THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS first came into contact with the Tibetans during the Long March, the period described by Zhou Enlai as the ‘darkest period in the history of the party’, when 90,000 Red Army troops were pushed out of Jiangxi Soviet region by the Guomindang encirclement and forced to march north-west to secure safe bases.
In April 1935, the First Front Army led by Zhu De (the commander in chief of the Red Army) and Mao Zedong crossed the upper course of the Yangtse, known to the Chinese as the Jinsha River, and to the Tibetans as Drichu. This brought them outside the confines of the Chinese cultural sphere and later into contact with Tibetans. The area known by the Nationalists as Sikang (Xikang)1 was predominantly inhabited by Khampas, who were culturally Tibetan and were nominally under the rule of the Guomindang government, though in reality the area was ruled by Pons (local chiefs).
The Second and the Fourth Armies also crossed into the Tibetan areas in 1935, with the Fourth Army remaining for nearly a year. The Communist leaders were immediately struck by differences in culture and language.2 During their time in Kham, the Red Army was desperately short of food and provisions and the Communists were forced to abandon their rules about not taking anything from the people. The army was obliged for the first time to take food and goods from villagers.3 The Communists were not able to communicate with the local people. When they entered villages, the people had fled, having hidden their provisions. The unprecedented number of soldiers in the area caused severe shortages of food. The Khampas attacked the exhausted Red Army, causing them great hardship.4 The Communists’ experience in Kham was summed up by Edgar Snow, ‘Passing into the (Mantzu and) Tibetan territories, the Reds for the first time faced a populace united in its hostility to them, and their suffering on this part of the trek exceeded anything of the past.’5
The Communists’ encounter with Tibetan-speaking people was confined only to eastern Tibet, and they had no idea of the situation in central Tibet, the area under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama. They recognised, however, their lack of influence and power in Tibet. Immediately on coming into power, they divided China into six military-cum-administrative regions, but Tibet remained outside this administrative division. Instead, the Communists adopted two strategies to bring Tibet within the structure of the PRC. On the one hand the Chinese boasted of their military superiority, constantly reminding the Tibetans that they had defeated the Nationalists. On the other hand they sought to win over the ruling élite by dampening their fear of Communism. The Communists were determined that Tibet should be incorporated into the administrative and constitutional structure of China.
The Communist Party had a small Tibetan membership, which had been recruited during the Long March and included people like Sangye Yeshi (Tianbao) and Sherab Dhundup (Yang Dongsheng),6 two of the first Tibetans to join the Communist Party. Most of the recruits were from very poor families who were genuinely attracted to the promise of an egalitarian society. Others were young boys who drifted into the ranks of the PLA. The party was quick to realise the potential of these recruits and some were sent to the Party school in Yan’an. The Communists left behind a group of pro-Communist Tibetans who founded the first Bod-pa (Tibetan) Soviet in Garze in 1936.7 It is interesting to note that they identified themselves as Bod-pa, a choice which undoubtedly implied some kind of Pan-Tibetan movement. At this stage, it seems the Communists were willing to pander to Tibetan nationalist aspirations of a united Tibet. All the Tibetan Communists were from eastern Tibet, which traditionally had been outside the control of the Tibetan Government in Lhasa and the Lhasa authorities were therefore unconcerned by the activities of this group. At another level there were people like Geta Rinpoche of Beri Monastery in Kham who realised that the Communists would win the civil war in China.8 Geta Rinpoche had the traditional status and authority of an incarnate Lama and so he could influence his followers, but the Tibetan Communist Party members had very little influence among Tibetans.
The first concern of the Chinese was to prevent any foreign powers from establishing a base in Tibet. When the Kashag decided to dispatch missions to Nepal, USA and Britain, the Chinese held protest rallies and Sangye Yeshi broadcast on Peking radio urging the Tibetan Government not to send the missions.9 The Communists met with general distrust in all Tibetan areas. Guomindang propaganda had played on the anti-religious ideology of the Communists and had publicised the fact that the Communists would destroy monasteries and that Lamas would be imprisoned.10 Therefore, when the Communists entered Tibetan areas they had to develop a cautious policy. They could not be seen to be reinforcing any of the Guomindang propaganda and initially adopted a policy of appeasement, doing their best to stress that the existing social and cultural system would not be altered. They could not engineer an internal revolution in Tibet. Therefore, the Chinese adopted a policy of winning over the ruling élite on the principle of revolution from above.
In March 1950, the Communists allowed a major religious ceremony to take place at Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery in Amdo, for the installation of the new incarnation of the Jamyang Zhepa. The ceremony was attended by Buddhists from Mongolia and other areas, and Chinese radio reported that 20,000 Tibetans and Mongols attended the ceremony.11 This was a major propaganda victory for the Communists, who used the occasion to publicise their religious policies and the Common Programme. At first the relationship between the monks from Labrang and the Communists was quite friendly. A number of monks were recruited to carry out translation work, translating the first Communist document into Tibetan, the ‘Eight-Point Contract’.12 This was an important manifesto outlining the policies that the Communist Party intended to pursue after its victory. It was first distributed in areas where the Communists had no control, which suggests the Communists recognised that despite their victory they had not gained influence in Tibetan areas.
The Communists decided to retain the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission13 and recruited many members of the existing staff to work for the new government. These people were well informed about internal Tibetan political conflict. The first director of the Commission was Zhu Shiguai. He was the father-in-law of Gyalo Dhundup, the elder brother of the Dalai Lama. The Communists at first tried to exploit this family connection by encouraging Zhu Shiguai to keep in communication with Gyalo Dhundup. Dhundup had escaped from Nanjing a few months before the city had fallen to the Communists. While Dhondup was in India he had been advised by his father-in-law to urge the Tibetan Government not to send missions abroad and that a peaceful settlement should be reached.14
The Communists immediately sought to exploit the internal divisions within Tibetan society and recruited all those who were disaffected with the Tibetan Government. The ninth Panchen Rinpoche, the second-highest ranking incarnate lama of Tibetan Buddhism, had been exiled in Amdo since 1928.15 He had fled from Shigatse when a conflict arose between his monastery, Tashilhunpo, and the Tibetan Government. When he passed away in Jyekundo16 in 1937, the Nationalists saw an opportunity to gain influence in Tibet by giving political support to a child born in Amdo as the tenth incarnation of the Panchen Rinpoche.17 When the Communists came to power the child had been installed at Kumbum Jampaling as the tenth Panchen Rinpoche. But the Tibetan Government refused to recognise the child and put forward its own candidate.18
On coming to power the Communists reported that the young Panchen Rinpoche had sent a telegram to Chairman Mao and Zhu De, the Commander in Chief of the PLA, on the day that the People’s Republic of China was founded. It allegedly stated: ‘I sincerely present to Your Excellencies on the behalf of all the people in Tibet our highest respects and offer our heartfelt support.’19 The Panchen Rinpoche was aged twelve at the time.
In January 1950, Beijing Radio and Xinhua released another telegram to Chairman Mao and Zhu De in the name of Panchen Rinpoche. It expressed the Panchen Lama’s support for the Communist Party and urged the PLA to liberate Tibet and to unify it with the Motherland.
On behalf of the Tibetan people, we respectfully plead for troops to be sent to liberate Tibet, to wipe out reactionaries, expel the imperialists, consolidate the national defences in the south west and liberate the Tibetan people. This assembly vows to lead the patriotic Tibetan people to mobilise the Tibetan people in support of the liberation army and to struggle hard for the People’s Motherland.20
At the same time the Communists held a meeting in Beijing of ‘democratic personages’ from Tibet to discuss the Tibetan problem and to endorse the Common Programme. The meeting was primarily held to oppose the Tibetan Government sending missions abroad.
The Tibetan Government was aware of the threat that the Panchen Rinpoche and his followers posed. They had been monitoring the activities of the Tashilhunpo monks, and immediately after the fall of Xining in 1949 the Governor of Kham was instructed by the Lhasa Government to inform the Panchen Rinpoche and his followers that, despite past differences, the government would not take any action against them.21 The Tibetan Government was increasingly suspicious of new arrivals from Amdo in Tashilhunpo, whom they suspected of being Communist agents. In April the Government ordered a search of some monks’ quarters in Tashilhunpo.22
While Lhasa recognised that a few Tibetan Communists would not present a serious threat to Tibet’s status, the reported support by Panchen Rinpoche of the new Chinese Government was ‘causing a lot of anxiety in official circles’.23 The government attempted to counter Chinese propaganda by broadcasting its attitudes towards the Panchen Rinpoche and his officials on Lhasa Radio. But the broadcasts stated that the new incarnation of Panchen Rinpoche could only be recognised after the traditional ceremonies had been completed.24 This seemed to imply that Lhasa was still not prepared to recognise the new Panchen Rinpoche. As a result the Panchen Rinpoche’s followers might have felt that their best chance of regaining power in Shigatse lay with co-operating with the new Chinese Government. The Panchen Rinpoche’s followers were also aware that the Lhasa Government had tried to impose their own candidate as the new incarnation of the Panchen Rinpoche and that automatic recognition would not be extended to a candidate enthroned in Kumbum. Since the child in Kumbum had been accepted by the Tashilhunpo monastery, the seat of all the Panchen Rinpoches, renewed confrontation between Lhasa and Tashilhunpo monastery was likely.
The Chinese were skilfully exploiting the religious sentiments of the Tibetan people. They used prominent religious figures to communicate with the Tibetan government in Lhasa and selected Geta Rinpoche to proceed to Lhasa to establish contact and explain the party’s nationality policy to the government in Lhasa. With the support of the Panchen Lama, Geta Rinpoche and other important religious figures, the Communists achieved a major propaganda victory. They were able to show that they would respect religious freedom.
At the same time the Communists strengthened military control over Kham and Amdo. They stepped up military pressure on the weak Tibetan defence system. In Chamdo, Lhalu was constantly receiving news of a build-up of Chinese troops in the border regions. The Chinese were careful not to cross into territories controlled by the Tibetan Government, hoping that a negotiated settlement could be reached with Lhasa.
Negotiations between the Chinese Ambassador and the Tibetan delegation in New Delhi had reached a stalemate. Shakabpa and his delegation had been waiting for instructions from the Kashag, and were hoping that the recent change in American policy would provide some measure of international support. The Chinese were frustrated by the fact that the Tibetans seemed to be more concerned with internationalising the Tibet issue and assumed that there was a real danger of intervention in Tibet from foreign powers.
On 6th May 1950, Geshe Sherab Gyatso (a noted Tibetan scholar and former abbot of Sera Je Monastery in Lhasa, but also deputy Chairman of the newly established Qinghai Provincial Government) made an appeal to the Tibetan people and to the Dalai Lama. It was an extraordinary broadcast in that, unlike previous radio messages, it implicitly warned that the Chinese would use force if necessary to ‘liberate Tibet’. In retrospect, this appears to have been the final warning to the Tibetan Government.
The broadcast promised that Tibet would be liberated, since it was part of China and the People’s Liberation Army was ‘strong enough to fulfil this task’.25 It went on to urge Tibetans not to believe in ‘British and American imperialist slander aimed at sowing discord between nationalities’. Tibet was by no means ‘too remote from Chinghai or Sikang,’ it argued. ‘If anyone should doubt the ability of the PLA to overcome geographical difficulties they need only remember the Long March or the recent liberation of Hainan.’ Geshe Sherab Gyatso stated that any hope of relying on British or American intervention was ‘futile’, as the destruction of the Guomindang had clearly shown.26
Finally, the broadcast assured the Tibetan people that, under the leadership of the Communist Party, all nationalities of the People’s Republic of China would be treated equally and religion would be respected. In accordance with the Common Programme of the CPPCC, Tibet would be granted ‘regional autonomy’ after liberation.27
The first military skirmish between Tibetan troops and the PLA took place at the end of May 1950, when a group of fifty PLA attacked Dengo, situated on the bank of the Drichu, ninety miles from Chamdo. The Tibetans in Chamdo first heard of the attack when the radio message from Dengo was abruptly cut off in the middle of transmission. Robert Ford was on the Chamdo end, and told one of his assistants to keep on calling Dengo.28 He immediately went to inform Lhalu, who was still in command at Chamdo, Ngabo having not yet arrived from Lhasa. In Ford’s words, ‘Lhalu looked grave but gave no sign of alarm. He murmured a brief prayer and then went into action’.29 Lhalu recalled the 500 men from Changthang, and planned the recapture of Dengo. He also sent a scout team to monitor any PLA movements.30
Dengo was strategically very important. It was the most likely route along which the PLA would advance and it was on the main trade route from Kanting to Chamdo, giving access to Jyekundo in the north. From Jyekundo the PLA could march southward cutting off any escape route for the main garrison in Chamdo. Lhalu therefore told Ford that Dengo must be recaptured, or it would be impossible for them to remain in Chamdo.31
If the PLA had decided to proceed to Chamdo, it would have taken them several days, even if they were not opposed. Lhalu informed Lhasa of the fall of Dengo and requested further military supplies. He also informed the Kashag that he had the support of Khampa leaders and the monks of Dargye monastery. He wanted to launch a direct attack on the advancing PLA and capture all territories up to Jyekundo.32 The Kashag, fearing this might lead to a full-scale military clash with the PLA, instructed him to recapture Dengo but not proceed beyond territories controlled by the Tibetan Government.33 The Kashag told Lhalu that although his army might be able to advance further into Chinese-controlled areas, it would not be possible to maintain control of these areas for long in the event of a concerted Chinese attack.34 They considered it unwise to march into Chinese-controlled Kham.
Four days after the fall of Dengo, scouts arrived back in Chamdo with the news that the Chinese had confiscated all Dengo’s communications equipment. They also learned that there was only a small group of PLA men in Dengo.35 Ten days after the attack, the regiment in Changthang led by Muja Depon arrived in Chamdo. Lhalu wanted to strengthen further the number of armed men, and therefore suggested that 500 monks should be armed.36 Since monks are not supposed to engage in the use of arms, this needed to be sanctioned by a higher spiritual authority. Lhalu and Khenchung Dawa decided to seek advice from Trijang Rinpoche, the Dalai Lama’s junior tutor, who was in Lhasa. Ford describes how an elaborate radio discussion was held between Trijang Rinpoche in Lhasa and Lhalu in Chamdo. When Trijang Rinpoche was asked what advice he would give, he simply said that they should ‘obey the wishes of the Governor-General [Lhalu]’.37
Lhalu had dispatched Muja Depon and his regiment, with an additional 200 Khampa militia men. This brought the number of men to 700. Muja Depon and his men attacked the PLA group and recaptured Dengo. This small victory provided the Tibetans with a much-needed morale boost and enabled them to push the Chinese back to the de facto border. It is interesting that the PLA did not try to recapture the area or launch a full-scale military invasion. It is not clear why the Chinese decided to attack Dengo in May. It was either to put pressure on Lhasa and the Shakabpa mission in Delhi who were meeting the Chinese ambassador, or to test Tibetan defensive measures. The Communists were fearful that the Tibetans might be establishing a formidable defensive wall in Chamdo.
On 29 July, Beijing Radio broadcast a speech by General Liu Bocheng, who stated that the primary task of the South-West Military Administrative Committee was to liberate Tibet and that the ‘PLA must launch an attack’.38 But no attack came until October. It gave Lhalu and his officers time to strengthen the fortifications in Chamdo. Bren guns were placed in strategic positions and everyone was kept on guard.
In the middle of 1950, the Korean issue was dominating the international situation. The Chinese feared that the Americans might use this as a pretext for their involvement in Tibet. If the international tension should degenerate into a war, there was a likelihood of the Tibetan case being entangled in the wider issues. On 16th May, Radio Beijing reported that ‘Henderson, US Envoy to India, had agreed with the GOI that a large shipment of rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, grenades and ammunition should be sent to Calcutta for transfer to Tibet via Darjeeling. US guards were to accompany the convoy and there was to be no Indian inspection’.39 The GOI denied the Chinese accusation as ‘entirely without foundation’.40 Although it was untrue that there was any such agreement between India and USA, the Chinese were none the less fearful of international involvement in Tibet. Generally, the Tibetans have dismissed the Chinese accusation of imperialist machination in Tibet by saying that there were no Americans or British officials in Tibet and the only two Europeans in Tibet were employed by the Tibetan Government. However, we need to understand the Chinese accusation in a much wider context. The Chinese had a legitimate fear of US determination to undermine the new Communist Government of China. At the end of May 1950, the Communists noticed that Gyalo Dhundup, brother of the Dalai Lama, had turned up in Taipei and had met Chiang Kai-shek on 21 May. Taipei Radio reported that Gyalo Dhundup had arrived to seek military aid from the Americans.41
The Chinese concentrated on strengthening their position in Kham (Xikang). They had not been able to win over the Tibetans in Bathang, Lithang and Markham. The largest anti-Chinese group was led by the Pomdatsang brothers, who ruled Markham. In Bathang, Phuntsog Wangyal (who had been expelled from Lhasa with the Chinese mission in 1949) and a small group of pro-Communists had taken power and were busily trying to persuade Pomdatsang and the king of the Derge Se, Ngawang Kalsang, to surrender to the Chinese.42 The Communists knew that if they were eventually to advance into central Tibet, then they would need to win over the Khampas. It now seems incredible that the Communists were able to win over the vast majority of the Khampas and enter Kham without any resistance. In fact many Khampas were willing to assist the PLA’s entry into Tibet. According to Ford, the Tibetan soldiers feared the Khampas more than the PLA.
After the Dengo incident, the Chinese must have come to the conclusion that the Tibetans were going to resist any military incursion. They were also convinced that Shakabpa’s mission in India was prevented from leaving for China by foreign powers hostile to China. Even members of the mission stated to the press that they had been prevented from going to China for discussions. The Chinese decided to make contact with the Tibetan Government by sending a number of influential pro-Communist Tibetan Lamas to Lhasa via Kham.
On 10 July 1950 the Communists dispatched Geta Rinpoche to Chamdo.43 He had been elected the Vice-Chairman of the Xikang Provincial People’s Government. He arrived in Chamdo and informed Lhalu that he wished to proceed to Lhasa. There was a flurry of radio communications between Chamdo and Lhasa.44 While he was waiting for confirmation from Lhasa, Geta Rinpoche was treated with the respect and reverence shown to all incarnate lamas.45 It is not clear what message he brought with him. It is most probable that Geta Rinpoche brought the same three-point proposal presented to Shakabpa by the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi, or perhaps a more detailed proposal. In the end the Tibetan Government refused to allow him to proceed beyond Chamdo, and on 22 August, Geta Rinpoche fell ill and died. The Chinese believed that Geta Rinpoche had been murdered by imperialist agents. After the fall of Chamdo, Ford was arrested and accused of the murder of Geta Rinpoche. Despite four long years of imprisonment, Ford denied any involvement.
In June a group from Xining arrived in Lhasa disguised as traders. The group brought a letter addressed to the Regent Taktra and another to the Tibetan Government. The letters urged the Tibetans to seek an agreement and to send a delegation to Beijing for negotiation. The group was accompanied by a radio operator. When they reached Lhasa, the government confiscated the radio.46 About the same time in Amdo, the Chinese recruited another of the Dalai Lama’s elder brothers, Thubten Norbu, an incarnate lama at Kumbum Monastery and two other prominent lamas from Amdo, Shar Kalden Gyamtso and Shalu Rinpoche, to proceed to Lhasa with a special message.47
It was most probable that the proposals that Thubten Norbu brought were similar to the three-point proposals that had been presented to Shakabpa in Delhi. Thubten Norbu says that many of the proposals were similar to points covered in the 17-Point Agreement.48 The Communists first planned to send a group of PLA soldiers to accompany the delegation but after some discussion with Geshe Sherab Gyatso, it was decided that only two Chinese officials and a radio operator would accompany them.49 Thubten Norbu met with Geshe Sherab Gyatso, who stated that it was advisable for the Tibetans not to speak of independence.50 The journey from Amdo to Lhasa took more than three months. The group was met at the Tibetan border in Shagchukha in the north-east by the Tibetan army, who refused to allow the Chinese official and the radio operator to proceed to Lhasa; they were detained on the outskirts of Lhasa.51 The Chinese were furious that they were not allowed to proceed to Lhasa. The Chinese escort insisted that if that was the case, then Thubten Norbu would not be allowed to go to Lhasa.52 The escort also boasted that he had just received a radio message that the Chinese forces had launched an attack in eastern Tibet and captured a number of prisoners.53 By the time the group arrived in Lhasa, the Chinese had already invaded Chamdo and Lhasa was in panic. Thubten Norbu met with the Dalai Lama, and for the first time the Dalai Lama received a first-hand account of Communist rule.
While the diplomatic negotiations were going on in Delhi, it was left to Ngabo, who by now had taken over from Lhalu in Chamdo, to repel any Chinese incursions. Lhalu had adopted an offensive policy and had successfully repelled the initial Chinese attack. In contrast, Ngabo believed that it was futile to fight the Chinese. Soon after he took office Ngabo decided to dismantle some of the defensive measures taken by Lhalu. Ngabo felt that Tibetan defensive measures would be construed by the Chinese as provocation. Ford advised Ngabo to dispatch one of the portable radios to Riwoche, which would give an early warning of Chinese movements. At the time, Ngabo ‘seemed to have everything under control’. Ford described him as ‘cool and efficient and quietly confident’.54 Ngabo told Ford, ‘we shall not give the Chinese permission to send troops into Tibet. If they enter by force we shall resist. If necessary, of course, we shall evacuate Chamdo and retreat to Lhasa. There will be no local surrender as long as I am in Chamdo.’55 In retrospect, it seems Ngabo was ingenuous in believing that the Chinese could be stopped in Chamdo.
On 17 August the Guomindang intelligence reported that the Communists were planning to advance into Tibet. The First Field Army under General Peng Dehuai was moving southwards to Tibet from its bases in Xinjiang and the Second Field Army, led by Liu Bocheng, was moving westward.56 The Communists continued to send informal emissaries to Lhasa and the Tibetan Government adamantly refused to meet any of them. However, Shakabpa had been instructed by the Kashag to keep in touch with the Chinese ambassador in Delhi, and since July 1950 the two had met several times. By September, both Shakabpa and the Chinese in India were increasingly frustrated by the fact that the Tibetan Government had refused to give any definite replies to the three proposals put forward by the Chinese. Despite Shakabpa’s recommendation that no agreement could be reached with China unless Lhasa compromised on the issue of Tibetan independence,57 the Kashag had decided not to accept the Chinese proposal. Knowing that if they were to inform the Chinese of their refusal, the Chinese would probably adopt military means to achieve their aims, the Tibetans naïvely tried to gain time by refusing to reply. The Kashag merely told Shakabpa to delay giving any answer to the Chinese until the international situation improved.58 Lhasa was aware of the growing tension over Korea, and therefore it was hoped that the Korean issue would either divert Chinese intention or the Americans would come to Tibet’s aid. On 28 September, the Chinese ambassador asked Shakabpa what response he had received from the Kashag. Shakabpa said there was a fault on the telegraph line, and a second message had been sent by horse rider, but it would be several days before they received a reply from the Kashag.59 It was unlikely that the Chinese would have believed Shakabpa’s delaying tactic.
Shakabpa was clearly irritated by the Kashag’s indecisiveness. On 30 September, he informed the Kashag it was imperative a decision be reached before the Chinese started to use military force.60 The Kashag once again replied that, because of the ‘uncompromising position’ of the Chinese stand, and because it would have serious repercussions on the future status of Tibet, they should wait until the international situation had improved before informing the Chinese of their refusal to accept the three-point proposal.61
There was, however, no improvement in the international situation. The Korean issue had become a major crisis. The Tibetans’ refusal either to receive emissaries or reply to their proposals convinced the Chinese that their peaceful attempts had been thwarted by foreign powers, and that the Tibetans were recalcitrant. They were determined that Tibet should be, in their words, ‘unified with the Motherland’ without delay.
On 25 June 1950, the North Korean army had crossed the 38th parallel and marched into South Korea. The Americans were able to repel the advancing North Korean troops. Using K. M. Panikkar as intermediary, the Chinese informed the UN that if the US were to cross the 38th parallel, the Chinese would intervene on the side of the North Koreans. On 7 October, US troops under the command of General MacArthur crossed the 38th parallel. Under the aegis of the UN, the American forces recaptured Seoul on 26 November.62
On 7 October,63 while the world’s attention was focused on the crossing of the 38th parallel, 40,000 PLA troops from the South-West Military Region, led by Zhang Guohua, crossed the Drichu river. The Chinese caught the Tibetans by surprise. Their tactic was to overwhelm the Tibetan troops by sheer numbers and speed. According to Zhang Guohua the plan for the invasion was drawn up by the top three Communist officials in the South-West Military Region: Liu Bocheng,64 Deng Xiaoping65 and He Long, who ‘personally planned and made preparations for the expedition’ into Tibet.66
The success of the PLA depended on swift encirclement. ‘The enemy was familiar with the terrain of this vast area and, besides, they [the Tibetans] were all expert horsemen. We were like a tiger trying to catch a fly – it was a hopeless task. Therefore the leaders of the SW Military District instructed us to carry out an outflanking movement. We were told that everything depended on our catching the enemy, that victory would be ours if we could surround the enemy.’67
The PLA attacked from three directions. The main aim was to capture Chamdo and prevent the Tibetan troops from retreating to Lhasa. One group assailed the small frontier post at Kamthog Drukha, east of Chamdo, capturing all the Tibetan soldiers stationed there.68 As the PLA marched towards Chamdo, by way of Rangsum, they met resistance from the Tibetan army.
The 54th Regiment crossed the Drichu river north of Dengo and marched towards Jyekundo, which was directly north of Chamdo. From there the PLA marched southward, and encircled the Tibetan army, cutting off their escape route. The Chinese tried to cross from Dengo, but since the earlier incident it had been well guarded and Muja Depon was initially able to repel the Chinese attack.
The PLA group crossed the Drichu from Bathang and marched straight across to Markham, where Derge Se commanded a small force of 400 men. The area was seven days’ march from Chamdo and was not seen by the Tibetans as an important sector and so had not been heavily guarded.69 On 10 October Derge Se received reports that the Chinese were rapidly advancing towards Kungo Dzong, the civil and military centre in Markham. Derge Se tried to withdraw north. Geoffrey Bull, a missionary who had been living in Markham, writes: ‘As soon as news of the proposed withdrawal leaked out, social order began to break down. People began to loot and soldiers to desert.’70 They were cut off by the advancing PLA and Derge Se had no alternative but to surrender, his men ‘utterly bewildered’ by the sheer speed of the Chinese advance.71 Derge Se announced to the Chinese, ‘I surrendered because I consider that further bloodshed is absolutely useless.’72
The news of the PLA’s advance did not reach Chamdo until 11 October. As soon as Ford heard the news of the invasion, he went to see Ngabo and requested that a radio should be sent to Riwoche, so that they could monitor PLA troops coming from the north to cut off their escape route to Lhasa. Ngabo told him that this route was secure and he needed a spare radio set in case the other broke down.73 The news of advancing PLA troops caused panic in Chamdo. People engaged in a frenzied round of prayers and rituals. The monastery performed rituals to ward off evil. The rich tried to save their wealth by depositing it in the monastery.74
When news of the Chinese attack reached Ngabo, he immediately informed Lhasa, and requested instructions from the Kashag. In retrospect it seems incredible that the Kashag did not respond at once. In desperation Tsogo, one of Ngabo’s officials contacted Dumra, a Kashag aide-de-camp, on 15 October but was told the Shapes could not be disturbed because they were at a picnic.75 Tsogo exclaimed in exasperation, ‘skyag pa’i gling kha: Shit the picnic!’76 This was the last communication between Lhasa and Chamdo.
There was no possibility that the Tibetan Army could stop the PLA advancing towards Chamdo. Ngabo decided to evacuate. Reports suggested that the Chinese still had not reached Riwoche and that the escape route back to Lhasa was safe. But in the middle of the night came news that the Chinese were indeed nearing Riwoche. Without warning, on the night of 16 October Ngabo and the Lhasa officials fled Chamdo. Those who remained felt betrayed, because Ngabo had commandeered most of the ponies, leaving the local people without transport.77 Ford writes: ‘panic was breaking out in the town. People were running about in all directions, carrying or dragging their personal belongings. Monks were hurrying towards the monastery, gabbling their prayers. The stalls in the main street were deserted’.78
The Chinese took Riwoche and encircled the retreating Tibetan troops near Drukha Monastery. There was no fighting. As Robert Ford says: ‘the Tibetan Army was not designed for retreat. When troops went to the front line they took their families with them; and with Muja’s men now came with as many women and children, with all their household goods and personal belongings piled up on yaks and mules. There were tents, pots and pans, carpets, butter-churns, bundles of clothes, and babies in bundles on their mothers’ backs. It was a fantastic sight.’79
The Tibetans surrendered to the PLA. On 19 October Ngabo sent two messengers to inform the Chinese that he would surrender. Ford was simply told by Muja to make camp: ‘Ngabo was brought out of the monastery, looking less frightened than I had seen him since we left Chamdo. He summoned Dimon and Muja, and gave them some orders, which they passed on to the Rupons. Then all the Tibetan troops began handing over their arms to the Chinese.’80 Inside the monastery the Chinese filmed Ngabo signing the surrender document. The prisoners were gathered and given lectures on socialism and the unity of the Motherland. All the Tibetan soldiers were then given provisions and money and allowed to return home.81 Ngabo and the officers were taken back to Chamdo. Later the Chinese announced that ‘a total of 5,738 enemy troops had been liquidated’ and 180 Tibetans troops killed or wounded.82
The military action was meant as a display of Chinese military strength; it showed her determination to ‘integrate’ Tibet within the new China. The Chinese could have marched straight on to Lhasa but the repercussions would have been far-reaching. Instead they attempted to convince the Tibetan Government that a negotiated settlement could be reached, and that they were still willing to seek ‘peaceful liberation’. As the PLA were advancing into Tibet, Zhou Enlai announced at the National Committee of the CPPCC: ‘The PLA is determined to march westward to liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China. We are willing to undertake peaceful negotiations to bring about this step which is necessary for the security of our Motherland. The patriots in Tibet have expressed and welcomed this and we hope that the local authorities in Tibet will not hesitate to bring about a peaceful solution to the question.’83
On 10 November, the Chinese issued a major policy statement for the first time. It was probably written by Deng Xiaoping, who was at the time the Secretary of the South-West Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and the Political Commissar of the South-West Military Region.84 The statement embodied the CCP’s basic nationality policies and the Common Programme. Later the document became the basis for the 17-Point Agreement. It stated that:
All the religious bodies and people of our Tibet should immediately unite to give the PLA every possible assistance, so that the imperialist influence may be driven out and allow the national regional autonomy in Tibet to be realised; fraternal relationships of friendliness and mutual aid may be established with other nationalities in the country, so that a new Tibet within the new China may be built up with their help.
Now that the PLA has entered Tibet, they will protect the lives and property of all religious bodies and people, protect the freedom of religious belief for all the people of Tibet, protect all lamaseries and temples, and help the Tibetan people to develop their education, agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, and commerce, so as to improve the livelihood of the people.
The existing political system and military system in Tibet will not be changed. The existing armed forces of Tibet will become part of the national defence force of the PRC. All members of the religious bodies of all classes, government officials, and headmen will perform their duties as usual. All matters concerning reform of any kind in Tibet will be settled completely in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people and through consultation between the Tibetan people and the leadership personnel in Tibet. Government officials who were formerly pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomingtang [Guomindang] will remain at their posts and no action will be taken concerning their past actions, provided that subsequent facts prove that they have severed relations with imperialism and the Kuomingtang and that they do not carry out acts of sabotage and resistance.
The PLA vigorously maintains its discipline and will faithfully carry out the above-mentioned policies of the Central People’s Government. It will respect the religion and customs and habits of the Tibetan people, be gentle in speech, buy and sell fairly, not take a single needle or piece of thread from the people without permission, only requisition furniture with the consent of the owners and pay compensation at the market price for any damage done, pay an adequate price for the services of the men and seize animals it employs [sic].
It is hoped that our Tibetan peasants, herdsmen, workers, and traders and all other people will, without exception, live in peace and follow their pursuits happily. They must not believe lightly in rumours of disturbance and frighten themselves. This is an earnest and true proclamation.’85
Having heard the news, the Kashag decided not to give any publicity to the Chinese invasion, for it would have caused panic in Lhasa. On 14 October, the Kashag instructed Shakabpa in India to contact the Chinese Ambassador and request that they stop any further advance into Tibetan territory.86 Shakabpa did not receive the telegram until 17 October, when he immediately rang the Chinese Embassy and asked for a meeting with the ambassador. He was told that he should come to the embassy the next day. On the following day, he met with Yuan and informed him of the situation in Tibet. Yuan replied that he was aware of the news and that it was the Tibetans’ fault for not responding to the Chinese proposal.87 Yuan wanted to know the Kashag’s reply to their proposal, but once again Shakabpa was in no position to give an answer.
Despite the fact that Tibet was militarily defeated and there was no hope of repelling the PLA forces now occupying eastern Tibet, the Kashag could not agree among themselves on how to respond either to the earlier Chinese proposal or to the invasion. It was not until 21 October that the Kashag instructed Shakabpa that the National Assembly had met and had agreed that he should proceed to China for negotiations.88 Finally, the Kashag agreed to discuss the Chinese three-point proposal and gave Shakabpa the following guidelines;
(1) They should accept Tibet as part of China, as long as it does not alter the status of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan religion. [In Tibetan it says ‘accept Tibet as part of China, only in name’ (‘ming tsam’)].89
(2) Tibet should have the right to establish external relations, particularly with Nepal and India.
(3) It was unacceptable to station Chinese troops in Tibet. It would seriously threaten its religious and political systems.
(4) They should release all prisoners captured in Chamdo.90
Shakabpa was disparaging about the Kashag’s response. He felt such a compromise had come too late,91 especially since he had already recommended adoption of a similar policy. He arranged to meet the Chinese Ambassador on 23 October but a few hours before the meeting Shakabpa received a telegram. It informed him that the Kashag had submitted its proposals to the Dalai Lama, who in turn had suggested that the oracle should be consulted. The oracle had pronounced that they should not accept the Chinese proposals. Shakabpa had to keep his appointment with Yuan. Upon his arrival at the Chinese Embassy, Shakabpa was asked for the Kashag’s response. He simply said: ‘We have not received a reply.’92
The news of the fall of Chamdo and the fear of the imminent arrival of PLA troops in Lhasa alarmed officials in government circles. The Regent, the Kashag and abbots of the three great monasteries held a meeting to discuss the situation. It was evident that they did not know how they should respond to the invasion. There were factions who advocated all-out war with the PLA and others who felt a negotiated settlement should be reached. One thing was clear: no one was willing to take charge. The Tibetans have always consulted State Oracles when faced with making a difficult decision, a device that ensures neither the Kashag nor individuals are held directly responsible for unpopular or dangerous decisions.
It was agreed that the two State Oracles, Gadong and Nechung, should be consulted to ascertain the best course of action. In early November (8th of the 10th Month of the Tibetan Calendar) the Regent, the Kashag, and four Drunyigchenmos from the Yigtsang (Ecclesiastic office) consulted Gadong oracle. One of the Drunyigchenmos asked:
What course of action, violent or non-violent, should be adopted in order to protect and perpetuate the religious and political system of Tibet? And who should bear the responsibility for the political and religious system of Tibet?93
The oracle’s pronouncement was unclear. ‘If you don’t offer prayers and propitiate the deities, then you cannot protect the Dharma and well-being of all sentient beings.’ As the oracle was about to come out of the trance, the four Drunyigchenmos sought further clarification: ‘At this critical stage in the history of Tibet, when the very survival of Tibet’s religion and polity is in danger, we are hampered by our ignorance. You are the protector of Dharma and all-knowing. You must give a clear prophecy.’ This time the oracle pronounced ‘If the All-knowing and all-seeing Guru assumes responsibility for the religious and political system, then the Dharma, Tibet and all beings would benefit.’ This was of course taken to mean that the 14th Dalai Lama should assume religious and political authority. When they consulted the second oracle, Nechung, he accorded with the Gadong’s pronouncement.94
The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, was only sixteen years old at the time. Traditionally, the Dalai Lama ascended the throne at the age of eighteen but it was clear that internal factions and panic had placed severe strain on the Tibetan Government. This is how the Dalai Lama described the situation: ‘We had reached a state in which most people were anxious to avoid responsibility, rather than accept it. Yet now, under the threat of invasion, we were more in need of unity than ever before, and I, as Dalai Lama, was the only person whom everybody in the country would unanimously follow.’95 The Regent Taktra and the Kashag called a meeting of the Tibetan National Assembly (Tsogdu Gyenzom), the highest decisionmaking body of the Tibetan Government, to confirm and endorse the oracles’ pronouncement.
The National Assembly agreed to request that the young Dalai Lama assume full powers. The Dalai Lama later wrote in his autobiography: ‘I hesitated but then the National Assembly met, and added its plea to the Cabinet’s, and I saw that at such a serious moment in our history, I could not refuse my responsibilities. I had to shoulder them, put my boyhood behind me, and immediately prepare myself to lead my country, as well as I was able, against the vast power of Communist China.’ He goes on to say: ‘So I accepted, with trepidation’.96 On 17 November a ceremony was held in the Potala. It was attended by the representatives of India and Nepal, and the Chogyal of Sikkim. A message of felicitations was received from the President of India. The Regent Taktra handed over power to the young Dalai Lama. To mark the occasion an amnesty was declared for all prisoners. The Kashag instructed Surkhang Wangchen Gelek in Delhi to inform the Chinese Ambassador that the Dalai Lama had assumed full power.97
In Chamdo, Ngabo and his officials were ignorant of the developments taking place in Lhasa, and Ngabo feared that the Dalai Lama and the members of Kashag might have escaped to India. He later wrote that he and other officials were worried that the people in Lhasa might be panic-stricken by rumours about the PLA. He and thirty-six other officials therefore decided to write a joint report to Lhasa (it was addressed to ‘whomever is in power in Lhasa’). The report gave a glowing account of the behaviour of the PLA and stressed the futility of resisting the Chinese army. They advised Lhasa that if a peaceful agreement could be reached, the people would not suffer, nor would the monastic or Khim zhi (family estates) be dismantled. Therefore, for the common welfare of the people, a peaceful agreement should be reached with the Chinese.
On 7 December, Gyaltsen Phuntsog and Samlingpa Phuntsog Dorje arrived in Lhasa with a message from Ngabo. They brought a letter addressed to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag. Surkhang and other members were anxious to hear the news from Chamdo. They questioned the two messengers about the situation and the strength of the Chinese army. Gyaltsen Phuntsog informed the Kashag that he did not know the strength of the PLA. Otherwise they gave a positive report on the behaviour of the PLA and stressed that they were very well disciplined. Kalon Rampa Thupten Kunkhyen asked why the PLA ‘were strong as iron while we melt like dough’.98
Gyaltsen Phuntsog reported that after Ngabo met the Chinese Commander Wang Qimei, he was dispatched to Lhasa. It was most probable that Wang Qimei presented Ngabo with the eight-point proposal which was brought to Lhasa by Gyaltsen Phuntsog. It was the most comprehensive proposal made by the Chinese to date and included the three-point proposal the Chinese ambassador in Delhi, Yuan Zhongxian, had put to the Kashag two months earlier.
(1) Union of the five races of China in a manner not prejudicial to the interests of the minority races.
(2) Tibet to remain under the rule of the Dalai Lama.
(3) Tibetan religion to receive protection.
(4) China to help Tibet in reforming her army into a powerful defence against external aggression.
(5) China to provide Tibet with expert guidance in matters relating to agriculture, animal husbandry, commerce and industry.
(6) Administrative reform in Tibet to be undertaken only after mutual consultation between China and Tibet.
(7) Collaborationists with American, British and Kuomintang [Guomindang] interests not to be persecuted.
(8) Tibet to be assured that the liberation movement is not in support of anti-Tibetan elements like Tashilhunpo and Reting factions.99
On 12 December the National Assembly discussed the eight proposals received from Chamdo. The Kashag and the abbots of the three monasteries held a secret meeting on the security of the Dalai Lama. It was agreed that it was not safe for the Dalai Lama to remain in Lhasa. There was a passionate debate among the members. Some argued that the Chinese could not be trusted and that the Communists’ offer was described as ‘trying to lure a fly with honey spread on a sharp knife’.100 In the end, due to growing fear that the Chinese would march into Lhasa, the National Assembly agreed to negotiate. Shortly after the arrival of the messengers from Chamdo, Ngabo had secretly dispatched a separate message which stated that he was no longer free to act independently and was conforming to the wishes of his captors101 and that the Government should take any action necessary, without worrying about Ngabo himself or other officials.102
Although the PLA had not made moves to advance on Lhasa, the Tibetans feared that they might try to cut off their escape route to India. A message arrived from Lhalu, which warned of 800 PLA soldiers on horseback moving towards Lhasa from the north. The Tibetans dispatched a number of officers to stop any Chinese attempt to cut off their escape route to Dromo, a small town 150 miles from Lhasa and near the Indo-Tibetan border.103 In Lhasa there were rumours that the Americans were sending a plane to pick up the Dalai Lama and an area behind the Potala was cleared for a plane to land.104 The ruling aristocratic families began to send their wealth to India or to their estates in the country. The Tibetan Government also decided to dispatch to India substantial quantities of gold and silver which were held in the Potala Treasury.
On the night of 16 December, the Dalai Lama, dressed as a commoner, with two tutors and the members of the Kashag, left Lhasa for Dromo. This caused panic in Lhasa among the ruling élite, but the authorities were unable to prevent people from leaving, nor could they instruct anyone to stay. Therefore it was decided that important officials should consult the oracles on whether they should leave or not.105 Heinrich Harrer writes, ‘every day caravans of heavily laden mules were seen leaving the town in charge of the men of the bodyguard. Consequently, the nobles hesitated no longer and began to move their families and treasures into safer places.’106 The Indian representative in Lhasa informed Delhi that the Tibetan spirit of resistance seemed dead and that they were merely trying to postpone the arrival of the Chinese through negotiations.107 Before the Dalai Lama left Lhasa, Lukangwa Tsewang Rapten and a monk official Lobsang Tashi were appointed as the joint caretaker Prime Ministers (Sitsab).