The Belgian air force was neglected and totally obsolete by 1940. Of its fleet of 234 aircraft, 180 were operational, seventy-six of the machines were fighters (twenty-two Gloster Gladiators Mk 1, twenty Hawker Hurricanes Mk 1 and thirty-four Fiat CR 42 “Falcos”). These machines offered no threat to German fighter aircraft. Belgium also had sixteen Fairey Battle Mk 1 bombers (very slow with poor defensive armament and already obsolete) in the 5th and 7th squadrons. That was everything.

Belgium was expecting the delivery of another eighty fighters under the Hawker Hurricane licence, but these were not operational in May 1940. Also too late to pose a threat were the Brewster F2 Buffalo fighters obtained from the United States and the Italian Caproni. Thirty-four Fiat CR 42 fighters of an order for forty in March had arrived at the time of the German attack.

Belgium had an observer corps armed with FRC 7-mm model 1927 and Madson 20-mm CHM model 1935 anti-aircraft guns. In 1940 this constituted the defence of the national airspace. The air force was composed of three regiments. The first specialized in aerial observation and air-to-ground cooperation, the second was the fighter force. The third regiment had aircraft for long-range reconnaissance and light bombing. Each regiment had anti-aircraft units.

It is a strange fact that a country with a relatively long coast should have disbanded its navy between the war because of budget shortages. The navy was reactivated in September 1939. By then it was far too late to start building naval vessels and disorganization ruled. The merchant marine was scoured for naval reserve officers, as too were other branches of the military for men who had seagoing experience. Eventually the navy had thirty officers, 98 NCOs and 513 other ranks. The only operational vessels were a small coastguard ship armed with a 47-mm gun and two MGs, and two wooden boats requisitioned as minesweepers. The coastal artillery had one gun at Antwerp and another at Zeebrugge.

On 1 September 1939, Belgium declared its neutrality but ordered general mobilization, fearing a German invasion in the east of the country. The mobilization met serious difficulties: a lack of officers and experience in the ranks of the reservists, and inadequate armament. As in France, the inactivity between 1939 and 1940 adversely affected morale. The men lacked fighting spirit, being more concerned for their families than the defence of the national borders. Another decisive influence for lack of motivation was the perennial Belgian problem still extant today: the racial tension between Fleming and Walloon. While the French-speaking Walloons manned the borders, the Dutch-speaking Flemings were stationed around the cities. In order to avoid any unease arising from this discrimination, the Government awarded farmers, miners, teachers and officials frequent home leave. But the esprit de corps was inevitably undermined², and while Belgium was “caught up” in its internal problems, the Germans prepared for war.

The Defence of the Albert Canal

The Albert Canal is 129.6 kms in length and was built between 1930 and 1939. It is a showpiece of Belgian engineering. It provided not only an unsurpassable link between Liège and Antwerp, but was also an excellent obstacle to an invader coming from the east. Harmonizing with the main aim of the defensive strategy of the Great War, the Belgians trusted blindly in the construction of defensive obstacles (ranging from the Albert Canal to bunkers and forts, such as Eben Emael), which in combination with the troops on the border would provide an insurmountable barrier against any attempt by the Germans to invade. This defensive plan depended on the German strategy for attack being the same as it had been at the beginning of the First World War. They did not expect it to be anything else, and for that reason, despite all the expenditure in time, effort and money, the Belgian defensive plan failed. As will be seen, the Blitzkrieg swept across the Albert Canal before the Belgians had time to react.