Forty minutes after the attack began, a heavy-MG half-platoon would be dropped as reinforcements. The twenty-four-man team under Oberjäger Nollau would jump over Central Hill. Upon landing they would retrieve the weapons containers and proceed to the trenches occupied by their colleagues and place themselves at the disposal of Lt Schächter. To make up for the lack of surprise, the paratroopers would be armed to the teeth in the attempt to balance matters by firepower. Kanne was a very complicated objective in comparison to the other two bridges. Eight light MG 34s, and two heavy MGs on a chassis mount, one mortar, one flame-thrower, twenty-eight MPs, six KAR 98 carbines with telescopic sight, forty-five without: grenades, pistols and hollow charges made up the “irrefutable argument” with which two officers and forty-five men would attempt to validate their claim to the bridge at Kanne.
As at the other bridges and Eben Emael, the Luftwaffe would support the paratroopers on the Opkanne hills fifteen minutes after they landed. This support would last eighty minutes. For this purpose, radio contact with Koch’s command centre at Vroenhoven would be indispensable, as too would be the setting out of flags to indicate to the pilots areas that should not be attacked. The artillery would also provide Schächter’s men with assistance. Ninety minutes after the commencement of the attack, Aldinger’s flak batteries would open up their fire directed by Lt. Meissner.
The Kanne Defenders
On 1 September 1939 when the Belgian Army was mobilized, 2. Grenadier-Regt., part of 7.Div (General Michielis, later Major-General Vantrooyen) was put into reserve at the Prince Albert barracks in Brussels. The same month the regiment was transferred to the Ardennes and then to Leuven. On 1 April 1940 it was moved again, this time to the North Sea coast near Ostende and Zeebrugge. Ten days later the regiment drew back to Ghent. At the end of April 1940 orders came to move up to the Albert Canal, where the regiment arrived on the night of 29 April. Its mission was precise: 2.Grenadier-Regt was to defend the sector of Canal between the bridge at Kanne and Lanaye, and the locks at the latter. Together with 18.Regt. of the Line they made up the infantry of Belgium’s 7.Division.
2.Grenadier-Regt. was commanded by Colonel Herbiet and consisted of the Staff, one platoon of Frontier Cyclists, a battalion of heavy guns – composed of seventeen officers and 542 men – and three infantry battalions. Each infantry battalion had twenty-two officers and 939 men. The entire regiment was thus made up theoretically of ninety-six officers and 3,532 men, but on the day of the attack comprised only 2,600 (of which 300-400 were officers and NCOs).
Early on 10 May the men of 2.Gren.Regt. occupied their trenches along the Canal in poor humour and with apathy, believing that as so often before they were the victims of a false alarm. The unit had been moved to this sector on 1 May and had quarters at Bassenge, eight kilometres west of Kanne. Their lack of motivation was made worse by the absence of many colleagues either on leave or on training elsewhere. The same was the case with the units detached to serve at Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven.
The frontline they were required to hold was nine kilometres long and extended from the Meuse river to Lixhe, as far south of Kanne as Maastricht was north of Kanne. To the north of the Gren.Regt. at Vroenhoven was 18.Regt. of the Line, to their south 2.Regt. Frontier Cyclists. The Gren.Regt. was placed in two lines two to four kilometres deep. The first, and by far the most important sector, was occupied by 2.Battalion at Opkanne-Kanne- Eben Emael. 3.Battalion was in the Loen-Lixhe region, and a small force occupied trenches on the eastern bank of the Canal near the Meuse. The second line was formed by 1.Battalion well to the rear in the sector Fall-Meer-Wonck running from Zussen in the south to Riemst. 4.Battalion was also in the second line of defence that extended south of Emael to west of Lixhe. 5.Group/20.Artillery- Regt. provided support1.