG-17.5 to Cincpac, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14; 080511 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch and all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 15.
31. Messages 071530 Cominch to Cincpac, 071611 Comnorwestseafron (Commander, Northwest Sea Frontier) to Cincpac, 071954 Cominch to Cincpac, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 14.
32. Messages 080351 Cincpac to Cominch; 080429 Cincpac to CTF-8, CTF-16, and CTF-17; 081910 CTF-8 to Cincpac; 082029 Cominch to Cincpac; all June 1942, CSCMF, roll 15.
33. Saratoga war diary; Lundstrom, First Team, 429–30; Reynolds, Famous American Admirals, 271–72.
34. Saratoga war diary, TF-16 war diary.
35. Message 091803 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, CSCMF, roll 15; Ugaki, 158, 160.
36. Messages 100045 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Cominch 00 File; 101957 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File; 110411 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 15.
37. TF-16 war diary; Saratoga war diary; message 101931 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 15.
38. Messages 111841 Cincpac to CTF-16, 110929 Cincpac to Cominch, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 15; 111645 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File; 082135, 122030, 142303 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-1, CSCMF, roll 15.
39. Message 130329 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-11, CSCMF, roll 15.
40. Cincpac report (28 June 1942); detailed casualty list for both sides in Sawachi; analysis of Japanese aircrew losses from James Sawruk.
41. Cincpac report (28 June 1942); Cressman et al., Glorious Page, 167–68; Norman W. Shaw, Screened Her Going Down, 351–53; letter Schindler to Tuleja (24 September 1958).
42. Letters Spruance to Nimitz (8 June 1942), Spruance to Fletcher (8 June 1942); Fletcher interview by Prange (17 September 1966).
43. Message 140112 June 1942 Comcrupac to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 15; Boo account to Walter Lord, enclosed in letter to Lundstrom (17 February 1996).
44. Letter Nimitz to King (13 June 1942), Nimitz Papers; message 150117 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 15; messages 191920 Cominch to Cincpac, 202013 Cincpac to Cominch, 211515 Cominch to Cincpac, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 16.
45. Letter Spruance to Nimitz (8 June 1942); Reynolds, Fast Carriers, 28; Citation File, NHC.
46. Letter Ashford to Buell (24 November 1971); letter Vice Adm. W. Frederick Boone to Cdr. T. B. Buell (20 November 1971), in Spruance Papers, coll. 37, box 1. On Browning, see also the appendix by Clark Reynolds in Cressman et al., Glorious Page, 214–16, and Dr. Harold L. Buell, “Death of a Captain.”
47. Cincpac Memorandum to Rear Adm. A. W. Fitch and Rear Adm. F. J. Fletcher, Aircraft Carrier Task Force Tactics (9 June 1942), and the replies: CTF-11 to Cincpac, Aircraft Carrier Task Force Tactics (undated) and Fletcher Memorandum to Cincpac, Aircraft Carrier Task Force Tactics (15 June 1942); M. R. Browning Memorandum for Rear Admiral Spruance (13 June 1942); R. A. Spruance Memorandum to Cincpac (13 June 1942); all available in RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files.
48. Cincpac report (28 June 1942); Fletcher memorandum (15 June 1942).
49. Browning memorandum (13 June 1942); Murray interview by Buaer (25 November 1942). Spruance memorandum (13 June 1942), Browning memorandum (13 June 1942); Lundstrom, First Team, 441–47; message 210317 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 16.
50. Message 102151 June 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 15.
51. Messages 151310 Cominch to Cincpac and 172033 Cincpac to Cominch, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 15. Fitch wrote in his undated memo on carrier tactics that carrier task force commanders could only risk detaching light forces for night attacks when there was a “high probability” of success. Fletcher in his memo to Cincpac (15 June 1942) acknowledged the desirability of following up air attacks with surface forces, but only if the enemy carriers had been knocked out.
52. For example, a recent entry on Spruance in a respected military encyclopedia stated: “When his friend Halsey was temporarily ill, Spruance took command of the American carrier force that fought and won the most crucial and decisive naval engagement of World War II” (Chambers, The Oxford Companion to American Military History, 673). Beach’s Salt and Steel, 113–14, acknowledged that Spruance was “subordinate to Fletcher” but took Fletcher out of the battle so early, “It fell thus to Spruance to make the crucial decisions when to attack (he selected exactly the right time) and when to run away from Yamamoto’s surface forces.”
53. Pratt’s articles describing Spruance as the sole carrier commander at Midway first appeared in Harper’s Magazine (“The Mysteries of Midway,” 133–45; “The Knockout at Midway,” 246–53). In the fall of 1943 the Bureau of Naval Personnel reprinted the articles. On 6 December 1943 Cdr. Charles G. Moore Jr., an old shipmate of Fletcher, wrote Adm. Randall Jacobs, chief of Bupers, “It is an odd type of reporting of a battle which fails to mention the name of the senior officer or that he was even present.” Moore commented that Pratt, “Having done so handsomely by Admiral Fletcher in the Coral Sea story, no doubt found it advisable to select another hero for Midway. This is journalistically understandable, although it is a bit like saying that since Nelson had achieved so greatly in the Battle of the Nile it would be more appropriate to give somebody else the credit for Trafalgar” (memo in Fletcher Papers). The next year Pratt incorporated his Midway piece without revisions in the book The Navy’s War, foreword by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Likewise Gilbert Cant’s 1943 America’s Navy in World War II, also written with Navy Department help, failed to mention Fletcher even being at Midway. In 1946 Pratt’s Fleet Against Japan, foreword by Fleet Admiral Nimitz, 53, described Spruance as the “victor of Midway.”
54. Fletcher to Morison (1 December 1947), Morison statement, both in Fletcher Papers.
55. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:84–85. Spruance to Potter (24 December 1959), Spruance Papers, coll. 37, series I, box 7. Fletcher to Smith (12 August 1964), Smith Papers.
1. Messages 281929 May 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, 301615 May 1942 Bupers to Cincpac, 011445 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, and 031430 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 13; 100235 June 1942 Cincpac to Com 11, CSCMF, roll 15.
2. Messages 060045 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 14; 082029 Cominch to Cincpac, 122253 Cincpac to CTF-18, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 15; letter Nimitz to King (13 June 1942), in Nimitz Papers.
3. On 1 July Draemel relieved Brown as Commander, Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet (Comamphibforpac) and left Phibpac (Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet) on 10 August to command the Fourth Naval District in Philadelphia. His tenure as Cincpac chief of staff during that very rough period earned him the DSM. He retired in 1946 as a rear admiral (NHC Officer Biographical File).
4. Message 160131 June 1942 Cincpac to Pacflt, CSCMF, roll 15.
5. Letter Spruance to Nimitz (8 June 1942); Citation File, NHC; Buell, Quiet Warrior, 164.
6. Buell, Quiet Warrior, 164–65. Spruance’s otherwise blandly written action report (16 June 1942) cautioned, “Where discrepancies exist between the Enterprise and Hornet reports, the Enterprise report should be taken as the more accurate,” a strong hint that Mitscher and the Hornet performed poorly at Midway. Message 142359 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 15. Letter Nimitz to King (13 June 1942); letter Buckmaster to W. W. Smith (22 August 1964). On the close call between the Enterprise and Oklahoma, see Enterprise deck log and CO USS Enterprise to Comairbatfor, Near Collision Oklahoma-Enterprise, November 10, 1941 (12 November 1941), from RG-313, Comairbatfor General Correspondence, via James Rindt. Murray’s career teetered prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Halsey requested on 18 November that he be detached, an action Kimmel evidently endorsed. On 8 December Halsey advised Cincpac, “In view excellent work of subject officer during current operations recommend my Serial 0979 of 18 November 1941 be canceled.” Kimmel concurred. On 13 February 1942 Halsey reiterated his request to Bunav that all reference to the 10 November 1941 incident be expunged from Murray’s personnel file. Since then his “conduct and shiphandling have been superb.” Messages 052145 Opnav to Cincpac, 081756 CTF-8 to Cincpac, 091733 Cincpac to Opnav, December 1941, in CSCMF, roll 508; Comairbatfor to Chief, Bunav, “Captain George D. Murray, U.S. Navy.” (13 February 1942), in RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files.
7. Messages 180121 June 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16 and CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 15; 192356 CTF-18 to Cincpac, 210140 NY Pearl Harbor to Buships (Bureau of Ships), June 1942, CSCMF, roll 16; 192303 Cincpac to Cominch, 192301 Cincpac to CTF-11, June 1942, in CNO TS Blue File.
8. Messages 220055 Cincpac to Cominch, 231442 Cominch to Cincpac, 242347 Cincpac to Pacflt, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 16; letter Nimitz to King (24 June 1942), in Nimitz Papers; message 251440 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File.
9. Coletta, Bellinger, 314–18; Cincpac to Cominch, Pacific Fleet, Air Arm, Upper Echelon, Command of (14 July 1942), RG-313, Comairpac (Commander, Aircraft, Pacific Fleet) General Correspondence; messages 162248 Bupers to Cincpac, 180051 Cincpac to Compatwing Two, July 1942, CSCMF, roll 18; 220523 Cincpac to Bupers, 212300 (sic, actually 26 July) Bupers to Cincpac, 262305 Cincpac to Cominch, 272059 Cincpac to CTF-17, 291925 Cominch to Cincpac, July 1942, CSCMF, roll 19.
10. Messages 151300 Cominch to Cincpac; 152201, 170331, 170425 Cincpac to Cominch, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 15.
11. For the air group reorganizations, see Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 8–16.
12. On Saratoga’s use of one elevator, Stern, 111–12.
13. CTF-17 to Cincpac, Report of Air Raid on Buin-Faisi-Tonolei (14 October 1942); Murray interview by Buaer (25 November 1942).
1. Conversation with George Clapp, 4 June 2001.
2. Message 080731 June 1942 Comsowespac to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 14; narrative by Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, South Pacific Command April 1942 through October 1942 (22 January 1943), 2; Jeffrey G. Barlow, “Taking the Offensive: Admiral Ernest J. King and the Decision To Seize Guadalcanal,” (1999) unpublished paper, 15–16, courtesy Jeffrey Barlow. Messages 280351 May 1942 Cincpac to Comsowespacfor and letter MacArthur to Cincpac, 29 May 1942, in MacArthur Papers. Messages 010100 Cominch to Cincpac, 020455 Cincpac to Comsowespacfor, June 1942, CNO TS Blue File. Frank’s Guadalcanal offers the best overall account of the planning and events of the Guadalcanal campaign.
3. Hayes, 142; messages 100046 June 1942 Cominch to Comnaveu (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe) (info Cincpac), CNO TS Blue File; 111530 Cominch to Comsopac, 140616 Ghormley to Cominch, June 1942, Comsopac war diary; Greybook, 581.
4. Message 210245 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 16; Greybook, 598. For the Japanese carriers, messages 222341 June 1942 Opnav to Cincpac, 012131 July 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 17; and 222230 July 1942 Opnav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 19. The first estimates properly gave the names Junyō and Hiyō, but the 22 July message “corrected” their readings to “Hayataka” and “Hitaka,” an error that persisted throughout the war.
5. Greybook, 599; message 230017 June 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 16.
6. Messages 231255 June 1942 Cominch to Comsowespacfor, Greybook, 601; Chief of Staff to MacArthur 24 June 1942, MacArthur Papers; 231415 and 242306 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 602–3; Greybook, 669.
7. Messages, all June 1942: 241943 Cincpac to Cominch and 262041 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 16; 251840 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 603; Greybook, 670; 271415 Cominch to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File.
8. Messages 272251 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File; 272301 Cincpac to CTF-18 and 300015 Cincpac to CTF-11, CTF-18, and CTF-3, June 1942, Cominch 00 File; Greybook, 672.
9. Potter, Nimitz, 109–11; messages 302155 Comairtransron (Commander, Air Transport Squadron) 2 to Opnav, 031941 Cincpac to Com 12, June 1942, CSCMF, roll 17.
10. Message 011445 June 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 13; on Turner, see Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer, 1:130, 150.
11. Frank, 433; Twining, No Bended Knee, 70–71. In December 1945 Turner testified that just prior to 7 December 1941 he had believed only part of the Japanese fleet would conduct the invasions in the Far East. The rest, “including the battleships and carriers,” would confront the Pacific Fleet, either by opening the war with a “heavy” raid against Hawaii (he gave the odds of that at better than 50–50) or by deploying into the Mandates or the Carolines to prevent Kimmel from advancing westward. Asked during the hearings why he did not send a categorical warning to Kimmel that Pearl Harbor would likely be attacked, Turner replied he did not consider that necessary, for the 27 November 1941 “war warning message” ordered Kimmel to “execute an appropriate defensive deployment.” No contemporary documentation exists for Turner’s claims, which if true meant he committed gross dereliction of duty for not warning his superiors of circumstances so diametrically opposed to the basic assumptions behind the navy’s war plans. Turner testimony, PHA, part 4, 1962–63.
12. Dyer, 1:272, citing Turner’s 3 July 1942 memo to Cincpac, but in box 16 of the Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner Papers, the memo is dated 5 July 1942. Message 210556 June 1942 Comsowespacfor to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 16. Message 040057 July 1942 Cincpac to CTF-18, CNO TS Blue File.
13. Message 022100 July 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 605–6.
14. Conversation between Cominch and Cincpac, 4 July (5 July 1942).
15. Conversation between Cominch and Cincpac, 5 July (5 July 1942); letter Nimitz to Melville V. Grosvenor (28 June 1942), in Adm. John S. McCain Papers.
16. Greybook, 704. Estimate—An Offensive for the Capture and Occupation of Tulagi and Vicinity (6 July 1942), in Greybook, 709–43. Chagrined by the poor accuracy of the high-flying B-17s at Midway, the War Plans Section actually proposed that the heavy bombers attack from an altitude of seventy-five to one hundred feet.
17. Kinkaid memoir, 189–90; Greybook, 707. Messages 070125 July 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary; 070231 and 062229 Cincpac to Comsopac, July 1942, CSCMF, roll 17.
18. Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 46. Turner’s own recollections, written in October 1945, of the planning and execution of Guadalcanal landings appear on pages 43–50. Letter Fletcher to Hanson W. Baldwin (8 July 1947), in Fletcher Papers.
19. Text of Fletcher’s DSM citation and date of award in Citation File, NHC. Col. Melvin J. Maas diary, in Congressman Melvin J. Maas Papers.
20. Staff roster and Pederson’s orders in Pederson Papers; biographies in Officer Biographical Files, NHC; quote on Humphreys in Col. M. J. Maas undated memorandum (c. August 1942); for the Radio Intelligence Unit, see Kenneth E. Carmichael, oral history, Naval Security Group (September 1983), RG-457.
21. Maas Papers; Zehnpfennig, Melvin J. Maas, sketches Maas’s life but is far less useful than the Maas Papers themselves in covering his time with Fletcher in the Saratoga. Message 132129 June 1942 Cincpac to Commandant, Marine Corps, CSCMF, roll 15.
22. Stern, 65, 70; Stahl, “Back to Savo Island,” 19–20.
23. General sources on movements and composition of TF-11 include the war diaries of TF-11, Comcru TF-11, Desron One, and the fleet oilers.
24. Message 090633 July 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File and Comsopac war diary. The actual letter of instruction was Cincpac to Comsopacfor (9 July 1942). The chartered tankers are identified in message 012122 July 1942 Comserforpac to Port Director San Pedro, CSCMF, roll 17.
25. Messages 122359 Cincpac to CTF-16, 112241 CTF-18 to Cincpac, 122341 Cincpac to Comserforpac, 140510 CTF-18 to Cincpac, 141135 Cincpac to CTF-11, July 1942, CSCMF, roll 18; Greybook, 619, 770, 772; Wasp war diary.
26. Messages, all July 1942: 160612 Comsopac to Cincpac, Greybook, 620; 141927 Cincpac to Cominch, 151500 Cominch to Cincpac, 152343 Cominch to Cincpac, and 170827 Cincpac to CTF-11, CSCMF, roll 18.
27. Message 170602 July 1942 Comsopac to CTF-11 etc., RG-313, Comsopac, Comsopac Message File.
28. Message 172250 July 1942 Comsopac to CTF-18, Comsopac Message File. Comsopac Op-Plan 1–42 (16 July 1942) in RG-38, Op-Ord File. Ghormley, “The Tide Turns,” 59, an unpublished memoir available in NHC; Ghormley narrative, 12. For the 27 July conference, see Comsopac File, Callaghan’s Report of the Conference (28 July 1942), copies in Morison Office Files, box 24, and in Ghormley’s “Tide Turns,” 65–69.
29. Letter Cincpac to Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, USN, Prospective Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force (12 May 1942), copy in Op-Ord File. Ghormley, “Tide Turns,” 24; message 090633 July 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File. Adm. Henry A. Wiley, a former Cincus, denigrated “strategical command” in his memoir An Admiral from Texas, 287: “Except for a concentration of the fleet once a year, the commander in chief was expected to exercise what was called ‘strategical command,’ whatever that means, but not tactical command.”
30. Ghormley, “Tide Turns,” 40; Gerald C. Thomas unpublished manuscript, “Of Coconuts & Their Prelude,” 7, Thomas Papers. Messages 081012 series July 1942 MacArthur-Ghormley to Cominch, Cincpac, and Chief of Staff, CNO TS Blue File.
31. Hayes, 148–53. Jeffrey G. Barlow personal communication. He is the most knowledgeable historian concerning U.S. Navy strategy in the Pacific War. Messages July 1942: 102100 Cominch to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary; 112000 Comsopac to Cominch, Comsopac Message File.
32. Letter Ghormley to Nimitz (2 August 1942), Nimitz Papers; Callaghan conference notes (28 July 1942).
33. U.S. Naval War College (Commo. Richard W. Bates and Cdr. Walter D. Innis), The Battle of Savo Island August 9, 1942 Strategical and Tactical Analysis, 18 (hereafter Bates and Innis).
34. Cdr. Oscar Pederson, “Air Operations,” Lecture Army & Navy Staff College (13 January 1944), in Pederson Papers. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:268–69, described Turner enjoying “complete autonomy from the moment of sailing,” because Fletcher “limited his command in practice to the three carrier groups.” Under the circumstances Fletcher had no real option but to stay with the carriers. Turner did not exercise “complete autonomy,” because he followed a plan that Fletcher approved.
35. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:364–69, 377–89.
36. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:367–68, 389–407.
37. Message 131147 July 1942 Comsowespac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 18. Greybook, 776; text of 17 July 1942 letter in Greybook, 774–75.
1. Message 180558 July 1942 Comsopac to CTF-11, Comsopac Message File; Platte and Cimarron war diaries.
2. Wasp war diary. Messages July 1942: 182230 CTF-18 to Comsopac, Greybook, 622; 210802 CTF-18 to Comsopac, Greybook, 626; 211106 CTF-18 to Comsopac, Comsopac Message File.
3. TF-16 war diary; Kinkaid memoir, 191–95; [Royal Navy] Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 8, Fleet Operations, Mid and S.W. Pacific—[Report of Cdr. M. B. Laing on USS North Carolina], in Australian Archives, MP 1857 Dept. of Defence (Navy Office, Historical Records Files), File 108A, courtesy of Commo. Bruce Loxton, RAN (Ret.), hereafter Laing report.
4. For Turner’s general activities, see the Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific Area (Comamphibforsopac) (TF-62) war diary. Twining, 43.
5. Loxton with Coulthard-Clark, The Shame of Savo, 28–30.
6. Messages July 1942: 210630 Comsopac to CTF-61, CTF-62, and CTF-63, Comsopac Message File; 210820 CTF-11 to Comsopac, Greybook, 626. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 4:280, stated Ghormley was busy “flying up to Nouméa to his flagship Argonne.” Ghormley did not leave until 1 August, after Callaghan had already rejoined him. Message 310537 July 1942 Comsopac to Comsopacfor, CNO TS Blue File. Ghormley stated in “Tide Turns,” 64, “I was desirous of attending this conference, but I found that it was impossible for me to give the time necessary for travel with possible attendant delays.”
7. Saratoga and Hull deck logs; Twining, 45. Lt. (jg) Frank O. Green, USNR, diary (27 July 1942), via Frank O. Green. He was a VF-5 pilot who witnessed the “excitement” of McCain’s dunking.
8. Callaghan conference notes (28 July 1942); Vandegrift, Once a Marine, 120; Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 46; Dyer, 1:301–2.
9. Dyer, 1:301–2; letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947).
10. Kinkaid memoir, 207.
11. Callaghan conference notes. In Dyer, 1:302, Fletcher had expected Ghormley to join him in Saratoga, but that makes no sense in light of what Fletcher told Callaghan at the conference.
12. Cincpac Letter of Instruction (28 May 1942). Correspondent Clark Lee wrote of a conversation with one of Fletcher’s younger staff officers, whom he chided for the failure to relieve Wake. “How about this present mission. . . . Are we going to risk this carrier?” The officer responded: “Not if we can help it.” Lee, They Call It Pacific, 323–24.
13. Colonel Maas, Estimate of the Situation (15 July 1942), Maas Papers; letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947).
14. Maas estimate (15 July 1942). Glover, Command Performance With Guts, 37.
15. Undated (c. early July 1942), handwritten first draft air operation plan in Pederson Papers, marked “Excellent” by either Fletcher or Lewis.
16. Messages 200135 Comamphibforsopac to CTF-11 and 210948 CTF-11 to CTF-62, July 1942, Comsopac Message File.
17. Letter Noyes to Fletcher (21 July 1942), undated (c. 22 July 1942) handwritten second draft air operation plan, both in Pederson Papers; Maas diary, Maas Papers.
18. Maas diary; letter Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes to Cominch, Cominch Report of Operations, Request of Corrections thereto (undated, c. 1944), copy in Fletcher Papers.
19. On Sherman, Reynolds, Famous American Admirals, 306–8; letters Rear Adm. Bradford E. Grow, USN (Ret.), to Lundstrom (28 August 1996, 7 September 1996); Vice Adm. Thomas R. Weschler, USN (Ret.), oral history, 81, 88–89. Weschler did admit, 92, his knowledge of Noyes was not firsthand. “Really the only time I ever saw” him was when he would “walk up and down the quarterdeck, in greens, wearing his aviation pigskin gloves.” Weschler “always had the impression of him as being sort of a mannequin, rather than really being a flesh-and-blood naval officer who was in the thick of decisions and ready to take over and set the course.”
20. CTF-11 to Cincpac, First Endorsement of Saratoga’s Report of Action Against Enemy (Japanese) Forces in Solomon Islands Area on August 24, 1942 (24 September 1942); Pederson lecture (13 January 1944); Carrier Aircraft, USS Wasp, Operation Plan 1–42 (27 July 1942), in Op-Ord File.
21. Callaghan conference notes; letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947).
22. Edward Miller, 197–99. Greybook, 707; letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947); Callaghan conference notes; message 020240 August 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61, Greybook, 631; memo Rear Adm. John S. McCain, Air Support subsequent to Occupation (undated, c. 1 August 1942), noted the carriers would leave D+2½ days, McCain Papers.
23. Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 44; letter Turner to Fletcher (25 July 1942) in Turner Papers, box 1, and Dyer, 1:307–8; Callaghan conference notes.
24. Letter Turner to Fletcher (25 July 1942), Callaghan conference notes.
25. Turner’s Memorandum for Admiral Hepburn (1943), in Adm. Arthur J. Hepburn, USN (Ret.), to Cincpac, Report of informal inquiry into the circumstances attending the loss of the USS Vincennes, USS Quincy, USS Astoria, and HMAS Canberra, on August 9, 1942, in the vicinity of Savo Island (13 May 1943), 267–81. Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 46. Notes from interview of Vice Adm. R. K. Turner by Hanson Baldwin (10 October 1946), in Morison Office Files, box 26. In box 26 is a memo of a conversation by a Morison staffer with “Ramsay,” presumably Rear Adm. Donald Ramsey, stating Callaghan did not know of Turner’s supposed “S.O.B.” remark. The memo was later altered to state that Callaghan did know of the comment. Callaghan died on 13 November 1942, so that emendation did not come from him.
26. Griffith, The Battle for Guadalcanal, 35; Vandegrift, 120; Twining, 45.
27. Kinkaid memoir, 207–8, 230. Letter Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman to S. E. Morison (14 February 1949), Morison Office Files, box 26. Letter Noyes to Rear Adm. Charles Wellborn (12 August 1950), in DNC, Office Files, box 20.
28. Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 116; Dyer 1:300; Frank, 54.
29. Isely and Crowl, 41; Maas estimate (15 July 1942).
30. Messages July 1942: 100616 Comsopac to Cincpac, Comsopac Message File; 100941 Cincpac to Comsopac and 192129 Cincpac to Long Island, CSCMF, roll 18; 222211 Cincpac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 19.
31. Messages July 1942: 210335 Comamphibforsopac to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary; 290513 Cincpac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 19, modified by 022115 August 1942 Cincpac to TG-2.6, CSCMF, roll 20.
32. McCain memo, Air Support Subsequent to Occupation, McCain Papers; message 020240 August 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61, Greybook, 631.
33. Dyer, 1:300–301; message 022357 August 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 20; Pederson lecture (13 January 1944); Maj. Harold W. Bauer, USMC, diary, 3 August 1942, via Nimitz Museum; A. C. Davis Memo for Admiral Kinkaid (4 August 1942), Pederson Papers.
34. Message 041436 August 1942 Commander, Aircraft, South Pacific Force (Comairsopac) to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary.
35. Message 191034 July 1942 Comsowespac to Comsopac, Greybook, 622–23; letter Ghormley to Nimitz (29 July 1942), Nimitz Papers.
36. Comairsopac war diary; Turner 1943 memo to Hepburn, 268; Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 47. Messages July 1942: 290857 CTF-61 to CTF-63, 300820 CTF-63 to CTF-61, Greybook, 628; 310811 Comairsopac to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary.
37. Message 290041 July 1942 Comairsopac to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary; Comairsopac war diary.
38. Dyer, 1:301; TF-11 war diary. Messages July 1942: 160345 and 190235 Cincpac to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File; 012122 Comserforpac to Port Director San Pedro, CSCMF, roll 17.
39. Callaghan conference notes; messages 271930 Chief of Staff Comsopac to Comsopac, 280950 Comsopac to Port Director Roses, Suva, and Nouméa, 281030 Comsopac to CTG-2.3, and 282007 Cincpac to Comsopac, July 1942, CSCMF, roll 19.
40. Callaghan conference notes. Messages July 1942: 272211 Comsopac to CTF-61 and 280201 CTF-61 to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary; 281500 CTF-62 to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 19. Dyer, 1:437, erred calling phase one the invasion and phase two the occupation of Ndeni, when in fact the invasion was phase two and Ndeni simply a part of it.
41. TF-11, Comamphibforsopac, and Platte war diaries. Messages July 1942: 290330 Comsopac to CTF-62, Comsopac war diary; 300246 Comsopac to CTF-62, 300331 Comsopac to Comairsopac, CSCMF, roll 20.
42. Messages 281830 July 1942 Cominch to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary; 292325 July 1942 Comsopac to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File; 011205 August 1942 Ghormley to Fletcher, CNO TS Blue File.
1. TF-61 Operation Order 1–42 (28 July 1942), in RG-38, Op-Ord File. As will be shown the Dale, Aaron Ward, and Laffey were not present with the carriers on 7–9 August, although the ONI Combat Narrative Landing in the Solomons 7–8 August 1942 (1943, NHC), Bates and Innis, Morison, and Dyer all erred in placing them there.
2. TF-61 Op-Ord 1–42; Ghormley, “Tide Turns,” 64; Maas diary (30 July 1942) for Suva flight.
3. TF-62 Operation Plan A3-42 (30 July 1942), in Op-Ord File.
4. Message 011200 August 1942 CTF-18 to CTF-61 (info Saratoga, Enterprise, CTF-16), in Pederson Papers.
5. Letter Kinkaid to Noyes (2 August 1942), info CTF-61, Pederson Papers.
6. Air Support Force, USS Wasp, Flagship, Operation Plan 2–42 (4 August 1942), in Op-Ord File.
7. Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 44; Vandegrift, 121; Pederson lecture (13 January 1944); Bartsch, “Operation Dovetail.” Message 312000 July 1942 CTF-62 to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 20.
8. Messages 011125 San Francisco to Comsopac, 011330 Comsopac to CTG-2.3, 010111 Comairsopac to Comsopac Admin, 011210 Comsopac to Comsowespac (noting urgent need for fuel in the New Caledonia area), 022030 Comdesron Four to CTF-61 and CTF-62, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20. Dyer, 1:309–10, asserted the Kaskaskia did not sail because she did not “get the word” due to a faulty cipher machine. However, Ghormley never included the Kaskaskia in sailing orders issued to the other ships.
9. TF-11, TF-16, Saratoga, Cimarron, and Grayson war diaries; Saratoga, Grayson, and Gwin deck logs; Dyer, 1:397; message 030150 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 20.
10. Cimarron, Platte war diaries; messages 042335 Comsopac to Cominch, 042337 Cincpac to Comsopac, 042357 Comsopac to Cincpac, 041350 Comsopac to Kaskaskia, 042137 Rainier to Comsopac, 042348 Comsopac to Rainier, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20.
11. Messages 012229 Cincpac to Comserforpac, 042044 Comserforpac Sub Com to Comserforpac, 041030 Comsopac to Commander, Service Squadron, South Pacific (Comseronsopac), 050110 Comseronsopac to Comsopac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20. The third installment comprised the Chester Sun and Eastern Sun (each eighty-five thousand barrels) and old Deroche (fifty-five thousand barrels); the fourth installment the Pacific Sun, Western Sun, and Flagship Sinco. The chartered tankers that Calhoun rerouted were the J. W. Van Dyke (105,000 barrels) and Sinclair Rubilene (sixty-five thousand barrels). Regarding U.S. merchant tankers, “fast” was a misnomer because until the late 1930s top speeds were commonly no greater than 13.5 knots.
12. Saratoga war diary; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:415; additional information on the flights to Fiji and New Caledonia from Hyakutake Nobushige, via James Sawruk.
13. Dyer, 1:314; Maas diary.
14. Standard Oil Company, Ships of the Esso Fleet in World War II, 247–48; message 050317 August 1942 Rainier to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 20; Greybook, 817. Noyes in his 15 August 1950 review of Morison’s volume 4 called attention to the failure of the oilers to appear at Efate.
15. Messages 050341 August 1942 CTF-18 to CTF-61, 060403 August 1942 CTF-18 to CTF-61, cited in CO, Torpedo Squadron Eight, to CO, USS Saratoga, Report of Operations—Tulagi, Guadalcanal, and Malaita Area, on 7 and 8 August 1942 (12 August 1942).
16. TF-11, TF-16, Comamphibforsopac war diaries; letter Noyes to Wellborn (12 August 1950). Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:429–30; message 061040 Comsopac to CTF-61, CTF-62, and CTF-63, Comsopac war diary.
17. Message 260530 July 1942 Comsopac to Comamphibforsopac, CSCMF, roll 19; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:384.
18. Messages 211200 July 1942 Comsopac Intel. Bull., 290530 July 1942 Comsopac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 20; 310059 July 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., 060255 August 1942 Comsowespac to all CTFs, CSCMF, roll 20; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:410–15, 430.
19. Messages 191310 July 1942 Comsopac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 19; 310346 July 1942 Comsopac Intel. Bull., 020610 August 1942 Comsopac Intel. Bull., 040455 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., 050330 August 1942 Comsopac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 20; TF-62 Operation Plan A3-42 (30 July 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:409–10, 430.
20. Messages 240742 July 1942 Comsopac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 19; 310059 July 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., 310346 July 1942 Comsopac Intel. Bull., 050313 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 20. On the Japanese carriers after Midway, Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:431–32. Messages 060700 Comsowespacfor to all CTFs and 061349 Comsowespac to all CTFs, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20. Dyer, 1:386, wrongly denied the presence of a carrier and declared the contact just a couple of destroyers.
21. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:403–4, 415–16, 427–28, 446–47.
1. Message 062045 August 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File. Principal documentary sources relating to the Guadalcanal landings include: Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific to Cincpac, Solomon Islands Operation, August 7, 8, and 9, 1942 (22 February 1943); CO USS Saratoga to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Report of Action Tulagi-Guadalcanal Offensive 7–8 August 1942 (19 August 1942); CO USS Enterprise to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Operations in Support of Occupation of Tulagi-Guadalcanal August 7–8, 1942, Report of (24 August 1942); CO USS Wasp to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Capture of Tulagi-Guadalcanal Area 7–8 August 1942 (14 August 1942); Adm. Arthur J. Hepburn, USN (Ret.), to Cincpac, Report of Informal Inquiry into Circumstances Attending the Loss of USS Vincennes etc. on August 9, 1942, in Vicinity of Savo Island (13 May 1943, hereafter Hepburn report). Official sources include ONI Combat Narrative, The Landing in the Solomons 7–8 August 1942 (1943) and Bates and Innis. The secondary literature on the Guadalcanal campaign is extensive. The best single source is Frank’s Guadalcanal. Also insightful is Herbert C. Merillat, Guadalcanal Remembered. For naval operations, see Japan, Senshi Sōsho, volume 49, and Morison, United States Naval Operations, volumes 4 and 5. For the Marine Corps: Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign; and Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, volume 1. The U.S. Army’s official history, John Miller Jr., Guadalcanal, is useful beyond its immediate subject. For air operations, see: Thomas G. Miller Jr., The Cactus Air Force, and Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal. The war diaries of TF-11, TF-16, Comamphibforsopac, and the Saratoga are useful for the basic operational chronology. For a detailed account of the carriers on 7–9 August 1942, see Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, chapters 3 and 4.
2. Calhoun, Tin Can Sailor, 52; Kinkaid memoir, 222.
3. Messages transmitted during the Guadalcanal landings appear scattered in action reports and war diaries. One of the most important sources is the Saratoga war diary. Kinkaid memoir, 220. Conversation with Rear Admiral “Bosco” (sic) Wright (12 November 1943), in Morison Office Files, box 27.
4. Saratoga war diary; Commander, Saratoga Air Group to CO USS Saratoga, Report of Action During Tulagi-Guadalcanal Offensive 7 and 8 August 1942 (12 August 1942).
5. Messages 062325 and 062336 August 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File.
6. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:439–44, 457. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 41–46.
7. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 46–47.
8. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 48–55.
9. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 56–62. Ens. F. J. Blair diary, via Foster Blair’s family.
10. Maas memorandum (7 August 1942), Maas Papers; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 62–63. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:452, 455.
11. Saratoga war diary.
12. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 64–68; Saratoga war diary; Maas memo (7 August 1942).
13. Saratoga war diary.
14. Saratoga war diary.
15. Saratoga war diary; Maas diary; message 071142 August 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61 and CTF-62, CSCMF, roll 20.
16. Kinkaid memoir, 227–28; Gwin deck log and war diary; Grayson deck log; TF-16 war diary.
17. CO USS Saratoga to Cincpac, Report of Action Tulagi-Guadalcanal Offensive 7–8 August 1942 (19 August 1942); Commander, Saratoga Air Group report (12 August 1942); message 070843 August 1942 CTG-62.2 to CTF-62, CSCMF, roll 20.
18. Maas memo (7 August 1942).
19. Message 071219 August 1942 Comsowespac to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 20; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:455; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 71–72; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 61.
20. Message 071219 August 1942 Comsowespac to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 20. Evans, The Japanese Navy in World War II, 226–28.
21. Kinkaid memoir, 228; CO Saratoga report (19 August 1942).
22. Saratoga war diary; Maas diary.
23. Saratoga war diary; CO Saratoga report (12 August 1942); Maas memorandum Watch-Tower, Maas Papers.
24. Saratoga war diary; CO Saratoga report (12 August 1942); Maas memo Watch-Tower; Dyer, 1:387.
25. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:455–57; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 74–75; Saratoga war diary. MacArthur advised Ghormley (message 061402 August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20) that Read (call sign JER) was located “on north Bougainville,” whereas Mason (call sign STO) was near Buin in southern Bougainville. He repeated the message late on 7 August (070927 Comsowespac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 20, relayed by Comsopac to all U.S. Navy ships).
26. Saratoga war diary; Felt, oral history, 107–8.
27. Maas memorandum Tulagi: Employment of Aircraft Deficiencies, Maas Papers; Ens. John P. Altemus diary, via John P. Altemus; Green diary; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 75–76.
28. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 75–76.
29. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 76–79.
30. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:458–59.
31. Saratoga war diary.
32. Saratoga and TF-16 war diaries; CO USS Enterprise to Cincpac, Operations in Support of Occupation of Tulagi-Guadalcanal August 7–8, 1942, Report of (24 August 1942).
33. Saratoga and Desron One war diaries; CO Saratoga report (12 August 1942).
34. Kinkaid memoir, 220.
1. Message 080707 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comsopac (info CTF-62, 63, CTG-61.1), CSCMF, roll 20. Maas memorandum AB Watchtower (8 P.M. 8 August 1942), Maas Papers.
2. S. E. Morison Pacific Notebook VI, conversation with Turner (14 May 1943), in Morison Office Files, box 27; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:28; Vandegrift, 128–29; Cincpac to Cominch, 1st Endorsement, Comsopac Preliminary Report—Solomon Islands Operation (23 August 1942); Potter and Nimitz, 254; President, Naval War College, to Cominch etc., Comments on Action Reports concerning activities in the Solomon Islands, August 7, 8, and 9, 1942 (8 December 1942); Hepburn report (13 May 1943), 53; Bates and Innis, 94.
3. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:27–28; Berry, Semper Fi, Mac, 58–59; Frank, 94.
4. CTF-62 to Comsopac, Despatch reports of operations during occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal (16 August 1942), copy in Hepburn report, 645–53. Eager to rebut criticism even before it was voiced, Turner cited a message (121620 August 1942 Cominch to Cincpac [info Comsopac, CTF-8, Cinclant], CSCMF, roll 21) ordering the top commanders to keep him informed of “pertinent information as to state of affairs.”
5. Comsopac to Cominch, First Endorsement, Commander Task Force 62 Communications During the Occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal (6 September 1942), copy in Hepburn report, 644.
6. CTF-62 report (16 August 1942). The eight Astoria messages, all August 1942 in CSCMF, roll 20, are: 062010 CTF-62 to Cincpac; 062020 CTF-62 to Comsopac; 062235, 062240, and 062246 Comamphibforsopac to Comsopac; 070205 CTF-62 to Comsopac; 070145 Comamphibforsopac to Comsopac, Comairsopac, and CTF-61; and 071030 CTG-61.2 to Comsopac and CTF-61, and info addressees. They included a lengthy outline of suggested troop deployments for Task Two, instructions on approaching the Lunga airfield after it was operational, notes regarding mine clearing, and a dispatch from a United Press correspondent.
7. Messages August 1942: 071330 Comsopac to CTF-62, CSCMF, roll 20, and 071030 CTG-61.2 to Comsopac and CTF-61, Greybook, 639.
8. Messages August 1942: 080150 CTF-61 to TF-11, in Desron One war diary; 080330 CTG-61.2 to Comsopac and CTF-61, 070843 CTG-62.2 to CTF-62, CSCMF, roll 20. USS Saratoga, Fighting Squadron Five Combatant Flight Operations Report, Guadalcanal and Tulagi Areas (8 August 1942), copy in Altemus diary. Maas memo AB Watchtower. Letter Rear Adm. Carleton H. Wright to Rear Adm. Charles Wellborn (9 February 1952) in DNC, Office Files, box 20. Greybook, 820.
9. Comamphibforsopac war diary; Thomas unpublished manuscript, 21; Comamphibforsopac staff log, in Turner Papers, box 36. Message 071517 August 1942 CTF-62 to Comsopac and CTF-61, which appears in Turner’s communication report (16 August 1942) in Hepburn report, 645. The Maas Papers show Fletcher did not have the 071517 message on 8 or 9 August; Ghormley had it later on 9 August (Ghormley’s staff log, Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley Papers, via Jeffrey Barlow). Cincpac did not log it until 11 August, CSCMF, roll 20. Bates and Innis, who had access to 071517 in the Hepburn report (660, 671) never used it, particularly, 83, where they analyzed Turner’s decisions on 8 August.
10. Custer, Through the Perilous Night, 118–19.
11. Comamphibforsopac staff log; Thomas unpublished manuscript, 21; Commander, Enterprise Air Group to CO, USS Enterprise, Narrative and Comments concerning the Tulagi-Guadalcanal Air Action and Landing Force Operations of 7–8 August 1942 (10 August 1942).
12. Bates and Innis, 64, 95; Gatacre, Reports of Proceedings, 169.
13. Message 080141 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 20.
14. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:27–28; Bates and Innis, 93. Comcrupac to Cincpac, Carrier-Task Forces, some lessons learned in operating of (24 September 1942), RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files; Pederson lecture (13 January 1944).
15. Dyer, 1:391; CO Saratoga report (12 August 1942); Kinkaid memoir, 225; message 122231 August 1942 Enterprise to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 21. In 1949 Capt. Leroy C. Simpler, former commanding officer of VF-5 in the Saratoga, recalled that after his last flight on 8 August he spoke with the “Skipper,” who asked him if he had seen any action. Simpler replied that he had not but that some of the others did fight. The “Skipper” commented, “He was lucky in not having been engaged and that it was just as well.” Simpler later complained: “What kind of a way was that for a C.O. to talk? It was tough enough for me to get Leroy [that is, himself ] to get into a plane and go out after the Nips, and an attitude like that on the part of the Skipper made it double tough to have to send my boys up to fight.” Some believed Simpler referred to Fletcher, because he certainly bore Fletcher ill-will, but by using “skipper” and “C.O.” rather than “admiral” Simpler meant Captain Ramsey (letter Roger Pineau to Morison, 19 February 1949, in Morison Office Files, box 27).
16. Interview of Lt. Cdr. L. C. Simpler by Buaer (26 February 1943), NHC; Maas memo AB Watchtower; CO Saratoga report (12 August 1942).
17. Maas memo AB Watchtower. The 7 May fight occurred 420 miles from Lae, 450 miles from Rabaul.
18. Maas memo AB Watchtower; Kinkaid memoir, 232. On 8 August the Enterprise solicited eight VF-6 volunteers to fly ashore to Lunga, according to the diary of Ens. Francis R. Register (8 August 1942), via Brandon Wood. Message 101220 August 1942 CTF-62 to CTF-61 and Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 21. Turner’s Op-Plan A3-42 had called for two small steamers to land aviation gasoline and bombs on D+1 Day. On 6 August, Ghormley delayed their deployment and on 8 August directed them to off-load their cargoes at Espíritu Santo (messages 061000 Comsopac to Port Director Efate and 080012 Comsopac to Dale and Comgen (Commanding General) Roses, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20). Vandegrift brought some aviation gasoline and ammunition, but no lube oil.
19. Comcrupac, Carrier Task Forces (24 September 1942); Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet (Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey) to Cincpac, Carrier Task Forces, some lessons learned in operating of (9 October 1942), in RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files.
20. Message 080707 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comsopac (info CTF-62, CTF-63, and CTG-61.1), CSCMF, roll 20. Letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947); Dyer, 1:392; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:28.
21. Letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947). Bates and Innis, 93, reasoned, “Two days of flight operations in the vicinity of Guadalcanal Island, without enemy detection or attack” should have “affected fuel consumption no differently than routine flight operations anywhere.” Of course those two days were far from “routine.” TF-16 war diary. CTF-11 (Comcrupac) to Comsopac, Preliminary Report—Solomons Islands Operation (9 September 1942), copy in Hepburn report, 9–11. Maas memo AB Watchtower.
22. Carter, Beans, Bullets and Black Oil, 28.
23. President, Naval War College (8 December 1942). Zimmerman, 50.
24. Griffith, 252; Bates and Innis, 93–94; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:28. The Enterprise, reckoning her fuel in barrels, had 16,534 barrels on the eighth. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:28n, rendered that as 521,000 gallons; the correct total is 694,428. He erred by converting with 31.5, the standard for liquid measurement, whereas fuel oil is forty-two gallons per barrel. In 1952 Wright remarked: “It would surely not be safe to use their average daily consumption while cruising as a basis for computing battle requirements. Any officer who commanded task forces in the Pacific knows the constant worry that arose from ‘How will I be fixed for fuel if I have to do the prolonged high speed steaming which will inevitably follow contact with enemy air or surface forces?’” Letter Wright to Wellborn (9 February 1952).
25. Dyer, 1:387–93.
26. Dale war diary. The TU-61.1.1 destroyers on 8 August had according to deck logs:
27. The Phelps had 51 percent capacity, meaning eight days at fifteen knots, 2.2 days at twenty-five knots; Gwin 62 percent, 8.2 days at fifteen knots, 2.5 days at twenty-five knots. The Grayson (28 percent, 3.7 days at fifteen knots, 1.1 days at twenty-five knots) was the low destroyer, but the Balch (also TU-61.1.2) and Sterett (TU-61.1.3) were both at or under 40 percent.
28. CTF-11 report (9 September 1942); Dyer, 1:393; TF-16 war diary. The Portland, at 46 percent, had an endurance of about 3.9 days at twenty-five knots; the Atlanta (47 percent) for 3.1 days at twenty-five knots. The Enterprise, though down to 39 percent, was still capable of about 3.9 days at twenty-five knots. (In comparison the Saratoga’s 49 percent translated roughly to 3.3 days at twenty-five knots; the Wasp’s data is unknown.) At 60 percent the North Carolina enjoyed the greatest endurance of all, around 4.7 days at twenty-five knots. Reviewing Morison’s volume 5, Vice Adm. Mahlon S. Tisdale commented: “We did not need to leave Admiral Turner’s Force. We had plenty of fuel. . . . History will not support Admiral Fletcher’s decision to abandon Admiral Turner’s transport force.” Letter Vice Adm. M. S. Tisdale, USN (Ret.), to Rear Adm. Charles Wellborn Jr., USN (3 October 1950), in DNC, Office Files, box 20. Tisdale stated that Kinkaid in 1942 “had fought his Task Force probably more successfully than any other save only Spruance at Midway.”
29. CTF-11 report (9 September 1942), letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947). Record of Proceedings of an Investigation Conducted by Rear Adm. J. F. Shafroth, USN (hereafter Wasp investigation), Statement of Rear Adm. George D. Murray, U.S. Navy, Commander Task Force Seventeen on 15 September 1942, taken at Washington, D.C. (4 January 1943), in RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files.
30. Turner interview by Baldwin (10 October 1946). Messages 070602 Comsopac to CTF-61, CTF-62, and CTF-63; 042348 Comsopac to Rainier, Kaskaskia, and Perkins; and 051055 Comsopac to Rainier; all August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20.
31. Cincpac to Cominch (23 August 1942); Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 2; CTF-11 report (9 September 1942); Potter and Nimitz, 254.
32. Messages 050507 Gen (General) Roses to Comsopac Admin, and 051910 Cimarron to Comairsopac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20.
33. Saratoga war diary. Letter Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman to S. E. Morison (14 February 1949), in Morison Office Files, box 26. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:28, asserted, “In the carrier task force [Fletcher’s] retirement request was greeted with dismay by senior officers, especially when they learned that the Australian Hudson’s report of Mikawa’s force had been received on board before 1900, and guessed that the Japanese Fleet was about to show its hand.” The truth behind the second part of Morison’s statement will be assessed in chapter 26, but there is no evidence whatsoever Noyes, Kinkaid, Ramsey, Davis, or Sherman, the “senior officers,” disagreed in any way with Fletcher’s request to withdraw the carriers. It will be seen Morison cited Sherman’s letter detailing his fervent advice to Noyes early on the morning of 9 August to ask Fletcher’s permission to strike enemy ships at Savo, but he chose not to mention the passage quoted above, where Sherman endorsed Fletcher’s recommendation to withdraw the carriers.
34. Maas memo AB Watchtower; Dyer, 1:391.
35. Maas memo AB Watchtower; letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947); Pederson lecture (13 January 1944).
1. Maas diary. Bates and Innis charged, 96, that Fletcher withdrew at 1200 on 8 August; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:58, said that as of 0100, 9 August, Fletcher still had not received permission from Ghormley to “execute the retirement he had been virtually pursuing for twelve hours.” Indeed the carriers made their closest approach, twenty-five miles, to the Guadalcanal coast at 1300 and again at 1700.
2. Stahl, 21, wrote this incident took place “around 1600,” and that he saw a dispatch noting, “Seven cruisers headed toward us at high speed.” No such signal arrived and the timing of the warning is well attested to 1837. Others also recalled the sighting report coming much earlier than it in fact did.
3. The plane was a Lockheed Hudson from No. 32 RAAF Squadron flown by Sergeant William J. Stutt, who was unfairly blamed for the delay in forwarding the sighting report to Sopac. Not receiving an acknowledgment, he flew back to Milne Bay, but headquarters did not radio the sighting for more than five hours. Warner and Warner with Seno, Disaster in the Pacific, chapter 1.
4. Message 071930 August 1942 Comsowespac to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 20.
5. Conversations with Thomas Newsome; letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947).
6. Letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947). Lee, 334; Altemus diary. Hepburn report, 371, 461–62; Dyer, 1:360–69; Loxton, chapter 15. Warner and Warner, 234, charged that on the afternoon of the eighth Turner and Crutchley (and the Saratoga, but strangely not Fletcher) knew of the sighting.
7. Maas diary.
8. Messages 080947 Comsowespacfor to all CTFs, 081020 Comsowespac to Cincpac, 081130 Comsowespacfor to Cincpac, 081233 Comairsopac to CTF-61, 081055 CTF-62 to Comairsopac, and 081554 Comairsopac to CTG-63.5, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20. The sighting at 1101 was made by another Hudson commanded by FO Mervyn Willman. The forwarding of his message by air headquarters was even slower than Stutt’s (Warner and Warner, 17).
9. Message 081141 August 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 20. Ghormley, “Tide Turns,” 93; Callaghan conference notes (28 July 1942). The c. 1949 memo in the Morison Office Files, box 27, asserted that “Ramsay” (presumably Donald Ramsey, Hepburn’s assistant) bitterly denounced Fletcher’s recommendation as a disgraceful way to “hang” responsibility on his superior. “Ramsay” urged Morison “not to hold Ghormley responsible for anything related to the withdrawal even though he approved it.” Because he exercised only “strategical command,” Fletcher, the tactical commander, “didn’t need to ask his permission to retire.” That is highly debatable.
10. Messages 081141 Comsopac to CTF-61; 080800 Comsopac to CTF-61; 081232 Comsopac to Platte, Kaskaskia, Perkins, and Clark; all August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20.
11. For the general movements of TF-62 on 8–9 August, see Comamphibforsopac war diary, Comamphibforsopac staff log, and CTG-62.6 (Rear Adm. V. A. C. Crutchley, RN), Operation “Watchtower”—The Capture and Occupation by United Nations Forces of Tulagi and Guadalcanal (13 August 1942), copy in Hepburn report, 55–86. Letter Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner to Rear Adm. Charles Wellborn (20 August 1950) with review of Morison’s volume 5. Bates and Innis, 92, blamed Fletcher for, “significantly enough,” not making “CTF 62 an information addressee for the message he sent Comsopacfor requesting approval for retiring the carriers.” That is incorrect. Turner certainly was an information addressee as shown in the original copy in the Cincpac Secret and Confidential Message File and also in the Hepburn report, 659, which Bates and Innis used.
12. Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 47. Turner stated therein that he received Fletcher’s message “about noon on 8 August,” and that Fletcher “carried out his notice and left the vicinity at approximately 1500 on 8 August.” Later the same account noted the carriers left “about noon of 8 August.” All of this was much earlier than the actual withdrawal of the carriers.
13. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:31, referred to the possible Rekata seaplanes as “big bombers.” However, message 150155 July 1942 Cincpac to PacFlt, CSCMF, roll 18, noted that the converted seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru (reported at Rabaul) had a dozen float planes, none of which were torpedo planes. The latest ONI estimates in June 1942 gave the regular seaplane tenders a complement of fourteen such float planes and the auxiliary seaplane tenders ten, each with a maximum bomb load of five hundred pounds. Aerial torpedoes weighed from eighteen hundred to two thousand pounds.
14. Message 090230 August 1942 CTG-61.2 to Comsopac and CTF-61 (info CTG-62.4 and CTG-62.6), sent at 1452, 9 August, by the McCawley on 2122 kilocycles but not actually received until after it was handed to Ghormley on 13 August and sent as 131418 August 1942, CNO TS Blue File.
15. Letter Turner to Wellborn (20 August 1950).
16. Crutchley report (13 August 1942). Turner explained that on the evening of 8 August, he weighed the Sowespac estimate of reinforcements to Shortland, the absence of sighting reports from McCain, and “the false information in the contact report received about 1820 Love.” He concluded, “After lengthy discussion” with Crutchley “the chances of attack that night were small.” Memorandum, Rear Adm. R. K. Turner to Cincpac, Comment on Hepburn Report (c. May 1943), copy in Hepburn report.
17. Thomas unpublished manuscript, 23; Vandegrift, 128–29.
18. Messages 081418 CTF-62 to TF-62; and 081405 CTF-62 to Comsopac, CTF-61, and Comairsopac (info Cominch and Cincpac); both August 1942, copies in Hepburn report, 659, also 650.
19. For Savo island, see Hepburn report; Morison, United States Naval Operations, volume 5, chapter 2; Bates and Innis; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:463–96; Gatacre, 169–80; Frank, chapter 4; Warner and Warner; Loxton.
20. Gatacre, 175.
21. In addition to the sources cited in note 11, see Rear Adm. V. A. C. Crutchley, Night Action off Savo Island (9 August 1942)—Remarks by CTG-62.6 (11 August 1942) and CTF-62 to CTG-62.6, Night Action of Savo Island, August 8–9, 1942 (12 August 1942) and Comcru TF-18 (Rear Adm. Norman Scott) to Cominch, Report of action, Tulagi-Guadalcanal, 6–10 August 1942 (13 August 1942). Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 2 noted Turner provided “no standing orders or doctrine covering the situation.” The Yoke ships stayed at anchor.
22. Crutchley report (11 August 1942).
23. Comamphibforsopac staff log; Comtransdiv 8 (Commander, Transport Division; Capt. George B. Ashe) Sopac, USS Neville to Comamphibforsopac, Report of Operations in Tulagi-Gavutu Area (12 August 1942). Messages 081924 CTF-62 to CTG-62.6 and 62.1, and 081941 CTF-62 to CTF-61, August 1942, copies in Hepburn report, 659–60.
24. Cincpac to Cominch (23 August 1942); Hepburn report, 34; President, Naval War College (8 December 1942); Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 2.
25. TF-16 war diary. Lt. Cdr. Leonard J. Dow, TF-16 communications officer, related to Buaer (29 September 1942): “The night of [8–9 August] about 2 o’clock in the morning, we received a message on the transport circuit that there was a night action going on to westward and that the situation was obscure. Outside of that single message there was no indication of any action at all. They apparently did not break radio silence to tell us what was going on.” Kinkaid memoir, 284.
26. Letter F. P. Sherman to Morison (14 February 1949).
27. Acquainted with the excellent night fighting tactics of the British carriers, the Wasp Air Group lacked aerial radar and hence any true night attack capability. Sherman would likely have desired his planes over Lunga at first light (0547) to attack ships or chase them toward New Georgia. Departing at 0500, the Wasp strike should have got to Savo before 0600 and overtaken Mikawa north of New Georgia an hour later and 130 miles northwest. The outbound leg would have been 260–75 miles. To reduce their return flight to two hundred miles, the carriers would need by 0830 to be at least fifty miles northwest of the launch point. Gaining such distance to westward could have been tricky. The northeast wind would force the flattops to run nearly opposite the Point Option course every time they conducted air operations—4 June all over again. A simultaneous Saratoga search 275 miles west and northwest could have discovered Mikawa’s ships just ahead of the Wasp strike group. A second strike wave, from the Enterprise, might also have scored. Again, though, the carriers would need to work steadily northwest at a great cost of fuel in order to retrieve all the planes. Just to attack Mikawa, everything described here must have gone without a hitch. Swift cruisers and destroyers proved difficult targets, so any strikes might have been inconclusive. Yet even a gesture of revenge would certainly have saved some sorely needed face. Letter F. P. Sherman to Morison (14 February 1949); Pratt, The Marine’s War, 30.
28. Letter Bates to Morison (1 February 1949), Morison Office Files, box 26; Bates and Innis, 323–24; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:58, citing letter (14 February 1949) from F. P. Sherman. Loxton, 252, stated Fletcher knew of Savo well before dawn and rejected pleas by the “Air Group Commander” to attack. He cited (301n31) Capt. H. G. Bradshaw, USN (Ret.), a torpedo plane pilot “embarked in Saratoga.” In fact Bradshaw served in the Wasp and relayed what he heard of Sherman’s entreaties to Noyes. Kinkaid’s memoir, 283, stated Fletcher “was completely uninformed regarding the surface actions in Iron Bottom Sound during their progress.”
29. S. E. Morison talk with Wright (12 November 1943); letter Wright to Wellborn (9 February 1952); Dyer, 1:395; letter Fletcher to Baldwin (8 July 1947). Letter George Clapp to Lundstrom (22 December 1997) and conversation 4 June 2001; Maas diary, 9 August 1942; Dyer, 1:395. Most likely Fletcher read message 081827 August 1942 CTF-44 to Comsowespac, Australian Commonwealth Naval Board: “Canberra damaged night action heavily on fire. Following received from USS Patterson. Begins. Canberra is abandoning ship. Have entire crew on board will destroy her,” Hepburn report, 95.
30. TF-16 war diary.
31. Dyer, 1:395.
32. CTF-11 report (9 September 1942).
33. Letter F. P. Sherman to Morison (14 February 1949).
34. Message 082138 August 1942 Radio Canberra to Any or All USN Ships, CSCMF, roll 20; Saratoga war diary; Maas diary; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:458–61.
35. TF-16 and Saratoga war diaries; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:460–61.
36. Messages August 1942: 090050 Fletcher to Ghormley, Comsopac Message File; 090245 Comsopac to CTF-44, CTF-63, CTF-61, and CTF-62, CSCMF, roll 20; Maas diary.
37. Messages 090100 Comsopac to CTF-61 and CTF-63, 090218 Comsopac to CTF-63, 090310 Comsopac to Cincpac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20; 090315 August 1942 Fletcher to Comsopac, Greybook, 639.
38. Bates and Innis, 326, 321; Capt. George L. Russell, Memorandum for Admiral, Admiral Hepburn’s Report on the Loss of the USS Vincennes, USS Quincy, USS Astoria, HMAS Canberra, August 9, 1942 near Savo Island—Comment upon (31 July 1943), in Hepburn report.
39. Message 090359 August 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary. Following the recollections of Vice Adm. George Russell, Buell’s Master of Sea Power, 221–22, described King learning of Savo on 12 August. Russell confused that with a later occasion. Fletcher’s original message 090315 in the CNO TS Blue File microfilm clearly was received on the ninth.
40. Messages 090544 Comsopac to Any and All USN Ships, 090620 Fletcher to Comsopac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 20; 090750 August 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61, CTF-62, and CTF-63, Greybook, 640.
41. Comamphibforsopac war diary and staff log; Comamphibforsopac report (22 February 1943); Comtransdiv 8 report (12 August 1942).
42. Message 090815 August 1942 (not sent until 12 August) CTF-62 to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File and Comsopac war diary. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:17; letter Turner to Wellborn (20 August 1950); Comsopac to Cominch, Preliminary Report Watchtower Operation (16 August 1942), copy in Hepburn report, 31–32. The Allies did not know the exact composition of Mikawa’s force until after mid October 1942 from prisoners taken in the Battle of Cape Esperance (Hepburn report, 30).
43. Letter Crutchley to Turner (10 August 1942), copy in Morison Office Files, box 26. Conference Notes [Cominch-Cincpac meetings in San Francisco] (8 September 1942); letter Nimitz to Ghormley (8 October 1942), Nimitz Papers.
44. Twining, 71; Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 48; Morison, Two-Ocean War, 168–69.
45. Turner and others made much of a message he sent McCain on the afternoon of 7 August, noting the scheduled search for 8 August did not cover the sector 290–318 degrees from Malaita. Turner conceded MacArthur’s planes from New Guinea handled that particular sector, the upper Solomons around Bougainville, but asked McCain to “consider morning search necessary for adequate cover.” Two B-17s flying the normal search 750 miles northwest from Espíritu Santo would only go as far as Vella Lavella and part of Choiseul, short of the waters Turner wanted examined. The TF-63 search (McCain’s Op-Plan 1–42 of 25 July 1942, which Turner had since 27 July) was weighted to the north to prevent a surprise from that direction. The only planes that could have covered the sector that Turner desired were the Mackinac’s PBYs in southeast Malaita, hence his mention of that point of origin.
Turner’s caution was fully justified. That was indeed where Mikawa was sighted the morning of 8 August. Unfortunately there is no contemporary evidence that his message, another McCawley transmission on 2122 kilocycles, ever reached McCain in time. Comsopac did not get it. On 20 October 1948, three years after McCain’s death, Rear Adm. Matthias B. Gardner, his former chief of staff, recalled to Bates that two B-17s from Espíritu Santo flew the special search to 315 miles from Malaita (eight hundred miles from Espíritu Santo) that morning but were still sixty miles short of Mikawa. No contemporary source confirms this search, which would have had four B-17s flying essentially the same mission, except that two proceeded fifty miles ahead of the lead pair. If McCain had received Turner’s message and thought it worth reallocating resources, he would certainly have used the Mackinac’s PBYs that were in the best position to complete the task. Turner memo to Hepburn (1943); Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:24–25; Bates and Innis, 99. Twining, 71, was very critical of what he perceived as a slur Turner cast on McCain for not making this search.
46. Comamphibforpac Administrative History, 47; Turner interview by Baldwin (10 October 1946).
47. Hepburn report, 39; Turner memo to Hepburn (1943), part of Hepburn report, 273.
48. Bates and Innis, 89–90; Twining, 70–71.
49. Twining, 62; Gatacre, 179.
50. Maas memo CC Watch-Tower (c. August 1942), Maas Papers; President, Naval War College (8 December 1942); Bates and Innis, 322; Turner memo (1943), part of Hepburn report, 272; message 201005 August 1942 Comamphibforsopac to Tutuila, CSCMF, roll 22.
51. Letter Turner to Col. James Webb (20 August 1942), Turner Papers, box 1; Twining, 57–59, 66–68; Dyer, 1:408. Turner’s original withdrawal order (081418) did state that all boats that could not be retrieved before sailing were to be left behind with their crews (Hepburn report, 659).
52. Conference Notes [Cominch-Cincpac meetings in San Francisco] (8 September 1942); Russell memo (31 July 1943).
53. Russell memo (31 July 1943). Hepburn’s itinerary, Appendix C of his report, shows that he was in San Francisco from 28 to 30 March 1943 before traveling east to Corpus Christi and then Washington, D.C., to complete his report. Dyer, 1:395.
54. Crutchley report (13 August 1942).
1. Dyer, 1:396–98.
2. Message 110650 August 1942 Vandegrift to Comamphibforsopac, Greybook, 695.
3. Messages August 1942: 101006 Comsopac to Comsowespac, Greybook, 621; 102147 Cincpac to Comsopac, Greybook, 644; 110206 Comsopac to Fletcher, Greybook, 645.
4. Letter Ghormley to Nimitz (11 August 1942), Nimitz Papers; message 100122 August 1942 Comsopac to Long Island, CSCMF, roll 21.
5. Pederson lecture (13 January 1944).
6. Pederson lecture (13 January 1944). Messages August 1942: 091414 Comairsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 20; 110200 CTF-61 to CTF-63, CSCMF, roll 21; 120316 Comsopac to Comsowespacfor, Greybook, 647.
7. Basic sources for TF-61 are the following war diaries: Saratoga (which includes the daily air task group orders), Comcru TF-11, Desron One, Minneapolis, TF-16, Comcru TF-16, Desron Six, Enterprise, Comcru TF-18, Desron Twelve, Platte, Kaskaskia, Cimarron. The Comairsopac war diary detailed the daily search missions. Bell, Condition Red, 28. Messages August 1942: 090732 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 20; 110150 CTF-61 to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 21.
8. Kamada Minoru kindly identified this particular submarine by consulting records in the War History Office in Tokyo. SRH-012, volume 4, part 2, 384, RG-457; message 140159 August 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, CTF-61, CTF-62, and CTF-63 (info Comsowespac), CSCMF, roll 21.
9. Messages 120130 CTF-61 to Comsopac (sent as 140414 Comsopac to Cincpac), 100007 Comsopac to Cincpac, 150119 Cincpac to Comsopac, 180207 Comsopac to Cincpac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 21.
10. Greybook, 823; message 112209 August 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, Greybook, 646.
11. Messages August 1942: 101220 CTF-62 to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 21; 111400 CG 1st Marine Division (Mardiv) to Comairsopac, Comsopac war diary; 120216 Comsopac to CTF-63, CNO TS Blue File; 121119 Comairsopac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 21.
12. The Dewey returned to TF-11, Ellet and Monssen to TF-16, and Buchanan to TF-18.
13. Message 130307 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 21; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:512–13.
14. Saratoga war diary; message 132246 August 1942 CTF-61 to TF-61, CSCMF, roll 21.
15. Messages 130012 Comsopac to CTF-62, 140910 Comsopac to CTF-61, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 21. CO USS Cimarron to Comserforpac, Pertinent Information on Performance of as Task Force Oiler (30 September 1942), RG-313, Cincpac Secret Correspondence, box 4900.
16. Message 150412 August 1942 Fletcher to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 21.
17. Messages August 1942: 142210 CTF-62 to Comsopac, Comsopac war diary; 150746 Comsopac to CTF-63, Greybook, 650; 130240 CTG-2.6 to Comairsopac, CSCMF, roll 21; 131600 Comsopac to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File; 140011 Cincpac to Comsopac, 140402 Comairsopac to Comsopac, 150816 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 21.
18. Message 160200 August 1942 Comairsopac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 21; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:521, 533.
19. Messages 170835 CTG-2.6 to CTF-62, 170539 Comairsopac to McFarland, 170946 Comsopac to Comsowespacfor, 200910 CTF-62 to Comsopac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 21; 161146 August 1942 Comsopac to Cominch, Greybook, 652.
20. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:446–51, 508–9; Ugaki, 177–78.
21. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:542–43, 43:599–600, 637–40.
22. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:515, 543–44; Ugaki, 181–83.
23. Messages 112209 August 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, Greybook, 646; 052138 November 1942 Opnav to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 30.
24. Messages August 1942: 062035 Cincpac to Comsopac, Greybook, 638; 112030 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 646; 121750 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 647; Greybook, 823; 122337 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 648.
25. SRMN-009, Cincpac Fleet Intelligence Summaries, 62; message 150003 August 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 21; TF-17 war diary; 162111 August 1942 Comsopac to Cincpac, Comsopac war diary; 180225 August 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File; 171007 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comcarpac, CSCMF, roll 21.
26. Message 160443 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 21; Greybook, 826.
27. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:517–21; Ugaki, 179–81; Tanaka Raizo, “The Struggle for Guadalcanal,” in Evans, The Japanese Navy in World War II, 160–62.
28. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:521–24.
29. Messages August 1942: 171152 Comsopac to CTF-61, Comsopac Message File; 172047 Cincpac to Comsopac, Greybook, 654.
30. Comcru TF-18 war diary; Maas diary (18 August 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:519–20.
31. Maas diary (15 August 1942); undated memo in Maas Papers. Maas wrote Capt. Spencer Lewis was “very able; quiet; but knows what it is all about. Understands employment of aviation, operations of task forces. Should be an Admiral. This is a must! 4.0.” Capt. Dewitt Ramsey was “very able, tactful, diplomatic, put Sara in improved condition immediately. Well liked and respected. Should be an Admiral at once. 4.0.”
32. Messages August 1942: 180916 Comsopac to CTF-61, CTF-62, CTF-63, and CTF-44, Comsopac war diary; 181302 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 21.
33. Message 182115 August 1942 Comairsopac to Any or all units, CSCMF, roll 21; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:534; Comairsopac war diary.
34. TF-16 war diary; message 190145 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 21. Messages 190315 CTF-62 to Guadalcanal and 190947 CG Cactus to Comsopac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 21. Fletcher did not receive high-level intelligence summaries (messages 150325 Comsopac to Cincpac and 150901 Cincpac to Comsopac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 21).
35. Saratoga war diary; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:534–35.
36. Saratoga war diary; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 96–97.
37. Messages August 1942: 200722 Comsopac to CTF-61 and CTF-44, CSCMF, roll 22; 192231 Comairsopac to CG Cactus, CSCMF, roll 21; 200910 CTF-62 to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22; 192320 Comsopac to CTF-61, CTF-62, and CTF-63, Comsopac war diary; 200235 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 22; 200041 Cincpac to Comsopac, Comsopac Message File; 200247 Cincpac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22; Frank, 149.
38. Cincpac to Cominch, Solomon Islands Campaign—Action of 23–25 August (24 October 1942).
39. Tanaka, in Evans, 164–66; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:537–39.
40. Ugaki, 185–86; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:539–40, 544–45; 7th Cruiser Division war diary, in NHC microfilm JD16.
41. Saratoga war diary; message 202013 August 1942 CG Cactus to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22.
42. Messages 202140 Mackinac to Comairsopac, 202250 Comsopac to CTF-61, 202345 CG Cactus to Comsopac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22; Saratoga war diary; CTF-44, Operation Watchtower, Narrative of events subsequent to the withdrawal to Nouméa of the Amphibious Force after the Capture and Occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal [16 August–3 September 1942]; Comcru TF-18 war diary.
43. Message 210044 August 1942 21V37 to 55V3, CSCMF, roll 22; Saratoga war diary; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 98–99; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:549.
44. Messages 180809 Comcrupac to TF-61, 200041 Cincpac to Comsopac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22; Saratoga war diary.
45. Wright’s group included Minneapolis and New Orleans from TF-11, San Francisco and Salt Lake City from TF-18, and destroyers Selfridge, Lang, Patterson, Worden, Maury, and Benham (Comcru TF-11 war diary).
46. Messages August 1942: 210257 Cincpac Intel. Bull., 210445 Comsowespac to all CTFs, 210250 Cactus to Transdiv 11, Transdiv 12, and McFarland, CSCMF, roll 22; 210426 Comsopac to CTF-61 and CTF-63, Comsopac war diary; 210702 CTF-62 to Fomalhaut, CSCMF, roll 22.
47. Comcru TF-11 war diary; Minneapolis war diary. Messages August 1942: 211050 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 22; 211156 Comsopac to Cincpac, Comsopac war diary; 211021 CG Cactus to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22.
48. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:549–52; Ugaki, 186–87; Boyd and Yoshida, The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II, 94–95. Message 211842 August 1942 Comdesdiv 7 to Comdesron 4 and CTF-62, CSCMF, roll 22.
49. Message 211120 August 1942 Fletcher to Comsopac, Greybook, 807.
50. Saratoga war diary; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 100–101; Comcru TF-18 war diary.
51. Messages 220251 Cincpac Intel. Bull.; 220241 Comsopac to CTF-61, CTF-62, CTF-63, and Mackinac; 220900 Fletcher to Comsopac; all August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22. On I-122, see also Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp, Sensuikan! in http://www.combinedfleet.com/sensuikan.htm.
52. Message 220910 August 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61, Greybook, 808.
53. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:536, 553–56; Ugaki, 187–88; 7th Cruiser Division war diary, in NHC microfilm JD16.
54. Greybook, 829; Cincpac report (24 October 1942). Cincpac’s general message 190305 August 1942 (Comsopac war diary) stressed, “Carriers and all other ships are prime objectives for destructive attack,” but “we cannot expect to inflict heavy losses on the enemy without ourselves accepting the risk of punishment.” Frank, Guadalcanal, 204–5, postulated this “extraordinary message” reflected Nimitz’s extreme dissatisfaction with Fletcher. “Since common sailors and junior officers were not in a position to choose when to accept or provoke battle, the object of this prod is plain.” However, this was a low priority all-fleet bulletin just to encourage those “common sailors and junior officers” to greater effort. If Nimitz truly wanted to “prod” Fletcher he could employ much less subtle means directly to Fletcher. F. C. Sherman diary (24 August 1942); Cominch Secret Information Bulletin (1943); Frank, 205.
55. Between 9 and 23 August the following bombardments took place:
11 August “feint” bombardment of Lunga by sub RO-34
12 Augustdestroyers Yūzuki and Oite briefly shelled Lunga
13 Augustsub I-123 shelled Lunga, I-122 shelled Tulagi
19 Augustdestroyers Kagerō, Hagikaze, and Arashi shelled Lunga and Tulagi
20 AugustKagerō shelled Tulagi and Guadalcanal
22 Augustdestroyer Kawakaze attacked destroyers Blue and Henley off Tulagi
Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:512–13, 534, 552.
56. A total of 1,029 Japanese troops reached Guadalcanal between 9 and 23 August: 113 special landing force sailors on the night of 16–17 August from the Oite and 916 soldiers of the Ichiki Detachment’s First Echelon from destroyers on the night of 18–19 August. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:520, 533.
57. Herbert C. Merillat, 71–72.
1. Sources on the Battle of the Eastern Solomons: CTF-61 (Comcrupac) to Comsopac, Preliminary Report of Actions, August 23–24, 1942 (6 September 1942), with Second Endorsement by Comairsopac and Tabular Record of Combat Reports. Cincpac to Cominch, Solomon Islands Campaign, Action of 23–25 August 1942 (24 October 1942), with enclosed action reports of ships and squadrons, including: CO USS Saratoga to Cincpac, Report of Action Against Enemy (Japanese) Forces in Solomon Islands Area on August 24, 1942 (10 September 1942), including group and squadron reports; Tactical Situation and Chronological History of Events—August 24, 1942, Fighter Net Radio Log and Radar Plot for Engagement against Japanese on August 24, 1942; Commander, Saratoga Air Group, Narrative of Operations on August 23, 1942, and the Morning of August 24, 1942 (5 September 1942); Commander, Saratoga Air Group to CO, USS Saratoga, Narrative Report of Action with Enemy on August 24, 1942, in Solomon Islands Area (29 August 1942); CTF-11 to Cincpac, Endorsement of the Saratoga’s Report of Action against Enemy (Japanese) Forces in the Solomon Islands Area on August 24, 1942 (24 September 1942); CO USS Enterprise to Cincpac, Action of August 24, 1942, including Air Attack on USS Enterprise, Report of (5 September 1942); CTF-16 to Cincpac, Report of Action 24 August 1942 (9 September 1942); Comcru TF-16 to Cincpac, Report of Action, 24 August 1942 (27 August 1942); Endorsement CTF-61 to Cincpac, Action of August 24, 1942, including Air Attack on USS Enterprise, Report of (25 September 1942). Task Force 16 Chronological Order of Events 0500–2400, August 24, 1942.
CTF-44, Operation Watchtower, Narrative of events subsequent to the withdrawal to Nouméa of the Amphibious Force after the Capture and Occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal [16 August–3 September 1942].
War diaries: Saratoga, Comairsopac, TF-16, Enterprise, Comcru TF-11, Comcru TF-18, Comcru TF-16, Comdesron One, Comdesron Six, Comdesron Twelve, Minneapolis. Carrier Operations, lecture by Cdr. Oscar Pederson to Army and Navy Staff College (4 November 1943), Pederson Papers.
Combat Narratives, Solomon Islands Campaign III: The Battle of the Eastern Solomons 23–25 August 1942 (1943). Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:79–107, Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:556–91; Frank, 159–93, Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 102–64.
2. Basic sources for Fletcher’s decisions and actions in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons include his Preliminary Report (6 September 1942) with map of contacts, Saratoga war diary, the Saratoga’s Tactical Situation and Chronological History of Events, TF-16 war diary, TF-16 Chronological Order of Events 0500–2400 (24 August 1942), and Pederson lecture (4 November 1943).
3. Twining, 78, recalled Schindler bringing the strawberries, but mistook the date as 12 August. Message 221921 August 1942 Cincpac to all CTFs, Comsopac Message File.
4. The messages from search planes cited here are in the Comairsopac war diary, task force and carrier war diaries, and in CSCMF. James Sawruk identified the individual PBY plane commanders.
5. TF-16 war diary.
6. Message 230156 August 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 22. Destroyer fuel is ascertained from the figures in their deck logs.
7. TF-16 war diary.
8. TF-61 preliminary report; Lee, 339; Commander, Saratoga Air Group report (5 September 1942); Laing report; Saratoga war diary.
9. Messages August 1942: 230159 Comairsopac to Mackinac, 230309 Radio Canberra to any and all U.S. ships, 230315 Comsopac to Comsowespacfor, CSCMF, roll 22; 230642 General MacArthur to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File; 230331 Radio Nouméa to Cactus, 230456 Comairsopac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22.
10. Messages 230440 Comsopac to CTF-61, 230601 Comsowespacfor to Comairsopac, 230613 Comsowespac to all CTFs, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22.
11. Yokoi, Toshiyuki, “The Admiral That Davy Jones Didn’t Want,” in Gluck, Ukiyo, 11.
12. Message 230345 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 22; CTF-11 to Cincpac, First Endorsement (24 September 1942) of CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942).
13. Comcru TF-18 war diary, TF-16 war diary, TF-16 Chronological Order of Events.
14. Frank, 165. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:83, noted the seven destroyers with Wasp at noon 23 August had from 68,885 to 104,794 gallons, averaging 84,824 gallons. As usual he did not explain what these figures meant in terms of capacity and actual steaming at different speeds. The overall average was 55 percent. The low destroyer was the Stack (about 6.7 days at fifteen knots, 1.9 days at twenty-five knots). CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942).
15. Greybook, 832.
16. Messages 230709 Comsowespac to Cincpac, 231140 Comsowespacfor to Cincpac, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22.
17. Messages 230816 CG Cactus to CTF-61 and CTF-62, 230835 Mackinac to CTF-63, 231040 CG Cactus to CTF-61, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22.
18. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:558–59; Ugaki, 188–89.
19. Tanaka, in Evans, 165; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:557–62.
20. Tanaka, in Evans, 166; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:562–63; Ugaki, 188–89.
21. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 106; TF-16 Chronological Order of Events.
22. TF-16 Chronological Order of Events.
23. Comairsopac war diary; I am again indebted to James Sawruk’s knowledge of Airsopac’s search operations.
24. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:562.
25. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:563–64, 566.
26. Saratoga Tactical Situation; TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; TF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942). Comairsopac war diary, Sawruk research.
27. TF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942).
28. TF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); Saratoga Tactical Situation.
29. Comairsopac war diary, Sawruk research.
30. Felt, oral history, 109; Commander, Saratoga Air Group report (5 September 1942); Lee, 341–50 (quote on page 350).
31. Lee, 350; TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; TF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942). Both Fletcher and Ghormley complained of communication problems with regard to contact reports.
32. TF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942). Gen. John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat, 57, in Pederson Papers. Pederson lecture (4 November 1943).
33. Felt, oral history, 110. CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); CTF-11 First Endorsement (24 September 1942).
34. TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; CTF-11 First Endorsement (24 September 1942).
35. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 113–14; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:582.
36. TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; TF-16 war diary; CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942).
37. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 114; CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942). Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:582.
38. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:545–47, 572.
39. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:564.
40. CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942); CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942).
41. CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942), with plot of contacts that can be compared with Japanese positions shown in maps in Senshi Sōsho, volume 49.
42. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 123–24. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:567.
43. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:567–68.
44. TF-16 Chronological Order of Events. Message 240223 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 22. RG-457, SRMD-002.
45. CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942).
46. CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); message 240355 August 1942 Mackinac to Comairsopac, CSCMF, roll 22.
47. TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; TF-16 war diary; CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942); CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942).
48. Comairsopac war diary; CO Bombing Squadron Six to CO USS Enterprise, Report of Action, August 24, 1942 (31 August 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:575–76.
49. CO Bombing Squadron Six report (31 August 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:573; information from James Sawruk. Transmissions on the fighter net blocked the search-attack frequency. Voice radio messages were unreliable beyond one hundred miles. See CTF-16 to Cincpac, Communications Failures Due to Faulty Equipment (3 October 1942), and CO USS Enterprise to Cincpac, Carrier Aircraft Radio Communications (25 September 1942), in RG-38, Cincpac Flag File.
50. TF-16 Chronological Order of Events.
51. From deck logs: TF-11 destroyer fuel, 24 August:
No figures are available for the Patterson, but her fuel state was very probably close to her sister Bagley, which also came out from Nouméa with Crutchley.
TF-16 destroyer fuel, 24 August:
52. CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942); TF-16 Chronological Order of Events. Second Endorsement, CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942) by Comairsopac.
53. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:569–71.
54. Lee, 353; TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; Pederson lecture (4 November 1943).
55. CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942); CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942).
56. For the attack on TF-16, see Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 125–50; combat air patrol messages in USS Saratoga Fighter Net Radio Log and Radar Plot for Engagement against Japanese on August 24, 1942, enclosure to CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942). Lee, 353.
57. Lee, 354; Glover, 38. Letter from Cdr. G. C. Slonim to “Jim,” one of S. E. Morison’s research assistants (c. 1949), in Morison Office Files, box 27.
58. Lee, 355; TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; message 240625 August 1942 Fletcher to Comairsopac and Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:568–69.
1. TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; Comdesdiv Twenty-two to Cincpac, Reports of action of 24 August, 1942, and subsequent events in connection there with (30 August 1942).
2. Lee, 355; CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942).
3. CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942); message 240808 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22.
4. CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942); Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 153.
5. CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); Commander, Saratoga Air Group to CO, USS Saratoga, Narrative Report of Action with Enemy on August 24, 1942, in Solomon Islands Area (29 August 1942); Slonim letter to “Jim” (c. 1949), in Morison Office Files, box 27.
6. Torpedo Squadron Eight, Commander, to CO, USS Saratoga, Narrative Report of Action with Enemy on 24 August 1942 in Solomon Islands Area (27 August 1942); Commander, Bombing Squadron Three, to CO, USS Saratoga, Narrative Report of Action against Enemy on August 24, 1942, in Solomon Islands Area (27 August 1942).
7. CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); TF-16 Chronological Order of Events. Slonim, 80; Slonim letter to “Jim” (c. 1949), in Morison Office Files, box 27.
8. Message 241014 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comsopac, Greybook, 809.
9. TF-16 Chronological Order of Events; TF-16 war diary; CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942); CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942); Desron One war diary. Message 241005 August 1942 Guadalcanal to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 22. Vandegrift ran low on fuel. That evening he had only enough aviation gasoline for “about one days operation of a carrier group plus marine planes” (message 241431 August 1942 Comairsopac to CTF-62 [info CTF-61 and Comsopac], CSCMF, roll 22). Commander, Enterprise Air Group, to Cincpac, Report of Action in the Solomon Islands Area, August 22–25, 1942 (2 September 1942). Felt, oral history, 111.
10. Comairsopac war diary; identification of PBYs from Sawruk; CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942). Messages August 1942: 241221 Comsopac to CTF-61, 241300 Ghormley to Fletcher, 241400 Comsopac to Guadalcanal, CSCMF, roll 22; 241102 Comsopac to CTF-17, Greybook, 809.
11. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:566.
12. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:571.
13. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:573–75; TF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942).
14. VT-8 report (27 August 1942); VB-3 report (27 August 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:574–77, 583.
15. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:573–74.
16. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:573–74. Pederson lecture (4 November 1943).
17. Ugaki, 190–92; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:577.
18. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:584–86.
19. Comcru TF-18 war diary; Capt. Forrest Sherman to Cincpac, Movements of USS Wasp, August 25, 1942 (14 November 1942).
20. Messages 241305 August 1942 Radio Guadalcanal to CTF-61, Comsopac war diary; 241355 August 1942 Guadalcanal to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 22; Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:585–86; message 241350 August 1942 Comsopac to Comsowespacfor, in MacArthur Papers, Sopac message file, message no. 75.
21. Message 241449 August 1942 Comairsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 22; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 158.
22. Comairsopac war diary, Sawruk research. SRMN-009, Cincpac Fleet Intelligence Summary, 24 August 1942, 72; message 242125 August 1942 Cincpac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22.
23. Tanaka, in Evans, 167–69. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:586–88.
24. Forrest Sherman letter to Cincpac (14 November 1942), NHC; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 158–60.
25. Saratoga war diary, TF-16 war diary.
26. Saratoga war diary, Comcru TF-11 war diary, TF-16 war diary.
27. CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); message 250303 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 22.
28. Saratoga war diary; TF-16 war diary; message 250646 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comsopac, Greybook, 659–60.
29. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 49:583; Ugaki, 192–93; Boyd and Yoshida, 96–97.
30. Ugaki, 193–94.
31. CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942); CTF-16 letter to Cincpac (10 September 1942). In his First Endorsement (24 September1942) of CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942), Fletcher referred to his “report of Communications of September 17, 1942,” which cannot now be located.
32. Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 162–64; CTF-61 Second Endorsement (25 September 1942) of CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942).
33. CTF-11, First Endorsement (24 September 1942) of CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942); CTF-16 letter to Cincpac (10 September 1942).
34. Comcrupac letter to Cincpac (24 September 1942); CTF-61 Second Endorsement (25 September 1942) of CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942); CO Enterprise report (5 September 1942).
35. Slonim letter to “Jim” (c. 1949), in Morison Office Files, box 27; CTF-61 preliminary report (6 September 1942); message 030600 September 1942 Comsopac to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 23; Pederson lecture (4 November 1943); RG-457, SRH-036, Radio Intelligence in World War II Tactical Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, January 1943, 256–57.
36. Layton interview by Pineau and Costello (11 May 1983), 36; RG-457, SRH-12, Combat Intelligence Unit, Traffic Intelligence Summary, 24 August 1942, 800–801.
37. Cincpac to Cominch, Solomon Islands Campaign—Action of 23–25 August—Preliminary Report (27 September 1942).
38. Cincpac report (24 October 1942); Cominch Secret Intelligence Bulletin No. 2.
39. Potter and Nimitz, Great Sea War, 259, said Kondō’s depleted Support Force lost ninety planes as well as the Ryūjō. In truth, counting the Ryūjō group, the Japanese lost sixty-four carrier planes (thirty-two fighters, twenty-four dive bombers, and eight torpedo planes) on 24 August.
40. The strangest wartime interpretation of the Eastern Solomons is Fletcher Pratt’s officially sponsored The Navy’s War, 227, 231. Pratt placed Kinkaid in charge and did not even mention Fletcher. He noted severe criticism for Kinkaid “not pursuing the Japs to the death.” Kinkaid bristled over being blamed for Fletcher’s decisions (Wheeler, Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet, 292).
41. Slonim letter to “Jim” (c. 1949), in Morison Office Files, box 27; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:102–3, 106.
42. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:106; Cincpac report (27 October 1942).
1. General sources for the movements of TF-61 and its components in late August and early September 1942 are the war diaries of the Saratoga, Comcru TF-11, Comcru TF-18, Desron One, Desron Twelve, and TF-17.
2. Messages 0249Z/25 Radio Honolulu to any USN ship, 250620 Comsopac to CTF-17, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22.
3. Messages August 1942: 251235 Cominch to Cincpac, Sopac Message File; 252205 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 660; 252241 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 658; 271935 Cincpac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22; 251732 Comsopac to CG Defense Force Samoa, CNO TS Blue File.
4. Comairsopac war diary; TF-16 war diary. Messages August 1942: 260239 Cincpac to Comsopac, 260342 Comsopac to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File; 260750 Comsopac to CTF-61, Sopac Message File; 260639 CTF-16 to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File; 261812 Comsopac to CTF-16, Greybook, 660.
5. Messages 260332 Comsopac to CTF-17, 260345 CTF-62 to all CTFs, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22.
6. Saratoga war diary; Rear Adm. D. C. Ramsey statement (16 February 1943), Wasp investigation.
7. Messages August 1942: 250646 CTF-61 to Comsopac, Greybook, 659–60; 261930 CTF-61 to Comsopac, Greybook, 810; 270132 Comsopac to CTF-61 and CTF-17, 270152 Comsopac to Phoenix, CSCMF, roll 22.
8. Saratoga war diary; Comairsopac war diary; Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 165–68.
9. Message 271026 August 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61, CTF-62, and CTF-63, Greybook, 662; Vice Adm. R. L. Ghormley statement (5 January 1943), Wasp investigation.
10. Saratoga war diary; messages 280445 August 1942 Cincpac Intel. Bull., CSCMF, roll 22; 281111 August 1942 Comairsopac to Radio Guadalcanal, CNO TS Blue File; Comcru TF-18 war diary.
11. Message 281045 August 1942 CG 1st Mardiv to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 22. Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 83:21–28; Ugaki, 193, 197–98; Tanaka, 169–74.
12. Laing report; TF-17 war diary; Murray statement (4 January 1943), Wasp investigation. Saratoga war diary; messages 282251 CTF-61 to Comsopac, 282259 CTF-61 to Phoenix, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 22.
13. Messages 290709 Comsowespacfor to Cincpac, 290955 CTF-62 to WW Burrows, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 23; Tanaka, 174.
14. TF-61 Op-Ord 4–42 (29 August 1942) and TF-61 Op-Ord 5–42 (29 August 1942), in Op-Ord File.
15. Messages August 1942: 281240 Cominch to Cincpac, 290310 Comsopac to Cominch, Greybook, 666; 300015 Cincpac to Cominch, in MacArthur Papers, Sopac message file, message no. 80; 302123 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 667.
16. Messages August 1942: 291642 Comsopac to CTF-61, Greybook, 684; 300542 Comsopac to Cimarron and Guadalupe, CSCMF, roll 23.
17. Messages 300519 Cactus to Comsopac, 301111 CTU-62.2.4 to CTF-62, August 1942, CSCMF, roll 23; 011315 September 1942 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 2:862.
18. Reports on the torpedoing of the Saratoga include: Cincpac to Cominch, Solomon Islands Campaign—Torpedoing of Saratoga, Wasp, and North Carolina (31 October 1942); CO USS Saratoga to Cincpac, Action Report on Torpedoing of USS Saratoga, 31 August 1942 (10 September 1942), First Endorsement CTF-11 (18 September 1942); CTG-11.4 (Comdesron One) to Cincpac, Report of Action of Japanese submarine and Task Force 11 on 31 August 1942 (7 September 1942), CTF-11 First Endorsement (18 September 1942) to Comdesron One report.
19. CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942), Comdesron One report (7 September 1942); Japan, Senshi Sōsho, 83:65; Boyd and Yoshida, 98; Green diary; Lee, 360. In his 1966 interview with Walter Lord, Fletcher recalled suffering his wound at Midway, but all the evidence shows it occurred on 31 August 1942 when the Saratoga was torpedoed.
20. Lee, 360–61; message 302005 August 1942 All U.S. ships to Comsopac, Sopac Message File; Comdesron One report (7 September 1942); CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942); Stern, 59–60.
21. Roger L. Bond, oral history, 108. Bond joined the ship in 1943 as a quartermaster. Stern, 93–94.
22. Lee, 361; Glover, 38; CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942); Comdesron One report (7 September 1942). The I-26 escaped after four hours of attacks by destroyers, although the Monssen was certain that her last attack at 0950 had finished the sub (message 012004 September 1942 Monssen to CTF-11, CSCMF, roll 23).
23. CO Saratoga report (10 September 1942); Cincpac report (31 October 1942); message 302340 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File.
24. Messages August 1942: 302140 Comsopac to CTF-17, CTF-18, and CTF-61, 302355 CTF-18 to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 23; 302123 Cincpac to Comsopac, Greybook, 687; 310242 Comsopac to CTF-16, CTF-17, CTF-18, and CTF-63, Greybook, 665. Crutchley’s TF-44 was to comprise the Australia, Hobart, Phoenix, and six destroyers. Messages August 1942: 310602 Comsopac to Guadalupe and Cimarron, CSCMF, roll 23; 310950 Comsopac to Comairsopac, Sopac Message File; 311022 Comsopac to CTF-18, 311107 Comairsopac to Comsopac, 310402 Comairsopac to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 23.
25. Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes statement (14 January 1943), Wasp investigation; TF-17 war diary; messages 310930 August 1942 CTF-61 to Comsopac, Greybook, 668; 010330 September 1942 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 23.
26. Saratoga war diary. Messages September 1942: 010722 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 23; 011025 CTF-11 to Cincpac, CNO TS Blue File. Stern, 60.
27. Message 012331 September 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, Greybook, 863.
28. Laing report; Cincpac report (31 October 1942); Ghormley statement (5 January 1943), Noyes statement (14 January 1943), Wasp investigation; Comcrupac letter to Cincpac (24 September 1942).
29. Ramsey statement (16 February 1943), Wasp investigation.
30. Letter Wright to Wellborn (9 February 1952) in DNC, Office Files, box 20; Cincpac report (31 October 1942); Murray statement (4 January 1943), Sherman statement (28 January 1943), Wasp investigation; message 072145 October 1942 Cincpac to CTF-1, CTF-11, CTF-16, CTF-17, CTF-62, CTF-64, and Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 26.
31. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:112; Cominch Secret Battle Experiences Bulletin No. 2.
32. Message 020924 September 1942 CTG-61.2 to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 23; Murray statement (4 January 1943), Wasp investigation; Cincpac report (31 October 1942).
33. Cincpac report (31 October 1942); Ramsey statement (16 February 1943), Sherman statement (28 January 1943), Wasp investigation.
34. Messages September 1942: 020722 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 23; 041302 Comsopac to CTF-11, Sopac Message File. Noyes statement (14 January 1943), Wasp investigation.
35. Messages September 1942: 052052 CTF-11 to Comsopac, 060550 Comsopac to Cincpac, Sopac Message File; 061325 Cincpac to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 23; 062233 Cincpac to Cominch, CNO TS Blue File; 070148 Comsopac to CTF-61, CSCMF, roll 23; 070452 Comsopac to CTF-62, Comsopac war diary; 091016 Comsopac to CTF-18, CTF-17, CTF-62, CTF-63, and CTF-64, CNO TS Blue File.
36. Messages September 1942: 062246 CTG-2.9 to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File; 080342 Comsopac to CTF-11, Sopac Message File; 110659 CTF-11 to Comsopac, 111030 Comsopac to CTF-11, CSCMF, roll 24.
37. For Sopac carrier operations to mid September 1942, see Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, 202, 220–29.
38. Message 030736 September 1942 Comsopac to CTF-17, CSCMF, roll 23; TF-17 war diary; message 070217 September 1942 CTF-17 to Comsopac, CSCMF, roll 23; Ghormley statement (5 January 1943), Wasp investigation.
39. Noyes statement (14 January 1943), letter Turner to Noyes (9 September 1942), letter Noyes to Ghormley (9 September 1942), Wasp investigation. Several marine sources somehow misconstrued this exchange between Noyes and Turner to blame Fletcher for trying to block the introduction of the grounded Saratoga planes in defense of Cactus. See Griffith, 111–12, and Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, 88.
40. Noyes statement (14 January 1943), Wasp investigation.
41. Sherman statement (28 January 1943), Wasp investigation.
42. Messages September 1942: 201322 Comsopac to CTF-17, Greybook, 882; 202147 Cincpac to Comsopac, 201755 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 25.
43. Ghormley statement (5 January 1943), Noyes statement (14 January 1943), Sherman statement (28 January 1943), Wasp investigation; Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes, Memo for Cincpac (5 October 1942).
44. Cominch Secret Battle Experience Bulletin No. 2; Capt. R. G. Tobin statement (17 February 1943), Wasp investigation.
45. Letter Comairpac (Halsey) to Cincpac (9 October 1942); Sherrod, 90.
1. Saratoga war diary. The conference minutes of the 7–9 September Cominch-Cincpac meetings first noted that Fletcher was to report to King for temporary duty for “about one month,” but that was crossed out and replaced by “two weeks.” Letter Nimitz to King (12 October 1942), in Admiral’s Personal Letters, 1942, Nimitz Papers.
2. Conference Minutes, 7–9 September 1942. Messages September 1942: 010235 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 23; 141807 and 142007 Bupers to Comairpac, 110340 Com 12 to Com 14, CSCMF, roll 24. DSM citations in citation file, NHC. For the ceremony, see New York Times (16 September 1942), where Halsey is called “Fighting Bill.” Halsey and Bryan, 108, wrongly placed the ceremony on 12 September in the absent Saratoga.
3. Notes on Conference at Palmyra, September 25, 1942, in Admiral’s Personal Letters, 1942, in Nimitz Papers.
4. They left the next day in the battleship Pennsylvania and reached San Francisco on 4 October. The officers had orders to report back to NAS Alameda on 27 October, the enlisted men to San Francisco on 21 October, before returning to Pearl. Interviews of George Clapp and Norman Ulmer by Lundstrom.
5. Message 280258 September 1942 Com 14 to Com 12, CSCMF, roll 25; letter McCain to Nimitz (30 September 1942), in Commander, North Pacific Area (Comnorpac) Folder, Nimitz Papers; Conference Minutes (9 September 1942).
6. Letter Nimitz to Ghormley (8 October 1942), in Admiral’s Personal Letters, 1942, Nimitz Papers. Messages October 1942: 070021 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 26; 110045 Cincpac to CTF-16 (info CTF-17), CSCMF, roll 27. Kinkaid wrote his wife on 8 October: “I am glad it has come out this way because there are a lot of aviators in the offing and there is some inclination to push them ahead of us ordinary mortals” (Wheeler, 266). Messages 071614 Cominch to Cincpac and 092207 Cincpac to Cominch, October 1942, CSCMF, roll 26.
7. Letter Nimitz to King (12 October 1942); message 110046 October 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16 and 17, CSCMF, roll 27.
8. Letter Nimitz to King (12 October 1942); message 260826 October 1942 Cincpac to Comairpac, CSCMF, roll 29; extract of letters to Mrs. Nimitz (27 October 1942), Nimitz Papers; Whitehill memo (14 August 1949), King Papers, NWC. Cincpac’s First Endorsement (6 April 1943) in the Wasp investigation. Letter Sherman to Noyes (12 April 1950) in F. P. Sherman Papers.
9. Messages October 1942: 160440 Comsopac to Cincpac, 170243 Cincpac to Comsopac, CNO TS Blue File; 160937 Cincpac to Cominch, 161245 Cominch to Cincpac, Greybook, 2:895; 181350 Comsopac to Cincpac, Greybook, 2:896; Greybook, 2:1096; extract of letters to Mrs. Nimitz (17 October 1942), Nimitz Papers; 180244 October 1942 Cincpac to CTF-16, CSCMF, roll 28.
10. Messages 230019 Cincpac to CTF-64, 242357 Cincpac to Bupers with text of 232307 Bupers to Cincpac, October 1942, CSCMF, roll 28.
11. Interview of Rear Adm. Harry Smith by Dr. Stephen Regan (13 July 1986), courtesy of Dr. Regan.
12. Whitehill memo (14 August 1949). Cominch-Cincpac conference 11–13 December 1942, Personnel Matters (11 December, 1942). Letter Fletcher to Nimitz (22 January 1943), in Admiral’s Personal Letters, 1943, Nimitz Papers. Layton interview by Pineau and Costello (11 May 1983).
13. For an example of how the Lexington received credit for the Yorktown’s achievements, see Cdr. C. G. Moore, Memorandum for Admiral Brown (1 March 1943), which stated, “It has been established beyond peradventure of a doubt [likely from Ted Sherman himself ] that Lexington aircraft were largely, if not wholly, responsible for inflicting such heavy damage on the enemy carrier Shokaku that that vessel was withdrawn from service for many months.” Moore served in the office of the CNO. Brown Papers. The president’s itinerary in the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park noted his 2 October 1942 meeting with King and Forrestal and revealed the only time during the whole war Fletcher met Roosevelt was in August 1944 in the Aleutians, e-mails 5 and 6 November 2002 from Raymond Teichman at Hyde Park.
14. F. C. Sherman diary, entry on 9 November 1942, which covered the period 12 October through 9 November; Saratoga war diary; messages 270400 Com 12 to Com 14 reporting Sherman’s flight to Pearl and 282109 Cincpac to TF-11 reorganizing the task force under Ramsey’s command, October 1942, CSCMF, roll 29.
15. Message 242239 October 1942 Cincpac to Bupers, CSCMF, roll 28.
16. Reynolds, Towers, 428. Nothing pertaining to the substitution of Ramsey for Sherman appears in this exhaustive biography of Towers, based on Towers’s private diary and extensive personal papers. Given such rich sources, it is reasonable to expect that, had Towers influenced Nimitz on such an important matter, some hint would have appeared in his papers.
17. Seattle Times (22 November 1942); letter Fletcher to Nimitz (22 January 1943). Messages October 1942: 301745 Cominch to Cincpac, CSCMF, roll 29; 051617 Admiral Fletcher to Cincpac and 092215 Cincpac to Secnav, CSCMF, roll 26. Interview of Harry Smith (13 July 1986) by Regan. In March 1943 Lewis rose to rear admiral and served as chief of staff to Vice Adm. H. Kent Hewitt, Eighth Fleet commander during the Sicily and Salerno landings. In August 1944 he took over one of the amphibious task groups that invaded Southern France.
18. For Sopac carrier operations in October and November 1942, see Lundstrom, First Team Guadalcanal, chapters 14, 16, 18–26.
19. Reynolds, Towers, 408; F. C. Sherman diary (9–16 November 1942).
20. CTF-16 to Cincpac, Operations of Task Force Sixteen in the Action for the Defense of Guadalcanal 12–15 November 1942 (23 November 1942); CO USS Enterprise to Cincpac, Report of Action 13–14 November 1942 (19 November 1942); F. C. Sherman diary (17 November 1942); letter Halsey to Nimitz (17 November 1942), Comsopac Folder, Nimitz Papers.
21. F. C. Sherman diary (19–20 November 1942). On 23 November Kinkaid wrote his wife: “I hate to leave my present job because I feel I know it well and have had considerable success in it” (Wheeler, 291).
22. Message 230612 November 1942 Comsopac to all CTFs, Comsopac war diary; F. C. Sherman diary (20 and 25 November 1942). The text of Kinkaid’s orders included: “You have commanded carrier task forces operating in this area with skill and effectiveness. You inflicted great damage upon the enemy in repeated engagements. . . . I desire to pay full tribute to your superb work” (Wheeler 295).
23. Wheeler, 295–97, 300–301. Halsey had independently recommended Kinkaid for a DSM for Santa Cruz, but it was never awarded. In 1946 Kinkaid tried to resurrect that DSM (actually a gold star in lieu of a second DSM) but the navy only rewrote the citation for his second DSM to include Santa Cruz and the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal with the Eastern Solomons (Wheeler, 291–92). Fletcher only received the one DSM for Coral Sea and Midway and no additional U.S. Navy decorations for the rest of the war.
24. Letter Nimitz to McCain (19 March 1943), in Admiral’s Personal Letters, 1943; letter Nimitz to Halsey (18 December 1942), Comsopac Folder; both in Nimitz Papers. The last non-aviator regularly detailed to lead a carrier task force into action was Rear Adm. Robert C. Giffen, whose TF-18 in January and early February 1943 contained two escort carriers. Giffen suffered the loss of the Chicago in the Battle of Rennell Island, 29–30 January 1943. From 29 June to 7 July 1944, non-aviator Rear Adm. Wilder D. Baker, the cruiser commander, led TG-58.4 in strikes on Saipan after Rear Adm. William K. Harrill became medically disabled.
1. Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, Administrative History of the Thirteenth Naval District, 4 volumes.
2. Morison, Two-Ocean War, 182; undated memo (1942) in Maas Papers.
3. Letter Fletcher to Nimitz (undated), letter Nimitz to Fletcher (14 August 1943), in Admiral’s Personal Letters, 1943, Nimitz Papers.
4. Comcrupac to Cincpac (24 September 1942), Comairpac to Cincpac (9 October 1942); Cincpac to Task Force Commanders, Pacific Fleet, etc., Operations of Carrier Task Forces (9 December 1942), in RG-38, Cincpac Flag Files.
5. Comairpac to Cincpac, Operations of Carrier Task Forces (14 April 1943); Comcrupac to Cincpac (24 September 1942); Comairpac to Cincpac (9 October 1942).
6. CTF-16 to Cincpac, Operations of Carrier Task Forces (8 January 1943). Letter Vice Adm. H. S. Duckworth to Lundstrom (25 March 1972); H. M. Dater memo, talk with Rear Adm. H. S. Duckworth (18 January 1951), in Duckworth Papers.
7. Reynolds, Fast Carriers, 72–73.
8. Ramsey left to become chief of Buaer in place of John McCain. Duckworth wrote Clark Reynolds (10 January 1965): “I have the greatest admiration for the fighting & professional ability of ‘Ted’ Sherman—there was none better. He seemed to be able to think out most of the answers before the questions were asked. But he had the greatest negative personality I have ever known. No one liked him & it worked against him in the long run” (Duckworth Papers). Letter Duckworth to Lundstrom (4 August 1972). Reynolds, Fast Carriers, 73–78, 80–87.
9. Letters Duckworth to Lundstrom (25 March 1972, 4 August 1972); Reynolds, Fast Carriers, 87–88.
10. Weapons Systems Evaluation Group Staff Study No. 4, Operational Experiences of Fast Carrier Task Forces in World War II (15 August 1951), 17, 151–61; Reynolds, Fast Carriers, 88–109.
11. Dyer, 2:631–32; Reynolds, Towers, 440.
12. Reynolds, Fast Carriers, 95; Reynolds, Towers, 442.
13. Reynolds, Towers, 447–48; message 212225 November 1943 Cincpac to Comcenpacfor (Commander, Central Pacific Force) (info Cominch and CTF-50), CNO TS Blue File; WSEG Staff Study No. 4, 161.
14. Reynolds, Towers, 399.
15. Cominch-Cincpac Conferences, Minutes, 25–27 September 1943; Wheeler, 340–41, 343–45; Cincpac, Administrative History of the North Pacific Area, (1945); Hayes, 668–76; letter Fletcher to Nimitz (4 December 1943), in Admiral’s Personal Letters, 1944, Nimitz Papers. For operations in the North Pacific Area, see also Hutchison, World War II in the North Pacific.
16. Letters Nimitz to Fletcher (7 January 1944 and 10 February 1944), Comnorpac Folder, Nimitz Papers. Morison, United States Naval Operations, 7:66, wrongly gave the date as 2 February. Morison concluded, “During the rest of the war the Aleutians sector offers little of interest to the military or the naval historian” and dealt with the following nineteen months of Comnorpac’s combat operations in less than a paragraph. Hopkins, Nice to Have You Aboard, 114–15.
17. Letters Nimitz to Fletcher (22 June 1944), Fletcher to Nimitz (8 August 1944), Comnorpac Folder, Nimitz Papers; letter Roosevelt to Fletcher (9 August 1944), Fletcher Papers; Norpac Administrative History.
18. Vice Adm. John L. McCrea, oral history, 318–21.
19. Norpac Administrative History, 284–88.
20. Letter Fletcher to Nimitz (16 December 1944), High Ranking Officers Folder, Nimitz Papers. Nimitz sent Fletcher a Christmas present to which Fletcher replied on 30 January 1945 in a letter headed “Dear Chester,” in which he wrote: “I think I can state positively that this is the only present that I ever received from a Fleet Admiral and naturally I am very grateful to be remembered by you.” In May 1945 Nimitz thoughtfully sent Fletcher a press release regarding the USS New Mexico, which he personally annotated: “Dear Frank Jack—As an old C.O. of this gallant ship I think you will be pleased to read this. Aloha, CW Nimitz.” Both documents in Fletcher Papers.
21. Minutes of Pacific Conference [Cominch-Cincpac], 24–26 November 1944. For the General Board, see Albion, Makers of Naval Policy 1798–1947, 78–93; Furer, 107–8.
22. Reynolds, Towers, 494–95; Minutes of Pacific Conference [Cominch-Cincpac], 24–26 November 1944. Fitch’s response is interesting because Calhoun was his roommate at Annapolis and had helped him with his studies. Calhoun, though, was not “one of the boys” and was disliked by Fitch and other members of the class of 1906 for his know-it-all personality. Conversation 24 January 2003 with John C. Fitch, Admiral Fitch’s son.
23. Russell, Project Hula; Norpac Administrative History; Hayes, 682–84.
24. Norpac Administrative History; Hutchison, 185.
25. Norpac Administrative History. Folder: World War II—Japanese Surrender Aboard USS Panamint, Robert T. Hartmann Papers, box 21. Hartmann was Fletcher’s public relations officer. United States Naval Emergency Occupation, Ominato Guard District Area, Commander North Pacific Force and Area Aboard The USS Panamint (AGC-13) (9 September 1945), copy courtesy of Ralph Wilhelm.
26. DSM citation in Citation File, NHC. Washington, D.C., Evening Star (29 November 1945), copy in Officer Biographical File, NHC. Letter Air Marshal Robert Leckie, RCAF, to Fletcher (23 January 1947), and citation of Companion of the Bath in Fletcher Papers.
27. Furer, 166; Reynolds, Towers, 533–34; letter Forrestal to Fletcher (13 February 1947), Fletcher Papers.
1. Letter Nimitz to King (29 May 1942), Nimitz Papers.
2. Pratt, “Campaign in the Coral Sea,” 361; Cant, America’s Navy in World War II; Pratt, The Navy’s War; transcript of Layton interview by Pineau and Costello (11 May 1983), Layton Papers; Battle Stations!; Karig and Purdon, Battle Report Pacific War.
3. Berry, 58; Henry I. Shaw Jr., First Offensive, 48; Griffith, 8–9, 138; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 5:182–83.
4. Memorandum, Maj. R. D. Heinl Jr., Officer-in-charge, Historical Section, to Brig. Gen. W. E. Riley (9 January 1948), Morison Office Files, box 18; Berry, 58.
5. Pfitzer, Samuel Eliot Morison’s Historical World, 172–74, 242–43; Morison, United States Naval Operations, 1:vii.
6. Letter Murphy to Rear Adm. C. C. Hartman (7 September 1951). An unidentified senior officer in Opnav wrote in response to Murphy’s criticisms: “This makes disturbing reading to me and shows that we need a more critical review of Morison’s work in the future. His work should be factually correct at least with fewer ‘smart aleck’ observations of his own. Abstracts from this may be shown when the statements are checked,” memo “To 29 from 02” (10 September 1951).
7. Letter Spruance to Bates (19 June 1946), Bates Papers, series I, box 8; letter Bates to Adm. R. C. Giffen (18 February 1947), Bates Papers, series I, box 1; letter Bates to McMorris (26 May 1948), Bates Papers, series I, box 2. Vice Adm. David C. Richardson, oral history, 103; Pfitzer, 242–43.
8. Pratt, Fleet Against Japan, 53; Richardson, oral history, 102–3.
9. Letter Bates to Adm. Jesse Oldendorf (15 April 1947), Bates Papers, series I, box 1; letter Fletcher to Spruance, undated (c. 1947), copy in Fletcher Papers; letter Fletcher to Morison (1 December 1947), Fletcher Papers; Letter Fletcher to Wellborn (22 August 1950), Fletcher Papers; letter Fletcher to Smith (12 August 1964), in Smith Papers; letter Dyer to Lundstrom (19 January 1977). Fletcher did help Thaddeus V. Tuleja, author of Climax at Midway (1960), and later Walter Lord and Gordon Prange.
10. Fleet Adm. C. W. Nimitz, Statement on Command at Midway (8 March 1946), in RG-38, Action Reports, box 37; message 202013 June 1942 Cincpac to Cominch, CSCMF, roll 16. Nimitz’s comments on Griffith’s Battle of Guadalcanal appear on the dust jacket.
11. Letter Smith to Buckmaster (23 April 1966), copy in Pederson Papers. Butcher, “Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, Pioneer Warrior or Gross Sinner?”
12. Jones, Campbell Brown’s Civil War, 212.
13. Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 93.
14. Ulysses S. Grant, The Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, 87.
15. Letter Murphy to Hartman (7 September 1951). Sun-tzu, The Art of War, 18.
16. Ewing, Thach Weave, 168–70. Thach was McCain’s operations officer in 1944–45 in the fast carriers and spent time with Mitscher in mid 1944. It must be said if Thach praised McCain’s receptivity to new ideas, they were mainly Thach’s own ideas, although he had to prove his case to McCain. Letter Lt. Cdr. Richard Best to Lundstrom (15 May 2000).
17. Stephens, The Fighting Admirals, 14–15.