Liam Lynch realised that a central headquarters would now be necessary for himself and his divisional staff. This was secured at MacSuibhne’s house, Coolea – an area where the people were loyal and trustworthy. Not a word of English was spoken in these headquarters and from this isolated spot, lines of communication to all the brigade headquarters and to GHQ were quickly established. This meant the involvement of railway workers, lorry drivers and all who could help in getting dispatches to their destinations. Lynch had put in motion an intricate system to assimilate what had been happening in different areas; for security reasons written orders and directions were kept to a minimum and often coded. Maurice Walshe of Mitchelstown, who had been Lynch’s principal staff officer, moved to this area and took up duty.
Lynch’s next task was to visit the brigades within a week of his appointment as divisional commander. With Florence O’Donoghue, he travelled at times on foot, at times in pony trap, on horseback or by boat and the entire inspection tour lasted fifteen days. In each of the brigade areas which the two men visited they had meetings with battalion and column commanders:
Every factor influencing the development of the fight was reviewed in detail – organisation, training, arms, intelligence, supply of explosives, communications, security, availability of men and weapons for columns, leadership and control of all formations down to the companies – all these were examined and orders given for such revisions and changes as were found to be necessary.1
Flying columns had come to be accepted as the most effective formation of command while the arms’ position remained critical. It was always Lynch’s hope that more arms might become available and thus change the situation. For successful guerrilla activity, speed and surprise was translated into success. When evasion was essential to survival, evasion was the correct policy. It upset Liam to think that the civilian population were often treated savagely, therefore he urged all units to remain vigilant, and impressed on the officers the value of sniping and road-cutting on a well-planned scale. According to Florence O’Donoghue: ‘the impact of his vigorous personality and his confident grasp of every fact in a complex situation had a bracing effect. He inspired many officers with a new and wider concept of the task and the objective.’2
Upon the formation of the Southern Division Lynch had to undertake responsibility for the administrative and supply problems which a vigorous campaign entailed. While undertaking such a task he continued the policy he operated in his own brigade of giving officers the maximum authority and freedom of action, and of holding them responsible for the results. In order to obtain arms and provision of food and clothing they needed money. He adopted a method of putting a levy based on the Poor Law Valuation of the individual holdings to cover the entire population of each brigade area. This meant that the poor areas bore less of the burden as they were already over-taxed through providing food on a large scale for the men ‘on the run’. In the majority of cases the levy was freely given. Similar organisation was undertaken in the nine brigades in his division. However, all suffered from a lack of arms.
In the No. 3 area, the flying column under Tom Barry’s command fought a number of successful actions including Crossbarry on 19 March 1921 where 104 officers and men outfought 1,200 British forces by breaking the encirclement and inflicting casualties on the enemy, destroying part of their transport and capturing a large quantity of arms and ammunition.
Lynch, in an effort to maintain a high standard of efficiency in the columns, suggested that all should remember the lessons learned in previous attacks – failures and success alike. He issued some orders and memoranda, an example of which is as follows:
... When moving, columns should have advance and rear guards connected with the main body.
Columns should never move into the country until it is first scouted and the O/C has satisfied himself that it is either free of the enemy, or is aware of the exact position he occupies.3
Lynch undertook all his activities in an efficient manner as can be seen from the many ‘Operation Orders’ which he issued.4
As time progressed, further plans were worked out. On the horizon there was to be the establishment of a divisional training camp at which all brigade officers and column commanders would undergo courses of intensive training. The courses were to be continued for other officers and the whole project visualised the creation of a divisional column for operations. Commandant Tom Barry of Cork No. 3 brigade was to be training officer and was to command the divisional column when formed. The establishment of the camp in Clydagh Valley between Rathmore and Ballyvourney was also being planned. Barry was not in agreement with the idea as he felt that by bringing together so many senior officers, the IRA was running the risk of putting the entire armed effort in the south-west of Ireland in jeopardy. It was his contention that ‘if the officers were to be captured or wiped out in a confrontation it would cripple the decision-making of the remaining volunteers as well as being a devastating blow to morale.’5He also believed that guerrilla warfare could not be taught. If men, with aggression and initiative, came into the active areas he felt this would be superior to any training camp as they would participate in action. This was the first major disagreement which Barry had with Lynch. However, though Barry disagreed with Liam Lynch’s decision on the divisional training camp issue, he was nevertheless prepared to give it a try. With Liam Deasy, Barry was on his way towards the Cork/Kerry border when at the end of the first day’s journey a dispatch arrived from Lynch informing them that the area of the proposed camp was infested by the enemy and it would be advisable to wait until the enemy withdrew.
In early May 1921 the extremely fine weather did not favour guerrilla warfare. In certain areas British forces formed a type of mobile unit where ten or twenty men in lorries were dropped in regions under an officer or a senior NCO. They moved across the country silently and quickly with the minimum of equipment to a rendezvous where they were again picked up by their transport. Such activity was a potential threat to individuals and to the IRA communication system. It immobilised many of the volunteers’ basic units, destroyed communications and added to their losses as a number of men were killed or captured. The failure of the Italian arms’ shipment as well as a large-scale extensive combing of mountainous areas made the task of fighting the crown forces extremely difficult.
In Lynch’s area the combined force of Cork No. 2 and Kerry No. 2 brigades ambushed a party of police near the village of Rathmore on 4 May 1921. Eight policemen were killed and their arms and ammunition captured. That night the enemy forces as a reprisal set fire to five farmhouses (four of which were totally destroyed) in the vicinity of the scene of the ambush. Later they burned down Rathmore creamery and Co-operative Stores.
On 1 June a cycle patrol of police was ambushed between Castlemaine and Milltown by Kerry No. 1 brigade under the command of Tadgh Brosnan – six Auxiliaries were killed and five wounded and their ammunition and arms were captured. Under the command of Paddy O’Brien a large-scale action against the crown forces took place on 16 June at Rathcoole (between Millstreet and Banteer) where columns from Millstreet, Kanturk, Newmarket, Charleville and Mallow combined forces. They attacked four lorries of Auxiliaries. One hundred and forty IRA were involved and suffered no casualties. The following day they recovered 1,350 rounds of ammunition which the Auxiliaries had abandoned. This was a great coup for Lynch’s brigade.
On the night of 11 May, Paddy O’Brien, his brother Dan and Jack O’Regan were in John O’Donnell’s, near Liscarroll, when they were surprised by British troops. The two O’Briens and O’Regan ran out the back way but were fired on. O’Regan was hit and fell. Dan O’Brien and Jack O’Regan were captured. Paddy O’Brien escaped. Dan O’Brien was taken to Cork military barracks, tried by drumhead court-martial and sentenced to death. He was executed on 16 May 1921. That night, when returning from Limerick, Liam Lynch and Florrie O’Donoghue had a narrow escape. They intended reaching Kiskeam, near Mallow, but because their horse was tired they rested for the night near Tuar. In a round-up at Kiskeam, Seán Moylan was captured, and subsequently sentenced to fifteen years penal servitude. Only for the tired horse Liam and Florrie would have slept in the same house with Moylan that night.
Lynch arrived back at division headquarters on 17 May and remained there until 31 May, when he set out to visit the Waterford brigade. Back in headquarters on 14 June he did some bookwork, then left three days later for further visits to brigades. During this period one of the most extensive combing operations undertaken by the British forces had been carried out in the mountainous area enclosed by the circle – Kilgarven, Rathmore, Millstreet, Ballyvourney and Dunmanway. Several thousand lorry-camping troops supported by armed vehicles and aircraft participated in the operation, which began on 6 June. General Strickland defined their mission as that of ‘seeking out the IRA columns, bringing them to action and annihilating’.
According to the Morning Post, ‘Information has been received from Ireland that the IRA is being mobilised ... Present happenings seem clearly to indicate that the rebel army means to come into the open ... In the wild country around the Clydagh Mountains, County Kerry, the concentration of a rebel force is in progress and at least 1,000 are already massed.’6It seemed as if the forces of the crown and the British newspapers were under the impression that the IRA would come out and attack openly as they had done in 1916. A week after the appearance of this news item in the Morning Post the sweep began.
Strickland’s order was in Lynch’s hands almost as soon as it reached Strickland’s own brigade commanders. Though the weather favoured the British action, broken bridges and trenched roads hindered their movement, and because of their slow rate the columns outstripped them. The columns generally moved under darkness whereas the British forces halted at night. The Cork columns and Kerry No. 2 column were the main targets. Good intelligence and prompt reports made it possible to keep all units informed of the progress of the raiding forces. Divisional headquarters were centrally situated and were able to send dispatches readily. Though it might have been possible for some of the columns such as Barry’s flying column to break the encirclement, evasion was considered to be a better policy because of the enormous superiority of the enemy in both men and weapons.
The entire operation did not lead to the capture of even one IRA member or any weapons or documents though unarmed civilians in many areas were shot during the action. Some weeks later on 23/24 June, a second large-scale sweep by the British forces enclosed an area, which centred around Millstreet, and it looked as if the authorities had information as to the whereabouts of Lynch’s headquarters. Lynch and Joe O’Connor had returned from a tour of Kerry and the West Limerick brigades and arrived at Rathcoole at 4 a.m. Being exhausted they decided to sleep, even though they had been told that they were within ‘the British ring’. Paddy O’Brien, also in need of sleep decided to remain on duty. He woke Liam and Joe O’Connor after a few hours as reports indicated that the raiding parties were moving in on all sides in full strength. The IRA men moved into Kilcorney, where they remained for the day, and later in the evening, they moved again. Due to an accurate report, they were able to get outside the encirclement despite having been within a hair’s breath of being captured.
IRA activity was still hampered by fine weather and June saw very little action. By this time rumours of efforts being made to bring about an ending of the conflict were widespread. Despite these rumours Lynch was unable to foresee an end to hostilities. In fact, it appeared as if the British government forces were stepping up their activity. Though the shortage of arms for the volunteers was now a biting reality, morale was nevertheless excellent as Lynch discovered in his review of the nine brigades in his division. He anticipated, therefore, that, with the possibility of securing further arms, a resumption of the struggle on a larger scale would be feasible in the autumn.
However, though the possibilities of a truce were being considered by De Valera, Collins, Cathal Brugha and others, Liam Lynch was not consulted as to the capacity of his command to continue the struggle. The only contact headquarters made with any member of the Southern Division was between Michael Collins, De Valera and Tom Barry of Cork No. 3 brigade. Dev asked Barry how long he felt his flying column could maintain the struggle in the field against the British. ‘It depends on the British reinforcement and the amount of arms we are able to obtain,’ said Barry, adding that they could last another five years. Dev replied, ‘A bit too optimistic’.7It was some weeks before Barry was able to meet Lynch and give him information on the conversations which took place at GHQ.
One of the unanswered questions of the period is why Liam Lynch the commanding officer of the First Southern Division was not consulted by GHQ or given an opportunity of expressing his views. More than anybody else he was in a position to assess the situation particularly at this time of mid-June 1921 as he had travelled around to each of the nine brigades in his area over the past number of months on at least two occasions. The First Southern Division was the largest and most active and had played the greatest part in the war; in addition this region had by far the largest concentration of British forces, and the inhabitants had suffered a great deal because of their involvement.
Piaras Beaslaí, in his book Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland, stated that Liam Lynch and some of his officers went to GHQ some time before the truce and reported that owing to shortage of arms, ammunition and enemy pressure they were unable to continue the fight.8This statement was inaccurate. Florence O’Donoghue of No. 2 brigade confirmed that he had seen a letter from Liam Lynch in which he asked for ‘a few rifles’ and said, ‘We will soon be in a very bad way for .303 as we had hard luck in captures recently.’ Another letter from Cork No. 3 read that they were urgently in need of .303, adding ‘to a certain extent we are held up by the want of this and harassed to a terrible extent by the enemy.’ O’Donoghue was aware that Liam Lynch had not been directly consulted for an opinion, and believed it was untrue that they were ‘unable to continue the fight’ as Beaslaí had stated. (O’Donoghue accepted Beaslaí’s assurance that his original statement was made in good faith and under a misapprehension of the facts.)9
Tom Barry, in Guerrilla Days in Ireland, said, ‘No deputation of southern officers ever visited GHQ ... It is a fact that Lynch never left the First Southern Division area in all those months. Furthermore, no brigade or battalion officer from Kerry, Cork or Waterford brigades visited Dublin or GHQ between the end of March and the truce except myself towards the end of May and Seán Buckley in May ... Every Divisional and Brigade officer in the south rejects completely Beaslaí’s statement about Liam Lynch.’10
Shortage of arms was, of course, an acute problem. Complications had arisen with the shipment of arms which was being organised by Donal Hales in Italy. Madge Hales, Donal’s sister, went to Italy and personally returned to Collins with information of the cancellation of the shipment.11As Madge Hales’ dispatch was by word of mouth, and, because of the usual secrecy in IRA circles, she did not inform anybody else, but it does seem extraordinary that Michael Collins did not pass the information on to either Tom Barry or to Liam Deasy who were organising the intake, transport and dumps, together with the scouts along the route, and also that he did not inform Liam Lynch who was the commander of the First Southern Division and to whom the receipt of the proposed shipment of arms was of vital importance.
There is no doubt that Collins was aware of the important role played by the flying columns in the Cork brigades and other southern regions. Nevertheless, these men in the south had not been consulted about their true positions and their true intentions for the future. Were there some seeds sown here which were to spring to life at a later stage during the Civil War when men like Deasy, Barry, Lynch and other officers decided to continue the conflict?
It does appear as if Lynch, Barry, Deasy and other officers in the Southern Division, while they would have welcomed a truce, would only have welcomed a short truce. They were prepared to continue the fight, which they felt would bring success, as their intelligence service was now superior to that of the British. They had people inside the corridors of power transmitting information to the IRA. Years later, Barry, Deasy and many men who were involved in the fight for independence, were convinced that had there been a shorter truce followed by a renewal of the armed conflict, the British might have been forced to enter into a more meaningful treaty which, with hindsight, could possibly have stopped the Civil War. The IRA was, by this time, tougher, more experienced and more immune to hardship. Extra men were coming on full-time active service: combat experience was more widespread, and with the majority of the civilian population behind them the columns were able to move more freely. Food and clothing for the men on active duty was provided by Cumann na mBan and houses throughout all brigade areas became safe billeting depots.
1 Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, p. 160.
2 Ibid., p. 161.
3 Operation Order No. 2, 22/7/1922.
4 Ibid., No. 9. 19/8/1922. See Appendix II.
5 Meda Ryan, The Tom Barry Story, p. 99.
6 The Morning Post, 31/5/1921.
7 Tom Barry, Guerrilla Days in Ireland; also Meda Ryan, The Tom Barry Story.
8 Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, p. 177.
9 Piaras Beaslaí in Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland, stated ‘Liam Lynch and other Southern IRA Officers went on a deputation to GHQ in Dublin to state that owing to the shortage of arms and ammunition and enemy pressure that they were unable to continue the fight.’
10 Tom Barry, Guerrilla Days in Ireland, pp. 170, 171.
11 See Meda Ryan, The Tom Barry Story, p. 74.