Following the great victory as TF-17 steered northeast of Midway, Fletcher startled Lt. (jg) George E. Clapp, one of his communication watch officers in the Saratoga, by asking his opinion where next they should fight. The gloomy Aleutians beckoned. No one knew how deeply the Pacific Fleet might become mired in a northern campaign. Clapp declared they should go back to the South Pacific and stop the enemy there. Fletcher told his staff to heed the young officer’s advice. The Aleutians were a sideshow. The central Pacific could take care of itself until the United States could advance to the Mandates in strength. The same was not true in the South Pacific Area, where Ghormley was about to assume command, or for MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area where Port Moresby remained in danger.1
Fletcher had no idea a South Pacific offensive was already in the works and that he would play a central role. The destruction of four carriers at Midway dramatically evened the balance of power. On 8 June MacArthur offered to sweep Japan out of Rabaul and back to Truk, and thereby gain “manifold strategic advantages.” Just give him two of Nimitz’s carriers and one marine division. In fact MacArthur’s bold design was simply a ploy for additional strength. He had no specific plan. Besides winning the victories that enabled MacArthur even to consider such an ambitious undertaking, Nimitz himself started the ball rolling in late May. Up to that point King proffered no timetable for his cherished advance through the New Hebrides and the Solomons to Rabaul. He merely remarked to Ghormley in April that it might begin that fall. Everything depended on how quickly Sopac could create the necessary support bases. Nimitz did not want to remain passive that whole time. On 27 May, even as he made ready to defend Midway, he offered MacArthur a marine raider battalion to rough up the seaplane base at Tulagi. MacArthur declined, deeming the raiders too few for the job. King himself favored strong raids to neutralize or destroy advance bases, “especially Tulagi,” but he, too, judged one battalion insufficient for that task. The “permanent occupation of Tulagi [is] not contemplated or approved at this time.” On 1 June Nimitz retorted that he never intended the raiders to hold Tulagi but simply “nullify” its base facilities to prevent the enemy from consolidating his hold.2
MacArthur’s Rabaul proposition resonated with army planners, who were so miserly in the Pacific in favor of Europe, but King already intrigued to redirect MacArthur toward the Netherlands East Indies. The British Eastern Fleet should join MacArthur to seize Timor, or perhaps capture bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the eastern Indian Ocean. Such actions, King informed Stark and Nimitz on 9 June, “Should serve to divert much of remaining enemy sea forces from strong action in New Guinea area which is now his likely next move.” That would “enable us not only to deal with such a thrust but to mount an operation designed to weaken his hold on Solomons and Bismarcks.” By “us,” King meant himself, Nimitz, and Ghormley, not MacArthur. “Such a correlated effort might well develop into getting pincers on [the enemy] applied in the areas west and east of New Guinea.” King’s proposals were as unrealistic as MacArthur’s Rabaul adventure. New Guinea meant too much to MacArthur ever to leave it to Nimitz. Meanwhile, the organization of the vast South Pacific Area proceeded steadily. On 11 June King inquired when Sopac could attack ships and bases, to which Ghormley replied he anticipated moving through the unoccupied New Hebrides, Santa Cruz, and the Ellice islands, “As soon as prospect of reinforcement is more favorable.” Ghormley did not actually answer the question. He saw no reason to hurry until he had adequate forces and could supply them.3
In the aftermath of the Midway victory, Nimitz considered where next to deploy his carriers. The Wasp was due in Pearl in early July to restore the number of available flattops to four. As usual Japan’s strongest opposition would come from its carriers, about which Midway prisoner interrogations and Ultra decrypts revealed much. The first-line carriers were the Shōkaku (completing repairs), Zuikaku, Zuihō, Ryūjō, and the new Junyō and Hiyō, in addition to the old Hōshō and converted carrier Kasuga Maru. Nimitz could counter with the Saratoga, Enterprise, Wasp, and Hornet. Aside from the Ranger in the Atlantic and several auxiliary carriers either in service or soon to be commissioned, they were all the flattops the U.S. Navy would have until summer 1943, when the first of the new Essex-class carriers might reach the Pacific.4
To comply with King’s April order, never rescinded, to keep two carriers in the South Pacific until further notice, Nimitz planned for Fletcher to return to the Coral Sea about 15 July. He could thwart any modest advances and also support limited amphibious attacks, such as the recapture of Tulagi. Two carriers would relieve the first pair later in August, but around 20–24 August they could all briefly operate together. On 22 June Nimitz radioed Ghormley (but not King) a brief outline of his plans. “Desire [to] exhaust possibilities of employing striking power [of ] these forces particularly during overlap to eject enemy from such of Solomon–New Guinea–New Britain bases as may be practicable.”5
On 23 June after a brief inspection of Palmyra, Nimitz returned to find a dispatch from Cominch prefaced: “Handle this with the greatest of secrecy.” King finally felt constrained to lay out his own offensive scenario. With British carrier support, MacArthur was to capture Timor “or other suitable place” northwest of Australia. Simultaneously Ghormley, with two of Nimitz’s carriers, would invade Tulagi. “British have been given target date August first.” Thus King struck first with a solid concept. Marshall explained to MacArthur on 24 June that King insisted Tulagi must come before Rabaul, otherwise land-based air posed too great a risk to its ships. That day King detailed the principal invasion forces for “Tulagi and adjacent islands.” Cincpac was to supply at least two carriers and suitable screen, plus two marine fighter and two dive bomber squadrons, in addition to the fighter-equipped marine observation squadron already en route to the South Pacific. Nimitz must arrange for carriers or aircraft transports to deliver these aircraft to the combat area. King suggested the Wasp remain at San Diego to continue carrier-qualifying pilots and later take one marine squadron south. Army planes waiting in Hawaii to reinforce MacArthur would supplement Sopac’s shore-based air contingent. MacArthur’s own air strength in northeast Australia and at Port Moresby would also participate, along with the Australian Squadron (TF-44) and subs. Once the marines took the objectives, King also expected a generous MacArthur to furnish the garrisons to hold them. McCormick’s War Plans Section questioned the availability of the marine squadrons needed for key forward airfields once captured or constructed. Their pilots were not yet carrier qualified and could not land back on board a flattop if necessary. Otherwise the carriers themselves might have to remain in place to provide air cover, not a desirable course of action. Thus, “Because of air difficulty it may not be possible to meet the August 1st date.” However, no airfield existed near enough to Tulagi even to permit marine aviation to join the initial stage of the offensive. That misled Nimitz into thinking their services might not be required immediately.6
As of 24 June only Fletcher’s TF-16 (Enterprise) and Mitscher’s TF-17 (Hornet) were available. The Enterprise’s arresting gear was being strengthened to handle TBFs and the Hornet fitted with CXAM radar. Because Nimitz was to meet King in San Francisco about 1 July, he asked permission to postpone their departure. The delay was vital, because Nimitz hoped to exchange the Saratoga (in Fitch’s TF-11 off Midway) and Wasp (in Noyes’s TF-18 at San Diego) for the Enterprise and Hornet. By that time Fletcher would have TF-11 in place of Fitch. King concurred. On 26 June Nimitz replied that TF-18 would escort the Second Marine Regiment, also at San Diego, to the South Pacific to join the proposed operation. TF-11 would remain at Pearl awaiting developments. King approved these arrangements, but lacking Marshall’s concurrence he had as yet no joint directive. Nimitz was to go ahead with preparations anyway.7
Nimitz advised that Ghormley would exercise overall command of the Tulagi operation, while Fletcher ran the “surface forces made available from fleet,” that is, the carriers, cruisers, and destroyer screens. Yet there was ambiguity regarding the question of command. McCormick wrote on 29 June that Fletcher “will be in tactical command,” but did not say whether just of these forces or the whole operation. Nimitz ordered Noyes to depart San Diego on 1 July. The marine squadrons would remain in Hawaii until their pilots were carrier-trained. “Their employment must await completion of air fields in objective area.” Nimitz understood the “quickest possible construction” of airfields must follow the initial landings, but believed that would need time. Retaining the marine squadrons would have serious consequences, for a suitable airfield did open up during the actual invasion. Fletcher came into the picture on 29 June. Cincpac Op-Ord 34–42 directed TF-11 (Saratoga, three heavy cruisers, six destroyers, and two fleet oilers) to depart Pearl on 5 July for the South Pacific Area to support amphibious operations. Fletcher was to meet Noyes’s TF-18 (Wasp, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, seven destroyers, four transports, and one cargo ship) on 10 July on the equator near Christmas Island and assume tactical command. At the same time Fletcher would pass to the “direct operational control” of Ghormley. More detailed instructions would follow after Nimitz returned from seeing King on the West Coast.8
On 29 June Nimitz and McCormick flew out from Pearl. The conference could not begin before 3 July, and Nimitz anticipated an opportunity to relax with his wife. The next morning while setting down at NAS Alameda, the massive four-engine Sikorsky XPBS-1 flying boat struck a floating log, flipped over, and sank. The copilot died, and most of the passengers were injured, some severely. To the nation’s great good fortune Nimitz sustained only bad bruises and cuts, but McCormick cracked two vertebrae. The implications of having Nimitz killed or incapacitated at that particular moment are staggering. The only likely candidates to replace him at the helm of the Pacific Fleet were Royal Ingersoll, in charge of the Atlantic Fleet, and Ghormley, who was on hand and more familiar with the theater. The Guadalcanal campaign might have ended much differently.9
Nimitz got back to business on 2 July, seeing Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, who had been Cominch assistant chief of staff (plans). King offered his services to Nimitz, suggesting, “Since [Turner] has been intimately involved with developments planned for amphibious operations in South Pacific he might well be employed in that connection.” Nimitz, who did not know Turner well, took the hint and gave him the South Pacific Amphibious Force. A 1908 Annapolis graduate, Turner fell under the spell of naval aviation, earned his wings in 1927 as a JCL commander, and served in several aviation billets. In 1936 while teaching at the Naval War College, he renounced the aviation career path as too restrictive (not “well rounded”), and thus less likely to secure him flag rank. He requested a battleship and in 1938 received the Astoria in Crudiv Six. A tough, bright, even brilliant officer, “Terrible Turner” was also arrogant, abrasive, irascible, and domineering, grasping for power where he had no business. Only strong-willed commanders kept him in check. Fletcher greatly respected Turner, praising him in a 1940 fitness report as “one of the most intelligent and forceful men in the service,” but Turner never dominated their relationship. In October 1940 upon Turner’s departure from the Astoria, Fletcher was overheard while shaking hands to say: “Well, Kelly, we never got along, but you always gave me a good ship.” In 1963 Fletcher told Turner’s biographer George Dyer, “Any Captain who relieved Kelly Turner was in luck. All he would have to do is back off on the thumb screws a bit to have the perfect ship.”10
Turner’s feat of mounting the Sopac amphibious offensive on incredibly short notice set him on course to be among the half-dozen U.S. naval officers most responsible for victory in the Pacific. But Turner—like everyone else—made occasional errors in judgment. According to the distinguished historian Richard B. Frank: “As is often the case with Turner, immediately after a large credit entry in our ledger on his performance, we must add a black mark.” Although admiring Turner’s “bold aggressive leadership,” Gen. Merrill B. Twining recognized his “colossal ego,” in that he “insists he will accept full responsibility for any mistakes he may have made—and then vehemently insists he never made the slightest error.” Such was the case with Turner’s post hoc comments that he knew Pearl Harbor was in danger prior to 7 December 1941. His obsession with projecting an aura of infallibility drove him relentlessly to shade or even misrepresent past events to vindicate his actions and shift blame to others, notably Fletcher.11
Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, circa 1943.
Courtesy of U.S. Navy
On 2 July Turner filled in Nimitz on Cominch’s plan for the “limited amphibious offensive,” about which, as King noted, he knew more than anyone else. The goal was to seize islands that could provide mutually supporting airfields for land planes and suitable seaplane bases. Turner selected unoccupied Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands as the initial objective. It lay 250 miles north of Espíritu Santo in the New Hebrides and 350 miles southeast of Tulagi, the nearest enemy base in the southern Solomons. He particularly valued Ndeni as a forward air base to cover the eastern flank of the Solomons but was unaware of its highly inappropriate terrain. Next would come Tulagi, along with adjacent Florida Island, and, also, eighteen miles south, Lunga Point, located on the part of the coastal plain of north central Guadalcanal best suited for an airfield. Turner also recommended heavily reinforcing Espíritu Santo, the gateway to the Solomons, and occupying Funafuti in the Ellice Islands, eight hundred miles east of Ndeni, to guard the right flank. He was the first to pinpoint Guadalcanal as the major objective. Tiny Tulagi and nearby Florida Island possessed no flat land that could readily be turned into an airfield. Unknown to him, intelligence revealed that the Japanese already started clearing the grassy plain at Lunga Point for a possible “land plane runway.” The development of Guadalcanal as a major air base would seriously endanger hopes for a swift Allied offensive and even threaten Efate and New Caledonia. Once Turner’s part in the Cominch-Cincpac conference ended, he and his staff would stop off at Pearl for briefings before proceeding to Auckland to join Ghormley. On 3 July, learning the conference would not begin until the next day, Nimitz had Spruance delay Fletcher’s departure from Pearl until Turner could reach Pearl. The rendezvous of TF-11 and TF-18 could take place farther south off Tongatabu.12
King and his entourage swept into San Francisco later on 3 July after hammering out a tough compromise with Marshall for the Solomons offensive. Dated 2 July, the “Joint Directive for Offensive Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area” called for the capture of the New Britain, New Ireland, and New Guinea area in three stages. Task One was the seizure of Santa Cruz (Ndeni), Tulagi, and “adjacent positions” about 1 August. Cincpac would designate the commander of Task One, presumably Ghormley. In that connection the boundary between Sopac and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) in the Solomons was to be shifted sixty miles west to longitude 159° east, just west of Guadalcanal. MacArthur’s role in Task One was to interdict “enemy air and naval activities westward of operating area” that is, tie up forces at Rabaul. In turn he would exercise direct command of Task Two (securing the rest of the Solomons and retake Lae and Salamaua on the northeast coast of New Guinea) and Task Three (the capture of Rabaul and surrounding positions). The Joint Chiefs would assign the forces for all three tasks, set the schedule, and determine when overall command would pass from Nimitz to MacArthur. They could also order the withdrawal of naval forces “upon completion of any phase,” should the operation “unduly jeopardize aircraft carriers.” Also the naval task force commander was to retain immediate tactical control of the Amphibious Force during all three tasks. The Joint Chiefs directed Ghormley to visit MacArthur in Melbourne to coordinate planning.13
King led off on 4 July by explaining the Joint Chiefs’ directive. Wary of MacArthur, he emphasized the line of demarcation between SWPA and Sopac was, in his words, no “Chinese Wall,” where naval forces crossing into SWPA automatically came under MacArthur’s control. Nimitz recommended that TF-16 (Enterprise) reinforce TF-11 (Saratoga) and TF-18 (Wasp) in the South Pacific, leaving only TF-17 (Hornet) above the equator. King cautiously agreed. Rear Adm. Randall Jacobs, the chief of Bupers, advised that Fletcher’s promotion to vice admiral was in the works. If necessary he would secure presidential authority for the three stars in advance of the formal notification. Turner summarized plans for the Task One offensive and stressed that the anticipated airfield in the Tulagi area must be operational within one week of the landing. He then took the overnight flight to Pearl.14
Subsequent discussions concerned mainly administrative matters. King released the newly arrived North Carolina from Pye’s TF-1 to TF-16. The first U.S. battleship since the World War I era, the “Show Boat” displaced 44,800 tons at full load with a top speed of twenty-seven knots, wielded nine 16-inch guns, a secondary armament of ten twin mounts of 5-inch dual-purpose guns, and a formidable close-in antiaircraft complement. Set to follow in August were her sister Washington and the South Dakota, first of another class of modern battleships. The gun-club admirals long dreamed of pitting the new battleships against their enemy counterparts, but now it was their speed and antiaircraft that was particularly valued. Envying Yamamoto the fast battleships that often screened his big carriers, Nimitz wanted to see how one of his own could protect his flattops. King again directed him to look into stationing a division of old battleships in the South Pacific. It was another curious example of the surface officer–aviator (King) wanting to fight the old battleships, while the surface officer–submariner (Nimitz) excluded them for the time being. Nimitz believed the old battleships, with their “concentrated powers of destruction,” could still play a vital combat role, but he balked at committing them until their antisubmarine screen was stronger and they possessed adequate air cover against land-based bombers that threatened even carriers.15
Departing San Francisco the evening of 5 July, Nimitz reached Pearl the next morning. In his absence, his own commanders were busy planning the Solomons offensive.
Spruance and Fletcher also read the Joint Chiefs’ directive on 2 July. To the War Plans Section, now temporarily under Captain Steele, the upcoming amphibious assault on Tulagi posed the same risks that Japan faced in June. “As was amply demonstrated at Midway, an attacker who has not neutralized shore-based air in advance is at a great disadvantage.” Should surprise not be achieved, enemy carriers might also counterattack. All the initial objectives lay within the reach of airfields at Rabaul, whose vigorous air search rendered surprise unlikely, as Brown, Fletcher, and Halsey could all attest. Early detection offered the alternative either of “wading on in” with the “hope of getting local air superiority” before being “sunk,” or withdrawing. Much depended on whether MacArthur’s heavy bombers could pummel Rabaul at the right time. Steele opined if that effort were successful, “The task is a cinch.” Otherwise, “We may lose a carrier.”16
On the afternoon of 5 July Turner joined Spruance, Fletcher, Fitch, and Kinkaid at Cincpac headquarters, where he laid out the proposals he previously presented to Nimitz. The airfield on Espíritu Santo must be functioning by 28 July, even if that required borrowing construction gear intended for Guadalcanal. There should be two landing exercises in Fiji beginning about 23 July to rehearse the plan. The Second Marines were to occupy Ndeni about D-2 Day (30 July), after a destroyer reconnoitered the site. MacArthur’s air offensive was to commence on D-2, while Sopac deployed seaplane tenders and PBYs to Ndeni and to Malaita, east of Tulagi, for the essential long-range searches. The main assault would capture Tulagi, Florida Island, and Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. Turner preferred the marines to land after naval gunfire and carrier strikes softened up the beaches. On 5 July in summarizing his plans, the Cincpac Greybook noted, “CVs close in will provide fighter coverage (about three days) and will dive bomb defended positions before the landing.” Turner’s views prevailed. On 6 July Nimitz submitted his outline to Ghormley, tactfully describing it as merely a suggested course of action reached after consultation with Fletcher and the Cincpac staff. TF-16 (Enterprise) would proceed south in addition to the Wasp and Saratoga. Even TF-17 (Hornet) might eventually participate. The overall operation the Cincpac staff charmingly dubbed “Pestilence.” Task One was “Watchtower,” the rehearsal “Dovetail,” and the occupation of Ndeni, “Huddle.” Tulagi was “Ringbolt” and Guadalcanal, immortally, “Cactus.” Nimitz ordered Fletcher’s TF-11 (plus the Vincennes) to depart Pearl at 0800 on 7 July, two days later than originally intended. On the way he was to conduct a full-scale air and shore bombardment exercise on the island of Hawaii. Transport Division Twelve (four APDs) would accompany TF-11, then proceed directly to Nouméa to embark the First Marine Raider Battalion. Nimitz rescheduled the rendezvous with Noyes to 19 July three hundred miles west of Tongatabu. Ghormley would take direct control of both task forces on 10 July as previously planned.17
Admiral Fletcher receiving the DSM from Admiral Nimitz, 6 July 1942.
Courtesy of American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming-Laramie
Turner later claimed Fletcher was “very much opposed in Pearl Harbor to undertaking the attempt against Guadalcanal, as he felt sure that it would be a failure.” If indeed Fletcher was so vehemently pessimistic as Turner subsequently alleged, one wonders why Nimitz did not simply replace him. Fletcher was not one to dissemble. Nimitz certainly knew what he thought about the prospects of success in the Solomons. Thus Fletcher may not have been as gloomy as Turner later charged. “Nimitz gave me the impression,” Fletcher wrote in 1947, “that the landing force would be ashore in two days and could dig in and accept air attack.” He could certainly accept that scenario. He recalled in 1963 that Nimitz again invoked the restrictions placed on the carriers for the Battle of Midway that demanded they were not to be risked in situations where they could not inflict comparable damage to the enemy.18
During the afternoon of 6 July Nimitz took Fletcher aside and surprised him by producing a U.S. Navy DSM and citation that read: “For exceptionally meritorious service as Task Force Commander, United States Pacific Fleet. In that position of great responsibility he exercised command of his Task Force with marked skill and resourcefulness, as a result of which heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy in the Coral Sea in May, 1942, and again, off Midway Island in June, 1942.” Nimitz had hoped to decorate the two Midway commanders at the same time, with a formal parade in dress whites and all the flourishes, but Spruance’s award had not arrived. If Fletcher was going to get his decoration before he left for battle, it had to be then. Unfortunately that private ceremony in Cincpac’s office marked all the official acclaim Fletcher ever received for Coral Sea and Midway. He knew his promotion to vice admiral was in the works, but Nimitz could not say when. Dinner that evening included, in addition to Nimitz and Fletcher, Fletcher’s good friend and classmate Vice Adm. William L. Calhoun (Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet, or Comserforpac), Spruance, Turner, Murray, and Col. Melvin J. Maas, fresh from Washington. After a pleasant time Fletcher returned to the Saratoga and made ready to sail next morning for the Solomons.19
Although Fletcher was CTF-16 for two weeks, the Enterprise, in dock the whole time, was just a mailing address. On 1 July the Comcrupac staff and flag complement filed back on board the Saratoga to run TF-11. Cdr. Butch Schindler, the staff gunnery officer, now ranked next after Capt. Spence Lewis, following the departure of Cdr. Gerry Galpin, the operations officer. In late June Galpin exchanged billets with Cdr. Charles O. Humphreys, the Minneapolis executive officer. A genial, stocky Marylander, Owen Humphreys (USNA 1922) was a noted athlete who qualified in submarines. A senior staff member called him “very able, positive; [with] unusual ability; aggressive.” Galpin, like Lewis and Buckmaster, later received the DSM for the victories of Coral Sea and Midway, and Schindler was awarded the Navy Cross for his Coral Sea combat missions. Cdr. Sam Latimer, Lt. Cdr. Alexander Thorington, Lt. Cdr. Harry Smith, and Lt. Cdr. Charles Brooks retained their jobs of flag secretary, assistant operations officer, flag lieutenant, and radio officer respectively. After Midway Fletcher brought Lt. Cdr. Oscar Pederson (USNA 1926), the former Yorktown Air Group leader, on his staff as air operations officer. That formalized the arrangement for aviation expertise that he forged on board the Yorktown. A new radio intelligence team led by Lt. Gilven Slonim (USNA 1936) reported as well. Slonim served ably in the Enterprise with Halsey and with Spruance at Midway. There were now five communication watch officers, and CSM Demps Gordy handled visual communications. The enlisted flag complement and marine detachment remained largely intact.20
The most unusual addition to the TF-11 staff was another aviator, forty-four-year-old Col. Melvin J. Maas, Marine Corps Reserve, who happened to be a serving Republican congressman from Minneapolis. A World War I veteran first elected to the House in 1926, Mel Maas received a Carnegie Medal for talking a crazed gunman in the Capitol into giving up his weapon. As ranking minority member on the House Naval Affairs Committee, he worked closely with Carl Vinson, the powerful Democratic chairman from Georgia, to pass the bills that brought about the two-ocean navy. A strong proponent of naval rearmament, particularly aviation, Maas fostered the expansion of the Marine Corps Reserve. He led a marine reserve aviation squadron in the 1930s and spent part of the summer of 1941 with Halsey in the Enterprise and at Midway analyzing patrol plane operations. In May 1942 Maas secured a leave of absence from Congress. Lt. Gen. Thomas Holcomb, the commandant of the Marine Corps, requested Maas be attached to the Cincpac staff. Nimitz responded he would be “delighted.” An eager if not particularly skillful pilot, the burly, rotund, cigar-smoking raconteur was not only a well-connected politician, but he was also much liked. Maas’s official title on Fletcher’s staff was simply, “Marine Officer.” He proved a sharp observer, keen opponent at darts, and ultimately an unusual ally. His contemporary notes, hitherto unknown to historians, are invaluable for understanding the background of the Guadalcanal campaign.21
The Sara’s flag quarters were situated port side forward on the main deck, one deck below the flight deck. There Fletcher had the usual commodious stateroom and pantry, along with a guest cabin and six cabins for his senior staff officers. Capt. Duke Ramsey’s suite was located to starboard, opposite the flag quarters. After the Sara sailed he relinquished these lavish in-port quarters to a grateful Maas and stayed in his sea cabin on the navigating bridge in the remodeled island. The Saratoga’s flag bridge was one level up from the navigating bridge, where a screened platform neatly surrounded flag plot and adjacent admiral’s sea cabin. The open sky forward position perched on the roof of the flag bridge in place of the large fighting top cut away during the recent refit. Lookouts shared that space with the big Mark 37 gunnery director and FD fire control radar array. The denizens of sky forward soon discovered if they leaned over the rail, they could misuse their powerful binoculars to look over Fletcher’s shoulder as he sat outside in his swivel chair reading his dispatches. They enjoyed their unique access to inside information until the gunnery officer, Lt. Cdr. Fremont B. Eggers, happened, while snooping, to drop his helmet onto the admiral. Embarrassed to have to go down to the flag bridge to retrieve his tin pot, Eggers categorically ordered sky forward cease the eavesdropping. That was unfortunate because they were participating in one of the pivotal actions of the Pacific War.22
The morning of 7 July Fletcher’s TF-11 snaked through the confined channel from Pearl Harbor to the open sea. Six destroyers of Desron One fanned out on alert for lurking I-boats. Capt. Samuel B. Brewer now ran Desron One and TG-11.4. He knew Fletcher well, having served with him in 1918 in the old Benham. Cdr. Hugh W. Hadley’s Transport Division Twelve joined the screen. Traveling empty, his four APDs, former four-piper destroyers, hitched a ride south. Rear Adm. Carleton Wright’s TG-11.2 emerged next. Flagship Minneapolis, New Orleans, and Astoria were Crudiv Six stalwarts, while the Vincennes came out in March 1942 with the Hornet task force. Flamboyant Saratoga, sole unit of Captain Ramsey’s TG-11.5, was the star of the show, but the ponderous afterguard of fleet oilers Platte and Cimarron (Capt. Ralph H. Henkle’s TG-11.6) disclosed to sharp observers that this task force had an ocean to cross and might not return soon. Indeed these seventeen ships were the first to set out from Hawaii for the six months of hell of the Guadalcanal campaign. Five remained in the Solomons forever; three, ripped open by torpedoes, eventually limped back for repairs. On 8 July during air and gunnery exercises, aerial bombs and heavy shells thudded into unoffending Cape Kahae near the southeast tip of Hawaii. That afternoon Fletcher headed southwest at fifteen knots to rendezvous on 19 July with Noyes west of Tongatabu.23
The night of 8 July Fletcher copied the radio summary of Nimitz’s directive designating Ghormley task force commander for Task One. Ghormley was to “seize and occupy Santa Cruz Islands Tulagi and adjacent positions” about 1 August. Nimitz provided TF-11 under Vice Admiral Fletcher (the first time his impending promotion was noted), TF-16 (Rear Admiral Kinkaid), TF-18 (Rear Admiral Noyes), additional marine forces, including aviation, and several support ships. TF-44 (now under Rear Adm. Victor A. C. Crutchley, RN, who relieved Rear Adm. John Crace in June) was to come east from Australia. Nimitz also arranged logistical support. In addition to the Platte and Cimarron with TF-11, the Kaskaskia would leave Pearl about 20 July. The old oiler Kanawha, already in the South Pacific, was to fuel TF-18, then advance to Nouméa. To keep the fleet oilers filled, the chartered tankers Mobilube and W. C. Yeager would haul 225,000 barrels from San Pedro to Nouméa around 22 July. Two others (the Esso Little Rock and E. J. Henry) were to reach Nouméa on 2 August with a similar load. Nimitz reserved the option to divert those chartered tankers to Samoa, Tongatabu, Fiji, or New Zealand as necessary. Thereafter he expected to make three such deliveries per month and offered aviation gasoline and other needed stores for the Pacific Fleet task forces as requested. Nimitz also advised that he “may from time to time issue further instructions in connection this operation.” He affirmed his “full confidence” in Ghormley’s “ability to carry this operation to successful conclusion.”24
The two TF-11 oilers replenished the destroyers and APDs on 12 July on the equator between Christmas and Canton islands. Nimitz advised Ghormley, Fletcher, and Noyes that Kinkaid’s TF-16 would sail from Pearl on 15 July with the Enterprise, battleship North Carolina, heavy cruiser Portland, light cruiser Atlanta, and seven destroyers. TF-16 was to reach Tongatabu on the twenty-fourth, where fuel would be waiting courtesy of the Kanawha and Mobilube, which Nimitz redirected there in place of Nouméa. Unfortunately it soon looked as if only two carriers might actually be available for Watchtower after all. On the evening of 13 July as TF-11 approached Samoa, Fletcher learned that the Wasp suffered a serious mechanical casualty to her starboard high-pressure turbine, “Evidenced by loud scraping noise even at lowest speeds.” The Wasp could make fifteen knots on her port engine. If it became necessary to lift the rotor to effect repairs, Noyes recommended taking her into Tongatabu, some twelve hundred miles southeast. Repairs should take about four days, with the help of the destroyer tender Whitney. Nimitz worried he might have to replace TF-18 with TF-17 (Hornet), which he planned to keep near Pearl. The lack of defending aircraft rendered even Hawaii vulnerable to a sudden carrier strike.25
On 15 July Ghormley postponed Dog-Day from 1 August tentatively to 7 August and set the Fiji rehearsals (Dovetail) for 27 July. He later cited the tardy arrival of the transports at Wellington and problems in handling their cargo due to bad weather. The delay was probably inevitable given the rushed preparations but risky if the enemy swiftly committed additional forces to the Solomons. On 16 July Fletcher released Transport Division (Transdiv) Twelve southwest to Nouméa. He awaited the rest of his force west of Tongatabu before commencing the offensive in the Solomons. Confirmation came of his promotion to vice admiral. Impatient with the delay in Washington, Nimitz again requested King and Jacobs allow Fletcher to assume that rank “at once.” King confirmed Fletcher’s promotion, to rank from 26 June. Thus Fletcher got his three stars as the navy’s seventeenth vice admiral. That promotion cleared up any question of his seniority, particularly over Noyes.26
The radio summary of Ghormley’s Sopac Op-Plan 1–42 that Fletcher received the evening of 16 July both pleased and puzzled him. In addition to TF-18, he received tactical command of TF-16, but unexpectedly also of nearly everything else in Watchtower. Ghormley divided the South Pacific Force into two task forces: Fletcher’s TF-61, the Expeditionary Force, and Rear Adm. John McCain’s TF-63, Shore Based Air. TF-61 comprised the three carrier task forces (11, 16, and 18), Turner’s whole Amphibious Force (TF-62), and Crutchley’s TF-44. In turn McCain’s aircraft, supported by a few seaplane tenders, would conduct long-range searches and limited air strikes. The operations plan tasked MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific air force to “interdict” Japanese forces to westward of Tulagi and Guadalcanal and reconnoiter the Solomons “as arranged” by McCain. U.S. subs from Australia and Pearl would, it was hoped, intercept ships off Rabaul and Truk. Fletcher was to supervise the Watchtower rehearsals in Fiji about 27 July, seizure of the Tulagi area “and adjoining portion Guadalcanal” on D-Day (7 August) and construction of an airfield, the occupation of Ndeni soon afterward, and finally the defense of the lodgment “until relieved.” In addition to conducting normal searches, McCain was to “cover approach and operations in Tulagi area by scouting,” execute air strikes, “render aircraft support on call,” and “initiate patrol plane scouting from Ndeni by D-2 Day and from Malaita on Dog Day.”27
Ghormley desired the “interested commanders” to confer regarding the coordination of “air activities.” About D-5 day he expected to move Sopac headquarters to Nouméa and break his flag in the old fleet auxiliary Argonne coming south from Pearl. The written version of the Sopac operations plan, copies of which would be dropped off at Tongatabu for Fletcher, Noyes, and Kinkaid, would treat logistics, communications, and intelligence, but it offered no additional insights into how Ghormley expected to accomplish the mission. He simply placed “the senior officer present of the naval forces which were made available to me” in “tactical command of the operation.” It was a just a matter of telling Fletcher and McCain “what to do, not how to do it,” which was what Nimitz did to him. Surprised to be handed virtually the whole show in the Solomons, Fletcher explained on 27 July to Rear Adm. Daniel J. Callaghan, Sopac chief of staff, that he was pleased with the additional responsibility, but he had thought Ghormley was going to exercise personal command.28
Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, 1942.
Courtesy of National Archives (80-G-12864)
Ghormley’s hands-off attitude toward Watchtower has yet to be explained. He did not participate in the preliminary planning either in Washington or Pearl. Nimitz did describe the outline he presented merely as a suggestion, implying Ghormley could alter the plan if he desired. The tight time schedule could justify Ghormley’s reluctance to make major changes, but his diffidence perhaps originated from the earlier controversy over the nature of the Pacific command. In early April Nimitz urged that for the time being Cincpac retain direct control over carrier task forces in the South Pacific Area, instead of turning them over to Comsopac. King concurred but made it clear during the first San Francisco conference that when the South Pacific offensive finally came to pass, Ghormley would be subject only to broad policy directives from above. Clearly by the end of June Nimitz understood Ghormley must come into his own in Sopac. So apparently did Ghormley, who later explained: “I appreciated I had no naval forces whatever under my direct command, except such forces from the Pacific Fleet that might be sent into the area from time to time.” Yet, “During the time these fleet units were in the South Pacific Area they were to be under my tactical command” (Ghormley’s emphasis). However, Nimitz’s 8 July letter of instructions for Task One (Watchtower) directed Ghormley, “Exercise strategic command in person in the operating area which is interpreted initially to be the New Caledonia–New Hebrides area.” If, as it seems, Nimitz had not meant to discourage Ghormley from taking an active role in executing Watchtower, he erred badly by using the words “strategic command in person.” There is every reason to believe the Nimitz desired Ghormley to have tactical as well as strategic command in Sopac. He couched all recent orders turning over the Pacific Fleet task forces to Sopac in terms that preserved Ghormley’s prerogatives. Ghormley could have requested clarification from Nimitz regarding that apparent oxymoron and thereby confirmed his greater personal control.29
Perhaps another factor behind Ghormley’s reluctance concerned his feelings toward the Watchtower plan. When he first heard of it on 26 June, his “immediate mental estimate of the situation was that we were far from ready to start any offensive.” An observer described him as “flabbergasted,” as indeed was everyone. On 8 July Ghormley and MacArthur jointly offered King and Nimitz their opinion of the offensive. Available ground troops were “adequate” for all three tasks, if not the shipping needed to transport and supply them. The real problem was aviation, both the land and carrier-based. Task One required the Amphibious Force and supporting carriers to linger in the target area from thirty-six hours to four days, “Where they will be outside the range of any supporting air and exposed to continued hostile air surface and submarine attacks.” Yet MacArthur’s air strength was insufficient to deter Japan from massing air and naval strength against Tulagi. The carriers “will be themselves exposed to attack by land based air while unprotected by our land based aviation,” making it “extremely doubtful that they will be able to furnish fighters escort to the transport area, especially should hostile naval forces approach.” Surprise was “improbable” due to “the depth of the existing hostile reconnaissance.”30
Having reached their conclusions “independently” and “confirmed” them in person at Melbourne, MacArthur and Ghormley recommended that Task One be postponed. To go ahead “without a reasonable assurance of adequate air coverage during each phase” meant “the gravest risk.” The recent enemy defeat at Coral Sea and Midway perfectly demonstrated what could befall an amphibious offensive that lacked proper preparation. Unless the Allies could assault Rabaul almost at the outset—and they lacked the strength for such an audacious move—Japan could rush planes and ships to the Solomons in such numbers to “expose the initial attacking elements to the danger of destruction by overwhelming force.” Therefore Task One should be “deferred pending the further development of force” to enable all three tasks to take place “in one continuous movement.” In the meantime Ghormley would strengthen the New Hebrides and occupy the Santa Cruz Islands, while MacArthur accelerated airfield construction in eastern New Guinea. Some details regarding the offensive plan might change after input from the Amphibious Force and carrier force commanders, “who have not yet arrived,” but not the overall gloomy assessment. At that juncture Ghormley indicated no desire to give the “carrier force commander” tactical command of the entire landing operation.
King brooked no delay of Task One. Now was not the time for such extreme caution. King himself exuded confidence all three tasks would proceed quickly and smoothly. Armed with the approval of the Joint Chiefs, he emphasized to Ghormley, MacArthur, and Nimitz that Watchtower must proceed as planned before the enemy could consolidate his hold on the Solomons. Nimitz was providing a third carrier and thirty-five B-17s from Pearl, and the flow of replacement planes would be accelerated. Ghormley realized any unjustified delay meant summary relief. “Considering recent known disposition hostile forces,” he declared on 12 July, “I consider means now prospectively available [to] Sopac sufficient for accomplishment [of ] Task One.” However, the caveat was MacArthur must have “sufficient means for interdiction hostile aircraft activities based on New Britain–New Guinea–Northern Solomons Area.” The “basic problem of this operation is the protection of surface ships against land-based aircraft during the approach, the landing and the unloading.” Much later Ghormley stoutly defended his original proposal to postpone the offensive. Thus when he turned over tactical command of most of Watchtower to Fletcher, he certainly had strong misgivings about the general plan. Someone unsympathetic might conclude Ghormley, in essence, said to King and Nimitz: If you do not agree with my estimate of the situation, then your man can run the show. Yet it is also important to note why Ghormley was so concerned: the threat of land-based aviation. In that light it seems logical he might want to accord the carrier commander the flexibility to meet the threat, or to withdraw if things got too hot for the flattops.31
On 2 August Ghormley explained to Nimitz, “[In] an operation such as we are undertaking, the strategic control has to be where communications are as perfect as possible. The modern Commander under such conditions can not be on a ship at sea where radio silence prevails and where his forces are so scattered that his vision is entirely dependent upon communications.” Thus Ghormley’s reluctance to exercise direct command perhaps resulted from his concern his communications were indeed far from “perfect.” The need for radio silence meant he often would only have “his operation order and some guessing” on which to base his picture of “tactical dispositions.” However, he failed to fathom that those precise conditions also applied to Fletcher, except that Fletcher was even more handicapped than his boss, in that he could not even freely transmit messages of his own without the risk of giving away his position.32
In truth Ghormley placed Fletcher in a difficult situation. Normally the officer in tactical command was in ready touch with all major elements. After the Battle of the Coral Sea, Fletcher and others proposed the top operational commander coordinate things from ashore, where he would likely be better informed of the overall picture than in a carrier. He could issue orders at will without worrying about disclosing his presence. However if Fletcher stayed in the Saratoga, the requirement of radio silence would make it nearly impossible to manage his suddenly enhanced command. At the same time his physical separation isolated him from the planning process. The Naval War College analysis of the Battle of Savo Island, written by Commodore Bates and Cdr. Walter D. Innis, noted how later wartime experience favored the “Supreme Tactical Commander” riding a heavy cruiser, from where he could operate with the Amphibious Force during the landings or join the covering force should enemy forces appear. Yet they approved the decision to give the whole Expeditionary Force to Fletcher, even though he was “the only combat trained carrier task force commander within the command.” Instead, “it was felt that it was more important to retain him within the carriers than to give him the freedom of action to go where he desired,” that is, with the Amphibious Force, the real “scene of action.” That was pure hindsight. Both Ghormley and Fletcher fully anticipated attacks on the carriers, with plenty of “action.” No one dreamed the Japanese would fail to find the carriers not only before, but also during the landings.33
Bates and Innis revealed their complete misunderstanding of the role of Fletcher’s carriers. Pederson, the TF-61 air staff officer, explained in a 1944 lecture, “The overall mission of the carriers was twofold: first, to furnish air support for the assault, and second, and subsequently, to prevent any large scale attempt by the Japanese to retake Guadalcanal.” Fletcher certainly expected a big carrier battle either during or soon after the landing phase. He remained with the carriers not simply by choice, but from necessity. Perhaps had Nimitz known and approved of Ghormley’s command structure, he would have sent Fletcher south along with Turner to oversee the detailed planning. In that case he would have had to name another flag officer as CTF-11 and entrust the striking force to the inexperienced Noyes. That he was reluctant to do.34
In the halcyon days of late May, the Naval General Staff looked forward, after the certain decisive victory at Midway, to shifting the focus to the Southeast Area. A four-pronged offensive in early July would start in New Caledonia to enable land-based air to seal off the northern Coral Sea. Soon afterward, Port Moresby would fall to another seaborne assault. Finally, the fall of Fiji and Samoa (the FS Operation) would complete the isolation of Australia. Later that year Combined Fleet could start carving up the Hawaiian Islands. Midway dealt a terrible blow to those grandiose ambitions. Not only did losing the four elite carriers substantially reduce the carrier fleet, but the destruction of so many planes also caused a chronic shortage for the entire IJN that Japan’s low aircraft production scarcely alleviated. The situation was only a little less gloomy with regard to trained naval aircrews, of whom the air command likewise produced insufficient numbers to man fully all the existing units, not to mention future expansion.
The Midway fiasco forced a complete reevaluation of strategy. On 11 June Imperial General Headquarters postponed the FS Operation for two months. In the meantime Seventeenth Army was to assault Port Moresby by land via the north coast of Papua (the RI Operation). Base Air Force would serve as the “mainspring” of a gradual advance toward Samoa. Concentrated air power at Tulagi and Guadalcanal would first support the capture of Efate, then leapfrog to New Caledonia and Fiji, and finally Samoa. On 17 June the high command instituted the SN Operation (“Solomons–New Guinea”). Lunga Point on Guadalcanal was to be ready by mid August for twenty-seven fighters and twenty-seven medium bombers, and within a month forty-five fighters and sixty medium bombers. The first substantial force reached Guadalcanal on 1 July. In turn, the main SN convoy left Truk on 29 June, but false fears of U.S. intervention delayed its arrival until 6 July. Its nearly twenty-six hundred naval pioneers, guarded by about 250 troops, erected an elaborate camp at Lunga and laid out the nearby airfield and an associated dummy airstrip to confuse Allied bombers.35
On 11 July Imperial General Headquarters formally canceled the FS Operation. For the time being the Indian Ocean, rather than the Pacific, looked more promising in an expanded raiding effort against British commerce by cruisers and destroyers based out of Burma. On 14 July the IJN underwent major reorganization. Vice Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō, commanding Base Air Force, took over the South Seas Area, now divided into an Inner South Seas Force (Inoue’s Fourth Fleet) and Outer South Seas Force (Eighth Fleet) under Vice Adm. Mikawa Gunichi. That gave Mikawa direct control of naval operations in New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomons. His surface force comprised the heavy cruiser Chōkai and the familiar 6th and 18th Cruiser Divisions. In August the fighters, medium bombers, and flying boats of the 6th Air Attack Force (26th Air Flotilla) were to shift from the homeland to the Solomons, while the 5th Air Attack Force concentrated on New Guinea. Seventeenth Army headed to Rabaul to organize the land assault on Port Moresby. Its first phase involved the establishment of a supply base and airfield at Buna on the north coast of Papua. Troops would push south from Buna through the forbidding Owen Stanley mountains and threaten Port Moresby from the north. When the navy finally controlled the northern Coral Sea, Mikawa would also execute another amphibious attack on Port Moresby. The lead convoy reached Buna on 21 July. Ships filtered additional men and supplies to Buna, while troops marched rapidly south to Kokoda in the midst of the mountains.36
The Pestilence offensive against the Solomons, New Guinea, and New Britain, of which the Watchtower assault on Tulagi and Guadalcanal was only the first phase, arose because MacArthur, King, and Nimitz believed the way was open to seize the stronghold of Rabaul. Watchtower would initiate the grand Allied counteroffensive to win the Pacific War. However in July, while Ghormley assembled his far flung forces, Japanese fortunes rebounded to the extent that they would soon consolidate their defense of the Solomons. Radio intelligence and air reconnaissance picked up numerous hints presaging an enemy advance in New Guinea and outward from the Solomons. On 13 July MacArthur cautioned that a “major advanced air operating base” on Guadalcanal would threaten Efate and northwestern New Caledonia. On the ninteenth the Cincpac War Plans Section told Nimitz: “It is now a race to see whether or not we can kick [Japan] out in time, and with present forces.” MacArthur did not seem as concerned about New Guinea, where the building of an airfield at Buna in mid August was to inaugurate Task Two of Pestilence. The sudden Japanese occupation of Buna proved a particularly unpleasant surprise. Little did MacArthur grasp he now faced a bitter campaign in rugged mountains and deep jungles where the enemy would drive within twenty miles of Port Moresby. Nimitz demonstrated more prescience. On 17 July he warned King, “It is unsafe to assume that the enemy will not exert every effort to recover the positions we may take from him.” If Washington did not strongly support the offensive by “a steady flow of replacements” of troops and aircraft from the United States, “Not only will we be unable to proceed with Tasks Two and Three,” but also, “we may be unable even to hold what we have taken.”37
