Notes

Chapter 1

1. Vaesen (2003), p.198, 200-201.

2. Hiance (2008), p.254 recounts in this respect a brawl on New Year’s Eve 1939 between Walloon and Flemish soldiers at Wonck near Eben Emael. It was caused by Flemish soldiers of 15.Regt of the Line requesting that the musicians play patriotic Flemish songs, Wonck being in Wallonia. The author commented, “Poor Belgian Army”.

3. The Pieux Frankignol enterprise built these four flank bunkers, the communication gallery BN2 and the casemates BN3 and BN10 positioned at the Albert Canal locks, Briegden north of Veldwezelt. Price was 1.07 million Belgian francs.

4. These cost 147,000 Belgian francs. Bunkers M and N were built by the firm De Backer et Fils of Flémalle for 373,000 francs. The bunkers E and F either side of the bridge at Kanne cost 45,204 and 46,321 francs respectively.

5. The last of the work for the defence of Maastricht was completed in 1958 during the Cold War. It involved the construction of a casemate on the bridge over the Lanaye lock, funded by the Defence Ministry and planned by the Ministry of Public Buildings and Reconstruction.

6. Both were sentenced to death in their absence for taking secret documents on the flight without permission. From Belgium they were transferred to Britain and then Canada. In 1943 Hönmmans, who was in ill-health, was repatriated to Germany in an exchange of PoWs. He was court martialled in 1944 and acquitted. He survived the war and died in Cologne in 1969. His wife did not survive the Gestapo interrogations relating to the Mechelen incident and his two sons fell at the front. Reinberger was also repatriated in 1944 and died at Koblenz after the war. See Boerger (2003), p.7-20.

7. In 1940, German summer time was two hours ahead of Greenwich mean time, Belgian time one hour ahead, Dutch time twenty minutes ahead. In this text German time is used.

8. Rather more than 16,000 Belgian troops were present in the battle region between Kanne and Veldwezelt.

Chapter 2

1. On 6 August 1938, in the midst of the Rhön Competition disaster struck. Several gliders, including the two Horten III’s flown by Blech and Scheidhauer flew into a fierce thunderstorm that included higher which had developed over the Wasserkuppe. The canopy of the Horton III consisted of a thin layer of cellophane which rather unfortunately for Blech and Scheidhauer became brittle when subject to cold temperatures, as were experienced during the thunderstorm. Consequently, it was not long before the brittle canopies and the glider’s plywood skins were shattered by hail strikes and the two pilots were forced to abandon their stricken gliders. Unfortunately, neither pilot waited long enough before opening his parachute. As a consequence both Blech and Scheithauer were caught in rising air and subsequently hoisted to greater heights. The two pilots when they reached the ground resembled icicles. Sadly Blech was dead, having died from exposure to the extremely cold temperatures present at very high altitudes. Scheidhauer however was more fortunate. He was found unconscious, hanging from a tree, but subsequently required two fingers from each of his hands and two toes from each of his feet to be removed because of frostbite. His barograph showed an altitude of 25,000 feet, a height thought at the time to be unreachable in a glider. (Almost a year later, on 8 August 1939, during the 1939 Röhn contest, Scheidhauer flew over 200 miles in a Horten IIIb, thereby earning for himself the much coveted “Golden C”) In the attack on the fort at Eben email in May 1940 Scheidhauer piloted the glider belobging to Squad 7.

2. Reitsch (2009) p.176-177 (Spanish language version)

Chapter 3

1. The German ranks are explained in the Introduction. This book is translated from the German, having first appeared in Spanish. Although for the most part the Belgian ranks were put as equivalents to the Spanish in the Spanish edition, in the German translation they were given the French equivalents because they did not correspond exactly to the German ranks.

2. In April 1940, Student had 4,500 paratroops at his disposal and 475 Ju 52s. A further 12,000 men were trained in the airborne role (22.Inf.Div). Permuy, 2002, p.239.

3. Their symbol was a comet. On 7 May, three days before the attack, this motif was applied to all SA Koch vehicles. Photographs taken at Maastricht prove this symbol. Portraits of participants in the operation painted by Wolfgang Willich also show this comet.

4. Karl-Heinz (Heiner) Lange, glider pilot, Granit Squad 5 (Eben Emael) related how many of his colleagues believed they were to attack a fort in Switzerland. Blum (2007) p.54.

5. Adolf Jacob (member of the beacon team illuminating the glider route) informed Gefr. Krautwurst and Gefr. Lukas, who were all sentenced to death. Gefr.Veenhuis received ten years’ imprisonment for failing to take proper measures to conceal military secrets. This was on 8 April 1940. After the success of the operation all these sentences were rescinded. (SA Koch War Diary, BA/MA RL 33/97).

6. The principle of the hollow charge was discovered by Charles Monroe in 1888, at that time an authority on explosives. Using a conventional explosive, immediately after the detonation there is a high pressure wave which has enormous penetrative power. The force of this wave is so great that gases and molten metal enter through a small hole it bores in the armour. The principle of the hollow charge is the use of the explosive power to melt the metal of the armour protection.

7. Koch’s proposal was declined. Melzer (1957) p.16.

8. Various sources, e.g. Oebser (2009) p.32 maintain that these pioneers volunteered for this “special duty”. The son of an SA Koch member, Bernhard Schrowange (2/Pi.31) informed the authors that his father “was expressly ordered” to join this paratroop group. Others such as Hermann Angelkort (1/Pi.11) did volunteer. Their experience and training as pioneers/trench builders was decisive. The opportunity to return to their previous unit after the operation with a decoration was invaluable and this special operation exercised a strong “power of attraction”.

9. According to former paratrooper Theo Schmitt (Vroenhoven bridge), their M-38 helmets had an approximately 7-mm thick layer of clay mixed with sawdust. It was not easy to find a suitable camouflage. According to SA Koch, this camouflage was applied on 21 and 23 March, also 9 and 23 April.

10. Franz Wilhelm Hermann Aldinger (b. Nuremberg 22 July 1907) studied Law and Social Sciences before entering the Reichswehr. After serving with the Legion Condor he fought in the Second World War and was awarded the German Cross in gold in September 1942. At that time he was CO Flak 1/1.Luftwaffe Korps. After the defeat in 1945 he studied engineering and worked for various concerns including Telefunken (1950-1957). In 1957 he volunteered for the Bundeswehr and commanded 1.Luftwaffe-Div. from 1961 to 1963 in the rank of General. He retired in 1966 and was awarded the Great Service Cross of the German Federal Republic. He died on 2 November 1993.

11. Aldinger described this in his article “Deutsche Flak feuert vor Madrid” in: “Wir kämpften in Spanien”, Die Wehrmacht, special issue, 30 May 1939.

12. Molina and Manrique (2008) p.13, 14, 24 and 29: also (2005) p.17; Gonzalez Alvarez (2006), p.110,111.

13. The He 123 was a single-seater, single engined biplane dive bomber and close attack aircraft armed with two 20-mm MGs and two MG 17 7.92-mm MGs. Its payload was four 50 kg bombs. The engine noise could be varied so that it sounded like a machine gun firing. The dive was more vertical than that of a Stuka, and the He 123 was more feared than a Stuka. The type remained in service until 1944. (Transl).

Chapter 4

1. Schalich (1985) p.10

2. The bunker crew given this duty consisted of one sergeant, two corporals and nine men of the Frontier Cyclists Battalion from Limburg who were all volunteers.

3. Named after its inventor, French colonel Léon Edmond de Cointet de Fillain, who designed it in 1933. It was a steel gate 2.5 metres high and three metres broad. The front part was mounted on a 3.28 metres long trapeze-shaped structure which tapered off up to 1.2 metres. It had two concrete rollers forward and one to the rear able to turn 90º. The obstacle weighed 1.4 tonnes.

Chapter 5

1. Altmann, captured at Crete, survived the war and died on 20 February 1981. Toschka took part in the campaigns in Poland, Belgium, Crete, the Russia and Italy. Promoted to the rank of Hauptmann and while commanding FJR 12 he fell near Anzio fighting British and US forces on 21 Febraury 1944.

2. Schindele came from Luftwaffe-Ausbildungs-Regt 13. In other cases these were pioneers from infantry regiments. In Group Eisen there were many such, even troop leader Adolf Brandes came from Pi.Battalion 14. One assumed that their experience with explosives, despite their having no training in parachute jumps, made them good candidates to fill the gaps in the SA Koch ranks. This lack of paratroop training was noticeable at Kanne, however, where the paratroops suffered heavy losses (personnel lists of SA Koch, BA/MA XXXVIII).

3. Fritz Bodet from Malmedy, member of Beton Squad 10; Hans Ahn, born in Eupen, Beton Squad 4; Josef Heinen, from Büttgenbach lost his life at Kanne bridge. The ages of Bodet and Heinen (28 and 29 respectively) contrast notably with those of their paratrooper comrades, another pointer to their Volksdeutsch origin. In addition to these Germans of Belgian nationality is Emil Johann Leenen who, though born in Germany, was a Dutch citizen and deserted from the Dutch Army.

4. Wiosello (1990) p.155. It should not be forgotten that German companies and workers took part in the construction of the Albert Canal. At Kanne for example there were at one time or another 200 Germans, sixty-five Hungarians, eighty Yugoslavs, and twenty-five Italians. In September 1930 there were 1,450 persons of twelve different nationalities living in the village. Gijbels (2008) p.17.

5. A/MA RH 24-27/135, Reconnaissance of Belgian and Dutch Territories. Addition to Nest Cologne, Nr. 3468/Ig dated 17 November 1939. Nevertheless there was no total certainty about the trench system and, in some cases, places were attacked erroneously being thought to be fortified trenches. The same report put the complement of Fort Eben Emael at 5,000 soldiers. Despite these false assumptions, bridgeheads had been established in scarcely half an hour.

6. The occupants of bunker N were: Corporals Cornée and Geerings, and Privates Piet van Hees, Bouva, Mertens, Rikske van Hoof, Brabant, Jefke Thomasen, Minnebier, Velga and Vranken. All were attached to the Frontier Cyclists at Limburg.

7. Doubtless a matter of dispute. The Belgians maintain that the gliders had no nationality markings. Pirenne (1990, p.16), who fought at Kanne, remembered that “the transport gliders without nationality markings (on the fuselage) overflew Belgian territory.” Several paratroopers, amongst others Kurt Engelmann, insist that there was a 10-cm high swastika on the rudder. According to the SA Koch War Diary, the black crosses and running numbers were removed on 30 November 1939. This was done so as to paint bigger crosses. On 3 December 1939 however “smaller black crosses” were applied. Photographs taken by German war correspondents of the gliders near the bridges show that none has any trace of a nationality marking. (Translator’s note: Under the various conventions in force at the time respecting military aircraft, a glider does not seem to have been held to be an “aircraft”. Moreover it does not seem proved that even in the case of conventional military aircraft there exists an obligation to display nationality markings. Neither the Dutch nor Belgian Governments subequently alleged a breach of any international convention by Germany in operating military gliders without nationality markings.)

8. A livery not corresponding to any colour officially authorized by the Reich Air Ministry. RLM 02 (RLM grey according to Mankau (2008) p.130.

9. Pallud (1991) p.81 comments in this respect that “after they had flown west, the gliders of Group Stahl and Beton were unhooked about one minute later than the other groups” (Granit and Eisen). Oebser (2009) p.90 states that there were two routes (north and south) although the Ju 52 pilots received the instructions on 26 April. The instructions received by Gallert’s and Thurm’s sections referred only to one light-beacon route marked out on a map according to orders. The position of each individual beacon was on the map. The route (or routes) were to be set up alternately by searchlights and revolving beams, Gallert and his people were only interested in the latter The route was to be formed of searchlights and revolving beacons, Gallert and his people handled only the latter.

10. According to the report of the commanding officer Altmann, Ellersiek was decorated by Adolf Hitler personally after the operation. Two years later on 9 April 1942, as platoon leader, 3/Sturm-Regt. in the initial operations in Russia he received the German Cross in gold.

11. Melzer (1957) confirmed (p.104): “The landings of the gliders were aimed at the bridge. At 0540 hrs one glider landed close behind the bunker, the occupants jumped out and opened fire on the bunker crew.”

12. Melzer (1957, p.59) and Blum (2007, p.111, mentioning Altmann’s official report, state that there was only one man injured, who broke an arm in two places. Schaumans (2004, p.77) on the other hand recalled two lightly injured men who were not able to do anything but remain where they were and mark the zone.”

13. This description is taken from the article “Het dramatisch verhaal van Grenswielrijder Willem Vranken” in “Het Berlang van Limburg Regional”, 1980. Ellersiek, (d.2003) remembered that “they shot a Belgian motorcyclist who was hurrying to the bunker to activate the explosive charges”. This information does not appear in any Belgian or German report. Captain Jammaers succeeded in reaching Ballet’s trenches to the west of the bridge.

14. It is very possible that this was one of the gliders to which Lhoest (1964) p.138 refers: “One of them landed only fifty metres south of bunker N.”

15. The paratroopers of the Stahl group did not notice the absence of Fickel on the way to Maastricht after they were relieved. He was taken to a hospital by German Army soldiers. He stated that when Koch heard of this incident, he came to visit him in person and to award him the EKI and EKII.

16. According to Belgian reports assembled under 1.CA-7 D1-18 Li “Relation des événements au cours des journées des 10 t 11 mai 1940 sur la position de Canal Albert, face a Maastricht”, only nine gliders were seen at Veldwezelt. As we shall see from the attack of the Ringler half-platoon, neither the Germans nor the Belgians took into account the tenth glider.

17. Each bridge had a flame-thrower. This was stated by Oberst van der Heydte under interrogation in Brussels on 19 November 1946 (although at the time of the attack he was not a paratrooper).

18. Oebser (2009, p.102) states that he wounded the pilot’s arm. We have taken the statements of Neirinck from the reports prepared by the Belgians postwar: “La 7. D.I. dur le Canal Albert. Titre VII: Les événements aux ponts et aux destructions – (B) Au pont de Veldwezelt.”

19. Vandevelde (1942), p.11-26.

20. Vandevelde mentions many of his colleagues only by initials. We were able to identify only a few.

21. A radio message received at 1015 hrs shows that nothing certain was known to the Belgian commanders about the bridge. “It has to be established at all costs that the bridge has been blown up: if it is in enemy hands it must be recaptured and demolished”, quoted from I CA7 DI-I8, extract from report at footnote 16 above.

22. A significant role played by the future Luftwaffe ace and Legion Condor veteran Adolf Galland, who led the German fighter squadron over the Albert Canal bridges and covered the advance of the paratroopers, controlled every movement of the Belgians on the ground and sprayed their trenches with MG fire. In his report, Oberleutnant Altmann praised the assistance of Galland in frustrating, in combination with the paratroops, all counter-attacks especially those after 0900 hrs. By the end of the campaign in the west, Galland had seventeen victories over Allied aircraft.

23. Egon Delica (1915-1991) was an experienced aerial reconnaissance officer who had taken part in the Polish campaign. His role in the attack on Fort Eben Emael was linked to this: should the Belgians prove difficult, he was to direct the German air attacks. He had no paratrooper training (he received his badge in 1943) and was not popular with Rudolf Witzig’s paratroopers. Moreover he did not have a good reputation based on an “excess” of transfers in his service document (Wehrpass). Apparently his arrival at Group Granit was a kind of puishment where he had to prove his “true worth”. When on 10 May Witzig’s glider was late, Delica was supposed to take command, but something odd occurred and Feldwebel Helmut Wenzel took over instead. According to Wenzel, Delica did not want the job when a liaison officer gave it to him, explaining that he was “too tied up with his own assignment”.

24. Many veterans, amongst others Kurt Engelmann and Leopold Gilg, related that during most of the attack, Delica was in one of the trenches (“Maastricht 2”) captured from the Belgians. The tension between the paratroopers and Delica apparently led to a kind of “ostracism” of the officer. Delica seemed grateful for it, perhaps because he was over-anxious and also had no paratroop training. After the operation neither Witzig nor Delica spoke out to clarify why Delica had not taken command. The price which Wenzel had to pay for it was very high: he was preclued from the award of the Knights Cross for “exceeding his jurisdiction”. This remained a bitter pill to his death in 2003.

25. Lhoest (1964, p.151): These dummies tied down the Belgians and prevented them from hurrying to defend the bridges. The Germans parachuted down over the Belgian rearguard hundreds of lifelike straw dummies dressed in green Czech uniforms (per Theo Schmitt, Beton Squad 4) and with fitted with pyrotechnics similar to MG bursts. According to the German war diary the dummies arrived in store at Cologne-Ostheim aerodrome on 11 April 1940. On 5 May, General Kesselring discussed with Koch the “battalion of paratrooper dummies” (which he called “Leh-men” after the very common German surname Lehmann). Using them might depend on the weather conditions although even in adverse weather the deception might work, they believed. On 10 May the Ju 52s returned to Gymnich aerodrome, fifteen kilometres south-west of Cologne after towing the gliders. There they loaded 400 dummy paratroopers (Otto Zierach stated in 1944 that there were 120, but this is an underestimate) of which most if not all were fitted with pyrotechnics to ignite on contact with the ground. The dummies were not all unloaded over one spot, or at the same time, but along a stretch of terrain from Tongeren to Gembloux, and over a period of hours. The most comprehensive drop was between 0600 and 0800 hrs although the Belgians reported others, one at 0910 and even at 1230 hrs. The deception was undoubtedly successful, for the Belgians called in numerous reserves, for example, eight 16-tonne tanks, and troops in armoured vehicles and T-13 tanks, to combat an enemy force of straw, each individual having “very large eyes and a beard”. Bikkar, A: “Les mannequins parachutustes: una ruse de guerre allemande” in “Revue de la Gendarmerie”, Nr.76, 1979, p.24-38; same author, “Mai 1940: Pourquoi le Fort Eben Emael est-il tombé si vite?” in: “Revue Belge d’Histoire Militaire, Year 31, Nr.3-4, Sept/Dec 1995, p.123-196.

26. Alfred Erdrich, b. Monschau/Belgian border, 1919, was the soldier whose parachute failed to open. The paratrooper shot to death was almost certainly Hubert von der Ruhe (b.1915) and the third, who tangled in high tension cables, probably Wilhelm Ochs (b.1919). The jump was not easy, for it had to be made from an altitude of only sixty metres, which was achieved only by the Germans during the war, equipped uniquely with RZ 16 parachutes. To sacrifice control of the parachute in favour of a very low altitude was a strategy favoured by German paratroopers despite the high risk that the wind might carry the soldier far from the planned landing zone, and prevented him jumping with a rifle or MPi.

27. This was confirmed by Herman Hermans, an inhabitant of Veldwezelt, who lost his parents and sister – family Hermans-Vuurstak – in the bombing raid on the Bilzerbaan-Grotebaan crossroads. While seeking cover he saw several aircraft drop paratroopers in the direction of Hees. Wiosello (1990), p.142-143.

28. Melzer (1957), p.58-62 and BA/MA RL 33/97, SA Koch War Diary. In addition the Belgian reports state that nine and not ten gliders landed at Veldwezelt. The tenth group went unnoticed.

29. As Schaumans assured the authors, the nine paratroopers who drifted away after the jumping were captured by the Belgians.

30. This is without doubt the Stuka 87B of 77 Geschwader which according to official records crashed near the Bilzerbaan at Veldwezelt, about fifty metres south of the highway. The crew, 22-year old pilot Uffz Ludwig Bussenius and 24-year old gunner Uffz Erwin Albrecht, were killed.

31. There is no reliable source for the first contact between paratroopers and German Army troops at Veldwezelt. Altmann wrote in his report that it occurred at 1430 hrs, while the radio log has 1630 hrs. Army troops began to arrive after noon. Before the arrival of Schützen-Regt 33, soldiers of Battalion zbV100 supported the paratroopers at all three bridges.

32. Melzer (1956) p.59.

33. Jan Nicolaes, who survived the attack, described in Wiosello (1990, p.151) that forty-five buildings (including the school and church) were damaged or destroyed. The houses near the Bilzerbaan were the preferred targets for the paratroopers and Stukas. The first building attacked was the house of Willem Geurts near the church. Reinhold Susdorf (Squad 8) recalled that his squad-leader Oberjäger Hahn and two of his colleagues blew up a house with 24 kg charges in order to clear obstacles and have a better field of fire.

34. Boon, L (1994, p.18).

35. It is very possible that this was Toschka’s Squad 8 (piloted by Opitz).

36. The official Belgian report described the situation of the Bossaert troop thus: “Ce pelotón a 3 groupes de combat et ses D.B.T. au Sud de la route; un groupe au Nord de la route. Le chef de pelotón a son P.C. à la maison Nicolaes située en bordure de la route à quelque 50 mètres en arrière de l’abris”, ibid footnote 18.

37. Oebser (2008) p.102.

38. Schaumans (2004) p.81 and 91. Bikkar (1995), p.137 and 184.

Chapter 6

1. The bridges at Vroenhoven, Lanaken and Kompveldstraat at Gellik were of concrete construction and crossed the Canal at places where the basin was deep and wide. The first of them, built in 1933, was the Vroenhoven bridge according to Delmer (1939, p.149 and 150): and Declerq and Santilman: “Le nouveau pont de Vroenhoven sur le canal Albert” in “Annales de Travaux publics de Belgique”, August 1934, p.597-612.

2. The mission of this squad was changed.

3. Theo Schmitt was captured at El Alamein, November 1942. He died in 1996. He was without doubt the paratrooper who most deserved the Knights Cross for the attack on Vroenhoven, but despite his service he was one of the major absentees at the award ceremonies of this much coveted decoration.

4. The Dutch customs post was in the village of Wilre, actually a suburb of Maastricht, and renamed Wolder postwar.

5. That was the original plan not carried out because the commander of Group Beton, Lt Schacht, received fresh instructions from Hauptmann Koch on 8 May 1940. He was to carry out a special mission about 1,200 metres west of the bridge and was therefore transferred from Squad 4 to Squad 7. The latter was originally to have been led by Rudolf Lange and thus came newly under Schacht’s command.

6. His eyewitness report is in Huijsmans, J and Guyvers M: “Grensfietserseenheid Lanaken”, 1934-1940, Part 1, 1981, p.24-27.

7. BA/MA RH 24-27/135. Reconnaissance Belgium and Holland, Addition to Nest Cologne Nr. 3468 Ig, 17.11.1939.

8. AOK 4. Ic Nr 486/4b geh.

9. In: “Einsatz der Fallschirm-und-LS (Kampf in Lastensegler) Truppe: Der Einsatz Eben Emael und Albert Canal”, BA MA Rl2 IV/108, p.10-113.

10. He joined SA Koch on 23 April 1940 and came from I/Flak.Abt.84.

11. Despite repeated attempts from 0720 hrs, he was not able to contact VIII Fliegerkorps until 1120 hrs. Altmann experienced the same at Veldwezelt. He informed at 0820 hrs that he had still not raised VIII Fliegerkorps.

12. The crew consisted of Sgt Crauwels (bunker commander), Corporals Nys and Penneman, and Privates Baete, Meers (possibly Meeres), Cramer, Degryse, Dreesen, Despiegelaere, Deklerk, Tellemans and Goesmans.

13. Jean-Hubert Ignoul celebrated his 39th birthday on 9 May 1940. He joined the police brigade at Tongeren in 1932 and was married with three children. He died during the attack on the bunker. According to Penneman the other gendarme guarding the bridge, Maréchal de logis Jacobs, fled to the cellar of a café run by a certain Menges. He was allegedly the only survivor of the three, for the other two on the far side of the bridge also fell during the attack.

14. Lhoest (1964), p.116.

15. Under interrogation in 1941, Dreesen still maintained that at that moment there were three paratroops on the bridge (cf. La 7.DI sur le Canal Albert).

16. Hofmann was Schacht’s deputy and had taken over command of Group Beton after Schacht and his squad were unable to fight on.

17. Despite what Schmitt says here, Klose does not appear in any official listing (cf. War Diary SA Koch, BA/MA RL 33/97). One assumes he was attached to Squad 11 formed only two days before the assault. (Translator’s note: One would think it far more probable that ‘Jupp Klose’ was a pseudonym to cover a comrade’s shame and name.)

18. Will Gahno (b.14 October 1913) led a group during the attack on Crete on 20 May 1941 attached to 4./Luftlande-Sturm-Regt. (according to the Bundesarchiv/Freiburg). This was Squad 4 in an attack on the Maleme (Hill 107) airfield by twelve troop gliders commanded by Hauptmann Sarrazin. At that time he held the rank of Feldwebel. He was decorated with the German Cross in gold on 24 February 1942. Gahno fell on 17 February 1944 while serving with Fallschirmjäger-Regt 12.

19. According to a postwar Belgian report (“Declaration des survivants de l’abri M de Vroenhoven”) based on the account of Private Degryse, Despiegelaere was one of the men who died while attempting to leave the bunker through an MG port. He ignored German cries of “Halt!” and was shot dead in the back by a paratrooper. Despite its many details, Annexe 1 of the report states that there are “glaring inaccuracies” in certain statements by the survivors of bunker M. Nevertheless the authors have included both possibilities although Crauwels, Nys and Despiegelaere were most probably killed by the hollow charge set by Schmitt after the mutiny.

20. Theo Schmitt mentions in his diary the use by the Belgians of “Dum Dum” bullets. He states that both he and Rudolf Bading experienced the effect of these bullets (illegal after the First World War by the Geneva Convention) on his own body, the first on the left and the other on his right arm, where the elbow and arm bones were broken.

21. Schmitt says in his diary that he was expecting Sprengart but found that the half-platoon which jumped over Vroenhoven was led by Lt Helmut Ringler. Schmitt states he was surprised to see him. Ringler told him that there had been a change in plan. This is the only varying version we have found, and we prefer the official account supported by the main sources and additionally by photographs which show Ringler near Altmann and the other NCOs who made up Group Stahl.

22. Lhoest (1964), p.132.

23. Altogether the Germans captured two anti-tank guns, twenty-one field guns, thirteen heavy and eleven light MGs, sixteen mortars, 350 soldiers and a large quantity of ammunition. The paratroopers had no compunction about using captured weapons where their own were unserviceable. The most coveted items were Belgian pistols, which at the time were the best in the world.

24. After the failed attempt to capture the Norwegian royal family at Elverum behind the lines, on their way back to Oslo the paratroopers were “intercepted” but Erich Walther skilfully talked his way out of the situation. They were halted towards 1130 hrs on a bridge south of Minnesund. The Norwegian defenders were well equipped with excellent weapons and could easily and quickly have overcome the Germans. A Norwegian officer who knew the composition of the paratroop squad told Walther that he was up against three regiments, and resistance was useless. Walther reacted with a bluff and assured the Norwegian officers that three regiments of paratroopers had recently dropped and would attack if the road ahead was not cleared. In the face of this threat the officer allowed Walther’s column of fifty lorries, some carrying Norwegian prisoners, to pass without further hindrance. (cf. González, 2008, p.74).

25. When he was examined later by SA Koch surgeon, Oberarzt Dr Jäger, the latter said ironically, “Well at least they took the rusty nails out first!”.

Chapter 7

1. The artillery support at Fort Eben Emael should not be overlooked, where two x 120-mm and sixteen x 75-mm guns were in place, eight of which being at the disposal of the Grenadiers.

2. In Pirenne’s platoon were Privates Florent, Dantine, Massin, Gilard, Duchesne and Hamende. Hamende was killed, and Duchesne and Pirenne wounded during the German attack. Coenen (1990, p.23).

3. According to Oebser (2009 p.187), landed on South Hill, near Strongpoint I.

4. A bullet passed through his face, entering at the mandible right lower side and exiting at the upper left side. Many sources, (e.g. Ellis (2002) and Quarrie (1983) state that Schächter was killed during the attack). He recovered from his grave injuries (although his face was disfigured) in time for the landings in Crete a year later when he was wounded again. Theo Schmitt, who participated in the attack at Vroenhoven stated that Schächter was a much liked officer amongst the paratroopers. He understood and forgave their forgetfulness in matters of respect to superiors. Schmitt recalled that paratroopers called corporals “roberjäger” to shorten the correct address down from “Herr Oberjäger”. There were other such abbreviations: “roberfeld” (Sgt), ‘roberleutnant, “roberhauptmann” (captain) etc. Necessity is the mother of invention, especially when time is of the essence in battle. Martin Schächter died in a geriatric home on 19 August 2007.

5. This was Reinhold Brestrich, b.1919, who came from Radio Comp. Ln Kp7 at Stendal.

6. The Abwehr overestimated the number of fortified positions in this zone. That can be seen from the targets furnished to Aldinger’s artillery. Target 41 “Bunker at the northern end of Emael” is the centre of the residential area of Eben-Emael: Target 44 “Bunker on the road from Emael to Vroenhoven” were only roads or strongpoint trenches. (War Diary SA Koch, BA/MA RL 33/97 Designation of Targets.)

7. The Squad 4 glider (Oberjäger Brandes) came down on North Hill near the Belgian AA emplacement and only a few metres from the command post of 2.Battalion. A little farther on, the Squad 3 glider landed on the hilltop, and the squad 10 glider came down north of the Belgian command post near the “lone tree crossroads”. (Oebser (2009, p.187).

8. Eyewitness statment, Lhoest (1964, p.170-180)

9. One of the wounded was taken prisoner by the Belgians and later freed at Dunkirk. He was the only paratrooper to be captured during the battle. Many Belgians removed equipment from the bodies of fallen paratroopers, favouring the belt in particular. When captured and brought to Maastricht, they had a hard time when the Germans discovered these “trophies”, but fortunately there were no excesses.

10. Pirenne’s eyewitness report appears in: Pirenne, G: La destruction du Pont de canne le 10 Mai 1940, in “Ceux du Fort Eben Emael” (1995, p.147)

11. The Squad was led by Oberjäger Max Maier, Oberjäger Walter Meier being his deputy. The other men of the Squad were: Gefreiten Iskra, Ölmann, Gehlich, Bader and Comdühr. The pilot was Unteroffizier Fritz Bredenbreck.

12. For the outline of events experienced by Granit Squad 2 we have relied on the report “Erfahrungsbericht des Trupp 2 über den Einsatz am 10.5.1940”, Hildesheim, 16 May 1940, composed by Meier six days after the attack. Although our analysis is based on it, we have not been able to avoid giving credit to other oral statements. Thus at Opkanne Meier went into a cellar: his MP 38 went off and then he was surprised to see six German paratroopers – of Group Eisen – who were hiding there, and came forward with raised hands. Meier left the house without a word. This does not appear in any official report (statement of Walter Meier Jo Fiévez). Walter Meier was always considered “odd” by his paratrooper colleagues, “a sort of intellectual”. His subliminal criticism of the relief at Kanne, who dismissed his offer, tells of his “different behaviour”. In 1941 for example he brought with him to Crete a crate of books he had “liberated” in Eben-Emael. A year later he was sent on an officers’ course at Dresden, but was soon rejected after the examiners found the answers he supplied in tests to be “non-committal, evasive and extremely strange”. He died in 2011.

13. These were most probably two units of the VCL (Vickers-Carden-Lloyd) artillery tractor, small tracked vehicles for towing a 47-mm gun. Under licence from Vickers they were manufactured in two versions by Familleheureux, one for artillery, the other for cavalry guns. The Belgian Army had ordered two batches each of 276 units, the first in 1935, the second in 1936. The captured tractors were used by the Wehrmacht under the designation Artillerie-Schlepper VA 601(b).

14. Koch’s suggestion to that effect was rejected. Melzer (1957, p.16.)

Chapter 8

1. Gahide (1980, p.47).

2. Letter from Denis Rolin, 23 May 1977 in: Gahide (1980, p.61).

3. When Aldinger’s flak units arrived at the bridge to relieve the paratroopers, they deployed their guns along the Albert Canal. Between Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven there was generally one 20-mm flak every fifty metres, mounted on a half-track. The command post was between the Dutch fort St Pieter and Eben Emael.

4. According to the list of the Belgian fallen, Delvigne died at Veldwezelt and Moens at Vroenhoven. The aircraft T-61 seems to have exploded in the air (Gahide 1980, p.50). In the case of both Belgian soldiers and German paratroopers who fell in the fighting for the bridges, even the Belgians found it difficult to identify the boundaries of the individual villages of Veldwezelt, Vroenhoven and Kanne.

5. Only T-68 bombed the bridge at Briegden but failed to destroy it. The aircraft was damaged and made an emergency landing at Herk de Stadt, Schakkenbroek. T-62 was shot down by Belgian AA fire, the crew then being “captured” as Germans. The Belgians were totally bewildered and confused. Gahide (1980, p.51).

6. http://www.vkblog.nl/bericht/I69428/RAF-verliezen,_10-15_mei_1940_(I). were have followed this documented version. It varies from Oebser (2009 p.227) where he states that Mansell was captured, but does not mention his escape.

7. Garland and Gray were posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for their part in this operation. London Gazette 34870, Tuesday 11 June 1940. Transl.

8. Gahide (1980, p.89).

Chapter 9

1. The EKII awarded at this ceremony had a rounded “3” in the date (1939). The medal is very rare and much sought after by collectors.

Chapter 10

1. From: “Belgique, la relation officielle des événments, 1939-1940”, p.55-56.

2. Bikkar (1995, p.184)

3. Lhoest (1964, p.151), Schaumans (1995, p.88-89) state in this connection that this had also occurred at Veldwezelt. A soldier named Trif, later killed in a French air raid at Maastricht, had been one of the “human shields” at the bridge. (Translator’s Note: It has to be stated again and again that the “international conventions” applied as much to Belgium as they did to Germany. Bading, immediately after the landings, was wounded by a dum-dum bullet fired from bunker M at Vroenhoven. Later that day, Theo Schmitt on the east bank at Vroenhoven was wounded by a dum-dum bullet fired from a house occupied by Belgian troops. The use of dum-dum munitions was and is contrary to the Geneva Convention. The side using the illegal munition, i.e. Belgium, lost the protection of the convention for all its troops on the battlefield in the specific case that the opposing belligerent, Germany, used Belgian troops as “human shields” for protection against dum-dum bullets. This justification is known as the doctrine of “operational necessity”. It is not suggested that the Belgian Army issued these rounds to its troops, but rather that a few rogue and undisciplined Belgian soldiers obtained the munitions privately. Nevertheless the responsibility to ensure that this did not occur fell on the Belgian Army.)

4. Eyewitness reports, according to Alfred Bauer and Reinhold Susdorf.

5. From: I-CA-7 DI-18 Li, “Relation des événements au colurse des journées des 10 et 11 mai 1940 sur la position du Canal Albert face à Maastricht.”

6. Pirenne, G. “Le chemin de la Captivité”, CLHAM, Vol. IV, September 1980.

7. Gardiner (2009 p.33,36), Calmeyn (1992, p.23)

8. Pirenne, G: “La destruction du pont de Canne le 10 Mai 1940”, CLHAM, Vol IV, March 1990, p.16.

9. ABC Andalucia edition, 14.May 1940, p.6 Even German Army soldiers were not familiar with the paratroop uniform. Thus Walter Meier (Group Eisen) in his report after the battle wrote that German infantry units coming up as their relief fired on them: “They did not know the uniform, which they identified as enemy. I experienced that myself several times”. Report of Squad 2, Granit, Hildsheim 16.May 1940.

10. Bikar (1995, p.137-139)

11. Day and night the flying formations practised take-off and towing in formation. “Operation of the paratroop and glider troop. The Operation at Eben Emael and the Albert Canal”. BA/MA RL2 IV/108.p7.

12. ABC, Andalucia edition, 14 May 1940, p.6.

13. ABC Madrid edition, 15 May 1940, p.9.

14. ibid 17 May 1940, p.8.

15. ibid 15 May 1940, p.9.

16. This tactic was commonplace at SA Koch. Kurt Engelmann (Eben Emael, Group Granit) told the authors that during training Witzig made them take two 25 kg hollow charges with them whenever they used the toilet. The reason is clear: on the day of the attack, if one of the two men given the task of bringing up the hollow charges fell, the other could take over from him.

17. as (11)

18. According to McRaven (1996, p.11) that is the basic precondition for special operations.

19. Inf.Regt 151 suffered eleven dead, forty-seven wounded and one missing. Pioneer-Batl.51 had one man dead, fourteen wounded and one missing. All SA Koch paratroopers who fell in action were buried at Maasatricht cemetery between 28 May 1940 and 8 June 1940. The exception was Hubert von der Ruhr, brought from Hees cemetery to Maastricht for reburial on 7 July 1941.