CHAPTER 17:
CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV RECONCILE

Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev carried on like old friends during Castro’s month-long visit to the Soviet Union in 1963. They joked with each other around a picnic table piled high with food at a feast in the Caucasian Mountains celebrating the arrival of spring. Khrushchev smiled mischievously at Castro, who was holding a long animal horn filled with wine. Castro reluctantly quaffed the wine, to the delight of the villagers. Moments later a grinning, gesticulating Castro cheered on Khrushchev as he emptied his Georgian drinking horn.

A few hours earlier, however, the two leaders had locked horns over the Cuban missile crisis. Khrushchev insisted that his deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba had deterred a U.S. invasion of the island. Castro was still furious that Khrushchev did not consult him before withdrawing the Soviet missiles from Cuba. They would return again and again to the missile crisis during their marathon talks from April 27 until May 23, 1963. Despite the recurrent friction between the two men, Castro and Khrushchev developed a close personal bond. Sergei Khrushchev writes of his father’s relationship with Castro, “He had given his heart to the bearded leader and now regarded him as a son.”690

At the same time, Khrushchev also had to contend with Mao Zedong, who exploited the chaos of the missile crisis to woo Cuba politically, challenging Khrushchev’s leadership of the international communist movement more boldly than before. On October 31, 1962, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) newspaper called Khrushchev’s removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba “a retreat at the expense of Cuba.” In Beijing, Chinese diplomats called into question the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally in meetings with the Cuban ambassador. In repeated messages to Havana, Mao assured Cuban leaders that China fully backed the Cuban revolution, and dismissed the United States as “a paper tiger.”691

A November 1962 CIA memorandum commented on China’s response to Khrushchev’s withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. The memorandum stated, “Their efforts to exploit the failure of Khrushchev’s Cuban policy, and what they have termed as a ‘Soviet Munich,’ have now driven the two parties so far apart that a further exacerbation… might lead to an open break.”692

On January 31, 1963, Khrushchev wrote Castro, “We should meet. During the Caribbean crisis, our viewpoints did not always coincide, we did not see the different stages of the crisis in the same way; it was clear that we viewed the ways to solve it differently.” Khrushchev added, “[T]here are still gaps, which are difficult to assess, in our relations with Cuba.”693 When Castro received Khrushchev’s invitation, he was still angry that Khrushchev had removed the Soviet missiles from Cuba.694 Castro later explained he decided to meet with Khrushchev “to avoid any further accumulation of bitterness in the relations between the Soviets and us.” He added, “[W]e had very close economic relations with the Soviets. The entire life of the country, the energy of the country depended on the Soviets.”695 Meanwhile, Castro was welcomed warmly in the Soviet Union.

On April 27, Castro gave a speech in Red Square from the steps of Lenin’s Tomb to 40,000 cheering Russians in Moscow. Castro declared, “Were it not for the Soviet Union, the imperialists would not hesitate to launch a direct military attack on our country.” Four days later, he was back in Red Square with Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, and other Soviet leaders on the reviewing stand at the annual May Day parade.696

Castro spent half of his nearly month-long visit to the Soviet Union with Khrushchev, a unique opportunity for an in-depth exchange of views. Khrushchev conducted a seminar on war and peace for Castro, in which he analyzed the missile crisis and its aftermath in the context of the Soviet strategy of “peaceful coexistence.” Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet missiles in Cuba had deterred the United States from invading Cuba: “Only one thing could constrain them: the fear, the knowledge that if they began the invasion, the missiles would carry out their mission and the cities of North America would be left in ruins.”

Castro was skeptical that Kennedy would honor his “no invasion” pledge. Khrushchev replied that Soviet missile power would make Kennedy keep his pledge. Khrushchev did not believe Kennedy would risk another possible nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union over Cuba.697 But Khrushchev turned down Castro’s request to keep Soviet troops in Cuba. “The presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba represents the sole good deterrent against every kind of military adventure,” Castro argued. “It is our opinion that Soviet military personnel located in Cuba are like the celebrated missiles. So long as they are there, American military circles are convinced that an attack on Cuba would inevitably lead to war with the Soviet Union, which is something they don’t want and fear.” Khrushchev wanted to withdraw Soviet military personnel from Cuba to ease U.S.-USSR tensions in the Caribbean.

Interestingly, Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman had recently pushed Khrushchev on Soviet troops in Cuba. On April 26, Harriman was in Moscow on another matter but took the occasion to raise the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba: “Cuba is creating much tension in the whole Caribbean area and if it is not important to the Soviets to have its troops in there why don’t the Soviets take them out.”698

Castro and Khrushchev also differed over Havana’s support for revolutionary movements in Latin America, according to historians Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali. Khrushchev advised Castro that it was not wise to press too hard in support of insurgencies, because the CIA still wanted to overthrow the Cuban revolution. Castro reiterated his belief that Cuba had “a revolutionary duty” to assist third-world insurgencies. Khrushchev assured Castro that there was a role for revolution in the Cold War. But he insisted the revolutionary struggle had to stop short of creating situations that could spin out of control, into nuclear war with the United States.699 In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the Kennedy Administration turned its attention to easing tensions with the USSR.

On June 10, 1963, President John Kennedy made a dramatic proposal to slow the nuclear arms race in a commencement address at the American University in Washington. He noted that the prospects for “general and complete disarmament” were not good. But he held out hope that “a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests” was possible. He said a nuclear test ban treaty “would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas.” Kennedy announced that U.S. diplomats were ready to negotiate a treaty to ban nuclear weapons testing. The United States would refrain from nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere “as long as other states do not do so.”

Khrushchev welcomed Kennedy’s offer to negotiate. When Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman returned to Moscow on July 15, however, Khrushchev balked at the U.S. insistence on on-site inspections. He called “inspections a form of espionage.” But negotiators for the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union did agree on a plan for a partial test ban treaty, without on-site inspections, on July 25. The treaty would prohibit nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere but allowed testing to continue underground.”700

Nonetheless, Kennedy faced an uphill battle for Senate ratification of the treaty. Historian Michael Beschloss writes, “The President was told that Congressional mail was running 15 to 1 against the treaty.” In a July 26 speech intended to mobilize political support, he declared, “For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control…” Said Kennedy: “[T]his treaty can be a step towards the reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement.”

Kennedy worked assiduously to win over opponents of the test ban treaty. “I regard the Chiefs as key to this thing,” Kennedy told Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, a Democrat from Montana. “If we don’t get the Chiefs just right, we can get blown.” When Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he stated that the Joint Chiefs could support the limited test ban treaty if it included safeguards. The Chiefs wanted a new series of underground tests and funding for the continued upgrade of warheads by U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. The Joint Chiefs also insisted on an assurance that the administration would resume atmospheric testing if the Soviets violated the treaty.

Kennedy gave the Joint Chiefs what they wanted, and he won their support. On September 24, 1963, the limited test ban treaty passed the Senate by a 80 to 19 vote on September 24, 1963. Deborah Shapely notes the partial test ban treaty was an important, but largely symbolic, step in easing Cold War tensions.701 By this time, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had a pressing need to continue atmospheric weapons testing. Both countries had completed the series of weapons tests they started in 1961.”702 Still, Cold War tensions seemed to ease for the moment. And the Kennedy Administration grappled with a leadership vacuum in the Cuban exile community.

The Cuban exile movement fell into disarray as the Kennedy Administration made the transition from Operation Mongoose to “autonomous operations.” The impact of the new covert policy was immediate for Cuban exile groups: They lost their CIA subsidies. Only Manuel Artime’s Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria (MRR) (Movement for the Recovery of the Revolution) and Manuel Ray’s Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE) (Cuban Revolutionary Junta) received U.S. arms and financial assistance for autonomous operations. And this assistance was top-secret.

Cuban exile action groups were also outraged that the Kennedy Administration cracked down on commando operations unauthorized by the CIA. Consejo Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Council) President Jose Miro Cardona went to Washington to protest the crackdown on Cuban exile commandos. When Miro met with Attorney General Kennedy on April 5, 1963, he pressed for proof that the Administration had a “plan for liberating Cuba.” Kennedy reassured him that the Administration was determined to topple the Cuban revolution, but downplayed the likelihood of direct U.S. intervention. Kennedy also rejected the CRC’s proposal for commando operations in Cuba.

Miro left his meeting with Kennedy demoralized. He felt that the Consejo was being upstaged by Alpha 66, and resigned as president of the CRC on April 10, 1963.703 Antonio Maceo replaced him. But the CRC’s free fall continued when the CIA cut off its subsidy. Member organizations began to quit the coalition, complaining of its ineffectiveness. With the disintegration of the Consejo, the exile community lacked what the CIA’s “Cuban Counterrevolutionary Handbook” called “a unity mechanism.”704

There were several unsuccessful efforts to unify Cuban exile groups. Former Bay of Pigs prisoner Enrique Ruiz Williams formed a “unity committee” with the backing of Attorney General Robert Kennedy. But neither Williams or nor his Ejército Liberación de Cuba (ELC) (Liberation Army of Cuba) had much of a popular following. According to CIA documents, Ruiz told other Cuban exiles that he had been chosen by Robert Kennedy “to lead new Cuban Republic.”

José “Pepin” Bosch, president of Bacardi Rum, financed a committee to select a single leader to represent Cuban exiles. Former Cuban President Carlos Prío Socarrás and Alonso Pujol, a Brigade 2506 veteran, promoted “a letter of integration,” which a number of prominent exiles signed.705 The Cuban exile community failed, however, to rally around a leader.706

In July and August 1963, former Nicaraguan strongman Luis Somoza was in Miami to rally the Cuban exile movement. In Miami, he met with Cuban exile leaders and offered them aid and arms and the use of bases in Nicaragua from which to launch attacks on Cuba. Among others, he met with Carlos Prío, Manuel Artime, Anotnio Varona, Antonio Veciana, and Carlos Marquez Sterling.

Somoza had come to a bitter conclusion after meeting with Robert Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. “The U.S. is not about to mount a large-scale movement or invasion against the island,” Somoza complained to a CIA officer. But he also vowed to “continue to work against Castro.” A CIA memorandum commented, “Somoza appears anxious to spearhead an anti-Castro movement with or without the support of the U.S. and appears to have gathered a token concurrence… from the Heads of State in Guatemala and Costa Rica and probably Salvador.”

Marquez Sterling, a presidential candidate in Cuba in 1958, and Carlos Prío met with Somoza several times to discuss efforts to unify the Cuban exile movement over summer 1963. Marquez Sterling told the FBI that Somoza briefed them on a meeting of Central American presidents in Costa Rica in March 1963. President Kenendy assured the Central American leaders that the United States was comitted to removing Castro from power. When Somoza’s Cuban action plan came up for discussion, Kennedy offered U.S. backing for the first phase of the plan: Up to 600 commandos would be trained to launch sabotage raids against Cuba from bases in Nicaragua. But Kennedy did not give a green light for the second phase, in which an “army” of Central American fighters would invade Cuba.

According to Marquez Sterling, Somoza explained, “President Kennedy was very strong in his statement to the Central American presidents that he wanted no fighting in Cuba as long as Russian troops were there because of the threat of thermo-nuclear war.” Marquez Sterling said “the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba… would be the sign for the beginning of military action in Cuba.” In a July 1963 meeting with Robert Kennedy, Somoza learned that Kennedy was moving forward with a plan similar to one discussed in Costa Rica. Kennedy told Somoza that he had chosen Manuel Artime to lead the Cuban exile invasion force, and pressed Somoza to rally the Cuban exile movement around Manuel Artime as “the chief of Cuban exiles.”

A September 1963 FBI report stated, “The Attorney General had a considerable interest in Artime.” CIA support for the Artime-led Cuban exile force was a compartmented operation, distinct from the CIA’s support of Artime’s “autonomous operation,” given the cryptonym AMWORLD.707 An anonymous CIA memorandum reported, “Artime predicated his planning on the assumption that the overthrow of Castro’s regime would be preceded by a long-and-hard war… commando teams; infil teams, and guerrillas… abductions, assassinations, targeted against G-2 informants, agents, officers, foreign communists to lift the morale of people inside Cuba.”

In private, Somoza was critical of Artime. He said Artime was “too young and too egotistical… [He] thinks more of himself than of the liberation of Cuba.” Somoza also took pot shots at Artime in meetings with Cuban exiles, calling him “a controversial figure…. Many Cubans would not accept his leadership.”

An October 1963 CIA memorandum reported that Somoza had endorsed Prío’s campaign to lead the Cuban exile community. The cable was based on the CIA’s debriefing of a top Prío aide, Orlando Puente Perez, who had just returned from a meeting with Somoza. “Somoza has decided to let Prío himself carry out the plan… Puente feels that, despite Prío’s indecisive character he has decided to spend the money needed for the job since he feels that this is his last opportunity to vindicate himself in the eyes of Cuban and United States nationals.”708

In September 1963, the CIA gave the CIA Station in Venezuela a heads-up about Carlos Prío’s plans to visit Caracas to build support for his leadership of the Cuban exile invasion force. The CIA cable stated, “HQS deprecates Prío’s role which liable give exile effort unsavory coloration and could furnish grist on Castro’s propaganda mills, esp if construed as explicit commitment re install Prío and what he stands for.”

But a unified invasion force of “several thousand” Cuban exiles never became a reality in Nicaragua. A CIA assessment found that the forces under Artime’s command in Nicaragua were unprepared for combat. On November 19, 1963, the CIA reported, “[T]he Artime operation is still far from reaching the point of being an effective military force.” There was no big battle-ready force in training in Nicaragua bases. Cuban exiles had only recently begun to infiltrate into Nicaragua, where they would undergo military training.

The plans for an invasion of Cuba scheduled for December 1963 never came together. A January 1964 FBI memorandum reported, “The Somoza plan for establishing a base of operations against Cuba never materialized and is now a part of the past.”709 Like Somoza, the Mafia stepped into the vacuum created when the CIA pulled back from the Cuban exile movement.

The Mafia increasingly supplied financial assistance and arms to Cuban exile action groups, whose CIA subsidies for paramilitary operations had been cut off. Paulino Sierra Martinez made a big splash when he arrived in Miami in 1963. Sierra, backed by gangsters with gambling interests in Las Vegas, met with Cuban exile groups to promote his group Junta de Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio (JGCE) (Junta of the Cuban Government in Exile). Sierra claimed his Mafia sponsors had $30 million for him to disperse to Cuban exile action groups.

The CIA took note of Sierra’s activities in Florida. “Sierra’s JGCE offered individual exiles and leaders of small groups a program under which Cubans would bring about the liberation of Cuba by their own efforts,” a CIA memorandum stated. “A movement that boasted ample financial backing without being tied to the apron string of U.S. policy must have seemed particularly appealing to exiles after the demise of the CRC, which had long been regarded as Washington controlled.”

Sierra’s backers were candid about their motives. In return for funding Cuban exile commandos, the gangsters expected support for the reestablishment of the Mafia’s gambling colony in post-Castro Cuba. According to a CIA report, “Sierra reportedly told Miguel León, a colleague of Manuel Artime Busea, that he represented U.S. gambling interests which were prepared to finance a united liberation movement.” The report added, “[I]n return Sierra’s backers would ask for gambling concessions once the Castro regime was overthrown.”

According to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Attorney General Kennedy took “a personal interest” in Sierra’s activities in Miami. Sierra was unable to unify the Cuban exile movement around the JGCE. But he gained credibility after he provided funds for arms to Alpha 66, Comandos L, Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperación Revolucionaria (MIRR) (Insurrectional Movement for the Recovery of the Revolution), a faction of the November 30th Movement, Second National Front of Escambray, and Unidad Revolucionario (UR) (Revolutionary Unity).710

Sierra funded air operations in Cuba by Orlando Bosch’s MIRR in August and September 1963. A CIA cable reported that Sierra provided “the initial funds” for a MIRR air raid on the Cunagua sugar mill in Camaguey province on August 15. As we have seen, the CIA had an “operational interest” in Bosch in 1962. Bill Johnson, a North American pilot for Bosch, informed the FBI that Roberto “Chiri” Mendoza also helped finance MIRR’s bombing raid in Cunagua. Mendoza, a business associate of Batista and Santo Trafficante, was a former owner of the Havana Hilton casino. He was also linked to the Sans Souci nightclub and casino.

According to the FBI, MIRR flew a second mission over Camaguey on September 7, attacking the Jaronu sugar mill. An FBI report stated, “Four of these bombs exploded and… caused great damage to the sugar mill.” In September, the CIA learned that MIRR had obtained aircraft for future attacks in Cuba. “Two P-51 aircraft are being sold for the total sum of 16,000 dollars to Bill Johnson by Aero Enterprises, Inc. of LaPorte, Indiana,” stated a CIA cable. “Bill Johnson has napalm loaded drop tanks which he will attach in LaPorte.”711

The Mafia took a special interest in blowing up oil refineries near Havana. On June 15, 1963, U.S. Customs agents broke up a plan to bomb the Shell Oil refinery, seizing a twin-engine Beechcraft airplane, explosives, and bombs at an abandoned airport near Miami. Michael McLaney, who bought the Hotel Nacional from Lansky’s allies in the Cleveland Syndicate in 1958, supplied the airplane and the money for the bombing mission. An FBI memorandum stated, “MM T-1 was of the opinion that McLaney was investing in the raid in order to earn some credit for future business operations in Cuba should the Castro regime be overthrown.” McLaney was a Mafia-linked businessman and sports gambler from New Orleans.

Mafia gambler Sam Benton organized the botched plan to bomb the Shell Oil refinery. Evelio Alpizar Pérez told the FBI, “Benton stated that he wanted the plane to carry two 300-pound napalm bombs and six 100-pound demolition bombs.” Benton, who worked for McLaney at the Hotel Nacional, tried unsuccessfully to recruit Alpizar for the Shell operation. McLaney described Benton’s role: “He lined up actions, arranged to fund and supply them, and took a percentage off the top.”

Benton had an unsavory reputation in Florida. An FBI report stated, “MM T-3… advised that Sam Benton has been involved… with Cuban revolutionary groups in plans to sink yachts to obtain insurance, arms deals, and collection of funds for personal use.”712 On July 31, the FBI raided a farmhouse in Lacombe, Louisiana, near Lake Ponchartrain connected to another McLaney-sponsored plot to bomb targets in Cuba. The FBI seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and twenty bomb casings. The farm belonged to McLaney’s brother William, a casino worker in Havana in the 1950s. Rich Lauchli, a Collinsville, Illinois, gun dealer, was tied to the explosives found in the farmhouse in Lacombe.

The Mafia used Lauchli, a cofounder of the ultra-right Minutemen, to supply arms and munitions to Cuban-exile commando groups. According to the FBI, Lauchli was introduced to “different Cuban exile leaders in Miami” by soldiers of fortune Frank Fiorini and Gerry Patrick Hemming. In return, Sierra provided funds for Hemming’s Interpen, which had a training camp for Cuban commandos outside of New Orleans.713

Meanwhile, Santo Trafficante was well known among Cuban exile action groups as a one-stop source for weapons. A “Miami source” told the FBI, “Any anti-Castro group in the Miami area could obtain arms and ammunition from the ‘Mafia’ through Trafficante and that Trafficante would be willing to finance such purchases if he were given evidence groups [were] actually taking some action against Castro.” In February 1963, the CIA noted that Trafficante “reportedly gave aid for arms and ammunition to Serafín’s Movimiento Acción Patriótica for commando raids in Cuba.”714 Evelio Duque’s Ejército Cubano Anticommunista (ECA) (Cuban Anticommunist Army) met with an unnamed Trafficante representative to negotiate an arms deal a few months later. A source told the FBI, “Duque wanted to obtain rockets, high explosives, and detonators for use in raids against Cuba,” the source said. “Duque allegedly received $25,000.00 from Carlos Prío for this purpose.”

Bartone and Duque’s emissary met again on June 25. FBI source MM T-1 reported that Bartone said he would make arrangements for the arms sale “with [Carlos] Prío and his brother Paco.” A CIA “Information File” on Duque described a July 1963 ECA military plan “to take the keys on northern coast of Las Villas province.” It added “The true purpose of the mission… was to embarrass the USA and force it into direct action against Cuba.” Duque may also have been receiving financial assistance from Batista for his operation in Las Villas. A July 13 CIA report stated, “Duque’s group appeared to have ample financial aid which was suspected of coming from Fulgencio Batista.”

Duque had a prior operational link to the Agency. A CIA trace file on Duque stated, “A POA [Provisional Operational Authorization] was granted Duque in Aug 61…” The POA was canceled in May 1962.715 Meanwhile, Antonio Varona traveled to Chicago, where he met with Sam Giancana, Murray Humphreys, and other leaders of the Chicago Outfit in July 1963. A confidential CIA informant said that “four underworld figures made a contribution of $200,000 to him [Varona].”716

Two months later the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) (Revolutionary Student Directorate) also made a trek to Chicago. According to a CIA report, two DRE members gave Richard Cain a “purchasing list” of weapons. Cain told the CIA’s Domestic Contact office (OO/C) in Chicago that the DRE wanted two small speedboats, radar, 40-millimeter and 20-millimeter cannons, 50 caliber machine guns, 9-millimeter submachine guns, 45-caliber pistols, and bazookas. The DRE was willing to pay up to $25,000 for the weapons.

According to an unsigned CIA memorandum, Cain was instructed to “get out of the picture as soon as possible, and to make no commitment. Apparently the DRE is an MOB-controlled organization which, at times, seems to act independently of its monitor.” A handwritten note in the margin exclaimed “Amen!” The DRE also cultivated Bacardi Rum as a financial sugar daddy. An FBI report stated, “MM T-1, who is in regular contact Cuban exiles at Miami, Florida, active in revolutionary activities, advised that Luis Bacardi of the Bacardi Rum manufacturing family, has been financing some activities of the DRE.” JMWAVE, the Miami CIA Station, reported that the DRE was offering a $10 million reward for Castro’s assassination.

“Nov 63 issue See magazine… contains wanted poster of Fidel Castro on front cover,” JMWAVE reported. “Wanted poster is part of a story… gist of which is DRE offers 10 million dollars reward ‘to person or persons who with help of the DRE will assassinate Fidel Castro.’” JMWAVE Chief Theodore Shackley described the CIA’s relationship with the DRE to the FBI. A Bureau report stated, “His agency maintained an interest in the propaganda, political and intelligence activities of DRE, but did not sponsor and had no interest in the paramilitary operations of the DRE and was interested in preventing the DRE from executing any paramilitary operations.”717 The Mafia’s growing involvement in the Cuban exile movement made it more difficult for the Kennedy Administration to control Cuban exile commando raids and manage U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

With the November 1964 presidential elections looming over the political horizon, President Kennedy was eager to take visible action against the Cuban revolution.718 Kennedy was not in political trouble. According to Gallup public opinion polling, Kennedy had a double-digit advantage over likely Republican presidential challengers. But he wanted to position himself better on Cuba. In 1960, he had criticized the Eisenhower Administration for doing too little, too late in Cuba. In 1964, he did not want to be vulnerable to similar charges from the Republicans.

Former Vice President Richard Nixon had already signaled that he would attack Kennedy’s policy in Cuba. Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona also planned to play up Cuba as an example of Kennedy’s “outmoded” and “weak-kneed” foreign policy.719 In June 1963, President Kennedy pressed the CIA to get its Cuban exile sabotage campaign up and running as soon as possible. The CIA’s new covert action plan, Operation AMLILAC, targeted Cuba’s economic infrastructure. A June 19 memorandum for the Standing Group asserted that the goal was not to foment an uprising but “to nourish a spirit of resistance and dissatisfaction which could lead to significant defections and other byproducts of unrest.”720

The first of the AMLILAC raids took place in the darkness of August 17–18. A nine-member team, using 75-millimeter recoilless rifles and 81-millimeter mortars, attacked oil storage facilities near the port of Casilda, not far from Trinidad on Cuba’s south coast. Another nine-member team shot up a sulfuric acid plant in Santa Lucia on Cuba’s north coast on the night of August 18–19. The CIA teams used recoilless rifles and 3.5-inch rocket launchers in the hit-and-run raid in Santa Lucia.

CIA-trained Cuban exile raiders struck again on September 30-October 1 in Oriente. They destroyed a lumber mill in Marabí. An Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) sank a large floating crane in the harbor of La Isabela de Sagua on Cuba’s north coast on October 21-22. UDT swimmers attached a limpet to a P-6 patrol boat at a Cuban naval base on the Isle of Pines, off Cuba’s south coast on December 23. Three Cuban sailors were killed and eighteen others injured.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor analyzed the CIA operations. “All were executed by Cubans landing in small craft launched from a mother ship,” Taylor wrote in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. “[The] operations [were] conducted in a manner designed to ensure nonattributability to the United States.” The motherships left from secret JMWAVE bases in the Florida Keys.721 JMWAVE’s standard operating procedure was to allow exile action groups like Alpha 66 to take credit for CIA-controlled operations. But in this case the CIA created a fictional exile action group Comandos Mambises, named after the nineteenth-century Cuban independence fighters, to claim responsibility for the attacks.

Comandos Mambises’s cover as a front for the CIA was blown when Clemente Inclán Werner and two other CIA-trained Cubans were captured off the coast of Pinar del Río. In an interview broadcast on Cuban television, Inclán said that his group was trained at a camp near New Orleans by the CIA. He said the raids were launched off the coast of Cuba from a CIA mothership named Rex.722

In Washington, Attorney General Kennedy moved to gain access to Mafia arms dealer Dominick Bartone’s contacts to promote “boom and bang” in Cuba. At the request of Special Assistant to the Attorney General William Kenney, Justine F. Gleichauf, head of the CIA’s Domestic Contact office in Miami, interviewed Bartone. Gleichauf reported that Bartone was willing to cooperate with U.S. authorities. Bartone’s lawyers were appealing his conviction for smuggling airplanes to the Dominican Republic in August 1959.

Gleichauf concluded that Bartone had “little, if any potential” for use by the CIA, because his legal status did not permit him to travel outside the United States. “However, he does have access to some rather unusual requests from abroad for arms and he has promised to keep us advised as they develop.”723 From Miami Beach, President Kennedy would turn up the rhetorical heat on Cuba. In a speech to the Interamerican Press Association in November 1963, Kennedy accused Fidel Castro of betraying the original ideals of the Cuban revolution.