1 Hugh Richardson, 1984, p. 173. Later Nehru hinted his regret and admitted that ‘. . . in the early days after independence and partition, our hands were full . . . and we had to face very difficult situations in our country. We ignored . . . Tibet. Not being able to find a suitable person to act as our representative at Lhasa, we allowed for some time the existing British representative to continue at Lhasa.’ Foreign Affairs Record, April (1959): IV, p. 120.
2 The Chinese name for Tibet is Xizang, which means literally the ‘treasure house’ of the Western region.
3 The five races were Han, Manchu, Mongols, Uygurs and Tibetans. The Nationalists did not mention the other ethnic groups that existed in China.
4 Summary of World Broadcasts, Part V, 1949, No. 24, p. 22 (hereafter cited as SWB).
5 Common Programme, Article 50: ‘All nationalities within the boundaries of the People’s Republic of China are equal. Unity and mutual help shall be effected among them to oppose imperialism and the public enemies within these nationalities so that the People’s Republic of China will become a big family of fraternity and cooperation of all nationalities. Greater nationalism and chauvinism shall be opposed and acts of discrimination, oppression and splitting the unity of the various nationalities, shall be prohibited.’
6 Jonathan Spence, 1990, p. 551
7 See differing views of General Huang’s visit to Lhasa; Hugh Richardson, 1977, Bulletin of Tibetology, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 31–5 and Tieh-Tseng Li, 1960. pp. 168–72. Li writes: ‘Besides taking in the memorial service for the late Dalai Lama, General Huang issued a proclamation emphatically urging the Tibetan people to place their trust and reliance in the National Government.’
8 Tsipon Shakabpa, 1967. p. 277.
9 Tieh-Tseng Li, 1960, pp. 169–70.
10 Shakabpa, 1967, p. 277.
11 Tieh-Tseng Li, 1960, p. 180. Li states that the purpose of Wu Zhongxin’s visit to Lhasa was to ‘officiate at the installation ceremony of the new Dalai Lama’. Basil Gould, the British representative at the ceremony, reported that the Chinese were not treated more favorably than other foreign representatives. (Basil Gould, A Report on the Discovery, Recognition and Installation of the 14th Dalai Lama, India Office (London), L/P&S/12/4179). See also Ngabo Ngawang Jigme’s speech to the second plenary session of the 5th Tibet Autonomous Region Peoples’ Congress. At this meeting (31 July 1989) Ngabo accused the Communists of accepting Guomindang propaganda, pointing out that his own research using Guomindang archives in Nanjing and what he had witnessed showed that Wu Zongxin’s mission did not preside over the enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama. Later the Communists accepted Ngabo’s claim but Chinese propaganda continues to propagate the idea that Wu Zhongxin had presided over the ceremony. For a recent Chinese statement on this issue see SWB, 1988, FE/0175/B2/2.
12 PRO (London), FO 371–76315: MR, 1 August 1948.
13 Ibid.
14 SWB, 1949, No. 17, p. 21.
15 Ibid, p. 27.
16 Tieh-Tseng Li, 1960, p. 199. Melvyn Goldstein (1989, p. 613) says that the idea originated with Ngabo, but Phuntsog Tashi Takla told me that Ngabo was not involved at all in this episode.
17 Lhawutara, lHa’u rta-ra Thub-bstan bstan-dar, 1982, p. 93.
18 Interview with Phuntsog Tashi Takla (hereafter cited as Takla).
19 Interview with Richardson.
20 FO 371–76315: MR, 1 August 1948.
21 Ibid.
22 Tharchin was interviewed by Dawa Norbu, ‘G. Tharchin: Pioneer and Patriot’, TR, December 1975, pp. 18–20.
23 FO 371–76315: MR, 1 August 1948.
24 Ibid: MR, 14 November 1949.
25 Melvyn Goldstein, 1989, pp.612–13.
26 Rinchen Dolma Taring, 1970, p. 171.
27 The terms Shape (zhabs-pad), Sawang Chenmo (sa-dbang chen-mo) and Kalon (dka’ blon) are interchangeable and refer to a member of the Kashag (bka’ shag ).
28 There were four Drungyigchenmo (drung-yig chen-mo). They were the heads of the Ecclesiastic Office, the body which constituted one of the most powerful segments of Tibetan bureaucracy. All matters relating to religious and monastic affairs came under the jurisdiction of Drungyigchenmo. They also had a say in secular affairs. All four Drungyigchenmo were always monks.
29 There were four Tsipons (rtsis-dpon), who were responsible for government finance. The term is loosely translated as ‘finance minster’.
30 FO 371–84453: MR, 15 December 1949.
31 Ibid.
32 SWB, 1950, No 42. p. 43.
33 Notes on a conversation with Mr Reid, FO 371–84449.
34 India Office Records, L/P&S/12/2175: Tibet supply of arms by GOI.
35 FO 371–84453: MR, 15 February 1950.
36 The 1914 Simla Convention, which was initialled by three participants, China, Britain and Tibet, but was never signed. China refused to recognise the Convention. However, Tibet and Britain signed a joint declaration, ‘which acknowledged the draft Convention to be binding on the two governments’.
37 FO 371–76315: MR 14 November 1949.
38 Heinrich Harrer, 1953. p. 235.
39 FO 371–84453: MR, 16 March 1950.
40 FO 371–84465.
41 FO 371–84469. Britain was opposed to supplying arms to Tibet because ‘of the serious risk that such supplies might fall into Communist hands’.
42 Notes on a conversation with Mr Reid, FO 371–84449.
43 FO 371–84453: MR, 15 January 1950.
44 See Alastair Lamb, The McMahon Line, A study in the Relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904–1914. (London, Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1966). The actual boundary between Lhasa-controlled Kham and territories which fell within Chinese jurisdiction is not fully clear. The Tibetan Government claimed jurisdiction over all Tibetan-speaking people in eastern Tibet, which would have established the Sino–Tibetan boundary as far as Tachienlu. The Chinese insisted that the boundary was at Gyamda, 100 miles from Lhasa. See also Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh, Himalayan Triangle, (London, The British Library, 1988). It has an excellent reproduction of maps from the Simla Convention on page 76.
45 A communiqué issued by the Chinese stated there were 2,317 men and 2,000 militia. NCNA, 8 November 1960.
46 Robert Ford, 1958, p. 29.
47 Ibid, p. 36.
48 Takla.
49 FO 371–84453: MR, 15 May 1950.
50 Melvyn Goldstein, 1989, p. 687.
51 Interview with Chagtral Sonam Chophel, Oral Archives, LTWA (hereafter cited as Chagtral Sonam Chophel). In Tibetan, rigs-ngan chan-gyi khri yi gdan ’zin /tha-ma Bod ’di rgGa yi ’oga-du tsud.
52 FO 371–84453: MR 15 June 1950.
53 Chagtral Sonam Chophel.
54 FO 371–84453: MR 16 March 1950.
55 Ibid.
56 The 1948 Trade Mission first visited China. They travelled to China on Chinese passports. The Chinese Government refused to recognise Tibetan passports. See Tsering Shakya, ‘1948 Trade Mission to United Kingdom. An Essay in honour of Tsipon Shakabpa’, TJ, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1990), pp. 114–115.
57 A monk member of the Kashag is known as Kalon Lama (bka’-blon bla ma).
58 FO 371–76315: MR 15 August 1950.
59 Lowell Thomas Jr, 1954, p. 275.
60 FO 371–84460.
61 FO 371–76317.
62 Ibid.
63 Melvyn Goldstein, 1989, pp. 626–7, and R. D. Taring, 1970, p.170.
64 FO 371–84453: MR 15 January 1950.
65 Tsering Shakya, 1990, pp. 97–114.
66 FO 371–76317.
67 FO 371–76314.
68 Ibid.
69 FO 371–84461.
70 FO 371–76314.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 FO 371–84469.
74 The Dalai Lama, 1985 (3rd ed), p. 8.
75 FO 371–84465.
76 See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS), 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East; China: 1065–1071. Memorandum by Miss Ruth E. Bacon of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse). This memo discusses arguments for and against recognition of Tibetan Independence.
77 FO 371–84453.
78 FRUS, 1949, Vol. IX, p. 1065.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 1075.
81 Ibid., p. 1076.
82 Ibid., p. 1078.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., p. 1081.
85 Ibid., pp. 1087–8. The text of the letter was similar to one which had been sent to Ernest Bevin.
86 Ibid., p. 1091.
87 Ibid., p. 109.
88 Ibid., p. 1096.
89 FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 276.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 284.
93 FO 371–84469.
94 Ibid.
95 FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 424.
96 Ibid.
97 Stephen Ambrose, 1983, p. 169.
98 FO 371–84469.
99 FRUS, 1950, p. 424.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 FO 371–84469.
107 FO 371–84463.
108 FO 371–63943.
109 FO 371–84453: MR, 15 December 1949.
110 FO 371–84457.
111 FO 371–75798.
112 K. M. Panikkar, 1955, p. 103.
113 Ibid., p. 106.
114 Ibid.
115 Sarvepalli Gopal, 1979 (Vol. 2), p. 243.
116 FRUS, 1949, Vol. IX, p. 1082.
117 FO 371–76314.
118 Ibid.
119 This refers to a Memorandum given by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to T.V. Soong (who was not only the brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek but also in charge of Chinese foreign policy). In 1943 on a visit to London Soong sought clarification of the British position on Tibet. On 28 July 1943 Eden agreed to provide Soong with a written statement. The key wording was that that British Government ‘have always been prepared to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but only on the understanding that Tibet is regarded as autonomous’ (emphasis added). For discussion on the subject see: Alastair Lamb, Tibet, China & India 1914–1950, A History of Imperial Diplomacy (Roxford Books, 1989), pp. 320–7.
120 FO 371–76314 (emphasis added). Some officials in the FO and Common-wealth Relations Office suggested that India should make it conditional for recognition of the PRC that the autonomy of Tibet should be guaranteed by the PRC.
121 FO 371–84453: MR, 15 December 1949.
122 FO 371–76317.
123 FO 371–76315: MR, 14 November 1949.
124 Shakabpa, 1967, p. 300.
125 Takla.
126 FO 371–84470.
127 Ibid.
128 FO 371–84468.
129 FO 371–84470.
130 Ibid.
131 FO 371–84470.
132 FO 371–84468.
133 FO 371–84470.
134 Phuntsog Tashi Takla confirmed that they went to the airport and did not suspect that they would be prevented from boarding the plane. They had confirmed tickets and checked in when Indian security officers told them they could not leave.
135 FO 371–84470.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 FO 371–84468.
139 FO 371–84470.
140 Here I have used the term ‘priest and patron’ as used by Shakabpa in his book. Generally the term ‘priest and patron’ gives a misleading rendering of Tibetan term mchod yon. For a discussion on the topic, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, ‘MCHOD YON, YON MCHOD and MCHOD GNAS/YON GNAS: On the historiography and Semantic of a Tibetan Religio-social and Religio-political concept’, in Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), Tibetan History and Language (Wien, 1991), pp. 440–53. For a detailed study of the nature of the Chinese–Tibetan relationship, see Zahiruddin Ahmad, Sino–Tibetan relations in the 17th Century (Roma, IMEO, 1970); Luciano Petech, China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century (Leiden, 1970). For an interesting theoretical interpretation of Sino-Tibetan relationship, see Dawa Norbu, ‘An analysis of Sino–Tibetan relationships 1245–1911: Imperial Power, Non-Coercive regime and Military dependency’, in Babara Aziz and Mathew Kapstein (eds), Soundings in Tibetan Civilization (New Delhi, Manohar, 1985), pp. 176–95.
141 Shakabpa writes that he was given a booklet and does not seem to have been aware that it was actually the ‘Common Program’ and the articles 50–53 were the basis of the Communist Policy toward minority groups. Zhwa sgab pa, 1976, p. 419.
142 Zhwa sgab pa, 1976, p. 420.
143 Ibid. In Tibetan, ‘Bod ming-tsam gyi rgya-khongs zhal-bzhes gnang-rgyu.’
144 FO 371–84469.
1 Tibet lost control of areas east of Drichu in the early part of the twentieth century. At the Simla Conference of 1914, the Tibetan Government claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Kham and Amdo. The Chinese refused to accept the Tibetan claim. The conference divided Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet with the Lhasa Government exercising political authority over Outer Tibet and the Chinese maintaining control over ‘Inner Tibet’, or Kham. The Nationalist Government created the province of Sikang (Xikang) in 1936, which their map showed extending up to Kongpo Gyamda, less than 150 miles from Lhasa. But they did not exercise any control west of the Drichu. Needless to say, the Nationalist regime in Taiwan does not accept any regional administrative reform made by the PRC and maps published in Taiwan continue to show the province of Sikang. (See: S. A. M. Adshead, Province and Politics in late Imperial China: Viceregal Government in Szechwan, 1898–1911, pp. 55–9. Curzon Press, 1984).
2 For a detailed account of the Communists’ experience in Kham, see Elliot Sperling, 1976, TR, 10:XI, pp. 11–18.
3 Mao told Edgar Snow, ‘This is our only foreign debt and some day we must pay the Mantzu and the Tibetans for the provisions we were obliged to take from them’. Edgar Snow, 1938, p. 193.
4 The Red Army was coming under increasing pressure from government troops and they were divided over the direction in which the Red Army should retreat. Zhang Guotao, one of the founder members of the party in 1921, argued that the army should march westward, but this would have led them further into Tibetan territory. Mao wanted the army to move north. It was Zhou Enlai who advised that it would be wiser to move north on the grounds that the western regions were inhabited by non-Chinese and that they might turn against them, as they had done in Sikang.
5 Edgar Snow, 1938, p. 192.
6 It is interesting to note that all those Tibetans who became Communists adopted Chinese names.
7 Israel Epstein, 1983. p. 15. He claims there were 2,000 Tibetan Communists, many of whom were killed during the war with the Nationalists. This seems unlikely, as that number of Communist Party members would have had a major impact on Tibetan society.
8 It is not clear whether Geta Rinpoche went through an ideological conversion or merely desired to be on the winning side. The former seems unlikely.
9 SWB, 1950, No. 42, p. 28.
10 The Tibetans were aware of the anti-religious stance of the Communists through what had happened in Mongolia during the 1920s and 1930s. It is interesting that in the ‘Last Testament of the 13th Dalai Lama’ he stated: ‘this present era is rampant with the five forms of degeneration, in particular the red ideology. In Outer Mongolia, the search for a reincarnation of Jetsun Dampa was banned; the monastic properties and endowments were confiscated; the Lamas and the monks were forced into the army; and the Buddhist religion destroyed, leaving no trace of identity.’ And he went on to say: ‘In future, this system will certainly be a force either from within or outside this land . . .’
11 SWB, 1950, No. 51, p. 27.
12 The ‘Eight-Point Contract’ was proclaimed by Mao and Zhu De on 25 April 1949. See Tibet 1950–1967 (Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1968) (URI) pp. 731–4.
13 This office grew out of a Mongol Affairs Office created by the Manchu. When the Nationalists (Guomindang) came to power, they established the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, which continues to function in Taiwan (The Republic of China.)
14 FO 371–84453. MR: 15 March 1950.
15 The Panchen Rinpoche is believed to the incarnation of ’od dpag med (Tib), or Amitabha (Skt), ‘the Buddha of Boundless Light’. The title Panchen literally means ‘Great Scholar’. In much western writing on Tibet, Panchen Rinpoche is referred to as the Panchen Lama or the Tashi Lama, derived from the name of his monastery, Tashilhunpo. I have preferred to use the correct Tibetan title, ‘Panchen Rinpoche’.
16 Under current Chinese administration it is referred to as Yushu.
17 Some sources refer to him as the 6th Panchen Lama or the 9th Panchen Lama. This is because the 5th Dalai Lama first gave the title of Panchen to Lobsang Choekyi Gyaltsen (1570–1662) and the title was conferred retrospectively on previous incarnations, so that Lobsang Chokyi Gyaltsen became referred to as either the 4th Panchen or 1st Panchen Lama of Tashilhunpo.
18 In 1910 the thirteenth Dalai Lama went into exile in India and on his return to Tibet he attempted to introduced reforms to modernise Tibet’s social and political systems. Tibet’s traditional system allowed the Panchen Rinpoche’s estates in Tsang to be treated as autonomous with the right to raise own revenue. The thirteenth Dalai Lama wanted greater contributions from the Panchen Rinpoche’s estates to help with the costs of modernisation. He also wanted to reduce the autonomy exercised by his estates. The Lhasa Government wanted the Panchen’s estate to meet a quarter of the total expenditure. By 1922, it was reported that the Panchen estate had defaulted and that some officials of the Tashilhunpo monastery had been arrested by the Lhasa Government. The Panchen requested the British Trade Agent in Gyantse to mediate between Lhasa and Shigatse but the British refused to be involved. On 26 December 1923, the Panchen Rinpoche, accompanied by a hundred attendants, left Shigatse for eastern Tibet.
19 Tibet: Myth vs. Reality (Beijing Review Publication, 1988), pp. 135–7 (emphasis added).
20 Ibid.
21 FO 371–76315: MR, 15 September 1949.
22 Ibid.
23 FO 371–84453: MR, 15 January 1950.
24 Ibid.
25 SWB, 23 May 1950, No. 58, p. 15.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Robert Ford, 1957, p. 53.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 ‘rGyal mtshan phun tsog (Gyaltsen Phuntsog) ’Nga mdo-spyi’i las-byar bskyod skabs kyi gnas-tshul ’ga’-zhig’ (An Account of my work in Kham), in: Bod kyi rig-gnas lo-rgyus dpyad-gzhi’i rgyu-cha bdams bsgrigs (Sources on Culture and History of Tibet, hereafter cited as SCHT), 1986, Vol. 9, pp.13–29.
33 FO 371–84453: MR, 16 July 1950.
34 Zhwa sgab pa, 1976, p. 430.
35 Ford, 1957, p. 58.
36 Ibid., p. 62.
37 Ibid., p. 64.
38 SWB, 1950, No. 69, p. 36.
39 SWB, 1950, No. 56, p. 24.
40 SWB, 1950, No. 57, p. 49.
41 Ibid.
42 Geoffrey T. Bull, When Iron Gates Yield (London, Hodder and Stoughton, no date), p. 100.
43 An account published in Tibet in 1990 by Wang Gui (dBang Ku’i) states that Geta Rinpoche had personally volunteered to go to Tibet to advise the Tibetan Government. He was also carrying a letter from the South-West Military Region commander. See dBang Ku’i, ‘Bod du dpung bskyod byed-skabs dGestag sphrul-sku’i skor thos-rdogs byong-ba’i gnas-tshul phrin-bu, in Bod-kyi lo-rgyus rig-gnas dpyud gzhi’i rgyu cha-bdmas bsgrigs’, 1992, Vol. 5, No. 14, pp. 252–72.
44 Robert Ford, 1957, p. 77.
45 Ibid.
46 FO 371–84453: MR, 15 June 1950. A report written by Hugh Richardson states that the group was led by a former officer of Ma Pu-fang and entered Lhasa disguised as traders. The group was also accompanied by two Khampas from Lithang, one of whom was the real leader of the party.
47 Thupten Jigme Norbu, 1961, p. 230. Norbu wrote that when the Chinese approached him to lead the mission to Lhasa, he insisted that he would like to take twenty high-ranking dignitaries from Kumbum to add weight to the mission. The Chinese authorities vetted the list of names he presented and finally only approved of two people.
48 Interview with Thupten Norbu, in oral archives of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala.
49 Ibid. He states that the Chinese wanted the delegation to be accompanied by PLA. Norbu told the Chinese that this would be seen as provocation by the Tibetans.
50 Ibid.
51 When the group eventually arrived at the Tibetan frontier, there were thirty people in Thubten Norbu’s party and another 140 people who were on pilgrimage. In all there were 3,000 yaks, 500 horses and mules. See Thubten Norbu, 1961, p. 234.
52 Thubten Norbu, 1961, p. 235.
53 Ibid.
54 Ford, 1957, p. 102.
55 Ibid. It appears from later actions that Ngabo was determined to avoid being captured by the Chinese. He wanted to retreat to Lhokha Dzong, but his party was encircled by the PLA and his escape route cut off (emphasis added).
56 SWB, 1950, No. 70, p. 46.
57 Zhwa sgab pa, 1976, p. 420.
58 Ibid., p. 421.
59 Ibid., p. 422.
60 Ibid. Shakabpa described the situation as ‘the water line had reached the brim and was about to cause a flood’ (in Tibetan: da-cha chu rags-gtugs la bslebs-pas).
61 Ibid.
62 It seems to me that the Chinese invasion of Tibet could at least partly have been prompted by the American involvement in Korea, which led China to believe that the USA had taken the first step towards an invasion of China from three directions: Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan. At the time Tibet was China’s Achilles’ heel. Therefore if China were to face a showdown with US, it was imperative that its political and military position in Tibet be secured.
63 Account published in Tibet by Khreng tse kri (SCHT, 1982, vol. I, pp. 211–55) who witnessed the invasion, states that the actual invasion began at midnight on 5 October, 1950, whereas Xinhua reported that the PLA attacked on 7 October. I believe that the PLA might have dispatched a reconnaissance party before the actual invasion on the 7th. Depending on the success of the reconnaissance raid, they would have decided to launch the main thrust of the invasion on 7 October. The date was very significant because China announced its military support to the North Koreans on the same day. The decision to deploy Chinese troops in Korea was only taken on 2 October, making the few days between 2 and 6 October a critical period in which the Chinese military prepared the final move both in Korea and Tibet. I believe that the decision to invade was taken in conjunction with their thinking over Korea.
64 During the Sino–Japanese war Liu Bocheng became known as ‘one of the best field commanders in the Red Army’. Evans Carlson, an American military official who met Liu in 1938, described him as ‘one of the best tacticians and students of military history’. See Robert B. Rigg, Red China’s Fighting Hordes, Harrisburg, 1951, p. 32.
65 Chang Kuohua [Zhang Guohua] ‘Tibet Returns to the Bosom of the Motherland (Revolutionary Reminiscences)’, SCMP, No. 2854, 6 November 1962, pp. 1–12.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ford, 1957, p. 108.
69 Ibid., p. 116. Ford writes that some of Derge Se’s troops fled before the Chinese attack. This is also confirmed by Bull who writes that there was very little fighting between the Tibetans and the PLA.
70 Geoffrey Bull, p. 107.
71 Ibid., p. 109.
72 Ibid., p. 110.
73 Ford, 1957, p. 111.
74 Ibid., pp. 111–13.
75 Aristocratic picnics were lavish affairs often lasting for several days. There is a popular belief that at the time of the invasion many high-ranking Tibetan officials were engrossed in playing mah jong.
76 See Melvyn Goldstein, 1989, p. 692 for full text of the conversation between Tsogo and Dumra.
77 Ford, 1957, p. 122.
78 Ibid., p. 123.
79 Ibid., p. 135.
80 Ibid., p. 137.
81 Ibid., p. 138. G. Bull writes that when Derge Se’s troops surrendered they were also given a talk and money. This was very effective propaganda. Later the soldiers gave glowing accounts of their treatment by the PLA.
82 Tibet 1950–67, URI, 1968, p. 2. An account written by Chang Kuohua [Zhang Guohua] states that ‘altogether 21 large and small scale engagement were fought, and over 5,700 enemy men were destroyed’. See SCMP, No. 2854 (1962), p. 6.
83 SWB, 1950, No. 77. p. 39.
84 One of the major charges against Deng Xioaping during the Cultural Revolution was his failure to adopt a class perspective on the Tibetan problem, instead trying to appease the upper classes.
85 Tibet 1950–67, URI, 1968, pp. 8–9.
86 Zhwa sgab pa, 1976, p. 422.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., p. 425.
89 Ibid., p. 425.
90 Zhwa sgab pa, 1976, pp. 246–147.
91 Ibid., p. 226. To describe the Tibetan proposals Shakabpa used a Tibetan saying which is similar to the English proverb about ‘Closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.’
92 Zhwa sgab pa, 1976, pp. 246–147.
93 Ha’u rta ra thub bstan bstan dar, 1982.
94 I have used the description of the event written by Lhawutara Thupten Tender, ‘Bod zhi-bas bcings-’grol ’byung-thabs skor gyi gros-mthun don-tshan bcu-bdun la ming-rtgas bkod-p’i sngon-rjes su’ (An Account of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet and the signing of the 17-Point Agreement). SCHT. Vol. 1 (1982), pp. 88–117.
95 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 83.
96 Ibid.
97 The Chinese interpret this differently. Yuan Shan writes that ‘according to usual practice, the Dalai Lama’s assumption of the reins of government would become legally effective only after the approval of China’s Central Government. Through the repeated consultation of the principal officials in the local government of Tibet, it was decided that due to the inconvenient transportation conditions between Tibet and the interior, the letter was brought to India by Surkhang.’ See Yuan Shan, ‘The Dalai Lama and 17 Article Agreement’, Renmin Ribao overseas edition, Beijing, 22 April 1991. As published in SWB, 24 April 1991, B2/1.
98 rGyl-mtshan phun-tsogs, 1986, p. 24.
99 DO 35/3096: MR, 15 December 1950.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. See Ngabo, 1989. He confirms that he did send a second set of messengers, Lhodro Kalsang and Chagdrul Chichag, to Lhasa but does not mention what he had told them.
102 Interview with Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
103 lHa’u rta ra thub bstan bstan dar, 1982, pp. 88–117.
104 Ibid. lHa’u rta ra states that the Kashag received a message from Shakabpa in India, which stated that the Americans were going to provide military assistance and that a plane would land in Lhasa to pick up the Dalai Lama. Shakabpa mentions no such message in his book. Nor are there any other archive sources which confirm this. However, it was true that the Tibetans did begin to prepare a landing strip, as indicated by Lhawutara. In an interview Phuntsog Tashi Takla (who was in India with Shakabpa) told me there was an American plan to send a plane to Lhasa and Shakabpa had been meeting separately with CIA officers in India. There is no mention of these meetings in United States Foreign Relations Documents. The Dalai Lama told me that Thupten Gyalpo (one of the members of Shakabpa’s delegation to China), who was in then India, later told him that an American individual had offered to fly to Lhasa and rescue him.
105 Ibid.
106 Heinrich Harrer, 1953, p. 274.
107 FRUS, Vol XII, (1951), p. 1507.
1 DO 35/3096.
2 Text of the cablegram from Kashag to UNO; UN document no A/15549. Tibet in the United Nations, 1950–1961, published by the Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New Delhi.
3 Tsering Shakya, ‘Tibet and League of Nations’, TJ, X:3 (1985), pp. 48–56.
4 FO 371–84454.
5 Ibid.
6 DO 35/3095.
7 Foreign Relations of the United States Vol. VI: East Asia (1950), p. 546. This refers to the question of the legality of the integration of Hyderabad into India. Hyderabad was ruled by a Muslim ruler, with only 11 per cent Muslim population. On the eve of Indian Independence, the Nazim had not acceded either to India or Pakistan. As there was growing tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, India feared that the Nazim of Hyderabad might support Pakistan, thus presenting India with a major security problem in South and Central India. In September 1948, India had occupied Hyderabad.
8 Ibid., p. 578.
9 FO 371–84454.
10 Article 35(2) of the UN Charter: ‘a state which is not a member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purpose of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present charter’.
11 FO 371–84454.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 FRUS, Vol. VI, (1950), pp. 550–1.
16 Ibid., p. 577.
17 DO 35/3094.
18 Tibetans knew nothing of El Salvador. Rene von Nebesky-Wojkowitz, an Austrian Tibetologist who was living in Kalimpong, remembers that Surkhang visited Prince Peter of Greece, who was also staying in Kalimpong at the time, to inquire as to the whereabouts of El Salvador. Prince Peter opened an atlas and pointed to the map using a magnifying glass. Surkhang disappointedly exclaimed, ‘But this State is hardly as big as Bhutan’. Nebesky writes that Tibetans were ‘under the impression that San Salvador was one of the Great Powers’. Rene von Nebesky-Wojkowitz, 1956, p. 102.
19 Tibet in the United Nations, 1950–1961, p. 6.
20 This was clearly was not the case. The Foreign Office made an exhaustive study of the legal status of Tibet and had reached the conclusion that Tibet had all the features of a State (emphasis added).
21 Tibet in the United Nations, 1950–1961, p. 14.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 FO 371–84454 (emphasis added).
25 There was also misunderstanding regarding the Chinese and Indian interpretation of the word autonomy. The Indian and the British understanding of the word is based on what is commonly known as the Eden Memorandum, which recognised Tibet’s right to ‘internal’ and ‘external’ autonomy. When the Chinese informed the Indians that China would respect Tibet’s autonomy, it meant something entirely different. The Chinese used the word in its narrowest sense, and it rejected Tibet’s right to maintain external relations.
26 FRUS, Vol. VI, (1950), p. 584. Bajpai also told Henderson that the statement made by Rau was ‘his own interpretation’ of the Chinese note to Delhi. On 30 November Bajpai told the British High Commissioner (A. Nye) that he had received a report from the Indian Mission in Lhasa, and that ‘there is no repeat no truth in the reports that the Tibetans and Chinese are entering into discussion’.
27 FO 371–84455. Bajpai told Nye this was the instruction sent to Rau at the UN.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. Letter from Sir P. Dixon to Sir Gladwyn Jebb.
31 Ibid. (emphasis added).
32 Ibid.
33 FRUS, Vol. VI (1950), p. 611.
34 Ibid., p. 612.
35 DO 35/3094. The same document is printed in FRUS, Vol. VI (1950), pp. 612–3 (emphasis added).
36 DO 35/3094.
37 FRUS, Vol. VII (1950), p. 1528.
38 Lu’o Yus-hung, ‘Bod zhi-bas bcings’-grol skor gyi nyin-tho gnad bshus’ (Diary of Peaceful Liberation of Tibet) SCHT, Vol. 1 (1951), p. 118. This was also confirmed to me by Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
39 Interview with Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
40 Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, Rang-skyong ljong mi-dmangs ’thus-tshogs rgyun kyi kru’u-rin Nga-phod Ngag-dbang ‘jigs-med kyi rang-skyong ljongs kyi skabs lnga-pa’i mi-dmang ’thus-tshog du-thengs gnyis-pa’i thog ngang-ba’i gal che’i gsung-bshad. (Speech by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 5th Tibet Autonomous People’s Congress; hereafter cited as Ngabo 1989).
41 Ibid.
42 The Dalai Lama, 1985, pp. 85–6.
43 lHa’u rta ra thub bstan bstan dar, 1982.
44 Although four members of the delegation have written their account of the meeting, none has listed the original ten-point proposal given by the Kashag. I asked Phuntsog Tashi Takla, who does not recall the ten points. Similarly, M. Goldstein says Sambo also stated that he did not recall the ten points. Lhawutara writes that the Tibetan delegation presented a ‘nine-point proposal’ but does not mention what the points were.
45 lHa’u rta-ra thub-bstan bstan-dar (1982). His account of the meeting was confirmed by P. T. Takla. Indian records of the meeting differ slightly from the account given by lHa’u rta-ra. The Indian records make no mention of Tibet’s request for GOI to mediate between China and Tibet. Bajpai told A. Nye that the Tibetan delegation told him that they intended resisting any deployment of Chinese troops in Tibet and would seek to maintain the traditional close ties with the GOI whose representative should remain in Lhasa.
46 Sambo in an interview with M. Goldstein states that he was alone at the railway station, but Takla remembers both he and Sandhu Rinchen were there.
47 In Tibetan, nang khul du rang btsan bdag yin dgos.
48 Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, 1989.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 It is interesting that Ngabo seems to imply that only point worth discussing was the status of Tibet and that if the Kashag was only to accept Tibet as part of China then he felt other issues were of such a minor consequence that it was pointless to press the Chinese, who were willing to agree to minor adjustments.
52 Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
53 lHa’u rta ra, 1982.
54 Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
55 A writer with long experience of negotiating with the Chinese noted: ‘It can be argued that limiting the agenda in one’s favour is a common tactic of international negotiations and no monopoly of the Chinese. Yet the Chinese seem to attach a special importance to the agenda, and the intensity with which they insist on the inclusion or exclusion of certain subjects surprises many international negotiators. Agreement to put a subject on the agenda seems to imply to the Chinese a certain concession on the matter. The Chinese do not share the view widely held in western countries that agreement on the agenda does not necessarily prejudice the nature of a negotiation.’ (Oguru Kazuo, ‘How the “Inscrutable” Negotiate with the “Inscrutables”: Chinese Negotiating Tactics Vis-À Vis the Japanese’. CQ, 79 [1979], pp. 528–52.) The Tibetans’ experience seems to confirm Oguru Kazuo’s statement.
56 Words such as ‘the People’ and ‘Liberation’ caused particular difficulties (see Huang Mingxin, ‘The Tibetan Version of the 17-Article Agreement’, China’s Tibet [Autumn 1992], pp. 12–15). It is interesting to note that author writes, ‘in the Tibetan language, there was no word which meant ‘China’. When the Tibetans use the word ‘rGya nag’, this excludes the Tibetans, and explicitly recognises Tibetan separateness from China.
57 lHa’u rta-ra, (1982), pp. 106–7. His account published in Tibet does not mention the incident. However, he writes that, as instructed by the Kashag, he objected to the deployment of the PLA in Tibet and therefore the meeting broke down for several days during which time he was worried that the PLA troops might have resumed their advance in Tibet. Accounts published in India by members of the delegation agree that the meeting broke down because of lHa’u rta-ra’s questioning and Li Weihan’s statement. See Sambo’s autobiography, ’mi-tshe’ rba-rlabs ’khrug-po, (1987), p. 109. A biography of lHa’u rta-ra published in India by his former secretary, Tenzin Gyaltsen, and entitled simply ‘lHa’u rta ra’, (1988) also confirms the threat made by Li Weihan (pp. 20–1). P. T. Takla also confirmed this account.
58 lHa’u rta ra (1982), pp. 106–7.
59 SWB, No. 111, 5 June 1951.
60 Jiang Ping, ‘Great Victory for the Cause of National Unity and Progress’, China’s Tibet, Spring (1991), p.8.
61 Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, 1989.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Jiang Ping (1991), p. 8.
65 Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, 1989.
66 Ibid.
67 Jiang Ping, 1991.
68 Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, 1989.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 lH’u rta ra, 1982, p. 108.
72 SWB, No. 111, 5 June 1951, p. 9.
73 Takla Phuntsog Tashi.
74 Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, 1989.
75 Phala Thupten Woden, Oral Archives of LTWA, Dharamsala.
76 The exiled Tibetans and their supporters usually claim that the Agreement is invalid because the seals were forged, an argument which is disingenuous and which does not take account of subsequent developments. This also implies that the Chinese had surreptitiously affixed the seals to the document, which was not the case. The delegation was fully aware that the Chinese had the seals newly made.
In 1992 the Chinese held a press conference in Beijing to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Agreement. At the conference Ngabo was asked by a journalist whether the seals were forged or not. He simply replied that they were made in Beijing.
77 lHa’u rta-ra, 1982, p. 108.
78 The Dalai Lama 1985, p. 88.
79 Ibid.
80 lHa’u rta-ra, 1982, pp. 108–9.
81 Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
82 This of course depended on India’s approval.
83 FRUS, Vol. VII, Part 2 (1951), p. 1609.
84 Ibid. p. 1611.
85 Ibid. pp. 1612–13.
86 FRUS, Vol. VII, Part 2 (1951), pp. 1687–9.
87 Ibid.
88 US documents refer to Thubten Norbu by the formal title, Takster. I have used his personal name.
89 FRUS, Vol. VII, Part 2 (1951), pp. 1689–91.
90 Ibid., p. 1692.
91 Ibid., p. 1696.
92 FO 371 84469.
93 Interview with George Patterson. Also a number of former Indian Intelligence officers working in Kalimpong (commonly known as ‘Watchers’) told me that they kept surveillance on American visitors to Kalimpong and were aware that Tibetan officials were meeting with the Americans.
94 FRUS, 1951, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1694–5.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., pp. 1707–10.
97 Ibid.
98 DO 35/2931.
99 Ibid.
100 DO 35/3097.
101 FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 2 (1951), p. 1719.
102 Ibid., p. 1717.
103 FRUS, Vol. VII, Part 2 (1951), p. 1718.
104 Ibid., p. 1726.
105 Ibid.
106 DO 35/3097.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 DO 35/3097. It is difficult to argue that the individual members of the Tibetan delegation were coerced. However, the second argument could be applied to this case. Though Ngabo himself had written that he was instructed to consult Dromo before signing any agreement, clearly he did not do so.
110 FRUS, Vol. VII (1951), p. 1722.
111 The full title of the paper was Mirror of News from all sides of the World. The paper was founded in 1925 and was published and edited by Tharchin himself. Originally the paper was funded by a Scottish Missionary group, but later when Tharchin fell out with the group he decided to raise the finance himself and became the sole owner of the paper. During the Second World War many local papers had to close because of shortage of paper, but the British Political officer in Sikkim, Basil Gould, allowed the paper to continue and moreover secured government funding for the paper. Gould argued that since this was the only Tibetan newspaper, it should be considered as a part of the war propaganda effort. After the war the funding was withdrawn and Tharchin had to rely on the patronage of wealthy friends. It ceased publication in 1964, but by this time the Tibetan Exile Government had founded a new Tibetan paper called Rang-dbang ser-shog (Freedom Press). It was reported that Tharchin commented: ‘Rang-dbang yod-dus, Rang dbang-med / Rang-dbang med-dus, Rang-dbang shar-song’ (‘When there was freedom, there was no Freedom. When there is no freedom, the Freedom has appeared’).
112 Unpublished manuscript of a biography of Tharchin, in possession of his son Sherab Tharchin, who kindly allowed me to read the manuscript. Phuntsog Tashi Takla remembers Tharchin making the speech, but does not recall him being carried on people’s shoulders.
113 Ibid.
114 FRUS, Vol. VII (1951), pp. 1728–9.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., p. 1733.
117 The letter was supposed to be untraceable and not identifiable with the US Government. However, in this paragraph, it mentions that Thubten Norbu (Taktse Rinpoche) would be going to ‘our country’. His arrival in New York was splashed all over the newspapers in the States and Europe. Therefore, the Chinese would surely have guessed the origin of the letter.
118 FRUS, Vol. VII. Part 2 (1951) pp. 1744–5.
119 For an account of Thubten Norbu’s escape to US, see George Patterson, Requiem for Tibet (London, Aurum Press, 1990), pp. 125–31.
120 Ibid.
121 lHa’u rta ra, 1982, p. 110–11.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Zhol khang bsod rnams dar rgyas, ‘krung-dbang sku-tshab Bod-du phebs-par phebs-bsu zhus pa’i dzin-tho’, in krung go’i bod-ljongs, 1991, pp. 17–25. (See English translation of the article in China’s Tibet [Spring 1990], p. 12.)
125 The Dalai Lama, 1985, pp. 89–90.
126 lHa’u rta ra, 1982, p. 112.
127 FRUS, Vol. VII, Part 2 (1951), p. 1747.
128 Ibid., p. 1745.
129 FRUS, Vol. VII, Part 2 (1951), p. 1751.
130 Ibid., p. 1752.
131 DO 35/3096.
132 DO 35/3097.
133 Ibid.
134 Zhol khang bsod rnams dar rgyas, 1990, p. 14.
135 The name has been deleted from US documents.
136 FRUS, Part 2, Vol. 11 (1951), p. 1754.
137 Ibid., p. 1755.
138 George Patterson, 1990, p. 132.
139 The name had been deleted from the US documents.
140 FRUS, Vol VII, Part 2 (1951), pp. 1776–8.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 FRUS, Vol. VII, Part 2 (1951), pp. 1786–7.
144 Ibid., p. 1795.
145 Ibid., p. 1802. Tibetan assets in the US were minimal, not more than 2–3 million US dollars, the majority of which belonged to the Pomdatsang family.
146 FRUS, Vol VII, Part 2 (1951), pp. 1803–4.
147 Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
148 lHa’u rta ra, 1982, p. 113.
149 Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, 1989.
150 Ibid.
151 Lha’u rta-ra, 1982, pp. 114–15.
152 Interview with P. T. Takla. The language of the 17-Point Agreement reflected the changing political status of Tibet. In the course of the discussion, Tibet was referred to as ‘Local Government’ and a new Tibetan word, ‘sanas-zhung’, was invented for the term Local Government. China was referred to as the ‘dbus-gzhung’ (literally Head Government): the Central Government.
153 Tibet: Myth vs. Reality (Beijing Review Publication, 1988), p. 134.
154 SWB, No 133, 6 November 1951, p. 39.
155 Dawa Norbu, ‘Tibetan Response to Chinese Liberation’, Asian Affairs, 62 (1975), pp. 266–78.
156 Parthasarathi, G. Jawaharlal Nehru; Letters to Chief Minister, Vol. 5. 1958–1964 (University of Oxford Press, India, 1989). pp. 227–9.
1 These kinds of explanations are very much influenced by Cold War rhetoric in which all Communist actions were interpreted as part of a Communist desire for world domination.
2 During the period of the Ambans, the Chinese resident was allowed to maintain 300 troops. The first expulsion of Chinese troops took place in 1913, when the Amban was expelled from Lhasa. Since then the Chinese had not been able to station any troops in the territories controlled by the Tibetan Government.
3 George Moseley, ‘China’s fresh approach to the national minority question’, CQ, 24 (1965), pp. 16–17. ‘In contrast to the Russian Revolution in which peoples other than the Great Russians played a significant role, the revolution in China was purely a Han Chinese affair.’
4 I quote this from Dawa Norbu’s ‘The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation’, CQ, No. 77 (1979), pp. 77–8.
5 Lu’o Yus-hung, ‘Bod-bskyod nyin-tho gnad-bshus’ (gnyis-pa), SCHT, Vol. 8 (1985), p. 313.
6 There are no reliable demographic statistics on Tibet for this period, though many writers have given rough figures on the total population of Lhasa and of Tibet.
7 Dronyerchenmo (Chief of Protocol) Palha Thupten Woden, Oral archive of Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (LTWA). This interview was conducted as a group discussion of former leading Tibetan Government officials Phala, Luishar Thupten Tharpa and Phuntsog Tashi Takla, and staff from LTWA. It forms one of the major sources on the period (here after cited as Phala).
8 Ibid. See also R. D Taring, 1970, p. 175.
9 FO 371–99659: MR, 15 December 1951.
10 Tibet 1950–1967, URI, 1968, p. 7.
11 Sylvain Mangeot, The Adventures of a Manchurian: The story of Lobsang Thondup (London, The Travel Book Club, 1975), p. 104.
12 FO 371–99659: MR, 15 December 1951.
13 Ibid
14 Ibid.
15 In Tibetan: dmag bshor-pa las / drod-khog ltogs-pa / dka’-las khag-gyi re. See lHa-klu tshe-dbang rdo rje (Lhalu Tsewang Dorje), ‘mi-dmangs bchings-’grol dmag lha-sar bca’-sdod byas rjes’, (Arrival of PLA in Lhasa). SCHT, Vol. 1 (1982), p. 348.
16 Chang Kuohua [Zhang Guohua], SCMP, No. 2854 (1962), p. 9.
17 Phala.
18 lHa klu tshe dbang rdo rje, 1982, pp. 347–8.
19 Ibid.
20 Phala.
21 lHa klu tshe dbang rdo rje, 1982.
22 Even Mao was concerned about Tibet having its own flag. Later, when the Dalai Lama visited China, he was asked by Mao about the origin of the Tibetan flag.
23 Ibid.
24 Phala.
25 dByin Pha’-thang (Yin Fatang), Bod-skyod thong-ma’i dus kyi ’tsham-’dri’i byed[snd]sgo zhig dran-gso byas-pa, SCHT, Vol. 2 (1983), p. 228.
26 Ibid.
27 Broadcast by Zhang Guohua, SWB, No. 255, 3 June 1953, p. 13.
28 FO 371–99659: MR, 15 February 1952.
29 Lhalu writes that originally the Chinese nominated him, but because of his criticism of the two Prime Ministers, the Kashag did not approve of the Chinese nomination.
30 Chang Kuohua, 1962.
31 Lu’o Yus hung, 1985, op. cit.
32 Monlam (smon lam) was introduced by Tsong Kha-pa (1357–1475), the founder of the Gelug pa school of Tibetan Buddhism. One of the most interesting features of the ceremony was that during the period of Monlam, monks known as ‘zhal ngo’ take over the jurisdiction of Lhasa. They can impose summary judgement on outstanding disputes, impose fines and punish criminals.
33 Lu’o Yus hung, 1985, op. cit.
34 In one of Mao’s much-quoted statements on religious belief, he wrote: ‘We cannot abolish religion by administrative orders; nor can we force people not to believe in it. We cannot compel people to give up idealism, any more than we can force them to believe in Marxism.’ He went on to say that ‘in settling matters of an ideological nature or controversial issues among the people, we can only use democratic methods, methods of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education, not coercive, high-handed methods.’ (Here I have used the translation by Holmes Welch, Buddhism under Mao, Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 365.
35 FO 371–99659: MR, 16 May 1952.
36 Lu’o Yus hung, 1985, op. cit.
37 FO 371–184166: MR, 15 March 1952.
38 Ibid.
39 Phala.
40 Yang dbyi-kran, Bod-dmag khul-khang thog-mar ‘dzugas skabs dang mi-dmangs tshogs-’du ’zer-ba rdzus-mar ’thab-rtsod byas-pa’ gnas-tshul (Establishment of Tibet Military Command and Struggle Against the Bogus People’s Organisation), SCHT, Vol. 9, 1986, pp. 58–85.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 68.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 80.
46 Ibid.
47 FO 371–99659: MR, 16 April 1952.
48 Phala.
49 Lu’o Yus hung, 1985, op. cit.
50 Tibetan sources merely state that the attack occurred at Ngabo’s house and do not give any further details. The incident became one of the main turning points in Chinese attitudes towards the Prime Ministers. It seems unlikely that there was a deliberate attack on Ngabo’s house, for, although he was unpopular, there was never an attempt to oust him from power. The Tibetan Government never demoted him or restricted his position. In any case, the majority of the Tibetan élite believed in working with the Chinese at the time.
51 In the early stages, the Chinese were anxious to avoid a direct armed conflict with the Tibetan masses. The growing anti-Chinese agitation in Lhasa meant that the Chinese were worried that they might have to resort to armed confrontation in Lhasa, which would ignite nationwide revolt, as happened later on.
52 On the Policies for Our Work in Tibet, Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, from Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Beijing, 1977, (Vol. V), pp. 73–6.
53 Ibid.
54 Phala.
55 The Tibet Bureau was established in 1930 as the representative of Tibetan Government in China.
56 Phala.
57 FO 371–99659: MR, 16 April 11952.
58 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 97.
59 Ibid.
60 FO 371–99659: MR, 16 May 1952.
61 Ibid.
62 Selected Writings of Mao Tsetung, Beijing, 1977, (Vol. V), pp. 73–6.
63 Takla.
64 FO 371–99659: MR, 15 April 1952.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 98.
68 Lukhangwa died in Delhi on 24 February 1966.
69 Lobsang Tashi remained in Tibet.
70 FO 371–110228.
71 Ibid.
72 Account of Panchen Rinpoche’s arrival in Lhasa; see Ya’ Han-krang, 1982, pp. 280–341.
73 Ibid., p. 318.
74 Also known as Jigme Dragpa.
75 FO 371–99659: MR, 16 May 1952.
76 Ya Hanzhang, The Biographies of the Dalai Lama (Beijing, Foreign Language Press, 1991), p. 438.
77 FO 371–99659: MR, 15 December 1952.
78 Ya’ Han-krang, 1982, p. 327.
79 FO 371–99659: MR, 16 June 1952.
80 Ibid.
81 Tibet 1950–1965, URI, 1968, pp. 44–5.
82 Xinhua reported: ‘in the past the American and British imperialism had tried to force down its price and increase the import tax on wool, thereby disrupting the economic life of the Tibetans. The interest shown by the Central People’s Government offered a new and broad outlet for Tibetan products . . . it has dealt a severe blow to the “economic aggression” of the imperialists and solved the merchant’s problem of frozen assets; the contract would have a beneficial effect on improving the people’s livelihood.’ (SWB, No. 162, 27 May 1952, p. 36.)
83 The largest Chinese import into Tibet was tea and some luxury goods. Even in eastern Tibet, as far as Amdo or Kham, they were trading extensively with India. It is interesting that all the largest trading families in Tibet had established themselves in Kalimpong. Tibet’s export was all channelled through India.
84 From the start the Chinese began to restrict the business activities of Nepalese traders. To some extent the Chinese saw the trade privileges enjoyed by the Nepalese and Indian merchants as extra-territorial rights, similar to the privileges enjoyed by Western traders in China.
85 Nepal did not have direct contact with China, where its interests were conducted by India. The Chinese were keen to establish a direct relationship. However, Nepal’s relationship with Tibet was governed by the treaty of 1856. In article 1 Tibet promised to send annual tribute, the sum of 10,000 rupees, to Nepal. According to Article 2 Nepal would assist Tibet if a foreign power invaded Tibet.
It is interesting that the Tibetan Government did not request help from Nepal when the Chinese invaded in October 1950. The treaty made it incumbent on Nepal to come to the aid of Tibet and it was still clearly valid. The last Tibetan tribute mission to Nepal arrived in Kathmandu with 10,000 rupees in January 1952. The Nepalese Government informed the GOI and asked them to advise them in the event of Tibet raising the issue resulting from the treaty of 1856. The GOI advised Nepal that they should not volunteer to raise the issue. However, if Tibet were to raise the issue then Nepal should give up extra-territoral rights in Tibet and the right to extract annual tribute from Lhasa. The GOI recommended that Nepal should maintain the right to a Mission in Lhasa.
86 FO 371–99659: MR, 16 June 1952.
87 Interview with Ngawang Dhondup Narkyid. He told me that he himself and a group of young aristocratic officials volunteered to go to China for studies.
88 There has been a protracted debate among Social Anthropologists about the exact translation of the Tibetan term ‘mi-ser’. Melvyn Goldstein prefers to translate the term as a ‘serf’ and others have suggested that term could best translated as ‘subject’. See Melvyn Goldstein, ‘Re-examining Choice, Dependency and Command in the Tibetan Social System: Tax Appendages and Other Landless Serfs’. TJ, 4 (1986), pp. 79–112; Beatrice D. Miller, ‘A response to Goldstein’s article’, TJ, 2 (1987), pp. 65–7; ‘Melvyn Goldstein’s Rejoinder’, TJ, 3 (1988), pp. 61–5; Beatrice D. Miller’s Rejoinder, TJ, op. cit., pp. 64–6.
89 tsong kha lha mo tshe ring, 1992, p. 122.
90 FO 371–99659: MR, 16 August 1952.
91 Dawa Norbu, ‘Tibetan Response to Chinese Liberation’, Asian Affairs, 62 (1975), pp. 266–78.
92 FO 370–110228.
93 K. M. Panikkar, 1955, p. 175.
94 Ibid.
95 ‘Five Principles of Co-existence’ (Panch Sheela) are (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.
96 The Sino-Indian Agreement stated that facilities would be transferred at a reasonable cost.
97 The 1954 Indo–Chinese Agreement was designed to supersede the Anglo–Chinese Convention of 1906 and Trade Regulation of 1908. It is interesting to note that trade regulation between Tibet and India, and much of the extra-territorial rights exercised by the British and later by the Republic of India were governed by the Anglo–Tibetan Trade Agreement of 1914, which was initialled by the Tibetans’ representative Lochen Shatra, the British representative Henry MacMahon and the Chinese representative Ivan Chen, but the Chinese had later refused to ratify the agreement and had made it clear that they would not recognise any bilateral agreement signed between Tibet and Britain. However, between 1914 and 1947 the Trade Agreement was in force and in 1947 the rights obtained by the British were transferred to independent India. When the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement was discussed in 1954, the Communists took the same position as the nationalists and refused to recognise the Anglo–Tibetan Agreement of 1914. Had the Chinese agreed that the antecedent to the 1954 Agreement was the Anglo–Tibetan Agreement of 1914, this would have implied that the Communists recognised Tibet’s right to external autonomy. Since India did not make any direct connection between the two agreements, it gave the impression that she was willing to concede that independent India did not recognise the Anglo–Tibetan Agreement of 1914. The implication of this neglect became evident when open dispute occurred over the border issue. This subject will be dealt with in a later chapter.
98 The Agreement made no mention of the boundary between India and Tibet (China). By the fact that, so far, Chinese had made no mention of the boundary, India assumed that the PRC accepted that there were no boundary disputes and that China accepted the status quo. See Gopal, 1979, Vol. 2, p. 181.
99 SWB, No. 362, 15 June 1954.
100 B. N. Mullik, My Years with Nehru, The Chinese Betrayal (Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 180.
101 Ibid., pp. 181–83.
102 Ibid.
103 FO 371–110647.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Once the Nepalese realised that the Chinese occupation of Tibet was a fait accompli, and once India had signed an agreement, Nepal could no longer avoid reaching an agreement with China.
107 Tibet 1950–1967, op. cit.
108 The Chinese liberality with money led to a popular song: ‘The Chinese Communist Party is like a kind parent, To whom we owe a great debt of gratitude; They give us silver dollars like showers of rain’.
109 Ka-bshod chos-rgyal nyi ma. Ngas byas-pa’i don-chung zhig. SCHT, 3 (1985), pp. 71–81.
110 The Tibetans looked to British India for political and economic support for the simple reason that communication between Tibet and India was far easier. It was far easier and safer for Chinese officials to travel to Tibet via India to reach Lhasa.
111 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 99.
112 Ibid., p. 100.
113 Ibid.
114 See Dawa Norbu, ‘Chinese Communist View on National Self-determination, 1922–1956: Origins of China’s National Minorities Policy’, International Studies, 25:4 (1988), pp. 317–42.
115 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 117.
116 Ibid.
117 Sylvain Mangeot, 1975, op. cit. p. 117.
118 Rinchen Dolma Taring, 1970, p. 199.
119 It is interesting that the Dalai Lama in his autobiography described how they used the traditional symbol of ‘Four Harmonious Brothers’ (mthun-po-spun-bzhi) on the new year invitation card, which the Dalai Lama wrote ‘were meant to emphasise, from our own point of view, the union of the nationalities’. I am sure that the symbolism was much appreciated by the Chinese (see The Dalai Lama, 1985, op. cit., p. 121).
120 SWB. No. 436, 3 March 1955, p. 13.
121 Ibid., p. 14.
122 The Dalai Lama, 1985, op. cit., p. 116.
123 Tibet 1950–1967, op. cit., p. 171.
124 Ibid., p. 112.
125 Ibid., p. 113.
126 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 132.
127 PRO, FO 371–122126. Translation of Chen Yi’s speech from the People’s Daily.
128 The Dalai Lama’s speech was carefully worded with warnings to the Chinese that if they were to rush into promoting reforms, they would face difficulties. The Dalai Lama also qualified each remark by noting that it had been promised by Mao himself. See Tibet, 1950–1967, op. cit. p. 147.
129 Tibet, 1950–1967, op. cit., p. 52.
130 This was a clear reference to the growing Chinese agitation in eastern Tibet, (Kham and Amdo). On his way to China, the Dalai Lama was able to hear from Khampas and Amdowa first-hand news of Chinese attempts to introduce reforms.
131 Ibid.
132 The People’s Liberation Committee of Chamdo was set up soon after the Chinese had occupied the area. In January 1951, the advancing PLA troops organised a ‘People’s Conference of all Classes of the Population’ in Chamdo, which also marked the founding of the CLC. However, it was not until 1954, that it was defined and given specific task.
133 Tibet, 1950–1967, URI, op. cit., pp. 121–4.
134 Ibid., p. 173.
135 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 116.
136 The original State Council Resolution issued on 9 March 1955 mentions that there would be 51 members.
137 Tibet, 1950–1967, URI, op. cit., p. 173.
138 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 133.
139 The 14 Departments were (1) the General Office (2) Economics (3) Religious Affairs (4) Civil Affairs (5) Construction (6) Cultural and Education (7) Public Health (8) Public Security (9) Agriculture and Forestry (10) Animal Husbandry (11) Industry and Commerce (12) Communication (13) Justice Department and (14) Finance.
1 Alo chos mdzad (Alo Chonze), Bod kyi gnas-lugs bden-dzin sgo phye-ba’i ldi-mig zhes bya-ba. (privately published, 1983), pp. 158–9.
2 Jamyang Sakya, 1990, p. 243.
3 Ibid., p. 244.
4 Many officials accepted the Chinese salary and at the same time continued to run their estates, which had traditionally been granted in lieu of salary by the Tibetan Government. The Chinese did not initially demand the surrender of estates by Tibetan officials.
5 Dawa Norbu, 1974, p. 132.
6 The Tibetan Buddhist sects are not like sects in the Christian tradition. The sects are not organised in any hierarchical or political structure, with central authority and different councils. As far as laymen were concerned, no distinction was made between the different sects. Many lay people were genuinely perplexed when asked which sect they belonged to.
7 Jamyang Sakya, 1990, p. 259.
8 Chagtral Sonam Chophel, Oral Archive, LTWA.
9 Ibid.
10 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, p. 99.
11 Ibid., p. 101.
12 Mao’s directive, 6 April 1952.
13 Interview with Pasang Gyalpo.
14 André Migot, 1955, pp. 97–8.
15 The Chinese have always looked down on minorities, but with the advent of Communism, their conviction that minorities were backward was reinforced by crude Marxist notions of evolution of society. The economic system of minorities areas dominated by pure nomadism or pastoralism was considered an earlier stage of socio-economic development.
16 These were the Kantze Tibetan Autonomous Zhou; the Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Zhou; the Jyekundo Tibetan Autonomous Zhou; the Golok Tibetan Autonomous Zhou; the Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Zhou; the Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Zhou; and the Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Zhou,
17 June Teufel Dryer, ‘Traditional Minorities Elites’, in Robert Scalapino’s Elites in the Peoples Republic of China (University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 416–50.
18 Ibid., p. 84.
19 Gonbo Tashi, 1973, p. 38.
20 Phala.
21 Interview with Lithang Ather Norbu.
22 Speech by Geshe Sherab Gyatso at the 3rd Session of the 1st National People’s Congress in June 1956 (see Tibet, 1950–67, URI, p. 181). This refers to the fact that in many Tibetan temples, there is a special chapel dedicated to wrathful deities. It is normal for guns and other weapons to be placed before an image of a wrathful deity.
23 Anna Louise Strong, 1960, pp. 65–6.
24 Interview with Changtrimpa Tenzin Tsultrim.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Interview with Lithang Athar.
28 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 158.
29 Phala.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 158.
33 Speech by Geshe Sherab Gyatso in June 1956. See Tibet, 1950–67, URI. p. 181.
34 Kuang Haolin, 1991. pp. 123–55.
35 Speech by Geshe Sherab Gyatso in June 1956. See Tibet, 1950–67, URI, pp. 180–1.
36 Ibid.
37 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, p. 187.
38 Alo chos mdzad, 1983, p. 170.
39 Ibid., p. 139.
40 Ibid., p. 137.
41 Sa-byang Tshe-brten rnam-rgyal, 1984, pp. 245–55.
42 Interview with Pasang Gyalpo.
43 Sa byang Tshe-brten rnam-rgyal, 1984, p. 253.
44 Alo chos mdzad, 1983, p. 136.
45 Ibid., p. 138.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 171.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Everyone seems to accept Lhabchug died of natural causes. There was no question of torture or ill treatment during the incarceration.
51 Alo Chonzed worked for several years in the Tibetan government-in-exile in charge of a co-operative in a Tibetan refugee settlement in south India. He felt that his work for the Mimang Tsongdu was never acknowledged by the Tibetan officials. Later, he became a passionate critic of the Dalai Lama’s family. He maintained that the Dalai Lama’s brother Gyalo Thundup and his brother-in-law, Phuntsog Tashi Takla, were working for the Guomindang. In 1981 he returned to Tibet and was selected as a member of the People’s Political Consultative Conference. But in 1990 he came to back to India, where when he visited his daughter in Dharamsala (North India) he was beaten up by a mob of Tibetan women.
52 Nari Rustomji, 1987, p. 47.
53 In a note given by the Chinese Foreign Office to the India Consular authorities in Lhasa dated 10 July 1958, the Chinese raised issues regarding the activities of the Tibetan émigrés and Guomindang agents living in Kalimpong. The Chinese also lodged a complaint about the only Tibetan language paper, the Tibet Mirror, published by Tharchin in Kalimpong. It was described as ‘a reactionary newspaper hostile to the Chinese government and people’. On 3 August 1958, the Chinese again protested about a campaign launched by the Tibetan émigré community in Kalimpong. These marked the beginning of the decline in Sino-Indian relations. The notes exchanged between GOI and PRC were published in a White Paper by the Ministry of External Affairs (GOI): Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreements signed between the GOI and China 1954–1959, pp. 60–7 (no date of publication cited).
54 B. N. Mullik, 1971, p. 183.
55 The Dalai Lama, 1985, pp. 140–1.
56 Nari Rustomji, 1987, p. 53.
57 krung-go gung-khreng tang krung-dbyang u-yon lhan-khang skyabs brgyad-pa’i tshang- ’dzam gros-tshogs thengs gnyis-pa’i thog gi gtam bshad. m’o tse-tung-gi gsung rtsom-bsdus, 1977, Vol. 5, p. 489. Speech by Mao at the Second Plenum of the 8th Central Committee (15 November 1956), hereafter cited as Speech at the Second Plenum. See English translation, John K. Leung & Michael Y. M. Kau, The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976, Volume 2, (M. E. Sharpe, 1984), p. 170. There are several versions of the speech which differ from each other. A version published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, pp. 332–49 has a lengthy paragraph dealing with the Dalai Lama’s visit to India. A version published in Wansui, pp. 112–18, makes no reference to the Dalai Lama and a new section has been inserted dealing with the problem of minority nationalities.
58 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 140.
59 Ibid.
60 Speech at the Second Plenum, 1957, op. cit., p. 489.
61 FO 371–121147. In his meeting with the British, Thubten Norbu told them that in the past the Dalai Lama was inclined to leave Tibet. He had secured US assistance but Tibetans felt US support did not go far enough. There was no mention of the Dalai Lama’s visit to India.
62 The Dalai Lama, 1983, p. 142.
63 John K. Leung & Michael Y. M. Kau, 1984, p. 170.
64 Ibid.
65 NCNA, 13.1.57.
66 B. N. Mullik, 1971, p. 160.
67 The Dalai Lama, 1983, p. 148.
68 Ibid.
69 Sarvepalli Gopal, Vol. 3, 1984, p. 36.
70 The Dalai Lama, 1983, p. 148.
71 Anon.
72 Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984, p. 36.
73 Ibid.
74 H. G. Parthasarathi, 1989, pp. 228–9.
75 John K. Leung and Michael Y. M. Kau, 1984, p. 170.
76 Ibid.
77 Thubten Norbu told me that in 1956 the US did not specifically urge the Dalai Lama to remain in India.
78 Thubten Norbu, 1961, p. 254.
79 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 149.
80 Thubten Norbu, 1961, p. 254.
81 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 150.
82 Phala. (He says that nine people went to see Zhou.)
83 The Dalai Lama, 1985, pp. 148–9.
84 FO 371–127639. In April 1957 the Chogyal of Sikkim was in London, where he told British Foreign Office officials that he was informed by his uncle Ragashag that when the Tibetan delegation met Zhou Enlai in Delhi they presented an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Tibet and the restoration of Tibetan independence, based on the reunion of all Tibetan-inhabited areas including those of the upper Yangtse (Drichu). Ragashag also said that it was Ngabo who led the discussion. Phala confirms that it was Ngabo who was most critical of the Chinese and spoke very bluntly with Zhou.
85 Phala.
86 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 151.
87 John K. Leung and Michael Y. M. Kau, 1984, p. 281.
88 Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
89 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 151.
90 Ibid., p. 152.
91 As quoted in Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984, p. 36.
92 Phuntsog Tashi Takla.
93 Ibid.
94 Concerning the Question of Tibet, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1950, p. 183.
95 Anon.
96 Collected Works, Vol. V, pp. 384–412.
97 The speech was not published in its entirety until much later and was not available in the West in its original form until 1985. See an interesting comparison of the two versions by Michael Schoenhals, 1986, pp. 99–111.
98 I used the text published in Roderick MacFarquhar, 1989, pp. 131–99.
99 I mean speeches given by Mao at the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee and his address to the Conference of Provincial and Municipal Party Secretaries, 27 January 1957.
100 The Dalai Lama and the Tibetans would not have been aware of the full contents of Mao’s speech. However, Xinhua gave extensive coverage to the Mao announcement that the reforms in Tibet would be postponed for five years. The Tibetans in India became aware of the speech through the Indian press.
101 At a press conference in London on 2 December 1991, in response to a question from a Xinhua correspondent, the Dalai Lama said that he returned to Tibet in 1956 because of promises given by Zhou Enlai.
102 The Dalai Lama, 1983, p. 157.
103 SWB, 1957, No. 659, p. 30.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, p. 218.
107 Ibid., p. 261.
108 SWB, 1957, No. 662. pp. 17–18.
109 Literally, ‘defender of faith’ (The Tibetan army). I am quoting this song as published in Dawa Norbu’s ‘The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation’, CQ, 77, 1979, p. 74
110 Statement of Gyakhar Gonpo in ‘Tibet under the Chinese Communist Rule’, A Compilation of Refugee Statements 1958–1975, Information & Publicity Office of HH the Dalai Lama, 1975, pp. 25–6 (Hereafter cited as TUCCR).
111 Ibid.
112 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, p. 140.
113 Gonbo Tashi, 1973, p. 48.
1 Michel Peissel, 1972, p. 90. I believe that many Khampas privately share views expressed by Peissel in his book, although they do not personally blame the Dalai Lama: anger was more directed towards the Tibetan aristocracy. In fact in the course of my research I met many people from eastern Tibet who expressed strong resentment against the Lhasa authorities for their failure to support them.
2 Gonbo Tashi, 1973, p. 57.
3 Chodrak, who was studying veterinary science in China, remembered that even those who had not completed their training were told they could return home and continue their education later.
4 Ngawang Dhondup.
5 ‘btsan-rgol’ means revolt. It was meant as revolt against the 17-Point Agreement. Only a few people knew the name, which was used as a code when establishing contact.
6 In Tibetan, brtan-bzhugs zhabs-brtan.
7 Gonpo Tashi, 1973, pp. 52–3.
8 It was a measure of the people’s sympathy and concern that people from all levels of society contributed enthusiastically. For the details of the ceremony and of the amount of gold and other precious gems that was raised, see Andrug Gonpo Tashi 1973, pp. 52–4. According to Andrug it amounted to 4745 tolas of gold.
9 Ibid., p. 51.
10 Phala.
11 See Ann Louise Strong, 1960, for Chinese account of events leading to the Khampa Revolt.
12 Michel Peissel, 1972, p. 95.
13 Andrug Gonpo Tashi, 1973, p. 55.
14 Another name for the group was ‘the National Volunteer Defence Army’ (in Tibetan, bsten-srung dang-blangs dmag-mi).
15 The four rivers are: 1. the Salween (rgya mo rngu chu); 2. the Yangtse (’bri chu); 3. the Mekong (rdza chu); 4. the Yellow River, (rma chu). The six ranges are: 1. Ngul Dza Zhamo Gang (rngl rdza zal mol sgang); 2. Por bor Gang (spor ’bor sgang); 3. Mi ngya Rawa Gang (mi nyag ‘a ba sgang); 4. Tshawa Gang (tsha sgang); 5. Markham Gang (smar khams sgang); 6. Marzha Gang (dmar rdza sgang).
16 Mao called for this special meeting to discuss his ‘On Contradiction’.
17 For details of the Rectification Campaign among minority groups see June Teufel Dreyer, 1976, pp. 150–8.
18 Tibet 1950–67, URI, pp. 267–70.
19 Ibid., pp. 222–34.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., pp. 271–83.
23 The Dalai Lama, 1990, p. 122.
24 Anon.
25 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, pp. 271–83.
26 Ibid.
27 The Dalai Lama remembers that the Chinese simply told him that Phuntsog Wangyal would not be returning to Tibet as ‘he was a dangerous man’. See The Dalai Lama, 1990, p. 122.
28 The Khampas inflicted severe damage on the PLA. Guomindang sources reported that the Communists suffered 65–75,000 casualties in clashes with the Khampas (SWB, 1959, No. 833 p. 35.
29 One of my informants remembers that there were more than thirty different regiments. The Lithangpa group was the largest.
30 I am grateful to Tenzin Sonam and Ritu Sarin for giving me a transcript of their interview with Loden.
31 Baba Lekshe.
32 Stephen E. Ambrose, 1983, p. 206.
33 Ibid., 1984, pp. 284–6.
34 Ibid., pp. 212–13.
35 Popular accounts of CIA activities, such as Willaim Blum’s The CIA: A Forgotten History (Zed Books Ltd., 1986), grossly exaggerate the CIA’s role in the Tibetan revolt and imply that the CIA trained ‘many thousands’ of Tibetans. See also John Ranelagh, The Agency, The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), pp. 335–6. There are a number of books written by former CIA agents which give accounts of CIA activities in Tibet, notably L. Fletcher Prouty The Secret Team, The CIA and its Allies in Control of the United States and the World (1973), and Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (1974). These books also tend to give exaggerated accounts of the CIA’s role in the Tibetan revolt. Prouty (p. 352) writes that without the help of CIA the Dalai Lama could not have made his escape from Lhasa.
36 CIA document TDCSPD/3639,989.
37 Lithang Athar, one of the first Khampas recruited for training, claims that he first met Thubten Norbu during this visit, and they began to recruit Khampas living in Kalimpong and Darjeeling.
38 Interview with Lithang Athar.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Phala.
42 Phala and Liushar.
43 The dates cited by Athar and Lhamo Tsering require verification from archive sources. However, this is not possible because the CIA files on the subject remain closed to the public.
44 The Dalai Lama, 1990, p. 140.
45 All information on these events comes from Lithang Athar, whom I have known since my childhood. I conducted in-depth interviews with him on three occasions, in Kathmandu, New Delhi and London.
46 Phala.
47 Athar.
48 During our interviews Athar said that he could never forgive the Tibetan Government for their failure to accept the American offer. He argues that if the Tibetan Government had acted then and worked with the Four Rivers, Six Ranges, the Khampas would have succeeded in gaining control of central Tibet. The Khampas failed because they lacked weapons and because American help came much too late.
49 Ibid.
50 Lhamo Tsering has written a detailed account of his first meeting with Gyalo Dhundup. See: Tsong Kha Lha mo tshe ring. sku’i gchen-po lha-sras rGya-lo don-drub mchog gi thog-ma’i mdzad-phyogs dang gus-gnyis dbar chab-srid ‘brel-ba byong-stangs skor, Amnye Machen Institute, Dhramsala. 1992.
51 I have been asked by my informants not to reveal the identity of the CIA agent.
52 Athar and Lhamo Tsering. Confirmation of the accuracy of the account given by my informants awaits public access to CIA archives.
53 Gonpo Tashi, 1973, p. 66.
54 Interview with Diwa Lang.
55 You can see the extent of movement of the Khampas resistance by looking at the route followed by Andrug Gonpo Tashi and his group. From July 1958 to April 1959, Andrug and his men travelled from Driguthang in Lhokh as far north-east Chungpo Tenchen. (See route map in Gonpo Tashi, 1973, p. 64.)
56 Athar.
57 This was mainly because the previous Panchen Rinpoche had spent a long time in exile in Kham and Amdo.
58 In Tibetan, krung-dbyangs dgongs-pa dang-ba dang / khams-rigs kyi zing-cha ’jag-tabs.
59 Lhawutara.
60 Ibid.
61 An account given by Barshi Ngawang Tenkhong, 1984, LTWE (hereafter cited as Barshi).
62 Lhawutara claims that he made this suggestion, but Phala says that it was Lhalu who made it.
63 Barshi.
64 Namseling Paljor Jigme, rNam gling dpal ’byor ‘jigs med, 1988, p. 94.
65 Ibid.
66 Gonpo Tashi, 1973, p. 69–71.
67 Ibid.
68 Phala.
69 Ibid.
70 Byams pa. zing-slong jag pas Shang dGa’-ldan chos-’khor dgon nas mthon-cha ’don-’khyer byas skor, SCHT, 1985, Vol. 5, pp. 222–9.
71 Phala.
72 Gonpo Tashi, 1973, pp.74–5.
73 Byams pa, 1985, p. 227.
74 SWB, 8 January 1959.
1 The Dalai Lama, 1983, p. 163.
2 This view was expressed by Phala.
3 SWB, 1959, No. 849, p. 18.
4 Barshi.
5 In Tibetan, nged kyi slob dpon mthong ba don ldna ’di / phyi bskyed med pa ’a bskul ma ’debs re ran.
6 bsam-khar.
7 Barshi.
8 Ibid.
9 Ngabo, On the 1959 Armed Rebellion, in Tibetans of Tibet, published by China Reconstructs Press (no date cited), pp. 157–67. I have a Tibetan version of this paper, which was broadcast over Lhasa Radio. Ngabo gives an account of the events leading up to the 10th March Uprising in Lhasa. Dharamsala has written a response to this article but has not refuted Ngabo’s central claim that it was not the Chinese who invited the Dalai Lama to the military camp for the performance. It was the Dalai Lama himself who chose the venue and timing of the show.
10 The Dalai Lama (1990, p. 142) has claimed that he received an invitation from General Chiang Chin-wu (sic) (Zhang Jianghua) shortly after the new year while he was in the Jokhang. I think he is mistaken as Zhang Jianghua was not in Lhasa at the time. The highest-ranking Chinese officer present in Lhasa was Tan Guansan.
11 The Dalai Lama, 1990, pp. 164–8.
12 Ibid., p. 165–6.
13 In Tibetan, ‘da tsar-ba re’.
14 Ngabo, On the 1959 Armed Rebellion, in Tibetans of Tibet, China Reconstructs Press (no date), pp 157–67.
15 Takla.
16 Barshi.
17 Barshi does not say which bla-spyi he wrote to. There were generally three bla-spyi in Drepung and three in Sera. bla-spyi forms the highest administrative body in the monastery. They are generally selected from high rank incarnate lamas (Rinpoche) for three years’ service.
18 Barshi.
19 Ibid.
20 Liushar.
21 Ibid., p. 273.
22 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 168.
23 Accounts given by Barshi and Phala differ slightly. Phala claims that he went to meet Gadrang with Takla and does not mention the names of the others, while Barshi mentions the names of three other monk officials.
24 Barshi. This was also confirmed by Phala in his interview.
25 Phala.
26 Barshi claims that they decided to mobilise the public immediately after the meeting with Gadrang and that he did not know that the Dalai Lama had refused to accept their appeal. In the accounts given by Takla and Phala, they claim that other officials decided to mobilise the public after they had failed to persuade the Dalai Lama, which seems likely to be more accurate.
27 Barshi. Phala confirms that some officials had gone about spreading the rumour in Lhasa that night.
28 China’s White Paper on Tibet, SWB, 24 September, 1992, p. C1/8.
29 Barshi claims that some officials came to see him next morning and told him that Surkhang and Shasur had advised them not to precede with the plan to mobilise the people.
30 Yuthok, 1990, p. 265.
31 Pronounced Khag.
32 The Dalai Lama, 1983, p. 169.
33 Michel Peissel and Noel Barber claim that the people started to gather outside the Norbulingka in the evening of 9 March. They write that nearly 10,000 people had surrounded the Norbulingka and that on that day the people also started to besiege the Nepalese and Indian Consulates. Evidence given by Phala, Barshi and others shows that people came to the Norbulingka only on the morning of 10 March. See Michel Peissel, 1972, p. 120; Noel Barber, 1969, p. 77.
34 Some popular books on Tibet cite the number of people outside the Norbulingka as 10,000: Noel Barber, The Flight of the Dalai Lama, Hodder and Stoughton, 1960, p. 106, and Michel Peissel, 1972, p. 120. John F. Avedon, in his book In Exile from the Land of Snows, Wisdom, 1984, p. 71, cites a figure of 30,000 people outside the Norbulingka. A Chinese source claims that there were only 2,000 people involved in the demonstration. See China’s White Paper on Tibet, SWB, 24 September 1992. p. C1/8.
35 Sambo himself does not mention this incident in detail in his biography.
36 Liushar.
37 He was more commonly known as ‘Chamdo Khenchung’. He is the brother of Chamdo Phagpa Gelek Namgyal, who is a young incarnate lama and the Chairman of the Chamdo Liberation Committee. Since 1950 he has occupied various positions in the Tibetan Government.
38 Some people I spoke to claim that Khunchung Sonam Gyamtso fired a pistol in the air to ward off the crowd, others claim that he was carrying a hand grenade. The crowd immediately accused him of attempting to assassinate the Dalai Lama. See description of the event in Hugh Richardson’s biography of Tashi Lhakap, Adventures of a Tibetan Fighting Monk, The Tamarind Press, Bangkok, 1986, p. 91.
39 China’s White Paper on Tibet, SWB, 24 September 1992, p. C1/8.
40 Dawa Norbu in his article (CQ, 1979, No. 77, p. 89) writes that ‘it is clear from my own findings that Tibetan fears and suspicions were unfounded, and that the Chinese had no such intentions’. He cites Luishar Thupten Tharpa as a source.
41 Liushar.
42 One Chinese eyewitness claims that Khunchung was slung over the back of a horse. See Shan Chao, ‘Sunshine after Rain’, Peking Review, 5 May 1950, p. 10.
43 This is also reported by another eye-witness, Langdun Gyatso, see TR, March 1969, pp. 3–5.
44 Michel Peissel and others have implied that Ngabo’s presence among the Chinese was sinister. Peissel goes as far as saying that Ngabo might have been ‘the principal instigator of the so-called Chinese plot to abduct the Dalai Lama’. See Michel Peissel, 1972, p. 121.
45 See the account of the event written by a leading Tibetan aristocrat who was at the reception: Jamyang Sakya, 1990, pp. 271–3.
46 Ibid.
47 Recent publications from China and Tibet show differences in emphasis concerning the class nature of the revolt. The Communists cannot accept that the Tibetan revolt was supported by the ‘lower classes’ and have maintained that the revolt was essentially organised by the ‘upper class’, while Tibetan writers tend to portray the revolt as a popular uprising supported by different social classes. In Master Panchen, Jamphel Gyatso goes so far as to say that the revolt in Kham was supported by the ‘masses’. It is also interesting to note that the Tibetan edition of Dung-dkar Blo-bzang ’phrin-las’s Bod kyi chos srid zung ’brei skor bshad-pa (The Merging of Religious and Secular Rule in Tibet, Beijing 1983) says that the 1959 revolt was supported by the ‘upper classes and the middle class’ but the phrase ‘middle class’ is omitted from the English translation. Although he does say that the masses supported the revolt, given the sensitivity of the subject, the inclusion of ‘middle class’ is significant. For the Communists, the class composition of the revolt was very important, for if they were to admit that the Tibetan masses supported the uprising, then the Communist Party would lose its legitimacy for claiming that it represented the Tibetan masses.
48 Liushar.
49 Many Tibetan officials I have talked to say that they feared there would be a Civil War either between the people of U-tsang and the Khampas or between the army and the Kham rebels.
50 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 172.
51 See Peking Review, 1959, Vol. XXI. pp. 10–11, on how General Tan’s first letter was brought to the Dalai Lama.
52 The correspondence between the Dalai Lama and Tan Guansan has been published as Concerning the Question of Tibet, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1959, pp. 26–40.
53 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 187.
54 Ibid., p. 189.
55 Ibid.
56 Barshi.
57 Rinchen Dolma Taring, 1970, p. 226.
58 TR, March 1969. pp. 3–7.
59 Nehru’s speech in the Lok Sabha, on 4 May 1959. (As reproduced in Raja Hutheesing, 1960. p. 41.)
60 In Tibetan, bya-ma dkrog-par sgo-nga len.
61 This was also confirmed by Luishar and Takla.
62 The Dalai Lama, 1985, pp. 186–8.
63 Ibid. The Dalai Lama has written in his autobiography that ‘my letters to the Chinese general were written to disguise my true intentions’. He says: ‘I felt and still feel that they were justified.’
64 Phala.
65 Ibid. The message was taken to the Indian Mission by a monk official, Tralkhang Khenchung. According to Nehru the first the GOI heard about the demonstration in Lhasa was on 11 March. He received a telegram from the Indian Consulate dated 10 March, and a second telegram was received on 14 March. Most probably, Phala’s message was sent on the latter date. The reports from the Indian Consular must have been alarming, for the GOI recognised the seriousness of the events in Lhasa. On 14 March Nehru told the Lok Sabha that ‘there was a clash of wills in Lhasa’. See Prime Minister’s Reply to the debate in the Rajya Sabha on 4 May 1959, as reproduced in Chanakya Sen, Tibet Disappears, Asia Publishing House, 1960, pp. 198–9
66 Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984, p. 88.
67 There have been a number of books and articles written by Westerners arguing that the Dalai Lama’s flight was ‘engineered’ by the CIA. One of the widely quoted articles is by T. D. Allman, ‘On the CIA’s role in the Tibet: Pawn to check Peking’, which appeared in the Guardian, 31 December 1973. He writes: ‘According to sources with first hand knowledge, the Dalai Lama’s departure was engineered by the CIA.’ See also Tom Grunfeld, 1987, pp. 150–1. Quoting George Patterson as a source, he asserts that the CIA was planning to spirit the Dalai Lama out of Tibet long before the March Uprising. L. Fletcher Prouty, 1973, writes that without the CIA’s help the Dalai Lama could not have escaped to India, an assumption shared by Grunfeld. They claim that ‘the logistics of the operation were too complex’ for the Tibetans to have carried out. There is no evidence to support these claims.
68 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, pp. 365–7.
69 Interview with Riga, who was one of the companions of Lo Nyendrak.
70 Michel Peissel, 1972, pp. 131 & 150. He writes that the Khampas were the main instigators of the Lhasa revolt and he even goes so far as to say that the Khampas actually made the decision to abduct the Dalai Lama from Lhasa. But he gives no evidence to support his conclusion. There is no doubt that many Khampa refugees living in Lhasa were active in the revolt but it is an exaggeration to say that they organised it. Peissel and others have painted an overly romantic view of the Khampas’ role in the Tibetan revolt.
71 Interview with Gyasto la who was a Thangka painter living in Shelkar.
72 This is also how the international community realised that something was happening in the country. Between 20 and 24 March, Radio Lhasa stopped broadcasting. This was noted by the BBC monitoring service. Xinhua (NCNA) also did not release any stories until 28 March (SWB, No. 859, 1959, p. 2).
73 Some Tibetan refugees living in Ladakh only knew of the events in Lhasa and the subsequent escape of the Dalai Lama to India when they were told by Ladakhi Muslim merchants who heard about it through broadcasts on Pakistani radio.
74 SWB, 1959, No. 859. p. 2.
75 Communiqué on the revolt issued by the NCNA (as reproduced in Tibet, 1950–67, URI, pp.348–56).
76 Ibid.
77 TR, March 1969, p. 4.
78 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, p. 353.
79 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 204.
80 The letter was taken to Lhasa by Thupten Sodpa.
81 The Dalai Lama, 1990, p.154. He says that he wrote to the Panchen Rinpoche asking him to join him in India. This seems to imply that the decision to move to India had already been made. Phala’s account says that the decision to cross the border was only made in Lhuntse Dzong, four days later. This is confirmed by Liushar. Athar, who radioed the decision to the CIA, also confirms that the decision was only made in Lhuntse Dzong.
82 Athar says that the two Khampa messengers were killed before they reached Shigatse.
83 In his second autobiography (1990, p. 154), the Dalai Lama claims that a cook assigned to him during the escape was trained by the CIA. He is clearly mistaken on this point. Athar and Lhamo Tsering, two of the main people responsible for running the CIA operation inside Tibet, assured me that at the time there were only two CIA-trained agents – Athar himself and Lotse.
84 Andrug Gonpo Tashi, 1973, p. 106.
85 The Dalai Lama, 1985, p. 212.
86 Interview with Tenzin Sonam/Ritu Sarin. Athar claims that he discussed with the CIA the possibility of sending a plane to pick up the Dalai Lama and his party.
87 The Dalai Lama, 1985.
88 Order of the State Council of the Chinese People’s Republic, Tibet 1950–1967, URI, pp. 357–8.
89 Although the GOI had granted asylum for the Dalai Lama and the party, they were at first ambivalent about the large number of refugees crossing the border.
90 I am grateful to Sherab Tharchin for giving me a number of copies of letters that were sent to his father’s newspaper.
1 Keesing Contemporary Archives (KCA), No. XI, 1959–1960, p. 16802.
2 FO 371–115018, Nehru’s letter to Anthony Eden, dated 29 January 1955.
3 According Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984. Vol. 3, p. 89. Zhou also told Panikkar in 1954 that granting asylum to the Dalai Lama would not be considered an ‘unfriendly act’.
4 Subimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office, Minerva, 1977, p. 150. (The author was the Indian Foreign Secretary, 1954–1961.) Dutt does not mention Menon by name, he merely writes about ‘A senior colleague of his [Nehrus], one in whom he had great confidence’. Dutt also says that the Soviet Union made it known that they wanted India to refuse asylum for the Dalai Lama (Dutt, op. cit., p. 210).
5 KCA, No. XI, 1959–1960, p. 16800.
6 Ibid.
7 FO 371–141591/171758. Nehru’s letter to Harold MacMillan 6/4/59. S. Dutt, the Foreign Secretary, told the British High Commissioner that India cannot declare ‘open door’ for all refugees (FO 371–141592).
8 In 1959, the opposition parties had only a few members in the Parliament. In fact the Communist Party constituted the largest opposition party with 31 MPs; the second largest was the Praja Socialist Party with 19 MPs. Other parties did not have more than 10 MPs each. With Congress domination, it was unlikely that any motion by the opposition would have succeeded in parliament.
9 Nehru’s statement in the Lok Sabha on 27 April 1959, as reproduced in Chanakya Sen, Tibet Disappears, 1960, p. 188.
10 Nehru’s statement in the Lok Sabha on 30 March 1959, as reproduced in Chanakya Sen, 1960, p. 165.
11 According the Nehru’s biographer (Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984, Vol. 3, p. 89), ‘there is no evidence to suggest that the GOI were aware of the American complicity in the flight of the Dalai Lama’. Nehru’s letter to MacMillian says that arms were dropped in Tibet by the Guomindang.
12 Apart from a general desire to avoid any involvement in the Cold War, the relationship between India and America was at a low point. In January 1959 a treaty had been signed between Pakistan and the United States agreeing that the US would supply ‘non-conventional’ weapons and establish launching sites for missiles. India had objected to these developments.
13 Personal source.
14 I have used the text of the Tezpur Statement as reproduced in Tibet, 1950–67, URI, pp. 375–8.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., ‘Commentary on the So-called Statement of the Dalai Lama,’ pp. 379–85.
17 Ibid.
18 As reproduced in Raja Hutheesingh, 1960, pp. 91–2.
19 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, pp. 388–93.
20 FO 371–141595. British High Commissioner’s report.
21 FO 371 141593. A telegram from the British High Commission, Delhi to CRO. Malcolm Macdonald wrote: ‘the PM [Nehru] insisted that India’s interest in Tibet was “historical, sentimental, and religious and not essentially political”.’
22 Ibid.
23 Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984, p. 90.
24 Subimal Dutt, 1977, p. 152. He writes that ‘the Dalai Lama spoke calmly and showed no trace of bitterness against anybody despite the physical and the mental strain through which he had passed,’ and adds: ‘The talk with the Dalai Lama had a strange effect on Nehru for the rest of the day. He was in a reflective and reminiscent mood.’ Dutt omits the detail of the discussion and merely reproduces Nehru’s speech in parliament giving his account of the meeting.
25 The Dalai Lama, 1990, p. 162.
26 Ibid.
27 FO 371–141593. Note of a talk with Mr Nehru on Tibet held on 29 April.
28 The Dalai Lama, 1990, p. 161.
29 Ibid.
30 Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984, p. 90.
31 G. Parthsarathi, Jawaharal Nehru’s letters to Chief Ministers, Vol. 5, 1958–1964, Oxford University Press, India, 1989, p. 227 (my italics).
32 FO 371–141593. According to Nehru, the Dalai Lama concurred with him.
33 Ibid.
34 FO 371–141592.
35 Ibid.
36 FO 371–141593. Notes of a conversation between Mr Davies of Australia House and Messrs Trench and Dalton of CRO.
37 FO 371–141593.
38 Herald Tribune, 23 April 59.
39 FO 371–141596.
40 SWB, FE/16/C/6, 2 May 1959.
41 A report from the British Embassy in Beijing to the Foreign Office. FO 371–141594.
42 ‘The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy’, by the editorial department of the People’s Daily, 6 May 1959. Reproduced in Chanakya Sen, 1960, pp. 330–56.
43 The Chinese accused the Americans of poisoning Sino-Indian friendship. Such a view was also held by left-wing elements in India. According to Karunakar Gupta (Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers, New Book Centre, Calcutta, 1982, pp. 14–15), this view was also shared by Sarder Panikkar, the former Indian ambassador to China. He told Gupta that the reasons for deteriorating relationship were (1) a powerful American lobby was operating in India and (2) Apa Pant, the Indian Political officer in Sikkim, who supposedly had influence over leading Indian politicians including Jai Prakash Narayan and President Rajendra Prasad. K. Gupta (pp. 37–8) cites CIA aid to the Khampas as evidence of the US poisoning of Sino-Indian relations. Did the CIA influence Indian politicians like Narayan et al. and were they involved in the massive anti-Chinese reaction that dominated the Indian press? There was no doubt that the CIA was operating on a large scale in India but it is not clear how far they influenced Indian public opinion on Tibet.
44 Subimal Dutt, 1977, pp. 155–6.
45 FO 371–141596. Note of a conversation between Malcolm Macdonald and Jaya Prakash Narayan.
46 Ibid.
47 The International Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organisation of 35,000 lawyers in 53 countries (mostly Western) with consultative status in the UN Economic and Social Council.
48 Chanakya Sen, 1960, p. 412.
49 The report does not deal with the status of Tibet before 1913, it only deals with the status of Tibet between 1913 and 1950 and concludes that Tibet was de facto independent. The Chinese accept that during this period their authority in Tibet was absent but they argue that the absence of authority was the result of foreign aggression (i.e. British machinations) and that therefore, the absence of Chinese authority did not create a legal situation. In October 1959, the Chinese convened a meeting of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, an organisation of lawyers from the Communist bloc plus some left-wing lawyers from Western countries who concluded that the situation in Tibet between 1913 to 1950 was ex iniuria ius non critur.
50 The detailed report was not published until September 1960.
51 The transcript of the press conference was republished in The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law. A Preliminary Report, published by the International Commission of Jurists, 1959, Document 20, pp. 200–3.
52 FO 371–141596.
53 Ibid.
54 He also travelled to Japan at the same time, but I have not been able to find out whether the Japanese gave a similar assurance or not.
55 An account of Nehru’s discussion with the Dalai Lama was given to the British High Commissioner by Dutt, the Indian External Minister. FO 371–141597.
56 S. Dutt, 1977, p. 157.
57 Chanakya Sen, 1960, pp. 470–2.
58 FO 371–141600.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 The Chinese Nationalists would have undoubtedly told the Irish that they would not accept any resolution based on the legal status of Tibet.
63 This is based on the British records of the meeting. FO 371–141600.
64 The Tibetans asked to meet the British Prime Minister but the visit coincided with the 1959 General Election. As a result the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were busy with campaigning.
65 FO 371–141602.
66 Selwyn Lloyd’s speech to the UN on 17 September 1959.
67 Tibet in the United Nations 1950–1960, p. 230.
68 In 1959 Chinese in Malaya constituted 37 per cent of the population. The ethnic Chinese population in south-east Asia was staunchly pro-PRC and looked with pride at the emergence of the new China. The Communist parties were also dominated by ethnic Chinese and they received support from the PRC. The Malays saw the strong affinity between the PRC and the Chinese population in their country as a potential danger.
69 FO 371–141605.
70 FO 371–150710.
71 SWB, 1960, 7/3/60, p. A1/1.
72 FO 371–150712. The Tibetans wrote several times to the British urging them to support Tibet’s appeal to the UN and Shakabpa held meetings with the British High Commissioner in Delhi. The British stressed that these meetings were held only as a courtesy to the Dalai Lama as a respected religious leader.
73 In 1960 the Dalai Lama sent New Year’s greetings cards to the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, causing a great deal of confusion and debate in the FO. The FO instructed the High Commissioner in Delhi to inform the Dalai Lama of the receipt of the cards. The High Commissioner, ever mindful of diplomacy, wrote back to the FO saying that he could not reply to the Dalai Lama’s card because it would be seen as establishing formal contact with the Tibetan government-in-exile. He advised that the Prime Minister’s Office and the FO should send a direct reply by ordinary mail. The FO, mindful of their position, immediately objected to the suggestion, claiming that since the offices of the Prime Minister and FO were higher than the High Commission in Delhi, a direct letter would mean that they had given higher recognition.
74 FO 371–150710.
75 Letter from Gyalo Dhundup to British Foreign Office, FO 371–150713.
76 FO 371–150713.
77 The Dalai Lama’s letters to the Secretary General are reproduced in Tibet in the United Nations, 1950–1960, pp. 232–8.
78 Ibid., p. 311.
79 FO 371–150712. When the Indians refused to give travel documents, the Tibetans reapplied on the pretext of travelling for medical treatment for the Dalai Lama’s mother. The Indians became suspicious when Gyalo Dhundup’s, Shakabpa’s and Sandu Rinchen’s names appeared with those accompanying the Dalai Lama’s mother. The Indians were even reluctant to provide travel documents for her and told the Tibetans that the treatment could be obtained in India. Eventually travel documents were provided for the Dalai Lama’s mother and Mrs Taring to travel to London.
80 FO 371–150719. A copy of the letter was given to the British by the Australian High Commission, in Delhi
81 Ibid.
82 The Dalai Lama, 1990, p. 194. He writes that the Indian Prime Minister Shastri was thinking of recognising the Tibetan government-in-exile but died before he made his final decision. If India had recognised the Tibetan government-in-exile it would have been most likely that China would have broken off diplomatic relations.
1 CHC, Vol. 14, 1987, p. 513.
2 The Chinese also noted that Russian economic aid to India was increasing. In September 1959 Russia agreed to extend more than $375 million for India’s 3rd Five Year Plan, doubling its total previous aid.
3 Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 1984, p. 489.
4 It may be that the Tibetan issue was discussed but without information having been made available. In view of the important role played by the army, the subject would have been most directly dealt with in secret by the Military Affairs Sub-Committee of the Central Committee. Apart from Zhou Enlai’s work report to the NPC, no high-ranking Chinese leader made any direct public statement on the subject.
5 There is also the question of the internal struggle within the Communist Party hierarchy. We know that the main opposition to Mao came from Marshal Peng Dehuai, who was the head of the North-West Military Region. In his own account, Peng Dehuai claimed that he had the Tibet issue in mind when the Lushan Conference was convened, but he never had the chance to bring it to discussion. Mao had successfully ousted Peng from power (see Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan Leadership’, in CHC, Vol. 14, 1987, p. 11). It may be possible that the ousting of Peng Dehuai made the officials from the North-West Military Region stationed in Tibet reluctant to voice their criticisms.
6 An interesting account of events immediately after the revolt was written in Tibetan by a Ladhaki monk who was captured by the Chinese: Lobsang Jampa, Escape from Hell, 1962, p. 4 (published by G. Tharchin, Kalimpong).
7 Another famous slogan was: ‘Under the sky there is no escape from the Communist Party and PLA.’
8 This story was told by the Dalai Lama at a hearing of Members of the European Parliament in Brussels, 25 April 1990.
9 Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms, A Historical Perspective, University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 26.
10 Order of the State Council of the Chinese People’s Republic, in Tibet 1950–1967, URI, p. 357.
11 Ibid.
12 SWB, 1959, No. 859, p. 2.
13 The Dalai Lama was considered to have been abducted, so retained his position on paper.
14 SWB, 1959, No. 861, p. 4.
15 Ibid.
16 Zhou Enlai’s report on the work of the government to the First Session of the Second NPC, SWB, 18 April 1959 (New Series), FE/5/C2/20.
17 Chang Ching-wu, The Victory of Democratic reform in Tibet, SCMP, No. 2218, 1960, pp. 29–36.
18 SWB, 1959, FE/3/C/1.
19 SCMP, 1960, No. 2218, p. 31.
20 Speech by the Panchen Rinpoche at the 2nd Plenary Session of PCART, 28 June 1959 (SWB, 1959, FE/69/C/3).
21 The experiences of one prominent Tibetan, Tenzin Chodrak, the personal physician to the Dalai Lama, is detailed in John. F. Avedon, In Exile from the Land of Snows, A Wisdom Book, 1985, pp. 301–28. He was arrested and sent to the notorious Jiuzhen labour camp in Gansu.
22 Life in Jang Tsala Karpo labour camp is described by Tashi Palden, a monk from Dragyab, in ‘Tibet Under Chinese Communist Rule, A Compilation of Refugee Statements, 1958–1975’, published by the Information Office of the Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, 1976, pp. 37–52.
23 SWB, 1959, FE/9/C/4.
24 Ibid., FE/58/C/2.
25 SWB, 1959, FE/14/C//6–8.
26 Ibid., FE/22/6/59.
27 SWB, 1959, FE/58/C/2.
28 Ibid., FE/69/C/5.
29 SCMM, 1965, No. 388, p. 14.
30 SCMP, 1963, No. 5, p. 45.
31 For details of these meetings see Dawa Norbu, 1987, pp. 186–96, and Tashi Palden’s statement in TUCCR, 1976, pp. 38–41.
32 SCMP, 1960, No. 2218, p. 33.
33 Dawa Norbu, 1987, p. 197.
34 Dhondup Choedon, 1985, pp. 301–28.
35 SWB, 1959, FE/69/C/2.
36 SWB, 1959, FE/69/C/4.
37 ‘Do Away with Feudal Prerogative of and Exploitation by the Tibetan Lamaseries’, JPRS, No. 11440, 5 February 1960, p. 24.
38 SWB, 1959, FE/69/C/3.
39 This figure only accounts for the number of monasteries and monks in TAR.
40 According to the NCNA the total population of Tibet in 1959 was 1,180,000. Of course if we look at the percentage of male population it would reach nearly 20 per cent.
41 Zhong guo gong chan tang Xizang zi zhi qu zhu zhi zi liao 1950–1987 (Data for the History of the CCP Organisation in the TAR), published by the TAR Publishing House, 1993, p. 67 (restricted circulation: hereafter cited as Data on the CCP in the TAR).
42 It is not clear from the sources whether this refers exclusively to Tibetans or to minority groups in general.
43 SCMP, 1960, No. 2218, p. 34.
44 Data on the CCP in the TAR, 1993, p. 128.
45 Pao Yi-shan, ‘Hold High the Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung and Do Our Work Well as the First Generation of Revolutionary Youth in Tibet’, SCMM, 1964, No. 442, pp. 8–11.
46 SCMP, 1960, No. 2, pp. 30–1.
47 Ibid., pp. 28–9. Speech by Wang Ch’i Mei at the inaugural meeting of the Chamdo Administrative District.
48 In Xinjiang the demobilised troops had played an important role in the economy and integration of the region with China. See Donald H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977, Westview/Dawson Replica Edition, 1977, pp. 56–67.
49 SCMP, 1960, No. 2, p. 30.
50 Of course the Communists also found a somewhat similar problem in China. When they came to power, the membership was predominantly drawn from the countryside and in the 1950s the party was unhappy about having to rely on the urban intelligentsia as a source of cadre recruitment. The Party began to establish Party schools to train workers and peasants to form the vanguard of the reforms. However, there remained what Franz Schurmann has called the Red and the Expert contradiction; that is the regime needed urban bourgeois professionals to run the factories, schools and administration, and Red cadres to lead the revolution. See Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, University of California Press, 2nd edition, 1968, pp. 168–72.
51 Dhondup Choedon, 1985, p. v. She was selected as a cadre from her village and claims that her training lasted for three months.
52 SWB, 1960, FE/318/B/3.
53 SCMP, 1960, No. 14, p. 45.
54 Franz Schurmann, 1968, p. 165.
55 ‘Tibet Today’, PR. 1964, No. 54, pp. 18–20.
56 This kind of misreporting of statistics was widespread in China and the issue of the accuracy of government grain production figures was raised by Marshal Peng Dehuai. The failure of the Great Leap Forward, for example, was concealed by deliberately distorting figures.
57 For details of the new tax, see ‘Provisional Measure for the Collection of Patriotic Public Grain Tax’. Adopted at the 34th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the PCART, 4 August 1960, SCMP, 1960, No. 34. pp. 20–5.
58 Ibid.
59 JPRS, 1962, No. 1298, pp. 97–8.
60 Traditionally the Tibetan peasants paid taxes to their manorial lords.
61 jin is equal to 0.5 kilograms.
62 Tibet, 1950–59, URI, p. 426.
63 Dittmer, 1987, p. 35. According to Dittmer industrial production decreased by 38.2 per cent and agricultural output fell by 26.3 per cent.
64 CHC, Vol. 14, 1987, p. 370.
65 Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution. Kegan Paul International, London, 1993, p. 303.
66 June Teufel Dreyer, 1976, p. 175.
67 SCMM (Supplement), 1967, No. 179, pp. 1–5.
68 During the period other minority leaders were rehabilitated, notably Long Hun and the Hui leader, Ma Sung-t’ing: June Teufel Dreyer, 1976, p. 187.
69 Frederick Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms 1950–1965, M. E. Shrape, inc. Dawson, 1979, p. 483.
70 Ibid., p. 446.
71 Fairy Sessions for Bourgeois Elements. SWB, 1961, FE/W110/A/5. It was reported in May 1961 that less than one million people were involved in the campaign. This confirms that it was mainly targeted at the so-called ‘Bourgeois Elements’, former leaders of industry, religious figures, the upper strata of the minority nationalities and members of political parties who had accepted the Communist rule.
72 Jamphel Gyatso, Master Panchen. This biography of Panchen Rinpoche was published shortly after his death in 1989 by the Oriental Publishing House in Beijing. However, in the wake of Tiananmen incident in May 1989 and the subsequent shift towards a more hard-line policy, the book was withdrawn from general circulation. The authorities argued that hitherto-unknown facts about the treatment of Panchen Rinpoche during the Cultural Revolution and facts about the Tibetan uprising revealed in the book were too sensitive for discussion during the difficult period. The book certainly brought to light many new accounts of Tibet’s recent history. In many ways it was groundbreaking in its frankness and treatment of Tibet’s recent past. Even in the original Chinese publication the authorities expunged figures cited of the number of Tibetans killed during the anti-rebellion campaign in eastern Tibetan. I have used a privately translated manuscript of the book; hereafter it will be refered to as Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
73 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Current Scene, 1961, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1–8.
77 Ibid.
78 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
79 Ibid.
80 Tibet, 1950–1970, URI, pp. 428–9.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Geshe Sherab Gyatso’s attack on the Party worried his friends, and close advisers told him that he should withdraw his statement. Chen Mo, a Chinese disciple who had acted as interpreter, refused to translate. During Geshe Sherab Gyatso’s speech Chen Mo felt so nervous that he had to be replaced by an official interpreter appointed by the United Front. Later Chen Mo asked the officials not to print Geshe Sherab Gyatso’s speech in the written report and submitted a revised written statement.
89 According to Jamphel Gyatso the petition was entitled: ‘A report on the sufferings of the masses in Tibet and other Tibetan regions and suggestions for future work to the Central Committee through the respected Premier Zhou.’
90 SCMM, 1967, No. 179, pp. 1–5. This pamphlet was produced by a group calling itself ‘Headquarters of Lhasa Rebels and Capital’s Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters Going to Tibet’. It is said that the Seventy Thousand Character Petition was entitled ‘Result, Defect, Analysis and Improvement on the Work of Suppressing Rebellion and Reform in Tibet’.
91 Here the Panchen Rinpoche was mainly concerned with the situation in eastern Tibet, in Tibetan-dominated areas in Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan. In these areas the Tibetan population came under pressure from the resettlement of large numbers of Chinese into the region. There is no doubt that thousands of Tibetans in the region were either killed in the suppression of the revolt or died as the result of economic disaster. The situation in Tibet proper was different, but it is interesting to note that figures released by the State Statistical Bureau in November 1954 give the total population of Tibet as 1,273,969 while the figure released by NCNA in 1959 is 1,180,000. It seems from the official Chinese statement that there was a 7.4 per cent decline in Tibetan population in Tibet (TAR). It is difficult to explain the discrepancy between the two figures. The decline cannot be attributed to either the reforms or the crushing of the revolt as both events occurred after 1959.
92 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
93 SCMM, 1967, No. 179, pp. 1–5.
94 Kao Feng of Qinghai and Zhang Chong Liang of Gansu were dismissed from their posts. Panchen Rinpoche’s criticism also related to these two regions.
95 Anon.
96 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
97 Anon.
98 SCMM, 1967, No. 179, pp. 1–5.
99 This in some ways relates to the campaign in China proper reversing verdicts, where cadres who suffered during the anti-Rightist campaign were rehabilitated. Deng Xiaoping declared that 80 to 90 per cent of the verdicts passed during the campaign were wrong and issued a notice that punishments levelled against them should be ignored.
100 Ibid. Later, during the Cultural Revolution, Ngabo and other members of the panel were accused of only releasing their relatives.
101 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
1 In 1942 Nehru wrote: ‘The future of which I dream is inextricably interwoven with close friendship and something almost approaching union with China’. See Krishna Hutheesingh, Nehru’s Letters to His Sister, Faber & Faber, 1963, p. 95.
2 Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984, p. 127.
3 After the flight of the Dalai Lama, demonstrations were organised in most Indian cities. After demonstrators burned an effigy of Mao, the Chinese protested to the Indians that it was an insult to the Chinese leader.
4 The basic Chinese and Indian claims are put forward in letters exchanged between the two Prime Ministers. Zhou’s letter to Nehru, 8 September 1959, sets out China’s position (see, White Paper II, pp. 27–33) and the Indian stand is made clear in Nehru’s response, dated 28 September 1959 (White Paper II, pp. 34–52.
5 The critics of Indian claims argued that Nehru was deliberately misled by Indian officials in the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs; see K. Gupta, ‘Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier’, Part 1, 1947–54, and Part II, 1954–1959, Economic & Political Weekly, 11 May 1974, pp. 721–6 and 765–72.
6 There are many books which have outlined the historical origins of the Indo-Tibetan border in great detail. Alastair Lamb is extremely thorough in his two-volume The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904–1914 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966). See also The China–Indian Border. The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries (Chatham House Essays), Oxford University Press, 1964. The Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People’s Republic of China on the Boundary Question, published by the Ministry of External Affairs of the GOI in 1961, is one of the main primary sources on the subject. While there are numerous publications from India, there are few publications from the Chinese side.
7 Such was the confusion of the border alignment between Tibet and India during the British occupation of India, one of the border markings applied by Sir Henry MacMahon showed some part of Aksai Chin as a part of Tibet. Jasbir. K. Singh, 1988, op. cit., p. 80.
8 It has to be noted that Pakistan saw the negotiations between India and China over Ladakh, which they claimed as part of Kashmir, as illegal, and implying Chinese recognition of India’s occupation of a disputed territory. If China had signed a border agreement with India, it would naturally have been tantamount to Chinese recognition of Indian sovereignty in Kashmir.
9 The Indians claim that the boundary between Tibet and the Indian states of Punjab, Himachal and Uttar Pradesh was confirmed by the Sino-Indian trade agreement of 1954.
10 The actual exchange of the notes took place in Delhi on 24 and 25 March 1914.
11 Most Tibetan officials also did not know the exact details of the notes exchanged between Lochen Shatra and MacMahon. In a 1960 Xinhua, Chensel Khunphel la (spyan gsal Kun ’phel lags), one of the closest officials of the 13th Dalai Lama, said that he never heard of the exchange of notes between Lochen Shatra and MacMahon.
12 The Tibetans were aware of the groups inhabiting these areas, known as blo ba. The tribes are Akas, Daflas, Miris, Abors and Mishmis.
13 The main objective of the Simla Conference was to define the border between Tibet and China. The Tibetans had participated at the conference in the hope of gaining secure and legal recognition of Tibetan independence.
14 Alastair Lamb, 1989. p. 469.
15 The British clearly recognised that the acceptance of the agreement had serious international implications. The agreement certainly breached the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.
16 Alastair Lamb, 1989. p. 415. Lord Harding, the Viceroy of India, had dismissed the exchange of notes between Lochen Shatra and McMahon as outside the mandate of the Simla Convention. He went so far as to say that the notes represented the ‘private views’ of Sir Henry McMahon.
17 Alastair Lamb, 1989, p. 468.
18 Phuntsog Tashi Takla, who worked in the Foreign Bureau, told me that the Chinese were particularly interested in where the Tibetans thought their border with India, Nepal and Bhutan lay.
19 Xinhua carried an interview with Sambo, whose family was a direct descendant of the 7th Dalai Lama. He mentioned that his family had a manorial estate in Tawang district granted by the Tibetan Government.
20 White Paper II, p. 39, Nehru to Zhou Enlai, 28 September 1959; see also Zhou’s letter to Nehru, 8 September 1959, pp. 29–30.
21 It is interesting to note that Hugh Richardson was equally dismissive of the territorial demands and advised Delhi not to take seriously the Tibetan claim, which he saw as an ‘attempt to test the Indian attitude’ (see Richardson, 1984, p. 174).
22 Report of the Officials of the GOI and the PRC on the Boundary Question, published by the Ministry of External Affairs, 1961, p. 25.
23 India reaffirmed Tibet as a ‘region of China’ by signing the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement of 1954.
24 The Times, 8 September 1959.
25 There is some conflict as to whether Zhou Enlai ever made such an offer to Nehru. Two of the chief officials in the Indian External Ministry, Subimal Dutt and Krishna P. Menon, give different accounts. In his biography Dutt writes that Zhou never made such a proposal. However, this was the only solution that could be proposed, given the fact that each side was in occupation of the disputed regions. The Chinese had secured complete control of the Aksai Chin and the Indians had moved into the Eastern Sector.
26 Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, Penguin Books, 1972, p. 277.
27 In December 1959 President Eisenhower visited India.
28 Lhamo Tsering.
29 Kenneth Galbraith, A life of Our Times, Memoirs, André Deutsch, London, 1981, pp. 394–7.
30 Ibid. Galbraith claims that with the help of Robert Kennedy, he ‘persuaded the President [J. F. Kennedy] to bring these to an end’.
31 One of the reasons for their objections may be explained by internal rivalries in the State Department and the CIA. The CIA’s work among the Tibetans was carried out by the Far East Section, whose objective was to destabilise China. But the objective in India (and South Asia) was very different: to win over the Indians to the Western side. Therefore, it was natural that the ambassador and the CIA station officer felt that aid to the Tibetans would undermine their work.
32 This was told to me by a number of Tibetans who were in training in Colorado.
33 Lhamo Tsering.
34 Ibid.
35 Leo E Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, University of California Press, 1971, p. 227.
36 In 1960 China also signed a border agreement with Burma, where they accepted the alignment drawn by the British and which in fact consisted of the continuation of the MacMahon line. During this period China also reached border agreements with Mongolia and Pakistan.
37 On 15 December 1960, King Mahendra ousted the elected Congress Government of B. P. Koirala and assumed political control of the country. It is possible that if Koirala’s Government had been in power, the Tibetans may not have been allowed to establish the base in Mustang. The Nepalese Foreign Minister said at a press conference that Nepal would not object to the PLA crossing the Nepalese border in pursuit of Tibetan resistance fighters. The Chinese, however, preferred authoritarian monarchical rule to the Congress Government, which it viewed as an extension of the Indian Congress Party.
38 Lhamo Tsering.
39 In a speech to the TAR People’s Congress on 28 March 1987, the Panchen Rinpoche said that the PLA was able to win the war ‘because the Tibetans provided the logistic service with their backs and pack animals’.
40 Neville Maxwell, 1972, p. 317.
41 Sarvepalli Gopal, 1984, p. 218.
42 It is beyond the scope of this book to analyse the details of the events which led to the war, a subject which has received a great deal of attention both in India and abroad. Views on the cause of and blame for the war naturally vary according to the writer’s support for India or China. Earlier works published in India and the West tended to lean slightly towards India. In 1970, Neville Maxwell, a former Times correspondent in India, published India’s China War, which argued that the failure of the border negotiations and the war lies with India. The book was received favourably by Beijing and serialised in a Chinese newspaper while the Indian Government banned publication. The Indian side of the case is presented in numerous books published in India, notably: B. N. Mullick, The Chinese Betrayal, and J. P Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder. Sarvepalli Gopal’s 3-volume biography of Nehru also provides a defence of India’s case.
43 Lhamo Tsering.
44 Of course during the war, CIA became actively involved in advising the Indians. The American Embassy in Delhi was staffed with the top ranking CIA officials like W. Lowrie Campbell, reported to be CIA’s authority on mountain warfare and Desmond FitzGerald, the CIA’s chief of clandestine operations.
1 Many Western apologists for China like to portray the period as a triumph of science over superstition. Edgar Snow, one of the most noted China watchers, wrote that the authority of the lamas was ‘undermined by the magic of science’ and ‘Lamaism and its gods were formally entering the limbo of forgotten folklore’. See The Long Revolution, Hutchinson & Co, London, 1973, p. 196.
2 Tibet, 1959–1967, URI, p. 449.
3 See statements in TUCCR by Pema Lhundup, pp. 103–9 and by Wangdu Dorji, pp. 110–14.
4 This is also true of China itself. After coming to power the Communists adopted more simplified characters. In other minority areas a similar language policy was adopted; among the Uygur and the Miao, for example there were attempts to introduce a romanized script. See Henry G. Schwarz, 1962, CQ, No. 12, pp. 170–82.
5 The Lhasa dialect was chosen as the standard for written Tibetan.
6 The changes can be best gleaned by reading the Collected Works of Mao, which became required reading for workers, students and cadres.
7 These terms later lost all their original meaning and were used merely as terms of abuse without objective meaning, so that a ‘reactionary’ or ‘revisionist’, for example, is anyone the Party happened to identify as an enemy at a given time.
8 Khrushchev argued that in Soviet Union, under the leadership of the Communist Party, class struggle was no longer an issue and the Communist Party was a party for all people.
9 Quote from B. Brugger, 1978, p. 25.
10 For translation of the article see SCMM, 1964, No. 428, pp. 8–18.
11 Ibid.
12 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
13 Frederick C. Teiwes, 1979, p. 508.
14 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
15 Frederick C. Teiwes, 1979, p. 510.
16 The Four Clean Ups referred to attempts to rectify corrupt practices in (1) economic accounting; (2) public granaries; (3) state and collective properties, and (4) assessment of work points.
17 SCMP 1968, No. 223, pp. 20–2.
18 It is interesting to note that in areas where the Chinese were confronted with difficulties they were ready to abandon ideology for practical considerations. For example while 1963 saw more radical policies adopted in Tibet, in Xinjiang where the Communists were faced with the problem of mass exodus of Uygurs and Kazakhs to Russia, the Chinese adopted more liberal policies with the promise of cultural freedom. This was an attempt to counter Soviet propaganda.
19 The Chinese use of the term class does not accord with the strict Marxist interpretation of class: the Chinese tend to use the term to mean a wide range of social groupings, using occupational status as the chief criterion.
20 Dhondup Choedon, 1978, p. 33.
21 Literally, ‘wealthless class’.
22 CNA, 1965, No. 548. p. 2.
23 Sui Jia, 1991, p. 5.
24 SCMM, 1964, No. 442, p. 11.
25 Ibid., p. 10.
26 It is interesting to note that in Tibetan it is more common to use the term ‘fatherland’ (pha yul) while it is more common in Chinese to use the term ‘motherland’ (zuguo, which strictly speaking means ‘ancestral’ land in Chinese).
27 Tibet, 1950–1967, URI, p. 447.
28 Kunsang Paljor, 1977, p. 26.
29 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
30 According to his biographer, the Panchen Rinpoche had once mentioned that he liked dogs, especially Alsatians, to Chen Yi, who immediately asked the Kunming Military if they could donate one or two Alsatians. Somehow the authorities in Kunming dispatched twelve Alsatians to Shigatse, which later became the evidence that the Panchen Rinpoche had raised fighting dogs.
31 The horses too were presents, this time given by Ulanfu.
32 It is not clear why Chape turned against the Panchen Rinpoche, his Guru. Did he do it purely to obtain personal gain or was he coerced by the Chinese? I am inclined to believe that the Chinese must have put a great deal of pressure on to him to procure such a denunciation.
33 Mao later told Edgar Snow (1973, p. 196) that ‘the Panchen Lama had been keeping company with some bad eggs of the old privileged class who not only obstructed change but had organised a clique. Certain members of the clique had exposed their plans [My emphasis].’
34 During the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the CCP produced a pamphlet entitled ‘Deeper Refutations of Lin Biao and Confucius while criticising Dalai and Panchen’. The pamphlet contains examples of tra-yig and a record of the Panchen Rinpoche’s dreams.
35 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
36 In Tibetan, tang la ngo rgol, mi dmangs la ngo rgol and mes rgyal kha bral tu gtong ba.
37 In Tibet’s case from feudalism to communism.
38 Tibet 1950–1967, URI, 1968, p. 472.
39 Xinhua, 31 December 1964.
40 Anon.
41 Xinhua, 26 December 1964.
42 This statement was made by Mao in a conversation with an African delegation visiting Beijing in August 1963. However, it was more than likely that the theoretical shift in Mao’s thoughts on the nationality question were first discussed at the 10th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee, when Mao made the pronouncement ‘never to forget the class struggle’. This had placed the ‘class struggle’ at the centre of the political campaign.
It is also interesting to note that Mao’s dictum about the national problem being essentially class struggle was not meant merely for internal policy consumption. More importantly it was an appeal to the international working classes. Mao drew a direct parallel to events in the United States, where the Civil Rights movement was at its height. Mao saw this as essentially class conflict and was using the idea of class struggle as an extension of China’s foreign policy. Later the Chinese were to expound a new concept of the UN based on an alliance of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries.
43 Xinhua, 31 December 1964.
44 Xinhua, 5 August 1965.
45 The right of Regional Autonomy was enshrined in the PRC Constitution adopted on 20 September 1954. Article 3 says: ‘The People’s Republic of China is a unitary multinational state. All the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality, or any act undermining the unity of the nationalities is prohibited. All the nationalities have freedom to use and foster the growth of their spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs or ways. Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas entirely or largely inhabited by minority nationalities. Such autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People’s Republic of China.’
46 Tibet 1950–67, URI, p. 426.
47 There are four other Autonomous Regions: Inner Mongol AR, set up in May 1947 nearly two years before the Communists took power in China; Xinjiang Uygur AR, founded on October 1955; Guangxi Zhuang AR, established in May 1958, and Ningxia Hui AR, established in October 1958.
48 Xinhua, 31 December 1964.
49 In the past they had existed virtually free from any Tibetan Government interference and had very little connection with the Tibetans. Therefore, the Tibetan revolt in 1959 did not have any impact on these groups. Some Tibetans escaped through their territories to India. These people had more in common with the tribal peoples of Assam. There are few anthropological or scholarly researches into the history and culture of these groups. Later Chinese sources often cite conflicting figures for Monpa and Lopa population. Questions and Answers about China’s Minority Nationalities (compiled by Ma Yin, 1985) gives Lopa population as 2,000 or more and, for Monpas, it gives 6,000 or more. Yet in 1979 the Monpas population was cited as 40,000. See China Reconstructs, No. 7, July 1979, p. 54.
50 Article 68 of PRC’s 1954 constitution states: ‘In all autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures, and autonomous counties where nationalities live together, each nationality is entitled to appropriate representation in the organs of self-government.’
51 Tibet 1950–1967, URI, 1968, p. 493.
52 Ibid., p. 505.
53 SCMM, 1965, No. 498, pp. 17–22.
54 Ibid.
55 China Reconstructs, November 1965.
56 Data on CCP in TAR, Lhasa 1993, p. 128.
57 Ibid.
58 George Moseley, 1965, p. 16.
59 Peking Review, 25 May 1978.
60 Israel Epstein, 1977, p. 33.
61 June Dreyer, 1976, p. 202.
62 SCMP 1968, No. 218, p. 6.
63 Qi Yan, 1991, p. 3.
64 In 1961, Nepal accepted the Chinese offer to build a road linking Tibet with Kathmandu, although there was no doubt that the road was of strategic interest to both countries. For Nepal the road connected outlying areas with Kathmandu and for the Chinese it allowed easy access to rice from the Terai and other manufactured goods. The Chinese imported Nepalese jute, cigarettes and sugar. However, severe economic constraints in Nepal meant that its ability to supply was limited.
65 Israel Epstein, 1983, p. 96.
66 TUCCR, 1976, p. 149.
67 CHC, Vol. 14, 1987, p. 365.
68 Dhondup Choedon, 1978, p. 5.
69 Israel Epstein, 1983, p. 97.
70 According to Dhondup Choedon, in the Red Flag commune there was a strict quota for agricultural production. 70–80 per cent of the production was geared towards cereals, with the emphasis on wheat. 20 per cent was devoted to pulses and mustard.
71 Dhondup Choedon, 1978, p. 28. She writes that the cadres received an additional 15 yuan per month.
72 Israel Epstein, 1977, p. 35.
73 Peking Review, 7 August 1985, p. 22.
74 Ibid., p. 43.
75 Dhondup Choedon, 1978, p. 8.
76 Ibid., p. 35.
77 Wang Xiaoqing and Bai Nanfeng, 1991, p. 67.
78 Many informants remember that, during the Tibetan New Year, the Chinese used to broadcast a special message to the Tibetans in India, inviting them to return. In 1966, one of the broadcasts began: ‘The alleyways in Lhasa are filled with the smell of oil from the frying of Khabse.’
79 Goldstein and Beal, 1989, pp. 622–3.
80 Dhondup Choedon, 1978, p. 27. She remembers being told by a Chinese cadre that the communes should be praised because: ‘(1) It is easy to advise the people, (2) it is easy to assign work, (3) it is easy to collect news, (4) it is easy to bring reforms, (5) it is of great benefit to the nation, (6) it is easy to organise and hence there is a more effective use of labour of the masses and (7) it is easy to lead the masses.’
1 See the general assessment of the academic writing on the Cultural Revolution, Lucian Pye, 1988, pp. 597–612.
2 See the full text, ‘Resolution on CPC History, 1949–1981’, Beijing, 1981.
3 Ibid., p. 81.
4 Anita Chen, 1992, writes that the official definition of the CR given by the Party in 1981 was a ‘gross distortion of historical reality’. The 1981 document, she says, ‘can be considered the victors’ last say on the matter after a protracted feud’.
5 Israel Epstein, 1977, p. 33.
6 It is interesting that the term ‘Green Brain’ crept into modern usage as a term of abuse.
7 Tibet, 1950–1967. URI, p. 603.
8 The importance of the identification of the beginning of the Cultural Revolution as May 1966 has been noted, see Anita Chen, 1992. Deng Xiaoping is thereby exonerated from involvement in the decision to launch the Cultural Revolution and identified as a victim, because it is known that after May 1966 Deng himself became a target of the Red Guards.
9 In Tibetan, Four Olds, bsam-blo rnying-pa, rig-gnas rnying-pa, yul-srol rnying-pa, goms-gshis rnying-pa,.
10 Tibet 1950–1967, URI, p. 604.
11 SCMP, 1968, No. 216, p. 27.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., No. 230, pp. 8–9.
14 Ibid., No. 216. p. 27.
15 Ibid., p. 28.
16 Ibid., p. 28.
17 Barnouin and Changgen, 1993, p. 72
18 Ibid.
19 SCMP, 1968, No. 216, p. 29.
20 Ibid.
21 It is interesting to note that while the Red Guards were saying that the Kha ta was a remnant of the feudal tradition and it should be forbidden, the adorning of Mao’s portrait with Kha ta was seen as acceptable. Chinese propaganda at the time stressed how people would use Kha ta to wrap Mao’s red book to show their love of him. There were many other contradictory and humorous occasions when the Red Guards and staff working at Lhasa Radio debated what constituted proletarian language and what language was appropriate to use when speaking about Chairman Mao. If one used non-honorific language one was liable to attack for not respecting the great leader and if one used honorific language, another Red Guard faction would attack you for going against the teaching of the beloved leader of the people.
22 This is from a four-page pamphlet written in Tibetan that was distributed in Lhasa by the Red Guards from Lhasa teacher training college. I obtained this pamphlet in Kathmandu.
23 ser smad ri-’bur sprul-sku.
24 According to figures given by the TAR Vice Chairman in 1987, there were 2,700 monasteries in TAR, 80 per cent of which were destroyed by 1965. The rest, apart from thirteen, were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.
25 SCMP, 1968, No. 205, pp. 22–3.
26 Dhondup Choedon 1978, p. 64
27 See the detailed denunciation of Deng Xiaoping by Red Guards from Shanghai. Tibet 1950–1968, URI, pp. 689–99.
28 Jung Chang, 1993, p. 343. She says that during her student days in 1964, her class was taken to see an exhibition about Tibet, where there was a display of ‘photos of dungeons crawling with scorpions, and horrific instruments of torture, including a tool for scooping out eyes and knives for cutting the tendons in the ankles. A man in a wheelchair who came to our school to give a talk told us he was a former serf from Tibet who had had his ankle tendons severed for some trivial offence’.
29 SCMP, 1968, No. 15, p. 30.
30 Tibet 1950–1967, URI, p. 631.
31 I have in mind people like Sambo, who was a member of the Tibetan delegation which signed the 17-Point Agreement; Phagpa Gelek Namgyal; the head Lama of Chamdo Kabsopa, a former Khalon who had been supportive of the Chinese; and Tsego, a former mayor of Lhasa. There are too many to mention them all.
32 There is a general belief that Zhou Enlai personally interfered and had Ngabo transferred to Beijing.
33 Interview with Tsering Wangchuk, a former member of staff at the Tibet Daily, now living in India.
34 SCMP, 1968, No. 179, pp. 1–5.
35 SCMP, 1968, No. 216, p. 32.
36 Ibid.
37 Stanley Karnow, 1984, pp. 306–7.
38 Tibet, 1950–1967, URI, p. 686.
39 SCMP, 1968, No. 216, p. 33.
40 Ibid.
41 Tibet, 1950–1967, URI, p. 631.
42 Ibid., p. 630.
43 Here the rebel groups were emulating events in China. The first rebel organisation, the Shanghai Workers’ Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters, was set up nearly two months earlier, on 9 November.
44 Tibet, 1950–1967, URI, p. 633.
45 SCMP, 1968, No. 215, p. 20.
46 Keith Forster, 1990, p. 5.
47 SCMP, 1986, No. 215, pp. 18–24. This report by the Tibet Military Commission on the situation in Tibet was first made public by the Red Guards from the Gyenlog group. They naturally condemned the report as biased and falsifying the true situation.
48 Ibid., p. 21. The figures are cited in the above mentioned report. A reliable report published by Tibetans in India says that Gyenlog had 20,000 followers and Nyamdrel 50,000.
49 It is interesting to note that the original report mentioned above cites the ethnic composition of each group. However, when it was published by the Red Guards, these figures had been erased. It was most likely that the authorities felt the people would have taken the figures as showing ethnic division between the two factions.
50 pyi-lo 1965 lor bod rang-skyong ljongs brchugs-pa nas bar bod-nang gi gnas-tsul la zhib ’jug zhus-pa’i pyongs bsthoms snyan zhu, p. 25.
51 SCMP, 1968, No. 178, pp. 10–13.
52 Ibid., No. 225. p. 42.
53 Tibet, 1950–67, URI, p. 665.
54 SCMP, 1968, No. 223, pp. 33–4. The documents mention that many drivers suffered from arthritis, hemoptysis and high-altitude sickness.
55 SCMP, 1968, No. 204, p. 25.
56 One regulation highlighted by the Red Guards was access to medical treatment in China. The Party would pay 50 per cent of medical treatment. The regulation stated that here no class background would be taken into account. SCMP, 1968, No. 201, p. 25.
57 Ibid., No. 213, p. 19.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 SCMP, 1967, No. 225, p. 37.
61 Ibid., No. 215, p. 25.
62 Ibid., No. 178, p. 1.
63 Ibid., No. 204, p. 18–21.
64 Before the Communist takeover of power in China, Zhang Guohua had served as a regimental commissar of the Red First Army Corps headed by Lin Biao. During the war against the Japanese, Zhang also served as a battalion commissar of Lin Biao’s 115th division.
65 William Whitson, 1973, p. 331.
66 Yang Tsang-hao, 1976, p. 50.
67 SCMP, 1968, No. 228, p. 6.
68 Ibid., p. 16.
69 Yang Tsang-hao, 1967, p. 51.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 49.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 50.
74 SCMP, 1968. No. 215, p. 21.
75 Ibid., No. 216, p. 41.
76 Ibid.
77 Chien Yu-shen, 1969, pp. 27–9.
78 See the detailed appraisal of Zhou Renshan’s work in Qinghai, SCMP, 1968, No. 230, pp. 41–50.
79 Tibet 1950–67, URI, p. 671.
80 SCMP, 1968, No. 215, p. 24.
81 Ibid., p. 16.
82 Tibet 1950–67, URI, pp. 666–9.
83 I have not gone into detail in each of the incidents. There are a number of Red Guard eye-witness accounts of the events published in SCMP.
84 Facts and Features, 1968, No. 16, pp. 18–19.
85 See two opposing views on Zhou Renshan, one by the Gyenlog and the other by the Nyamdrel faction in SCMP, 1967, No. 221, pp. 25–9.
86 SCMP, 1968, No. 228, pp. 17–18.
87 Ibid., No. 231, pp. 8–9.
88 See notes of the meeting: Tibet, 1950–67, URI, pp. 683–8.
89 Facts and Features, 1967, No 1, pp. 21–2.
90 SCMP, 1968, No. 218, pp. 12–14.
91 Facts and Features, 1968, Vol. 1, No. 12, pp. 22–3.
92 Ibid.
93 Jurgen Domes, 1970, pp. 122–45.
94 Chien Yu-shen, 1969, p. 24.
95 CNA, 1969, No. 789, p. 1.
96 But Data on Party states that Zhou Renshan and Wang Qimei were dismissed from the Party in August 1971 at the 1st session of the TAR CPC Deputy Congress.
97 Jurgen Domes, 1970, p. 124.
98 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
99 This is also the case with another important Tibetan official, Ragti, who became Party Secretary in the 1980s.
100 Interview with Tenzin Chodrak, who was from Nyemo and now lives in India. One of his relatives was executed along with Thrinley Choedron.
101 I have been told that this method is also used in China. The point is not the way a spade was used, but the interpretation made by the Chinese and the farmers who were forced to abandon the practice.
102 See Jigme Ngabo, 1988, pp. 24–5.
103 In Tibetan, ‘rnam sa-la zher-pa ’i skyab’.
1 In traditional Tibetan society blacksmiths, butchers and other craftsmen were considered as outcasts and suffered considerable social prejudice.
2 Names such as ‘Liberation’, ‘Red Flag’, and ‘Modernity’. See Tiley Chodag, 1988, p. 266.
3 Once ransacked, the monasteries and the temples quickly deteriorated, in part because after the Cultural Revolution the local people and the Chinese began to strip the ruins of all their timber for fuel.
4 May Mao Tsetung Live for Ten Thousand Years.
5 SWB, 1970, No. 3298/B11/3.
6 SWB, 1970, No 3275/B11/16.
7 The organisational history of the TAR’s Party and government system.
8 SWB, 1970, No. 3533/B11/13.
9 The authorities began to release painstakingly compiled statistics such as the number of free haircuts carried out by the PLA, the number of farm implements that they repaired, and amount of manure the PLA moved to the fields. This was meant to show how much the army was helping the people.
10 Lucian W. Pye, 1975, p. 500.
11 In the past Tibet had very close religious and cultural ties with Kalmyk and Buryat Mongols, who were followers of Tibetan Buddhism. After the Russian Revolution this connection came to an end.
12 Jurgen Domes, 1977, p. 143. He notes that a review of the purge of the PLA after the Lin Biao affair reveals that 65 per cent of the officers who were removed were from the 4th Field Army.
13 Israel Epstein, 1983, p. 162.
14 Current Scene 1971, No. 10, p. 14.
15 Israel Epstein, 1983, p. 12.
16 Current Scene 1971, No. 10, p. 14.
17 SWB, 1991, No. 4210/B11/10.
18 SWB, 1973, No. 4210/B11/10.
19 Ibid., No. 4228/B11/1.
20 Ibid., No. 4220/B11/14.
21 It is interesting to note that in 1965 she had been nominated President and in 1981 she was reinstated to the same post.
22 On 28 April 1972 in Beijing, Prince Sihanouk proclaimed his Cambodian government-in-exile and the setting up of a liberation army. China espoused his cause.
23 Jamphel Gyatso, 1990.
24 KCA, 1971, Vol. XVIII. p. 24773.
25 The Tibetan operation in Mustang had been kept secret and there had never been any publicity. In 1964 George Patterson and the British film-makers Adrian Cowell and Chris Menges managed to get to Mustang and film the Tibetan guerrillas attacking a Chinese military convoy. When the news of this reached the CIA, an urgent meeting was held. The CIA instructed the Tibetans to confiscate the films at all costs, but Patterson and his friends had managed to leave India. The film was later broadcast in Britain by ITV as ‘Raid into Tibet’. However, Patterson and the film-makers were unaware of the connection between the CIA and the Tibetans.
26 Lhamo Tsering.
27 Without archival sources it is difficult to date the exact time when the decision was reached.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 It should be noted that the Chinese were active in arming anti-Indian groups. The Chinese supplied and trained the Nagas and Mizo groups, which were demanding independence from India. Throughout the 1970s and early 80s the Chinese continued to support Mizo National Front (MNF) and its military wing, the Mizo National Army. Laldenga, the leader of MNF, was a frequent visitor to Beijing. I met him when he was living in England in the early 1980s, and he told me that some of the soldiers from the MNF may have been trained in Tibet. There were also leaders of Naga National Council (NNC), like Thuingaleng Muivah and Thinoselie Medom Keyho, living in Beijing. Both of them were attending Party school in Beijing and their fighters were being trained in China.
31 Kissinger described talks between Mrs Gandhi and Nixon as ‘a dialogue of the deaf’, adding that Nixon’s comments about Mrs Gandhi ‘were not always printable’. See H. Kissinger, 1979, pp. 848–81.
32 Henry Kissinger, 1979, p. 862. Kissinger also noted that Zhou Enlai was so concerned about India that ‘he spent most his time talking about India’.
33 In 1970s the Tibetans claimed there were 80,000 refugees in India. This would mean that at the best estimate between 10 and 20 per cent of male Tibetan refugees were under arms. Also see Avedon, 1984, p. 165. He says there were 10,500 Tibetans serving in the Indian army.
34 After the war, when the Indian Government organised a parade to celebrate victory, the Tibetans were not allowed to participate and no ceremonies were held to award the men their medals. The existence of Unit 22 was kept secret by the GOI but in the 1980s popular Indian papers began to write about the group and the abuse of power by Indian officers.
35 Henry Kissinger, 1979, p. 906.
36 Although Kissinger does not mention Tibet, he would have recognised that this was one of China’s main concerns.
37 SWB, 1970, No. FE/3328/A3/1.
38 Girish Pant, 1991, p. 155. It is interesting to note that by the late 1970s Chinese aid had dropped to 2.7 per cent.
39 The Nepalese Government appointed the well-known Nepali anthropologist Dor Bhadur Bista as Consul General in Lhasa.
40 Lhamo Tsering.
41 Ibid.
42 SWB, 1975, No. FE/4812/B11/19.
43 SWB,1974, No. FE/4762/B11/21.
44 Ibid.
45 SWB, 1974, No. FE/4691/B11/15.
46 SWB, 1974, No. FE/4780/B11/14.
47 SWB, 1974, No. FE/4765/B11/6.
48 Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 4, 1982, p. 71.
49 Bernard Vincent Olivier, 1993, p. 149.
50 SWB, 1976, No. FE/5154/B11/12.
51 In Tibetan, ‘pa-dring ma-dring ‘di las M’o-kru’u dring-che’.
52 The Gang of Four were Jiang Qing; Zhang Chunqiao, the head of Shanghai CCP; Wang Hongwen, who was also a cadre from Shanghai; and Yao Wenyuan, who wrote the article attacking Wu Han’s The Dismissal of Hai Rui from Office. The article had marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.
53 Edward Luttwak, a prominent American academic, accompanied Schlesinger and wrote a number of articles about his trip. Luttwak was clearly not impressed with the situation there. Despite Chinese attempts to impress the visitors, the Americans left with the impression that Tibet had become a Chinese colony. Luttwak’s article was reproduced in TR, 1977, Vol. XII, No. 4, pp. 14–17.
54 It is interesting to note that the Chinese authorities refused to allow the visitors to purchase local newspapers. This was confirmed by Charles Benoit, who accompanied Schlesinger as the official interpreter. See TR, 1977, Vol. XII, Nos 1 & pp. 5–6.
55 Maxwell was the author of India’s China War which blamed India for the 1962 war. The Tibetans were familiar with Maxwell’s name as his book had been translated into Chinese and reprinted in the People’s Daily. It was given such importance that it became required reading for political study sessions.
56 Han Suyin’s book was entitled Lhasa the Open City, A definite misnomer. She boldly asserted that Tibet had never been so open and cited as evidence the visits of the King of Nepal, the Shah of Iran’s sister and James Schlesinger, none of whom could be regarded as ordinary visitors to Tibet.
57 Visits by Maxwell, Greene and Han Suyin brought extensive positive coverage of Chinese rule in Tibet. Maxwell’s articles appeared in all the major Western newspapers, including The Times and the New York Times; and Greene’s film was shown on the BBC and other Western television channels. They managed to create the view among Western liberals and leftists that the Chinese had brought economic and social benefits to Tibet.
58 SWB, 1976, No. FE/5343/B11/7.
59 SWB, 1978, No. FE/5996/B11/17.
60 Ibid.
61 The ‘three types’ were cadres who during the Cultural Revolution (1) had gained power illegitimately (2) had engaged in factional struggle and (3) had killed and robbed.
62 Paul Hyer, 1969, pp. 24–62.
63 Laszlo Ladany, 1988, p. 285.
64 Yang Jingren, 1981–82, p. 93.
65 An article entitled ‘On the protracted nature of the nationalities problem in the Socialist period’ appeared in the 6 April edition of the People’s Daily. Authors Liu Xianzhao and Wei Shiming stressed that ‘the final disappearance of the nationalities can be realised progressively only after Communism has been attained in the whole world.’ The authors therefore considered it ‘utterly absurd and stupid to deny the existence of a nationalities problem in the socialist period’. See English translation of the article, SWB, 1979, No. FE/6099/B11/10–12.
66 Yang Jingren, 1981–2, p. 100.
67 TR, 1977, Vol. XII. No. 5, p. 5.
68 TR, 1979, Vol. XIV, No. 11, p. 19.
69 SWB, 1979, No. FE/6193/C/3.
70 The issue was discussed at length in an article in the People’s Daily, 6 April 1979. See English translation SWB, 1979, No. FE/6099/B11/10.
71 The Chinese argue that the figures on Tibet cannot be compared with other regions because Tibet began from a lower starting point.
72 Xinhua, 21/10/1983. The same report goes on to say that the Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources had discovered over 60 minerals in the TAR. The region has the largest deposit of lithium in the world and one of the largest reserves of chromite, as well as the second largest reserve of copper in China. The report also lists the following minerals: porphyry copper, tungsten, gold, silver and iron.
73 The Four Modernisations were in the areas of agriculture, economy, military and science and technology.
74 In the case of the Muslim minority, there was the added dimension of wooing the oil-rich Arab countries to invest in China.
75 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
76 For a list of prisoners released, see TR, 1978, Vol. XIII, No. 11. pp. 5–6.
77 SWB, 1979, No. FE/6099/B11/12.
78 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
79 SWB, 1979, No. FE/6032/B11/10–12.
80 Yang Jingren, 1980, p. 100.
81 SWB, 1979, No FE/6149/B11/12.
82 Israel Epstein, 1983, pp. 517–21.
83 It is interesting to note that in April 1979 the formation of a Tibetan Communist Party-in-exile was announced.
84 TB, 1979, Vol. XI, No. 2, p. 5.
85 dus-dran thengs bchu-dgu pa’i bka’-slob. chab-srid lam-ston. Dhramsala, 1982, p. 285.
86 Ibid., p. 326.
87 Because the border between India and Tibet was closed, the Tibetans could only enter via Nepal. The Tibetans only had visas for Nepal and once reaching Kathmandu, they made their way to Dharamsala without valid travel documents. However, the Indians turned a blind eye to the illegal entry of Tibetans.
88 SWB, 1979, No. FE/6020/A3/12–13.
89 Ibid.
90 In 1991 Gyalo Dhundup conducted a lengthy private interview giving an account of his involvement in Tibetan affairs since 1949. The interview was videotaped and was widely circulated in the Tibetan community (hereafter cited as Gyalo Dhundup video).
91 Some members urged the Dalai Lama to cancel the visit while others accused the leaders of failing to inform the Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies, which had functioned as a parliament in exile. See TR, 1979, Vol. XIV, No. 8, p. 7.
92 In 1951 when the Tibetan delegation went to Beijing they travelled using Chinese passports.
93 Some of the members of the Tibetan delegation told me that the Chinese officials who accompanied them were at a loss for words. They became embarrassed and walked away from the scene.
94 Ngabo Jigme, 1988, p. 25.
95 The Chinese briefly imprisoned a woman called Tsering Dolma, who shouted, ‘Bod rang-tsen’ (Independence for Tibet). The delegation protested to the Chinese and she was later released and allowed to leave for India.
96 The BBC’s The World About Us series made a two-part documentary film produced by Simon Normanton on the history of Tibet in the twentieth century. The film was a mixture of nostalgia for the lost Shangri la and the destruction of Tibet’s unique cultural heritage by the Chinese. The second part of the documentary made extensive use of the films taken by the Dharamsala delegation.
97 TB, 1980, Vol. XII, No. 2, p. 8.
98 Jamphel Gyatso, 1989.
99 Ibid.
100 It is interesting to note that at same time the Communist Party reappointed another former cadre to head Xinjiang, another sensitive region. Wang Enmao, for a long time Party Secretary in Xinjiang, was purged in 1969 but was sent back in 1981 to take up his old job.
101 Wang Yao, 1994, pp. 385–289.
102 Ibid., p. 288.
103 Ngabo Jigme, 1988, p. 26.
104 Ibid.
105 SWB, 1980, No. FE/6436/B11/1–6.
106 Ibid.
107 SWB, 1980, No. FE/6430/B11/3.
108 Yang Jingren, 1980, p. 93.
109 The letter was released to the press by the Dalai Lama on 4 September 1993. For full version of the letter see TR, 1993. Vol. XXVIII, No. 10, 1993, pp. 9–14.
110 Yang Zhongmei, 1988, p. 143.
111 Yang Jingren, 1981–2.
112 Xinhua, 29 November 1984. The proposal was not made public when it was given to Gyalo Dhundup in 1981. (Italics added for emphasis.)
113 FEER, 16 July 1982, p. 29.
114 In September 1981 Marshal Ye Jianying, chairman of the NPC, announced a nine-point proposal for Taiwan’s unification with the mainland: (1) talks should be held as soon as possible to realise the ‘great cause’ of reunification; (2) there would be exchanges of mail, trade and tourism; (3) after reunification Taiwan would be a special administrative zone and Beijing would not interfere with local affairs; (4) Taiwan could keep its socio-economic system, including private property and foreign investment; (5) people in authority would take new jobs but retain their political power; (6) the PRC would give aid to help resolve local financial problems; (7) there would be freedom of entry and exit; (8) Taiwan’s investments in China would be guaranteed, and (9) Beijing hoped that the Guomindang would stick to its one-China policy and ‘join hands in promoting reunification’.
115 It is interesting to note that the idea of unification of all the Tibetan-speaking population applies only to regions under Chinese control. There was no attempt among the refugees to identify Tibetan-speaking populations of Nepal, India and Bhutan as part of Greater Tibet.
116 Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, 1992, p. 44.
117 Wang Yao, 1994, p. 289.
118 It is interesting to note that the Chinese never published precise figures on the number of cadres withdrawn from Tibet.
119 ‘Tibet; Today and Yesterday’, China Today, 1983, No. 7, p. 16.
120 Data on CCP in Tibet, 1993, p. 296.
121 ‘Tibet; Today and Yesterday’, China Today, 1983, No. 7, p. 43.
122 SWB, 1982, No. FE/6959/B11/7. This phrase was used by Chen Yun in an article in Red Flag, 1982.
123 It was reported that 83 per cent of the cadres were under forty-five years of age. SWB, 1985, No. FE/7900/B11/11.
124 SWB, 1981, No. FE/6717/C/15.
125 SWB, 1980, No. FE/6335/B11/1.
126 Ibid., No. FE/6436/B11/3.
127 Article 116 empowered the Regional People’s Congress to examine and ratify laws passed by the NPC. Article 117 gave the autonomous regions the right of fiscal management of the region. (This was the right to decide on revenue generated locally). Article 118 gave the regions the right to plan and control economic development. Article 119 gave similar rights over education, culture and science. Article 120 allowed autonomous regions to organise their public security.
128 It is beyond the scope of this book to deal with all the legislative changes made during the 1980s. The most significant new law was the electoral law of the NPC.
129 For example, when in 1981 the NPC passed China’s Marriage Laws, the regional NPC in Tibet decided that age of marriage in Tibet should be two years less for men and women than the limit set in China of 22 for a man and 20 for a woman.
130 In Tibetan, ‘brug-skad rgyab-nas char-par btang-yar min-’dug.
131 Wang Xiaoqing and Bai Nanfeng, 1991, p. 68.
132 An Zhiguo, BR, 1987, No. 47, p. 5.
133 TR, 1983, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, p. 6.
1 Hu Yaobang presided over seven meetings, and his speeches were compiled into a single document entitled, ‘blo-mthun Hu’u ya’o pang gis bod-ljongs kyi las-dun skor gyi bzhugs-mol tshogs-’du ‘i thog gnag-ba’ a gsung-bshad’ (hereafter cited as Hu Yaobang, 1984).
2 SWB, 1984, No. FE/7806/B11/5.
3 Hu Yaobang, 1984.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 In Tibetan, ‘Hu’u ya’o pang gis Rag-’di skyobs-pa red’.
7 SWB, 1984, No. FE/7642/B11/6.
8 A speech by the Panchen Rinpoche to the TAR Standing Committee meeting of the NPC held in Beijing on 28 March 1987. This document was published in 1991 by the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala under the title ‘The Panchen Lama Speaks’ (hereafter cited as the Panchen Lama, 1987).
9 SWB, 1984, No. FE/7641/B11/5.
10 Ibid., No. FE/7688/B11/1.
11 Ibid.
12 SWB, 1984, No. FE/7632/B11/1.
13 M. Goldstein and C. Beall, 1989, p. 634.
14 Wang Xiaoqing and Bai Nanfeng, 1991, p. 30.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 bid.
18 SWB, 1984, No. FE/7645/B11/7.
19 TB, 1985, Vol. XV, No. 5, p. 1.
20 Xinhua, 29 November 1984.
21 SWB, 1983, No. FE/7237/B11/15.
22 The Panchen Lama, 1987, p. 15.
23 SWB, 1985, No. FE/7987/B11/7.
24 Ibid., No. FE/7980/B11/8.
25 It is also interesting to note that almost all young Tibetans who escaped to India and Nepal in the late 1980s gave as chief reason for leaving the country the wish to join monasteries in India.
26 He was released from prison in November 1987 and died not long after at his relatives’ home in Lhasa.
27 Interview with Palden Gyatso.
28 SWB, 1985, No. FE/7885/B11/7. This figure was said to be incomplete.
29 Ibid.
30 SWB, 1984, No. FE/7785/B11/3.
31 Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, 1992, p. 50.
32 SWB, 1985, No. FE/7858/B11/7.
33 Catriona Bass, 1990, p. 50.
34 For the English translation of some of the poetry written by this group, see Barme and Minford, 1989, pp. 432–53.
35 SWB, 1985, No. FE/8043/B11.6.
36 SWB, 1985, No. FE/8047/B11/1.
37 They were Ragdi, Pasang, Gyaltsen Norbu, Tenzin and Dorje Tsering (SWB, 1985, No. FE/8113/B11/7).
38 SWB, 1986, No. FE/8372/B11/16.
39 SWB, 1986, No. FE/8614/B11/7.
40 Ibid., No. FE/8633/B11/15.
41 Ibid.
42 SWB, 1987, No. FE/8667/B11/5.
43 SWB, 1986, No. FE/8314/A3/3.
44 Ibid., No. FE/8317/A3/3.
45 FEER, 4 June 1987, p. 46.
46 Ibid., p. 42.
47 It has to be remembered that in 1986 Soviet troops were still in Afghanistan.
48 FEER, 4 June 1987, p. 4.
49 Gyalo Dhundup video, 1990.
50 The Panchen Rinpoche, 1987, p. 7.
51 Ibid.
52 As noted in an earlier chapter the Chinese had in the past provided military aid to secessionist groups in India. Therefore, there were always Indian fears about Chinese aid to various anti-government movements.
53 In India at the time some senior politicians and the press were calling for India to use ‘Tibet as a lever on China’. See article by Rashat Puri in the Hindustan Times, reproduced in India Weekly (London) 12–18 September 1987. Lt-Gen. E. A. Vas, former commander in charge of Eastern Command, wrote an article in the Asian Herald (28 May-3 June 1987), where he urged Indian politicians not to adopt a rushed military means to evict the ‘intruders’ and went on to say that ‘there are more ways of countering China’s political aims’ than military means.
54 TR, 1986, Vol. 21, No. 8, pp. 8–10.
55 It should be noted that Tibet was listed as a separate country in the 1945 Act. It had gone unnoticed either by the Tibetans or the Nationalist Chinese, who were occupied with the civil war. Had it come to the notice of the Guomindang government at the time, it is most likely that they too would have protested at the inclusion of Tibet as a separate State.
56 TR, 1986, Vol. 21, No. 11, p. 6.
57 For example, Senator Jesse Helms, renowned for his anti-Communist views, and Senator Claiborne Pell, who is regarded as a moderate.
58 SWB, 1987, No. FE/8624/A1/2.
59 China Daily, 29 September 1987.
60 Five-Point Peace Plan for Tibet (Information Office, Central Tibetan Secretariat, Dharamsala), pp. 4–5.
61 On 28 September 1987, the State Nationality Affairs Commission issued a detailed rejection of the Dalai Lama’s proposal.
62 He was the Deputy Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
63 State Department Bulletin, Vol. 87, No. 212a, December 1987.
64 Ibid.
65 An official Chinese account of the demonstration was given in BR, March-April 1989, pp. 27–30.
66 The Chinese said that those present had participated in the demonstration. This was directly contradicted by many Westerners. For the nature of Western tourist involvement during and after the demonstration, see Ronald Schwart, 1991, pp. 588–604.
67 At the 44th Session of the UN Commission on Human Right held in Geneva (Switzerland), on 4 March 1988, the Chinese delegation was forced to admit that the police had shot and killed Tibetans during the demonstration. The Chinese admission came after testimony given to the commission by Robert Barnett, who had witnessed the demonstration in October. He presented ten sworn statements from other eye witnesses who also confirmed that the police had aimed directly into the crowd. Barnett also showed photographs supporting these accounts.
68 Most Tibetans-in-exile believe that origin of the flag lies in great antiquity and accept that it has always been the national flag of Tibet. It was first displayed at the 1947 Inter-Asian Relations Conference.
69 rGya-nag dbus ‘thab-pyods gchig-gyus khang-gi bco-’jin Yin-ming Phu nas sku-zhab rGyal-lo Don-’grub brgyud btsan-byol gzhung-la btang-ba’i chig-tho (here-after cited as Yan Mingfu, 1987).
70 Ngabo, 1989. The day after the first demonstration in Lhasa, Ngabo was summoned to Beijing and a few days later met with Gyalo Dhundup. According to Ngabo, Gyalo Dhundup expressed his disbelief that the Dalai Lama had made the speech in Washington.
71 Yan Mingfu, 1987.
72 The last section of the memorandum dealt with Gyalo Dhundup. It stated that he had told them that the Dalai Lama did not advocate independence and that Gyalo Dhundup himself personally regarded independence as an unrealistic goal. The exiled government published a rebuttal of Yang Mingfu’s memorandum. On the last point the exiled government commented that it was Gyalo Dhundup’s personal assessment of the Dalai Lama’s position. I think this also marked the point when Gyalo Dhundup ceased to be an effective mediator. Firstly, it showed the Chinese that Dhondup was not able to influence the Dalai Lama or the exiled government. Secondly, the Chinese revelation about Gyalo Dhundup’s personal views made exiled Tibetans suspicious of him.
73 Yan Mingfu, 1987.
74 Bod-rGya dbar gyi ’bral-lam (a document issued by the Kashag in Dharamsala 1988).
75 Gyalo Dhundup video, 1990.
76 Pema Namgyal, 1994, p. 66.
77 SWB, 1987, No. FE/8373/B11/1.
78 This was an important document published in the Party’s theoretical journal, Red Flag, 16 June 1983. See English translation in Missiology: An International Review, 1983, Vol. XI, No. 3, pp. 267–89.
79 The last paragraph of the document states: ‘under the socialist conditions, the only correct way to solve the religious problem is that, under the premise of protecting the freedom of religious belief, we greatly develop the socialist economy, culture, science and technology and achieve great progress in developing socialist material and spiritual civilizations so as to gradually eliminate the social and cognitive sources that have given rise to religion and enable it to exist.’
80 Xinhua, 9 July 1987.
81 SWB, 1986, No. FE/8373/B11/1.
82 In Tibetan, rGya-mi ma-yong skyab or rGya-mi med-ba’i skyab (before the arrival of the Chinese, or, when there were no Chinese) and rGya-mi slebs-nas (since the arrival of Chinese).
83 Zhang Tianlu and Zhang Mei, 1994, p. 63.
84 Ma Rong, 1993.
85 SWB, 1988, No. FE/0082/B2/1.
86 While Chinese pressure on Western countries is less effective, this is not the case with Asian and Third World countries, which are dependent on trade and aid from China. Soon after the Dalai Lama’s visit to the United States in September 1987, he was scheduled to visit Thailand, which under pressure from China refused to grant him a visa. Similarly, Nepal has constantly refused to allow the Dalai Lama entry.
87 Address to Members of the European Parliament by His Holiness The Dalai Lama, Strasbourg, 15 June 1988.
88 The Dalai Lama’s announcement was angrily criticised by hardliners in the exile community. The Dalai Lama’s brother, Thubten Norbu, circulated a letter in the exile community asking the people to reject Strasbourg. For other criticisms see Phuntsog Wangyal, ‘Giving Up the Struggle’, TR, Vol. 23, No. 9, 1988, pp. 9–11; Jamyang Norbu, ‘In Deng’s Grave New World, An Illusion Dies’, TR, Vol. 24, No. 8, 1989, pp. 13–17; Tashi Tobgye Jamyangling, ‘The Tibetan Challenge. A Political Menopause?’, TR, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1989, pp. 14–17.
89 Daily Telegraph, 23 June 1988.
90 Sha Zhou, 1990, pp. 3–5. Also published in the Beijing Review, it provides in greater detail the Chinese analysis of the content of the Strasbourg proposal and their objections.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 4.
93 Winston Lord, 1989, p. 16. (Author served as US Ambassador to China 1985–1989.)
94 The neighbouring states, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh, would have resisted the withdrawal of China from Tibet.
95 Winston Lord, 1989, p. 16.
96 Press Release from the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, India, 28 September 1988.
97 Some exiled Tibetans have been critical of the role played by Michael van Walt van Praag and accused him of influencing the Dalai Lama to eschew Tibetan independence (See Jamyang Norbu, TR, 1989, Vol. 24, No. 8, pp. 13–17), because they see some similarity between the Strasbourg proposal and the options he had advocated in his book The Status of Tibet, Westview Press, 1987, pp. 197–203. In a letter to TR, 1989, Vol. 25, No. 11, pp. 22–3, Michael van Walt van Praag denied that he had influenced the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan government-in-exile. It was unlikely that the Dalai Lama was influenced by a single individual; the ideas he had advocated in his Washington and Strasbourg speeches had been the culmination of many years of discussion within the inner circles of Dharamsala decision-makers. However, the Dalai Lama told me that the actual proposal that was distributed in Strasbourg was written by Michael van Walt van Praag.
98 TR, 1988, Vol. 23, No. 11, p. 4.
99 Gyalo Dhundup video, 1990.
100 Ibid.
101 SWB, 1989, No. FE/0039/A3/2.
102 SWB, 1988, No. FE/0082/B2/1.
103 FBIS-CHI-89-022/15 March 1989, pp. 39–42.