Compared to Dietrich and von Manteuffel, General Erich Brandenberger was the least favored of General Model’s three army commanders. He was too methodical for the hard-driving Model, who had once derided him as ‘a typical product of the general staff system’ and as having ‘the features of a scientist.’ But regardless of Model’s sarcasm, Brandenberger brought considerable experience to his post. He entered Russia from the starting gun in 1941 as commander of the 8th Panzer Division, which was frequently the spearhead of General Erich Manstein’s LVI Panzer Corps. He was promoted to General der Panzertruppen in August 1943, and led the XXIX Army Corps for a year before being chosen to command the Seventh Army in the Ardennes.
General von Manteuffel, head of the Fifth Panzer Army, which was to be on his right, thought better of the bespectacled Brandenberger. He described him to John Toland as a ‘vigorous son of a Silesian school master.’ He was ‘indifferent to danger, brusque and a product of the German Staff School.’1 The Americans who came into contact with General Brandenberger also formed a favorable impression:
I talked the next day at Freising with General Brandenberger, who had commanded the Seventh Army in the Ardennes, and left him a brief to be answered in writing. Like General Westphal, General Brandenberger quickly saw the purpose of our historical activity. In my brief conversation with him, I was highly impressed by this officer’s intelligence and knowledge of what had taken place in the units under his control. The manuscripts which he prepared were very detailed accounts of the operations in which he engaged … Brandenberger’s general appearance (graying hair with a tendency to baldness and shell-rimmed glasses which interrupt the roundness of his face) is that of a man in his middle or late fifties … He gives the impression of being a careful, steady worker, rather than a flashy brilliant one.2
But General Model’s denunciation of the paunchy commander obviously carried over to Hitler, who, although personally selecting Brandenberger, was disinclined to provide him with the wherewithal necessary for the success of his mission. He was charged with blocking the left flank of the offensive from the feared U.S. General George Patton and his Third Army. Originally, the OKW plan had allocated Seventh Army the use of six infantry divisions and one panzer division for the task. But when the shoe pinched the flow of troops to the west, it was Brandenberger whose order of battle suffered. His army of four mostly inexperienced divisions entered the fray as more of a reinforced corps than an army. And in spite of General von Manteuffel’s nearly continuous appeals, a panzer formation for his Volksgrenadier army was not forthcoming. But if Brandenberger’s forces received least attention, his account of his army’s operations is perhaps the most detailed of the three. The ETO Historical Section editor of manuscript A-876 described it as ‘a model report’.
Danny S. Parker
In the course of the withdrawal of the German Army in the West toward the frontier of the homeland, the remnants of the Seventh German Army reached the sector of the West Wall between Geilenkirchen and Wallendorf in the second week of September 44. By the subordination of the LXXX Inf Corps on the right wing of our southern neighbor, First Army, the Seventh Army sector was extended on 17 Sep 44 as far as south of Trier.
At this time there was a direct enemy threat to both wings of the army, in the Aachen sector, and southwest of Bitburg. In both of these sectors the enemy had pushed forward and breached the West Wall. He clearly intended to continue his large-scale offensive toward and across the Rhine. Whereas it was possible by prompt action on the left wing of the Army to wipe out part of the enemy forces at Wallendorf, where they had broken through, and to drive the rest back westwards over the frontier, it was possible only to seal off the breach made at Aachen by the relatively stronger enemy forces. All our attempts here to retake the forward line of the West Wall came to naught. However, Seventh Army (having transferred the sector from Geilenkirchen to east of Stolberg to Fifth Pz Army on 22 Oct 44) was able, despite the loss of Aachen and the Aachen sector, to prevent the strategic penetration attempted by the enemy in the direction of Cologne and Düsseldorf. And a brief consideration of the state of the beaten Western Army and the difficulties of supply and replacement will give the reader an idea of the extraordinary performance of the German troops in achieving such a defensive success.
The German formations arriving in the West Wall in mid-September 44 were all battle groups having only a few hundred men each and a scattering of artillery pieces and heavy weapons as armament. The security forces of the Home Army occupying the Wall and the Army (Heeres) and Luftwaffe fortress battalions arriving from Germany were now merged with these battle groups. These replacement units suffered either from incomplete training, as in the case of the Luftwaffe units, the naval retrainees and the soldiers who had been taken out of school before finishing their courses. Otherwise they had ear or stomach ailments or were otherwise not completely fit. Desperate attempts were made to obtain equipment and weapons, but the urgency of the danger meant that many units were a patchwork of diverse equipment and personnel. This can be fully understood if one realizes that in a single unit there might be men having 100 different APO numbers, while in a single artillery regiment there might be four different types of foreign weapons. The grave disadvantages of such a situation are evident. Furthermore, some units had to be reorganized and reconstituted while heavy fighting was in progress (e.g., at Aachen and in the Hürtgen Forest), or else units which have been occupying quiet sectors of the front (e.g., the Eifel) had to be committed in some very active sector during or immediately after their reconstitution. Such was the fate of 344 Inf Div and 353 Inf Div.
Such conditions, which made tremendous demands on both officers and men, were unavoidable, although the Supreme Command was anxious above all to ensure that newly constituted or rehabilitated reserve or panzer divisions be committed in active sectors only as a last resort. The Supreme Command had decided quite some time ago that the ‘new’ panzer and infantry divisions should be welded into an assault army for the purpose of mounting a fresh and decisive operation.
However, the violence of the fighting at the frontier, both at Aachen and in Lorraine, forced us to modify this rule in many instances. During the battles of Aachen, for example, we had to commit a total of five volks grenadier divisions (12 VGD, 47 VGD, 183 VGD, 246 VGD, and 272 VGD), one airborne division (3 FJ Div), and four panzer-type divisions (9 Pz Div, 116 Pz Div, 3 Pz Gren Div, and later 15 Pz Gren Div), in order to prevent a strategic breakthrough eastward across the Roer, which would have upset the whole plan for a counteroffensive. In Lorraine also, we were occasionally obliged to employ single divisions and panzer-type units undergoing reconstitution (e.g., Pz Lehr Div and 11 Pz Div) in order to stabilize the situation. And although portions of these infantry divisions and almost all of the panzer-type units could be used in the December 44 offensive, it cannot be denied that their commitment seriously hampered their rehabilitation and the preservation of their fighting power for the offensive.
After the penetration at Wallendorf had been eliminated during the second half of September 44, the situation on the Eifel Front between Monschau and Trier remained comparatively quiet with the exception of small, local engagements. In October and November 44, newly-arrived volks grenadier divisions were committed here, to relieve the West Wall divisions mentioned above for employment in Lorraine and Aachen, and also to replace the panzer-type units still engaged in fighting and due for a rest. These volks grenadier divisions were supposed to utilize their time on this relatively peaceful front to continue their training and to acquire fighting experience gradually.
The left flank of Seventh Army was constantly endangered by the situation in Army Group G’s sector, since an enemy penetration through the Orscholz switch line or in the Saar would undoubtedly have had the result of opening the Moselle ‘Door’. Therefore, security measures had to be maintained constantly in the area south of Trier.
This description of our situation makes it clear that Seventh Army never had time, from the moment it occupied the West Wall until the offensive began, to prepare adequately and to organize for the great attack. But it shows, nevertheless, that Seventh Army contrived, in the most difficult circumstances, to fulfill the necessary strategic conditions for the mounting of the offensive. The fact that certain of the units earmarked for the attack had to be used beforehand was a necessary evil.
It may be left to the judgment of posterity whether it was the Allied supply situation, or the psychological effect of the West Wall, or the increasing resistance of the German troops on the western frontier, which produced the ‘West Wall Miracle’. The fact remains that, against all expectations, the apparently overwhelming advance of the Allied tank armies was halted. During the frontier battles which now developed, it became clear that the enemy had two main centers of gravity: the wide Aachen sector (First U.S. Army) and the Lorraine area (Third U.S. Army). The more important of the two was the area of Aachen, which could be identified in November 44 as the Ninth U.S. Army sector; here it seemed that all the reserves at the disposal of the Allies had been almost magically assembled. The strategic objectives of the enemy were plain: in the north, a breakthrough across the Cologne–Düsseldorf line into the Ruhr; in the south, the conquest of the Saar. The loss of the two important industrial regions of western Germany would have a decisive influence on the course of the war. And from these two offensives, corresponding operations against the interior of the Reich were to be expected. Obviously, the Allies’ estimate of German war potential and the German leadership was this: after the decisive defeat of our armies in the Battle of France and after the heavy defensive battles on the Eastern Front, a large-scale German offensive need no longer be expected. The Allies estimated that our available reserves were – at most – sufficient for only local counterattacks. The Allies saw this latter view apparently confirmed by the location of the area chosen for the reconstitution of the Sixth Pz Army. They took the risk of holding the 160-kilometer front between the Hürtgen Forest and the northern flank of Third Army, southeast of Luxembourg. Here they had only two or three divisions in the line and with an armored division thoroughly subdivided into little ‘fire departments’, located behind the line.4 Moreover, these divisions were the exhausted Hürtgen Forest divisions, at that time being rehabilitated and brought up to strength. This soft spot in the enemy front and the apparent estimate of the situation made by the enemy were certainly the determining factors which induced the Supreme Command to mount the planned offensive.
From 22 Oct 44 on, Seventh Army was in control of the sector east of Stolberg as far as Nittle, south of Trier. Enemy dispositions in this sector led us to expect heavy attacks in the Hürtgen Forest sooner or later, attacks which would have a direct bearing on the enemy goal of a breakthrough across the Roer in the direction of Cologne and Düsseldorf. There were two other possible threats: a double envelopment across the Sauer and the Moselle, or, alternatively, a push from the sector of First U.S. Army against the southern flank of our Seventh Army. The greatest threat was undoubtedly to the right wing of Seventh Army, since the results of our reconnaissance indicated that the enemy’s reserves were assembling in the Aachen–Liège area. For a while we were disturbed by the possibility that the 4 U.S. Armd Div and 6 U.S. Armd Div were still opposite our left wing. In this connection it is interesting to recall that the oblique maneuver of the above-mentioned 9 U.S. Armd Div was interpreted by Seventh Army as a northward displacement of 4 U.S. Armd Div or of 6 U.S. Armd Div. The American attempt to simulate the presence of 75 U.S. Inf Div in the area of Luxembourg must be regarded as a failure; from this area we received notice of the presence of nothing more than a fairly large number of tanks, and Seventh Army considered this report to be based on the location in Luxembourg of American tank workshops.
Seventh Army was dependent upon the Supreme Command for intelligence concerning the enemy’s strategic reserves. This intelligence indicated that a limited number of such forces were located near Paris and Metz. It was also presumed that one or two new divisions were already on the way from the United States or England, and due consideration was given to the possibility that these fresh formations would eventually be committed at Aachen.
It was only natural that in our estimate of the enemy situation and in our suppositions regarding the enemy’s estimate of our own position the very difficult terrain in the Eifel and in the Ardennes – especially in winter – should play an important role. Both of these mountainous and heavily wooded districts possess only limited networks of rather poor roads. The gradients and the numerous sharp curves and hairpin turns make motorized traffic difficult, especially in the presence of snow and ice. In addition, the majority of the wider and better roads on both sides of the frontiers between Germany and Luxembourg and Germany and Belgium run north and south, in a direction unfavorable for an offensive from either side. In the northern portion of the American ‘undefended’ sector there tower the heights of the Schnee-Eifel, partly in American, partly in German hands. Further south, the boundary between the fronts was formed first of all by the Our river, then by the Sauer, and finally by the Moselle. Even in peace time the comparatively narrow but high-banked Our forms a considerable barrier to traffic when the snows began to melt or when ice forms on it.
It is true, to be sure, that none of these obstacles impeded the progress of the German Army in its forward march of 1940, but it must be borne in mind that our attack took place in the month of May and that the German Army at the time was infinitely stronger than its opponent. Above all, in 1940 Germany enjoyed complete air supremacy, whereas in 1944 this lay, to a still greater degree, on the side of the Allies.5
So far as the terrain was concerned, the heavily wooded slopes of the Schnee-Eifel favored a German attack only with regard to concealment and camouflage. And this advantage was more or less offset by the Allies’ possession of almost limitless facilities for air reconnaissance.
Before Seventh Army learned of the plan for the Ardennes Offensive, the following signs indicated that the Supreme Command intended a completely new operation:
About the end of October 44, the Ia of the Operations Section of the Wehrmachtführungsstab, Obst i.G. Wilhelm Meyer-Detring, appeared at Seventh Army Headquarters at Camp Falke some six kilometers east of Münstereifel. He expressed the somewhat astonishing desire to look over the terrain of the Schnee-Eifel. In a short time he and the army chief of staff started by car to the LXVI Inf Corps and, on arrival at his destination, he went to an observation post on Calvary Mountain (immediately west of Prüm), where he was able to scan the surrounding landscape minutely.
Simultaneously, Seventh Army was ordered to reconnoiter positions for an army command post in the vicinity of Daun, and another near Wittlich, and to prepare them for occupation. This was not an easy task because most of the villages there were filled with refugees, conscripted labor, and supply installations. However, Army Group B was very insistent and declared Itself in favor of the position previously reconnoitered, with Manderscheid as an alternate location. (This town later became the command post of Fifth Pz Army.) The southern command post was prepared on the outskirts of Wittlich.
At the beginning of November 44, the Commanding General of Seventh Army personally received from Field Marshal Model an order to designate on a map sketch a line which would offer the best defensive potentialities between Givet and Grevenmacher. The element of antitank defence was to be weighted heavily in the selection of this line. Further, he was to calculate the strength required for such a defense.
The Commanding General of Seventh Army, after careful consideration, proposed a line which would have its right wing leaning on the Meuse and the Semois; this line would also rest on hills and minor obstacles along the general line from Givet to Grevenmacher. The strength required, according to his calculations, would be six infantry divisions and from one to two panzer divisions.
The following divisions were withdrawn from the front:
At the end of Oct 44: |
2 SS Pz Div, relieved by 18 Volks Gren Div. |
Beginning of Nov 44: |
2 Pz Div, relieved by 26 Volks Gren Div. |
On 10 Nov 44: |
36 Volks Gren Div, relieved by 212 Volks Gren Div. |
On 15 Nov 44: |
347 Inf Div, relieved by 272 Volks Gren Div. |
Additional volks grenadier divisions, as well as several volks artillery corps, volks projector brigades, and other Army (Heeres) formations were announced as due to arrive. Rehabilitation and assembly areas were to be reconnoitered in the Eifel for all of these units.
On 6 Nov 44, the chiefs of staff of Seventh Army, Sixth Pz Army (Gen Krämer), and Fifth Pz Army (Gen Gause), were called for a consultation with the Chief of Staff of Army Group B (Gen Krebs) at the headquarters of Army Group B, south of Krefeld. Here, after having been sworn to absolute secrecy, they were acquainted with the plan of the offensive. Gen Krebs handed each a message which read as follows:
‘The German war potential enables us, by summoning all our powers of organization and by straining every nerve, to form an offensive force by rehabilitating and completely reconstituting the twelve panzer and panzer grenadier divisions at present employed on the Western Front, as well as some twenty volks grenadier divisions and two Fallschirmjäger divisions. With the aid of these forces, the last that Germany is able to collect, the Führer intends to mount a decisive offensive. Since such an operation would offer no prospect of a decisive success on the vast Eastern Front, and since a similar operation on the Italian Front could not be of decisive strategic significance, he has resolved to unleash his attack from the West Wall. The success of this operation will depend fundamentally upon the degree of surprise achieved. Therefore, the time and place for this offensive will be such as to completely deceive the enemy. Considering the situation, the terrain, and the weather, the enemy will be least likely to expect such an attack shortly before Christmas, from the Eifel, and against a front only thinly held by him. The objective of the offensive will be Antwerp, in order to rob the Allies of this very important supply port and to drive a wedge between the British and the American forces. After achieving the objective, we will annihilate the British and American forces then surrounded in the area of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle)–Liège–north of Brussels. In the air, the operation will be supported by several thousand of the best and most modern German fighters, which will secure – at least temporarily – supremacy in the air. The most important factors will be first – SURPRISE, and next – SPEED!’
Each chief of staff was thereupon handed a map, on which had been indicated the mission of his army, together with an estimate of the forces which would be available for the operation.
Each army received only the following information about the units on its flanks: the boundary lines, their zones of attack, and their missions. For example, Seventh Army learned only that at the beginning of the attack its right neighbor would be 26 Volks Gren Div, under Fifth Pz Army, north of the line Stolzemburg–Wiltz–St. Hubert–Givet.
On the basis of their instructions, the armies were to consider the missions assigned to each of them and to make the necessary preparations. In the meantime, only the commanding general of each army, his chief of staff, his Ia, and one other officer of the army staff were to be made aware of the secret.
The primary mission assigned to the army at this briefing was the protection of the south flank of strong German armored forces along the line Bastogne– Namur to Brussels–Antwerp. In order to defend this flank, the army would have to advance at least to the approximate line Givet–Libramont–Martelange–Mersch–Wasserbillig. For the accomplishment of this mission, it was proposed to assign to the army three corps staffs, six infantry divisions, one panzer-type division – presumably 25 Pz Gren Div – from two to three volks artillery corps, from one to two battalions of Army (Heeres) artillery, two volks projector brigades, from one to two artillery brigades (assault guns, self-propelled), one engineer brigade, one Organization Todt brigade, and six bridge columns. Preparations for the offensive were to be completed by the end of November 44. The decision as to when the corps and division staffs, as well as the other members of the army staff, would be briefed was to be made in each case by Army Group Headquarters.
From the very beginning, the following precautions were ordered:
a. The strategic concentration, and all preparations for it, were to be so arranged that they could be interpreted as the strengthening of German forces in the Eifel area to repel an Allied offensive on both sides of the Schnee-Eifel, an offensive which the Supreme Command had reason to suspect the Allies of planning.
b. Radio traffic was to continue without any changes whatever.
c. Reconnaissance patrols were not to be increased.
d. No reconnaissance beyond the former limits (especially by officers wearing panzer-type uniform or by members of new divisions) was to be permitted.
e. Seventh Army would continue to control the same sector as before, and would direct the movements of the new units arriving in the assembly areas, including those of the two new panzer armies.
These two panzer armies were to conceal themselves as completely as possible; later they received special names for the sake of secrecy.
f. All movements into the assembly area were to be carried out in darkness. During daylight there was to be no abnormal activity in this area. Special staffs and units were to be chosen to enforce this precaution.
g. The construction of rear area fortifications by public effort, was to continue as before. The gauleiters, even though they were defense commissioners of the Reich, and their assistants and subordinates, were to be kept as completely in the dark as the service command (Wehrkreis) staffs, the fortress engineer staffs, and the other home defense agencies.
h. The name of every single individual initiated into the plan of the offensive was to be entered on a special list. Each person whose name appeared thereon had to sign an oath to observe absolute secrecy about the project, on pain of the severest punishment.
i. All sketches, diagrams, maps, and written orders were to be registered, and a check was to be made daily to see that none were missing. Furthermore, these documents were to be under the surveillance – day and night – of one of the initiated officers.
j. Special precautions were to be taken to prevent any eavesdropping on staff conferences or map exercises.
k. An order was circulated, directing the withdrawal from the front line of Alsatians, Luxemburgers, Lorrainians, Belgians, and other undependable elements, in order to prevent any of these from going over to the enemy.
l. During the training period before the offensive, only the word ‘counterattack’ was to be used.
m. Each headquarters was to use a different code-name for the operation (for example, Seventh Army called it ‘Winter Storm’).
Further secrecy measures ordered for the strategic concentration will be mentioned later.
All of these precautions were adopted with the object of preserving completely the element of surprise. As an example of what might happen if the secret were betrayed, the initiated officers were reminded of the German Somme Offensive in 1918, when the enemy received advance warning from deserters. Naturally, the maintenance of such secrecy hampered preparations, for much information could not be written down, and no clerks or cartographers could be used. Therefore, all of the preliminary work had to be done by a small circle of initiates.
Under the conditions outlined, the Army began its preparations for the concentration and the operation. First of all, attack zones, immediate objectives, routes of advance, crossing sites, and reconnaissance and operational objectives were selected and submitted to the army group for approval. Because the Seventh Army was quite uncertain as to the size of the forces which the army group would allot to it for the operation, Seventh Army submitted only a very modest estimate of its requirements in troops and material:
a. One panzer or panzer grenadier division, for commitment on the right flank of the attack.
b. Six infantry divisions.
c. From two to three volks artillery corps and the same number of volks projector brigades.
d. From two to three artillery brigades (assault guns, self-propelled), or heavy tank destroyer battalions.
e. At least four Army (Heeres) engineer or bridge construction battalions and from six to eight bridge columns, including one for the erection of a bridge for tanks.
f. The Army also asked that several divisions be placed in reserve behind its left wing.
The army was promised:
a. 25 Pz Gren Div, which, although still committed under Army Group G, was to be withdrawn and rested very soon.
b. Four volks grenadier divisions in the assault line, and from two to three in reserve.
c. Three volks artillery corps and one Army (Heeres) artillery battalion.
d. Two volks projector brigades.
e. Two artillery brigades (assault guns, self-propelled), and from one to two heavy tank destroyer battalions.
f. One engineer brigade [47th] comprising two battalions; one Organization Todt brigade, likewise of two battalions.
g. Six bridge columns, with 100 large rubber pontoons.
All the preparations now begun by the army were based on the above figures, which, in its opinion, represented the minimum forces required for the successful accomplishment of its mission.
The first outline of the army attack plan was as follows: Four volks grenadier divisions, controlled by two corps (LXXXV Inf Corps on the right; LXXX Inf Corps on the left) will attack abreast in the sector Vianden–Wallendorf– Echternach and smash through the enemy front, destroying him in the process.
a. Immediate objective of the right corps will be the ridge line and the road from Diekirch to Hosingen. This corps will take this objective before the end of the first day of attack, and it will continue to advance straight westward, committing – if necessary – its advance reserves in order to seize the crossings over the Clerf and Sauer. 25 Panzer Gren Div, initially in army reserve behind the right corps, will then – if possible during the night following the first day of the attack – be moved across the tank bridge set up in the meantime at Wallendorf. 25 Panzer Gren Div will next push straight ahead through Ettelbrück, Harlange and south of St. Hubert, in a westerly direction, in order to maintain contact with the left flank of Fifth Pz Army and to protect – by aggressive action – the southern attack flank in the sector Gedinne–Neufchâteau. At this time, the Staff of LIII Inf Corps will be placed in control of operations on the right wing. The divisions of LXXXV Inf Corps will then turn southwest from the Wiltz–Diekirch area, in order to go over to the defensive, en masse, along the approximate line Neufchâteau–Martelange–Mersch. This will be done so that tactical centers of gravity can be established in accordance with the enemy situation and the anticipated enemy movements along the roads leading north and northeast. Advance elements will push forward rapidly to the Semois sector to reconnoiter, to deny the crossing sites to the enemy, and to stop (or at least delay) the enemy advance.
b. The Seventh Army main effort, assigned to the right corps, will be completed by the attachment of two volks projector brigades, two volks artillery corps, one artillery brigade (assault guns, self-propelled) and one heavy tank destroyer battalion.
c. The left corps (LXXX Inf Corps) will attack with two volks grenadier divisions across the Sauer in the Wallendorf–Echternach sector and then, turning soon thereafter to the south and the south-west, will quickly seize the known enemy artillery area of Medernach–Christnach–Altrier. Then it will go over to mobile defense along the Wasserbillig–Mersch line, and send strong advance elements into the area north of Luxembourg.
When the plan was first drafted at the beginning of November 44, the left attack wing of Seventh Army was expected to extend only as far as Bollendorf. This limitation would have permitted a more concentrated attack. Very soon, however, Hitler demanded that the attack front should extend as far as Echternach. He was under the impression that a German bridgehead still existed there, and that it could be used during the first stage of the offensive. The report announcing the withdrawal from this bridgehead apparently went astray on its way to Hitler, so that on the ‘Führer Map’ the bridgehead still appeared.
Another oft-repeated demand of the Supreme Command was that Seventh Army should push as far south as possible, so as to gain sufficient freedom of movement for a delaying action in the event of strong enemy attacks against the southern flank of the German offensive. This demand was not entirely consistent with the Supreme Command’s basic concept: if the Americans follow their customary methods, it is likely that they will send their main forces to the Meuse rather than make any important assault on the flanks of the offensive. Hitler was firmly persuaded that the internal difficulties inherent in a combined Allied Command would delay the countermeasures and that the Allied leaders, dwelling too much on the factor of security, would initially concentrate on trying to halt the German offensive at the Meuse.
Seventh Army, in contrast to this, was firmly convinced that the German operation would evoke a speedy reaction from the enemy. Since it was highly probable that the Franco-Belgian area contained no large reserves, the possibility had to be considered that all available enemy troops in the area of Metz and perhaps also in the sector opposite Army Group G would be brought up for offensive action against the southern flank of the attacking German armies. And for that, the roads leading north through Luxembourg and Arlon would be considered first. Seventh Army estimated that strong enemy forces would arrive in the Arlon area north of Luxembourg not earlier than the fourth day of the attack. The fact that these forces would probably be commanded by General Patton made it quite likely that the enemy would direct a heavy punch against the deep flank of the German forces scheduled to be in the vicinity of Bastogne. In the Battle of France, Patton had given proof of his extraordinary skill in armored warfare, which he conducted according to the fundamental German conception.
On the basis of this concept of enemy action, the Commanding General of Seventh Army emphasized again and again during discussions with army group the need for placing sufficient forces at his disposal for the protection of the southern flank of the attacking forces, stressing that this was a prerequisite for the success of the operation. He emphasized above all the need for highly mobile units furnished with antitank weapons and heavy artillery, so that a flexible and active resistance could be offered to the enemy along the 100-kilometer front. Basing his supply estimates on the same concept, he strongly urged that a generous supply of ammunition be furnished, since the heavy defensive battles to be expected would consume much greater quantities of ammunition than would the mobile warfare of the two panzer armies. But his requests were answered with vague promises that a number of units would be placed behind the left wing of the attack by army group or High Command West (OB West). Consequently, these would be available for temporary use in the southern zone of the attack. The requests of Seventh Army for ample supplies of ammunition, as well as for adequate supplies of other equipment, unfortunately remained unheeded.
With the consent of Army Group B, the commanding generals of the corps assigned to Seventh Army (LXXIV Inf Corps, LXVI Inf Corps, LXXX Inf Corps, and LXXXV Inf Corps) were briefed on 16 Nov 44. (I am not quite sure of the date, as I am writing entirely from memory.) LIII Inf Corps, later to be assigned to Seventh Army, had not yet come up. For the time being, no other members of corps staffs were to be told the secret, but Army Group B permitted us to inform the following additional members of our staff: Ic, Ober-quartiermeister, Signal Officer, Artillery Officer, and Engineer Officer.
Although the concentration of the units earmarked for the offensive was by this time well under way, it became clear that the date first set for the start of the great attack – about the end of November – could not be reached.
a. Fifth Pz Army, which was to hand over control in the Aachen sector to Fifteenth Army, could not yet be freed owing to the heavy defensive fighting in the third Battle of Aachen still in progress. It was only in the second half of November that Fifth Pz Army (under the code-name, Feldjägerkommando z.b.V.) could be sent to Manderscheid. Sixth Pz Army (under the code-name, Auffrischungsstab 16) had already proceeded to Schlenderhan, near Quadrant; this name was designed to conceal from the enemy its presumable dimensions.
Seventh Army controlled the assembly of all units (except SS panzer-type units); it controlled their movement, billeting, supply, camouflage, etc.
Seventh Army furnished both panzer armies with all information culled from the enemy news services and gathered the results of reconnaissance for the sectors in which they were to attack.
On 29 Nov 44, map exercises were carried out at Seventh Army Headquarters with the Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff of the three corps assigned to the army for the offensive, in the presence of the Commanding General of the army group, Field Marshal Model, during which the execution of the first phase and the expected course of the attack in the first day were discussed. In this discussion, the following important points came up for consideration:
a. Should the attack be started at night or in the daytime?
The overwhelming majority of those taking part in the discussion expressed opposition to a night attack, justifying their view with the observation that the state of training of the troops was far below that required by the peculiarly arduous conditions of a night attack.
b. Should there be an artillery preparation or not?
On this question, opinions differed, as might have been expected in view of the different nature of the situation in the various sectors. Seventh Army was all for an attack without such a preparation, not only so that the element of surprise might be maintained, but also because the scarcity of worthwhile targets would result in a considerable wastage of valuable ammunition. Army Group B later permitted us to ignore the wish of the Supreme Command for an artillery preparation lasting half an hour, but insisted that measures taken by Seventh Army be uniform throughout the Army.
c. The first river crossings.
Carefully executed reconnaissance had shown that one bridge column would be required for each crossing of the Our (swollen by melting snows and jammed with ice packs), and two per crossing of the Sauer. One vehicular bridge and one or two footbridges would be required for each division, as well as a tank bridge, later to be utilized as the main supply bridge. Crossing sites on the two rivers were to be at Roth, Gentingen, Wallendorf, Bollendorf, and Echternach. The military bridges soon to be constructed over the streams would in the meantime be replaced by improvised bridges, so as to have the equipment available for the construction of bridges over the Sauer at Ettelbrueck and over the Clerf at Kautenbach, and for other crossings. Material for the erection of the improvised bridges was to be placed in readiness conveniently near the banks of the streams and carefully camouflaged, and only after the attack had begun was it to be moved to the river banks and set in place. The reconnaissance of fords was going on currently. The presence of bridging materials in the vicinity of the streams was to be explained by the argument that enemy air attacks were to be expected and that the material was destined for the repair of bridges damaged by expected enemy air attacks.
d. Destruction of the enemy’s artillery.
All of the enemy gun positions in the army’s attack zone had been precisely located by our artillery reconnaissance. It was presumed that many of the located positions were, in reality, alternate positions. Numerous army artillery batteries had been observed in the Altrier–Christnach area. It was to be feared that their highly-skilled gun crews, familiar as they were with the terrain, would wreak havoc on the bridge positions while our troops were moving across the Our and the Sauer. It would be important, therefore, to pin down these crews as much as possible at the beginning of the attack and then to force them to move to other positions to avoid counterbattery fire.
e. The creation of a manpower reserve.
The Supreme Command had already ordered the constitution of a ‘Führer Reserve’; in addition, it was now ordered that companies should attack with a strength of only eighty men each, the remainder being transferred to the field reinforcement battalions.
At the beginning of December 44, after the division commanders had been briefed, map exercises were held at corps headquarters, at which time the questions of the leadership of the offensive, organization, support, camouflage, etc., were fully discussed.
The Commanding General of Seventh Army and his Chief of Staff were present at several conferences at Army Group Headquarters, at which the progress of the preparations was reported and necessary alterations in the plan for the strategic concentration were announced.
As a result of the situation in the area of Aachen and in Alsace-Lorraine, several divisions could not be withdrawn from combat for rehabilitation and reconstitution, as planned. On the contrary, the situation was such that a number of divisions already withdrawn for the reception of reinforcements had to be recommitted. 116 Pz Div, for example, had to remain in the line in the Hürtgen Forest during almost the whole of November 44; 272 Volks Gren Div, 3 FJ Div, and 47 Volks Gren Div – against all expectations – had to be temporarily committed in an emergency. All these divisions, particularly 47 Volks Gren Div, suffered heavy losses in the fighting.
Pz Lehr Div was now placed at the disposal of Army Group G to lead a counterattack in the area of Zabern.
Seventh Army was particularly affected by these alterations in the original plan, for 25 Pz Gren Div could not be released by Army Group G to participate in the offensive. As a substitute, 5 FJ Div, recently completely reconstituted from Luftwaffe personnel, was assigned to Seventh Army. In training and in the quality of its officers – both junior and senior – this division displayed notable deficiencies. But as it was an especially large division, with a comparatively high number of weapons, including an assault gun battalion, there was nothing else to do but to assign this division the main effort, i.e., the thrust on the right flank of the army.
At this time, only three more volks grenadier divisions were expected to be made available to Seventh Army, although – to be sure – two more were to be brought up later as High Command West reserves. All other supporting arms were sharply reduced as well, so that, in comparison with the strength originally promised, Seventh Army had been considerably weakened.
The main body of the units which would launch the offensive arrived in, or began moving to, the assembly area during November 44. Individual divisions (for example, 212, 272, 277, 18, and 26 Volks Gren Divs) were committed to replace the panzer divisions slated for reorganization, and the West Wall divisions previously committed but now to be reorganized. The other divisions were assembled in the areas selected by Seventh Army. These areas had been so chosen as to place each division immediately to the rear of its attack zone. Volks grenadier divisions were located nearer the line of departure and motorized divisions further to the rear. The entire area bounded by the West Wall, the Moselle, and the Rhine was now jammed with troops. Despite the excellent concealment afforded by the terrain in the Eifel, the strict regulation of all traffic along the roads, and the deceptive measures already mentioned, it seemed scarcely possible that all of this movement could remain hidden from the vigilant eyes of enemy reconnaissance and observation. However, to conceal every move still more, all supplies for the offensive (ammunition, POL, food etc.) were brought up during the hours of darkness (even moonlight being avoided) and placed as far forward as possible. Since the railroads could bring the main part of these supplies only as far as the Rhine, motor transport had to finish the job. Unfortunately, the roads in this area were filled with sharp curves and hairpin turns, and there was almost a continuous succession of steep hills. Furthermore, the local citizens – in a fervor of enthusiasm – had, under the leadership and supervision of the gauleiters, innocently set up road blocks at the entrance and exit to every small village, along the paths of likely enemy approach. Even worse, owing to some mistake by the political functionaries, these road blocks were often so narrow that our heavy tanks (Mark V and Mark VI) simply could not pass through them. It was only with the greatest effort that the gauleiters of Cologne and Trier, as Defense Commissioners of the Reich, could be induced to have these bottlenecks widened or removed.
To be sure, rumors did circulate among the population and in Party circles to the effect that an offensive was being prepared; this was to be expected because the magnitude of the troop movements could not be completely concealed from the population. The marvel is therefore all the greater that we finally did achieve a tactical surprise!
As of 1 Dec 44, the Supreme Command had ordered that all reconnaissance of the attack zones was to cease, in order to prevent anyone from being taken prisoner or from deserting to the enemy. At the beginning of December 44, the SS panzer-type units of Sixth Pz Army arrived in their assembly area of Cologne–Bonn–Münstereifel–Düren–Bergheim; and, simultaneously, the divisions previously committed in the Fifteenth Army area (12 Volks Gren Div, 3 FJ Div, and 47 Volks Gren Div) began to arrive in the area of Zülpich-Gemünd–Schleiden. The Oberquartiermeister section of Sixth Pz Army was transferred to Seventh Army with the mission of supplying the assault units. On 10 Dec 44, Fifth and Sixth Pz armies finally took over control in their attack zones. Simultaneously, Seventh Army Headquarters moved from Camp Falke, 6 kilometers east of Münstereifel, while Sixth Pz Army was arriving at Wittlich. Seventh Army’s extreme right wing, the Hürtgen Forest Front from Düren to Lammersdorf, was turned over to Fifteenth Army.
Seventh Army’s strategic concentration was greatly simplified by the inavailability of many of the units earmarked for the offensive. After 352 Volks Gren Div (Commander: Obst, later Genmaj, Schmidt) had released 353 Inf Div on the right wing of LXXX Inf Corps for commitment in the Hürtgen Forest, two assault divisions (352 Volks Gren Div and 212 Volks Gren Div) were in the front line. All they had to do, therefore, was to link up later on in their attack zones. 276 Volks Gren Div (Commander: Gen Möhring), which was intended for later use on the right assault flank of LXXX Inf Corps, had already been moved to the area southeast of Wittlich on both sides of the Moselle. 5 FJ Div (Commander: Obst, later Genmaj, Heilmann), which was to replace 25 Pz Gren Div, arrived about the beginning of December 44 in the area east and southeast of Bitburg. Other units which had arrived were the two volks artillery corps, one Army (Heeres) artillery battalion (120 mm), one volks projector brigade, and one incomplete bridge column (to be used only for unit assemblage of equipment). Still missing were one projector brigade, the engineer brigade, the Organization Todt brigade, and all the other bridge columns. The self-propelled assault gun companies at first assigned had been cancelled again.
Most of the supplies had been collected in various dumps, with the notable exception of all engineer and ferrying equipment. Stock piling of supplies immediately behind the line of departure was not to be accomplished until about four to six days before the start of the attack. In this regard, it was forbidden to move supplies by truck nearer than ten kilometers to the front, so that the enemy would not become aware of the increased motor traffic during the hours of darkness. For this reason, all supplies had to be transferred at the edge of this limit to horse transport, or else be manhandled further by bearer columns (as, for example, ammunition to the firing positions). Seventh Army had set up listening posts in the forward line, whose duty it was to exercise surveillance and report any excessive noise from our truck motors. Thanks to the results collected by these listening posts, it was found possible to draw in the perimeter of this forbidden area to five kilometers.
By the end of November 44, Seventh Army had issued attacks orders to the corps:
Seventh Army will cross the Our and Sauer rivers on X-Day, smash its way through the enemy front in the Vianden–Echternach sector and, with its strong right wing, will defend the south flank of Fifth Pz Army by advancing to the Gedinne–Libramont–Martelange–Mersch–Wasserbillig line. The Seventh Army mission will then change to one of mobile defense. Advance elements will proceed as far as the Semois sector and the area north of Luxembourg, in order to reconnoiter, to deny the main roads and river crossings, and to delay the advance of the enemy forces toward the blocking line. Therefore:
a. At 0530 hours on X-Day, LXXXV Inf Corps (with 5 FJ Div on the right and 352 Volks Gren Div on the left) will cross the Our and breach the enemy front in the sector Vianden–Wallendorf (exclusive). It will drive west and turn south to the Gedinne–Libramont–Martelange–Mersch line, where it will – en masse – go over to the defensive. By the use of mobile advance elements, it will maintain contact with the south flank of Fifth Panzer Army, which will be driving through Bastogne on the north. LXXXV Inf Corps will continue its advance beyond the blocking line as far as the Semois sector, where the main crossings will be denied to the enemy.
b. LXXX Inf Corps (with 276 Volks Gren Div on the right and 212 Volks Gren Div on the left) will jump off at 0530 hrs on X-Day and cross the Sauer, smash its way through the enemy front in the Wallendorf–Echternach sector. LXXX Inf Corps will drive forward to the Mersch–Wasserbillig line and then will – en masse – go over to the defensive. LXXX Inf Corps will advance mobile elements as far forward as Luxembourg, with the same mission as the corresponding elements of LXXXV Inf Corps, except that LXXX Inf Corps will delay the enemy advance to the north or northeast through Luxembourg. Thus, the enemy artillery area of Medernach–Christnach–Altrier will be reached as quickly as possible. In order to deceive the enemy, assault detachments will cross the river south of Echternach as well.
c. LIII Inf Corps will be initially in army reserve. It will be prepared to take command (during the course of the operation) of either the right wing or the center of the Seventh Army zone.
d. Boundary Lines:
Between Fifth Pz Army and Seventh Army:
Kyllburg (Fifth)–Neuerburg (Fifth)–Stolzemburg (Fifth)–Wiltz (Seventh)– Bastogne (Fifth)–St. Hubert (Seventh)–Gedinne (Seventh).
Between LXXXV and LXXX Inf Corps:
Speicher (LXXX)–Kruchten (LXXXV)–Wallendorf (LXXX)–Ermsdorf (LXXX)–Mersch (LXXX).
Between Seventh Army and First Army:
Nittel (Seventh)–Luxembourg (First).
LXXXV Inf Corps and LXXX Inf Corps had issued their attack orders to their divisions at the beginning of December. Simultaneously, the division commanders and their chiefs of staff had been initiated into the plan, as with the other initiates, under the injunction of strictest secrecy.
Since their arrival in the assembly area, divisions had undergone an active training program, with emphasis on remedying – by mid-December 44 – the serious inadequacies of unit training and of combined-arms training. Special attention was given to river crossings; practice crossings were made on the Saar, the Kyll, the Prüm. These practice sessions were explained to the troops and the local population as being preparation for counterattacks in the event of an enemy breakthrough in the Eifel.
X-Day was designated by a very special enciphered message four days in advance. Therefore, movement into the forward assembly areas was to be completed during the first two nights of the last four days preceding the attack, and only in the night before the actual attack were the jump-off positions to be occupied. Since on 9 Dec 44, 12 Dec 44 was finally set as the great date, it follows that the two subsequent nights were to be those for the final assembly. All these movements had been thoroughly scrutinized and checked in every minute detail. One of the greatest difficulties was that of avoiding, at all costs, any collision of one unit with another, for 2 Pz Div and Pz Lehr Div had to march from the rear assembly area, across the Seventh Army rear, to the forward assembly area. Withdrawal of the divisions scheduled for reconstitution and their assembly after reorganization in the proper attack zones had been very thoroughly planned. These movements were facilitated by prior reconnaissance executed by special detachments, and by the issuance of detailed instructions. Another particular difficulty was the movement of guns and mortars into their firing positions. Since no motor vehicle could move closer than five kilometers to the front, all guns had to be manhandled or towed by horse power for this distance.
Once emplaced, guns were camouflaged as thoroughly as possible. The wheels of the guns and motor vehicles had previously been wrapped with straw and rags, so as to diminish incidental noise; to a certain extent, ‘noise-camouflage’ was secured each night by having planes fly low above the moving vehicles to drown the sound of their motors. In order to foil the enemy air reconnaissance, guns were dug in to the maximum extent possible. Tanks were well concealed by the construction of deep, well-camouflaged emplacements.
No artillery registration was permitted. Firing data, therefore, had to be obtained by calculation or by liaison with the batteries of the divisions which had been occupying the position.
Seventh Army was obliged to transfer a considerable part of its relatively ample transport facilities to the newly constituted Sixth Pz Army, so that we now had only the minimum necessary for our supply requirements. Therefore, the motor transport of the volks artillery corps and volks projector brigades had to be fully utilized in the movement to the forward assembly area.
Seventh Army’s left wing, behind which one regiment of 212 Volks Gren Div had been placed as security against a threat emanating from the Orscholz switch line, was to be uncovered recklessly, so as to enable 212 Volks Gren Div to be held ready as closely integrated as possible in its attack zone of Bollendorf–Echternach. Therefore, the entire front between Wintersdorf and Nittel was defended only by 999 Penal Bn, one fortress machine gun battalion, and six immobile guns.6 As a reserve south of Trier stood the Seventh Army Service School (strength, one weak battalion). Even this minor reorganization was permitted only during the last night or two.
On 12 Dec 44, the engineer brigade finally arrived. It consisted of two battalions, which had been trained only in obstacle construction and had no training in military bridge construction. The arrival of the Organization Todt brigade and of the bridge columns was delayed by the difficult transportation situation on the west side of the Rhine. Seventh Army tried to move them up with the motor transport of the volks artillery corps, but by 17 Dec 44 had succeeded in bringing up only one more column, conveyed irregularly in single vehicles as available.
Since X-Day (originally 12 Dec 44) was postponed from day to day because of the weather conditions, Seventh Army still hoped that sufficient stream-crossing material would be brought up. When, on 14 Dec 44, the attack was finally set for 16 Dec 44, Seventh Army protested vehemently to Army Group B that the shortage of engineer equipment stream-crossing material would seriously threaten the accomplishment of the Army’s mission.
On 11 and 12 Dec 44 all Army, corps, and division commanders of the units to participate in the offensive were summoned to the Staff Headquarters of High Command West, at Ziegenberg near Bad Nauheim, where Adolf Hitler impressed on them the vital importance of the offensive. On this occasion, the Commanding General of Seventh Army seized the opportunity to express Seventh Army’s viewpoint to Genobst Jodl, and emphasize its fears that the lack of engineer equipment and troops would jeopardize the attainment of its mission. Genobst Jodl promised further assistance, just as Army Group B had done. But, actually, on the day the attack began the catastrophic nature of Seventh Army’s engineer situation had not been remedied one iota. The Organization Todt brigade did not come up until 17 or 18 Dec 44, and one or two additional bridge columns arrived only shortly before Christmas.
Antiaircraft defense in the army was provided by a flak brigade (two regiments) of III Flak Corps (Commanding General: Gen Pickert). During the concentration, most of the antiaircraft guns were placed forward, at the Moselle and Kyll bridges, as protection for the troops and equipment moving through these defiles; but, at the beginning of the offensive their center of gravity was shifted to the right wing so that they could protect the highly important Our and Sauer crossing sites and, incidentally, their own assembly and artillery area. At the main crossings were placed batteries which could instantly move to the western bank when required. Single batteries were attached to the elements. 5 FJ Div had its own integral flak battalion; the volks grenadier divisions each had one battery (20 mm and 37 mm). Single batteries (20 mm and 37 mm) were placed along the routes of advance and main supply routes to defend the open stretches and the defiles. (The above details have been checked and confirmed by Gen Pickert, Commanding General of III Flak Corps. Allendorf, June 46.)
Although Army Group B had directed that a very brief artillery preparation be made simultaneously along the entire army front, Seventh Army left this matter to the discretion of the various corps, since conditions in each zone would depend upon the width of the river and the distance between the enemy positions and the line of departure. Seventh Army ordered that any artillery preparation and all fire support be directed only against known targets (such as pockets of resistance, bivouac areas, etc.), with the main concentration to be on located enemy batteries. The most advanced assault groups were to take advantage of this preparation to work their way through No Man’s Land and across the first streams. But an order from higher headquarters forbade them to pass the most forward line of combat outposts before 0530 hrs.
As favorable results had been obtained from experiments in the use of searchlights to illuminate enemy territory, several searchlight batteries were assembled, mainly on the high plateau of Ferschweiler, with the object of blinding the enemy and lighting up the targets when the preparation began. About fifty heavy searchlights were available for this purpose.
Because of the postponement of X-Day (originally 12 Dec 44) to await a period of bad flying weather, all movement into the forward assembly area was halted. To be sure, most of the preparations had already been completed, e.g., the emplacement of guns and mortars, the bringing forward of the improvised bridge material, the insertion of staffs for the relief of units in the forward line, etc. This delay entailed a certain danger of betraying the project. Nevertheless the careful scrutiny from the air of our positions by the enemy revealed nothing to him of significance, so that we could still count on achieving surprise. The troops themselves were told of the offensive only one day in advance.
With the exception of the severe difficulties in the assembly of engineer troops and equipment, all preparations for the attack had been carried out according to plan with comparative smoothness. In the night of 15/16 Dec 44, our forces were disposed as follows:
a. On the right, LXXXV Inf Corps:
Gen Inf Kniess
C of S: Obst i.G. Lassen
CP: Burg
(1) With, on its right: 5 FJ Div
Sector: Vianden – east of Bettel
Cmdr: Gen Heilmann
Ia: Maj Passlik
CP: a bunker north of Roth
Composition: |
13, 14, and 15 FJ Inf Regts |
|
assault gun bn (about 20 SP assault guns) [11 StuG Brig.] |
|
one flak bn |
|
one mortar bn |
|
one arty regt (two bns: one mobile, one immobile) |
|
one engr bn |
|
one AT bn |
|
three reinforcement bns |
Total strength: about 20,000 men
(2) And, on its left: 352 Volks Gren Div
Sector: Gentingen – Wallendorf (exclusive)
Cmdr: Obst Schmidt until 25 Dec 44, then Genmaj Batzing
Ia: Maj i.G. Schneider
CP: Hüttingen
Composition: |
as for other volks grenadier divisions, incl one battery of 6 SP assault guns* |
(3) And, as corps troops:
one volks arty corps (five bns)
one volks proj brig
one obsn bn
b. On the left, LXXX Inf Corps:
Gen Inf Dr. Beyer
C of S: Obst i.G. Goestlin
CP: Wolsfelder Burg
(1) With, on its right: 276 Volks Gren Div
Sector: Wallendorf – Bollendorf (both inclusive)
Cmdr: Genmaj Möhring, KIA 18 Dec 44, then Obst Dempwolff
Ia: Maj i.G. Wittmann
CP: Schankweiler
Composition: |
as for other volks grenadier divisions, except no battery of SP assault guns, until one arrived at the end of the month. |
(2) And, as corps troops:
one volks arty corps (five bns)
one arty bn (120 mm)
one volks proj brig
c. Under army control:
LIII Inf Corps HQ, located at Föhren.
one engr brig, controlled at the crossing sites by the Army Engr Off
one flak brig, especially instructed in cooperation
d. Simultaneously arriving in the army rear area:
(1) In High Command West reserve: 9 Volks Gren Div
Assembly area: vicinity of Wittlich
Cmdr: Genmaj Kolb
Ia: Obstlt i.G.?
Composition: |
as for other volks grenadier divisions, incl one battery of 11 SP assault guns |
(2) In High Command Wehrmacht reserve: 79 Volks Gren Div
Assembly area: northwest of Wittlich
Cmdr: Obst Weber until 30 Dec 44, then Obst Hummel
Ia: Obstlt i.G. Henneberg
Composition: |
as for other volks grenadier divisions, incl one battery of 11 SP assault guns |
(3) In High Command Wehrmacht reserve: Führer Gren Brig
Assembly area: vicinity of Bitburg
Cmdr: |
Obst Kahler until 25 Dec 44, then Obst Kühn, until 27 Dec 44, then Obst Meder |
Composition: |
one pz gren bn, incl one hv armd car co |
|
one bicycle bn |
|
one rcn bn |
|
one pz bn (25 Mk IVs & Vs) |
|
one battery of 20 SP assault guns |
|
one engr bn |
|
one reinforcement bn |
(4) Later, one artillery battalion of a volks artillery corps moved up.
Thus, the total strength of the army at the beginning of the attack (exclusive of the strategic reserves of the higher commands) was:
24 inf bns
6 engr bns
30 self-propelled assault guns (approx)
25 arty bns (319 guns)
2 proj brigs (108 projs)
2 obsn bns
6 flak bns
6 field reinforcement bns
On 15 Dec 44 Seventh Army was advised that X-Day would be 16 Dec 44. Therefore, the operations section of the army staff moved during the night of 15/16 Dec 44 to the forward command post at Dockendorf. The main command post simultaneously moved to Eisenschmidt.
At 0530 hrs on 16 Dec 44, Seventh Army started its part of the attack, according to plan. The form of artillery support differed between the two attacking corps. In the case of LXXXV Inf Corps a ten-minute artillery preparation was laid down, under cover of which the assault companies stole forward as far as the combat outposts – in certain instances, beyond these as far as the point where they would be just out of range of stray shells emanating from the enemy’s most advanced artillery positions – and began the task of crossing the streams. The fire plan foresaw a gradually increasing intensity of fire, directed so that it would reach its highest concentration of ferocity shortly before the breakthrough of the enemy’s strongpoints. It was provided that known enemy artillery positions, presumably manned, receive the main concentration, along with his assembly areas.
On the other hand, LXXX Inf Corps, whose assault waves had a much greater distance to go before reaching their point of breakthrough, dispensed with any artillery preparation so as not to alert the enemy. Its spearhead troops jumped off from their line of departure and silently crossed the Sauer under cover of darkness. It was only when they had achieved a breakthrough that their artillery support would come into play, at which time its targets would be the same as in the other corps. For dealing with the enemy batteries further ahead in the area of Altrier, a 120 mm artillery battalion had been subordinated to LXXX Inf Corps.
Seventh Army was of the opinion – an opinion later confirmed – that, with so few worthwhile targets present, the effect of the artillery fire would be very dubious, especially since the accuracy of our guns had been diminished by digging them in to ground level and by camouflaging them.
Insofar as it had been possible to use them near the front, the guns of the infantry regiments, the guns of the flak battalions, impressed with the necessity for full collaboration, and also the heavy infantry weapons had been included in the fire plan.
The searchlights proved of great assistance, making the enemy area as bright as day and blinding his gun crews while our own troops remained shrouded in darkness. This eased the task of the attacking infantry.
Each of the divisions attacking had formed two attack groups which sent their best shock companies against the enemy resistance nests to their front. These companies were supported by detachments carrying bridge-building equipment. Such shock companies were used along the entire attack front of Seventh Army:
a. In the sector of 5 FJ Div, east of Vianden by 14 FJ Inf Regt, and at Roth by 13 FJ Inf Regt.
b. In the sector of 352 Volks Gren Div, at Gentingen by 915 Inf Regt, and at Ammeldingen by 916 Inf Regt.
c. In the sector of 276 Volks Gren Div, south-east of Wallendorf by 986 Inf Regt, and at Bollendorf by 987 Inf Regt.
d. In the sector of 212 Volks Gren Div, at Weiterbach by 423 Inf Regt, and east of Echternach by 320 Inf Regt.
In the main, the jump-off of the attacking spearheads began smoothly and according to plan, with scarcely any losses. The element of surprise seemed to have been completely achieved along the entire front. The degree of resistance which the advancing attack groups met on the western bank of the river varied for the different groups. The weakest defense was encountered by the right wing of 5 FJ Div, which succeeded in taking Vianden and after a short battle fought around single strongpoints – mainly in the vicinity of Vianden Castle – and in establishing a bridgehead some two to three kilometers in depth west of Roth. This offered sufficient protection to start bridging the stream at once. And this was where the first snags appeared. The conveyance of the building material proved to be a lengthy affair as a result of the bad roads, the steep grades, and the hairpin turns on the way.
Through a local failure of the lower echelons and the unsatisfactory way in which the boundary had been drawn between 5 FJ Div and 352 Volks Gren Div, the initial surprise was not properly exploited to take the enemy strongpoint at Föhren. Heavy mortar fire skilfully directed from an excellent observation post, was emerging from this point against the bridge position at Roth. The erection of the bridge by the poorly trained bridge columns took a long time; only on 17 Dec 44 was the bridge complete – after the enemy strongpoint at Fouhren had been taken by 15 FJ Inf Regt in coordination with elements of the 352 Volks Gren Div.
The attack group on the right, 14 FJ Inf Regt, was able to sweep through Vianden and take considerable territory. On the afternoon of 16 Dec 44, it attained its immediate objective, the ridge line and road Diekirch–Hosingen– vicinity of Hoscheid. To the rear, local battles took place against American groups fighting valiantly in the area of Putscheid and Weiler. The bringing up of the reserve regiments (15 FJ Inf Regt) whose task it was to mop up these resistance nests, was in progress.
352 Volks Gren Div, likewise exploiting skilfully the element of surprise, had considerable success. The attack group on the right, 915 Inf Regt, moving forward energetically against an enemy stoutly defending himself in well-fortified positions, had attained by the afternoon of the first day the heights around Bastendorf and Longsdorf, its initial objectives. Here, too, enemy groups were resisting, and these were attacked by 914 Inf Regt, which had been brought up for that purpose. For the moment, these two places remained in the hands of the enemy. The Army had ordered that in general such nests of resistance were to be by-passed and left to be disposed of by the reserves coming up later.
The attack group on the left (916 Inf Regt) had encountered very stubborn resistance on the heights west and northwest of Wallendorf, where it became involved in very bloody fighting in its attempt to free the division’s left flank, north of the Sauer.
During the day of 16 Dec 44, enemy resistance on the right wing of the division notably stiffened, so that before the advance elements could push on to the Sauer sector of Michelau–Ettelbrück they had to be reformed again. In the building of the bridges over the river in the division zone even more trouble was met than had been encountered by 5 FJ Div. Here also the enemy was accurately placing his mortar shells with the assistance of excellent observation posts on the heights, and the task of erecting the bridges was made more difficult by the fast current of the stream and the softness of the river bottom. At this point, we lost a good deal of construction material and suffered many casualties.
Along the entire front of LXXX Inf Corps, enemy resistance was notably stronger, more concentrated, and tougher, despite the achievement of surprise. The elements of 4 U.S. Inf Div employed here defended themselves in skilfully constructed strongpoints which utilized the favorable configuration of the terrain to great advantage. These American troops made a much more formidable impression on us than did those in the sector of 28 U.S. Inf Div. Furthermore, American artillery in the Medernach–Altrier sector, which we had known to be very strong, lent very efficient support to the defenders after midday of 16 Dec 44, and very greatly hindered the work of erecting the bridges, not only on the left wing but in the entire sector of the corps.
The 276 Volks Gren Div, even as early as the moment when the infantry was to cross the river, encountered unexpectedly serious resistance, mainly from machine guns and mortars emplaced on the heights west of Wallendorf, in the triangle of the Our and Sauer rivers. As a result of this hammering at its right flank, the division was unable to attain its initial objective. But while the right wing of the right attack group was thus halted, the left wing was able to take Bigelbach by the evening of 16 Dec 44. The attack group on the left, by taking possession of the heights on the western bank of the river, southwest of Dillingen, and by pushing into the valley of the Schwarzen Ernz, was able to build a small bridgehead across the Sauer. The third regiment of 276 Volks Gren Div was still moving to the assembly area during the night prior to the attack, so that it was not available for the first day of the offensive. It may have been this, as well as the unexpectedly large number of enemy strongpoints encountered, that split the division and diminished its weight and penetrating power. In this case, the inadequate training of the newly constituted division made itself painfully felt.
212 Volks Gren Div, aided by surprise, had attacked energetically and quickly crossed the river. However, the relatively strong enemy forces occupying Echternach, the difficult nature of the terrain, and – later on – heavy American artillery fire, made their mission an arduous one.
Despite these drawbacks, the well-trained and well-led troops on the right flank (423 Inf Regt) managed to seize the heights above Berdorf and to penetrate into the village itself. Here, heavy and bitter fighting developed, but our troops succeeded in holding the place even though the enemy made a heavy counter-attack with tank support, an attack which we succeeded in defeating with only close range antitank weapons (panzerfausts, rocket-launchers, etc.), knocking out a number of enemy tanks in the process.
The left attack group (320 Inf Regt) succeeded in pressing forward on both sides of Echternach. They reached as far as Roudenhaff, two kilometers further south, to the southern fringe of the wood north of Dickweiler and the heights just west and south of Girsterklaus. Inside this bridgehead, enemy strongpoints were still holding out, principally at Birkelt and Echternach; the fire from here, directed by artillery observers against the Sauer crossings, had a very damaging effect. Due to these enemy actions and the aforementioned lack of engineer strength and material, not a single bridge had been completed at the end of the first day.
The third regiment of the division (316 Inf Regt) had been placed in Seventh Army reserve, so that neither the division nor the corps had any control over its employment.
On the evening of 16 Dec 44, Seventh Army was satisfied with the tactical successes achieved. If it was true that the goals reached – above all in the center and on the left wing of the army – were not all that had been planned and expected, it was also true that the penetration of the enemy front, especially on the strategically important right wing of the army, had succeeded. Our estimate of the enemy had been fully confirmed. Seventh Army had always expected that enemy resistance would be strengthened by early commitment of his rearward reserves. It was now a matter of making the breakthrough a thorough one before the enemy had a chance to bring up stronger reserves, and, with our main effort definitely on the right wing of the army, of winning more ground to the West. If – by chance – the left wing of the army should not make such good progress as we hoped, this would not be terribly serious, so long as it ‘fixed’ enemy forces by drawing them into combat with itself, if possible.
It was of decisive importance for the continuation of the battle plan, however, that the artillery, the heavy weapons, and the assault guns of the divisions should be transported to the western bank of the river in order to support adequately the further offensive advance. But the bridge situation was nothing less than catastrophic! In previous calculations, the Army had assumed that it would be possible to erect one 24-ton bridge in each division zone by the night of 16/17 Dec 44 at the latest. But on the basis of the reports received such construction seemed to be decidedly uncertain on the right wing, and impossible in the center and on the left wing. The Army did what it could, so far as material assistance was concerned, without being able to overcome this disadvantage. Its worst fears had been realized. On learning, during the evening of 16 Dec 44, that one Our bridge had been completed at Gemünd on the southern flank of Fifth Pz Army, Seventh Army sought to utilize this for the conveyance across the stream of the assault guns and motorized artillery of 5 FJ Div. Unfortunately, the bridge in question was so heavily occupied by the tanks of Fifth Pz Army that our request was rejected.7
However, notwithstanding the difficulty in the matter of bridges, Seventh Army ordered the attack to be pressed on 17 Dec 44 with all available means. LXXXV Inf Corps was ordered to advance across the Clerf and the Sauer and, above all, to seize the crossings at Kautenbach and Ettelbrück. LXXX Inf Corps was ordered to continue its efforts to attain its initial objective, i.e., the enemy artillery position areas. The resistance nests still in existence were to be bypassed and left to the attention of the reserve regiments.
These intentions were realized on 17 Dec 44 only on the right wing, where 14 FJ Inf Regt of 5 FJ Div succeeded by quick, sharp attack in seizing the Clerf crossing at Kautenbach and thus opening the way for the further progress of the division through Wiltz to the west. By this action, the primary mission of Seventh Army, protection of the southern flank of Fifth Pz Army and the maintenance of contact with it, was fulfilled.
As a result of the Bridge situation, only during the night of 17 Dec 44 were the advance reserves of 5 FJ Div able to cross the Our in order to push further west out of the Kautenbach bridgehead. The regiments of 5 FJ Div were still mopping-up between the Our and the Clerf, principally in the area of Holzthum and Consthum and along the length of the road from Putscheid to Hoscheid. But the rest of the div now assembled. Artillery was still completely lacking, as were antiaircraft guns, for the bridge of Roth was finished only in the afternoon of 17 Dec 44. It had proved feasible to get single assault guns over the top of a weir near Vianden, but with very great difficulty. It was impossible to ford the Our because of its swollen state at the time. However, the lack of artillery and heavy weapons was not such a serious drawback in this zone, as the enemy was no longer putting up any concentrated resistance.
It was obvious that the German attack on both sides of the boundary between Fifth Pz Army and Seventh Army had struck upon a particularly weak spot, for the southern wing of the neighbor unit on the right had also made good progress and was now, after the capture of the Clerf sector and Drauffelt, fighting abreast of the spearheads of 5 FJ Div. On the other hand, the complete lack of artillery support had a disastrous influence on the situation along the remainder of the army front, so that, except in the 5 FJ Div zone, only minor local successes were achieved.
It is true that 352 Volks Gren Div had finally been able, with the assistance of the newly committed 914 Inf Regt, to take Longsdorf, after it had held out for some time. However, 352 Volks Gren Div made no further progress worthy of mention either in the sector of Bastendorf or in the sector northwest of Wallendorf. Nor did the attempt of the two attack groups to gain contact with each other through the insertion of 914 Inf Regt meet with success. The toughening resistance of the enemy made it clear that he was committing all reserves available locally (engineer troops were now appearing on his side), throwing them into the defensive battle, and fighting desperately to keep open his Sauer bridgeheads at Ettelbrück and Diekirch. And the increasing casualties on our side showed plainly that this tough resistance of the Americans was not to be broken without the aid of artillery and assault guns. As it was expected that the miliary bridge at Gentingen would be ready for traffic by 17 Dec 44, it was hoped that we would be able to get the artillery pieces and heavy weapons of the 352 Volks Gren Division over to the other side in the night of 17/18 Dec 44. But the roads down to the river and up the other side proved to be so steep (some were curved as well), and so slippery because of the weather, that the transfer to the other bank of the river proved to be a slow and wearisome task. The Organization Todt brigade whose assistance had been promised had not yet turned up.
On the right wing of LXXX Inf Corps, 276 Volks Gren Div’s right assault group was able to make some local progress and to take the wood north of Beaufort. Nevertheless, the resistance on the right flank, where the enemy was obstinately resisting in the Our–Sauer triangle, could not be crushed. In the direction of Waldbillig, the attack was brought to a halt through a lack of adequate support.
The difficulties of the river crossing were especially great in the case of the 276th Division. The attempts to erect a military bridge at Wallendorf were defeated by the artillery fire of the enemy, with heavy material and personnel losses on our side.
After this fiasco, all of the undamaged bridging equipment and the newly arriving portions of a bridge column were utilized in erection of a bridge alongside the old road bridge. This new bridge was not ready for use until 17 Dec 44, so that the 276 Volks Gren Div was compelled to use the bridges at Gentingen in the zone of its right neighbor, the 352, and at Weilerbach in the 212 Volks Gren Div zone, to get single heavy weapons across to the other side.
In the zone of the 212th Division, attempts to get a bridge thrown across the stream east of Echternach had been broken up by enemy artillery fire. The attempt, too, to continue the work at night under searchlights was a failure. After this, 212 Volks Gren Div had – on its own initiative – repaired a covered-in bridge (already damaged by artillery fire) at Weilerbach, north of Echternach. This, however, was possible only after the enemy strongpoint at Birkelt had been eliminated on 18 Dec 44. Thus, on 18 Dec 44, there was at least one way across the river open to both divisions of the LXXX Inf Corps.
Because of the inadequate support received, 212 Volks Gren Div made little progress on 17 Dec 44; however, Echternach was now completely encircled, so that the American troops heroically fighting there were putting up a losing battle. Several enemy counterattacks against Berdorf were repulsed.
As had been foreseen, the overall position of Seventh Army was a perilous one, owing to the lack of engineer troops and equipment. For this reason, it was a stroke of pure luck that the consequences of this shortage had been felt least of all on the decisive northern wing of the Army. It was now a matter of advancing the right wing with all forces at our disposal, in a westerly direction, and of protecting this movement by advancing southwest through Michelau and Ettelbrück. The situation of LXXX Inf Corps was of lesser significance. Here it was only a matter of getting the attack going again, in order to hold down enemy forces, of eliminating the influence of the enemy artillery where the corps on the right was trying to cross the river, and of delaying the advance of the enemy reserves as much as possible.
It was to be hoped that by 18 Dec 44 – three bridges would be completed with one or two more finished by 19 Dec 44. This would relieve the whole general situation on the western bank of the river. But in the meantime valuable time – the precious moment of surprise – had been lost! The enemy forces opposite our center and our left wing had recovered from the initial shock and had begun to counterattack. Considerable losses on our side had been the result.
The difficulties met in crossing the river – scarcity of building material, insufficiently trained personnel, and the state of the river itself at the time, not to mention the slopes and turns down to and up from the banks – caused traffic jams at the points of crossing. But one thing we had to be thankful for was that the inclement weather spared us the ordeal of heavy air attacks. During the next few days after 19 Dec 44 the clouds cleared away somewhat, but the moderate raids by enemy planes were adequately dealt with by our antiaircraft defenses, the main force of the enemy’s air strength being at this time concentrated on the panzer armies. Losses in personnel at the points where the bridges were being set up were not very great initially. What did constitute a serious dis-advantage was the delay in getting the guns and heavy weapons across the streams (due to the narrowness and the poor quality of the roads leading to and from them), and the delay in getting our troops and supplies across.
By 18 Dec 44 we had succeeded in getting the main body of 5 FJ Div over to the western bank. In the main, only the large reinforcement battalion of this numerically strong division (20,000 men) was still waiting to cross – about 6,000 men, plus some rear-echelon troops, remained on the eastern bank. During the course of this day, the enemy resistance nests still holding out between the Our and the Clerf were mopped up and 5 FJ Div started to move westward. The leading battalions from the Kautenbach bridgehead, pushing ahead along the highway south of Wiltz through Nocher and Roullingen, went first. Next, the 14 FJ Inf Regt moved by the same route, while 13 FJ Inf Regt proceeded along the road flanking the Sauer to the North, through Hoscheid in the direction of Esch sur la Sûre. 15 FJ Inf Regt, assisted by elements of 352 Volks Gren Div, had taken the strongpoint at Föhren and now had the task of fighting a way clear on the northern flank of the 352 Volks Gren Div, in the direction of Brandenburg.
However, on this day, 352 Volks Gren Div did not succeed in making any noteworthy progress with its right wing, as the artillery was still moving to the western bank of the Our. At this time, the main effort of the division lay on its left wing where – as a prerequisite for its further progress and for the elimination of the obstacle facing the right wing of LXXX Inf Corps – the resistance on the heights west of Wallendorf had to be broken. From these heights the enemy could still sweep the crossings at Gentingen and southeast of Wallendorf with partially directed artillery fire. A coordinated attack by our troops overcame the enemy elements fighting tenaciously in strongly fortified strongpoints, and finally took the heights. Isolated strongpoints and resistance nests were bypassed.
Our neighbor on the right (XLVII Pz Corps) had, on 18 Dec 44, taken Allenborn with two panzer divisions, Niederwampach with Pz Lehr Div, and Oberwampach with 26 Volks Gren Div. Therefore, the mission of Seventh Army, whose right wing had taken the sector of Wiltz on the first day, was now much closer to accomplishment.
On 19 Dec 44, 5 FJ Div scored a particularly fine success. While the advance elements of the division pushed ahead to reach Harlange (southeast of Bastogne), the reinforced engineer battalion, which had turned off northward, was able to encircle a strong enemy group (elements of 28 U.S. Inf Div and 9 U.S. Armd Div). Several hundred prisoners were taken, with rich booty. Among the material taken were some 40 Sherman tanks, 20 of which were put in order by the engineer battalion and manned with members of the assault gun brigades, constituting a very welcome addition to the forces of the division. Here on the right wing of the Army the impression had grown that no further resistance of any great significance was to be expected from the enemy in this zone. The main body of 28 U.S. Inf Div and 9 U.S. Armd Div seemed to have been wiped out.
Along the length of the roads running across the area to the south of Bastogne there was only sporadic and incoherent resistance still being offered by isolated enemy groups.
352 Volks Gren Div was able to take Bastendorf with its right assault group and regain contact between it and 915 Inf Regt on the left. This meant that a unified command within the framework of the division was again possible. The continuation of the attack, however, still hung up somewhat, for the artillery and heavy weapons had not yet all arrived. Local attacks on our part alternated with counterattacks by the Americans on heights, in villages, and in woods here and there in the vicinity of Diekirch and north thereof During one of these battles the Division Commander, Obst Schmidt, was wounded. He remained in command of the division in spite of this, until relieved by Genmaj Batzing.
In the entire zone of LXXXV Inf Corps, no new enemy detachments – with the exception of rear-echelon units (engineer troops) – had appeared. But this did not mean that the enemy troops in front of the left wing of the corps had been beaten. It was therefore imperative to get the attack of 3 52 Volks Gren Div going again, to wipe out the important enemy bridgehead of Ettelbrück–Diekirch, and to transfer our forces to the other side of the Sauer. Otherwise, enemy reserves might soon come pouring out of the bridgehead in a counterattack against the southern base of the German offensive, or – at least – might be able to strengthen the bridgehead greatly.
Seventh Army, therefore, gave the necessary orders and made an effort to form an artillery center of gravity with portions of the Volks Artillery Corps, the Volks Projector Brigades, and the flak units, so as to lend assistance to 352 Volks Gren Div, whose part of the attack was still hung up.
It had already transpired in the course of the fighting that the practice of trying to bypass isolated enemy nests of resistance was not always successful. The enemy did not simply lay down his arms even if he had been isolated, and he managed to interrupt our lines of supply frequently. In other cases, however, our own tempo of attack flagged considerably; significant numbers of troops were absorbed by security duties in the rear, as there were no reserves available for such duties, although the Army had asked for them to be made available. And again, the half-trained troops were not fully accustomed to the type of warfare being conducted, a type in which tank groups had to be followed by closely-integrated infantry formations for mopping-up purposes.
On 20 Dec 44, the development of the situation along the entire front was favorable to LXXXV Inf Corps. Its right neighbor (XLVII Corps) was stalled along the Noville–Bizory–Neffe line, northeast and east of Bastogne, having come up against strong enemy resistance in the shape of 101 U.S. A/B Div, and was regathering its tank forces, in order to advance them past Bastogne – 2 Pz Div on the north and Pz Lehr Div on the south.
However, 5 FJ Div south and southeast of Bastogne had not met with any resistance worth mentioning. Reconnaissance patrols sent out by the division had penetrated west of the road from Bastogne to Martelange, but had discovered no signs whatever of any enemy forces arriving from the south or the southwest. The leading units of the division – 14 FJ Inf Regt on the right and 13 FJ Inf Regt on the left – closed their ranks and managed to advance their forward elements almost to the Berle–Liefrange line. 15 FJ Inf Regt, which at the time found itself in the area of Brandenburg still east of the Sauer, pressed forward to the west and succeeded in taking the Sauer crossing at Michelau.
Both corps and army then paused to weigh the advantages of an attack west of the river Sauer in a southerly direction, with the object of opening the crossing at Ettelbrück from the rear; but decided against such a tactical move, since it was contrary to the idea of keeping the center of gravity of the attack on the right flank. In addition, the difficulties of crossing the river at Michelau were so great that such a push could not have been followed up without sufficient artillery support.
Meanwhile, the attack of 352 Volks Gren Div (after the capture of Bastendorf and the location of the artillery west of the Our) had started moving again. On 20 Dec 44 they succeeded in taking heights of some tactical importance south of Bastendorf, and the left attack group (916 Inf Regt) captured Diekirch. The enemy had succeeded in destroying every one of the bridges over the Sauer between Wallendorf and Diekirch, with the exception of a small bridge west of Reisdorf. However, the bridge at Diekirch was not completely destroyed and the infantry and single heavy weapons could be brought over to the other side. The division closed its ranks, therefore, with strong detachments of 916 Inf Regt pushing west along the southern bank of the Sauer with the mission of opening the crossing at Ettelbrück from the rear. The division command post had been displaced to Bastendorf. Seventh Army now collected a bridge column and, in the night of 20/21 Dec 44, sent it over to the division, which was to have the mission of throwing a bridge over the river at Ettelbrück. The construction was done that night.
There was still no sign of the appearance of enemy reserves moving to attack the Martelange–Ettelbrück line. Owing to the unavailability of any air reconnaissance, we were entirely dependent on the results of ground reconnaissance and radio intelligence. However, there were now signs of the appearance of a new enemy formation in the zone of LXXX Inf Corps; therefore, Seventh Army concluded that the enemy, contrary to our expectations, was about to throw in the first reserves he could lay hands on from the sector of 4 U.S. Inf Div. Our opinion was that tank formations would momentarily appear in an attack against the deeper flank of our offensive, between Neufchâteau and Ettelbrück.
During 21 Dec 44, the situation continued favorable in the attack zone of LXXXV Inf Corps. After its advance elements had previously passed across, 5 FJ Div reached with its forward elements the road from Bastogne to Martelange without any considerable resistance from the enemy. 13 FJ Inf Regt, on the left flank of the division, was therefore ordered to turn inward against Martelange and to prepare itself for defense and the mission of denying the Sauer crossings. The advance detachment and the march group on the right now received the order to press on ahead to Libramont. 15 FJ Inf Regt would follow the division through Wiltz.
According to news received from our neighbor on the right, Bastogne was now surrounded and was being called upon to surrender. Gen Pz Brandenberger, Commanding General of Seventh Army, was now able to link up with the troops of Gen Pz von Lüttwitz’ XLVII Pz Corps in Berlé. The latter declared the situation of his corps to be favorable; he expected the early fall of Bastogne. It was true that the most forward elements of his corps – 2 Pz Div – had gotten only midway between La Roche and St. Hubert, although – according to plan – they ought to have reached the Meuse on the fourth day of the offensive (19 Dec 44). However, the enemy in front of this corps appeared to be completely defeated and no enemy reserves of any significance had made their appearance, so that there appeared to be nothing to prevent them from reaching their initial objective, the Meuse. To be sure, at this point the specter of a fuel shortage made its appearance.
Up till now, Seventh Army, in spite of difficulties, had completely fulfilled its mission. It now received an order from Army Group B that, in addition to its mission of protecting the southern flank of the offensive, it would form a front to the north and prevent any escape of the trapped garrison of Bastogne, in the direction of Martelange; Pz Lehr Div and elements of 26 Volks Gren Div would secure the front at Sibret in the direction of Neufchâteau. For assisting in this task, portions of 14 FJ Inf Regt would be used, later to be relieved by 15 FJ Inf Regt.
352 Volks Gren Div finally succeeded in taking Ettelbrück. The bridge over the Sauer was partially destroyed, but could very soon be rendered usable again with the aid of the material and bridging equipment being brought up. The long and obstinate resistance put up by the enemy at this point seemed finally to have been broken. The division was able to move forward with its advance elements towards its ultimate objective, the Attert sector of Bettborn–Bissen. There it was to pass to the defensive.
Seventh Army now had three main problems:
a. The strengthening of the front south of Bastogne, where – owing to the failure of our troops to take Bastogne – it had to be ready for attacks of enemy reserves moving in from the south and southwest to relieve the town.
b. It had to tackle the problem of the ever-widening gap between the left wing of LXXXV Inf Corps and the right wing of the LXXX Inf Corps, which neither of the two corps was able to fill. This worry could only be eliminated by the rapid advance of 276 Volks Gren Div through Medernach and Cruchten, which, however, in view of the serious situation of the division and of LXXX Inf Corps was not possible.
c. In the event of a further advance by Fifth Pz Army, the protection of its southern flank could only be assured if further troops were assigned to Seventh Army. Seventh Army once again asked Army Group B for the OKW reserves which had arrived in the Bitburg–Wittlich area, a mobile unit to be sent in on the right wing and an infantry division to be used as an army reserve in accordance with the development of the situation.
Seventh Army intended to commit the staff of LIII Inf Corps (under Gen Kav Rothkirch) on its right wing, assigning the mobile unit and 5 FJ Div to it, while LXXXV Inf Corps would confine itself to the control of 352 Volks Gren Div and the new arriving formations.
The front had already become too wide for LXXXV Inf Corps to control adequately. LIII Inf Corps, therefore, received the necessary orders to take over its new zone on 22 Dec 44.
This day represented rom a tactical and organizational point of view the turning point in the conduct of the offensive by Seventh Army. On this day, the last offensive successes occurred on the one hand; on the other, a striking change occurred in the enemy situation. The flank attack of Third American Army, under General Patton, began to make itself felt.
In the meantime, we had received no news of what was happening to the right wing of the Army. Lack of air reconnaissance on our part meant that the advance of the American formations remained hidden to our eyes until their forward elements clashed with our own ground reconnaissance. (23 Dec 44!)
The leading elements of 5 FJ Div were able to reach Vaux-les-Rosieres on 22 Dec 44. Motorized patrols pushed on to Libramont–Neufchâteau and beyond without encountering any strong enemy resistance. The regiment on the right of the division (14 FJ Inf Regt) assembled in the Hompré–Hollange area and at the same time blocked, mainly with antitank guns, the road from Bastogne to Martelange between Lutrebois and Assenois, to the north. The regiment on the left (13 FJ Inf Regt) took Martelange with its forward elements after a short battle and tried to establish a bridgehead at this point, so as to be able to send reconnaissance patrols south and southeastward. In the meantime, mopping-up operations were in order. This regiment, therefore, assembled and moved further forward to protect the northern bank of the Sauer on both sides of Martelange and to build up strongpoints with the aid of detachments sent south of the River (Arsdorf, Bilsdorf, Bigonville). The third regiment of the division, 15 FJ Inf Regt, was moving through Wiltz to the west. Division headquarters at this time was at Berlé, with an advance command post in the castle at L’Ossange, one kilometer west of Lutrebois. LIII Inf Corps set up its headquarters in Dahl, four kilometers south of Wiltz, and took over control of only 5 FJ Div at first.
352 Volks Gren Div had moved out of the area of Ettelbrück and started in the direction of its objective, 915 Inf Regt moving through Feulen–Mertzig toward Bettborn–Redingen, 914 Inf Regt moving through Michelbouch– Vichten toward Usseldingen, and 916 Inf Regt moving south through Schieren. The forward elements of the right column reached Pratz, while the main body of the regiment reached the Mertzig–Grosbous area.
Both the other regiments had reached Michelbouch and Schieren and had taken these places against rather weak enemy resistance. At this moment the division was surprised by a blow delivered by the 80 U.S. Inf Div, strengthened by elements of the 10 U.S. Armd Div. Although there was a lack of air reconnaissance, this surprise must also be blamed on our ground reconnaissance, which to a certain extent had failed us. The right flank of the Division was now very gravely threatened. 915 Inf Regt, attached to the division for the attack, did not rise to meet the crisis, although it must be borne in mind that the enemy possessed superiority of numbers and greater mobility. The enemy, moving up rapidly on both sides of the road, now succeeded in completely encircling the forward elements of this regiment in Pratz and the main body of it in Grosbous–Mertzig area. The other regiments of the division could not come to its aid, attacked as they were by the enemy, and they were driven over to the defensive. Incompleteness of training and inefficiency on the part of the lower command had a decisive effect on the outcome of this action. There was no choice but to withdraw the division into a bridgehead at Ettelbrück and to order the encircled 915 Inf Regt to fight its way out to the northeast.
Neither the corps nor the army had any reserves whatever to help the division in this critical situation. The lack of the reserves which the Army had asked for repeatedly was now bitterly felt.
Now LXXXV Inf Corps reached its decisive turning point. With the exception of the capture of Martelange, the corps had failed to reach its objective since the difficulties of crossing the Our and the lack of bridging material had caused a delay of two or three days. Had it not been for this delay, the corps would doubtless have reached the envisaged defense line with time enough to prepare for mobile defense against the expected enemy attack against the German southern flank.
For Seventh Army, the area between Martelange and Ettelbrück constituted the most urgent problem in the immediate future. Everything depended on preventing the enemy from achieving a breakthrough across the Sauer at this point and striking northward. Such a thrust into the deep flank of Fifth Pz Army would find the most dangerous strategic spot; it would not only imperil the continuation of the offensive, but would also endanger the whole army group.
In acknowledgement of this danger, 79 Volks Gren Div (Cmdr: Obst Weber) and the Führer Gren Brig (Cmdr: Obst Kahler) were released from their reserve status by the OKW and given to Seventh Army to fill its requisition. However, their most forward elements could not be expected to arrive in Hoscheid until 23 Dec 44 at the earliest.
Seventh Army intended on 22 Dec 44 to insert 79 Volks Gren Div in the gap between LXXXV and LIII Inf Corps to clear up the enemy detachments there. The Führer Gren Brig was to be delivered to LIII Inf Corps, for use as a mobile flank defense in the Gedinne–Libramont zone of the army group advance toward the Meuse. The Brigade was ordered, because of the road and bridge conditions and because of the unclarified situation between Martelange and Ettelbrück, to use the route Roth–Hoscheid–Niederschlinder–Heiderscheld–Eschdorf– Harlange.
The Fifth Pz Army on 22 Dec 44 had 2 Pz Div at a point southeast of Marche, with Pz Lehr Div in front of St. Hubert, and was obviously making good progress in its drive toward the far side of the Meuse. However, 5 FJ Div could no longer provide adequate flank protection for the attacking spearheads of the Panzer Army without further support. And, in spite of its intention, Seventh Army could not avoid temporarily committing the Führer Gren Brig in the gap between LXXXV and LIII Inf Corps.
A thankless task indeed had fallen to LXXX Inf Corps. This corps, considering the terrain and the enemy situation, had the most difficult portion of the attack to control. Moreover, its striking power had been diminished by the extension of its zone of attack from Bollendorf to Echternach, inclusive. Such an extension, however, was not only necessary, but quite correct from an operational point of view, since the arc formed by the Sauer and the Moselle had always furnished the enemy with the possibility of a large counterattack. Since the additional troops urgently requested by the Army after its attack zone had been extended could not be made available, Seventh Army had decided, despite the fact that its main effort was located on the right wing, to give its best division to LXXX Inf Corps. This was 212 Volks Gren Div under Genmaj Sensfuss, which was best in terms of training, leadership, and fighting experience. The corps could hope to receive no further reserves whatsoever, for these had had to be sent in on the strategically more important wing of the Army. It was compelled, therefore, to try to execute its mission with the rather weak forces at its disposal, even though it was important that it attempted to draw upon itself the fire of as many enemy forces as possible, and thus to tie them down. Heavy losses had been sustained by the divisions of LXXX Inf Corps as early as the first two days of the attack.
276 Volks Gren Div was able to take Reisdorf on 18 Dec 44, against an enemy defending himself stoutly. And since its right neighbor, 352 Volks Gren Div, had succeeded in taking the heights west of Wallendorf, the enemy on the right flank of 276 Volks Gren Div had finally been flattened, after he had exerted a decisive influence on the progress of the entire division. In the same vein, conditions for the river crossing were now more favorable. True, only ferries were available, since all of the bridging equipment had been carried off for use in the construction of the military bridge at Bollendorf. Since 276 Volks Gren Div still possessed no bridge of its own, it was compelled, in an effort to get a portion of its artillery and heavy weapons across, to use the bridges of its neighbor at Gentingen and Weilerbach. Both were ready for use on the night of 18/19 Dec 44.
With this assistance, and thanks to the fact that the northern flank was free, the right attack group, 986 Inf Regt, succeeded in taking Eppeldorf, thereby securing elbow room in the direction of Medernach. Meanwhile the left regiment, 987 Inf Regt, succeeded in taking Beaufort and in penetrating into the wood to the west and south. Hopes were now held that the attack on the enemy artillery position areas of Medernech–Christnach could be energetically pursued.
The division commander, Genmaj Möhring, while on a trip through the wood two kilometers east of Beaufort, was killed by enemy machine gun fire issuing from the most forward enemy line. During the next two nights the psychological influence of the death of their commander was perceptible in the attitude of the men. The noticeably diminished fighting spirit of the division could be traced partly to this cause; but it was also connected with the failure of the assault gun company to appear, and with the division’s incomplete training. After the division had been temporarily under the command of Obst Schroeder, Artillery Commander of LXXX Inf Corps, Obst Dempwolff assumed command on 22 Dec 44.
Despite the fact that the bridge at Weilerbach was not ready for use until the night of 18 Dec 44, thus rendering it impossible to get the heavy weapons, artillery, and assault guns over to the other side of the stream, 212 Volks Gren Div was able to push southward between the defended villages of Osweiler and Dickweiler with its left attack group, 320 Inf Regt, and to penetrate into the forest of Dewald, northwest of Herborn. However, 423 Inf Regt on the right was still fighting around Berdorf, where the enemy – supported by tanks – continued to fight with especial tenacity. The enemy strongpoint was still holding out at Echternach as well. It is true that a shock company of the third regiment, 316 Inf Regt, had already penetrated into the city on 17 Dec 44, but it did not succeed in clearing out the enemy troops. Nor had it been able to prevent the enemy from bringing up tank reinforcements through Lauterborn into the city.
On 18 Dec 44, the division first identified elements of 10 U.S. Armd Div in its zone. This meant that the first point for the commitment of enemy reserves against the German attack had been decided. Both Army and corps now considered the situation of the division, as a result of this development, to be very critical. Seventh Army thus released the division’s 316 Inf Regt, until then envisaged as Army reserve, to be employed as the division saw fit.
This date brought with it the greatest success along the entire front for LXXX Inf Corps, after it became possible to convey the mass of the supporting weapons over the bridge at Weilerbach, at last ready, and to commit them in support of the offensive.
276 Volks Gren Div, using its right regiment, had now reached Ermsdorf (two kilometers north of Medernach) and the heights north of Savelborn, Haller, and Waldbillig. On the left wing, a task force of the left regiment forced its way into the valley of the Schwarze Ernz as far as the area of Müllerthal. By a simultaneous attack from the north and the east the left attack group succeeded in penetrating into Christnach. This toughly defended village changed hands several times in the course of the day and at evening was again in the hands of the enemy. But the initial objective had been reached to the extent that the enemy artillery had been compelled to displace to the rear; the cessation of artillery fire against the bridge positions testified to that. On this day, also, the military bridge at Bollendorf was completed, so that the division had at last a crossing of its own. The division command post was now transferred to Beaufort.
On 19 Dec 44, 212 Volks Gren Div succeeded in gaining ground to the south, taking little heed of the enemy strongpoints still holding out to the rear, and in reaching the line: the southern fringe of the wood north of Consdorf–the northern edge of Scheidgen (zone of 423 Inf Regt)–Michelshof (one and a half kilometers southeast of Scheidgen)–the southwest fringe of the forest of Dewald–northwest of Herborn (zone of 320 Inf Regt).
This meant that here we had approached to within four kilometers of the initial objective of the attack – the area of Altrier. In the course of the day’s fighting, elements of 423 Inf Regt also succeeded in taking complete possession of Berdorf, and the division reconnaissance battalion managed to destroy the enemy strongpoint at Echternach. Here, four officers and 180 men of the valiant American defenders were taken prisoner. Opposite the enemy strongpoints at Osweiler and Dickweiler security forces were left, later to be relieved by elements of 999 Penal Bn. The reserve, 316 Inf Regt, was now moved up behind the center of the Division.
While the attempt to throw a bridge across the river east of Echternach was foiled by enemy artillery fire (aerial spotting!), another bridge was successfully erected at Edingen on 19 Dec 44. In spite of these successes achieved by the division the prospects did not seem completely favorable either to the Army or the corps. Owing to the delay which had intervened as a result of the difficulties of getting our weapons across the streams, valuable time had been frittered away, and the amount of territory gained, to the south, on which the Supreme Command had laid such emphasis, was insufficient. Even if the elements of 4 U.S. Inf Div (originally engaged in their unsupported state) had been seriously weakened by the heavy fighting, the signs were that fresh enemy forces, in addition to the elements of the already identified 10 U.S. Armd Div, would soon arrive.
Another disadvantage which had to be borne was that, as a result of the weather having cleared considerably, the enemy air force came out in strength and greatly worsened the conditions for our troops. The manner in which the five-kilometer gap continued to grow between the 276 Division and its neighbor on the right in the area of Ermsdorf–Diekirch was causing the formation great disquiet. Because of the absence of reserves it was now impossible to close this gap.
For the reasons stated, it appeared that the attack of LXXX Inf Corps could be continued only if the division had an opportunity to re-assemble, and if its neighbor on the right should succeed in clearing the area of Ettelbrück. Because of the enemy situation and our total lack of air reconnaissance, a reckless advance of the individual spearheads would invite catastrophe; catastrophe, because heavy counterattacks by the newly-arriving American reserves would fall upon our unprepared and unfavorably-disposed troops. For this reason, LXXX Inf Corps decided that on the following day it would strive to make only local gains, to clean up the area in its rear, and to close its ranks.
On 20 Dec 44, all the attacks made by the different divisions came up against stronger American opposition; the American counteroffensive was beginning. The result was a struggle, involving 276 Volks Gren Div around Savelborn and Christnach and 212 Volks Gren Div around Consdorf and Scheidgen. Battles which raged back and forth, which brought no gains of any significance for us.
Most important, in the 212 Volks Gren Div zone, planned enemy counterattacks, assisted by tanks, started to be felt. During the next few days we were able here to identify definitely all regiments of 5 U.S. Inf Div, while in front of the division on the corps right portions of 80 U.S. Inf Div were identified. Since here was the first recognizable reaction on the part of the enemy against the southern flank of the German offensive, Seventh Army presumed that the main force of the enemy countermeasures would come from the area of Luxembourg, to be thrown against the base of the German offensive in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough across the arc of the Sauer and Moselle rivers. On the other hand, the continued absence of 4 and 6 U.S. Armd Divs, which had to be expected sooner or later, seemed to indicate that the enemy tank reserves had been sent in through Arlon–Neufchâteau in the general direction of Bastogne and to the east.
Thus, the turning point in the battle had arrived for the LXXX Inf Corps. On 21 Dec 44, the enemy attacks increased in ferocity to such an extent that it was clear that in front of the center and the right wing of the corps fresh enemy forces were being employed. The situation on the extreme left wing of 276 Volks Gren Div was so vague that it also constituted a grave threat to the right flank of 212 Volks Gren Div. 423 Inf Regt fighting here was forced to pull back, so as to absorb the force of punches delivered by the enemy against its flanks. However, with the exception of a breach which the enemy made at Michelshof, 212 Volks Gren Div was able to maintain its position. In order to arrange its forces for defensive fighting the division started to move off in the night of 21/22 Dec 44 along the following line: Hill 347 (northeast of Müllerthal)–the hill north of Scheidgen–the fringe of the wood north of Michelshof–the heights south of Rodenhof–Echt–the heights north of Dickweiler–Hill 370 (west of Girsterklaus)–Enberg northeast of Girst. On the left wing of the Division there now stood only strong elements of 999 Penal Bn.
LXXX Inf Corps engaged in heavy fighting also on 22 Dec 44. Along the boundary of the two divisions, in the valley of the Schwarze Ernz north of Müllerthal, the enemy succeeded in making a deep salient, which became during the days following the main point of danger. It imperilled the internal cohesiveness of the corps and the bridge at Bollendorf. As the loss of this bridge would have placed 276 Volks Gren Div in a serious position, Seventh Army ordered the establishment of an auxiliary bridge at Dillingen, which was not completed until 25 Dec 44.
212 Volks Gren Div was now ordered to counterattack to clear up the position along its boundary with 276 Volks Gren Div. Both of these divisions had sustained heavy losses. The companies within them had now an average strength of no more than 30–40 men and the severe weather had caused many frostbite cases among the troops. Besides the reinforcements obtained from the field reinforcement battalions only about 100 men could be supplied to the corps, not nearly enough to even approximately replenish its ranks. The situation south of Bollendorf forced 212 Volks Gren Div to withdraw during the night of 22/23 Dec 44 to the line Kalkesbach–Hill 313 (southwest of Lauterborn)-the hill north of Osweiler.
On 23 and 24 Dec 44, all positions in the center and on the left wing of LXXX Inf Corps were successfully defended. Counterattacks by both the inner flanks of the divisions had enabled us to restore the position in the valley of the Schwarze Ernz for the time being, so that the Sauer bridge lying at Bollendorf and shielded by the deeply eroded Sauer valley could still be used. Nevertheless, the threat at this spot remained real, and had a decisive influence on the general situation.
The greatly weakened 276 Volks Gren Div, extended on too wide a front during the preceding fighting, had to be withdrawn to the line of the heights northeast of Eppeldorf–Beaufort–Point 191 (three and a half kilometers west of Berdorf), as a result of the increasing weight of the enemy attacks. This brought into existence a wide, almost completely unsecured, gap between it and its neighbor whose left wing was still located in the bridgehead at Echternach on 23 Dec 44. This gap represented a serious threat to the cohesiveness of the Army front. In spite of this, Seventh Army had to insist on the continuation of the hopeless battle of the corps on the southwest bank of the Sauer, since enemy forces had to be ‘fixed’ as long as possible. Further reinforcements were not available to LXXX Inf Corps.
While the 276 Volks Gren Div was able on the whole to maintain its position on 25 Dec 44, 212 Volks Gren Div was obliged to retire that night to the line of Berdorf–the hill southeast and the hill southwest of Echternach. The forces still located southeast of Echternach were at the same time withdrawn behind the Sauer, only strong combat outposts being left on the southern bank of the river. The next morning an enemy tank attack issued from the woods south of Posselt and penetrated as far as Felsmühle on the Sauer. As a result of this and of renewed strong attacks (from the valley of the Schwarze Ernz) against Berdorf, the bridgehead occupied by 212 Volks Gren Div was further diminished in the night of 25/26 Dec 44. On the following day, it only extended over the hill at Hamm, one and a half kilometers north of Berdorf. In the meantime, contact between the divisions had been lost. 276 Volks Gren Div had likewise been pressed back until it was now occupying a small bridgehead on the heights on the western bank at Dillingen.
As the final mission of LXXX Inf Corps – the fixing of enemy forces – could no longer be fulfilled, Seventh Army decided to withdraw the LXXX Inf Corps in the night of 26/27 Dec 44 to the West Wall. Both the divisions had now lost about one-third of their total and about three-fourths of their fighting strength in bloody combat, without reinforcements to make up such losses. Nevertheless, this corps had to remain fully ready for defense in the West Wall as there was a danger of the enemy attempting to smash through the Wall with a subsidiary push. As a result of the critical nature of the situation of LXXXV Inf Corps, the right wing of 276 Volks Gren Div in the West Wall had to be extended as far as Gentingen, so as to build up a security garrison behind the heavily engaged 352 Volks Gren Div.
Despite the fact that the LXXX Inf Corps had not accomplished its mission, and on 27 Dec 44, had been driven back to its starting position, it must be said that it had fulfilled its thankless task to the best of its abilities. Two and perhaps three large enemy units had been tied down, at heavy cost to the corps. This aided considerably the main effort in the German southern flank. On the other hand, the fact that the corps had still fallen short of its goal had a very damaging influence on the morale of both officers and troops. The belief in final victory and in the infallibility of the Supreme Command had received the heaviest blow yet.
At this time, a subsidiary enemy push across the Sauer against the sparsely-occupied West Wall – in view of our weaknesses in morale, personnel, and material – would have offered favorable prospects of success and would certainly have constituted a very great strategic threat to the whole German Western Front. But, surprisingly enough, enemy pressure now relaxed completely, so that combat outposts were able to secure the last bridgeheads on the southern and western banks of the Sauer. Reconnaissance showed that the enemy obviously had no immediate intention of attacking here. This meant that Seventh Army was now in a position to withdraw 276 Volks Gren Div at the beginning of January 45 for reconstitution.
The reaction against 352 Volks Gren Div on the left wing of LXXXV Inf Corps on 22 Dec 44 had notably diminished this division’s fighting power. 915 Inf Regt, which was encircled in two groups in the area of Grosbous–Mertzig, vainly attempted to smash its way out to the east and northeast. Finally, certain elements of the regiment succeeded in breaking a way out into the woods to the north, and managed to rejoin the division in the Ettelbrück bridgehead on 25 Dec 44. But by this time the regiment had lost the greater part of its heavy weapons and its equipment, as had its supporting artillery battalion. Both the other regiments had also suffered heavy personnel and material losses, so that the whole division possessed only the value of a combat team. The forces at its disposal, however, were sufficient for the occupation of a bridgehead at Ettelbrück on 23 Dec 44 and for securing the Sauer sector east of Ettelbrück southward – and north of Ettelbrück westward. The whole of the area between Arsdorf (eight kilometers northeast of Martelange) and Bourscheid, remained without security.
The enemy, who soon discovered this state of affairs thanks to his air and ground reconnaissance, exploited it at once and sent 80 U.S. Inf Div north against the Heiderscheid–Eschdorf line on the same date. Part of the American division turned inward against the bridgehead at Ettelbrück. When the Commanding General (Gen Kav Rothkirch) of LIII Inf Corps looked out of the window at his headquarters that afternoon, and observed from there (Dahl, five kilometers southwest of Wiltz) that enemy infantry and armored forces were descending the slopes at Heiderscheid and moving northwards into the Sauer Valley, he immediately collected all the forces he could lay his hands on (rear echelon troops of 5 FJ Div and elements of the 47th engineer brigade) in order to build up a security garrison at the Sauer crossings between Esch and Bochholz sur la Sûre which would be ready to blow up the bridges if necessary. Thus, at the last moment, a surprise attack by the enemy in the vicinity of Wiltz was prevented, an attack which would have placed Seventh Army in a very awkward position.
There can be no doubt that in this instance 80 U.S. Inf Div missed a highly favorable opportunity, for a resolute push further north on 23 Dec 44 would likely have met with success.
On receiving a report on the enemy situation from the LIII Inf Corps, Seventh Army hoped that the troop movements reported there referred only to a change-over among our own troops, perhaps part of 352 Volks Gren Div or forward elements of the Führer Gren Brig, so it ordered a check to be made. Unfortunately the investigation disclosed that the enemy was present. In the meantime, the reserve units newly assigned to Seventh Army were on the way to the positions allotted to them:
a. Führer Gren Brig (Cmdr: Obst Kahler), through Roth–Niederschlinder–Bourscheid–Heiderscheid–Eschdorf, to LIII Inf Corps.
b. 79 Volks Gren Div (Cmdr: Obst Weber), through Gentingen–into the area of Bourscheid–Burden–Niederfeulen, to LXXXV Inf Corps.
Seventh Army intended to use 79 Volks Gren Div, after its assembly, in an attack southward from the area mentioned, in order to restore the position between LIII and LXXXV Inf Corps and to throw the enemy back on to the defense line envisaged as the operational objective. The march columns now approaching had been seriously delayed as a result of the poor facilities for crossing the Our. These difficulties, together with enemy air attacks, had forced them to disperse thoroughly. Both Seventh Army and its corps pressed them to hasten the tempo of their march forward, especially in the case of the Brigade, and at least to send ahead, into the area they were to occupy, elements capable of putting up a stiff fight. On 23 Dec 44, an advance task force of the Führer Gren Brig (reconnaissance battalion and heavy armored car battalion) reached the area of Eschdorf–Heiderscheid in the morning, and reconnaissance patrols sent on ahead had gotten as far as the area east of Martelange, but all other elements of the Brigade were still astride the Our. This excessive dispersion in depth arose from the different degrees of mobility of the various portions (wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles, and bicycles). That portion of the Brigade mounted on bicycles, for instance, was still in the vicinity of Bitburg. The most advanced elements now received the blow of the III U.S. Corps in its southern flank and were cut off. The rearward elements were forced to prepare for defense at Eschdorf and Heiderscheid without the support of the other parts still straggling behind (tanks, self-propelled assault guns, artillery, etc.). Meanwhile, the Commander (Obst Kahler), who had moved ahead to the front of his troops to carry out a personal reconnaissance, was seriously wounded. The effect of this was that the fighting value of the newly constituted Brigade was much lessened in this very difficult situation. Furthermore, Maj von Courbière, Commander of the armored car battalion, who now took over control, was not quite up to the task.
Of the 79 Volks Gren Div, only the most forward regiment (208 Inf Regt) had crossed to the east bank of the Sauer. Both of the other regiments, 212 and 226, were still on the way. Before Seventh Army and LXXXV Inf Corps were fully informed on the situation at Heiderscheid, 208 Inf Regt had captured Niederfeulen in the vicinity of the position it was to occupy. Both Seventh Army and the LXXXV Inf Corps now wondered whether to commit the regiment, on the basis of the altered situation in an attack at Niederfeulen and Heiderscheid. The mission would be to free the elements of the Führer Gren Brig encircled there and by simultaneous attack on Eschdorf and Bourscheid in the vicinity of Heiderscheid to attempt an encirclement of the enemy. However, this idea was not adopted because the enemy attacked Niederfeulen and the forces at our disposal were considered too weak to carry out an attack across hilly and wooded territory.
The final decision of LXXXV Inf Corps was to utilize the elements of 79 Volks Gren Div and the Führer Gren Brig (the elements which had now arrived near Bourscheid) for an attack on Heiderscheid in order to restore contact with these elements which had penetrated as far as Eschdorf. For this purpose the Brig was now subordinated to LXXX Inf Corps.
On 23 December 44, Seventh Army moved its advance command post from Dockendorf to Wiltz, a place previously occupied by the staff of 28 American Inf Div. That night, Wiltz was heavily shelled by enemy artillery, causing losses in the Army Staff. But apart from this, the shelling which was kept up all through the next few days disturbed only our supply trains and our signal communications.
On this day the German attacks did not achieve their aim of closing the breach made by the enemy at Heiderscheid. But they did have the effect of preventing the further penetration of the enemy northward across the Sauer. By closing up from the rear the enemy had strengthened his forces and was able to hold the ground already won.
The elements of the Führer Gren Brig cut off around Eschdorf on the previous day collected themselves for an attack and attempted in vain to break out of Eschdorf to the east. Moreover, simultaneous attacks by portions of 79 Volks Gren Div, even though supported by tanks and assault guns, were likewise a failure. The panzer units had suffered many technical breakdowns and had been led into difficult terrain. In addition to this, the artillery of 79 Volks Gren Div, as a result of the difficulties it had met with on its march forward (bad roads, lack of bridges, etc.) was not yet in position and could not adequately support the attack. The attack for the most part had been supported by an artillery battalion of 5 FJ Div which had stalled near Hoscheid owing to lack of prime movers. Along with the artillery, still lacking were one and a half regiments of the division and also the assault gun battalion; the progress of these units had likewise been held up by bad weather, bad terrain, and lack of bridges. (The winter conditions slowed down all the various movements along the poor roads leading up and down the gradients, so that the distances covered were in all cases less than had been hoped for.)
In summary, it can be said that the attack, utilizing the element of surprise, had been carried by narrow spearheads as far as the area of Heiderscheid; but the attack groups – weakened by casualties and technical failures – had been counterattacked in their flanks by the enemy from the woods on both sides of the road Bourscheid–Heiderscheid. Our forces had been shot up so badly by enemy tanks and artillery that they had been driven back to their original jump-off positions. Heiderscheid was lost.
In view of the situation in the zone of 5 FJ Div, Seventh Army ordered the Führer Gren Brig to the northern bank of the Sauer for defense on both sides of Esch sur la Sure. Its defense lines were to face south. It was hoped to get the brigade, badly shot up as a result of the situation, gathered together compactly again. True, as a result of its unhappy experience when employed earlier, it had suffered very serious personnel and material losses. To replace the Commander, who had been seriously wounded, Obst Kühn took over control for a period of two days, later to be replaced by Obst Meder.
It was now Seventh Army’s task, after the failure of the attempt to close the enemy breach, to seal off the advance of the enemy troops while still holding a widened bridgehead around Bourscheid.
At 2100 hrs on 24 Dec 44, Seventh Army received a flash report that enemy forces had broken through the lines of 352 Volks Gren Div in the sector of Diekirch–Bettendorf and were proceeding northward across the Sauer. Since if the report were true this would be a very serious matter for the entire army, the Commanding General, Gen Pz Brandenberger immediately started off personally to see if the situation was as actually reported. Happily, the report proved to be false, or at least greatly exaggerated. It was true that the Sauer bridgehead at Ettelbrück had been lost, so that 352 Volks Gren Div was now fighting only behind the Sauer, in defense of the Erpeldingen–Diekirch– Bettendorf sector.
On 25 Dec 44, the Führer Gren Brig was finally attached to LIII Inf Corps, and between the latter and LXXXV Inf Corps a new boundary line (Kautenbach– Heiderscheid– Bettborn) was established.
While LIII Inf Corps was ordered to defend the Sauer, LXXXV was to hold the Sauer bridgehead at Bourscheid and – starting at Burden behind the Sauer – assume a defensive mission. This bridgehead at Bourscheid, including approximately the line from the fringe of the wood north and east of Ringel– Kehmen–Welscheid–Burden, was of vital import for the continuation of the fighting. Hill 500 (west of Bourscheid) commanded the entire Sauer position and was imperative for observation for the artillery. The terrain on the eastern bank of the river rendered very difficult the right choice of artillery positions. The deeply eroded valley of the river presented great obstacles to wheeled traffic, especially under winter conditions, so that the bridgehead had to be hand supplied.
On the newly-formed right wing of LXXXV Inf Corps on either side of Bochholz sur Sûre, elements of the engineer brigade were still occupying the front. In order to release the latter for their proper functions and to shorten the front, Seventh Army ordered a concentrated attack to reduce the Ringel salient. This attack, after the completion of re-assembly by 79 Volks Gren Div, was carried out on the night of 26/27 Dec 44.
This attack, which began under cover of darkness because of enemy control of the air, achieved some initial success and some of our troops penetrated into Ringel, but here the superior power of the enemy artillery halted the attack and forced its abandonment after we had sustained serious losses. For the first time during the offensive a great shortage of artillery ammunition was felt, a shortage which from that moment onward was felt more and more in all enterprises of Seventh Army.
In the zone of 352 Volks Gren Div no enemy attacks of any importance had taken place, so that this division was able to begin its rehabilitation in so far as that was possible. On 25 Dec 44, Genmaj Batzing took over command of the division from Obst Schmidt, who had been wounded, and the division command post was moved to Brandenburg.
During the heavy fighting on the right wing of Seventh Army in the area south and southeast of Bastogne, complete quiet reigned in the sector of LXXX Inf Corps, now back in the West Wall. In the sector of LXXXV Inf Corps, too, with the exception of local engagements and continuous artillery duels, comparative quiet reigned. Despite this, Seventh Army considered the situation tense, especially since in the last days of December there were signs of the appearance of 6 U.S. Armd Div in the sector of 352 Volks Gren Div. But when this American division was located southeast of Bastogne on 1 Jan 45, it did not appear that the enemy before the left wing and the center of the Army had any intentions of carrying out an attack. Therefore, our front there was considerably weakened by the withdrawal of mortars and artillery in favor of the LIII Inf Corps sector, where desperate fighting was in progress. LXXXV Inf Corps now had at its disposal, in addition to the divisional artillery, only two or three battalions of supporting artillery and a few mortar batteries.
LXXXV Inf Corps used the period of quiet on its front to prepare itself for defense, to build new positions, and to re-organize its forces. It was able to report at the beginning of January 45 that it was completely prepared for defense. And as the Sauer was always an obstacle, even if not an insuperable one, Seventh Army was not particularly worried about its Sauer front.
Both Seventh Army and LXXXV Inf Corps still cherished the intention of a breakout from the bridgehead at Bourscheid to be achieved by a punch into the eastern flank of III American Corps. The hope was to lighten the strain of the defensive battle being fought by LIII Inf Corps southeast of Bastogne. Therefore, LXXXV Inf Corps planned an attack by 79 Volks Gren Div in the direction of Niederfeulen, since the failure of the attack on 24 Dec 44 had taught them that under such arduous terrain conditions an attack in the direction of Heiderscheid did not appear advisable. But in the end the scarcity of ammunition and the inadequate numbers of troops forced the abandonment of this plan.
Moreover, the various local attacks attempted had shown clearly that the penetrating power of the German formations was not great enough to achieve any worthwhile success against the enemy superiority in men and material.
The more likely it became that Bastogne would not capitulate, the more clearly did the Army comprehend that this area would finally become the main point of the Battle of the Ardennes, and that here was the decisive point in its attempt to protect the flank of Army Group B.
Even if the first enemy countermeasures on the southern flank of the German offensive in the area north and northeast of Luxembourg had had no decisive effect, Seventh Army was counting on the assault of strong enemy tank forces of Third American Army – through Arlon and Neufchâteau in the direction of Bastogne. The wide north-south roads presented themselves to the enemy eye for the carrying out of such an operation. The attacks preceding this push (which became stronger from 23 Dec 44 onward) against the left wing and the center of the Army sector had forced Seventh Army – despite its estimate of the general situation – to commit its few available reserves in the central portion of the sector to prevent a breakthrough there.
As a result of these developments, at first only 5 FJ Div was assigned to LIII Inf Corps on the right wing of Seventh Army. This division was unusually large and had also sustained very few casualties so far. Having just been formed exclusively from ex-Luftwaffe personnel, it suffered from a weak lower command echelon, insufficient training, a lack of equipment, limited combat experience and relative immobility. Above all these drawbacks, it had very little artillery and not nearly enough motor vehicles. And even if these deficiencies were partly offset by the enthusiasm of the men and by their excellent morale, the fact remains that its fighting power was moderate and no more than that. Seventh Army had sought to increase this division’s combat efficiency by assigning to it artillery battalions from a volks artillery corps and by giving it very efficient officers (individually selected) for its higher and lower command.
This division now had the difficult mission of protecting the area between the Neufchâteau–Bastogne road and the Sauer crossing at Lultzhausen (i.e., it had a 30-kilometer front) from the attacks of an enemy greatly superior in numbers and in material. On 22 Dec 44 the most forward elements of the division were located at Vaux-les-Rosières, 14 FJ Inf Regt in the area of Remichampagne– Hollange–Hompré, and 13 FJ Inf Regt on both sides of Martelange. 15 FJ Inf Regt was still moving through Wiltz into the Harlange area. The engineer battalion was defending along the Sauer south of Harlange. Only one battalion of the division’s own artillery was available, owing to the shortage of prime movers. For this reason, two or three battalions of a volks artillery corps were now attached. Because of the absence of the promised motor transport, great difficulties were encountered in supply, especially with regard to POL and ammunition. The fighting ability of this ‘green’ division was also weakened by its great dispersion.
The development of the situation in the center of the Army presented the realization of its intention to strength the Army right wing by committing the Führer Gren Brig.
On this day the enemy counterattacks against 5 FJ Div began. Though such attacks had been expected, the results of our own reconnaissance had been so meager, that when the attacks did start they took our forces partly by surprise. At first, the center of gravity of the enemy assault lay on the east of the Neufchâteau–Bastogne road, where the divisional advance detachment and elements of 14 FJ Inf Regt had, after bloody fighting, been thrown back to the Clochimont–Hompré line. Starting from Hompré, the division had built up a defence flank facing west along the Hollange–Strainchamps line.
To the west there stood elements of 26 Volks Gren Div, its right neighbor in the Sibret–Assenois area. Simultaneously, the tank spearheads of 2 Pz Div (XLVII Pz Corps, Fifth Army) at Foy Notre Dame had gotten a few kilometers nearer the Meuse, so that the Army had to reckon with a continuation of the whole offensive over the Meuse to the northwest. This continuation was strongly indicated by the fact that Pz Lehr Div had now turned off, out of the area of St. Hubert, in the direction of Rochefort.
13 FJ Inf Regt was also being attacked east of Martelange, and very bitter fighting developed in the various villages between Arsdorf and Martelange. However, it proved possible to hold the Sauer crossing and the city. Prisoners captured during the fighting indicated that 4 U.S. Armd Div and 26 U.S. Inf Div were nearby.
This was proof that strong forces of Third American Army were taking part in the attack. Its intention could only be a breakthrough to Bastogne and the liberation of the American forces there. It was therefore our task to prevent such an intention from being carried out. We had to face the likelihood that the American forces encircled at Bastogne would make an energetic attempt to break out, most likely in the direction of Assenois, to meet their relief detachment. For this reason, both Army and corps made up their minds to call a halt to any further westward push and to gather together all their available forces to resist the newly-appearing forces of the enemy.
LIII Inf Corps, which had shifted its command post from Dahl to Winseler (west of Wiltz), on the evening of 23 Dec 44, now did all in its power to make a bastion out of the right wing of 5 FJ Div by assigning to it assault guns, antitank weapons, and by rearranging its artillery support. Since Seventh Army clearly realized that in the coming defensive battles everything would depend on the power of its artillery and its antitank defenses, it ordered that those elements of the volks artillery corps still fighting under LXXXV Inf Corps be transferred to LIII Inf Corps, with the exception of one battalion equipped with Russian 122 mm howitzers. For these there was not sufficient ammunition. The 1st Battalion (75 mm antitank guns) was to be moved as speedily as possible over to the right wing of the Army. But all movements were delayed by the lack of fuel and prime movers, by the air situation, and by the icy roads.
On 24 Dec 44, it was possible to hold the front on the right wing of the division. It was obvious that the enemy was closing up his ranks from the rear. On the other hand, 13 FJ Inf Regt lost Martelange after fierce fighting. But in any case it would have had to be evacuated very soon, as it would hardly have been possible to hold this bastion on the Sauer very long after the repulse of the regiment on the right at Clochimont and Hompré. 13 FJ Inf Regt retired to a line running from Strainchamps to Warnach, so as later to withdraw still further to another from Hollange to Tintange. In the sector adjoining the east, all our forces had been withdrawn already to the northern bank of the Sauer, although at first it was possible to occupy this spot only with weak security forces.
On 25 Dec 44 the Führer Gren Brig, which had also withdrawn to the other bank of the river, was subordinated to LIII Inf Corps in the Kaundorf– Heiderscheid sector. The new boundary between this corps and LXXXV Inf Corps was Kautenbach (LIII)–Heiderscheid (LXXXV)–Bettborn (LXXXV).
On this day the enemy, who had obviously closed up from the river, attacked 5 FJ Div front in great strength. Supported by artillery fire, about 120 enemy tanks, with their main effort in the direction of Clochimont– Hompré, stormed forward. But this attack was repulsed. However, the situation of the division was now very critical. The high losses in personnel and equipment were not to be made up easily, seeing that the reinforcement battalion of the division was making very slow progress along the ice-covered roads. Equipment vans and field kitchens had to be manhandled through the hilly Ardennes country! Furthermore, there was scant prospect that the stronger elements of Fifth Pz Army could be made available for the defense of the southern front, because they were still being used in a concentrated attack against the encircled defenders of Bastogne without very much success. For this reason, Seventh Army sent in repeated requests for 9 Volks Gren Div, which was in OKW reserve in the area of Bitburg.
It did not surprise the Army in the least when it learned that the 4 U.S. Armd Div had succeeded on 26 Dec 44 in breaking through the defensive front of 5 FJ Div and the encircling ring of 26 Volks Gren Div (Fifth Pz Army) to establish contact with the troops in Bastogne. All attempts to restore the position by closing the front again behind the enemy forces which had stormed through were wrecked by the material superiority and greater fire power of the Americans.
It was now painfully clear to Seventh Army that the offensive had failed. Daily the decision and order of the Supreme Command for the withdrawal to the West Wall was awaited. But instead it was ordered that the ring around the enemy forces be closed again by energetic attacks from both sides and that Bastogne was to be retaken at all costs!
For such a project it would first be necessary to bring up reserves for Fifth Pz Army; in the meantime, the right wing forces of Seventh Army had the job of keeping the enemy corridor as narrow as possible, for which purpose 5 FJ Inf Div had to take up a flank position along the Remoifosse–Hompré line.
The dangerous situation was finally resolved by a decision to assign 9 Volks Gren Div (Cmdr: Genmaj Kolb) to Seventh Army and commit it on the latter’s right wing. Every effort was now made to bring this division up as quickly as possible in motor trucks, but the Army was only able to release a given percentage of transport space and fuel for the purpose, enough to move a single battalion at a time. Getting the artillery up and into position caused us particular trouble, for the Raupenschlepper Ost (a caterpillar tractor designed principally for the Eastern Front) fell behind as a result of the weather conditions. For all these reasons, the arrival of the division took a very long time and it had to be committed piecemeal as its elements arrived, a fact which had a disastrous result on its effectiveness.
On 27 Dec 44, the situation of LIII Inf Corps grew more critical after 26 U.S. Inf Div succeeded in crossing the Sauer, breaking through the front of the Führer Gren Brig at Kaundorf, and pushing forward to the area of Nothum. The brigade had not set up its defense line along the river, but on the heights north of it, because it did not have sufficient infantry to build up a continuous line. The enemy, therefore, made his way around the isolated strongpoints on the heights on the northern bank of the stream, where the hilly terrain offered ample concealment. They advanced quickly to the north. This highly threatening breakthrough in the rear of 5 FJ Div, which was facing west and southwest, had to be cleared up. This was necessary to prevent the division from being completely cut off from its line of communications, and also to permit the assembly of 9 Volks Gren Div. Seventh Army, therefore, with a heavy heart, decided to utilize the available battalion of 9 Volks Gren Div for a counterattack. In addition to this battalion, LIII Inf Corps committed on its left wing the Engineer Brigade, which had been withdrawn previously (two weak battalions). Both units were subordinated to the Führer Gren Brig for the counterattack.
But the counterattack was a hopeless failure, for the elements of 9 Volks Gren Div – completely inexperienced as they were – were not up to the demands of the role allotted to them. The battalion was almost completely wiped out. Moreover, the psychological effect of this fiasco later spread through the whole of the division. At any rate, it had been possible to momentarily seal off the enemy breach along the line Harlange–Nothum– Buderscheid.
Meanwhile, the enemy had continued to exert strong pressure against the front of 5 FJ Div. Having strengthened his forces by bringing up 35 U.S. Inf Div to the area north of Martelange, he now attacked heavily the center and the left wing of the division. Here, the elements of 15 FJ Inf Regt, arriving fitfully in odd lots, had been committed. By fighting fiercely and tenaciously the division was able to prevent an enemy breakthrough, but it could not avoid losing some ground.
Its neighbor on the other side of the breach, 26 Volks Gren Div, after losing Bastogne now had to give up Sibret, so that the breach made by the enemy widened still further.
On 28 Dec 44, the Führer Escort Brig (Fifth Pz Army) carried out an attack on Sibret from Chenogne which was a failure. While conditions were quieter at this time in the sector of 5 FJ Div, enemy pressure continued strong in the sector of the reinforced Führer Gren Brig, but the enemy achieved no particular success. The elements of 9 Volks Gren Div continued to arrive slowly and be committed piecemeal, for the Führer Gren Brig had suffered very heavy losses and without some additional support would have been incapable of maintaining its defense front.
On 29 Dec 44 heavy attacks were renewed along the entire front of LIII Inf Corps, attacks which forced 5 FJ Inf Div back to the line of Lutrebois–Villiers la bonne Eau–Harlange–Bavigne. This line, which had been prepared with the most modest of means, was to be held at all costs. It had been ordered that on 30 Dec 44 strong forces would be released by the Fifth Pz Army for the purpose of rewelding our broken ring around Bastogne. One task force consisting of 3 Pz Gren Div and the Führer Escort Brig, under the control of XLVII Pz Corps, was to attack eastward through Sibret; a second task force, consisting of 167 Volks Gren Div and strong elements of 1 SS Pz Div, under the control of XXXIX Pz Corps, would move northwest from the area of Lutrebois–Villers la bonne Eau. Therefore, the elements of 5 FJ Div then in the attack zone were temporarily attached to the Fifth Pz Army, without altering the Seventh Army boundaries.
The attack carried out by the eastern force on 30 Dec 44 achieved initial successes and reached the road from Bastogne to Martelange, northwest of Lutrebois. But heavy enemy counterattacks caused it to lose the ground it had gained; and the attack of the western force unfortunately failed also.
Since the main body of 9 Volks Gren Div (some artillery elements were still missing) had come up in the meantime and taken control on 29 Dec 44 in the sector from north of Nothum to Roullingen, it was possible to withdraw the hard-pressed and almost exhausted Führer Gren Brig (without its bicycle battalion) on the night of 29/30 Dec 44. It assembled northwest of Wiltz and began rehabilitating itself so that it could form an Army reserve. 9 Volks Gren Div was at this time engaged in heavy fighting with a greatly superior enemy force attacking from the direction of Wiltz–Winseler. For this reason it had not been possible to withdraw the engineer brigade still in the front line, although Army Group B had repeatedly requested this. From a captured enemy order it became known to us that the commander of 26 or 80 U.S. Inf Div had expressed the wish that his troops take Wiltz within a few days.
On 31 Dec 44, 167 Volks Gren Div (Cmdr: Gen Höcker) was inserted along the boundary between Fifth Pz Army and Seventh Army. Having been temporarily assigned to Seventh Army (LIII Inf Corps), this division defended the Marvie–Lutrebois sector. On its left, 5 FJ Div had the sector, Lutrebois– Harlange–area north of Bavigne. On the left wing of the corps lay the sector of 9 Volks Gren Div (area north of Bavigne–north of Nothum–south of Roullingen–south of Buderscheid–the Sauer river southwest of Goesdorf). LIII Inf Corps had moved its command post from Winseler to Boevange on 29 Dec 44.
The German Supreme Command had not yet abandoned its idea of an attack on Bastogne. It ordered I SS Pz Corps (with 9 and 12 SS Pz Div) to be sent to Fifth Pz Army within the next few days, so as to renew the attack on the city from the east. Such an intention necessitated Seventh Army’s right wing remaining in a stationary position with the unaltered mission of protecting the southern flank of Fifth Pz Army. It was now to be expected that the center of gravity of the enemy attack would move further east to the sector of 9 Volks Gren Div, so as to be able to deliver a blow northward through Wiltz at the deep German flank. But since the Führer Gren Brig had been placed at the disposal of the Fifth Pz Army as of 1 Jan 45, Seventh Army had no reserve whatever.
On 1 Jan 45 Seventh Army moved its command post from Dockendorf to Jucken (six kilometers east of Dasburg), in order to facilitate control of the center of its sector. This was the first day after the start of the offensive when comparative peace reigned over the whole army front. And now it was possible, at least, to withdraw the engineer brigade from the front line at Nothum. This formation, which had practically been wiped out in the fighting, was also transferred to Fifth Pz Army on the orders of Army Group B.
On the following day a serious crisis arose on the right wing of the Army. The enemy, supported by tanks, broke through in the sector of 167 Volks Gren Div and pushed as far as Wardin along the Army boundary. He was obviously trying, by means of simultaneous attacks from the west and the south, to link up his forces in the area west of Wiltz or at the important crossroads of Doncols, so as to cut off and surround the forces in the projection of the arc at Harlange. The unusually heavy artillery fire directed at the crossroads, and into the woods at Doncols, seemed to confirm this intention. This placed 5 FJ Div in a very serious position. True, 167 Volks Gren Div succeeded by counterattacks in narrowing and sealing off the breach made by the enemy, but the threat still remained real. As a reaction, the attacks against 9 Volks Gren Div became stronger.
Seventh Army’s request that it be permitted to attempt to rescue 5 FJ Div from the Harlange pocket was rejected, since the Supreme Command was primarily concerned with fixing as many enemy forces here as possible. Therefore, Seventh Army was able to assist the heavily engaged LIII Inf Corps only by committing on the right wing more and more elements of the volks artillery corps and the volks projector brigade, and by bringing up all the personnel and material reinforcements available.
But these measures were of no avail and rendered only temporary assistance. The most keenly felt lack now was the shortage of ammunition, due in its turn to a shortage of transport at home. Seventh Army decided to withdraw 276 Volks Gren Div – a mere combat team – located on the right wing of LXXX Inf Corps in the West Wall and to hand it over to LIII Inf Corps. The division was to be assembled for this purpose in the area north-east of Wiltz.
167 Volks Gren Div was reassigned to Fifth Army on the 2 Jan 45, so that the sector from which the I SS Pz Corps would lead an attack on 4 Jan 45 against Bastogne would be under unified control. The boundary between the armies was to be Grumelscheid–Doncols–Lutrebois (these three towns were to be within Seventh Army’s sector).
The staff of LIII Inf Corps had been driven out of Boevange on 31 Dec 44 by enemy artillery fire and had transferred its command post to Encherange (four km northeast of Wiltz). The command post of 5 FJ Div was located in the railroad station at Grumelscheid, while the command post of 9 Volks Gren Div was at Noertrange.
From the 3–5 Jan 45, no strong enemy attacks took place on the front of the LIII Inf Corps. Nevertheless, the troops, unable to find adequate cover and shelter in the frozen ground, suffered severe losses from the continuous enemy artillery fire. Casualties from frostbite and illness were also high. Local fighting took place here and there. It led to a breakthrough in the sector of 5 FJ Div on 4 Jan 45, which, however, was cleared up again. (This was at La Bonne Eau.)
By 4 Jan 45, 276 Volks Gren Div had been completely withdrawn from the West Wall and two days later its main body had been assembled in the area of Wilwerwitz– Kautenbach. Both Army and corps had decided to commit the division, whose combat value was slight, on the weakly-held left flank of the corps along the line Buderscheid–Goesdorf–north of Ringel. By this action, it was intended to narrow the decisive sector of 9 Volks Gren Div, and thus to acquire a reserve.
On 6 Jan 45, however, the enemy carried out a surprise attack from west and south on Goesdorf and forced his way through the village and on to Dahl. This meant a new and deep salient in the front of LIII Inf Corps and the loss of the commanding heights around Dahl. And the salient which had been halted on the fringes of the wood north and east of Dahl as well as east of Goesdorf, meant a considerable lengthening of the front line, a very great handicap in view of our lack of troops. Therefore, Seventh Army ordered the salient to be eliminated by counterattack and the Sauer front to be regained as far as Esch sur la Sûre. For this operation, the Führer Gren Brig, over which the Army had in the meantime regained control, was delivered to LIII Inf Corps and the elements of 276 Volks Gren Div which had arrived were subordinated to it.
True, this use of the Führer Gren Brig was contrary to the intentions of LIII Inf Corps, which desired to send the formation to the threatened spot on its own right wing (Doncols crossroads), and not elsewhere. The attack was to be made by the Führer Gren Brig from the northwest through Dahl to the south, and simultaneously, by the elements of 276 Volks Gren Div from north and east. All available artillery and mortars were collected to support the attack, so that on the morning of 7 Jan 45 108 guns could fire rounds in support of the assault. Under this protecting belt of fire the attacking spearheads succeeded in pressing forward into the northern and eastern outskirts of Dahl. Unfortunately, however, the attack, which could receive no further support because of the ammunition shortage, stalled when it encountered heavy enemy artillery fire. When the enemy counterattacks began, Dahl had to be evacuated and our troops had to withdraw to their jump-off positions.
Seventh Army ordered the attack to be renewed on 8 Jan 45 and gave to LIII Inf Corps a regiment of 79 Volks Gren Div for this purpose. This regiment had the mission of attacking, simultaneously with the attack from the east of the reinforced Führer Gren Brig, in the direction of Goesdorf. But this operation was also a failure because of the strong resistance and counterattacks of the enemy.
There was nothing left for us to do now but go over to the defense along the front with the assistance of 276 Volks Gren Div. The failure of the attacks on Dahl and Goesdorf had driven home to the Army the lesson that the assault power of its troops – as a result of the ammunition, air, and personnel situation – was now slight indeed.
On 9 Jan 45 the left wing of 5 FJ Div was breached by the enemy in the region north of Bavigne. Here, the enemy penetrated as far as Berlé, and now stood deep in the rear of the division, whose elements located at Harlange were practically cut off. The crossroads at Doncols were seriously threatened. If this intersection were lost, the last remaining supply route of the division would fall into enemy hands.
Attempts to eliminate this enemy salient did not meet with success, for visibility was so limited in this hilly terrain that the troops could not execute a well-supported and closely integrated attack.
The situation of the right wing of the Army, already difficult, grew worse on 10 Jan 45 when 90 U.S. Inf Div joined the attack against the completely exhausted and fantastically outnumbered 5 FJ Div. In front of the extreme right wing of Seventh Army there now stood three American Infantry Divisions (26, 35, and 90); at the same time, two American Armored Divisions (4 and 6) were attacking from the west.
The breakthrough by the enemy on 11 Jan 45 to the crossroads at Doncols completed the encirclement of 5 FJ Div. The remnants of its widely-scattered elements fought their way through the wooded terrain to the northeast. The combat elements of the division had now been almost completely crushed, the greater part of its equipment had been lost. Only by the immediate commitment of the Führer Gren Brig was it possible to temporarily halt a further enemy advance.
By 10 Jan 45, 167 Volks Gren Div (adjoining on the north) had already been assigned to Seventh Army, and in turn to LIII Inf Corps, to keep the combat sector under a unified command. 1 SS Pz Div was sent to attack southward from the area of Ober- and Niederwampach, with the mission of recapturing the crossroads at Doncols again. It was hoped that this attack would enable 5 FJ Div and 167 Volks Gren Div to smash through to the northeast. Control of the attack of 1 SS Pz Div was taken over by LVIII Pz Corps of Fifth Pz Army, to which 167 Volks Gren Div and 5 FJ Div were also assigned.
Therewith, the battle in the area of Bastogne had come to an end for Seventh Army, and during the night of 12/13 Jan 45 the organized retreat behind the Wiltz sector was begun. LIII Inf Corps had not been able to fulfil its mission of protecting the southern flank of the front around Bastogne. However, its task had really been an impossible one. With vastly inferior forces, handicapped by a serious shortage of ammunition, and under the most severe fighting conditions, it had nevertheless been able to tie down considerable enemy forces (two armored and four infantry divisions) from 23 Dec 44 until 11 Jan 45 and to prevent a strategic breakthrough by the enemy to the north against the deep flank of Army Group B. This was all that Seventh Army could possibly do.
From 12 Jan 45 onward, the measures initiated by the Supreme Command for the liquidation of the Ardennes Offensive were put into effect. As it had been decided that the frontal arc reached during the attacks would be given up gradually and under pressure from the enemy, Seventh Army still had to defend behind the Wiltz and the Sauer. Although it was still important to hold the Sauer front in the center of the Seventh Army sector, measures for the withdrawal of the right wing of the Army to the heights between the Wiltz and the Clerf, and behind the Clerf, were put into effect on a modest scale. By 10 Jan 45, the Wiltz position had been prepared for defense by the use of two construction battalions and of all hands available behind the front, and the troops who had prepared it were withdrawn to the next planned defense line. However, these preparations also suffered from the shortage of men and material; for instance, it was possible to dig antitank ditches only with the aid of blasting cartridges, and there was a shortage of these. So these preparations were not to be valued very highly.
Organizationally, a thorough rearrangement was initiated after it had been found necessary to transfer LXXXV Inf Corps to Army Group G on 12 Jan 45 for use in Lorraine. Seventh Army assigned this corps’ right division (79 Volks Gren Div) to LIII Inf Corps, and its left division (352 Volks Gren Div) to LXXX Inf Corps. Since LXXX Inf Corps had previously lost 276 Volks Gren Div, its only other division was 212 Volks Gren Div. The new boundary line between the two corps was Biewels, two kilometers north of Vianden (LIII)– Hoscheid (LHI)–westward along the Sauer.
The southward attack of LVIII Inf Corps of Fifth Pz Army, executed by 1 SS Pz Div, did not reach the crossroads at Doncols, so that the situation along the right Army boundary remained tense. However, Army Group B was now able to order a withdrawal, so that the situation could be restored and a coherent front could be built up behind Wiltz. The boundary line between Fifth Pz Army (LVIII Pz Corps) and Seventh Army (LIII Inf Corps) was the line Dasburg (Fifth)–Draufelt (Seventh)–Grumelscheid (Seventh)–Doncols. With the situation quiet on 13 and 14 Jan 45, the center and the left wing of LIII Inf Corps could be withdrawn behind the Wiltz from the town of that name to the mouth of the Sauer.
In the sector of the LIII Inf Corps, 9, 276, and 79 Volks Gren Divs were situated from right to left behind the Wiltz. The Führer Gren Brig had already been withdrawn from the front and assembled in the vicinity of the Clerf. It had to be ready for transfer to the Eastern Front, and it left at the end of Jan 45.
On 18 Jan 45, XII U.S. Corps (Third Army) started an attack across the Sauer on both sides of Diekirch northwards. Seventh Army had long known of the transfer of 5 U.S. Inf Div from the area of Echternach to the sector of 352 Volks Gren Div. But as 6 U.S. Armd Div, observed at the same spot at the end of December, had in the meantime been sent to the area around Bastogne, Seventh Army believed that there was little likelihood of a strong enemy attack in the vicinity of Echternach. Consequently, the attack of 5 U.S. Inf Div came as a great surprise. The greatly diminished power of the artillery of 3 5 2 Volks Gren Div, which had not yet overcome the psychological effect of the unhappy days just before Christmas, could not hope to stand up to this attack. By the end of the very first day of the American assault, several deep salients had been pushed into our line. The American troops, moving under cover of a thick smoke screen, bypassed the strongpoints of 352 Volks Gren Div, whose machine-gun and mortar crews could not see what was happening. The artillery was also blinded. All it could do was to lay a thin curtain of fire along the souther bank of the Sauer – on account of the scarcity of ammunition, a very thin curtain! A few of the strongpoints on the northern bank of the river held out for a few days longer. The enemy attack inflicted further heavy personnel and material losses on the division and caused the loss of the greater part of its artillery.
The American drive across the Sauer represented an increased threat to the southern flank of LIII Inf Corps and to the entire Fifth Pz Army, parts of which were still fighting east of Bastogne. The attack brought with it the loss of the southern crossings of the Our as well, since once again they lay within the range of the American artillery. All that remained to Seventh Army were the crossings at Vianden and Gemünd. And now there was a danger of the enemy turning in eastward across the Our and against the West Wall, which at the time was secured from Vianden to south of Trier (some 50 kilometers) only by the weakened 212 Volks Gren Div. Army Group B now placed a task force (Pz Gren Regt, reinforced – Graf Kielmannsegg) of 11 Pz Div, which was being rehabilitated behind the Seventh Army front, behind the right wing of LXXX Inf Corps as a security garrison within the West Wall. This regiment could not be sent west of the Our.
To seal off the enemy push, Army Group B sent a combined-arms task force of Pz Lehr Div (Gen Bayerlein), while Seventh Army assigned a regimental group of 79 Volks Gren Div to the right wing of LXXX Inf Corps. Before these troops could take a hand in the fighting, 352 Volks Gren Div was thrown still further back on 19 and 20 Jan 45. The scarcity of ammunition and POL, as well as the weather conditions (a heavy snowstorm raged on 19 Jan 45) had a very disadvantageous influence on the course of the battle.
Seventh Army’s situation was all the more difficult, because the whole retreat of LIII Inf Corps eastward depended on Fifth Pz Army. And Fifth Pz Army’s difficulties, because it had a large number of tanks, were even greater than those of Seventh Army. The retrograde movement proceeded exceedingly slowly. It was therefore of vital importance that the position of the southern flank be restored.
On 20 Jan 45 the enemy took Brandenberg, until then the command post of 352 Volks Gren Div, the new command post having just been set up in an air raid shelter south of Bauler. With the assistance of elements of Pz Lehr Div and of 79 Volks Gren Div which we had managed to commit on the right wing of 352 Volks Gren Div, it was possible to halt the enemy in the line: two kilometers south of Hoscheid–Landscheid–Walsdorf–Bettel. But he continued his two-pronged attack: 5 U.S. Inf Div south of Hoscheid, 4 U.S. Inf Div south of Vianden.
Thus, elements of Pz Lehr Div were involved in heavy fighting on 21 Jan 45 in the region south of Hoscheid–Landscheid. To control this section, Army Group B ordered XLVII Pz Corps (CG: Gen Pz Frhr Heinrich von Lüttwitz) to move into the army sector and take over Pz Lehr Div and 352 Volks Gren Div. LXXX Inf Corps once again controlled only 212 Volks Gren Div.
Meanwhile, LIII Inf Corps, on the southern flank of Fifth Pz Army, had withdrawn to the line: the western fringe of the wood south of Boevange–the stream as far as Weidingen, east of Wiltz–the Wiltz sector, so that the loop of the Sauer south of Hoscheid again formed the pivot of the withdrawal movement and for this reason had at all cost to remain in our hands. Enemy pressure against the front of LIII Inf Corps was not at the time particularly strong, so that the situation was not especially threatening.
On 22 Jan 45, LVIII Pz Corps (CG: Gen Pz Krüger), previously the left corps of Fifth Pz Army, was assigned to Seventh Army, for Fifth Pz Army had to take over the sector of Sixth Pz Army. The Corps stood with 340 Volks Gren Div (Cmdr: Genmaj Tolsdorff), 167 Volks Gren Div (Cmdr: Genmaj Höcker), and 5 FJ Div, along the line: Asselborn–east of Boevange. The command post was in the mill north of Dasburg.
Activity in front of XLVII Pz Corps had died down somewhat on 22 Jan 45, but 352 Volks Gren Div had not been able to prevent small breaches in its line. On this day the enemy had sent in particularly strong air formations. For the first time the situation in the air was similar to that which had prevailed in Normandy.
During the next two nights (22/23 and 23/24 Jan 45), the two corps on the right of the army (LVIII Pz Corps and LIII Inf Corps), starting on the right, withdrew behind the Clerf sector. At the same time, 167 Volks Gren Div was withdrawn from the front by LVIII Pz Corps and sent to Fifth Pz Army via Dasburg. This withdrawal behind the Clerf sector proceeded on the whole smoothly and without incidents. In front of the center of Seventh Army the line had been stabilized once again (23–24 Jan 45). It is true that heavy attacks by the enemy continued to take place, but with the exception of local enemy advances we were able to hold.
Seventh Army had moved its command post on 23 Jan 45 from Jucken to Merkeshausen; LVIII Pz Corps, to Ohlscheid; LIII Inf Corps on 22 Jan 45 to a spot three km northeast of Eisenbach; XLVII Pz Corps, on 24 Jan 45 to Baustert; and LXXX Inf Corps (after the release of 352 Volks Gren Div) to Wolsfelder Berg.
On 25 Jan 45 a breakthrough across the Clerf took place on the southern wing of Fifth Pz Army, opposite 26 Volks Gren Div, threatening the northern flank of 340 Volks Gren Div in the region of Urspelt. But 340 Volks Gren Div was able to seal this off with a counterattack. In the sector of 276 Volks Gren Div there also occurred a breakthrough across the Clerf to Pintsch. Very bitter fighting developed around this village, which changed hands several times and finally remained in ours. Here, the enemy sustained heavy losses.
It was now a matter of vital importance to hold the bridgeheads west of the Our until all material had been transferred across this boundary river. And here we were faced with tremendous difficulties, as the deeply eroded Our valley and the icy roads caused enormous traffic jams; the great shortage of gasoline proved to be simply catastrophic. Consequently, withdrawal of the panzer units, the artillery, and the troop columns was terribly slow. The direct result was that the troops defending the bridgeheads were obliged to fight on much longer and sustained greater losses.
As a consequence of the conditions delineated above, on 26 Jan 45 bitter fighting arose along the whole front west of the Our; the fighting was heavy in the LVIII Pz Corps sector astride the Clerf, in the Pintsch–Lellingen area of 276 Volks Gren Div, and at Hoscheid, which was lost to the enemy on the same day. And during the next day, these ferocious bridgehead battles continued, especially in the area of Hosingen–Putscheid–Weiler. Although we lost many men we succeeded in holding the enemy away from the bridge at Dasburg and Gemünd, so that the greater part of our equipment could be brought over to the eastern bank of the Our. As a result of the shortage of gasoline a number of tanks had to be blown up, as we had no vehicles to spare for towing them. However, by 31 Jan 45 all bridgeheads had been withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Our.
The Ardennes Offensive, on which the Supreme Command pinned all its hopes, completely failed because the prerequisites for success were lacking from the start:
a. The prerequisites were:
(1) Adequate forces.
(2) Air superiority, or at least equality.
(3) Adequate supplies of ammunition.
(4) Adequate supplies of POL.
(5) Adequate supplies of motor transport.
(6) Adequate supplies of engineer equipment.
(7) Adequate supplies of spare parts for tanks and armored vehicles.
b. As a result of all these shortages, we were not able to overcome the difficulties of the weather and the terrain
c. The sole advantages which the German forces enjoyed were the element of surprise, and the favorable conditions in the enemy sector. However, both these things were only of help to us at the beginning.
So far as our estimate of the enemy’s reaction is concerned, it may be said that the Supreme Command erred when it imagined that the enemy would content himself with a defensive reaction, and that the difficulties inherent in a unified Allied command would cause a certain time lag to intervene before the Allies struck back. These false suppositions had a particularly unhappy effect on the situation of Seventh Army, which was at least three or four divisions too weak to accomplish its mission. If it can be asserted that Seventh Army, on the whole, performed rather well under the circumstances, this was due only to the fact that the offensive never got as far as the Meuse. For, if the flank of the offensive had had to be protected as far as Givet, the forces assigned to Seventh Army would have been hopelessly inadequate. Actually, the remote objective of Antwerp had from the beginning been deemed by Seventh Army to be simply unrealizable: The Suggestion of Army Group B – to limit the mission of the attack to reaching the Meuse – had been regarded by Seventh Army as one which could be realized. Even the Meuse seemed far away to Seventh Army when shortages became omnipresent:
a. Some of the divisions which had been earmarked for the offensive were still engaged on other fronts when the time arrived for the attack to begin; their timely arrival in the west was thus placed in jeopardy and it was not feasible to prepare them for their mission. Again, some of them were involved in defensive battles up to the very last moment, whence they emerged on one day and, on the next, stormed forward in far-flung attack toward the goal. The panzer grenadier division scheduled to assist Seventh Army in its task was never brought up; instead, there was the Führer Grenadier Brigade, a unit with only very moderate combat power, badly led, and unable to achieve anything of note. The stage of training reached by the divisions was not an advanced one, there was a particular lack of experienced noncommissioned officers, and the intermediate leaders were neither so flexible nor so well-schooled that they could hope to rise to the requirements of a trying war of movement.
b. The artillery prime movers were inadequate; the Raupenschlepper Ost was too weak to pull the guns through mud and – later – through snow, up the hilly ground. Part of the artillery had not been intended for anything but the preparation of the attack, and remained behind – immobile – in the jump-off positions. Not a single division had its full complement of assault guns, some of them had none at all, and others no more than three or four. The bridge columns dumped at the Rhine possessed no vehicles of their own for towing purposes; and Seventh Army was forced to undertake the task of towing the heavy vehicles either with its own motor vehicles or by horse power or even with human strength, to their scene of operation wherever it might be; consequently, the artillery was deprived of its prime movers, which it desperately needed to assure its ammunition supply. In any case, when the attack began on 16 Dec 44, only half a bridge column had gotten as far as the vicinity of the stream.
c. As a result of the shortage of POL, difficulties piled one on the other from the moment of initiation of the attack and gradually increased until they became insurmountable.
d. The number of pontoons provided for the first crossings of the Our and the Sauer was completely inadequate: the divisions possessed no more than eight of these; one division had only two large pontoons, and one of these was destroyed by enemy fire when the first crossing attempt was made.
A notable difficulty was that, until the last moment, the troops were completely in the dark as to what they were supposed to achieve, so that the offensive began with insufficient preparation for the very difficult terrain. However, it was not due to lack of foresight on the part of the Army that such a state of affairs existed; it had pointed out on many occasions the deficiencies which still existed. And the employment of two panzer armies in the depth of winter meant very difficult conditions and not inconsiderable risk. Our years of experience on the Eastern Front should certainly have enabled us to anticipate these difficulties.
Seventh Army was not able to prevent the relief of Bastogne, although it recklessly plundered its other sectors in order to give everything to the right wing: men, antitank weapons, artillery, and ammunition. Even during the second part of the offensive it still had to sacrifice, because strong elements of Fifth Army were still located in the area west and northwest of Bastogne and Seventh Army had the mission of covering their withdrawal. Since once again the order for a retreat was given too late and its tempo was much too slow, the few remaining combat units of any ability were frittered away and consumed; in the end all usable Army reserves were gone. Seventh Army contemplated this development – the concentration of all available reserves on the right wing – with growing concern. The enemy counterattack struck first of all at the southern flank of the German offensive and its strategic effect lessened as Fifth Pz Army withdrew nearer and nearer to the Bastogne–Houffalize line.
What would have happened if the American Command had quickly changed the main effort of its mobile forces to a thrust across the Sauer near Diekirch in order to strike the German flank further east; and had next rolled up the West Wall to the north, advancing west – or worse still – east along the Sauer in order to catch the remnants of Fifth Pz and Seventh Army at the Our?
About the beginning of January 45, when Seventh Army was thoroughly involved near Bastogne, such an operation would have found Seventh Army’s thinly manned line incapable of any effective resistance, because of its lack of reserves and mobility. Seventh Army had feared such an attack from the beginning, an attack which began only on 20 Jan 45 – when the front had approached the Clerf sector – and which, even then, was not executed with maximum strength. The limitation of this attack can be ascribed to the fact that Seventh Army was fortunately able to concentrate on this vital point, even if its available forces were rather small. This delaying action enabled us once again to get the remainder of the Ardennes Armies back behind the West Wall and, with their support, to build up a new line of defence.
The Seventh Army Staff is not in possession of sufficient data to enable it to predict accurately the success of an Allied operation which largely ignored the German shock troops in the relatively strong Meuse zone; and which delivered a well-planned, powerful, coordinated attack against the southern pivot of the German offensive in order to drive north or northeast across the Sauer. Such an operation might have succeeded in annihilating the Ardennes Armies and in bringing about the speedy collapse of the Western Front.
It may be observed, in conclusion, that Seventh Army, fighting a heavy and long-drawn-out action under the most arduous and unequal conditions succeeded, on the whole, in accomplishing its mission.
1. Command Posts on 16 Dec 44:
Seventh Army |
Dockendorf |
LXXXV Inf Corps |
Burg |
5 FJ Div |
bunker north of Roth |
352 Volks Gren Div |
Hüttingen |
LXXX Inf Corps |
Wolsfelder Berg |
276 Volks Gren Div |
Schankweiler |
212 Volks Gren Div |
Prümzurley |
LIII Inf Corps |
Föhren |
2. Bridge Sites:
5 FJ Inf Div |
Vianden, aux. bridge, 60 tons, ready 28 Dec 44. |
|
Roth, aux. bridge, 24 tons, ready 17 Dec 44. |
352 Volks Gren Div |
Gentingen, aux. bridge, 24 tons, ready 17 Dec 44. |
276 Volks Gren Div |
Bollendorf, military bridge, 24 tons, ready 19 Dec 44, intermittently usable until 24 Dec 44, when it was destroyed. |
|
Dillingen, aux. bridge, 24 tons, ready 25 Dec 44. |
212 Volks Gren Div |
east of Echternach, aix. bridge, construction prevented by enemy artillery fire. |
|
Weilerbach, restored covered bridge, about 40 tons, ready 18 Dec 44. |
|
Edingen, aux. bridge, 24 tons, ready 19 Dec 44. |
LXXX Inf Corps Arty Cmdr |
LXXXV Volks Arty Cmdr |
212 Volks Arty Regt 1st Bn; one battery Danish guns, one battery French guns (190 mm) 2d, 3d, 4th Bn one battery naval guns 276 Volks Arty Regt (four bns) Volks Arty Corps (five bns) 8 Volks Proj Brig (two regts, of three bns each) One battery (120 mm) Obsn Bn |
352 Volks Arty Regt (four bns) Volks Arty Corps (three bns) 5 FJ Arty Regt (ultra-mobile task force) four bns one battery Danish guns 18 Volks Proj Brig (two ree-ts. of three 18 Volks Proj Brig (two regts, of three bns each) One battery (120 mm) Obsn Bn |
Reserve: LIII Arty Cmdr
1. SEVENTH ARMY:
CG: |
Gen Pz |
Brandenberger |
C of S: |
Obst i.G. |
Gersdorff, Frhr von |
Ia: |
Obstlt i.G. |
Voigt-Ruschewey |
Ic: |
Maj i.G. |
Hirche |
O Qu: |
Obstlt i.G. |
Fusenegger |
Harko: |
Genmaj |
Riedel |
2. LXXXV Inf Corps:
CG: |
Gen Inf |
Kniess |
C of S: |
Obstlt i.G. |
Lassen |
Arko: |
Obst |
Beisswaenger |
3. LXXX Inf Corps:
CG: |
Gen Inf |
Beyer, Dr |
C of S: |
Obst i.G. |
Koestlin |
Arko: |
Obst |
Schroeder |
4. LIII Inf Corps:
CG: |
Gen Kav |
Rothkirch, Graf |
C of S: |
Obst i.G. |
Bodenstein |
Arko: |
? |
? |
5. XLVII Pz Corps:
CG: |
Gen Pz |
Lüttwitz, Heinrich; Frhr von |
C of S: |
Obstlt i.G. |
Bernstorff, Graf |
6. LVIII Pz Corps:
CG: |
Gen Pz |
Krüger, Walter |
C of S: |
Obst i.G. |
Dingier |
7. 5 FJ Div:
Cmdr: |
Obst, later Genmaj |
Heilmann |
Ia: |
Maj i.G. |
Passlik; after about 22 Dec 44, |
|
Maj |
Georgi |
8. 352 Volks Gren Div:
Cmdr: |
Obst |
Schmidt; after 25 Dec 44, |
|
Genmaj |
Batzing |
Ia: |
Maj i.G. |
Schneider |
9. 276 Volks Gren Div:
Cmdr: |
Genmaj |
Möhring (KIA); after 23 Dec 44, |
|
Obst |
Dempwolff |
Ia: |
Maj i.G. |
Wittmann |
10. 212 Volks Gren Div:
Cmdr: |
Genlt |
Sensfuss |
Ia: |
Maj i.G. |
Koestlin; after about 26 Dec 44, |
|
Maj i.G. |
Edler von Rosenthal |
11. 79 Volks Gren Div:
Cmdr: |
Obst |
Weber; after about 30 Dec 44, |
|
Obst |
Hummel |
Ia: |
Obstlt i.G. |
Henneberg |
12. 9 Volks Gren Div:
Cmdr: |
Genmaj |
Kolb |
Ia: |
? |
? |
1. Interview notes in the John Toland Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 37.
2. Hechler, ‘The Enemy Side of the Hill’, see note 7, Introduction, part one of this book.
3. Information on the Seventh Army is weighty. See also General Erich Brandenberger, ‘Questions and Answers on the Ardennes Campaign’, A-934, 12 July 1949, and B-447. Also, from Generalmajor Rudolf von Gersdorff, Brandenberger’s capable Chief of Staff: ‘An Interview with Gen. von Gersdorff: Seventh Army in the Ardennes Offensive’, ETHINT-54; The Ardennes Offensive’, A-909, 8 November 1945; ‘Results of the Ardennes Offensive’, 3 February 1946; ‘Evaluation and Equipment of the Units Attached to the Seventh Army during the Ardennes Offensive’, A-932, n.d.’ Generalmajor Paul Riedel, ‘Seventh Army Artillery’, B-594 and B-783; and ‘Battles in the Ardennes: Activity of the Artillery of the Seventh Army’, B-467, n.d.
4. This was the new U.S. 9th Armored Division, with each of its combat commands separated across the width of the Ardennes front.
5. A much more important reason for the rapid advance through the Ardennes in 1940 is that the Germans did not really have to fight prior to reaching the Meuse River. The few Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais pulled back across the river as had been pre-arranged. For a comparison of the 1940 and 1944 offensives see Magna Bauer’s manuscript on file at OCMH.
6. 44th MG Battalion.
7. Panzer Lehr was using this bridge to cross over the Our.
* Jagdpanzer 38t ‘Hetzer’.