Six months of talks on the possibility of a Civil War had passed yet there appeared to be no concrete plans to conduct such a war. From the outset, the Executive was working from a disadvantageous position; four of their members were prisoners. (Tom Barry had been captured in an effort to get into the Four Courts during the fight. Liam Mellows, Rory O’Connor and Dick Barrett were taken after the surrender of the building.) Lynch’s staff was totally inadequate.
Upon the evacuation of British forces throughout the country, Republicans had taken over most of the British posts and were practically in complete control of the country south of a line from Waterford to Limerick. The Provisional Government had the advantage of having a definite policy, control of the money and the ability to call on the British for war supplies. On 6 July 1922 they issued a call to arms which met with a ready response.
Two posts in the south, Skibbereen and Listowel, which were occupied by Provisional Government troops, were attacked and captured.
Connie Neenan said ‘when our brigade in Cork heard of the attack on the Four Courts we went straight away to reinforce Limerick ... and got caught between two Free State posts. On the first night of that attack there was some shooting and Spillane fell and died within five minutes ... That was the start of it for us. We went from there to Rathkeale where we met Liam Lynch.’1They moved on to Adare, captured a post and then to Limerick and further fighting. ‘We lost a few more of our men, among them Paddy Norton, Dear Christ but he was a terrific man at a time when we needed him.2
Lynch was extremely disturbed by a late night report stating that Ashford Castle had been commandeered by Donnacha O’Hannigan: not alone were they neighbours but they were very close friends and had fought together during the War of Independence. Lynch discussed the position with Deasy and his men. True, actual fighting had not yet begun, but it was evident to Lynch that O’Hannigan would be captured. There was no possible way he could escape, and as he was pro-treaty the situation was delicate. Lynch was in a quandary as he did not want to abuse his authority in favour of a personal friend. As a way out, Deasy suggested that he himself would go to Ashford and make some arrangements with the anti-treaty commander. Lynch welcomed the suggestion and gave Deasy full authority to act as he saw fit. Deasy cooled the situation and the local IRA commander allowed O’Hannigan to leave with his men bearing their arms.
It was the first touch of sadness in the conflict of friend against friend. ‘When I returned to Mallow that night and told Lynch how the O’Hannigan affair had been solved, his happiness and satisfaction were very evident,’ Deasy said. No matter what differences were to arise later, Lynch and Deasy decided that they would try to make every effort to end a campaign which they felt was going to destroy solidarity.
On the following day, 30 June, Lynch left for Limerick and with him were men from the Cork brigade led by Dan Sando O’Donovan – the first contingent to enter the city. On their way to Limerick they took Free State posts at Croom, Adare and Patrick’s Well. They entered the city from the western end and occupied the new barracks as well as other strategic positions.
At the other end of the city they were opposed by the East Clare brigade under the command of Michael Brennan with men from Limerick city and county who had taken the pro-treaty side. Brennan and Lynch had worked closely during the War of Independence, often collaborating as in the kidnapping of Lucas, and they were now on opposing sides. Lynch told Deasy that he wished he could find common ground to settle the situation with men like Brennan, O’Hannigan and Michael Collins. ‘The conflict was eating into his very soul, he did not want to oppose his friends, but at all times he wanted to do what was best for Ireland,’ according to Liam Deasy. Lynch believed that ‘if hostilities could be avoided in the Munster area perhaps the situation might not deteriorate.’3
Michael Brennan of the Western Division said that, ‘the holding of Limerick was the holding of the whole south and west’. Brennan, with the government forces, controlled an area which covered the whole of Clare, part of Galway and the Ballinasloe railway line – ‘most of the men in these posts were unarmed’. It is obvious that Lynch realised this. Brennan was hoping for rifles which were to be sent from Dublin. ‘My whole fright was that Lynch would attack me before the guns turned up, because we couldn’t last. I had to keep him talking to keep him from attacking. We met and we met, altogether about a dozen times. We used to meet in the presbytery of the Augustinian church where we argued and argued.’
The fact that Lynch seemed to be totally in control of the south was, according to Brennan, ‘painfully true’. Lynch was convinced, at this stage, that there was nothing to be gained by further bloodshed and that some agreement should be reached in order to control the situation. Brennan was under the impression that Lynch was really only bluffing, that all he wanted was a free hand to over-run the country and wreck the treaty and to impose his views on the people. But others, those who worked with him, claimed that ‘Lynch genuinely wanted peace and made every effort to maintain some form of peace and to avoid the civil strife’.4 During these early days of the struggle three men, Professor Alfred O’Rahilly, University College Cork, Frank Daly, managing director of Suttons and chairman of Cork Harbour Board and T. P. Dowdall, who supported the War of Independence, were anxious to meet Liam Lynch and explore any and every possibility that might lead to peace. The men arrived in Mallow and, having discussed the matter with Lynch and Deasy, they returned to Cork disappointed.
Lynch had thought that the take-over of Limerick would be a mere formality but this was not the case. He took over the new barracks where he established his headquarters and then occupied the Strand barracks, Castle barracks and Ordnance barracks. Shortly after Lynch’s arrival in Limerick, Dan Breen and Stephen O’Mara intervened to avoid a conflict; at an arranged meeting, Donnacha O’Hannigan and Liam Lynch signed a truce by which both hoped a permanent settlement would follow.5The agreement was signed at 6.30 on 4 July 1922 which was to be put into effect by 12 o’clock that night.6The agreement, under nine points, listed the areas which should be occupied by both sides, and stated that such an agreement should be maintained until both sides of the army Executive forces and Beggars Bush – ‘find a solution to the problem’.
In an earlier agreement with Liam Deasy, O’Hannigan had agreed to evacuate the First Southern Division area which was in the main anti-treaty: now Lynch undertook not to occupy any posts in O’Hannigan’s old brigade area, East Limerick.
The agreement never came into operation because Commandant General D. A. MacMaghunsa (McManus) from GHQ wrote a letter to Liam Lynch the next day in which he stated that Commandant General Brennan and Commandant General O’Hannigan who had been discussing terms of agreement ‘had no authority whatever to enter into such an agreement’. He went on to say that he reserved full liberty of action and had told these officers not to partake in a further meeting which had been arranged ‘and that they are to have no further communication with you on the matter.’ Despite this letter the two parties to the agreement came together next day, and, in the presence of two prominent priests, signed a new agreement at 1.30 a.m.on 7 July which stated that in the interests of ‘a united Ireland and to save our country from utter destruction’ it was agreed that as soon as Seán Mac Eoin could be brought into the area a meeting would be convened and would be attended by all the commandants of all the divisions in the south and west regions. It further stated ‘that the forces now opposed to one another in Limerick city end for all time this fratricidal strife in view of the meeting of Divisional Commandants in Limerick. And as a guarantee of good faith towards a permanent agreement the Divisional Council of the First Western Division Dáil Forces IRA agree to hand in their resignations if agreement is not reached at the meeting of Divisional Commandants ...’
The agreement listed buildings which would be occupied by the opposing forces; it also stated that troops in Limerick city were not to appear in public with arms except by liaison arrangement and that ‘a truce now exists between the Executive forces, Irish Republican Army and First Western Division and the Fourth Southern Division Dáil Forces Irish Republican Army until the Conference ends between the Divisional Commandants. All our posts to be withdrawn to the agreed centres by 6 o’clock Friday evening 7 July 1922.’
The agreement was signed by Liam Lynch, Donnacha O’Hannigan and Michael Brennan.
MacMaghunsa (McManus) wrote to Lynch that ‘while absolutely disapproving of this agreement’ he was willing to allow this matter to go ahead on condition that ‘there is no change in the military position here’ but he would not ‘agree to any interference with our present strong military position’, and would even forego using the advantages gained for the sake of national agreement.
It was Brennan’s opinion that because of this agreement with Liam Lynch, Dublin was probably saved from invasion by the southern forces. There seems to be little doubt that Lynch was hoping for victory without bloodshed, and whether there was a flaw in the Lynch/O’Hannigan agreement or not, the fact that Brennan’s name was added, and as Brennan and Lynch were understood to be loyal and sincere, it was felt that their signatures might at least encourage moderation. It was of course a time when communication was slow, when men’s loyalties were torn and their emotions played upon, when men and women followed their leader rather than their own convictions; Lynch, in using his authority wisely, gained increased respect amongst his comrades and followers.
Unfortunately, this effort to prevent even a portion of the country from the scourge of Civil War failed because the men who controlled Provisional Government policy decided to destroy that section of the army which refused to accept the treaty. A meeting of both sides of the divisional commandants in the south did not find favour in Dublin. Two officers, one from each side, were detailed to go to Dublin to convey the proposals to the Provisional Government. Seán, McCarthy (instructed by Lynch on behalf of the anti-treatyites) went, but his opposite number was never appointed, so the project fell through, consequently for a few days an uneasy peace reigned in Limerick. Then at 5.30 on the evening of 7 July the Provisional Government forces at William Street opened fire on the Ordnance barracks and the pattern of the conflict in Dublin was repeated. The Limerick/ Waterford line which ran through Tipperary, Golden, Cashel, Fethard, Clonmel and Carrick-on-Suir held for a short time, but the lack of artillery and machine-guns eventually meant surrender.
Lynch moved his headquarters from Limerick to Clonmel on 11 July, and on 13 July was joined by Éamon de Valera who was assigned by Lynch to a post on the staff of the director of operations. De Valera hoped for peace which would include some form of compromise. When Robert Brennan and Erskine Childers arrived next day they found Lynch pinning flags to a wall map along ‘the Waterford/Limerick Line’ and De Valera urging a settlement ‘while they still had something to give away’.
On 4 July 1922 Frank Aiken had written to the minister for defence (Richard Mulcahy) intimating that he would not fight on either side because in his view a ‘fight would only ruin the country without gaining any grounds for the Republic.’ He went south and saw Liam Lynch. Unable to make any impression on Lynch’s fixed conviction (that defence of the Republic in arms was the only means left of preventing its extinction) he left him and returned to Dublin to inform the minister for defence of his decision. Next morning the barracks at Dundalk was captured by Provisional Government forces, Aiken was taken prisoner but was given parole. He went to Dublin again for another interview with the minister for defence but was re-arrested on returning to Dundalk. He escaped and went on to fight with the Republican forces and to take the stand outlined by Liam Lynch.
Again on 15 July Lynch moved his headquarters to Fermoy barracks. De Valera went with Lynch but shortly afterwards returned to Clonmel to work with Séamus Robinson O/C Second Southern Division, in an effort to reinforce the Limerick/Waterford line, which they thought should be held.
Meanwhile at a Provisional Government meeting on Wednesday 12 July, a Council of War was held. Michael Collins announced that he had arranged to take up duty as commander-in-chief of the army and would not until further notice be able to act in his ministerial capacity. W. T. Cosgrave was appointed to act as chairman of the Provisional Government and as minister for finance ‘in the absence of Mr Collins on military duty’.7
Richard Mulcahy was made chief-of-general-staff (he also held on to his post as minister for defence) as Eoin O’Duffy had the task of general-in-charge of the South-western Division. This cancelled any hope, which Lynch had of maintaining stability in the south and the west.
The treatyites captured Limerick on 20 July and took advantage of the large coastal area with convenient ports at strategic points. The landing of troops took place first in Waterford on 23 July and during the following days Provisional Government troops landed in Westport and then advanced to Castlebar. Ernie O’Malley wrote to Lynch on 21 July, ‘Could you give me an outline of your military and national policy, as we are in the dark here.’ Lynch’s reply stated his aim was ‘to maintain the existing Republic’ and that this would be by means of guerrilla warfare.8On 26 July Roderick Connolly, president of the communist party visited Lynch in Fermoy. That day a train had been wrecked at Kingsbridge and workers refused to repair it. Connolly proposed that a Republican government should be set up with Cork city as its capital and, ‘that a democratic programme should be published to rally the people, and that in this way the Republic should be saved.’9Lynch was unimpressed. He reported the incident to a staff meeting the next day and then dismissed the matter.
Provisional Government (treatyite) forces took Tipperary town on 30 July. On that same day, Harry Boland was shot by armed men who burst into his hotel in Skerries; he died two days later. Carrick-on-Suir was captured by treatyite forces on 2 August, Kilmallock on 5 August and Clonmel on 8 August. On 2 August troops landed in Fenit. From there they pushed on to Tralee and during the following days, they occupied Castleisland, Listowel and Farranfore. Limerick was already in their hands. On 8 August the landing at Passage West, though vigorously opposed by Republicans, opened the way for occupation of Cork. Other landings at Youghal, Glandore, and Kenmare laid most of Cork open to occupation by Provisional Government forces. Though larger towns and villages were occupied, substantial areas of the country still remained in Republican hands. It was a return to the old type guerrilla warfare, a warfare with which many of the Republicans and Provisional Government forces were not unfamiliar.
During the first month of the war over 1,000 Republican prisoners were taken. It was now a ‘war of brothers’ where friends fought against friends, neighbours against neighbours and brothers against brothers: the civilian population were no longer behind those who wanted to continue to fight. On 10 August 1922, Lynch wrote to Ernie O’Malley requesting a daily report:
Do your utmost to order doing of line and wires and also all road communications. Limerick agreement means O’Hannigan and Brennan divisions are adopting neutral attitude. This is glorious if they stand by their signatories.
God bless our arms.10
After the occupation of Waterford the line from there to Limerick was subjected to pressure at many points. Golden was taken by treatyite forces in a surprise attack; they took Carrick-on-Suir after a three-day struggle and Republicans had to evacuate Tipperary. Broken at many points, the Republican line collapsed. The O’Hannigan/Brennan/Lynch agreement was overturned. The forces defending the line formed into columns and unsuccessfully began to harass the garrisons.
On 11 August Lynch evacuated Fermoy barracks and burned it. This was the last post to be held by Republican forces. It was a sad Liam Lynch who took his personal belongings and valuable papers to walk out into the streets where he had issued his first challenge to the British military almost three years earlier. Once more the Chief of the IRA was without barracks, base stores, or supply service. Siobhán (Creedon) Langford recalls being with Liam and his men as they evacuated:
A group of officers stood with Liam Lynch in the barrack square It was a heart-breaking moment. Suddenly Dan Mulvihill’s fine voice rang out in the popular aria from Verdi’s Ill Travatore, ‘Home to our Mountains’. Appreciation of Dan’s performance flashed on every face, and the dejection of the hour was somewhat lightened.
As Liam Lynch looked back at the burning building he pondered and asked what would the next chapter be for him. He did not expect an answer. The first phase of the Civil War had ended and a new one was about to begin.11
1 Connie Neenan, Survivors, p. 244
2 Ibid.
3 Liam Deasy, author interview, 5/12/1972.
4 Paddy O’Brien, author interview, 6/8/1975.
5 Mulcahy papers University College, Dublin, Archives, P7/B/192/ 173; see also Eoin Neeson, Civil War in Ireland, pp. 88, 89; also Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, pp. 262, 263.
6 See Appendix I.
7 P. G. 57 Minutes, 12 July 1922; also P7/B/244/58, Mulcahy papers, University College Dublin, Archives.
8 C. Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution, p. 357.
9 Ibid. p. 359.
10 Document captured at Blessington – Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin Archives, P7/A/80.
11 Interview with Siobhán (Creedon) Langford, 6/9/1976; Siobhán Langford, In Hope and in Sadness, p. 241.