Notes

1. Legislature by Lot: Envisioning Sortition Within a Bicameral System, Gastil and Wright

1. For more on these three solutions, see the following: Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayers, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (London: Yale University Press, 2004); a special issue of Representation (50:1, 2014) provides insight into how less conventional voting systems influence the strategic behavior of parties, candidates, and public officials; Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (London: Yale University Press, 2005).

2. Josiah Ober, “What the Ancient Greeks Can Tell Us About Democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 67–91.

3. Speech given in September at the 2017 New York Times Athens Democracy Forum.

4. Current reports are available at the Electoral Integrity Project website, www.electoralintegrityproject.com. Also see Terrill Bouricius, David Schecter, Campbell Wallace, and John Gastil, “Imagine a Democracy Built on Lotteries, Not Elections—Nexus,” Zócalo Public Square (April 5, 2016).

5. See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to Stop It (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2011).

6. For a deliberative critique of legislative elections in particular, see John Gastil, By Popular Demand: Revitalizing Representative Democracy Through Deliberative Elections (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

7. Direct evidence of candidate personality traits is hard to come by, but research suggests that they have a meaningful link to ideological orientation and behavior. See Bryce J. Dietrich, Scott Lasley, Jeffery J. Mondak, Megan L. Remmel, and Joel Turner, “Personality and Legislative Politics: The Big Five Trait Dimensions Among U.S. State Legislators,” Political Psychology 33 (2012): 195–210.

8. This problem is exacerbated for women: see Jennifer L. Lawless and Richard L. Fox, It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don’t Run for Office (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

9. Mark Smith, American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

10. Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

11. Even in a political party with a working majority, a minority faction within the party might work with opposition members to thwart a victory for its own party leadership.

12. Current data are available at Gallup and Pew Research Center online.

13. See the 2017 online OECD report, Government at a Glance, available at www.oecd.org/gov/govataglance.htm. The figures for trust in parties refers to 2005–13, as reported in the 2013 edition of the OECD report.

14. For an accessible introduction to participatory budgeting, see Josh Lerner, Everyone Counts: Could “Participatory Budgeting” Change Democracy? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). On town meetings and how they could become more powerful, see Frank Bryan and John McClaughry, The Vermont Papers: Recreating Democracy on a Human Scale (Port Mills, VT: Chelsea Green, 1989).

15. This has been observed in a wide range of deliberative bodies using lay citizens. See, for instance, Kimmo Grönlund, André Bächtiger, and Maija Setälä, eds., Deliberative Mini-Publics: Involving Citizens in the Democratic Process (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2014).

16. See, for example, the emergence of a concern about aboriginal political rights in a national deliberation on political reform held in Canberra; Lyn Carson, John Gastil, Janette Hartz-Karp, and Ron Lubensky, eds., The Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the Future of Deliberative Democracy (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013).

17. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

18. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, goes farther with this requirement when a demos does more than make rules for its own members. When states make laws enforceable on noncitizens, for example, the inclusion principle requires a demos to “include all adults subject to the binding collective decisions of the association” (120). This goes beyond the scope of our proposal, but it’s interesting to conceive the ways such populations could be mixed into a sortition assembly, perhaps on a provisional basis in relation to specific legislative questions.

19. The Deliberative Poll is a trademark of the Stanford Center for Deliberative Democracy; however, the term is not capitalized in this volume. This method of polling, along with many deliberative processes such as citizens juries, have become so widely adopted and diverse in their designs that their names have become vernacular. Capitalization is reserved for specific instances of processes, such as the 2012–14 Irish Constitutional Convention, and legally designated institutions, such as the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review.

20. For a review of recent evidence, see Heather Pincock, “Does Deliberation Make Better Citizens?,” in Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the Practice and Impact of Deliberative Civic Engagement, ed. Tina Nabatchi, John Gastil, Michael Weiksner, and Matt Leighninger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 135–62.

21. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 112 (italics added for emphasis). The omitted text offers the qualifier, “within the time permitted by the need for a decision.” The time required for a small sortition legislature would be considerably less than for a mass public.

22. Figures provided by the CBO online, www.cbo.gov.

23. John Gastil and Peter Levine, eds., The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005).

24. John Gastil and Robert Richards, “Embracing Digital Democracy: A Call for Building an Online Civic Commons,” PS: Political Science and Politics 50 (2017): 758–63.

25. Michael A. Neblo, Deliberative Democracy Between Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

26. There are straightforward solutions to these problems; see Daron Shaw, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Charles Stewart, “A Brief yet Practical Guide to Reforming U.S. Voter Registration Systems,” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 14 (2015): 26–31. The barrier to such reforms—and the impetus for counterproductive voting laws—is that broader participation would hurt the electoral fortunes of the Republican Party; see Wendy Weiser, “In 22 States, a Wave of New Voting Restrictions Threatens to Shift Outcomes in Tight Races,” The American Prospect (October 1, 2014).

27. There are risks in using strata in a sample to seek proportionate representation of minorities. Depending on the number of actual people this involves, the result can be that a few individuals from an oppressed group are thrust into the position of “representing the interests” of “their” group in the assembly. Since these individuals are themselves randomly chosen, there is no reason to believe that they will have the temperament or experience to fulfill this role. For this reason, if a sortition assembly is serious about genuinely representing the interests of marginalized groups, there need to be other mechanisms in place to bring the perspectives of those communities into their deliberation in a meaningful way.

28. On the performance of juries, see Neil Vidmar and Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007). On deliberative citizen bodies generally, see Grönlund et al., Deliberative Mini-Publics; Nabatchi et al., Democracy in Motion; and Gastil and Levine, Deliberative Democracy Handbook.

29. Evidence of the impact deliberation has on Australian and US participants appears in Katherine R. Knobloch and John Gastil, “Civic (Re)socialisation: The Educative Effects of Deliberative Participation,” Politics 35 (2015): 183–200. On similar impacts on American jurors, see John Gastil, E. Pierre Deess, Philip J. Weiser, and Cindy Simmons, The Jury and Democracy: How Jury Deliberation Promotes Civic Engagement and Political Participation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

30. UK government data accessed online July 2016.

31. Existing legislatures in most places are heavily biased toward people with wealth and high incomes. Whatever other problems in demographic representativeness a sortition assembly might have, it will certainly be a substantial improvement in terms of socioeconomic representativeness. See, for example, Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2014): 564–81.

32. Alexander Guerrero, “Forget Voting—It’s Time to Start Choosing Our Leaders by Lottery,” Aeon (January 23, 2014).

33. Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, eds., Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

34. Benjamin Snyder, “14% of Zappos’ Staff Left After Being Offered Exit Pay,” Fortune (May 8, 2015).

35. Aspen Institute program details accessed online July 2016 from its website, www.aspeninstitute.org.

36. Kennedy School program details accessed online July 2016 from its website, www.hks.harvard.edu.

37. State-by-state details on Next Generation workshops are available at the National Institute for Civil Discourse site, nicd.arizona. edu.

38. See for example, Carol S. Weissert and William G. Weissert, “State Legislative Staff Influence in Health Policy Making,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 25 (2000): 1121–48.

39. Alan Rosenthal, “The Good Legislature,” State Legislatures (August 1999).

40. Andy Sullivan, “Insight: In Washington, Lawmakers’ Routines Shaped by Fundraising,” Reuters (June 12, 2013).

41. Claudio Maria Radaelli, Technocracy in the European Union (London: Longman, 1999).

42. Hank Jenkins-Smith, Democratic Politics and Policy Analysis (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1990).

43. This idea is adapted from a May 18, 2018, correspondence with Nicholas Gruen of Lateral Economics, who suggested an even stronger role for random selection in the commission election. In his scheme, the first step would create a modest slate of legislators eligible for the commission. A ballot listing these names would then let sortition legislators indicate whether any of those individuals were unfit to serve in that capacity. Those who failed to meet a high threshold would be removed from consideration, with random selection choosing commissioners from those who remain. To avoid embarrassment, the process would operate by secret ballot, with no public record of which names were removed prior to the final random selection.

44. The founder of the citizens’ jury process argues along these lines—both for facilitation and experimentation and research on any new citizen body; see Ned Crosby, System Four: A New Form of Democracy (Unpublished manuscript, 1976). The Australian nongovernmental organization newDemocracy, for example, is experimenting with exercises wherein citizens critique prospective policies, or expert testimony on them, in terms of preset criteria (logic and depth, for example) to sharpen citizens’ skills at critical thinking and deliberation (personal correspondence with Lyn Carson, October 2016).

45. Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

46. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason. Also see Amy Gutmann and Dennis Frank Thompson, The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

47. Warren and Pearse, Designing Deliberative Democracy.

48. Technically, such rooms are often not fully private, but only researchers are likely to venture into them. Some minipublics even have a decision-making phase closed from public scrutiny, such that the participants cannot be identified individually with the particular votes that were cast. Other processes, such as the deliberative poll, do not vote at all but record attitudes via confidential pre- and postdeliberation surveys; see James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

49. John Gastil, Katherine R. Knobloch, Dan Kahan, and Don Braman, “Participatory Policymaking Across Cultural Cognitive Divides: Two Tests of Cultural Biasing in Public Forum Design and Deliberation,” Public Administration 94 (2016): 970–87. A broader conception of consensus suggests other kinds of agreements that can be reached, short of policy agreement, per se; see Simon Niemeyer and John S. Dryzek, “The Ends of Deliberation: Meta-Consensus and Inter-Subjective Rationality as Ideal Outcomes,” Swiss Political Science Review 13 (2007): 497–526.

50. Christopher F. Karpowitz, Chad Raphael, and Allen S. Hammond IV, “Deliberative Democracy and Inequality: Two Cheers for Enclave Deliberation Among the Disempowered,” Politics & Society 37 (2009): 576–615.

51. Linking pay to attendance might help keep legislators present, but it can’t regulate their behavior.

52. A special issue of the Journal of Public Deliberation (8:2, 2012) provides a range of views on participatory budgeting.

53. Jessica McKenzie, “Small but Successful Participatory Democracy Experiment to Continue in Utah,” Civic Hall (August 4, 2015). For background, see Jeffrey Swift, “The People’s Lobby: A Model for Online Activist Deliberation,” Journal of Public Deliberation 9:2 (2013).

54. Current information available at citizenassembly.co.uk.

55. John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, “A Surprising Number of Americans Dislike How Messy Democracy Is. They Like Trump,” Washington Post (May 2, 2016).

56. The basic argument appears in Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Also, see the essay Mansbridge coauthored with numerous colleagues, “The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 64–100.

57. See the special issue of Representation (50:1, 2014).

58. Party primaries within each district would determine the candidates who vie for votes in the general election.

59. Recent examples are available online from the Sortition Foundation, www.sortitionfoundation.org.

60. See Patrick Heller, “Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre,” Politics and Society 29 (2001): 131–63.

61. Benjamin R. Barber, The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). Also see Matthias Benz and Alois Stutzer, “Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland,” Public Choice 119 (2004): 31–59.

62. Personal communication from the Icelandic sociologist Kris Arsaelsson, 2016.

63. A basic description is available at Participedia.net.

64. See, for example, work by the Native Nations Institute online, nni.arizona.edu.

65. Chris Wells, The Civic Organization and the Digital Citizen: Communicating Engagement in a Networked Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

2. Postscript: The Anticapitalist Argument for Sortition, Wright

1. This was the crux of a famous debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas in the 1970s over whether the state should be viewed as a state within capitalist society or as a capitalist state.

2. Thus Lenin described bourgeois democracy as the “best possible shell” for capitalism. Others, more modestly, see democratic institutions in the capitalist state as creating obstacles for anticapitalist policies rather than necessarily producing optimal policies for capitalism. This, for example, is Claus Offe’s view in his arguments about the class biases of negative selectivity in the design of state institutions and, using slightly different terms, Göran Therborn’s argument about the class character of the organizational properties of state apparatuses.

3. There is a vast Marxist-influenced literature that makes this argument. For an analytically rigorous version of the argument, see Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). For an extended discussion of the specific ways in which capitalist democracy impedes anticapitalist possibilities, see Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, On Democracy (New York: Penguin, 1983).

4. For a discussion of socialism as a radically democratic and egalitarian economic structure, see Erik Olin Wright, “The Socialist Compass,” in Envisioning Real Utopias (London and New York: Verso, 2010).

5. The expression was coined by André Gorz, Strategy for Labor: A Radical Proposal (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976).

3. From Deliberative to Radical Democracy: Sortition and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Sintomer

1. Hubertus Buchstein, “Countering the ‘Democracy Thesis’—Sortition in Ancient Greek Political Theory,” Redescriptions 18:2 (Autumn 2015): 126–57.

2. Aristotle, The Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), 168; translation modified.

3. Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (London: Verso, 2009), 47.

4. Bernard Manin, Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

5. Yves Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy? Random Selection in Politics from Athens to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, forthcoming); Liliane Lopez-Rabatel and Yves Sintomer, eds., Sortition and Democracy: Practices, Tools, Theories (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2019, forthcoming).

6. Antoine Vergne, “Le Modèle Planungszelle-Citizen Jury,” in La Démocratie Participative Inachevée: Genèse, Adaptations et Diffusions, eds. Marie-Hélène Bacqué and Yves Sintomer (Paris: Yves Michel, 2010), 83–100.

7. Simon Joss and James Durant, eds., Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conference in Europe (London: Science Museum, 1995).

8. James Fishkin and Cynthia Farrar, “Deliberative Polling: From Experiment to Community Resource,” in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, ed. John Gastil and Peter Levine (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005), 68–79.

9. Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

10. Peter Dienel, Die Planungszelle (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997); Ned Crosby, In Search of the Competent Citizen (Plymouth: Center for New Democratic Processes, 2005); Denis C. Mueller, Robert D. Tollison, and Thomas Willet, “Representative Democracy via Random Selection,” Public Choice 12 (1972): 57–68.

11. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

12. Julien Talpin, “Deliberative Democracy and Sortition in Politics: A Critical Assessment,” in Sortition and Democracy.

13. Richard Sclove, Democracy and Technology (New York: Guilford Press, 2015); Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe, Acting in an Uncertain World: An Essay on Technical Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).

14. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley/London: University of California Press, 1984); John Burnheim, Is Democracy Possible? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); Ernest Callenbach and Michael Philips, A Citizen Legislature (Berkeley: Banyan Tree/Clear Glass, 1985); Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, Random Selection in Politics (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999); Robert A. Dahl, “The Problem of Civic Competence,” Journal of Democracy 3:4 (October 1992): 45–59; John Gastil, By Popular Demand: Revitalizing Representative Democracy Through Deliberative Elections (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Barbara Goodwin, Justice by Lottery (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2012); Bernard Manin, Principles of Representative Government; Yves Sintomer, Le Pouvoir au Peuple: Jurys Citoyens, Tirage au Sort et Démocratie Participative (Paris: La Découverte, 2007); Hubertus Buchstein, Demokratie und Lotterie: Das Los als Politisches Entscheidungsinstrument von der Antike bis zu EU (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2009); David van Reybrouck, Against Elections (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2016).

15. “The Jury Selection and Service Act,” 28 U.S.C., secs 1861–9.

16. James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion & Democracy (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1997), 162.

17. Mogens Herman Hansen, Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 231–2.

18. Aristotle, The Politics, III: 2, 1275a; Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 110–2.

19. Liliane Lopez-Rabatel, “Sortition in Athens: Instruments and Words,” in Sortition and Democracy.

20. Bernard Manin, “Comment Promouvoir la Délibération Démocratique? Priorité du Débat Contradictoire sur la Discussion,” Raisons Politiques 42 (2011): 83–113.

21. Moses I. Finley, The Invention of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 73f.

22. Anja Röcke, Losverfahren und Demokratie: Historische und Demokratietheoretische Perspektiven (Münster: LIT, 2005); Yves Sintomer, Petite Histoire de L’expérimentation Démocratique: Tirage au Sort et Politique d’Athènes à nos Jours (Paris: La Découverte, 2011).

23. Peter Stone, “The Logic of Random Selection,” Political Theory 37 (2009): 390.

24. Jeffrey B. Abramson, We the Jury. The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy, 3rd ed. (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 2003).

25. Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

26. Mirabeau, “Discours Devant les États de Provence,” in Œuvres de Mirabeau (1825), VII:7, quoted in Pierre Rosanvallon, Le Peuple Introuvable: Histoire de la Représentation Démocratique en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1998).

27. Bernard Manin, Principles of Representative Government.

28. Ibid.

29. Yves Sintomer, “Random Selection, Republican Self-Government, and Deliberative Democracy,” Constellations 17:3 (2010): 472–87.

30. Hans-Liudger Dienel, “Les Jurys Citoyens: Pourquoi Sont-Ils Encore Si Rarement Utilisés?” in La Démocratie Participative Inachevée, 105.

31. Tarso Genro and Ubiratan de Souza, Orçamento Participativo: A Experiência de Porto Alegre (São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 1997); Archon Fung and Erick Olin Wright, eds., Deepening Democracy. Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (London/New York: Verso, 2003); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ed., Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon (London/New York: Verso, 2005).

32. Jane Suiter, David Farrell, and Clodagh Harris, “The Irish Constitutional Convention: A Case of ‘High Legitimacy’?” in Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe, ed. Min Reuchamps and Jane Suiter (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016), 33–52.

33. Didier Caluwaerts, Confrontation and Communication: Deliberative Democracy in Divided Belgium (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 2012); Inge Henneman et al., G1000, Le Rapport Final: L’innovation Démocratique Mise en Pratique (Brussels, 2012); Vincent Jacquet et al., “The Macro-Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium,” in Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe, 53–74.

34. John Gastil, By Popular Demand.

35. Katherine R. Knobloch et al., “Did They Deliberate? Applying an Evaluative Model of Democratic Deliberation to the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review,” Journal of Applied Communication Research 41:2 (2013): 105–25; Katherine R. Knobloch et al., Evaluation Report on the 2012 Citizens’ Initiative Reviews for the Oregon CIR Commission (State College: Pennsylvania State University, 2013); Katherine R. Knobloch, John Gastil, and Tyrone Reitman, “Connecting Micro-Deliberation to Electoral Decision-Making: Institutionalizing the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative,” in Deliberation: Values, Processes, Institutions, ed. Stephen Coleman, Anna Przybylska, and Yves Sintomer (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 2015), 21–40.

36. John Gastil, Katherine R. Knobloch, Justin Reedy, Mark Henkels, and Katherine Cramer, “Assessing the Electoral Impact of the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review,” American Politics Research 46:3 (2018): 534–63.

37. Anja Röcke and Yves Sintomer, “Les Jurys de Citoyens Berlinois et le Tirage au Sort,” in Gestion de Proximité et Démocratie Participative, ed. Marie-Hélène Bacqué, Henry Rey, and Yves Sintomer (Paris: La Découverte, 2005), 139–60.

38. Yves Sintomer, Carsten Herzberg, and Anja Röcke, Participatory Budgeting in Europe: Democracy and Public Governance (London: Ashgate, 2016).

39. Baogang He, “Participatory Budgeting in China: An Overview,” in Participatory Budgeting in Asia and Europe: Key Challenges of Deliberative Democracy, ed. Yves Sintomer, Rudolf Traub-Merz, and Junhua Zhang (Hong Kong: Palgrave, 2011); Joseph Cheng, Yu Sheh, and Fan Li, “Local Government’s Consultative Budgetary Reforms in China: A Case Study of Wenling City,” China International Journal 13:1 (April 2015): 115–8.

40. Munkhsaikhan Odonkhuu, “Mongolia’s (Flawed) Experiment with Deliberative Polling in Constitutional Reform,” ConstitutionNet (June 29, 2017).

41. Maxime Mellina, “Une expérience démocratique de tirage au sort à la Fédération des associations d’étudiants de l’Université de Lausanne? Représentativité, effets symboliques et délibération,” Participations (forthcoming, 2019).

42. Dimitri Courant, “Délibération et tirage au sort au sein d’une institution permanente: Sociologie du Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire (1968–2016),” Participations (forthcoming, 2019).

43. Mauro Buonocore, “Un Weekend Deliberativo all’Ombra del Partenone,” Reset 96 (July–August 2006): 6–8.

44. Yves Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy?

45. José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, “Las Razones de la Tómbola,” Nexos (April 1, 2015).

46. Robert E. Goodin and John Dryzeck, “Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Minipublics,” Politics and Society 34 (2006): 219–44.

47. David Held, Models of Democracy, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).

48. Yves Sintomer, “Délibération et Participation: Affinité Élective ou Concepts en Tension?” Participations. Revue de Sciences Sociales sur la Démocratie et la Citoyenneté 1 (2011): 239–76.

49. Simone Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?” Political Theory 37:3 (June 2009): 323–50.

50. Archon Fung, “Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World,” Political Theory 33 (2005): 397–419.

51. Yves Sintomer, Le Pouvoir au Peuple.

52. Shaoguang Wang, Democracy, Republic and Sortition: From Athens to Venice (in Chinese; Beijing: CITIC Press, 2018).

53. James S. Fishkin, “Reviving Deliberative Democracy: Reflections on Recent Experiments,” in Deliberation: Values, Processes, Institutions, 99–108.

54. Gordon Gibson, “Deliberative Democracy and the B.C. Citizens’ Assembly,” speech delivered on February 23, 2007.

55. Pierre Rosanvallon, La Contre-Démocratie.

56. Dominique Bourg et al., Pour une Sixième République Écologique (Paris: Odile Jaco, 2011); Rupert Read, Guardians of the Future: A Constitutional Case for Representing and Protecting Future People (Weymouth: Green House, 2012); Michael K. MacKenzie, “A General-Purpose, Randomly Selected Chamber,” in Institutions for Future Generations, ed. Iñigo González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

57. Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, Random Selection in Politics, 13–4.

58. Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Jon Elster, Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

4. Random Assemblies for Lawmaking: Prospects and Limits, Fishkin

1. In this essay, I draw on points developed in more depth in Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics Through Public Deliberation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

2. For an overview of current challenges facing deliberative democracy, see James S. Fishkin and Jane Mansbridge, introduction to “The Prospects and Limits of Deliberative Democracy,” Daedalus 146:3 (Summer 2017): 6–13.

3. I build here on the discussion in James S. Fishkin, “Competing Visions,” in When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 65–94. Here I will use the scheme for different purposes.

4. For more on non-tyranny as a principle of democratic theory, see James S. Fishkin, Tyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique of Political Theories (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

5. See Fishkin, “Appendix: Why We Only Need Four Democratic Theories,” in When the People Speak, 197–200.

6. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942); Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). See also Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

7. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 121.

8. For a discussion of the problem of inclusion in modern democracies, see Fishkin, Democracy When the People Are Thinking, 14–7.

9. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 263.

10. Tyranny through omission, through failures to act to provide needed resources or protect against actions by third parties, is a particular vulnerability. See my Tyranny and Legitimacy for an attempt to systematically review the possibilities.

11. See, for example, Federalist 63. For the many uses of this event for antidemocratic argument, see Jennifer Tolman Roberts, Athens on Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

12. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

13. See Project Vote Smart’s website for the provision of a great deal of very user-friendly information to voters, votesmart.org.

14. For an overview, see David Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). For the relative ineffectiveness of voter handbooks and other efforts to get voters more informed, see 137–9. For an account of the tensions between direct and deliberative democracy, as well as proposed remedies, see John Gastil and Robert Richards, “Making Direct Democracy Deliberative Through Random Assemblies,” Politics and Society 41:2 (2013): 253–81.

15. Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (New Haven / London: Yale University Press, 2004).

16. Thad Kousser, Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative Professionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

17. See Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, eds., Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Patrick Fournier, Henk van der Kolk, R. Kenneth Carty, Andre Blais, and Jonathan Rose, When Citizens Decide: Lessons from Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

18. See Fishkin, Democracy When the People Are Thinking, part III and part IV, section 2.

19. In Texas the deliberative poll was the only method used for integrated resource planning by the Public Utility Commission for every (then) regulated utility. In Japan the Fukushima national deliberative poll was commissioned by the government to help it make a decision about nuclear power. In Macau, the government convened a deliberative poll to decide whether there would be government involvement in a press council. The citizen deliberations turned against government involvement, a conclusion that was accepted by the government. In Mongolia the “Law on Deliberative Polling” requires a national deliberative poll before the parliament can consider constitutional amendments. There are also requirements for local deliberative polls for certain urban planning issues. For more on these cases, see Stanford’s website for its Center for Deliberative Democracy, cdd.stanford.edu.

20. Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

21. I take the term first democracy from Paul Woodruff, First Democracy: The Challenge of an Ancient Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

22. Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 303.

23. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, 307.

24. A. R. W. Harrison, “Law-Making at Athens at the End of the Fifth Century B.C,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 75 (1955): 34.

25. Grote notes that the graphe paranomon did not always work as intended. It could degenerate into a forum for personal attacks, turning “deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover.” George Grote, A History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 401–2.

26. The nomothetai also now faced its own version of the graphe paranomon designed also to incentivize responsible debate. See Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, 166.

27. Grote, A History of Greece, 399.

28. R. K. Sinclair, Democracy and Participation in Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 70–1.

29. When participation flagged, incentives were instituted, which led to criticism that these institutions, especially the juries that were constituted in the same way, were dominated by the poor and the elderly. The propensity of the poor and the elderly to do jury service was satirized by Aristophanes in The Wasps. See Aristophanes, Clouds, Wasps and Peace, ed. and trans. Jeffrey Henderson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

30. Sinclair, Democracy and Participation in Athens, 18n666.

31. Aristotle’s Politics 1317b2, cited in Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, 313.

32. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, 314.

33. The end of the story is not clear as of this writing. It will be posted on the Stanford Center for Deliberative Democracy website, cdd.stanford.edu.

34. See, for example, Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips, A Citizen Legislature (Berkeley: Banyan Tree Books, 1985); Keith Sutherland, A People’s Parliament (London: Academic Imprint, 2008).

35. For an experiment within a deliberative poll that shows the added effect of discussion as opposed to just the provision of information, see Cynthia Farrar, James Fishkin, Donald P. Green, Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, and Elizabeth Levy Paluck, “Disaggregating Deliberation’s Effects: An Experiment Within a Deliberative Poll,” British Journal of Political Science 40:2 (2010): 333–47.

36. James S. Fishkin, Thad Kousser, Robert C. Luskin, and Alice Siu, “Deliberative Agenda Setting: Piloting Reform of Direct Democracy in California,” Perspectives on Politics 13:4 (2015): 1030–42.

37. Arthur Lupia, “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections,” The American Political Science Review 88:1 (1994): 63–76.

38. Michael Binder, Cheryl Boudreau, and Thad Kousser, “Shortcuts to Deliberation? How Cues Reshape the Role of Information in Direct Democracy Voting,” California Western Law Review 48:1 (2011): 97–128.

39. Precautions such as an added comparison group for matching might also be advisable in case of any imperfections in the sample. Matching will show whether small imperfections make any difference to the overall results. Stratified random sampling should be based on demographics and, where appropriate, geography, to ensure inclusion of relevant subgroups. Comparisons of participants and nonparticipants can be used to analyze any distortions in the sample, either attitudinal or demographic.

5. Lessons from a Hybrid Sortition Chamber: The 2012–14 Irish Constitutional Convention, Arnold, Farrell, and Suiter

1. Tom Arnold was the chair of the convention. David Farrell and Jane Suiter were, respectively, the chair and deputy chair of the Academic and Legal Support Group (ALSG) that supported the work of the convention. The survey work referred to in this chapter was carried out by Farrell and Suiter in conjunction with Clodagh Harris and Eoin O’Malley (two other members of the ALSG).

2. On mixed sortition chambers, see the chapter in this volume by Pierre-Étienne Vandamme and colleagues.

3. Gil Delannoi and Oliver Dowlen, Sortition: Theory and Practice (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010).

4. William Roche, Philip O’Connell, and Andy Prothero, eds., Austerity and Recovery in Ireland: Europe’s Poster Child and the Great Recession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

5. David Farrell, “Political Reform in a Time of Crisis,” in Austerity and Recovery in Ireland, 160–76.

6. Jane Suiter, David Farrell, and Clodagh Harris, “Ireland’s Evolving Constitution,” in Constitutional Acceleration Within the European Union and Beyond, ed. Paul Blokker (London: Routledge, 2018), 142–54.

7. For further discussion, see David Farrell, Eoin O’Malley, and Jane Suiter, “Deliberative Democracy in Action Irish-Style: The 2011 We the Citizens Pilot Citizens’ Assembly,” Irish Political Studies 28 (2013): 99–113.

8. For analysis, see Jane Suiter and David Farrell, “The Parties’ Manifestos,” in How Ireland Voted 2011, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 277–93.

9. For more, see Fine Gael: Let’s Get Ireland Working (Fine Gael Manifesto, 2011); One Ireland: Jobs, Reform, Fairness (Labour Manifesto, 2011).

10. Programme for Government, 2011–16, Department of the Taoiseach, 2011.

11. This refers to Article 41.2 of the constitution, which states that “mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.”

12. Programme for Government, 2011–16.

13. This memorandum (which has not been published) was subsequently provided to Tom Arnold when he assumed the position of chair.

14. Patrick Fournier, Henk van der Kolk, Kenneth Carty, André Blais, and Jonathan Rose, When Citizens Decide: Lessons from Citizen Assemblies on Electoral Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

15. Farrell, O’Malley, and Suiter, “Deliberative Democracy in Action Irish-Style.”

16. Another significant point of difference was the broader range of topics the convention was tasked with considering.

17. Terms of Reference for the Irish Constitutional Convention, presented to the Irish parliament in July 2012.

18. The Good Friday agreement of 1998, and its later review in the 2006 Saint Andrews Agreement, are the cornerstones of the Northern Ireland peace process. For more, see Niall Ó Dochartaigh, Katy Hayward, and Elizabeth Meehan, eds., Dynamics of Political Change in Ireland: Making and Breaking a Divided Island (London: Routledge, 2017). We can only speculate as to why reference was made in the memorandum to the Good Friday process, but it is likely that one reason was to ensure buy-in from the Sinn Féin party, which has elected representatives on both sides of the border in Ireland. In its 2011 manifesto (Towards a New Republic, Sinn Féin, 2011) the party had proposed an “all-Ireland Constitutional Forum.”

19. Speech by Taoiseach Enda Kenny to the Dáil, July 10, 2012.

20. This lack of willingness to engage on the part of the Unionist parties is the common position both parties hold to any initiative that has an all-Ireland dimension to it.

21. For a sample of criticisms, see “Fine Words Don’t Do Collins Justice,” Irish Independent (editorial, August 20, 2012); “The Way Politics Is Done,” Irish Times (editorial, July 12, 2012); Noel Whelan, “Constitutional Convention Will Have Its Remit Severely Pruned,” Irish Times (February 25, 2012); Fintan O’Toole, “Tammany Hall Lives on in Feeble Reforms,” Irish Times (June 28, 2012).

22. Notably Fournier et al., When Citizens Decide.

23. This reporting process is common to many minipublics and was developed into an elaborate system of “theme teams” in the AmericaSpeaks large-meeting process, which it called Twenty-First Century Town Meetings. See Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer, Joe Goldman, and Steven Brigham, “A Town Meeting for the Twenty-First Century,” in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century, ed. John Gastil and Peter Levine (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005), 154–63.

24. These topics were selected following a consultation process involving nine public meetings around the country, attended by a thousand people in all, during October/November 2013. Arising from this process and from the additional eight hundred submissions made to the convention on “Any Other Amendments,” a list of possible topics for the two additional meetings was compiled. The convention voted on this list to decide the two additional topics.

25. Johan Elkink, David Farrell, Theresa Reidy, and Jane Suiter, “Understanding the 2015 Marriage Referendum in Ireland: Context, Campaign, and Conservative Ireland,” Irish Political Studies 32 (2017): 361–81.

26. For analysis, see Elkink et al., “Understanding the 2015 Marriage Referendum.”

27. Suiter et al., “Ireland’s Evolving Constitution.”

28. See Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Arthur Lupia and Anne Norton, “Inequality Is Always in the Room: Language and Power in Deliberative Democracy,” Daedalus 146 (2017): 64–76.

29. Christopher F. Karpowitz and Chad Raphael, “Ideals of Inclusion in Deliberation,” Journal of Public Deliberation 12:2 (2016): 17.

30. Matthew Flinders, Katie Ghose, Will Jennings, Edward Molloy, Brendan Prosser, Alan Renwick, and Graham Smith, Democracy Matters: Lessons from the 2015 Citizens’ Assemblies on English Devolution (London: Democracy Matters, 2016), 42.

31. The semistructured interviews of nine citizen-members took place in February 2014. They were carried out by David Farrell, Jane Suiter, and Clodagh Harris.

32. Dáil debate, July 18, 2013.

33. Dáil debate, October 10, 2013.

34. Dáil debate, July 18, 2013.

35. These unstructured (anonymous) interviews were carried out in the Irish parliament building, Leinster House, by David Farrell and Jane Suiter. The generally positive comments of convention members about their experiences in the process are also shown in the section on “Voices of the Convention” contained in its final report (Ninth Report of the Convention on the Constitution).

36. David Farrell and Jane Suiter, “The Election in Context,” in How Ireland Voted, 2016, 277–92.

37. The phrase “ecology of democratic institutions” comes from Mark Warren, “Citizen Representatives,” in Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, ed. Mark Warren and Hilary Pearse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008), 69.

6. Intercameral Relations in a Bicameral Elected and Sortition Legislature, Vandamme, Jacquet, Niessen, Pitseys, and Reuchamps

1. The analysis in terms of desirability, achievability, and viability is borrowed from Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (London: Verso, 2010).

2. For a contemporary account of this debate in Belgium, see Min Reuchamps et al., “Le G1000: Une Expérience Citoyenne de Démocratie Déliberative,” Courrier Hebdomadaire du CRISP no. 2344–5 (2017).

3. For example, debates continue on a 2016 proposal from Green MPs in the lower house, who advocate forming parliamentary commissions composed equally by elected and sortition citizens, with decisions requiring a majority in both groups.

4. See Tom Arnold’s contribution to this volume; Min Reuchamps and Jane Suiter, eds., Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2016), chapter 2.

5. In the Belgian context, the question was likely to be understood as a question about the possibility of introducing a sortition chamber alongside an elected one. However, we recognize a regrettable ambiguity in the formulation of the question. This results from our attempt to make the questions understandable for people who have no prior knowledge of sortition and little understanding of bicameralism.

6. Accountability in sortition is even lower when such bodies use secret ballots, as advocated by Gastil and Wright. On the limitations of sortition compared to elections, see Hervé Pourtois, “Les Élections Sont-Elles Essentielles à la Démocratie?” Philosophiques 43:2 (2016); Pierre-Étienne Vandamme and Antoine Verret-Hamelin, “A Randomly Selected Chamber: Promises and Challenges,” Journal of Public Deliberation 13:1 (2017).

7. See the contributions by Terrill Bouricius and Brett Hennig.

8. See Dimitri Courant’s contribution to this volume.

9. For a good defense of party democracy, see Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), chapter 1.

10. In his chapter within this volume, Terrill Bouricius adds that sortition representatives would likely not be properly equipped to defend themselves.

11. This is analogous to why elected officials are reluctant to attack the initiative and referendum process in countries and states where it exists, given the general popularity of such direct democratic processes. We thank John Gastil for this suggestion.

12. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

13. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Melissa Schwartzberg, Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

14. See George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 1. In the particular case of a legislature by lot, the second (sortition) chamber would also have the function to provide an assessment of law proposals by an informed (yet nonexpert) and reduced public opinion, which might have the desirable effect to force the elected chamber to justify its disagreements with the sortition chamber to the wider public.

15. Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism; George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

16. See Axel Gosseries, “Constitutions and Future Generations,” The Good Society 17:2 (2008): 32–7.

17. Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism, 104.

18. An alternative possibility, if the sortition chamber enjoys a high legitimacy, is that public pressure would force the elected chamber to compromise, which would mitigate the deadlock.

19. Path dependency can be a reason to take strong bicameralism as a given, but if this is what grounds Gastil and Wright’s choice, one should be careful not to generalize their claim beyond the US context.

20. In France, for example, the Senate has a subordinate role, as it is possible for the government to give the last word to the National Assembly. Nonetheless, the Senate exercises influence on decisions even when it has a distinct majority—that is, even when its intervention amounts to political compromise rather than a mere technical improvement of the bill. See Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism, 173–5.

21. The exact influence of the subordinated chamber depends on the differences of composition between the chambers and on the institutional rules defining the so-called navette process—that is, the number of possible movements of a bill from one chamber to the other and on the kind of dispute settlement rule that is institutionalized. The influence of the second chamber is the lowest where the political orientations of the two chambers coincide necessarily, due to the designation process or the electoral calendar. See, for example, Bernard Manin, “En Guise de Conclusion: Les Secondes Chambres et le Gouvernement Complexe,” Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée 6:1 (1999), 195. Yet in these cases, second chambers tend to be dismantled or reformed.

22. Yannis Papadopoulos, Democracy in Crisis? Politics, Governance and Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

23. Ian Shapiro, Politics Against Domination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 75.

24. This option is defended in Vandamme and Verret-Hamelin, “A Randomly Selected Chamber: Promises and Challenges.”

25. As an in-depth study of the reasons for (non)participation to juries and minipublics reveals, rates of acceptance are higher where citizens feel they will be able to exercise genuine power. Vincent Jacquet, “Explaining Non-Participation in Deliberative Mini-Publics,” European Journal of Political Research 56:3 (2017): 640–59.

26. David van Reybrouck, Against Elections. The Case for Democracy (London: The Bodley Head, 2016), 150–62. This scenario looks less likely when considering that, historically, bicameralism has often served as a compromise between competing forms of representation (See Manin, “En Guise de Conclusion,” 196).

27. Lynn M. Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory 25:3 (1997): 347–76.

28. See Tom Arnold, David M. Farrell, and Jane Suiter’s chapter in this volume for an optimistic view on the interactions between elected politicians and lay citizens during the Irish Constitutional Convention. For findings reporting existing influence, see Matthew Flinders et al., Democracy Matters: Lessons from the 2015 Citizens’ Assemblies on English Devolution (London: Democracy Matters, 2016), 39–40.

7. Joining Forces: The Sortition Chamber from a Social-Movement Perspective, Felicetti and della Porta

1. See Kimmo Gronlund, Andre Bachtiger, and Maija Setälä, eds., Deliberative Minipublics: Involving Citizens in the Democratic Process (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2014); Donatella della Porta and Dieter Rucht, eds., Meeting Democracy: Power and Deliberation in Global Justice Movements (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

2. We refer specifically to actors who see improvements on the liberal democratic system as an integral part of their activism. This definition leaves out, among others, a galaxy of far-right social movements inclined toward minimalistic democracy or authoritarian positions. Though increasingly relevant, such movements are beyond the scope of an essay interested in convergence between pro-democratization forces.

3. For a comprehensive overview of relationship between democratic innovation and social movements, see Julien Talpin, “Democratic Innovations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, ed. Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 781–92.

4. See Antonio Floridia, From Participation to Deliberation. A Critical Genealogy of Deliberative Democracy (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2017); John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, eds., Deliberative Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

5. See Archon Fung, “Countervailing Power in Empowered Participatory Governance,” in Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, ed. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (London: Verso, 2003), 259; Talpin, Democratic Innovations, 5–8.

6. See Jürg Steiner, The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy: Empirical Research and Normative Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

7. Francesca Polletta, “Social Movements in an Age of Participation,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 21:4 (2016): 487–8.

8. Self-interested actors, such as NIMBY movements, might contribute to deliberative democracy. Occasionally, however, they might undermine public deliberation, and therefore their involvement in it might be opposed. For extensive discussions on this aspect, see John S. Dryzek, “The Forum, the System, and the Polity: Three Varieties of Democratic Theory,” Political Theory 45.5 (2017): 610–36; Jane Mansbridge et al., “The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 18:1 (2010): 64–100.

9. See Andrea Felicetti, Deliberative Democracy and Social Movements. Transition Initiatives in the Public Sphere (London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016).

10. Jane Mansbridge, “Cracking Through Hegemonic Ideology: The Logic of Formal Justice,” Social Justice Research 18:3 (2005): 335–47.

11. See Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

12. Loïc Blondiaux and Yves Sintomer, “L’impératif Délibératif,” Politix 15:57 (2002): 17–35.

13. See Sara M. Evans and Harry C. Boyte, Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

14. We thank Erik Olin Wright for remarking upon this latter aspect.

15. John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

16. Lyn Carson, “How Not to Introduce Deliberative Democracy: The 2010 Citizens’ Assembly on Climate Change Proposal,” in The Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the Future of Deliberative Democracy, ed. Lyn Carson, John Gastil, Janette Hartz-Karp, and Ron Lubensky (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013), 284–8.

17. Quote taken from draft workshop paper presented by Lyn Carson, which became her chapter in this volume. See the author for a copy of that earlier paper.

18. James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, “Broadcasts of Deliberative Polls: Aspirations and Effects,” British Journal of Political Science 36:1 (2006): 184–8. Also see Lyn Carson’s chapter in this volume.

19. Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World, 13–4, 37.

20. Ibid., 15–6.

21. John Boswell, Simon Niemeyer, and Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Julia Gillard’s Citizens’ Assembly Proposal for Australia: A Deliberative Democratic Analysis,” Australian Journal of Political Science 48:2 (2013): 164–78.

22. See Christopher Rootes, “Denied, Deferred, Triumphant? Climate Change, Carbon Trading and the Greens in the Australian Federal Election of 21 August 2010,” Environmental Politics 20:3 (2011): 410–7.

23. James S. Fishkin, Robert C. Luskin, and Roger Jowell, “Deliberative Polling and Public Consultation,” Parliamentary Affairs 53:4 (2000): 657–66.

24. For parallels with broader historical trends, see Talpin, Democratic Innovations, especially 2–5.

25. See David Toke, “USA: Consolidation of a Renewables Industry?” in Ecological Modernisation and Renewable Energy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 98–128; David Hurlbut, “A Look Behind the Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Case Study,” Natural Resources Journal (2008): 142.

26. Fishkin and Luskin, “Broadcasts of Deliberative Polls,” 186.

27. James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 123.

28. Jane Mansbridge, “Deliberative Polling as the Gold Standard,” The Good Society 19:1 (2010): 55.

29. Fishkin, When the People Speak, 123–4.

30. See John Gastil and Katherine Knobloch, Hope for Democracy: How Citizens Can Bring Reason Back into Politics (unpublished manuscript).

31. Ibid., Hope for Democracy, chapters 3–4.

32. Jane Mansbridge, “Using Power/Fighting Power,” in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Chichester, UK: Princeton University Press, 1996), 46–66.

33. Gastil and Knobloch, Hope for Democracy, 130–7.

34. Ibid., Hope for Democracy.

35. Jan van Damme, Vincent Jacquet, Nathalie Schiffino, and Min Reuchamps, “Public Consultation and Participation in Belgium: Directly Engaging Citizens Beyond the Ballot Box?” Policy Analysis in Belgium (2017): 215.

36. Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps, “The G1000: Facts, Figures and Some Lessons from an Experience of Deliberative Democracy in Belgium,” in The Malaise of Electoral Democracy and What to Do About It, ed. Didier Caluwaerts et al. (Brussels: Re-Bel, 2014), 10–33.

37. Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, “The G100,” 11; Vincent Jacquet and Min Reuchamps, “Who Wants to Pay for Deliberative Democracy? The Crowdfunders of the G1000 in Belgium,” European Political Science Review 10:1 (2016): 1–21.

38. Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps, “Deliberative Stress in Linguistically Divided Belgium,” in Democratic Deliberation in Deeply Divided Societies: From Conflict to Common Ground, ed. Juan E. Ugarriza and Didier Caluwaerts (New York: Springer, 2014), 46–7.

39. See Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, “The G1000.” For an analysis of the deliberative limits of the G1000, see Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps, “Strengthening Democracy Through Bottom-Up Deliberation: An Assessment of the Internal Legitimacy of the G1000 Project,” Acta Politica 50:2 (2015): 151–70.

40. See Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, “The G1000,” 22.

41. Didier Caluwaerts, Vincent Jacquet, and Min Reuchamps, “Deliberative Democracy and the So What Question: The Effects of Belgium’s G1000” (presentation, APSA Annual Meeting, 2016, 20).

42. Van Damme et al., “Public Consultation and Participation in Belgium,” 229.

43. Talpin, Democratic Innovations, 5–8.

44. See Archon Fung, “Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future,” Public Administration Review 75:4 (2015): 513–22; Talpin, Democratic Innovations.

45. Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Ernesto Ganuza, Popular Democracy: The Paradox of Participation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 151.

46. Andrea Felicetti, Simon Niemeyer, and Nicole Curato, “Improving Deliberative Participation: Connecting Minipublics to Deliberative Systems,” European Political Science Review 8:3 (2015): 1–22.

47. See Polletta, “Social Movements in an Age of Participation.”

48. John S. Dryzek, “Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building,” Comparative Political Studies 42:11 (2009): 1379–402.

49. Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça, “Mitigating Systemic Dangers: The Role of Connectivity Inducers in a Deliberative System,” Critical Policy Studies 10:2 (2016): 178.

8. Should Democracy Work Through Elections or Sortition?, Malleson

1. In addition to the lead chapter of this volume, see Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips, A Citizen Legislature (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008); Alex Zakaras, “Lot and Democratic Representation: A Modest Proposal,” Constellations 17:3 (2010): 455–71; Kevin O’Leary, Saving Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

2. Terry Bouricius, “Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day,” Journal of Public Deliberation 9:1 (2013); Alexander A. Guerrero, “Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42:2 (2014): 135–78; Brett Hennig, The End of Politicians (London: Unbound, 2017); David van Reybrouck, Against Elections (London: The Bodley Head, 2016).

3. Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

4. Probably the works that come closest to this are Anthoula Malkopoulou, “The Paradox of Democratic Selection: Is Sortition Better Than Voting?” in Parliamentarism and Democratic Theory, ed. Kari Palonen and José María Rosales (Toronto: Budrich, 2015); Peter Stone, “Sortition, Voting, and Democratic Equality,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19:3 (2016): 339–56. Also see Arash Abizadeh “Representation, Bicameralism, and Sortition: Reconstituting the Senate as Randomly Selected Citizen Assembly,” workshop paper, McGill University, 2016. Even these are quite different from the systematic comparison attempted here.

5. See, for instance, Hennig, The End of Politicians; Callenbach and Phillips, A Citizen Legislature.

6. The analysis here cannot be fully comprehensive. A comprehensive account would need to consider all three of the main mechanisms of democracy: elections, sortition, and referenda/initiatives, as well as complicated combinations thereof.

7. This is not meant as a hard-and-fast distinction, rather as a useful heuristic.

8. Also of relevance here is the important issue of the political equality of minorities, which I must bracket for space constraints, but see endnote 33 in this chapter.

9. Peter Esaiasson and Soren Holmberg, Representation from Above: Members of Parliament and Representative Democracy in Sweden, trans. Janet Westerlund (Aldershot: Darmouth, 1996).

10. Manin, The Principles of Representative Government.

11. James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17.

12. Most of these statistics refer to the 115th Senate, except for the median wealth, which refers to the 114th. Tami Luhby, “America’s Middle Class: Poorer Than You Think,” CNN (August 5, 2014); Jennifer E. Manning, Membership of the 115th Congress: A Profile, CRS Report No. R44762, Congressional Research Service (April 12, 2018). Also see material available at OpenSecrets.org.

13. Thinking along these lines, Bouricius approvingly cites Marx’s famous comment that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” See his chapter in this volume.

14. David E. Broockman, “Black Politicians Are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Blacks’ Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives,” American Journal of Political Science 57:3 (2013): 521–36; David T. Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Kenny J. Whitby, The Color of Representation: Congressional Behavior and Black Constituents (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).

15. Michael B. Berkman and Robert E. O’Connor, “Do Women Legislators Matter? Female Legislators and State Abortion Policy,” American Politics Quarterly 21:1 (1993): 102–24; Kathleen A. Bratton and Leonard P. Ray, “Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway,” American Journal of Political Science 46:2 (2002): 428–37; Michele Swers, The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

16. Nicholas Carnes, “Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 37:1 (2012): 5–34; Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu, “Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America,” American Journal of Political Science 59:1 (2015): 1–18; Nathalie Giger, Jan Rosset, and Julian Bernauer, “The Poor Political Representation of the Poor in a Comparative Perspective,” Representation 48:1 (2012): 47–61.

17. Gil Delannoi, Oliver Dowlen, and Peter Stone, The Lottery as a Democratic Institution (Dublin: Policy Institute, 2013); Abizadeh, “Representation, Bicameralism, and Sortition.”

18. Oliver Dowlen, The Political Potential of Sortition (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008).

19. See David Owen and Graham Smith’s chapter in this volume.

20. Hennig, The End of Politicians, 71.

21. Guerrero, “Against Elections.”

22. Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

23. Philip Pettit, “Representation, Responsive and Indicative,” Constellations 17:3 (2010): 426–34.

24. This knowledge by itself may be enough to alter behavior. Consider the famous psychological experiment where merely having an image of a pair of eyes near a donation box encouraged people to behave more responsibly in paying for the coffee and tea they were drinking. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Toronto: Doubleday, 2011), 57–8.

25. Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

26. Guerrero, “Against Elections.”

27. See John Dryzek and Carolyn Hendriks, “Fostering Deliberation in the Forum and Beyond,” in The Argumentative Turn Revisited, ed. Frank Fischer and Herbert Gottweis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012); Fishkin, When the People Speak; David M. Ryfe, “Does Deliberative Democracy Work?” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 49–71; see also Lyn Carson’s chapter in this volume.

28. This is difficult but not impossible. Consider, for example, the functioning of the Congressional Budget Office in the US Congress and other similar bodies that manage to perform an important technical service while staying quite ideologically neutral.

29. For an overview of this evidence, see Fishkin, When the People Speak.

30. By competency I mean, loosely, the possession of general political knowledge of how society works (how the basic institutions function and what the major conflicts and fault lines in society are), as well as the ability to arrive at rational judgments (by understanding new information, learning, and drawing conclusions that coherently reflect underlying values).

31. See, for example, Bouricius, “Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition”; Guerrero, “Against Elections”; Ethan Leib, Deliberative Democracy in America: A Proposal for a Popular Branch of Government (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004).

32. It would be useful to do the selection by lot so as to prevent members from going into the area in which they already have fixed views.

33. Another issue of political equality is that of protecting the rights of minorities. The problem with electoral systems in this regard is that they are aggregative systems and so enable majorities to continually outvote entrenched minorities. Moreover, the electoral system may at times provide perverse incentives for politicians to actively stigmatize minorities (such as black people, Muslims, or welfare recipients), when doing so can bring overall electoral benefits. A sortition legislature may well perform somewhat better at protecting minorities due to its deliberative nature, since members, even prejudiced ones, would have no structural incentive to stigmatize minorities, and on the contrary would be encouraged to talk to each other and hear each other’s experiences. This will not guarantee mutual understanding or respect, of course, but it may well help.

34. Though we haven’t discussed it here, there is also an interesting question as to whether sampling should be random or stratified. Stratification ensures proportional representation but raises uncertainties about which specific characteristics should be stratified for.

35. Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 142.

9. Accountability in the Constituent-Representative Relationship, Mansbridge

1. For the full argument, see Jane Mansbridge, “What Is Political Science For?” Perspectives on Politics 12:1 (2014): 8–17.

2. Per contra, see many others, including Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

3. books.google.com/ngrams, accessed August 16, 2018.

4. For the full argument, see Jane Mansbridge, “A Contingency Theory of Accountability,” in The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, ed. Mark Bowens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 55–68.

5. Frances E. Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

6. For a fuller account of the core/periphery metaphor, see Jane Mansbridge, “On the Relation of Altruism and Self-Interest,” in Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 133–43. Also see Jane Mansbridge, “A ‘Moral Core’ Solution to the Prisoners’ Dilemma,” in Joan W. Scott and Debra Keates, eds., Schools of Thought: Twenty-Five Years of Interpretive Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 330–47. On peer accountability, see inter alia Robert E. Goodin, “Democratic Accountability: The Distinctiveness of the Third Sector,” European Journal of Sociology 44 (2003): 359–96.

7. For a fuller account of the fears that lead citizens not to participate in the face-to-face democracy of a small New England town meeting, see Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

8. See Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, eds., Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

9. For more on these assemblies, see Warren and Pearce, Designing Deliberative Democracy; Dimitri Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation dans l’Armée Française: Le Cas du Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire (1969–2015)” (master’s thesis, EHESS, September 2014); John Gastil, “Beyond Endorsements and Partisan Cues: Giving Voters Viable Alternatives to Unreliable Cognitive Shortcuts,” The Good Society 23 (2014): 145–59.

10. Geoffrey Brewer, “Snakes Top List of Americans’ Fears,” Gallup News Service (March 19, 2001). So too, in this study of 1,011 Americans, only 34 percent of nonwhites reported being afraid of public speaking, compared to 43 percent of whites.

11. Claudine Gay, “The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation,” American Political Science Review 95 (2001): 589–602.

12. See Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 218. For more on surrogate representation, see Jane Mansbridge, “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes,’” Journal of Politics 61 (1999): 627–57.

13. For more on the paucity of either empirical or theoretical work on the constituent-representative relation and a proposed ideal of “recursive representation” aimed at thickening that relation, see Jane Mansbridge, “Recursive Representation,” in Making Present, eds. Dario Castiglione and Johannes Pollak (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).

14. For tenants’ association government, see the Toronto Community Housing Corporation case in Genevieve Fuji Johnson, Democratic Illusion: Deliberative Democracy in Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

10. How to Ensure Deliberation Within a Sortition Chamber, Carson

1. Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips, A Citizen Legislature (Berkeley Springs, CA: Banyan Tree Books, 1985); Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, Random Selection in Politics (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); Ethan Leib, Deliberative Democracy in America: A Proposal for a Popular Branch of Government (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004); David van Reybrouck, Against Elections: The Case for Democracy (London: Bodley Head, 2016); Brett Hennig, The End of Politicians: Time for a Real Democracy (London: Unbound, 2017).

2. See the newDemocracy or Participedia.net websites for case studies.

3. Gil Delannoi and Oliver Dowlen, Sortition: Theory and Practice (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010); Mogens Herman Hansen, Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); Keith Sutherland, Ernest Callenbach, and Michael Phillips, A People’s Parliament: A (Revised) Blueprint for a Very English Revolution (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008).

4. Stephen Elstub and Peter McLaverty, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Issues and Cases (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), citing Barker 1978, 142.

5. Daniel Yankelovitch, Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991).

6. Tony Fitzgerald, “Politicians with a ‘Winning at All Costs’ Mentality Are Damaging Australia,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 12, 2017. Italics added for emphasis.

7. Ibid.

8. These are adapted from political theorist Robert Dahl. In this volume, see Gastil and Wright’s lead chapter, “Legislature by Lot.”

9. John Urh, Deliberative Democracy in Australia. The Changing Place of Parliament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Carolyn Hendriks and Adrian Kay, “From ‘Opening up’ to Democratic Renewal: Deepening Public Engagement in Legislative Committees,” Government and Opposition (forthcoming, published online first, 2017).

10. Henry Martyn Robert, Robert’s Rules of Order: Classic Manual of Rules of Order for Deliberative Assemblies (Minneapolis: Filiquarian Publishing, 1876).

11. Tom Atlee, The Tao of Democracy: Using Co-Intelligence to Create a World That Works for All (Winnipeg: Writers’ Collective, 2003); Peggy Holman, Tom Devane, Steven Cady, and associates, The Change Handbook. The Definitive Resources on Today’s Best Methods for Engaging Whole Systems (Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2006); Sandy Schuman, Creating a Culture of Collaboration. The International Association of Facilitators Handbook (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006); Vivien Twyford et al., eds., The Power of “Co”: The Smart Leaders’ Guide to Collaborative Governance (Woolongong: Twyfords Consulting, 2012).

12. Some of the content for this chapter has been extracted verbatim from various research and development notes that the author prepared for the newDemocracy Foundation’s website.

13. The Journal of Public Deliberation or Participedia.net are both good starting points.

14. For a useful description of minipublics, see Oliver Escobar and Stephen Elstub, “Forms of Minipublics: An Introduction to Deliberative Innovations in Democratic Practice,” newDemocracy (May 8 2017), available on the newDemocracy website. In writing this chapter, I have in mind an entire chamber that has been randomly selected, as in Gastil and Wright’s formulation. This is quite different from a partial-sortition chamber, as advocated by a candidate in a recent French presidential election and by activists in Belgium and Switzerland. I also set aside any argument that power should be decentralized by abandoning parliamentary chambers altogether.

15. John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, eds., Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

16. Tom Dusevic, “Rage Against the Political Machine,” The Weekend Australian (December 24–5, 2016), 14.

17. Dusevic, “Rage Against the Political Machine.”

18. Lyn Carson, “Ignorance and Inclusion, Mr Jefferson, Might Be Good for Democracy,” working paper series, United States Studies Centre, Active Democracy website (November 2009).

19. In a similar way, jury deliberation can make citizens more likely to vote (where voting is not compulsory). See John Gastil, E. Pierre Deess, Philip J. Weiser, and Cindy Simmons, The Jury and Democracy: How Jury Deliberation Promotes Civic Engagement and Political Participation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

20. Hélène Landemore, “Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and Why It Matters,” Journal of Public Deliberation 8:1 (2012).

21. Sandy Hodge, Zelma Bone, and Judith Crockett, “Using Community Deliberation Forums for Public Engagement: Examples from Missouri, USA and New South Wales, Australia,” Queensland Government Publications (n.d.).

22. John Gastil and Peter Levine, eds., The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005).

23. Daniel Yankelovitch, Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991).

24. Daniel Yankelovitch, The Magic of Dialogue (Crows Nest, Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1999).

25. Examples of such feedback can be found in research reports at the newDemocracy website.

26. Tina Nabatchi, John Gastil, Michael G. Weiksner, and Matt Leighninger, eds., Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the Practice and Impact of Deliberative Civic Engagement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

27. Chris Barker and Brian Martin, “Participation: The Happiness Connection,” Journal of Public Deliberation 7:1 (2011).

28. Lyn Carson, “Investigation of (and Introspection on) Organizer Bias,” in The Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the Future of Deliberative Democracy, ed. Lyn Carson, John Gastil, Janette Hartz-Karp, and Ron Lubensky (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013).

29. The author was involved in both of these minipublics. Also see reports available online at GreenCross Australia and University of Technology Sydney.

30. Jennifer Roberts and Ruth Lightbody, “Experts and Evidence in Public Decision Making,” Climate Exchange (February 2017), available online at Climate Exchange website.

31. Paolo Freire, Education: The Practice of Freedom (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1976).

32. Freire, Education; Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the City (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1993).

33. Landemore, “Why the Many.”

34. John Gastil, Democracy in Small Groups (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 1993).

35. Max Hardy, Kath Fisher, and Janette Hartz-Karp, “The Unsung Heroes of a Deliberative Process: Reflections on the Role of Facilitators at the Citizens’ Parliament,” in The Australian Citizens’ Parliament, 177–89.

36. Dale Hunter, Anne Bailey, and Bill Taylor, Art of Facilitation: How to Create Group Synergy (Tucson: Fisher Books, 1995).

37. Usually, “a leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: we did it ourselves.”

38. Twyford et al., The Power of “Co.”

39. See the de Borda Institute website: http://www.deborda.org/faq/what-is-a-preferendum/

40. Gavin Mooney, “A Handbook on Citizens Juries with Particular Reference to Health Care,” newDemocracy (2010), available on the newDemocracy website.

41. See the G1000 website.

42. See the What Do We Think website, Turnometro, or Beta Baoqu.

43. See the newDemocracy website.

44. Plato, The Republic, 2nd ed., trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, 1974), 260–80.

45. Naomi Klein, No Is Not Enough: Defeating the New Shock Politics (New York: Penguin, 2017).

46. Mark E. Warren, “When, Where and Why Do We Need Deliberation, Voting, and Other Means of Organizing Democracy? A Problem-Based Approach to Democratic Systems” (presentation, American Political Science Association, 2012).

47. Barry Hindess, “Deficit by Design,” Australian Journal of Public Administration 61:1 (2002): 30–8.

48. Delannoi and Dowlen, Sortition.

11. Sortition and Democratic Principles: A Comparative Analysis, Courant

1. This chapter is a shortened and completely revised version of a paper published in an earlier and longer version in Spanish—see Dimitri Courant, “Pensar el Sorteo. Modos de Selección, Marcos Deliberativos y Principios Democráticos,” Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 72 (2017): 59–79; and in English, see Dimitri Courant, “Thinking Sortition. Modes of Selection, Deliberative Frameworks and Democratic Principles,” Les Cahiers de l’IEPHI, Working Papers 68 (2017); and in French, see Dimitri Courant, “Penser le tirage au sort. Modes de sélection, cadres délibératifs et principes démocratiques,” in Expériences du tirage au sort en Suisse et en Europe : un état des lieux, eds. Antoine Chollet and Alexandre Fontaine (Berne : Schriftenreihe der Bibliothek am Guisanplatz, 2018).

2. Yves Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy? Random Selection in Politics from Athens to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, forthcoming).

3. In this volume, see Gastil and Wright’s lead chapter, “Legislature by Lot.”

4. For empirical developments of this theoretical framework, see Dimitri Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation dans l’Armée Française: Le Cas du Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire (1969–2014)” (master’s thesis, EHESS, September 2014).

5. I leave aside filiation (heredity) and acquisition (buying of offices), as those two modes have almost disappeared.

6. Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1979), 134.

7. For more detail on sortition in ancient Athens, see chapters in this book by Owen and Smith and by Fishkin.

8. Bernard Manin, Principes du Gouvernement Représentatif (Paris: Flammarion, 2012).

9. Francis Dupuis-Déri, Démocratie: Histoire Politique d’un Mot (Montréal: Lux, 2013); Dimitri Courant, “Délibération et tirage au sort au sein d’une institution permanente. Enquête sur le Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire (1968–2016),” Participations (forthcoming, 2019).

10. Karoun Demirjian, “Grassley: Two Controversial Federal Bench Nominees Won’t Be Confirmed,” Washington Post (December 13, 2017).

11. See the website of the California Citizens Redistricting Commission, wedrawthelines.ca.gov.

12. Jacques Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (New York: Verso, 2006), 42.

13. Candidates and agents in charge of selecting representatives could be completely wrong about the candidates’ real competences.

14. Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy.

15. Hélène Landemore, “Deliberation, Cognitive Diversity, and Democratic Inclusiveness,” Synthese 190:7 (2013): 1209–31.

16. Oliver Dowlen, The Political Potential of Sortition (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008).

17. In this volume, see Gastil and Wright’s lead chapter, “Legislature by Lot.”

18. James S. Fishkin and Robert Luskin, “Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal,” Acta Politica 40 (2005): 284–98.

19. John Gastil and Robert Richards, “Making Direct Democracy Deliberative Through Random Assemblies,” Politics & Society 41:2 (2013): 253–81.

20. Dimitri Courant, “Les Militants du Tirage au Sort. Sociologie d’un Nouvel Activisme Démocratique” (paper presented at the CLAIMS workshop, Paris, 2018).

21. Though conventional participatory budgeting does not incorporate random samples, randomly selected panels linked to participatory budgeting exist in Germany, France, and China. See Yves Sintomer, Anja Röcke, and Carsten Herzberg, Participatory Budgeting in Europe: Democracy and Public Governance (London: Routledge, 2016); Dimitri Courant, “From Klérotèrion to Cryptology: The Act of Sortition in the XXIst Century, Instruments and Practices,” in Sortition and Democracy, ed. Liliane Rabatel and Yves Sintomer (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2018b).

22. See Arnold, Suiter, and Farrell in this book.

23. Dominique Bourg, ed., Pour Une 6e République Écologique (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2011).

24. Contrary to religious uses of sortition, see Courant, “From Klérotèrion to Cryptology.”

25. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

26. One could argue for tests to be used to filter potential sortition legislators from a larger pool, but this aristocratic argument goes against the democratic equality of the principle “one person, one vote.”

27. This typology goes beyond the distinction between auto-selection and hetero-selection.

28. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy.

29. Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy?

30. Daniel Gaxie, Le Cens Caché (Paris: Seuil, 1993).

31. Mancur Olson, Logique de l’Action Collective (Bruxelles: Université de Bruxelles, 2011).

32. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

33. Cornelius Castoriadis, La Montée de l’Insignifiance (Paris: Seuil, 1996).

34. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 47, 49.

35. Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy?

36. Gil Delannoi, Le Retour du Tirage au Sort en Politique (Paris: Fondapol, 2010), 19.

37. This connection between sortition and direct democracy can be explained by the concept of legitimacy based on humility, as we will see below. See also: Dimitri Courant, “‘We Have Humility’: Perceived Legitimacy and Representative Claims in the Irish Citizens’ Assembly” (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, Boston, 2018).

38. The Danish Board of Technology is an official institution aiming to provide reliable information to the Danish Parliament. Since 1987, it has organized debates on technological issues among randomly selected citizens.

39. However, control procedures are useful to prevent ex post corruption by lobbies.

40. Courant, “From Klérotèrion to Cryptology.”

41. Manin, Principes du Gouvernement Représentatif, 74–93.

42. Pierre Bourdieu, “La Représentation Politique,” Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 36–7 (1981): 3–24.

43. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

44. Bourdieu, “La Représentation Politique,” 6–7.

45. Alexandros Kontos, “La Démocratie, un Régime Politique Inconnu” (PhD thesis, Paris, 2001): 42, 258.

46. On the Texas case, see Felicetti and della Porta’s chapter in this volume. On Ireland, see the chapter by Arnold, Suiter, and Farrell.

47. Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy?

48. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Holt, 1929), 207.

49. Landemore, “Deliberation, Cognitive Diversity, and Democratic Inclusiveness.”

50. This was done for the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, along with many other minipublics. Determination of relevant subpopulations is contextual and should be open to political debate.

51. A sortition system could make districts useless. Moreover, if people represent districts, they might be encouraged to represent a part of the whole—not the whole.

52. Owen and Smith make this point in their chapter, as a critique of the multiyear terms of service suggested by Gastil and Wright.

53. Plato, Protagoras (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

54. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation,” 102.

55. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Les Confessions d’un Révolutionnaire (Paris: TOPS, 2013).

56. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

57. My perspective differs from that of Kelsen, who only compared nomination and election, the first one creating a dependence to the top, and the second a dependence to the electorate. See Hans Kelsen, La Démocratie: Sa Nature, Sa Valeur (Paris: Dalloz, 2004).

58. Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation.”

59. Manin, Principes du Gouvernement Représentatif.

60. Delannoi, “Le Retour du Tirage au Sort,” 14.

61. Robert Rosenthal and Leonore Jacobson, “Teacher Expectation for the Disadvantaged,” Scientific American 218:4 (1968): 19–23.

62. Elisha Y. Babad, Jacinto Inbar, and Robert Rosenthal, “Pygmalion, Galatea, and the Golem: Investigations of Biased and Unbiased Teachers,” Journal of Educational Psychology 74:4 (1982): 459–74.

63. I discovered legitimacy-humility studying the military. I asked if the CSFM-sorted officials had a title, to which the secretariat answered, “No, no title! We don’t want them to become arrogant!” Courant, “Tirage au Sort et Concertation,” 113. The concept was also mentioned by members of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in interviews I conducted: “We have humility, we don’t care about the fame, we just want to help people.” See also Courant, “‘We Have Humility.’”

12. In Defense of Imperfection: An Election-Sortition Compromise, Abizadeh

1. See Dennis C. Mueller, Robert D. Tollison, and Thomas D. Willett, “Representative Democracy via Random Selection,” Public Choice 12 (1972): 57–68; Richard G. Mulgan, “Lot as a Democratic Device of Selection,” Review of Politics 46:4 (1984): 539–60; Fredrik Engelstad, “The Assignment of Political Office by Lot,” Social Science Information 28:1 (1989): 23–50; Gil Delannoi, Oliver Dowlen, and Peter Stone, “The Lottery as a Democratic Institution,” in Studies in Public Policy (Dublin: Policy Institute, 2013); Terrill G. Bouricius, “Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day,” Journal of Public Deliberation 9:1 (2013).

2. Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

3. See also Kevin O’Leary, Saving Democracy: A Plan for Real Representation in America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); John P. McCormick, “Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular Government,” American Political Science Review 100:2 (2006): 147–63; Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips, A Citizen Legislature (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008); Alex Zakaras, “Lot and Democratic Representation: A Modest Proposal,” Constellations 17:3 (2010): 455–71; Michael K. MacKenzie, “A General-Purpose, Randomly Selected Chamber,” in Institutions for Future Generations, ed. Iñigo González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Pierre-Étienne Vandamme and Antoine Verret-Hamelin, “A Randomly Selected Chamber: Promises and Challenges,” Journal of Public Deliberation 13:1 (2017); Arash Abizadeh “Representation, Bicameralism, and Sortition: Reconstituting the Senate as Randomly Selected Citizen Assembly,” workshop paper, McGill University, 2016.

4. David van Reybrouck, Against Elections: The Case for Democracy (London: Bodley Head, 2016); Keith Sutherland, A People’s Parliament (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008); Terrill Bouricius’s chapter in this volume. An exclusive sortition system is also explored in Alexander A. Guerrero, “Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42:2 (2014): 135–78.

5. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes, “Elections and Representation,” in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 29–54; James D. Fearon, “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance,” in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, 55–97.

6. Manin, Principles of Representative Government; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, “Elections and Representation,” 30; Adam Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in Democracy’s Value, ed. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 35.

7. Jane Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation,” American Political Science Review 97:4 (2003): 515–28.

8. Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Governments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

9. Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

10. Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception,” 36–8; Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists.

11. James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3–4.

12. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, in “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12:3 (2014): 564–81, argue that policy in the USA correlates more strongly with elite preferences. For criticism, see J. Alexander Branham, Stuart N. Soroka, and Christopher Wlezien, “When Do the Rich Win?” Political Science Quarterly 132:1 (2017).

13. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

14. Manin, Principles of Representative Government.

15. Fishkin, When the People Speak; Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

16. Oliver Dowlen, The Political Potential of Sortition: A Study of the Random Selection of Citizens for Public Office (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008); Oliver Dowlen, “Sorting Out Sortition: A Perspective on the Random Selection of Political Officers,” Political Studies 57:2 (2009): 298–315; Peter Stone, The Luck of the Draw: The Role of Lotteries in Decision Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

17. Manin, Principles of Representative Government.

18. Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception.”

19. On the intrinsic significance of participation or involvement, see Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue; Patchen Markell, “The Insufficiency of Non-Domination,” Political Theory 36:1 (2008): 9–36.

20. David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

21. John L. Sullivan and Eric M. Uslaner, “Congressional Behavior and Electoral Marginality,” American Journal of Political Science 22:3 (1978): 536–53.

22. Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

23. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 201–5; Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

24. Hervé Pourtois, “Les Élections Sont-Elles Essentielles à la Démocratie?” Philosophiques 43:2 (2016): 411–39.

13. A Gradualist Path Toward Sortition, Burks and Kies

1. We owe the expression “hybrid legitimacy” to Julien Talpin, “How Can Constitutional Reforms Be Deliberative? The Hybrid Legitimacies of Constitutional Deliberative Democracy,” in Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe, ed. Min Reuchamps and Jane Suiter (Colchester, UK: ECPR, 2016), 93–108. Whereas Talpin’s hybrid concerns whether epistemic, commonsense, democratic, and representative legitimacy can accrue in one constitutional setting, we only mean that the sortition chamber’s blend of empowerment, continuity, and embeddedness could secure several forms of legitimacy that other kinds of minipublics lack by dint of design.

2. For a synthetic account exploring these challenges, see John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

3. One imperfect comparison might be universal suffrage.

4. For a succinct version, see Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin, “Introduction: Referendum Democracy,” in Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns, ed. Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave), 1–22.

5. Alan Renwick, “Referendums,” in The SAGE Handbook of Electoral Behaviour, vol. 1, ed. Kai Arzheimer, Jocelyn Evans, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck (London: SAGE Publications, 2017), 433–58, especially 444–5.

6. Renwick, “Referendums,” 445.

7. Renwick, “Referendums,” 445–8.

8. Renwick, “Referendums,” 450. For the datasets and broader argument, see 448–53.

9. On how sortition bodies aim (or fail) to achieve accountability, see various chapters in this volume, particularly the one by Jane Mansbridge.

10. For an initial examination of this question, see Pierre-Étienne Vandamme, Vincent Jacquet, Christoph Niessen, John Pitseys, and Min Reuchamps in this volume. They find that citizens are more open or, at least, more neutral to the idea of a sortition or mixed chamber whereas decision-makers are strongly opposed. Concerning the referendum on electoral reform formulated by the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly, opinion polls collecting voters’ reasons for supporting or opposing the reform suggest that they held neutral opinions on a sortition-selected body’s being the source of the proposal. See Lawrence Leduc, “How and Why Electoral Reform Fails: Evaluating the Canadian Experience” (presentation, ECPR Joint Sessions Workshops, Lisbon, 2009).

11. Exceptions include Colorado, where the state constitution is routinely amended by a majority vote of the electorate.

12. See Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6–8.

13. A conclusion shared by Alan Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10.

14. Bowler and Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform, 19–23. For a more general overview of rational choice theory as applied to institutions, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies XLIV (1996): 936–57, especially 942–6. Finally, see also Bouricius and Vandamme et al. in this volume for parallel considerations.

15. Bowler and Donovan, The Limits of Electoral Reform, 23–5. On the relation between social movements and sortition, see Andrea Felicetti and Donatella della Porta in this volume.

16. Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform, 11–6.

17. Ibid., 12–3.

18. Ibid., 50–2. Renwick later emphasizes that exogenous factors also constrain outcomes, such as cognitive constraints and limited information (239–42).

19. Anthony R. Zito and Adriaan Schout, “Learning Theory Reconsidered: EU Integration Theories and Learning,” Journal of European Public Policy 16:8 (2009): 1108.

20. A well-designed, largely-agreed-upon sortition design backed by sortition “experts” may prove vital to sortition’s political and legislative uptake. Moreover, the diversity of approaches in this volume—for example, bicameral, unicameral, multibody, pure sortition, mixed sortition, one-shot, continuous, aggregative, deliberative, participatory, radical—are suggestive of the difficulties in forming a cohesive sortition expert network.

21. For discussion of cognitive constraints, attitudinal change, and diffusion, see also Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform, 47–68, especially 59–60. We leave open whether this cultural approach to institutional reform owes more to historical or sociological approaches to institutions. See Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 937–42, 946–50.

22. For worries that it would not, see Bouricius and Vandamme et al. in this volume.

23. For concerns over professionalization and partisan contagion, see Tom Malleson, David Schecter, Bouricius, and Vandamme et al. in this volume.

24. Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World, 99–123. For broader questions of the sortition chamber’s participatory shortcomings, see Sintomer; Felicetti and della Porta; Malleson in this volume.

25. Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, “Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44:3 (2006): 533–62.

26. Nicole Curator and Marit Böker, “Linking Minipublics to the Deliberative System: A Research Agenda,” Policy Sciences 49:2 (2016): 173–90.

27. On the assemblies in Ireland, Iceland, and Luxembourg, see respectively: Jane Suiter, David M. Farrell, and Clodagh Harris, “The Irish Constitutional Convention: A Case of ‘High Legitimacy’?” in Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe, ed. Min Reuchamps and Jane Suiter (Colchester, UK: ECPR, 2016), 33–52; Eirikur Bergmann, “Participatory Constitutional Deliberation in the Wake of Crisis: The Case of Iceland,” in Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe, 15–32; Raphaël Kies, Les Consultations Citoyennes et les Réformes Constitutionnelles, report for the Chamber of Deputies, Luxembourg, 2015.

28. Lawrence Leduc, Heather Bastedo, and Catherine Baquero, “The Quiet Referendum: Why Electoral Referendum Failed in Ontario” (presentation, Canadian Political Science Association annual meeting, Vancouver, 2008), 8.

29. Patrick Dumont and Raphaël Kies, “Luxembourg,” European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook 55:1 (2016): 175–82.

30. For more on the Irish Constitutional Convention, see Tom Arnold in this volume.

31. Archon Fung, “British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform,” Participedia.net.

32. Leduc et al., “The Quiet Referendum,” 1.

33. Aleksi Eerola and Min Reuchamps, “Constitutional Modernisation and Deliberative Democracy: A Political Science Assessment of Four Cases,” Revue Interdisciplinaire d’Études Juridiques 77:2 (2016): 18.

34. For an overview, see the discussion of insiders and outsiders, followers and challenges in Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps, “Generating Democratic Legitimacy Through Deliberative Innovations: The Role of Embeddedness and Disruptiveness,” Representation 52:1 (2016): 13–27.

35. Mundo Yang, “Europe’s New Communication Policy and the Introduction of Transnational Deliberative Citizens’ Involvement Projects,” in Is Europe Listening to Us? Successes and Failures of EU Citizen Consultations, ed. Raphaël Kies and Patrizia Nanz (London: Routledge, 2013), 17–34.

36. Kies and Nanz, eds., Is Europe Listening to Us?; Espen Olsen and Hans Jörg Trenz, “From Citizens’ Deliberation to Popular Will Formation? Generating Democratic Legitimacy in Transnational Deliberative Polling,” Political Studies 62:1 (2014): 117–33.

37. Raphaël Kies, “The Seven Golden Rules to Promote EU Citizens’ Consultation” (presentation, Fourth International Conference on Legislation and Law Reform, Washington, November 17–18, 2016); Elisa Lironi and Daniela Peta, “European Economic and Social Committee EU Public Consultations in the Digital Age: Enhancing the Role of the EESC and Civil Society Organizations,” report for the European Economic and Social Committee, 2017.

38. Christine Quittkatt, “The European Commission’s Online Consultations: A Success Story?” Journal of Common Market Studies 49:3 (2011): 653–74; European Commission, “Better Regulation Guidelines,” commission staff working document, 2016, 17.

39. Christian Marxsen, “Open Stakeholder Consultations at the European Level—Voice of the Citizens?” European Law Journal 21:2 (2015): 261.

40. European Commission, “Better Regulation Guidelines,” 84.

41. Lironi and Peta, “European Economic and Social Committee EU Public Consultations in the Digital Age.”

42. Romain Badouard, “Combining Inclusion with Impact on the Decision? The Commission’s Online Consultation on the European Citizens’ Initiative,” in Is Europe Listening to Us?, 153–72.

43. Marxsen, “Open Stakeholder Consultations at the European Level,” 275.

44. In the EU case, decision-makers would include the commission, parliament, and council. On the Oregon case, see John Gastil, Robert Richards, and Katherine Knobloch, “Vicarious Deliberation: How the Oregon Citizens’ Review Initiative Influenced Deliberation in Mass Elections,” International Journal of Communication 8:1 (2014): 62–89.

45. Suiter et al., “The Irish Constitutional Convention.”

46. Raphaël Kies, Monique Leyenaar, and Kees Niemöller, “European Citizens’ Consultation: A Large Consultation on a Vague Topic,” in Is Europe Listening to Us?, 59–78.

47. Carolyn Hendriks, “Coupling Citizens and Elites in Deliberative Systems: The Role of Institutional Design,” European Journal of Political Research 55:1 (2016): 43–60.

14. Sortition, Rotation, and Mandate: Conditions for Political Equality and Deliberative Reasoning, Owen and Smith

1. There are other significant historical periods of the use of sortition—in particular, the Renaissance republicanism of Italian cities such as Venice and Florence in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and under the Crown of Aragon. In these periods, sortition was utilized primarily to select major and minor offices rather than assemblies, but this has some resonance with Athenian practice because sortition was introduced as a defense against faction and unstable coalitions. See Morgens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Oliver Dowlen, The Political Potential of Sortition (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008); Yves Sintomer, From Radical to Deliberative Democracy? Random Selection in Politics from Athens to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, forthcoming), originally published as Petite Histoire de l’Expérimentation Démocratique: Tirage au Sort et Politique d’Athènes à Nos Jours (La Découverte, Serie “Poches,” Paris, 2011). Our reconstruction of the institutions of Athenian democracy that follows draws on these texts.

2. Graham Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 72–110; Kimmo Grönlund, André Bächtiger, and Maija Setälä, eds., Deliberative Mini-Publics: Involving Citizens in the Democratic Process (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2014); Maija Setälä and Graham Smith, “Mini-Publics and Deliberative Democracy,” in Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, ed. André Bächtiger, John Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

3. The characteristics of these and other minipublic designs discussed in this section are explained in Smith, Democratic Innovations; Grönlund, Bächtiger, and Setälä, eds., Deliberative Mini-Publics; and Setälä and Smith, “Mini-Publics and Deliberative Democracy.”

4. James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). In From Radical to Deliberative Democracy?, Yves Sintomer points out that the Greeks did not have access to ideas about probability sampling, and thus the generation of random samples and the idea of counterfactual judgments were not part of their understanding of sortition bodies.

5. Simone Chambers, “Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004): 289–410.

6. Setälä and Smith, “Mini-Publics and Deliberative Democracy.”

7. Mark E. Warren and John Gastil, “Can Deliberative Minipublics Address the Cognitive Challenges of Democratic Citizenship?” Journal of Politics 77:2 (2015): 562–74.

8. Michael A. Neblo, Deliberative Democracy Between Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 181; see also Yanis Papadopoulos, “On the Embeddedness of Deliberative Systems: Why Elitist Innovations Matter More,” in Deliberative Systems, ed. John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 125–50.

9. In the analysis that follows, we consider a simple legislative assembly and avoid discussion of the UK case in which government ministers are drawn from both legislative assemblies. This would add a further level of complexity to the design of a sortition chamber.

10. See Gastil and Wright’s lead chapter in this volume, “Legislature by Lot.”

11. Ibid., 22.

12. We thank Terrill Bouricius for stressing this important point during the 2017 Real Utopias workshop.

13. See Gastil and Wright’s opening chapter in this volume, “Legislature by Lot.”

14. Ibid., 28.

15. Smith, Democratic Innovations, 30–71.

16. Ernesto Ganuza and Gianpaolo Baiocchi, “The Power of Ambiguity: How Participatory Budgeting Travels the Globe,” Journal of Public Deliberation 8:2 (2012); Yves Sintomer, Carsten Herzberg, Anja Röcke, and Giovanni Allegretti, “Transnational Models of Citizen Participation: The Case of Participatory Budgeting,” Journal of Public Deliberation 8:2 (2012).

17. Quote comes from a workshop draft of the opening chapter of this volume by Gastil and Wright. The paper is available from the authors on request.

18. Gastil and Wright, “Legislature by Lot.”

19. Alexander Guerrero also takes an issue-based approach to his sortition proposal, but, similar to Gastil and Wright, argues for smaller bodies without rapid rotation. See Alexander A. Guerro, “Against Elections; The Lottocratic Alternative,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42:2 (2014): 135–78.

20. Laurence Bherer, Louis Simard, and Mario Gauthier, “Autonomy for What End? Comparing Four Autonomous Public Organizations Dedicated to Public Participation” (presentation, ECPR Joint Sessions, Salamanca, 2014).

21. The initiative process would need to be implemented in a different way than current practice, where organized interests tend to dominate.

15. Who Needs Elections? Accountability, Equality, and Legitimacy Under Sortition, Hennig

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, De la Démocratie en Amérique, vols. 1–3 (Paris: Librairie de Charles Gosselin, 1835); Brett Hennig, The End of Politicians: Time for a Real Democracy (London: Unbound, 2017), 27–37; also see James Fishkin’s chapter in this volume. In the first US presidential election (of 1788–89) less than 2 percent of the US population voted. In the UK at the same time, 1 to 3 percent of the population could vote in parliamentary elections. Elections, historically, were never democratic devices and were never intended to become such devices. See “US President—National Vote, 1788–1789,” available online at Our Campaigns website (www.ourcampaigns.com), compared to “1790 Fast Facts,” US Census Bureau, available online on the Census Bureau’s website; Neil Johnston, “The History of the Parliamentary Franchise,” House of Commons Library Research Paper, 2013, 9.

2. “Outperform” here refers to the normative democratic ideal of informed, deliberative, representative decision-making in our legislatures. Note that this “ultimate aim” does not deny the likelihood that as a first strategic step a bicameral system may be necessary. Indeed, I have recently authored a proposal for just such a bicameral system in the Scottish Parliament, where randomly selected citizens in a permanent “House of Review” would serve staggered two-year terms. See Brett Hennig, Lyn Carson, Iain Walker, and David Schecter, A Citizens’ Assembly for the Scottish Parliament (Sortition Foundation, Common Weal and new-Democracy Foundation, 2017).

3. Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1.

4. John Dunn, “Situating Democratic Political Accountability,” in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 11.

5. Dunn, “Situating Democratic Political Accountability,” 330.

6. Ibid., 335.

7. Ibid., 330.

8. Ibid., 330n1.

9. Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 15.

10. Ibid., 16.

11. Ibid., 15; Achen and Bartels (24–7 and chap. 4) are especially dismissive of the classic theory outlined by Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), and applied in books such as Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), which places parties on a one-dimensional spectrum progressing toward the “median voter.” See also Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin, eds., introduction to Democracy, Accountability, and Representation.

12. Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, 18.

13. Tim Roemer, “Why Do Congressmen Spend Only Half Their Time Serving Us?” Newsweek (July 9, 2015).

14. Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

15. Bartels, Unequal Democracy, 253–4.

16. Gilens, Affluence and Influence, 70.

17. Ibid., 81–3.

18. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12:3 (2014): 564–81.

19. John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (London: W. W. Norton, 2009), 688–93, 706, but see 708: “monitory democracy is [not] mainly or ‘essentially’ a method of taming the power of government.” Also see Dunn, “Situating Democratic Political Accountability,” 334–5.

20. In any accountable system there must be “some set of established and observed rules” for selecting and replacing the rulers that is not at the discretion of the rulers themselves—this “important, if minimal, sense of political accountability” is why we are not concerned by the second-term US president, and why a system using sortition (with strict term limits) would continue to satisfy this minimal condition of accountability. See Dunn, “Situating Democratic Political Accountability,” 333.

21. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). For definitions of deliberative democracy see 3, 7, 101, 116.

22. Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

23. Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). Or the many innovative online deliberative tools may be used to achieve a similar goal.

24. Conor Friedersdorf, “Constant Fundraising: The Other Campaign-Finance Problem,” Atlantic (April 18, 2012).

25. Hennig, The End of Politicians, chap. 4; and elsewhere in this volume.

26. Ibid.

27. Fishkin makes a similar point in his chapter in this volume.

28. John S. Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 27.

29. Lyn Carson describes such parallel processes in her chapter within this volume.

30. W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, “The Logic of Connective Action,” Information, Communication & Society 15:5 (2012): 739–68; David Karpf, The MoveOn Effect: The Unexpected Transformation of American Political Advocacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

31. See Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, 114. Other nondeliberative forms of political interaction, such as protest and direct action, are also important in a democratic society, but again we would not wish them to occur in an ideal legislature.

32. Oliver Escobar and Stephen Elstub, Forms of Minipublics (Research and Development Note, newDemocracy Foundation, 2017); Fred Cutler, Richard Johnston, R. Kenneth Carty, André Blais, and Patrick Fournier, “Deliberation, Information, and Trust: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly as Agenda-Setter,” in Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, ed. Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). On the limits of the minipublic analogy, see Owens and Smith’s chapter in this volume.

33. Elsje Jorritsma, “Rotterdam Gaat Wijkpolitici Niet Kiezen Maar Loten,” NRC (February 23, 2017).

34. There are many other recent examples detailed on the new-Democracy and Sortition Foundation websites.

35. Hennig, Carson, Walker, and Schecter, A Citizens’ Assembly for the Scottish Parliament. There is also recent and significant institutional support for the introduction of such a bicameral system to the Parliament of the German-Speaking Community of Belgium.

36. That organization might target the state of Queensland, which has a unicameral parliament. For more on newDemocracy, see Lyn Carson’s chapter in this volume.

37. See the Sénat Citoyen campaign website, senatcitoyen.fr; Gil Delannoi and Lyn Carson, French Presidential Election and Sortition (newDemocracy Foundation Research Note, 2017).

38. Mark E. Warren and John Gastil, “Can Deliberative Minipublics Address the Cognitive Challenges of Democratic Citizenship?” Journal of Politics 77:2 (2015): 582–74. Vandamme et al. in this volume show that in Belgium a sortition chamber inspires more confidence in 34.4 percent of people (33.3 percent disagree and 32.3 percent are neutral).

16. Why Hybrid Bicameralism Is Not Right for Sortition, Bouricius

1. In this volume, see Gastil and Wright’s lead chapter, “Legislature by Lot.” Also see Arash Abizadeh, “Representation, Bicameralism, and Sortition: Reconstituting the Senate as a Randomly Selected Citizen Assembly” (presentation, bicameralism workshop at McGill University, 2016). Also see Anthony Barnett and Peter Carty, The Athenian Option: Radical Reform for the House of Lords (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008); Keith Sutherland, “The Two Sides of the Representative Coin,” Studies in Social Justice 5:2 (2011): 197–211.

2. Frank Fischer, Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting Policy Inquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 61.

3. Anthoula Malkopoulou, “The Paradox of Democratic Selection: Is Sortition Better Than Voting?” in Parliamentarism and Democratic Theory, ed. Kari Palonen and José María Rosales (Toronto: Budrich, 2015), 250.

4. Ibid., 247.

5. Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions,” Political Behavior 32:2 (2010), 303–30.

6. Ibid.

7. Gastil and Wright, “Legislature by Lot.”

8. I subscribe to the social construct analysis of political leadership advanced by Murray Edelman that “belief in leadership is a catalyst of conformity and obedience.” Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 37. Narratives about the accomplishments of leaders should be treated with extreme skepticism, as explained by Philip M. Rosenzweig, The Halo Effect: How Managers Let Themselves Be Deceived (London: Pocket Books, 2008).

9. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).

10. Joshua Becker, Devon Brackbill, and Damon Centola, “Network Dynamics of Social Influence in the Wisdom of Crowds,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114:26 (2017): E5070–6.

11. David Owen, The Hubris Syndrome: Bush, Blair and the Intoxication of Power (York: Methuen & Co., 2012).

12. James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business (London: Economics, Societies, and Nations, 2004).

13. Studies have found no significant difference between liberals and conservatives in this regard, but it seems likely that the subset of individuals from across the political spectrum who are willing to run for office tend toward harmful “intellectual arrogance” rather than beneficial humility. See Mark R. Leary et al., “Cognitive and Interpersonal Features of Intellectual Humility,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 43:6 (2017): 793–813.

14. Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S. Schacter, “The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study,” New York University Law Review 77:3 (2002): 575–624.

15. In his 2009 memoir, Senator Ted Kennedy estimated that 95 percent of the drafting and negotiating in Congress is done by staff rather than legislators. Edward M. Kennedy, True Compass: A Memoir (New York: Twelve, 2011), 486.

16. Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Majority (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 122.

17. Carey K. Morewedge et al., “Debiasing Decisions Improved Decision Making with a Single Training Intervention,” Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2:1 (2015): 129–40.

18. Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle, 14.

19. Anthony Downs coined the term in An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), while Bryan Caplan takes it one step farther, arguing that voters gain psychological utility from irrational loyalty in his book The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

20. By “aptitude,” he does not refer to an inherent character trait but the effect of procedures. Jeremy Bentham and Philip Schofield, Securities Against Misrule and Other Constitutional Writings for Tripoli and Greece (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009).

21. Jon Elster, Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 202.

22. Margaret T. Lee and Richard Ofshe, “The Impact of Behavioral Style and Status Characteristics on Social Influence: A Test of Two Competing Theories,” Social Psychology Quarterly 44:2 (1981): 73–82.

23. Geoffrey L. Cohen, “Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85:5 (2003): 808–22.

24. Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips, A Citizen Legislature (Berkeley, CA: Banyan Tree Books, 1985).

25. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

26. Jon Elster (echoing Jeremy Bentham) has stressed this “defensive” potential of sortition in Securities Against Misrule. Also see Oliver Dowlen, The Political Potential of Sortition: A Study of the Random Selection of Citizens for Public Office (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009).

27. Politicians such as Representative Charles Rangel and Representative Michael Grimm were re-elected despite standing under dark clouds of corruption. These and other examples can be found on the OpenSecrets website, www.opensecrets.org.

28. On distinction, see Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

29. In their chapter in this volume (“Sortition, Rotation, and Mandate”), David Owen and Graham Smith call for a large pool of randomly selected citizens, and they divide up tasks among subgroups in a way that bears some resemblance to this idea—but without an all-purpose chamber.

30. Anthoula Malkopoulou, “The Paradox of Democratic Selection: Is Sortition Better Than Voting?” in Parliamentarism and Democracy Theory Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Kari Palonen and José María Rosales (Leverkusen: Budrich, Barbara, 2015), 230. Gastil and Wright do specify a number of reasonable, though modest, modifications to standard legislative chamber practices for a sortition body, but these do not seem sufficient to me. In his “Paris Commune” essay (1871), Karl Marx noted that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the readymade state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” An all-sortition legislature would constitute a fundamental change of class control (whether one thinks of elected legislators as a “political class” or servants of a “capitalist class”), though expressly not in a Leninist “vanguard party” sort of way.

31. The ability of multiple minipublics to address various dilemmas of sortition design is described in Terrill G. Bouricius, “Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day,” Journal of Public Deliberation 9:1 (2013).

32. Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, eds., Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

33. Although it has huge budgetary impacts, the 2017 impasse on “repeal and replacement” of Obamacare could have been an opportunity, especially with a nontraditional disrupter like Donald Trump. If there had been far more on-the-ground experience with sortition experiments in the US, it is possible to imagine how major chunks of public policy on health care could have been handed off to a sortition process. Conservatives don’t trust government bureaucrats making decisions about their health care, and liberals don’t trust insurance executives. But it might be that both sides could agree to let a large representative sample of ordinary citizens hear from a range of experts on the issue and make decisions on their behalf.

34. This is similar to John Rawls’s “original position” thought experiment. By separating people choosing the procedures from the concrete policy matters by a virtual “veil of ignorance,” they have an incentive to propose a fair and epistemically solid process for other minipublics to use. If the same body is both deciding on rules and dealing with policy, the incentive is to create rules that will favor the current majority in adopting their preferred policy.

35. Careful examination by the agenda council may suggest a particular issue doesn’t warrant the calling of interest panels, but even an objectively unworthy topic that can muster a significant petition interest might be important to have a review panel examine, even if no policy change gets advanced, so that the public is assured it was adequately looked at.

36. David Estlund, “Opinion Leaders, Independence and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem,” Theory & Decision 36:2 (1994): 131–62.

37. Douglas Adams, Restaurant at the End of the Universe (New York: Del Rey, 1997), 201.

38. Bouricius, “Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition.”

39. From the time of Aristotle up to the European Enlightenment, elections, through their “principle of distinction,” were seen as the appropriate tool for aristocracy or oligarchy, while sortition was viewed as natural to democracy. See Manin, The Principles of Representative Government.

17. Sortition’s Scope, Contextual Variations, and Transitions, Gastil and Wright

1. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

2. Dennis Hale, The Jury in America: Triumph and Decline (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016).

3. The origins of these and related processes appear in John Gastil and Peter Levine, eds., The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005).

4. Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer, Joe Goldman, and Steven Brigham, “A Town Meeting for the Twenty-First Century,” in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook, 154–63.

5. James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

6. Mark E. Warren and Hillary Pearse, eds., Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Also see Mark Warren and John Gastil, “Can Deliberative Minipublics Address the Cognitive Challenges of Democratic Citizenship?” Journal of Politics 77 (2015): 562–74.

7. See the chapter in this volume by Tom Arnold, David M. Farrell, and Jane Suiter.

8. See the chapter in this volume by David Owen and Graham Smith.

9. See the chapter in this volume by James Fishkin.

10. See the formulation of this problem in Sean Ingham, “Disagreement and Epistemic Arguments for Democracy,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 12 (2013): 136–55. Also see the response, Robert Richards and John Gastil, “Symbolic-Cognitive Proceduralism: A Model of Deliberative Legitimacy,” Journal of Public Deliberation 11 (2015).

11. We view this as drawing on two chapters in this volume: Owen and Smith’s and Bouricius’s.

12. The problem is often sparking legislative deliberation in the first place. See Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

13. See Mansbridge’s chapter in this volume.

14. See Courant’s chapter in this volume.

15. Carolina Johnson and John Gastil, “Variations of Institutional Design for Empowered Deliberation,” Journal of Public Deliberation 11 (2015).

16. On social-movement organizations, see Felicetti and della Porta’s chapter in this volume. On the response of political parties, see Bouricius’s chapter.

17. Transparency International provides annual ratings at its online portal.

18. See Michael Johnston’s overview (7–8) in his edited volume, Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, 3rd ed. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2001).

19. Political critique isn’t immune to the “fundamental attribution error” prevalent in social cognition: it is a common mistake to attribute actors’ behavioral transgressions to character flaws, rather than to the circumstances in which they act. See, for example, Philip E. Tetlock, “Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution Error,” Social Psychology Quarterly 48 (1985): 227–36.

20. See Mansbridge’s chapter in this volume.

21. Joan Tronto, Who Cares? How to Reshape a Democratic Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

22. See Deven Burks and Raphaël Kies’s and Bouricius’s chapters in this volume.

23. See the chapters in this volume by Pierre-Étienne Vandamme et al. and Tom Arnold et al.

24. Promising initiatives include those pursued by the Sortition Foundation and other cases documented at the Participedia.net compendium, including “Democracy in Practice: Democratic Student Government Program in Cochabamba, Bolivia.”