Despite their knowledge of the territory which gave them an enormous advantage, and the impressive defensive installations, the Belgians were never in a position to go on to the attack. They lacked initiative, strategy and leadership. The exaggerated hierarchical structure of the Army blocked rapid decision-making where it was needed. Thus the death of Captain Giddelo at the beginning of the German attack destroyed the chain of command and threw the Belgian soldiers stationed at the Albert Canal bridges into a chaos which paralyzed them. In contrast to the Germans, and to the paratroopers in particular, nobody amongst the Belgians was trained to make decisions in the absence of an officer. And this detail determined the course of events.

The situation of the troops was not ideal. There was only conscription, there were no volunteers in the Army. This resulted in a very weak esprit de corps, for the men were more interested in their leave passes than barracks life. Used as they had become to the monotony of “simulated field manouevres”, they did not take the possibility of a German attack very seriously. On 9 May 1940 the issue of leave passes restarted. It created an attitude which did nothing to foster recognition of the danger in which Belgium stood from its powerful neighbour. Most of the men granted leave left for their homes on the evening of 9 May. What was left was an unmotivated and slipshod body of men who in most cases would not offer the paratroopers much opposition. If one adds to this lack of motivation the problematical racial situation between Walloon and Fleming – the Belgian national problem even today – then we have a panorama which illustrates very well how ripe the country was for the principle “divide and conquer”.

To continue with our analysis: what use is a motivated, even well trained corps of men if they have no weapons or equipment? At the Albert Canal many troops had weapons which would not fire and grenades with no detonator caps. Despite the great expense in modernization over the preceding ten years before the German attack, the Belgian Army had not organized proper training of its soldiers nor an efficient system of supplying ammunition. As regards the men, they had never received basic guidelines e.g. as to what was to be done with munitions in case of an alarm. It was also never decided what the fifteenth company of every infantry regiment were to do with the horse-drawn 76-mm mortars. It was left to the decision of each individual commander. Thus at Veldwezelt bridge there was no mortar in position when the paratroopers attacked. Mortar fire would have been the best means to prevent the Germans building their bridgehead². It was also never laid down what should be done (shoot or not shoot) if the enemy dug in behind human shields. That was not an unimportant matter. According to Belgian eyewitness reports in this respect, the treatment of prisoners in some cases contravened the international conventions³.