As time went on the stringency of these orders slackened somewhat so that from 17 November the men could send and receive letters and postcards subject to censorship, and from 21 November they were granted liberty, but only in Hildesheim. Their preferred “watering holes” were the “Wiener Café”, “Theatergarten”, the “Korso” and “Trocadero”. Further, they were not permitted to be out alone and all groups were to be accompanied by an NCO. There were also cultural excursions, such as to the nearby Harz caves. On 27 February another restriction was introduced: an absolute ban on wearing any insignia indicating rank or branch of service: the uniform jacket had to be free of any kind of badge.

From the beginning many questions remained to be answered and one of them, the transporting of paratroopers by glider, had to be resolved as quickly as possible. Oberleutnant Kiess occupied himself in obtaining the best personnel and materials so that the problem did not interfere with the mission. In Hildesheim during the first weeks in November 1939 he gathered many of the best and most experienced glider pilots within Germany. From 4 November the pilots began feeling out the suitability of the gliders for the mission. Flights with heavy weights, night flights, formation flights, landing on a target (no more than twenty metres away) were practised. An important aim of this training was to enable the paratroopers to become accustomed to flying in the cramped confines of the glider and that they learn how best to stow their weapons and equipment in the limited spaces available within the glider’s fuselage. After the landings, the glider pilots would be required to fight as infantry and so they too needed to be trained in ground fighting and weapons handling.

Witzig’s pioneers began their training under Army Oberleutnant Hassinger on 4 November with fifteen 50 kg and twenty-five 12.5 kg hollow charges⁶. All remaining paratroopers exercised using hand grenades and smoke bombs, 12.5 kg mines, limpet mines and flame-throwers.

On 6 November, Koch and Kiess received these battle orders by hand from Generals Student and Paulus, Chief of 6. Army General Staff:

“Prevent destruction and maintain open the bridges at Maastricht and along the Albert Canal west of it. Capture Fort Eben Emael, destroy with explosives the armoured cupolas and heavy weapons installations.”

The orders regarding Eben Emael were clear. Those with the task of capturing the bridges had to neutralize the bunkers near the bridges and set up a bridgehead to ward off any enemy counter-attacks. To accomplish this it was envisaged that for each bridge two groups would be formed, each of four or five assault squads. The first would attack the bunkers with hollow charges while the second established a defensive perimeter of approximately 300 m radius from the western end of the bridges and quashed any enemy resistance. All this had to be done within half an hour. After that, work would begin on setting up the bridgehead. Ninety minutes after the landing they would receive covering fire from German artillery, which would by then be advancing. After four hours all paratroopers would be relieved.