With regard to military affairs, no person was closer to Hitler in late 1944 than Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, taciturn head of the German High Command of the Armed forces (OKW) and the Wehrmachtführungsstab, the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which formed Hitler’s household military command center. His was acknowledged to be the brain behind the OKW plan for the offensive, which many, such as General von Manteuffel, were inclined to criticize for its lack of realism:
Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont had never been in the war … Their lack of fighting experience tended to make them underrate practical difficulties, and encourage Hitler to believe that things could be done that were quite impossible … I imagined that Hitler must realize that a rapid advance would not be possible under winter conditions, and these limitations, but from what I have heard since, it is clear that Hitler thought the advance could go much quicker than it did. The Meuse could not possibly have been reached on the second or third day as Jodl expected. He and Keitel tended to encourage Hitler’s optimistic illusions.1
After the war, the Historical Section described their impressions of the chainsmoking head of OKW:
He was fairly cold, exact, humorless and stiff in posture and personality. I was impressed by his grasp of details; for example, I started to apologize for one question regarding the American attempt to simulate the presence of an extra U.S. division in the south of the VIII Corps sector. Gen. Jodl said, ‘Oh, that’s all right, I can answer that question with candor; we didn’t know anything about a simulated division, but we did know that a few days before the 16th of December you moved fresh troops in the north flank of the VIII Corps [106th Infantry Division].’
As Jodl was executed at Nuremburg in October 1946, the opinions expressed in his interviews constitute an important primary source.2 After all, in the course of the interrogations he acknowledged that the plan for the operation had evolved from numerous detailed discussions between Hitler and himself. The attack had to be launched in the West ‘because the Russians had so many troops that even if we had succeeded in destroying thirty divisions, it would not have made any difference. On the other hand, if we destroyed 30 divisions in the West, it would amount to more than one third of the entire invasion army.’ He and Hitler firmly believed that by a successful offensive ‘a decisive turning point in the Campaign in the West, and possibly of the entire war could be achieved.’
However, as the preparations for the offensive continued, Jodl had to accept more and more compromises within the framework of the plan, and found himself leaning towards the ‘small solutions’ proposed by Hitler’s generals: ‘The venture of the far-flung objective [Antwerp] is unalterable,’ he wrote to General Westphal on 1 November, ‘although the goal appears to be disproportionate to our available forces.’3 Just before the attack Jodl confided, ‘I was filled with doubt.’ When asked, after the war, if the German army could have succeeded in reaching Antwerp had they possessed the reserves which were available in 1940, he replied:
We would have needed many, many more reserves and correspondingly more aircraft, munitions and fuel. We did not have the other factors of superiority on a large scale. If we had had ten more good divisions, we might have thrown you over the Meuse, but how we could have held the big salient thus created, is not clear. Our strategic position would have been worse rather than better.4
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel was a very unlikely figure for one of the most powerful military men in Hitler’s headquarters. Born near Brunswick, Keitel was neither a Prussian nor rose very far in the field command. During the Great War he served first as an artillery battery commander and later as a staff officer. In 1925 he took his first post-war job, with the Reichswehr Ministry, eventually becoming a colonel with the Organizations Department of the Truppenamt in 1929. Owing to the fact that he was War Minister Werner von Blomberg’s son-in-law, his promotions were rapid thereafter: a Major General in 1934, a Leutnant General in 1936 and a General of the Artillery in 1937. His lack of practical military experience was illustrated by the fact that he never commanded a military formation larger than a battalion. However, Hitler made Keitel his head of the OKW in 1938, mainly on Blomberg’s recommendation of him as an efficient chef de bureau.
What Hitler saw in Keitel was an unthinking assistant who would blindly obey his bidding. He was an officer of little imagination or intellectual power and willingly sold out the Reichswehr to the National Socialists. Even Hitler was under no illusion as to his capabilities: ‘he has the mental capacity of a cinema usher,’ he once observed.5 Others around Keitel saw him as a sycophant and a mouthpiece for Hitler’s decisions – ‘Lakeitel’ (Lackey Keitel), as he was called by those who saw through his title. Although Keitel seldom made any decisions of his own he was a perpetual fixture at Hitler’s side, and often lent his signature to important documents. This, perhaps more than anything else, sent Keitel to the gallows along with General Jodl on 16 October 1946.
It was against this backdrop that Keitel and Jodl composed the following answers to a questionnaire regarding the Ardennes Offensive.6 In particular, their final statement regarding the planning is unapologetic: they believed the best choice had been made in launching the attack in the West. ‘I cannot recall being so divided in my feelings towards any other man as I was towards Hitler,’ Jodl said at Nuremberg. ‘My emotions ranged from reverence and admiration to hatred. His destructive and caustic criticism of so much I held dear – the General Staff, the middle class, the nobility, the Reichswehr, our sense of right and justice – all this repelled me more and more, during the second half of the war.’ Major Hechler, who conducted the interviews at Bad Mondorf, observed that:
General Jodl appeared very eager to write full details on the Ardennes Offensive … [However] he was very much concerned with the impending war crimes trials … General Jodl cleared this particular account of the Ardennes Offensive with Field Marshal Keitel, because Keitel was at all times very jumpy about war crimes, and seemed to be scared to answer any question quickly … As with all of General Jodl’s answers, I believe that great weight can be attached to the strategic considerations he discusses.
With regard to Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Hechler wrote:
At about 7:30 PM Maj. Büchs came over and General Jodl sought us out and said that Field Marshal Keitel wanted to speak to me. Keitel came over and in between bows and scrapes and other despicable gestures, he said he had read General Jodl’s account of the Ardennes Offensive and had countersigned it. It was obvious that this had been done at Jodl’s initiative. I asked Keitel if he did not want to take the questions and expand on them with his own account, but he quickly backed away from that one with the plea that Jodl knew twice as much as he did. I took an instant dislike to Keitel, who looked for all the world like a slave who feels he must bow before a tyrant. I felt like telling him to stiffen his backbone like Jodl and quit talking to me in wheedling tones.
But more important than personality, both Keitel and Jodl suffered a deficiency which was harped upon repeatedly by other German commanders: neither had much in the way of first-hand experience with the war. Although both made nominal trips to the fronts, neither stayed long enough to gain more than transient impressions. And neither had ever commanded a large military formation in peacetime, much less during an all out world war. Dietrich accurately identified the source of their optimism: ‘they only waged war,’ he said, ‘on maps.’
Danny S. Parker
Q. What factors influenced the selection of 16 December 1944 as the date for the start of the German Ardennes Offensive?
a. First Army (V Corps) attack toward Roer River dams?
b. Threat offered by Third U.S. Army’s imminent attack on the Siegfried Line scheduled to start 19 December (How much intelligence did the Germans have of this attack?)
c. Situation and Russian capabilities on East front?
d. Military or Political morale considerations?
e. Weather.
A. The moment for the attack was dictated by circumstances. In our first planning we hoped to launch the attack somewhere between 26 and 28 November (new-moon period). But the arrangement and refresher training of the combat divisions, as also the bringing up of munitions and fuel dragged on into December, as a consequence of Allied air raids.
16 December was, unfortunately, the earliest moment at which an attack could be made. This brought the operation already into a period of improving flying weather. The divisions of the 1st and 2d wave were marched up, the divisions of the 3d wave were just arriving.
Neither the attack of the 1st U.S. Army nor the intended attack of the U.S. 3rd Army, which was unknown to us, had any influence on the choice of the time of attack. On the contrary the attack of the U.S. 5th Corps was just what we wanted; we should have liked it still better if the British Army Group had already started a major attack over the Roer.
The situation on the Eastern Front had no more immediate influence on the moment of attack, except in the general tendency to make the attack as soon as possible in order to use the experience-proven worst flying weather and to release as soon as possible more units for the east.
The morale of the troops played no part in it. The men were certainly inadequately and hurriedly trained and still not sufficiently welded together, but in the mass they were optimistic and full of aggressiveness. On 12 December HQ was moved from Berlin to Ziegenberg, on 13 and 14 The Führer spoke to the Commanding Generals. On 14 December the 16th was fixed as the day for attack.
Q. What, specifically, were the ultimate and intermediate objectives of the offensive in the final orders issued?
A. The objects of the operations were: Breakthrough with the 6th Panzer Army over the Meuse between Liège and Huy with Antwerp as the objective. The 5th Panzer Army had to cross the Meuse between Huy and Dinant and cover the left flank of the 6th Army against Brussels–Charleroi. The 7th Army was to take the line Dinant–Neufchâteau–Luxemburg and secure the deep left flank of the Army Group. The mission of the left wing of the 15th Army was to press forward over the Hohes Venn into the line Monschau–Verviers–Liège, and there intercept a counterattack of the strong enemy forces from the Aachen region into the deep right flank of the Army Group. A later supplementary attack between the Meuse and Geilenkirchen towards the south was desired by Oberbefehlshaber West but not approved and the forces provided for it were brought up behind the main attack as OKW reserves. Secondary objectives were not given, in accordance with our fundamental operational principles.
Q. Was there ever an intention on the part of the German high command, either in the planning phase, or during the course of the offensive when the attacks to the north failed, to swing south and turn the flank of Third U.S. Army?
A. The idea of turning south after the breakthrough, in order to operate against the left flank of the U.S. 3rd Army, was voiced by the Führer before the final decision on the attack, but it was dropped as it lacked an opposite pole. By reaching Antwerp, on the other hand, the entire British Army Group would have been cut off from its connections to the rear. During the course of the Offensive the idea of wheeling south was never again taken up.
Q. What counter-intelligence measures were used to conceal the assembly and preparations for attack of the 6th Panzer and 5th Panzer armies?
A. The directives for the secrecy and masking were particularly carefully drawn and comprised the following:
a. Whoever knew about our intention had to subscribe a written undertaking.
b. All preparations were made under the slogan, counterattack into the south flank of a British major attack on the Ruhr.
c. The moment when the Armies, Corps, Divisions and Regiments might be informed of our real intention was fixed by the OKW.
d. The Panzer Divisions of the 6th Panzer Army were brought up at the last moment and in night movements.
e. The new assault divisions might only be brought into the frontline on the very last night. It was forbidden to send out any scouts in advance from these units. In the last few days no scouts at all might be used. Unreliable soldiers (Alsatians etc.) had to be taken out of the frontline.
f. Artillery and AA could only fire in the same field as before.
g. Troop movements in daytime were forbidden.
h. Our planes could not move to their jumping off place before the first day of the attack.
i. The 6th and 5th Panzer Armies had to retain their existing CPs. The new CPs for the attack might only be occupied by a small operational staff under a cover name.
k. Comprehensive sending of fake radio messages was to preserve the existing organization of the operational staffs in the radio picture.
Q. Planning dates.
a. When was the Ardennes selected as the area in which the offensive would be launched?
b. When was the plan adopted to use offensively the reserves in the West?
A. In the last few days of September.
Q. What was the minimum build-up of forces considered necessary, in the planning stage, for the launching of this offensive? Was this minimum set or exceeded? When was the build-up started and when completed? Were available reinforcements considered sufficient?
A. 25 to 30 Divisions were considered the necessary minimum. This number was considerably exceeded. The troops began to move up at the beginning of November. The first arrivals, the three Volksgrenadier Divisions, were put into the frontline of the attack sector. No changes were made in the manning of the front until the day of the attack. By about 10 December all the forces had been brought up. Assuming always that the attack was a complete surprise for the enemy we considered the reserves at our disposition as sufficient to attain our objective.
Q. What were the available stocks of motor fuel for the two armies, in terms of kilometers, at the start of the offensive? Was the German Command in a position to sustain the drive by drawing on its fuel reserves, in the event that American POL dumps were not captured? How much fuel and other major supply items needed to be captured in order to sustain the offensive? Was there accurate knowledge of the location of the main Allied supply installations (elements of the I SS Panzer Corps penetrated to the southern edge of a 3,300,000 gallon dump near Spa)?
A. There were three supply units of 200 km (8000 tons) with the troops. Another about 20,000 was also ready. With these the objective could be reached without capturing any fuel from the enemy. We had no exact information about U.S. fuel but assumed that near Liège was the head of a pipe line.
Q. If the plan for the offensive could not be realized, how long did the German High Command estimate it would take for the Allies to recover from the spoiling effect of the offensive and mount a new offensive of their own?
A. In the event the object of the offensive was not attained we believed the Allied major attack would be delayed for a minimum of 6 weeks at any rate.
Q. What, if any, important effects in halting the drive had the heavy air attacks of 24–25 December on German lines of communication?
A. The crushing air attacks on transport installations and crossings aimed especially at the middle Rhine Zone, Koblenz–Mainz–Frankfurt, against the valleys of the Moselle, Lahn and Nahe, and against traffic hubs like Giessen, Hanau and Limburg, had grave consequences. The difficult transportation situation which had already been in existence for a long time, could not be improved, in spite of every kind of auxiliary service and repair and restoration work. The Rhine was the end of any through railroad movements on a large scale. West of the Rhine islands of communication functioned on individual rail sectors, so that all movements, especially of supplies, had essentially to be made across country.
Q. Does the enclosed map correctly depict the original plan of the German attack and its subsequent revision? What factors determined the revision of the original plans? When was the revised plan made and when was it put into effect? Why was the II SS Panzer Corps held in reserve until 23 December?
A. My sketch is a fairly accurate reproduction of the plan of attack for the Ardennes offensive. The Corps divisions I cannot any longer reconstruct from memory. As far as I can remember, there were three corps each in the 6th and 5th Panzer Armies, and at least two Corps in the 7th Army. Already on 24 December we were going over to the defensive. No new plan of attack with far-reaching aims was made. The II SS Panzer Corps originally stood as a second attack wave behind the I SS Panzer Corps and was, after a successful breakthrough, to follow northeast, driving around west of Liège and wheeling against the Meuse south of Maastricht and against the Albert Canal, in order to start the pocketing of the enemy main force in the Aachen area and to cover against an attack from the British and Canadians on the Albert Canal. The Corps was not held back in reserve, but could not follow up the I SS Panzer Corps on account of the completely jammed roads. It was then brought up behind the right wing of the 5th Panzer Army and wheeled in towards the north.
Q. At what date in the counteroffensive did it become evident that it would be impossible to continue forward to the original objectives and that it would be necessary to take up the defensive of that which had been obtained? At what point did it become evident that a retrograde movement from the whole of the Ardennes salient was imperative?
A. It was recognized already on the 18th or 19th of December that we should not succeed in gaining the Maas or crossing it by surprise. A major battle with the U.S. forces south and east of the river was impending. The decision to defend what we had gained was taken about Christmas, the decision to retreat from the Ardennes was made on 14 January, two days after the beginning of the major Russian offensive. At the same time the relinquishing of nine armored units, three infantry divisions and about one-third of the artillery corps and mortar brigades was ordered.
Q. What was the relative importance of St. Vith and Bastogne to the German High Command plan of attack? Did the fact that St. Vith was seized too late add weight to the importance of seizing Bastogne?
A. The significance of St. Vith and Bastogne was realized, yet it was ordered that the first attack waves ought not to stop to wipe out such stubbornly defended key points but leave them for the second wave. The decision for the immediate capture of Bastogne was made as soon as it was realized that we had to reckon with strong enemy counterattacks east and south of the Meuse. The experience of St. Vith had no influence on this decision.
Q. What caused the failure of I SS Panzer Corps in the Monschau–Malmédy area?
A. The main reason for the failure lay in the indescribably bad road conditions. A thaw had set in and the few unpaved roads were soon quagmires. The deployment and development of the I SS Panzer Corps was greatly impeded. The attack of the LXVII AK did not gain enough ground towards the Hohes Venn and this also hampered the free movement of the I SS Panzer Corps towards the west. SS Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich can give you more exact details.
Q. Was the Allied reaction to the German attack quicker than had been anticipated by the German High Command?
A. The promptness with which the Allies reacted to the German attack did perhaps exceed our expectations. Before anything else however it was the speed of our own movements which lagged far behind expectations.
Q. What methods were employed to gain an accurate knowledge of Allied dispositions in the Ardennes? To what extent were civilian agents depended upon to supply this information?
A. Our picture of the distribution of American forces in the attack sector was essentially derived from tactical reconnaissance, prisoners of war, radio intelligence and our information was, as far as we know, only obtained to a very small degree from agents. Oberst I.G. (Gen. Staff Col.) Buerklin could give you better information, as chief of the Dept. of Foreign Armies, Western Front (Chef der Abteilung Fremde Heere, West).
Q. Did the Germans, mistaking a limited withdrawal for major retreat, believe that on the 24th of December the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps was in such a weakened condition that it would be possible to break through to Liège?
A. No. We did not have this opinion. A breakthrough in the direction of Liège was not intended.
Q. What knowledge did the Germans have of the faked U.S. troop movements into the VIII U.S. Corps sector in early December?
A. Out of the ordinary troop movements in the U.S. VIII Corps area at the beginning of December were not observed, only a relieving movement on the north wing of the Corps and a reinforcement of artillery at two points, neither of which exercised any influence on our intentions.
Q. In what order of importance would the Germans place the following factors influencing the failure of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes?
a. The failure to seize St. Vith in time to prevent the formation of a stout line of defense by the Allies on the northern shoulder of the breakthrough area?
b. The appearance of good flying weather on or about 24 December, allowing Allied air superiority to be extensively used.
c. The failure to seize Bastogne.
d. The failure to seize large stocks of Allied gasoline and supplies.
e. The ability of the Allied Command to move reinforcements quickly to the threatened area.
f. The failure of Operation ‘GREIF’.
g. Other factors.
A. The failure of the offensive is to be ascribed to the following reasons, in the order of importance:
a. Soft roads which made impossible the rapid advance of armored units and hindered a breakthrough in depth into the Meuse area.
b. Tougher resistance of U.S. troops than expected, especially at St. Vith. (The forces occupying the Schnee-Eifel in our opinion could have held out longer.)
c. The inadequate training for such an attack of our leaders, subordinate commanders, and troops; in many of the divisions, especially the Armored Divisions.
d. The widespread shortage of transport, especially heavy tracked prime movers.
e. The enemy superiority in the air which made itself felt in particular in the major fighting of 24 December.
f. In the uniform and promptly applied operational measures taken by the Allies.
The rest of the grounds cited in (c), (d) and (f) in the questionnaire did not play much part. Particularly the ‘Greif’ operation, apart from a few long-range patrols, never came into effect, since the rapid breakthrough on the second day, to the Meuse, which was its condition precedent, did not happen.
Q. What was the significance of the heavily reinforced attacks on 31 December to 4 January on the Bastogne area?
A. The object of the reinforced attacks in the Bastogne area from 31 December was to capture Bastogne itself and so create more favorable conditions for the holding of the ground gained.
Concluding Remarks: We do not believe, with the troops and material then at our disposal, that the Supreme Command could have done anything better as it saw the situation. The operation was fundamentally one of surprise, and to this extent we believe it was a complete success. Perhaps one or other exaggerated measure to insure its secrecy may have hampered the thoroughness of the preparations for the attack. But such things have to be taken for better or worse as solely in complete surprise did the chance of success lie. That this chance could not be exploited lay in the reasons cited.
The criticism, whether it had not been better to have employed our available reserves in the east rather than in the west, we submit to the judgment of history; whether it was a ‘crime’ to prolong the war by this attack, we leave to the Allied courts. Our own judgment is unchanged and independent of them.
1. B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, Quill, New York, 1948. Actually there was hope within Hitler’s headquarters that the Meuse might be reached on the evening of the first day of the assault.
2. See also Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, ‘Planning the Ardennes Offensive’, ETHINT-50, and ‘An Interview with Genobst. Alfred Jodl: Ardennes Offensive’, ETHINT-51; and two documents by Herbert Büchs, ‘An Interview with Maj. Herbert Büchs: The Ardennes Offensive’, ETHINT-34, 1947, and ‘The German Ardennes Offensive’, A-977, n.d. Büchs was Luftwaffe aide to Jodl during the period. Extensive comparison between the 1940 and 1944 operations can be found in R-44, Magna Bauer, ‘Comparison Between the Planning for the Germans’ Ardennes Offensive in 1944 and Operation “Gelb” in 1940’, April 1950, in OCMH files.
3. OB West, KTB Anlage 50, pp. 30–1, 1 November 1944.
4. This, and all other quotations in the section from Jodl, originate from ETHINT-50, op. cit.
5. See Richard Brett-Smith, Hitler’s Generals, Osprey, London, 1976.
6. The source document is MS no. A-928 from the Historical Division of the U.S. Army, dated 12 July 1949. It is on file at the National Archives as part of Record Group 338.