On 7 November Pilz made two more short flights practising precision landing at a predetermined spot. This manoeuvre was extremely important, for on the day of the attack it would be necessary to touch down within twenty metres of the assigned zone and to assist them in this regard barbed wire was wrapped around the glider’s skid so as to quickly arrest the glider’s movement upon contact with the ground. These were the last flights Pilz made before 18 November. One of the reasons for this was probably the need to allow other pilots time to practise and a lack of training aircraft.

Tow pilots were also actively recruited. According to Rudi Opitz, the pilots chosen to tow the gliders were all very experienced and were mostly born between 1912 in 1915. It is understood that each pilot, in addition to the training they had previously received in respect of instrument and astronomical navigation from a Flugzeugführerschule “C”, “C-Schule”, had each also attended a Blindfliegerschule, (blind flying school) where they had received further instruction in instrument navigation and dead reckoning. Upon completion of their training it has been said that these pilots were among the most highly trained specialists in the Luftwaffe.

One of the pilots selected to be a tow pilot was 27-year-old Oberfeldwebel Alfred Hillebrand who joined “Propaganda Ballonzug” from the second staffel of KGr zbV on 2 November 1939, bringing with him a Ju 52 that had been assigned to SA Koch. On 6 November 1939, Hillebrand made his first flight towing a DFS 230. As was the case with the training of the novice glider pilots, during the first weeks in November 1939 the “old hands” were also heavily involved in the training of the tow pilots. The gliders towed by Hillebrand were initially all flown by an “old hand”.

Like the glider pilots, the tow pilots also experienced long periods of inactivity, particularly during the month of November. The two training flights that Hillebrand made on 6 November were the last flights he made prior to 16 November 1939.

Opitz recalls that when not flying, he and his fellow glider pilots were confined to their barracks. Every time one of them left the barracks, they had to sign out. The tow pilots, glider pilots and paratroopers all had their separate quarters and were not permitted to mingle with one another. By way of example, for meals, Opitz remembers that they had to go at predetermined times to a mess hall where they were not allowed to sit with, or talk to, anyone from one of the other groups stationed at Hildesheim.

There was no “happy marriage” of tow pilots and glider pilots. Most training flights Hillebrand made involved a different glider pilot. Everyone, Opitz said was unhappy. The glider pilots didn’t know what they were practising for, or they wanted to be flying other types of aircraft. “We were only ever given enough information in order to train in general terms. Various scenarios were drawn in sand boxes. Never were we given any names or locations.”

The tow pilots, who had come from instrument flying school, were very aloof, believing that they should be flying around the world on instruments. They were not happy to be stuck towing gliders, while the paratroopers preferred their parachutes over riding around in gliders made of rickety wood and aluminium covered with canvas.

Heiner Lange suggested that a rift existed between the civilian glider pilots who received a low rank and the “old hands” who by virtue of long military careers were senior NCOs. The military pilots had no experience in soaring and sport glider experience which one gains only in flying sport gliders in constantly changing winds.

To this strange sensitivity betwen pilots was added the factor that the General Staff was not entirely convinced that the Albert Canal bridges and Fort Eben Emeal could be captured by airborne troops. The original plan envisaged bombing and artillery fire which would cease shortly before the gliders set down alongside their targets. The “former civilian pilots” (above all Opitz, Egner and Schubert) considered this very risky. If the timings or synchronization went awry the gliders could fall victim to friendly fire. They discussed the plan among themselves and agreed that they would rather a surprise night attack in formation (which Student proposed on 5 December).

The former civilian pilots were permitted at Christmas to go into town. They used this leave to call Dr Jacobs, who had been in charge of the development of the DFS 230 glider, to discuss their reservations about the proposed plan that they fly in daylight. Jacobs in turn telephoned Hanna Reitsch, his department’s test pilot, who enjoyed the confidence of Adolf Hitler and many of his senior officers of the Luftwaffe, including Generaloberst Udet. It is not known who Hanna Reitsch spoke to however, after the Christmas holidays, orders were issued requiring that one of the former civilian glider pilots report to General Ritter von Greim who had been given the task of investigating the complaint made by the glider pilots while on a visit to Hildesheim. Perhaps so as to conceal the identity of the glider pilot who had telephoned Jacobs, the former civilian glider pilots selected Flieger Otto Bräutigam to appear before General Ritter von Greim and to present their alternative plan. Hanna Reitsch wrote:

“Otto Bräutigam radiated confidence, courage and humour, was always ready for a prank and could even be slightly risqué, but despite all that he was one of the greatest and most daring experts. But no one saw his bitterness and rage at how they treated the glider pilots. None of these men was a coward (…) but neither were they rebels who could not accept the discipline necessary in any military organization. However, it could not be the correct outlook for a military organization that you had to accept the mistaken assessment and errors of its officers, which could mean people’s deaths, simply because the alternative was measures suggested by a simple private. On the contrary, the glider pilots would not have it, just as I would not(…). My conrades said I could do something about it because I was a woman. But I could only help indirectly².”

The test was simple. A bridge and a bunker were chosen at Hildesheim. The pilots selected were Bräutigam and Oberleutnant Walter Kiess. Both were towed up at night and released several miles from the objective so that they flew without any assistance. Kiess missed his objective by more than a kilometre, but Bräutigam landed his glider within a few metres of the assigned target. Therefore a night attack was possible.

On the nights of 6 and 7 January a few pilots including Lange and Pilz made short flights around Hildesheim. These were the only night flights undertaken before 10 May 1940, for after the success of trials on 11 January it was decided that the attack should commence at dawn.

As with other aspects of the training for glider pilots, there are a few inconsistencies in the available eyewitness reports. It is stated in these that the pilots received training more or less as according to their skill. Yet Rudi Opitz and Ludwig Egner for example were said never to have flown by night before 10 May. One of the pilots who took part in these experimental night flights went astray and, not having the height to get back to Hildesheim, decided to land inside an Army barracks. The sentries were taken totally unawares proving that a small airborne force could attack a fortified location by landing inside it.

In order that glider pilots kept slightly higher station than the tug at night, every Ju 52 was fitted with a row of eight lights on the upper part of the rudder. These “formation lights” had a metal plate which hid them from the glider pilot if he ascended too far above the tug. These lights also had shielding to prevent their being seen from the ground.

The January 1940 night flights were not the first flown by SA Koch pilots. On 20 November 1939 Pilz made a thirty-five-minute flight the reason for which is unknown but was surely one of the experiments carried out by Propaganda-Ballonzug. Trials were held to establish the various ways of towing the glider: three coupled to a single aircraft or two behind a Ju 52 with tow rope lengths of eighty metres and 120 metres respectively. Neither of these methods was considered suitable for a massed-take-off.

Fritz Stammer suggested a rigid coupling system between tug and glider. Although this was more suitable than the long (seventy metre) flexible tow rope there was not enough time for the technical work and to train pilots in its use. There were also several experimental flights at different heights. On 12 December 1939 Heiner Lange flew at 2,500 metres and several SA Koch pilots have asserted that some flights reached 4,500, metres (where the temperature was -8ºC), although that has not been confirmed.