The influence which defeat in the First World War had on German consciousness must not be forgotten. The humiliation at Versailles awoke resentment and a need to avenge the wrongs inflicted, and so it is perhaps not so far from the truth to say that the attack on Belgium was founded on these sentiments. The German paratroopers, born mostly between 1916 and 1918, would assuredly have learned from their fathers – veterans of the Great War – of the horrors of the campaign in Flanders, the effects of trench warfare and the Great Depression which followed the defeat. They also knew that speed, sureness of foot and determination were necessary if Fall Gelb were to succeed. They were the Chosen from the beginning of the campaign in the West and were to unleash chaos in the Belgian lines. Revenge for Versailles and the objective of preventing at any price the Belgians from hindering the advance played an important role in the development of events.

After these initial considerations, however, one must look for the so-called “technical” keys to the paratroopers’ success in Belgium. The attack on the Albert Canal bridges and Fort Eben Emael ushered in a new kind of military planning. The fact that a little over 400 paratroopers could immobilize and eliminate defensive positions in the hands of 16,000 Belgians was more than audacious, it was incredible. Without any doubt the principle upon which the attack was built was the element of surprise. Koch’s paratroopers used a new tactic both aggressive and daring. The hollow charges, for example, had not been tested in action previously in order to maintain secrecy. The same applied to another “novelty”: the use of troop-carrying gliders. The intensive take-off and landing exercises under variable conditions (at night, in snowfall, etc) and with experienced pilots¹¹ had as its result a precise and coordinated attack. “The silent aircraft” which touched down over the Albert Canal trenches, had never previously been used in an operation, and the secret was kept even after the attack, for the gliders which escaped damage during the operation were dismantled and transported back to Germany. Nobody was to find out how the paratroopers had got to the Canal, and beyond doubt the Germans succeeded in this aim by ordering strict secrecy about the details of the operation. It is amazing how much fear and “confusion” this attack unleashed. The Spanish newspaper ABC alleged that the Germans had a “secret weapon” and expressed it in unique terms:

“With regard to this element, the most fantastic rumours are circulating. Some hold they are simply bombers which nose-dive to attack: others say they fire ‘a deadly lightning’. Another person will aver that the paratroopers have an apparatus small enough to fit into a rucksack which can kill everyone in a radius of 100 metres. Others believe that it is a form of radium which emits such strong radiation that there is no way technically to neutralize it. People say that this new weapon made it possible to break through the Belgian fortifications.¹²”

Next day the newspaper continued with its suspicions and underlined the significance of the “new paratrooper-warrior”:

“The military events of the last weeks are really astounding. They have changed the traditional concept of warfare, where are the new developments which have presented themselves: In the first place, an increase in the fighting capacity of the Luftwaffe which is taking apart the most powerful air fleet in the world and almost immobilizing it. Secondly the total efficiency of the new paratrooper-warrior who suddenly appears on the scene and thanks to scientific progress is wonderfully equipped and armed. We have also (…) this new secret weapon of the Germans, whose massive effects were proven at Fort Eben Emael at Liège (sic). What exactly is this secret weapon? Some war correspondents hint at a narcotic gas or a gas which paralyzes the victim for several hours. Others believe it is a gas which attacks metal and rusts guns, MGs and rifles lightning fast to prevent them from working.”¹³

On 17 May they returned to the theme of this mysterious and potent secret weapon:

“With reference to the new and secret weapon used by the Germans in their lightning conquest of Fort Eben Emael (…) it is being reported that suddenly nobody could use the guns and MGs. In any case, according to other prisoners, these same weapons had quite suddenly stopped working. In view of these contradictory statements (…) it remains to be clarified if this new weapon used by the German paratroopers affects only people, or affects only weapons, or both at the same time.”¹⁴

The Allies experienced a sense of vulnerabity. Great Britain for example set about forming an “Anti-Parachutist Defence” of local civilian volunteers. Minister of War Sir Anthony Eden stated only four days after the attack on Belgium and Holland: “In order to be effective, the fight against such elements must be taken in hand quickly.” In Brussels, where paratroopers were apparently ubiquitous: “It is known that a number of German paratroopers landed near Brussels in the last few days.”¹⁵ This was pure fantasy.

The training of the paratroopers bore fruit. They had had such an excellent and systematic schooling that even if certain troops and commanders dropped out, the remainder of the unit could not only carry out their own mission but also those of their missing colleagues¹⁶. The officers trusted their subordinates and supported them in their initiative, experience and knowledge. That was the basis of the German military mentality during the war. All paratroopers were trained to take over the function of their superiors if circumstances so dictated. Coordination and efficient cooperation like clockwork determined every movement of the paratrooper. The attack on the Albert Canal was an example of tactical flexibity and autonomy in command, a characteristic of the Germans which manifested itself frequently in the course of the war. Just so – with more flexible and unforseeable, more deadly and more effective concepts – they overcame the static idea of defence which the Belgians had, for although the aims of the mission were set out in the HQs, the operations on the ground decided how best they were to be achieved.

This latter aspect must be clearly shown. Otto Zierach, one of the paratroop officers who took part in the attack of Vroenhoven, underlined how important was the training of paratroopers at SA Koch. Four years after the attack in March 1944, as principal of the Luftwaffe Academy at Berlin-Gatow, in a precise, military-historical report he wrote:

“The Group had a firm structure and also a leader, but after the landings did not operate as a closed unit. Two to three men would be given a specific assignment and the Group – or even the platoon leader – had no immediate influence on it. Should one of these two-to-three man parties have to drop out, its place would be taken by another as foreseen.”¹⁷

The training of paratroopers to have an unshakeable will bore fruit. The Germans knew how valuable these bridges were, and were not prepared to consider the possibility of not capturing them. In this respect Zierach went on: “Benefiting from the shock of the Belgians, the anti-bunker teams would run behind the trenches where the enemy was to be found, some in firing positions, others running hither and thither without any purpose. The paratroopers had only one objective in mind – to carry out their special assignment. Ignite the explosive and hollow charges.”

The paratroopers never allowed the Belgians to seize the initiative for a moment, moved fast and with determination, improvised and deceived the enemy (Theo Schmitt’s activity at Vroenhoven is an example of this). The fact that all paratroopers were volunteers naturally had an effect. The factor strengthened esprit de corps uncommonly well and created a fellowship such as was scarcely to be found in any other elite unit of the German Wehrmacht.

To sum up: It was a simple plan with concrete and perfectly outlined goals worked out in secret down to the smallest detail, then precipitated into a rapid surprise attack. This was carried out by men who were prepared to achieve their objective at any price and defying all obstacles.¹⁸ Yet these extraordinary characteristics could lead the soldier into forgetfulness about his own safety and security. To put it another way, believing too much in one’s own abilities, and underestimating those of the enemy, can be costly. Crete in 1941 is a case in point. The conviction of being invincible, with which the paratroopers set out to take the island, became for many of them their downfall.

Along with an underestimation of the Belgian Army there was an overestimation of other factors, as for example the threat posed by Fort Eben Emael. The historian Günther Schalich addressed this subject. The bridges – and that is the main aim of our work – were due much more weight than the fort. To close off the field of vision of the fort was easy, but to capture the bridges was a remarkable exercise in speed and precision.

The attack on the Albert Canal bridges was obviously not free of errors, but against a weak enemy they were not so decisive as they were to be a year later on Crete. The Abwehr, the desertions by men born German but subsequently forced to be Belgian nationals and the knowledge and reconnoitring of the terrain did not bring the expected results every time. For example, the paratroopers were not in a position to estimate how many trenches or troops there were on the Opkanne hills. This put them under heavy pressure and over a long period of time they were unable to coordinate their forces. To these drawbacks must be added the case of wounded soldiers left to fend for themselves in the heat of battle, or the bewildered paratroopers who hid out in the cellars of Opkanne.

Optimism and ambition are necessary in any military endeavour. To expect it to be done better than thought possible at first glance is a quality which should not be deprecated. But it is bad if a plan from the outset bristles with uncertainties and errors of calculation, and those who have to carry it out cross their fingers trusting and hoping that the problems will be easy to solve. For Kanne – and Maastricht – no clear goals were set which could have been achieved with the means at their disposal. That was the risky thing about this plan: gliders landing too far from the objective at Kanne, and men pretending to be Dutch police aiming to capture the bridges at Maastricht. These targets were beyond the means, and the strategy was overlooked. The mistakes made by the Belgians, and their lack of coordinated reaction, slackened the consequences of this error of planning for Kanne.

The errors of estimation caused civilian casualties. The cruel and barbaric face of war showed itself – naturally! – also at the Albert Canal. At Veldwezelt there was a bloodbath, forty dead, men, women and children. Were the Belgians guilty of negligence? To all appearances the community and military authorities tolerated the presence of the civilian population in the war zone simply because they did not expect an attack just then. The concept of “Blitzkrieg” which the Germans had taken to heart surprised soldiers and civilians alike. Therefore several families died when a command post was bombed at Veldwezelt. In some cases, also at Veldwezelt, apparently military objectives were attacked without any certainty that that was what they were and without regard to the presence of civilians in the neighbourhood. Thus the attack on the bridges demanded a bloody tribute in civilian victims in addition to the 150 military personnel who died in the region of the bridges and at Eben Emael.

War is terrible, an evil in itself. Not even the most motivated soldier does not think it. Heinrich Schlaghecke, a paratrooper at Vroenhoven, did not feel he could shoot Belgian soldiers found sleeping in their trenches: “I was not a criminal who could simply slaughter an unarmed man. I fired above their heads and then took these sleepy Belgians prisoner without problem,” he said after the war. More than one paratrooper, such as Hermann Büschen for example, confessed later: “To realize in an attack ‘someone is shooting at me personally’ overcomes all rational impressions one formed countless times before his first operation at the front.” He was lucky, for not all paratroopers saw it through. The paratroopers and glider pilots lost forty-three dead, 100 wounded and one taken prisoner (later released at Dunkirk)¹⁹.

The attack by the paratroopers was, however, a very important piece of the trap prepared for the French and British. The Germans attacked at the same place as they had done thirty-six years before in order to draw the Allies’ attention. The desire to repulse Hitler’s troops in central Belgium and so prevent the invasion of France hastened the Allied advance. The best of the French and British armies moved into Belgium to confront the Wehrmacht. They put themselvs into the lion’s den by doing so, for on 12 May General Guderian’s panzers crossed the Ardennes, the wooded mountains in south-east Belgium which all believed to be impassable for panzers. Seventy-two hours later an eighty-kilometre wide breach had opened between the Allies. The Germans continued their advance unstoppably, and every attempt by the British and French to concentrate their forces and halt the Germans was beaten off by the Luftwaffe.

The Silent Attack served as a trap. The sweep of the scythe was the last act in the Western campaign of 1940: swift, effective and devastating. In Belgium, the German Blitzkrieg was successful.