On 21 September Fletcher’s flagship Saratoga eased into her mooring at Pearl. Across the channel the Enterprise occupied a repair berth, while dry dock number 2 beckoned the wounded Sara. Fletcher explained to Nimitz the misfortunes that occurred on his watch as CTF-61: maiming of one carrier in a puzzling battle and a second torpedoed by a sub, plus the little he knew of the Savo debacle. The debriefing took place in Cincpac’s new headquarters perched on Makalapa Hill north of the harbor. The bright, breezy office reflected Nimitz’s cheerful personality, a welcome tonic that boosted Fletcher’s spirits. So did word that while the Saratoga was being repaired at Pearl he would go home for two weeks, then spend two weeks of temporary duty in Washington with Cominch. In early September, King and Nimitz had discussed possible temporary jobs for Fletcher in Washington. Nimitz ordered Fletcher to be back at Pearl by early November to take TF-11 with the restored Saratoga down to the South Pacific. Fletcher told Nimitz, “He felt fine and was ready for further operations.” Nimitz accepted him at his word. Fletcher must have spoken persuasively. A photo taken at that time shows he lost weight and appeared tired, if not haggard, due to the incredible strain he endured not only at Guadalcanal, but also the preceding eight months.1
Contrary to general belief, Fletcher’s return to Pearl did not spell the end of his carrier command. He remained Commander, Cruisers, Pacific Fleet, and CTF-11. Other widespread changes in command did occur in his absence. The big amalgamation of the carriers and patrol wings finally came to pass on 1 September, when Fitch became Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet. He was only a fill-in for Halsey, who reported for duty in Washington on 29 August after extended medical leave. The San Francisco conference derailed that succession. King looked to jettison prickly Rear Adm. John Towers as chief of Buaer. His solution was to pack Towers off to Nimitz as Commander, Aircraft, Pacific Fleet (Comairpac) in the rank of vice admiral, while McCain relieved Towers at Buaer. McCain in turn was to hand off Aircraft, South Pacific Force, to Fitch, an equally tough fighter but a better administrator. Nimitz now desired Halsey, whom he found well rested and fit, to resume his post as senior Pacific Fleet task force commander. Halsey would spell Fitch as Comairpac until Towers could arrive in mid October, then take TF-16 with the repaired Enterprise to Sopac. That arrangement put Kinkaid out of a job, but Nimitz, who thought well of him, already had another billet in mind. On 15 September Nimitz used the occasion of an award ceremony on the deck of the Big E to announce Halsey’s return to the fleet. Spruance received his DSM for Midway and Kinkaid a DSM for leading the TF-11 cruisers in the Battle of the Coral Sea.2
Vice Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher, 17 September 1942. “He did appear to be in good shape except for a slightly strained expression about the eyes, which you have become so accustomed to seeing in the eyes of others returning from active operations” (Admiral McCain describing Fletcher to Admiral Nimitz, 30 September 1942).
Courtesy of Cdr. Samuel E. Latimer Jr.
Nimitz departed Pearl on 24 September to consult Ghormley and other key commanders and personally unravel just what befell Sopac. While laying over at Palmyra, he encountered McCain and Fletcher’s old associate Col. Mel Maas winging north. When asked about Noyes, McCain replied he was “all right, just suffering a little from the blast.” Nimitz then remarked of Fletcher: “We are going to give him a ‘blow’ (rest) on the mainland.” McCain responded: “I was going to write to you about him, but I didn’t. Two or three of these fights are enough for any one man. A rest will do him good.” Maas opined Fletcher was very tired and needed time to recover. Nimitz asked McCain to sound out Fletcher as to how he felt and to report back to him.3
Unaware his fate was being discussed, Fletcher closed up shop on 27 September and released the Comcrupac staff and flag complement on leave.4 That afternoon he and Spence Lewis joined McCain on the overnight flight to NAS Alameda. From there Fletcher and Lewis were fly commercial air to Washington, while McCain stopped off in San Diego before resuming his trip to the same destination. The long hop from Oahu to the West Coast gave “Slew” McCain ample opportunity to converse at length with his old classmate and friend. On 30 September as promised McCain wrote Nimitz from San Diego:
I talked with Fletcher. He said he was very concerned and very apprehensive as to the location and character of service of his task group, both before the hit and until arrival at Pearl, also very tired. He added that he was in good shape and rested now and after a little leave would be ready to go again. He did appear to be in good shape except for a slightly strained expression about the eyes, which you have become so accustomed to seeing in the eyes of others returning from active operations. I told him that he should not ask to go on another detail until he felt at his best; that he owed that both to himself and to the job. He thought this over for awhile and said, “You are right, I will take as long a leave as I can get, and if I feel my best will ask to go again and I am sure I will.” I feel he should be taken at his word.
From this Nimitz finally grasped that Fletcher merited the same sensitive consideration afforded Halsey in his long recovery, for the very good reason that Fletcher bore the same intense pressure much longer. Nimitz understood the vital need to rest senior commanders as well as junior officers and planned a “recuperation center for flag officers” on Oahu. His own efforts to relieve stress, such as comfortable quarters and congenial housemates, pistol shooting range and horseshoe pitch, paid dividends by increasing his own stamina.5
Nimitz returned to Pearl on 5 October after a long and exciting trip to the South Pacific. It included an inspiring overnight stay on Guadalcanal with Vandegrift—something for which Ghormley never found the time. He came back imbued with the belief Guadalcanal could be held if everyone showed sufficient fortitude. One shining example of that cardinal virtue was Bill Halsey, whose presence in Sopac was vital. Nimitz decided to send him south ahead of TF-16. He wrote Ghormley on 8 October that Halsey and Spruance would reach Nouméa around 16 October, the same day TF-16 (Enterprise) left Pearl under Kinkaid’s temporary command. Nimitz assured Ghormley, “Halsey will report to you for duty and be subject to your operational control for so long as he is in your area.” He could “confer face to face with Halsey on the many problems that will confront the two of you in the weeks ahead,” an opportunity never accorded Fletcher. Once TF-16 arrived, Halsey would shift to the Enterprise as “senior Pacific Fleet task force commander afloat.” Kinkaid, “who is now an experienced carrier task force commander,” would, when relieved as CTF-16, take over TF-17 in the Hornet in Murray’s place. The Enterprise and Hornet were slated for new captains, but Arthur Davis and Charles Mason (both selected for rear admiral) would not be detached until “the newcomers are sufficiently familiar with the situation.” The Saratoga would also have another skipper, but Duke Ramsey (likewise awaiting two stars) would remain “until his relief is ready.” Nimitz further explained, “Fletcher is expected back in time to take T.F.11 down to your area, probably in early November. If, by any chance, Fletcher does not return, [Rear Admiral Frederick] Sherman is expected to be available for this task force.” Ted Sherman, former captain of the Lexington, served as a deputy Cominch chief of staff since early June, but Nimitz just discovered he was now available for a carrier command. The rest of the 8 October letter contained surprisingly trenchant criticism (for Nimitz) of Comsopac’s recent decisions to retain TF-17 at sea instead of safely in harbor and not bring the battleship Washington forward from Tongatabu. Nimitz’s patience neared its end. “In closing let me again urge you to take such calculated risks as may be warranted in order to continue the attrition which we are now inflicting on the enemy’s sea and air forces.”6
On 12 October Nimitz informed King that he knew of Sherman’s prospective orders to report to Cincpac for duty and of King’s intention for him to relieve Murray as CTF-17. The ax was about to fall for George Murray, after both King and Nimitz independently decided on his removal. Nimitz advised he already earmarked Kinkaid to replace Murray after Halsey took over TF-16. “Inasmuch as Sherman’s movements could not conveniently be speeded up in time to relieve Murray before Kinkaid could relieve him, I propose to adhere to my previous plan to have Kinkaid relieve Murray. After Sherman reports I will employ him as commander of the first available Task Force.” That might be Fletcher’s TF-11, for Nimitz explained:
When Fletcher returned to Pearl from the south, he stated that he felt fine and was ready for further operations. Subsequently Colonel Maas informed me at Palmyra that Fletcher had indicated he was tired and needed a rest. I asked McCain to talk to Fletcher on this subject on their way to the Mainland. McCain has informed me that he believed Fletcher will be ready for service again at sea after his present rest. If he is in all respects ready to return to sea duty when the Saratoga is ready in early November, I will be glad to have him. If you feel that Fletcher needs a longer period of rest, I suggest that he be retained ashore in some capacity, in which case I propose to use Sherman as task force commander of the Saratoga task force.
Nimitz said nothing about Fletcher’s permanent removal from the carriers. Instead he wanted Fletcher back when fully fit and trusted King to follow through as they personally agreed the month before in San Francisco.7
The same was not true for the unlucky Leigh Noyes, a pariah after the fiery loss of the Wasp. In the 12 October letter to King, Nimitz described Noyes as a “spare flag officer,” who was to step in as Comairpac in the brief interval (ultimately only one day) between Halsey’s departure for Sopac and the arrival of Towers from Washington. Afterward Noyes was to report to Towers for duty. However, “If Noyes can be employed advantageously elsewhere,” King should do so, “because I will have Ramsay [sic] and Mason as spare flag officers when they are relieved of their commands.” Obviously Nimitz had no thought of returning Noyes to carrier command, but Cominch’s idea of “advantageous employment” turned out to be the Pacific Coast Section of the Board of Inspection and Survey. Nimitz wrote home on 27 October that Noyes “will probably hate me for it but I didn’t pick the job.” In 1949 King observed that Noyes “had a very good chance” in the South Pacific, “but missed it.” However, the 1943 investigation of the loss of the Wasp exonerated Noyes and Forrest Sherman, leading Nimitz to declare that Noyes’s decisions were “justified” and that no one was to incur blame. Nevertheless Noyes spent the balance of the war in the Board of Inspection and Survey, succeeding as president in March 1945. He retired in 1946 as a rear admiral, with no recognition for his combat service. Forrest Sherman, a rising star, thought that was unjust. In 1950 when he was chief of naval operations, he arranged for his old boss to be advanced to vice admiral on the retired list. A grateful Noyes replied: “Thanks so much for your efforts in my behalf, without which I am sure it would never had gotten through.”8
On 15 October Nimitz read the message that effectively terminated Ghormley’s tenure as Comsopac. Warning of “all out enemy effort against Cactus,” Ghormley declared his resources were “totally inadequate to meet situation” and demanded reinforcements. He appeared to have lost all hope. Nimitz conferred with Captain McCormick, who concurred, “The critical situation there requires a more aggressive Commander.” Nimitz informed King of his desire to replace Ghormley with Halsey. King approved, and on 16 October Nimitz issued the necessary orders. Writing home the next day, he described his “sore mental struggle,” the “hours of anguished consideration” that concluded his friend Ghormley was “too immersed in detail and not sufficiently bold and aggressive at the right time.” Kinkaid kept TF-16, which granted Murray a reprieve as CTF-17, and Halsey soon named Kinkaid CTF-61 in charge of all Sopac carrier task forces.9
On 22 October in full anticipation of Fletcher’s imminent return, of which he heard nothing to the contrary in the past three weeks, Nimitz instructed Admiral Wright to return from Sopac to Pearl by 5 November. Wright was to resume his post as Commander, Cruisers, TF-11, because Fletcher would be taking the Saratoga task force south around 10 November. On 23 October, though, Nimitz received a terse message from Bupers: “Officer Signal Number 64 [Vice Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher] being detached present duties proceeding direct from Washington to duty Com 13 and Comnorwestseafron. Request nomination Comcrupac.” Com 13 referred to commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District (Pacific Northwest), and the Northwest Sea Frontier comprised the coastal waters of those states and the Alaskan sector. Nimitz proposed Kinkaid for Fletcher’s replacement as Commander, Cruisers, Pacific Fleet. King agreed. Fletcher would not return to Pearl Harbor even for the customary change of command, so that particular relief took place on 29 October in absentia, with Fletcher in Washington, D.C., and Kinkaid in the South Pacific.10
King had a perfect right to relieve Fletcher or anyone else under his command. He was responsible for fighting the naval war and entitled to choose his own leaders. Whether the relief was justified is another matter. It may have seemed after the departure of Ghormley and Noyes that Fletcher’s ouster was just part of the clean sweep of the discredited Sopac leadership. In truth, though, Fletcher never had a fig of a chance with King despite Nimitz’s demonstrably strong support. Fletcher reported on 30 September to “Main Navy,” so familiar from his days with the old Bureau of Navigation, but a far different place under King’s steely grip. He found himself frozen out like an unwanted orphan and did not know his fate was already decided. Although King and Nimitz discussed a number of temporary jobs for Fletcher in Washington, none materialized. Cominch and his minions barely gave him the time of day. Secretary Knox (who only returned from Brazil about two weeks after Fletcher’s arrival) “was the only person that would listen to me.” Amazingly no one in Cominch headquarters bothered to debrief the most battle-experienced task force commander in the U.S. Navy. Absorbed in the planning for the Torch Operation (the invasion of North Africa) set for early November, not to mention crises that raged from the Solomons to Stalingrad, King’s staff had no time for an admiral whom the boss obviously already discarded.11
Once Ernie King got down on someone, he never changed his mind. Only first impressions counted. From far-off Washington Fletcher had appeared hesitant and timid that spring in the South Pacific, lost the Lexington and Yorktown, failed to sweep away the opposition before Savo, and suffered damage to the Enterprise and Saratoga. King rarely went beyond his initial, perhaps erroneous, perceptions to determine what really happened. In 1949 he described Fletcher (whom he called “Edward J. Fletcher”) as someone with “not very much in the way of brains,” and who had “ideas but did not know how to work them out.” King recalled that he “frequently had to press Admiral Nimitz to take proper and drastic action about officers whose accomplishment was not up to standard.” Here King himself took the “proper and drastic action” by seizing the fortuitous opportunity of an open vice admiral’s billet. Its present incumbent, Charles Freeman, would turn sixty-four, ordinarily the mandatory retirement age, on 19 November. In a few instances newly promoted rear admirals commanded naval districts and sea frontiers while awaiting operational postings, but for senior admirals the districts were the elephant’s graveyard. King probably thought Fletcher should feel grateful just to keep the three stars. Pye and Brown, for example, reverted to rear admiral when they were relieved. Yet King begrudged those vice admirals he could not for some reason demote, remarking to Nimitz in December that he “is frequently embarrassed by officers who are Vice Admirals for the duration.” At the same time someone from Washington evidently hinted to Nimitz that Fletcher himself had asked or implied he wanted to go ashore. Nimitz wondered to Kinkaid whether that were so, and Kinkaid personally broached the subject to his old friend Fletcher. In January 1943 Fletcher firmly contradicted that particular Washington calumny, writing Nimitz, “Kinkaid surprised me very much by saying that you had asked him if I had applied for or desired shore duty. I can assure you nothing was further from my mind, and my orders came as a complete surprise and as a considerable shock.” That Nimitz perceived duplicity on the part of Cominch insiders is suggested by the remarks in 1983 of Admiral Layton, the former Cincpac intelligence officer. Ordinarily highly critical of Fletcher, Layton stated that although King judged Fletcher incompetent, Nimitz did not concur. “But then Nimitz was a loyal commander, loyal to his subordinates. King was, well, I think there were people on King’s staff who were jealous of Fletcher.”12
Ironically in Ted Sherman, Nimitz had a suitable replacement for Fletcher readily available. For survival if nothing else, Sherman while in Washington assiduously presented his actions in the Coral Sea (where he lost King’s beloved Lexington) in the best possible light at the expense of Fletcher, Buckmaster, and the Yorktown. He resembled Turner in never admitting a mistake. While in the States, Sherman reaped the public plaudits for the Coral Sea victory, including meeting Winston Churchill. His quest for carrier command bore fruit on 29 September, when he heard King was considering him for sea duty. King wanted another naval aviator as a carrier task force commander, and Sherman “was the only one available with sufficient rank and experience, without going down to very junior people.” On 3 October King himself told Sherman that although he was “very much pleased” with his work in Washington, Sherman “was needed out at sea.” The next day in a vivid demonstration of how indeed Sherman basked in official favor due to his Coral Sea reputation, he engaged in an “off the record” talk with President Roosevelt “about carriers” and received FDR’s personal congratulations. Oddly Fletcher, who led the victorious Allied forces in that same engagement (as well as Midway and the Eastern Solomons), was readily at hand but never invited to the White House—a particularly reprehensible example of official ingratitude. The Navy Department kept him away from the press even though it had already announced the loss of the Yorktown. It is interesting that Roosevelt raised with Sherman the problem of “strain” that task force commanders faced “night and day,” and thought “they should be periodically pulled out for a rest.” One wonders if he spoke of Halsey or whether King already laid the groundwork for Fletcher’s relief when he and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal visited the White House on 2 October. Otherwise Roosevelt, who followed naval affairs closely, might have questioned Fletcher’s sudden exile.13
Informing Cincpac he was coming, Sherman left Washington on 12 October for California for a brief leave and to assemble his staff of mostly former Lexington officers. He was to be in Pearl before the end of the month. Now the way seemed open for King’s protégé to take the reins of TF-11 in the Saratoga. That was very likely what King desired once he heard from Nimitz that Kinkaid, not Sherman, would relieve Murray as CTF-17. Nimitz was already on record with Cominch and Comsopac preferring Sherman if Fletcher proved temporarily unavailable. Sherman flew into Oahu early on 27 October to the good news that Fletcher was no longer in the picture. However instead of becoming CTF-11 in his place, Sherman only received the use of a house on Ford Island in which to await another command. That very day, after Capt. Dewitt Ramsey was relieved as commanding officer of the Saratoga, Nimitz, to everyone’s surprise, instantly frocked him rear admiral and gave him TF-11, effective 30 October. Sherman confided to his diary he was “a little disappointed” not to get the Saratoga task force, “But feel I will be promptly employed and nothing to worry about.” Such “disappointment,” though, was particularly bitter for a man with Sherman’s ego, because Ramsey was considerably junior to him.14
Nimitz hinted prior to 27 October he would not follow King’s script and anoint Sherman as CTF-11. On the twenty-fourth, the day after he learned of Fletcher’s relief, he requested Bupers not to reassign the Comcrupac staff but keep it intact for TF-11. The only exceptions were Captain Lewis, who was “available for such duty as Bupers may desire,” and Commander Pederson, already ordered as the Enterprise’s navigator. Lewis (USNA 1910) was too senior for a task force chief of staff either for his classmate Sherman or Ramsey (USNA 1912). Besides, Lewis had been at sea for nearly three years and merited a new assignment. Significantly, several officers whom Nimitz wished to retain in the TF-11 staff did the same duty as those whom he knew Sherman already selected for his own carrier staff.15
Rear Adm. Dewitt C. Ramsey, 1943.
Courtesy of U.S. Navy
To promote a captain and have him immediately hoist his flag in his former ship was unusual, but not unheard of. In June Rear Adm. Marc Mitscher briefly remained in the Hornet as CTF-17 and would have stayed had not Midway tarnished his reputation with Nimitz. Yet now in the case of TF-11, Nimitz selected a junior flag officer over a more senior admiral who was not only on hand but also slated for that slot. Why did Nimitz completely change his mind regarding Sherman? He came to esteem Ramsey, in particular for how well he handled the Saratoga, but he had been equally strong on Sherman since May and June when hoping to snare Sherman for the Wasp and then the Hornet task forces. Since then Sherman himself did nothing to forfeit the trust either of King or Nimitz, except perhaps Nimitz now recognized him intriguing with the Washington brass. Nor was Sherman anything but rock solid with Halsey, the new Comsopac. Granted a new factor at Pearl was Comairpac Towers, for whom Ramsey was a valued associate. Also Towers was no fan of Ted Sherman, whom he disliked for his “overbearing style of leadership,” an interesting criticism from someone who enjoyed much the same reputation. No evidence appears that Towers played any role in Nimitz’s decision, or that he was even consulted. For lack of sources one can only speculate why Nimitz spurned Sherman. A reasonable explanation is he used Ramsey’s appointment as CTF-11 to protest the high-handed way King dealt with Fletcher in violation of their understanding in September.16
Fletcher relieved Freeman on 21 November in a ceremony in Seattle. It was a bittersweet occasion for the admiral who was retired and the other who was relegated. A reporter interviewed the new Com 13, who puffed on a corncob pipe: “Admiral Fletcher’s eyes snap when he speaks of his recent duty, but he holds himself back from too much reminiscing. ‘I don’t want to get kicked in the pants by the Navy Department,’ he confided. ‘I’m having my first press conference today and I’ve got to be careful.’” Fletcher did allow himself to observe: “I feel like all Navy men. I would rather be at sea. But I’ll say that if I have to be on land, I’d rather be here than anywhere else, under the circumstances. It is a highly important job.” He reiterated that sentiment to Nimitz in January 1943. “The fortunes of any one man of are no consequence in this war, and if I have to have shore duty, this is about the best assignment there is.” Platitudes, though, could not remove the pain of his removal from combat. Captain Lewis accompanied his boss into exile as assistant commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District. Fletcher tried his best to help get Lewis promoted, but his influence now meant little. Lewis did not get his two stars, at least not yet.17
While Fletcher spoke with the Seattle reporters, he did not know that in the faraway South Pacific his good friend Tom Kinkaid was experiencing his last full day as CTF-16. The contrast between the fates of Fletcher and Kinkaid, though, was profound. In Kinkaid’s case, Nimitz could react before losing another of his trusted commanders.
To understand how differently Kinkaid was treated from Fletcher, one must examine how the carriers performed in October and November 1942 in the South Pacific.18
George Murray’s TF-17 (Hornet, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers) spent a month doing what it could to help cover Cactus, but one lone carrier could accomplish little except at great risk. On 5 October the Hornet raided Shortland to help stem the “Tokyo Express” that delivered men, weapons, and supplies to Guadalcanal, but the weather and a paucity of targets ruined a bold effort. Norman Scott’s cruisers and destroyers won the Battle of Cape Esperance on the night of 11–12 October, but the effect was only temporary. On 13–14 October heavy ships pummeled Lunga and nearly destroyed the Cactus Air Force on the ground. A day later Imperial transports brazenly discharged their loads in broad daylight. The grave danger to Cactus panicked Ghormley and led to his relief. The next day Hornet aircraft again tried to derail the Express but found only slim pickings. Murray headed east to rendezvous on 24 October with Kinkaid’s TF-16 (Enterprise, battleship South Dakota, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and six destroyers) 250 miles northeast of Espíritu Santo.
Halsey started aggressively as Comsopac, just as King and Nimitz desired. He hurled Kinkaid’s TF-61 against a powerful carrier force coming down against Cactus. The resulting Battle of Santa Cruz on 26 October pitted four Japanese carriers (Shōkaku, Zuikaku, Zuihō, and Junyō with 194 planes) against two U.S. carriers (175 planes). Only a mechanical failure prevented the Hiyō from participating. Kinkaid fought from a position of disadvantage. Instead of holding his carriers southeast of Guadalcanal, Halsey rashly committed them northeast of the Solomons out near the limit of friendly land-based air support. The exchange of blows left the Hornet fatally damaged and the Enterprise’s innards torn by bombs, in return for knocking out but not sinking the Shōkaku and Zuihō. The customary deployment of the two U.S. carriers into separate task forces ten miles apart once more split the defense, as Fletcher feared. Every Japanese strike found its target, whereas most of the U.S. planes, sent out in three small, isolated flights, never sighted any enemy carriers. Kinkaid swiftly withdrew the injured Enterprise, which recovered nearly all the aircraft aloft in epic fashion (like the Saratoga’s less celebrated performance on 24 August) and pulled clear of pursuit. The Japanese overhauled the burning hulk of the Hornet early the next morning and avenged the Doolittle raid.
The Battle of Santa Cruz, dubbed the “South Pacific Naval Battle” by the jubilant, if battered Japanese, ended in a tactical defeat for the United States. Yamamoto believed he destroyed the entire U.S. carrier force and opened the way to Guadalcanal. Regrettably the 17th Army failed to capture the Lunga airfield. Now he need only regroup, beat down the aircraft remaining at Lunga, and transport overwhelming numbers of troops and matériel to Guadalcanal to root out the garrison. Santa Cruz cost Japan ninety-nine carrier planes and many irreplaceable veteran aircrews. The South Pacific Naval Battle was in fact an Allied strategic victory. The Enterprise survived with ninety-five planes (and most of the aviators from the eighty planes that were lost), while the marines held Henderson Field. Halsey was very lucky to escape total disaster had the Enterprise and all the carrier aircraft accompanied the Hornet to the bottom of the sea.
A disgusted Towers raged that non-aviators lost yet another carrier. Murray passed through Pearl on his way to command NAS Pensacola and related a tale of woe of how Kinkaid mishandled TF-61. Towers urged Nimitz to relieve Kinkaid immediately with Mitscher and end the travesty of black shoes in carriers. Nimitz did not buy that, nor was he willing yet to remove Mitscher from the doghouse. Instead he sent Ted Sherman south to Sopac to form a task force around two or three auxiliary carriers. Everyone agreed the small carriers must serve together in one formation within the same screen. Sherman, the greatest proponent of multi-carrier task forces, got no argument on that score. By the time Sherman reached Nouméa on 16 November, Halsey fought and won his most decisive engagement. To Sherman’s surprise Halsey gave him TF-16 in the Enterprise.19
On 10 November after Halsey learned of another imminent major push against Cactus, Kinkaid’s TF-16 (partially repaired Enterprise, two battleships, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers) hastened north from Nouméa. Former Sopac chief of staff Rear Adm. Dan Callaghan, who was covering a convoy to Cactus, released one heavy cruiser and two destroyers to join Kinkaid on the twelfth. On the night of 12–13 November, before TF-16 could get within range of Guadalcanal, Callaghan and Scott valiantly pitted five cruisers and eight destroyers against a bombardment force that included two fast battleships. They saved Cactus at the cost of their lives. On 13 November, to Halsey’s intense displeasure, Kinkaid was still not in position to use his aircraft or Ching Lee’s two fast battleships to prevent another night bombardment of Lunga ahead of a large force of transports coming down the Slot. The next day Kinkaid flew off nearly all his planes in searches and strikes with orders to fly to Henderson Field, while he cleared out with the Enterprise. Relentless air attacks by the Cactus Air Force and Enterprise’s Air Group Ten almost wiped out the convoy, but only Lee’s great surface victory on the night of 14–15 November prevented another huge bombardment that again could have pulverized the U.S. planes on the ground. Thus the last Japanese attempt to reconquer Guadalcanal ended in complete failure. The epic victory earned Halsey his fourth star.
Kinkaid felt deep satisfaction over the employment of the Enterprise and Air Group Ten in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. He kept the wounded carrier to the rear behind the shield of land-based air support and awaited the enemy to come calling. The Big E then shuttled her planes to a land base and pulled out in timely fashion before absorbing any counterattack. “This time,” Kinkaid boasted, “the air group on the carrier was utilized more effectively than ever before.” He offered the November operation as a model for carriers in constricted waters within the enemy’s air search network. Halsey chose not to contest Kinkaid’s evaluation or publically criticize him, but his subsequent actions reflected his strong disapproval of Kinkaid’s performance both at Santa Cruz and in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Halsey also perceived the solution was at hand. On 16 November he informed Sherman that he would relieve Kinkaid as CTF-16 in the Enterprise and act as senior carrier task force commander when Ramsey brought down TF-11 (Saratoga) late that month. Although Kinkaid was “an excellent man,” Halsey told Sherman, the relief “had to be done.” The next day Halsey informed Nimitz he would retain only the two light antiaircraft cruisers and destroyers in the TF-16 screen and form the heavy cruisers and the Brooklyn-class light cruisers into surface striking groups to be split among Kinkaid, Admiral Tisdale (TF-16 cruiser commander), and Boscoe Wright, the TF-11 cruiser commander. “This is absolutely no reflection on Tom Kinkaid,” Halsey emphasized, “as I consider he has done a fine job,” but “I am merely placing my tools where I believe they would be most useful.” Halsey felt it would be “inexcusable to have a man of Sherman’s Air experience not utilized in the Enterprise when he is available.” As for Kinkaid, Halsey explained, “As soon as I can get some flag officers I would like to send Tom back to the States for a rest. He has done a noble job and has been at it a long long time.” To take Sherman’s place in the auxiliary carriers, Halsey requested either Murray or Charles Mason. Nimitz selected Mason.20
Kinkaid reacted to his sudden relief with disbelief and anger. He truly liked carrier command. Sherman told him on 18 November he had not “instigated” the change in command. Kinkaid replied he “knew that but he was disappointed to be relieved just as he knew how to handle aircraft.” Kinkaid then shocked Sherman by saying “he had decided he needed a rest and instead of going to command cruisers felt he wanted to go back to Pearl Harbor.” Sherman heard that Kinkaid could not get in to see Halsey later that day. Instead, chief of staff Miles Browning relayed Kinkaid’s desire to be sent back to Pearl immediately for a rest. That, Sherman judged, did not make “a very good impression.” On 20 November he traveled to Espíritu Santo to see his old boss Jake Fitch, who to his surprise “was quite free with his criticism of Kinkaid’s handling the task force.” Fitch told Sherman that Kinkaid should have immediately attacked on 26 October after receiving a predawn PBY report of enemy carriers and then criticized Kinkaid’s failure to support Murray once the Hornet became disabled. Likewise with regard to the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Fitch disagreed with Kinkaid’s decision to release the Enterprise’s planes to Cactus, “which was jammed and couldn’t effectively handle them.” Cincpac, too, did not altogether condone Kinkaid’s conservative withdrawal of the Enterprise on the afternoon 14 November. In the general report of 18 February 1943, Spruance suggested Kinkaid might have remained closer to Guadalcanal and retrieved at least a portion of the Enterprise Air Group, then, with the support of the Washington and his own heavy cruisers, finished off the enemy cripples and stragglers.21
The Sopac reorganization took place on 23 November. In place of TF-16, Kinkaid received TF-67 (three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers), with Tisdale as second-in-command. Halsey’s orders reassigning Kinkaid to TF-67 contained what Sherman called an “unusual first paragraph telling what fine work he had done, but in view of tactical situation it was necessary to assign him elsewhere.” Sherman considered it “a very flowery paragraph to save his feelings.” The next day Kinkaid left Nouméa for Espíritu Santo to join TF-67, but confided to Sherman that he was “going home for a rest when R.Adm. Wright gets down here.” Unlike the common perception, Kinkaid’s departure from Sopac had nothing to do with any orders from Washington or Pearl but was due strictly to his reluctance to return to cruisers. He left in a huff because Halsey would not keep him in carriers. Wright formally relieved Kinkaid on 28 November, and two nights later fought the disastrous Battle of Tassafaronga according to Kinkaid’s tactical plan because he lacked the time to work out one of his own.22
It is evident the bad feelings that erupted between Kinkaid and Halsey after the October 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf actually originated in November 1942. Yet the delicacy with which Halsey handled Kinkaid’s relief and hasty departure, sans billet, preserved Kinkaid’s reputation both within the navy and subsequently among historians. Fletcher never received the same consideration. Arriving on 2 December at Pearl, Kinkaid found a surprisingly sympathetic Cincpac, who advised he was seeking approval for Kinkaid to relieve Admiral Theobald as commander of the North Pacific Area and CTF-8. To sweeten the pot because Kinkaid was not particularly eager to go to the Aleutians, Nimitz recommended (and Kinkaid subsequently received) a gold star in lieu of a second DSM for his actions in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. The citation praised Kinkaid’s “keen leadership, determined action and outstanding resourcefulness in driving off and destroying a large attacking force.” Fletcher, though, never received any official recognition either for his overall command in that battle or sinking the Ryūjō. Later in December Kinkaid accompanied Nimitz to the third Cominch-Cincpac conference in San Francisco, where King confirmed the new assignment in the Aleutians. King, too, had tired of Fuzzy Theobald’s lack of initiative and constant wrangling with the army. After spending Christmas with the Fletchers in Seattle, Kinkaid relieved Theobald on 4 January 1943 and prepared to retake Attu and Kiska in the western Aleutians.23
Nimitz certainly stepped in to save Kinkaid’s career and retain him in a combat assignment, and there is every indication he would have done the same for Fletcher if he had just been given the opportunity. Two letters reflect Cincpac’s attitude toward his two erstwhile black shoe carrier admirals. In March 1943 when Ted Sherman and Duke Ramsey still led the only two fast carriers in the Pacific Fleet, McCain requested Ramsey resume the post of assistant chief of Buaer. Nimitz demurred. The “proposal you make concerning Ramsey is a very difficult one for me,” and “only after long reflection” had Nimitz reached a decision. “As you well know, our competent carrier task force commanders have been passing through their commands so rapidly that we have suffered somewhat from stability and lack of permanency. Ramsey is undoubtedly as good a carrier task force commander as we will ever get, and with the present limited number of carriers, I think it would be a mistake to take him out. The Japanese do not use amateurs or Makee-learns in similar jobs; and we should have the best people available in our limited number of carriers.” The only carrier task force commanders whose exits Nimitz had not personally arranged or condoned were Fletcher and Kinkaid, presumably the “competent carrier task force commanders” to whom he referred. Nimitz had stated his position on black shoe carrier admirals to Halsey on 18 December 1942. Halsey had placed Admiral Mason in charge of TF-65 over the more senior (but non-aviator) Rear Adm. Harry W. Hill simply because the task force included two auxiliary carriers as well as Hill’s two old battleships. Nimitz did not care for it. “I am sure you agree with me,” he wrote Halsey, “that there are many line officers thoroughly capable of taking command of a task force which has in it aircraft carriers, and that nothing would be more harmful to the morale of our senior officers than to create the impression that only aviators may command task forces which have carriers included.” Nimitz spoke not only for Hill but also for the departed Fletcher and Kinkaid. Whether Halsey agreed became moot because, strictly speaking, there were no more black shoe carrier admirals.24