Waldemar Heckel
There was no love lost amongst the Successors of Alexander the Great. Our sources depict them as hungry for power, distrustful and undeserving of trust. Arrian, in his Events after Alexander (1.5), says of Perdikkas that he was ‘held in suspicion by all and at the same time he himself was suspicious’ (Περδίκκας ὕποπτος ἐς πάντας ἦν καὶ αὑτὸς ὑπώπτευεν). And Plutarch (Eumenes 3.5) comments that Antigonos, when he was called to account, ‘paid no attention to the written instructions of Perdikkas, since he already had lofty ambitions and was scornful of everyone’ (Ἀντίγονος μὲν οὖν οὐ προσέσχε τοῖς γραφεῖσιν ὑπὸ Περδίκκου, μετέωρος ὢν ἤδη καὶ Περιφρονῶν ἁπάντων). These are just two examples from biographical and historical accounts, which are rife with what we might call ‘the language of distrust’. Some of this is clearly bias, written after the chaos of the late fourth century had coalesced into the hellenistic Kingdoms; some of it comes from the propaganda wars that were fought as vigorously with the pen as those of Kretopolis and Gabiene were fought with the sarissa and sword. But it seems clear that distrust, with its concomitant conspiracies and checks and balances, was an important – if not the most important – feature of the politics of the Diadochoi. This essay provides an introduction – it does not claim to be exhaustive – to the origins and the manifestations of this distrust and its role in the Successors’ failure.
Justin in Book 13 of his epitome of Trogus’ Philippic History gives two seemingly contradictory pictures of the marshals in Babylon in June 323 and their struggle for power. First, he writes:
But Alexander’s friends were justified in having their eyes set on the throne since their qualities and the respect they enjoyed were such that one might have taken each one of them for a king, all of them possessing handsome features, a fine physique and great powers of body and mind alike – so much so that a stranger would have supposed that they had been selected not from one people only but from all the world. For never before that time did Macedonia, or indeed any other nation, produce so rich a crop of brilliant men, men who had been picked out with such care, first by Philip and then by Alexander, that they seemed chosen less as comrades-in-arms than as successors to the throne. Little wonder then that the world was conquered by officers of this mettle, when the army of Macedon was under the direction of so many men who were kings rather than generals. Such men would never have met their match had they not clashed amongst themselves, and the province of Macedonia would have produced many Alexanders if Fortune had not armed them to destroy each other by making them equals in merit.1
Sed nec amici Alexandri frustra regnum spectabant. Nam eius virtutis ac venerationis erant, ut singulos reges putares; quippe ea formae pulchritudo et proceritas corporis et virium ac sapientiae magnitudo in omnibus fuit, ut qui eos ignoraret, non ex una gente, sed ex toto terrarum orbe electos iudicaret. Neque enim umquam ante Macedonia vel ulla gens alia tam clarorum virorum proventu floruit, quos primo Philippus, mox Alexander tanta cura legerat, ut non tam ad societatem belli quam in successionem regni electi viderentur. Quis igitur miretur talibus ministris orbem terrarum victum, cum exercitus Macedonum tot non ducibus, sed regibus regeretur? Qui numquam sibi repperissent pares, si non inter se concurrissent, multosque Macedonia provincia Alexandros habuisset, nisi Fortuna eos aemulatione virtutis in perniciem mutuam armasset.
(Justin 13.1.10-15)
Trogus’ sentiments are echoed by many modern writers, who see Alexander’s Successors as a pride of lions, too powerful and ambitious for their own good. And there is a certain amount of truth in this interpretation.2 But soon afterwards, Justin (or rather Trogus) puts the following argument into Ptolemy’s mouth. Rejecting the kingship of Arrhidaios, who would need a guardian, he says:
Better to choose from those who stood close to their late king in personal qualities, who were the governors of provinces, who were entrusted with military campaigns – rather that than be subjected to the domination of unworthy men while the king had but nominal power.
melius esse ex his legi, qui prae virtute regi suo proximi fuerint, qui provincias regant, quibus bella mandentur, quam sub persona regis indignorum imperio subiciantur.3
Both views make a certain amount of sense, if we remember that the former represents an evaluation based on hindsight, and the latter preserves the jealous view of one of those who actually competed for power. In fact, it is unclear from Justin’s second passage just whom Ptolemy had in mind.
It is a commonplace that Alexander neglected his responsibilities by not naming an heir. But he was guilty of more than simple neglect. He had created an environment of distrust: rather than making his generals too powerful to accept central authority, he made them (as a whole) too weak – despite their great ambition and talents – to allow any of them to assume control of affairs in the absence of such central authority. So ingrained had the politics of distrust become that the Successors themselves created political structures that employed checks and balances, which because they were intended to limit the aspirations of the individual served only to weaken and destabilize the empire.
I
In the autumn of 330 Alexander the Great conducted a cabinet-shuffle, Macedonian style, by removing from office (and from the land of the living) his senior general Parmenion, together with that general’s son, Philotas, and Alexander the Lynkestian, whose career had been suspended for over three years.4 When it came to replacing Philotas with a new commander of the Companion Cavalry, arguably the most important of his military posts, Alexander chose to split the command in two, giving half to the man who had saved his life at the Granicus, Kleitos the Black, and the other half to his dearest personal friend, Hephaistion. The appointments balanced merit and nepotism, just as they placed an outspoken critic of Alexander’s orientalism and autocratic tendencies in opposition to the king’s most accomplished ‘yes man’ – some would say his lover. The last point has no part in this paper – except perhaps to show the range of qualifications for political and military office in the Macedonian state and army – but the episode itself is instructive, as Arrian intended it to be. Alexander divided the command in two:
because he would not have wished one man, not even his dearest friend, to command so many cavalrymen …
ὅτι οὐδὲ φίλτατον ἂν ἠβούλετο ἕνα τοσούτων ἱππέων … ἐξηγεῖσθαι
(3. 27. 4)
It was not the first time that the king had replaced a single powerful individual with two lesser men: after the flight of Harpalos to the Megarid in 333, Alexander divided the treasurer’s responsibilities between Koiranos and Philoxenos.5 The Aegean fleet, when it was reconstituted in 333/2, balanced Hegelochos, an adherent of the Attalos–Parmenion group, with Amphoteros, the brother of Krateros, and presumably a loyal supporter of the king.6 But, to return to the Companion Cavalry, it is worth noting that after Kleitos’ death in 328, the unit was further divided into several hipparchies, of which Hephaistion’s was but one – this one retained some honorific status although, perhaps significantly, it was separate from the agēma or ilē basilikē, which was deployed in the king’s immediate vicinity.
When it came to administrative positions, Alexander was equally cautious: in Egypt, four officials administered the satrapy, including two native Egyptians, Petisis and Doloaspis, whereas elsewhere a single governor was thought to suffice.7
Alexander employed other means of limiting the powers of his commanders and administrators. Instead of a division of power, he sometimes placed in adjacent territories men who might not share the same political goals. Thus we may explain the curious relationship between Antipatros in Macedonia and Memnon, the stratēgos of Thrace. We know that the latter rebelled against Antipatros in 331, and that Antipatros was forced to come to terms with him in order to deal with the war of Agis III in the south.8 Memnon not only remained in office, but he later brought reinforcements to the east, fearing no reprisals from Alexander.9 It appears that Alexander was far from displeased with Memnon, whom he may very well have installed as stratēgos with a view to keeping the powerful viceroy in check.10 It is noteworthy that the Thracian stratēgia had been taken from Antipatros’ son-in-law, Alexandros Lynkestes, when the king departed for Asia. The Lynkestian had no attested command at the beginning of the campaign, but when he was later appointed hipparch of the Thessalian cavalry, he served under Parmenion. Although we have no clear indication that Parmenion and Antipatros were at odds with one another, it is certain that the Parmenion–Attalos group in 336 had different political goals from those of Antipatros and the Lynkestians. And, despite what has been said about Alexander’s desire to weaken the ‘stranglehold’ that Parmenion and his adherents had on military commands,11 it is clear that in the first years of the campaign Alexander used Parmenion as a counter-weight to the powerful Antipatrid–Antigonid group.
Early in the campaign, satrapies were assigned to men of stature, often powerful but ageing adherents of Macedon’s most potent factions. Hence Kalas son of Harpalos, who was probably a kinsman of the unstable treasurer and of Philip II’s Elimiot wife, Phila, was entrusted with Hellespontine Phrygia, Antigonos the One-Eyed received Greater Phrygia. To Nearchos, one of the King’s hetairoi and a naturalized Makedon, went Lykia; and Balakros son of Nikanor (a son-in-law of Antipatros) was detached from the group of Somatophylakes to become satrap of Kilikia.12 In fact, the bulk of Asia Minor and Alexander’s lines of communications were in the hands of Macedonian aristocrats who could, theoretically, affect the success or failure of the young king’s campaigns.13 Publicly Alexander was forced to display his trust in individuals who, precisely because of their personal power and that of their factions, were the cause of secret distrust, probably even acute anxiety.
As the campaign progressed, the appointment of members of the Old Guard became less important. Success had given Alexander his own claims to personal authority, just as later the Successors would base their claims to kingship on military victory. Furthermore, the very victories that ensured the king’s reputation had witnessed casualties amongst the ranks of the established aristocracy and created vacancies for Alexander’s New Men, whose upward mobility had been blocked by the entrenched aristocracy. The king must have attended numerous military funerals, but the tears he shed were often of doubtful sincerity.
Soon it became possible to make appointments of a different kind. Since the invader had by now moved into the heartland of the Persian Empire, native satraps were retained: Aboulites in Sousiana (Curt. 5.2.16–17), Mazaios in Babylonia (Curt. 5.1.43–4), Amminapes (initially) in Parthia (Arr. 3.22.1; Curt. 6.4.25, ‘Manapis’), Satibarzanes in Areia (Arr. 3.25.1), Proexes the Persian in the Caucasus (Arr. 3.28.4), and Artabazos in Bactria and Sogdiana (Curt. 8.1.19; 7.5.1; cf. 7.11.29). But, again, Alexander showed himself reluctant to trust his appointees, choosing to attach to them garrison commanders (φρούραρχοι), generals of occupying forces (στρατηγοί) and sub-rulers (ὕπαρχοι), clearly intended to serve as a check on the very men to whom they were in theory subordinated. It could be argued that Alexander did the same when he appointed a Macedonian satrap in Sardis,14 but the point is surely that, if Alexander had trusted native administrators, he might also have appointed native tax-collectors, garrison commanders and generals. The retention of Tiridates, the Persian treasurer in Persepolis (indeed, the man who betrayed the city to Alexander),15 represents an attempt to give further authority to natives, but this was apparently only a temporary measure. Undoubtedly, the minor officials were natives, but the men who gave the military orders and the troops who followed them were Greco-Macedonians.
Where local potentates would not do, new administrators were found – often Greek civilians rather than Macedonian officers. It is perhaps going too far to call them ‘harmless nonentities’16 but the pattern was clear before the king’s death in Babylon. Alexander resorted to the weakening of certain positions through collegiality and the use of lieutenants (or rather ‘watch-dogs’) to keep higher officials in check; later on there was a noticeable reluctance to appoint men of the aristocracy and officer class to administrative posts.17
Finally, we must add an intangible element, which is nevertheless well documented. Many of Alexander’s commanders simply did not like each other. The most famous example is, of course, the rivalry between Hephaistion and Krateros. This is particularly instructive because both were especially favoured by the king, though one was a personal friend (φιλαλέξανδρος) and the other a steadfast supporter of the kingly office (φιλοβασιλεύς);18 loyalty to the person of the king did not, however, entail unquestioning support for his policies, most notably Alexander’s orientalism. This issue would continue to divide the marshals in the final years of the conquest and in the early Diadochic period, but the matter of personal likes and dislikes cannot be put aside. There is no point in itemizing who disliked whom. It is sufficient to note that there were many who had ‘long hated Philotas’ (τοὺς πάλαι μισοῦντας αὐτόν, Plut. Alex. 49.8; cf. Curt. 6.8.22: vicit bonitatem tuam, rex, inimicorum meorum acerbitas), even more who quarreled with the odious Hephaistion,19 and after the latter’s death his place was taken by Perdikkas. One of the few who co-operated well with Hephaistion, he was predictably unloved by the army in general and many of the marshals in particular. Justin comments in connection with the Egyptian campaign (13.8.2):
but what harmed Perdikkas more than the strength of his enemy was the loathing he incurred by his arrogance; this won the hatred even of his allies, who deserted in droves to Antipater.
Sed Perdiccae plus odium adrogantiae quam vires hostium nocebat, quam exosi etiam socii ad Antipatrum gregatim profugiebant.
Leonnatos, Peithon, Seleukos and Aristonous, who supported Perdikkas in the early stages, may have been more favourably disposed to him, but it is more likely that they (as opposed to others, like Krateros, Meleagros, Antigonos, Antipatros) were somewhat more sympathetic to the ‘orientalising’ policy, which they would now have to decide whether to continue or abandon. In short, for the purposes of this discussion it suffices to say that much of the enmity amongst the Successors was deep rooted. Their actions thus reflected how they regarded one another, and to what extent they supported a more progressive or a conservative approach to the empire.
II
All this set the stage for the disastrous events of 323, where equality in both competence and authority led to the disintegration of the newly-won empire. Ironically, the very talent, the military potential and the large pool of candidates for supreme office made the survival of the empire virtually impossible; for the Successors deviated from Alexander’s policies in only one important respect – the appointment of satraps from the very top of the officer class. But because Alexander had been careful to keep his officers on a reasonably even footing, the succession struggle was the result of the collapse of the existing hierarchy, the lack of a clear chain of command. Furthermore there was a failure to respect tradition and authority. Distrust (ὑποψία) was the disease that killed Alexander’s empire.
I have mentioned the ‘failure to respect tradition’, and this may seem odd when we talk about the power-struggle that followed Alexander’s death. It is precisely the fact that Macedon had no traditional mechanism to deal with the problem of continuity of administration within the empire that every attempted solution was in fact an ad hoc arrangement. Hence we are well advised to resist the old German discussions of Staatsrecht, with their rigid definitions of offices that proved as ephemeral as the individuals who held them. The varied, but interchangeable, terminology makes it clear that the positions occupied by the marshals after Alexander’s death were those required by the circumstances rather than fixed offices whose previous occupants could be identified and whose functions delineated on the basis of precedent. Prostatēs, epimelētēs and epitropos all designated the officer who exercised authority in the name of the king. Had the Successors been content – or rather had it been possible for the Successors to be content – with entrusting such power to a single individual, then the chances of survival for Alexander’s empire might have been different. But ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’, and the political arrangements of the years 323 to 320 resulted in a most unpleasant brew. The most useful tradition, which continued to exist but which could not be transferred to, or superimposed upon, the new empire, was the Macedonian respect for a strong monarchy.20 The political hierarchy, so essential to maintaining power, had been eroded by Alexander himself, through a combination of policy and neglect. Without the top of the pyramid the lower offices and institutions could not find place or function. The Macedonian system had been one of expanding lower levels. And one of the levels directly below the king was occupied by the hetairoi, the king’s ‘friends’, who despite their title were subordinates of the king and rarely true friends of one another.
The language of distrust
The sources – Arrian’s Events after Alexander, Diodoros (Books 18–20) and Plutarch’s Eumenes – are rich in the ‘language of distrust’. For the sake of example, I list some passages from these works:
1. Arr. Succ. 1.4–5: ἀναιρεῖ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ Μελέαγρον. ἐξ ὧν Περδίκκας ὕποπτος ἐς πάντας ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπώπτευεν. ὅμως ἐς σατραπείας ἀνειπεῖν οὓς ὑπώπτευεν … (‘Not much later he killed Meleagros as well. As a result Perdikkas was suspected by all and was himself suspicious. Nevertheless, he appointed to satrapies those whom he distrusted … ’)
2. Diod. 18.4.7: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ Μελέαγρον ἐν τῇ στάσει καὶ πρεσβείᾳ προδότην γεγενημένον, ἐπιλαβόμενος οἰκείας διαβολῆς καὶ καταγορίας, ὡς ἐπιβουλὴν κατ’ αὐτοῦ πεποιημένον ἐκόλασε [sc. Περδίκκας]. (‘Next he [Perdikkas] also punished Meleagros, who had been a traitor during the strife and on his embassy, using as a pretext a personal quarrel and the accusation that Meleagros had devised a plot against him.’)
3. Diod. 18.7.5: ὁ δὲ Περδίκκας ὑφορώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολήν … (Perdikkas suspects the designs of Peithon in the Upper Satrapies)
4. Diod. 18.29.1: Περδίκκας γὰρ ὑφορώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν αὔξησιν (Perdikkas’ suspicions concerning the growth of Ptolemy’s power)
5. Arr. Succ. 1.27: ὑποπτεύεται Εὐμένει Νεοπτόλεμος (Neoptolemos suspected by Eumenes)
6. Plut. Eum. 5.4: Νεοπτόλεμος δὲ βουλεύων μὲν ἐπ’ Εὐμένει προδοσίαν οὐκ ἔλαθε … (‘Neoptolemos planned to betray Eumenes but did not go undetected … ’)
7. Arr. Succ. 1.20: Περδίκκας δὲ Ἀντιγονῳ ἐπιβουλεύων εἰς δικαστήριον ἐκαλέι. ὁ δὲ εἰδὼς ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι οὔτε ὑπήκουσε καὶ εἰς ἔχθραν ἀλλήλους κατέστησαν (‘Perdikkas, plotting against Antigonos, summoned him to stand trial. But he, knowing that he was the object of a plot, did not obey and they became enemies of one another.’)
8. Arr. Succ. 1.24: Ἀντίγονος δὲ ἐς Μακεδονίαν παρὰ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Κρατερὸν ἔφυγε, καὶ τὴν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπιβουλήν, ἣν Περδίκκας ἐβούλευε, διηγήσατο (‘Antigonos fled to Macedonia, joining Antipatros and Krateros, and he detailed the plot against himself, which Perdikkas devised.’)
9. Diod. 18.25.4: [ἔδοξεν] πρεσβεύειν δὲ καὶ πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον περὶ κοινο- πραγίας, ὄντα τοῦ μὲν Περδίκκου παντελῶς ἀλλότριον, ἑαυτοῖς δὲ φίλον, κοινῇ δὲ ἐπιβουλευόμενον. (‘It was decided to send envoys to Ptolemy as well for the sake of making a pact to cooperate; for Ptolemy was completely estranged from Perdikkas and friendly to them, and like them the object of Perdikkas’ plots.’)
Words that indicate suspicion and plotting are particularly common in both Arrian and Diodoros;21 similarly, the verb προσποιεῖσθαι (‘to pretend’ to do something) is found frequently in Diodorus, with eleven examples in Books 18–20 alone. Another common element in the history of the Successors is the struggle between those individuals who work in concert (though not necessarily for the common good – that is, for the integrity of the empire) and those who strive for private gain. Hence we find the words κοινοπραγία and κοινοπραγεῖν and their opposites ἰδιοπραγία and ἰδιοπραγεῖν occurring with a certain regularity. In all of Diodorus, ἰδιο-πραγία occurs only once: not surprisingly, in Book 18.22 And ἰδιοπραγεῖν appears seven times, all in Book 18.23 Κοινοπραγία occurs seventeen times, of which 10 are in 18–20, but the eight occurrences of κοινοπραγεῖν are, again, all in 18–20.24 What is important is that words that we might expect to find in this connection are frequent in other authors who describe the period. In Arrian’s Events after Alexander, we find, in addition to hypopsia and hypopteuein, epiboulē / epiboulein and hyponoia, and there are variations on this language in Plutarch’s Lives, especially in his Eumenes.
We might add other examples, where the phrasing makes clear that there were apprehensions concerning the ambitions of others. Again, I list only a few:
1. Justin 13.5.15 says that Antipater was joyful at the death of Leonnatos, because he had at one and the same time rid himself of a rival and augmented his forces. (Antipater…morte Leonnati laetatus est; quippe et aemulum sublatum et vires eius accessisse sibi gratulabatur.) This finds an interesting parallel in Arr. Succ. 1.9, where Leonnatos dies fighting while ‘pretending’ to give aid to Antipatros (ἀλλὰ πίπτει καὶ Λεόννατος ἐπιβοηθεῖν δοκῶν Ἀντιπάτρῳ).
2. Perdikkas suspects Peithon’s designs in the upper satrapies and orders the men to execute the Greek mercenaries, in order that Peithon might not spare them and use them against him.
3. Ptolemy forms an alliance with Antipatros because he knows that Perdikkas will attack him and attempt to wrest Egypt from him. Nevertheless, he also eliminates the hyparchos, Kleomenes of Naukratis, a known Perdikkas supporter.
A system of ‘checks and balances’
In Babylon in June/July 323, the vying factions resorted eventually to what R.M. Errington termed the ‘compromise solution’,25 which saw Arrhidaios accepted as king (he would now be known as Philip III), with provision made for the possibility that Rhoxane might bear a son, who would then become joint-king, symbasileus. To satisfy those who were suspicious of Perdikkas’ designs, Krateros was recognized as the guardian (prostatēs) of Philip Arrhidaios, though his power was limited – indeed, threatened – by Perdikkas’ control of the Royal Army. The chiliarchos was subordinate to the prostatēs,26 but the latter was absent and the former became, de facto, the strongman in Babylon, at least as soon as he had eliminated Krateros’ supporter, Meleagros. This man had been appointed Perdikkas’ hyparchos (his lieutenant, or tertius dux as Curtius calls him). But the aim of this sharing of power was not better government but rather the limiting of the office-holders’ ambitions. Antipatros, who had ruled Macedon and Greece in Alexander’s absence, was not brought under the authority of the crown: instead the split, which had developed in Alexander’s lifetime, between Macedonia and the Asiatic portion of the empire, was institutionalized. This was the very problem Alexander had attempted to address when he summoned the regent to Babylon and sent Krateros to Macedonia as his replacement. It is significant that in 321 (or 320: I do not wish to go into the vexed question of chronology), when Antipatros wedded his daughter Phila to Krateros, he ‘prepared for his [sc. Krateros’] return to Asia’ (Diod. 18.18.7). Clearly, Krateros’ place was with the king, and the king’s place was in Asia.27 And it is almost certainly the same thinking that induced Antipatros to leave both kings (Philip III and Alexander IV) in Asia with Antigonos, when he himself prepared to return to Europe after the settlement at Triparadeisos. That he was later apprised, by Kassandros, of the folly of such a move is beside the point. As long as Antipatros felt that the eastern empire could be administered through officials in Asia, there was no room in Europe for the kings, or for their guardian, whether that man was Krateros, Perdikkas or some other of Alexander’s former marshals.
Now all this is well known and I do not wish to restate the terms of the settlement of 323. What is less obvious, however, is how the terms of Triparadeisos heightened the distrust amongst the marshals and thus paralysed the empire. Richard Billows, in his influential study of Antigonos,28 presents a rather positive view of Monophthalmos’ status and of his relations with Antipatros. Antigonos is seen as Antipatros’ putative successor – his possession of the ‘Kings’ is regarded as a sign that he would become the epitropos or guardian in the event of Antipatros’ death. And the stratēgia – which he exercised in Asia (i.e., Asia Minor) for the purpose of waging war on Eumenes – is regarded not as a temporary post but as a permanent one.29 And, as a final way of confirming the shared rule of the empire by these two grizzled veterans, the marriage of Phila (Krateros’ widow) to Antigonos’ son Demetrios appears as a confirmation of Monophthalmos’ power and importance.
In fact, nothing is farther from the truth. Antipatros was indeed reluctant to bring the kings back to Macedon, where he had ruled unobstructed for almost fifteen years, but he was careful to limit Antigonos’ power by establishing in crucial satrapies individuals whom he felt he could trust. Arrhidaios, a former (temporary) guardian of the kings, was installed in Hellespontine Phrygia; White Kleitos, who had defected to Antipatros and Krateros, received Lydia, from which Antigonos’ supporter Menandros had been ousted;30 and Philoxenos, who appears to have won Antipatros’ favour by making no effort to block his path towards Syria, was reinstated,31 thus driving the former satrap, Philotas, into Antigonos’ arms.32 Together these three satraps boxed in Monophthalmos in Asia Minor. The kings themselves received Sōmatophylakes, four for Philip Arrhidaios and three for Alexander IV, but only one can be considered a possible adherent ofAntigonos – that is, if Ptolemaios son of Ptolemaios can be identified with Polemaios, the nephew of Antigonos.33
Antipatros’ distrust of Antigonos is clear from the appointment of Kassandros as the latter’s chiliarch of the cavalry. Arrian (Succ. 1.38) mentions the appointment, but Diodoros’ comments (18.39.7) are unequivocal: ‘he (Antipatros) attached his son Kassandros to Antigonos as chiliarch, so that he [Antigonos] would not be able to pursue his own goals undetected’ (παρέζευξε δὲ τῷ Ἀντιγόνῳ χιλίαρχον τὸν υἱὸν Κάσανδρον, ὅπως μὴ δύνηται διαλαθεῖν ἰδιοπραγῶν). And, indeed, before Antipatros left Asia he was already rejoined by Kassandros, who advised his father to remove the kings from Antigonos’ care and treat him with suspicion (Ἀντίγονον δι’ ὑπονοίας ἔχειν).34
We are told that Antigonos, for his part, when he learned of Antipatros’ death was ‘delighted by what had happened’ (ἡσθεὶς δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσι)35 and ‘was carried away by hope and made up his mind to maintain a firm grip upon the government of Asia and to yield the rule of that continent to no one’ (Diod. 18.47.5, R. Geer tr.). But a few chapters later, Diodoros is more specific when he states: ‘Antigonos … called a council of his philoi36 and, after he had made them acquainted with his design for gaining imperial power, assigned satrapies to some of the more important philoi and military commands to others; and by holding up great expectations to all of them, he filled them with enthusiasm for his undertakings. Indeed, he had in mind to go through Asia, remove the existing satraps and reorganize the positions of command in favour of his own friends.’37 It is interesting that, in the event (at least, as far as we can determine), many of the prominent adherents of Antigonos did not receive substantial compensation. What we do learn from all this is that Monophthalmos saw the existing structure as impeding his path to power. Antigonos’ methods were often brutal, and he did not feel bound by the terms of the settlement of Triparadeisos, especially after the death of Antipatros. The empire, if it were to remain intact, required not only a man strong enough to exercise the central authority but an administrative structure that allowed him to do so. But, in fact, the divisive practices instituted by Alexander were, only five years after his death, too firmly entrenched to permit anyone to rule the entire empire. The politics of distrust guarded against the possibility of a single man ruling the empire, for its purpose had been a negative one, to weaken the individual administrators. If the parts were weak, the body could not be strong. Fragmentation and the formation of the hellenistic kingdoms were thus the inevitable result.
Distrust and manipulation characterized the early age of the Successors – and even the royal women and daughters of generals became part of the game. But the foundations had been laid early and the marshals, as they aspired to greater power, attracted to themselves supporters in the form of personal hetairoi or philoi, while at the same time seeking to limit the influence of others. There developed the beginnings of hellenistic personal kingship, certainly in the years that followed Antipatros’ death in 319. But in the first years it was a case of no unanimous candidate emerging and the consequent attempt to maintain a balance through limitations on the power of individuals. The end product of the politics of distrust was the disintegration of the empire.
Notes
1 The translation of the Latin, here and elsewhere, is by my friend and collaborator in numerous ventures, John Yardley, who read both the paper presented at Hay-on-Wye and this revised version. (The Greek translations and paraphrases, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.) I should like, at this point, to thank the conference organizers, Daniel Ogden and Anton Powell, for their hospitality and for agreeing to add my paper to the programme virtually at the last minute.
2 Cf. Plut. Alex. 39.7, where Olympias, in a letter to Alexander, is reported to have said ‘you make them all the equals of kings (ἰσοβασιλέας) and provide them with a multitude of friends (πολυφιλίας)’.
3 Justin 13.2.12. In Curt. 10.6.15, Ptolemy proposes that the generals should rule the empire ‘by committee’.
4 For these individuals and events see Heckel 1992, 27–33, 357–8, with complete references to ancient sources and modern literature.
5 The theory (Badian 1960, 246) that Harpalos fled because Alexander planned this division of power is a case of the historical fallacy ‘post hoc, propter hoc’.
6 Amphoteros and Hegelochos with the fleet: Curt. 3.1.19; cf. Hauben 1972, 57. Alexander relied upon Amphoteros to arrest Alexander the Lynkestian (Arr. 1.25.9–10); for Hegelochos’ relationship to Attalos see Heckel 1982, and Heckel 1992, 6–12.
7 See Arr. 3.5.2; Curt. 4.8.5; Julien 1914, 22–3; cf. Bosworth 1980, 275–7.
8 Diod. 17.62.4–6; Justin 12.2.16–17 conflates the activities of Memnon and Zopyrion (on the latter see Curt. 10.1.44–5).
9 Curt. 9.3.21. Badian 2000, 254–5 n. 24 persists in identifying Memnon as an adherent of the family of the Rhodian Memnon (cf. Badian 1967, 179–80) and remarks that ‘there is, to my knowledge, no attestation of the name in earlier or contemporary Macedonian prosopography’. But this is true only if we reject Memnon the stratēgos as Macedonian, which we need not do. Hence Tataki 1998, 365, no. 29, plausibly catalogues him as ‘Makedon’.
10 Berve 1926, 254 n. 1 attributes to W. Otto the observation that Alexander may not have been displeased by Memnon’s actions against Antipatros. Although Berve is willing to allow the possibility (‘Die Möglichkeit ist zuzugeben’), it is probably the most logical explanation. Cf. the apparent indifference of Artaxerxes II to the quarrels between Tissaphernes and Kyros: ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχθετο αὐτῶν πολεμούντων (Xen. Anab. 1.1.8).
11 Thus Badian 1960, 329.
12 Discussion in Baumbach 1911; Julien 1914. Kalas (Hellespontine Phrygia): Arr. 1.17.1; Curt. 3.1.24; Arr. Succ. 1.6; Nearchos (Lykia): Arr. 3.6.6, cf. 1.24.3–6; also Justin 13.4.15; Antigonos (Phrygia): Arr. 1.29.3; cf. Curtius 4.1.35 (wrongly ‘Lydia’); Balakros (Kilikia): Arr. 2.12.2; cf. Diod. 18.22.1.
13 See my ‘King and “Companions”: Observations on the nature of power in the reign of Alexander the Great’, in J. Roisman (ed.) Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great, forthcoming 2003.
14 Arr. 1.17.7: Asandros was appointed satrap, with Pausanias as phrourarchos, and Nikias in charge of assessing and collecting taxes.
15 Surrender of citadel by Tiridates: Curt. 5.5.2; Diod. 17.69.1; retains his command: Curt. 5.6.11.
16 Thus Badian 1961, 25.
17 When this did occur – for example, in the case of Kleitos’ appointment as satrap of Baktria and Sogdiana – it was vigorously resisted by the appointee himself. Peithon son of Agenor and Philippos son of Machatas were officers who received satrapies in India, but they were relatively low on the military ladder.
18 See esp. Plut. Alex. 47.11; cf. Diod. 17.114.1–2.
19 Krateros, Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 2.1–3; Arr. Anab. 7.13.1, 14.9) and Kallisthenes (Plut. Alex. 55.1) all seem to have had problems with Hephaistion; and the torturers of Philotas are described as ‘Hephaistion’s party’ (Plut. Alex. 49.12: [οἱ] περὶ τὸν Ἡφαιστίωνα).
20 Curt. 3.6.17 says: ‘the Macedonians have a natural tendency to venerate their royalty … and the extent of their admiration, or their burning affection for this particular king [sc. Alexander], is difficult to describe.’
21 See Diod. 19.1.1, 69.1, 70.3*, 79.4; 20.68.3* and Arr. Succ. 1.5 and 1.27 for ὑποπτεύω. Passages marked with an asterisk (here and in n. 24 below) deal with the history of Agathokles of Sicily.
22 Diod. 18.52.8.
23 Diod. 18.7.4, 9.2, 39.7, 42.2, 50.1, 62.7, 64.6. The frequent occurrence of idiopragein was noted already by Hornblower 1981, 169, who attributes the general use of what I am calling ‘the language of distrust’ to Hieronymos. It remains to be determined if the occurrences of other words, like hypopteuein, hypopsia, hyponoia, in Arrian and Plutarch’s Eumenes, are also attributable directly to the same primary source.
24 Diod. 18.9.5, 14.2, 23.2, 25.4, 29.4, 49.2, 53.5; 19.17.2; 20.27.3, 106.2 (koinopragia); Diod. 18.41.6, 57.3; 19.4.1*, 6.5*, 58.5, 58.6; 20.28.3, 107.4 (koinopragein).
25 Errington 1970, 49–77.
26 Thus, Perdikkas quickly eliminated Meleagros and appointed Seleukos as chiliarchos (Diod. 18.3.4; cf. Justin 13.4.17) when he usurped at least a portion of the prostasia upon the birth of Alexander IV. The second position of the chiliarch is clear also from Arr. Succ. 1.38; Diod. 18.39.7; 18.48.4 (Κάσανδρον χιλίαρχον καὶ δευτερεύοντα κατὰ τὴν ἐξο?σίαν). For a discussion of the chiliarchy see Heckel 1992, 366–70.
27 Krateros’ prostasia pertained only to Philip Arrhidaios, a technicality that was exploited by Perdikkas upon the birth of Alexander IV.
28 Billows 1990, 68–74.
29 His stratēgia in Asia was similar to Peithon’s stratēgia in the Upper Satrapies: both men tried to use these temporary offices as spring-boards to greater powers. For the limitations on Antigonos’ power see Wehrli 1968, 34; Engel 1976, 28. Diod. 19.14.1 says that Peithon put to death Philotas (Philippos?) of Parthia ‘when he became strategos of the Upper Satrapies’ (στρατηγὸς δὲ τῶν ἄνω σατραπειῶν ἁπασῶν γενόμενος), but in fact this is a revival of the stratēgia that he had been assigned by Perdikkas in 323. And, it is clear from Diodoros’ account that the other satraps (in the period after Triparadeisos) did not regard his claims as legitimate. See also Bengtson 1937, 96–111 (Antigonos); 176–80 (Peithon).
30 For the satrapies of Arrhidaios and White Kleitos see Arr. Succ. 1.37; Diod. 18.39.6; Kleitos was entrusted with the fleet by Perdikkas (Justin 13.6.16) but defected to Antipatros and Krateros (Arr. Succ. 1.26); Menandros resurfaces in the army of Antigonos (Plut. Eum. 9.8–11; Diod. 18.59.1–2).
31 Perdikkas instated Philoxenos as Philotas’ replacement (Justin 13.6.16); he is the only one of Perdikkas’ independent appointees to receive confirmation at Triparadeisos (Arr. Succ. 1.34; Diod. 18.39.6).
32 Justin 13.6.16; Arr. Succ. 24.2; Diod. 18.62.4–63.5. For his career see Heckel 1992, 328–30; Billows 1990, 423–4.
33 Thus Billows 1990, 427. The Sōmatophylakes of Philip III were the brothers of Lysimachos and Peukestas, Autodikos and Amyntas respectively, Alexandros son of Polyperchon, and Ptolemaios son of Ptolemaios (Arr. Succ. 1.38).
34 Arr. Succ. 1.42.
35 Diod. 18.47.5; cf. Justin 13.5.15: Antipater…morte Leonnati laetatus est.
36 Note that Antigonos’ philoi are little different from the hetairoi of the Macedonian kings. One of the elements of the personal kingship instituted by the Diadochoi was thus present long before the fateful proclamation that followed the Antigonid victory at Salamis in 306.
37 Diod. 18.50.5. The translation is by R. Geer (Loeb); the emphasis is my own.
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