Squad 7/Walter Baedke (1 nco/8 men)

The glider was to land north of the trench system about 150 metres north-west of the bridge and protect the squad or squads there disarming the demolition charges. They would also watch out for suspicious movements north of the Canal bed.

Squad 8/Rudolf Toschka (1 nco/8 men)

The glider was to land on the north side of the Bilzerbaan near a house 100 metres from the bridge. This house was to be occupied and the north and north-west of the bridge secured.

Squad 9/Erich Rückriem (1 nco/8 men)

The glider was to land south of the Belgian trench system, 150 metres south-west of the bridge, and secure the south-western and western flanks. The Squad was to monitor any movement on the canal bank to the south (towards Vroenhoven) and give cover to the men disarming the explosive charges on the bridge.

Squad 10

This Squad was formed two days before the attack and was Altmann’s reserve. It consisted partly of soldiers who had neither experience nor training as paratroopers. One of these men was Franz Schindele. Others, such as Gefr. Erich Schuster, decorated with the Knights Cross on Crete in 1941, was a qualified paratrooper. This arrangement was the same with groups Beton and Eisen².

It was therefore the intention to coordinate the attack from the command post, which would be set up 100 metres south-west of the bridge. From here Altmann would control the operations of each squad organized as follows:

• In the so-called “northern sector”, Obfw Toschka would take over command. His area of jurisdiction was the terrain and Canal positions up to the Bilzerbaan, and objectives of Squads 3, 4, 6 and 7. After completing their respective missions they were to protect their positions, most importantly against a possible Belgian attack from the north-west, and also to prevent local Belgian troops regrouping.
• The “southern sector” under Fw Pohlmann covered the terrain between the Canal and the Bilzerbaan which had to be brought under control. Squads 2, 6 and 9 involved had the same purpose as the “northern sector”, to protect their positions against a Belgian attack from the north-west and prevent local enemy troops regrouping.
• Squad 1 would be in command on the bridge itself. As soon as it had been secured it would be protected by the squad on the frontier side, and Arpke’s squad would then function as a reserve.
• Support would come from the heavy-MG half-platoon of Lt.Helmut Ringler whose men would jump from two Ju 52s aiming to land south of the Bilzerbaan behind the Belgian trench system forty minutes after the gliders touched down. Ringler had then to liaise with Altmann as soon as possible in order to sound out the situation and secure the sectors with his half-platoon.
• Luftwaffe aircraft would circle over the area and provide the paratroopers with cover. Communication would be maintained by laying out bedsheets and flags on the ground and by radio (via the command post).
• Ninety minutes after the beginning of the attack the flak units should have reached Altmann. Fire direction would be the responsibility of Lt Ringler and Stabsfeldwebel Lorenz.

In the German arsenal there was nothing more frightening than the hollow charges. These would be the “surprise” which the paratroopers would use to attack the Albert Canal bridges and Fort Eben Emael and eliminate the bunkers and casemates. The paratroopers were equipped with radios that were dropped in containers, one for each bridge, in order to remain in contact with Aldinger’s artillery batteries.

Group Stahl landed with its leader Oblt Gustav Altmann on the western bank of the Albert Canal. Most of the gliders came down near the bridge, though this was not what was intended (although this had no influence on the run of events). This occurred at 0520 hrs.