Appendix III
The Admiral’s report
One of the joys of researching this book is the opportunity it gave the author to return to the forgotten world of manual typewriters and carbon paper.Terms like ‘top copy’ have left the language now that computers and word processors can churn out 20 immaculate and identical copies of a document in under a minute. In the world of 1942, documents were typed on six or seven pages at once, with carbon paper between the pages. The top copy would be easily readable, but anyone so low on the pecking order that they were destined to receive copy seven could expect to wrestle with fuzzy and often unreadable type, laced with barely readable corrections. After a day in an archive ploughing through a succession of seventh copies, any researcher can be forgiven for hoping his next project will be set in a time when the computer has taken over.However, there is a softness and a vulnerability about manually typed documents which the computer can never match, and it gives them a special charm.
Happily, the top copy of Rear Admiral Muirhead-Gould’s report is available in the Australian National Archive in Melbourne. I have tried to capture its flavour by setting it out here in a form as close as I could get to the original.The first page of the top copy is littered with initials and dates as it circulated around the Navy Board.The first set of initials, dated 16 July, probably belong to Sir Guy Royle.The last set of entirely indecipherable initials is dated 31 July. Occasionally someone has scribbled a note on the National Archive’s top copy, but the identity of the author of these jottings remains a mystery, as does the timing of their musings. Other copies have been more heavily annotated but it is impossible to tell by whom or when. The annotations on the other copies tend to be a bit more sceptical: one anonymous scrutiniser has tried to work out in the margin which submarine did what, clearly not accepting Muirhead-Gould’s version at face value.
Royal Australian Navy
Rear-Admiral
From ..... The Commodore-in-Charge, H.M.A. Naval Establishments, Sydney
To ......... The Secretary, Naval Board, Melbourne
Date ..... 16th July, 1942. No. ...... B.S. 1749/201/37.
Subject ... MIDGET SUBMARINE ATTACK ON SYDNEY HARBOUR MAY 31st – JUNE 1st, 1942
1. Submitted for the information of the Naval Board is the following report on the Midget Submarine Attack on Sydney Harbour, May 31st – June 1st, 1942:-
2. Appendices supporting the narrative are attached:
Appendix I – Chronological sequence of events.
Appendix II – Sources of information.
Appendix III – Submarine and torpedo particulars (operational only).
Appendix IV – Loop indications and signatures.
Appendix V – Lessons learnt.
Appendix VI – Recommendations for recognition of Personnel.
3. It is considered that four midget submarines participated in the raid. Of these, two are known by their actual Japanese numbers (No. 14 and No. 21). They are thus referred to in the following narrative. The other two unknown midgets are referred to as “Midget A” and “Midget B” respectively.
4. It is considered that the force which attacked Sydney consisted of five “I” class submarines, four midget submarines, and one, possibly two, float planes. These were:
“I” 21 (Float plane)
“I” 24
“I” 22
“I” 27
“I” 29 (Possibly float plane)
Midget No. 14
Midget No. 21
“Midget A”
“Midget B”.
5. The attack was possibly preceded by aerial reconnaissance, which may have been carried out on 29th, 30th and 31st May.
6. A reconnaissance of Sydney Harbour, especially the Naval Anchorage area, was carried out by one biplane single float plane at approximately 0420K/30 May.
7. Allied warships in Sydney Harbour at the time included the following:
No. 1 Buoy - H.M.A.S. “CANBERRA”
No. 2 Buoy - U.S.S. “CHICAGO”
No. 4 Buoy - U.S.S. “PERKINS”
No. 5 Buoy - U.S.S. “DOBBIN”
No. 6 Buoy - H.M.A.S. “BUNGAREE”
Birt’s Buoy - H.M.S. “KANIMBLA”
Off Robertson - H.M.A.S. “AUSTRALIA”
Point
8. The plane, which was burning navigation lights, approached the harbour from a northerly direction, flew over the Naval Anchorage, circled U.S.S. “CHICAGO” twice, and departed in a due east direction.
TACTICS
9. The contents of Midget No. 21 (ample food supplies, first aid kit, charts, lists of call signs etc.) suggest that this was by no means regarded as a “suicide” venture.
10. The establishment of “picking up dispositions”, rendezvous at which midgets were to rejoin their parents, had been made. Five of such rendezvous were spaced at fairly regular intervals (an average of 18 miles apart) two to the northward and three to the southward of Sydney.
11. The waiting parent submarines were in each case spread 2 miles apart on a line of bearing at right angles to the coastline.
RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS OF MAY 31st/JUNE 1st
12. Weather conditions were reported outside the heads at 1900K as – rough sea, moderate swell, wind S. by W. force 4, dark and overcast. The moon was full and rose at 1813K. Dawn on Monday, 1st June, was at 0545K; high tide 2125K, height 6 feet.
13. Four midget submarines (Midget 14, Midget 21, “Midget A” and “Midget B”) were released (from “I” submarines 22, 24, 27 and 29) off Sydney Heads, a short distance to seawards, but outside the Loop area, during the afternoon of Sunday, 31st May.
MIDGET NO. 14
14. The first attempt at an entry was made by Midget No. 14, and was unsuccessful. She crossed the loop at 2001 and, by 2015, was caught in the nets (centre portion, close to the Western gate). She was unable to free herself, and blew herself up at 2235. Her propellers were thickly covered with grease when the wreck was recovered. No food had been touched, neither had any sanitary utensils been used.
“MIDGET A”
15. The second entry was made by “Midget A”. She crossed the loop at 2148, and entered the harbour unobserved.
16. “Midget A” was not sighted until 2252. She was then sighted by “CHICAGO” and a ferry in the proximity of Garden Island. She was also sighted by Dockyard Motor Boat “NESTOR” and an officer on Ferry Wharf, Garden Island, at the same time. She was then close to Garden Island (200 yards off) and proceeding towards the Harbour Bridge.
17. “Midget A” was fired on by “CHICAGO” and apparently turned towards North Shore instead of proceeding further up the harbour. She was next sighted at 2310 from the Oil Wharf at Garden Island (by H.M.S.* Vessels “WHYALLA” and “GEELONG”) in the direction of Bradley’s Head. They fired at her and kept the area under observation for half an hour.
18. “Midget A” fired two torpedoes from the direction of Bradley’s Head at 0030. One of these failed to explode, after running ashore at Garden Island. The other passed under the Dutch Submarine K9 which was lying alongside “KUTTABUL” at Garden Island, hit the sea bottom and exploded, sinking “KUTTABUL”.
19. It is presumed that these torpedoes were fired at “CHICAGO” at No. 2 Buoy, who was about to slip and proceed. The dock floodlights, which would have silhouetted “CHICAGO”, were extinguished just before the torpedo was fired. “Midget A” then escaped, passing over the loop on her exit from the harbour at 0158.
“MIDGET B”
20. “Midget B” made an unsuccessful attempt to enter the harbour but failed to reach the effective loop (No. 12) or, consequently, the boom. She was sighted by “YANDRA” (the Duty A/S Vessel on patrol within the Loop Area) and later by “LAURIANA” who illuminated her until intercepted between the Heads, at 2254, by “YANDRA”.
21. Two separate attacks were carried out by “YANDRA” on “Midget B” during a period of 9 minutes, starting from the time she attempted to ram the submarine at 2258 until her second attack – a full pattern of six depth charges – at 2307.
22. It is considered that “Midget B” was destroyed by this second attack, in a position 023° 3.6 cables from Hornby Light.
MIDGET NO. 21
23. Midget No. 21 entered the harbour at 0301, at which time she crossed No. 12 Loop. She proceeded up harbour unobserved until she reached Bradley’s Head vicinity. Here she was sighted by “KANIMBLA” and fired on at 0350 and gave rise to the unconfirmed contact made by “DOOMBA” off Robertson Point at 0450.
24. She was detected in Taylor Bay and attacked with depth charges, first by “SEA MIST” at 0500, then by “YARROMA” and “STEADY HOUR” until 0827. The effect of these attacks was clearly shown in the great amount of damage done to Midget No. 21, which was evident in the wreck when it was recovered. It is probable that the first attack caused the submarine to run into the bottom, because the lower bow cap was damaged and both caps were jammed, although set to release. The torpedo tubes had both been fired, although the bow caps had jammed on release. The lower tube had been fired with the external adjustment fittings engaged, and these had sheared off when the torpedo moved in the tube. This suggests that an attempt was made to fire in a hurry, and was prompted by, or interrupted by, the depth charge attacks. The tubes can be fired only from the Control Room; the release of the bow caps can be carried out only from forward; other operations in the tubes may be carried out from the Control Room or the forward compartment.
25. Both members of the crew were shot through the head; the demolition charges had been fired but the fuzes were drowned. It is possible that the junior member of the crew had attempted to escape, as he was found with his boots off. The Captain was wearing boots. This suggests that an early depth charge attack damaged the midget, and later ones progressively wrecked her.
SUMMARY
26. It is, then, considered that four midget submarines attempted to enter the harbour, of which only two –
“Midget A”
Midget 21
succeeded in passing the boom, and of which one –
“Midget A”
got away again.
27. The other three midget submarines were destroyed:
Midget 14 in the net at 2235/31.
“Midget B” between Heads at 2307/31.
Midget 21 in Taylor Bay between 0500 and
0827/1st June.
G.C. Muirhead-Gould
Rear-Admiral
JAPANESE MIDGET SUBMARINE ATTACK –
31st MAY – 1st JUNE, 1942
CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE
| TIME (K) | EVENTS |
|---|---|
| 2000 | Recorded crossing on No. 12 Loop |
| 2015 approx | Watchman sighted suspicious object in nets near Sheerlegs - Western Channel. Watchman and mate proceeded in skiff to investigate. |
| 2130 approx | Watchman proceeded to “YARROMA” and reported suspicious object. (“YARROMA” was duty Channel Patrol Boat at West Gate) “YARROMA” would not approach for fear that object was a magnetic mine. |
| 2148 | Recorded crossing on No. 12 Loop. |
| 2152 | 88“YARROMA” reported “Suspicious object in net” and was told to close and give a full description. |
| 2210 | “YARROMA” reported object was metal with serrated edge on top, moving with the swell. “YARROMA” was ordered to give full description. |
| 2220 approx | Stoker from “YARROMA” sent in Maritime Services Board skiff to investigate and reported object as submarine. “LOLITA” closed “YARROMA”. Captain Bode, “CHICAGO”, left TRESCO with suggestion that he should go to sea with “PERKINS”.* |
| 2227 | N.O.C.S. to All Ships, Sydney - “Take A/S precautions.” Port closed to outward shipping. |
| 2230 | Watchman sent back to work. “YARROMA” reported - “Object is submarine. Request permission to open fire.” |
| “GOONAMBEE” ordered to proceed forthwith to investigate object at West Gate. 2nd Duty Staff Officer proceeded to Channel Patrol Boats not duty. (“GOONAMBEE” was duty M/S Vessel in Watsons Bay.) | |
| 2235 | “YARROMA” reported submarine had blown up. |
| 2236 | N.O.C.S. TO GENERAL - “Presence of enemy submarine at boom gate is suspected. Ships are to take action against attack.” |
| 2252 | “LAURIANA” noticed flurry on water ahead to port, investigated with searchlight which showed conning tower of submarine, distance 60 feet to 80 feet. Signalled Port War Signal Station, Channel Patrol Boat and Minesweeper entering harbour and Channel Patrol Boat at boom. (“LAURIANA” was one of four duty Naval Auxiliary Patrol Boats.)* No response. |
| “CHICAGO” to N.O.C.S. - “Submarine periscope sighted about 500 yards off our starboard bow, heading up the channel.” | |
| 2250 to 2253 approx | U.S.S. “CHICAGO” at No.2 Buoy switched on searchlight and opened fire towards Fort Denison - red tracers (pom-pom). Dockyard Motor Boat “NESTOR” halfway between ferry wharf and No.2 Buoy noticed disturbances in water 40 yards ahead. “CHICAGO’S” searchlight then illuminated periscope of submarine coming towards “NESTOR”. Submarine was steering towardsharbour bridge 200 yards off Garden Island. Officer on Ferry Wharf saw periscope in “CHICAGO’S” searchlight. Shots falling all round it. |
| 2254 | “YANDRA” sighted conning tower 400 yards away 028° - 3 cables from Hornby Light. (“YANDRA” was duty A/S Vessel on patrol within Loop Area.) |
| 2255 | “YANDRA” approached to attack. |
| 2258 | “YANDRA” attempted to ram submarine which reappeared 100 yards astern, damaged, and slowly turning to starboard. Position 283° 2.5 cables from Hornby. |
| 2259 | “YANDRA” ordered to carry out A/S Sweep. Negative result. |
| 2300 | “GOONAMBEE” proceeded from Watson’s Bay to Gate in West Channel. Patrolled Bradley’s Head to Gate. “YANDRA” at West Gate. |
| 2303 | “YANDRA” sighted conning tower 600 yards away. |
| 2304 | A/S contact obtained. “YANDRA” prepared to attack. |
| 2307 | “YANDRA” fired pattern of 6 depth charges set to 100 feet. Position 023° 3.6 cables from Hornby Light. Submarine was not seen after explosions. |
| 2310 | “GEELONG” fired at suspicious object in line to left Bradley’s Head and, with “WHYALLA”, swept with searchlights for half an hour. (“GEELONG” was A.M.S.* refitting alongside oil wharf. “WHYALLA” was A/S vessel self refitting alongside “GEELONG”) |
| 2314 | N.O.C.S. signal - “All ships to be darkened.” |
| 2315 | “BINGERA” ordered to immediate notice. (“BINGERA” was Stand Off A/S vessel at No.7 Buoy.) |
| U.S.S. “PERKINS” slipped and was ordered back to buoy by “CHICAGO” securing again at 2340 to No.4 Buoy. (“PERKINS” at 4 hours notice at No.4 Buoy) | |
| 2330 | “BINGERA” to N.O.C.S. - “Ready to proceed.” |
| 2334 | “BINGERA” ordered to “slip and carry out A/S search in harbour. Submarine reported passing - proceeding towards harbour bridge.” |
| 2336 | “BINGERA” reported - “Ready to proceed.” Rear Admiral and Chief Staff Officer proceeded down harbour. |
| 2340 | “PERKINS” secured again No.4 Buoy. “BINGERA” slipped and proceeded up harbour. |
| 0000 | Rear Admiral and Chief Staff Officer boarded “LOLITA”. |
| 0025 | Flood lights new dock extinguished by orders N.O.C.S. |
| 0030 | “KUTTABUL” hit by torpedo. All lights on Island were extinguished by the explosion and the telephone went out of order. |
| 0034 | Lights and telephone switchboard, Garden Island, come into service. |
| 0045 | “BOMBAY” “WHYALLA” ordered to raise steam. (“BOMBAY” was A.M.S. at 4 hours notice at No.9 buoy.) |
| “PERKINS” slipped. | |
| 0103 | “BINGERA” ordered to slip between Bradley’s Head and Garden Island. |
| 0110 | N.O.C.S. - General - “Enemy submarine is present in the harbour and “KUTTABUL” has been torpedoed.” |
| 0120 | Submarine K.9 slipped and proceeded up harbour in tow. (K.9 was alongside “KUTTABUL”) |
| 0121 | “ADELE” ready. Told to remain at Buoy. (“ADELE” was Stand Off Examination Vessel at Watson’s Bay.) |
| 0125 | “SAMUEL BENBOW” reported - “Crew at action stations raising steam.” (“SAMUEL BENBOW” was Stand Off M/S Vessel at Watsons Bay.) |
| 0158 | Crossing reported on No.12 Loop. |
| 0214 | “CHICAGO” to N.O.C.S. - “Proceeding to sea.” |
| 0230 | “WHYALLA” to N.O.C.S. - “Slipped and proceeding to sea.” |
| 0230 to 0245 | Staff Officer, Channel Patrol Boats, received orders to proceed and patrol when ready vicinity Bradley’s Head. “TOOMAREE” - East Boom Gate. “MARLEAN” - West Boom Gate “SEA MIST” - ” ” ” “STEADY HOUR” to contact duty C.P.B’s at boom - “LOLITA” and “YARROMA”. (Stand off Channel Patrol Boats at Farm Cove.) |
| 0243 | “PERKINS” to sea. |
| 0245 approx | “STEADY HOUR” ordered “SEA MIST” to patrol Bradley’s Head - Boom. |
| 0256 | “’CHICAGO’ to sea” reported by P.W.S.S. |
| 0300 | “CHICAGO” reported - “Submarine entering harbour.” |
| 0301 | Crossing reported on No. 12 loop. |
| 0305 | “’WHYALLA’ to sea” reported by P.W.S.S. |
| 0307 | N.O.C.S. ordered “BINGERA” - “Carry out A/S patrol in vicinity of ‘CANBERRA’.” |
| 0320 | “BOMBAY” reported - “Ready to proceed.” |
| 0335 | C.P.B’s proceeded on patrol Lieutenant Adams embarked in H.M.I.S. “BOMBAY” and proceeded to sea on A/S search as per N.O.C.S. 1735z/31.* |
| 0340 | L.F.B. 92 reported sighting submarine 5 miles off Port Hacking at 0105k/1. |
| 0350 | “KANIMBLA” switched on searchlight and opened fire. “BINGERA” searched area. (“KANIMBLA” was 12 hours notice at Birts Buoy.) |
| 0450 approx | “DOOMBA” signalled “BINGERA” about submarine contact off Robertson Point. This was investigated without result. “CANBERRA” signalled unconfirmed sighting torpedo track from Bradley’s Head at 0440. (“CANBERRA” at 4 hours notice at No 1 Buoy.)‡ |
| 0500 | “YARROMA” and “SEA MIST” and “STEADY HOUR” all patrolling. |
| 0500 approx | Red Verey Light seen in Taylor Bay by “YARROMA” and depth charge explosion heard. “YARROMA” proceeded to scene at full speed and en route saw three more Verey Lights and heard further detonations. |
| 0500 approx | “STEADY HOUR” sighted suspicious object. Whilst proceeding up West Channel “SEA MIST” attacked and fired Verey Light (red). “SEA MIST” reported 3 submarines. |
| 0500 approx | “SEA MIST”, at request of “GOONAMBEE”, investigated suspicious object in Taylor Bay. Fired 2 depth charges on each occasion firing a Red Verey Light before so doing. Aldis Lamp was used to illuminate target. |
| 0511 | N.O.C.S. stopped all sailings from Newcastle and Port Kembla. |
| 0532 | “BOMBAY” to sea. |
| 0540 | P.W.S.S. reported 2 Red Flares, apparently from ship anchored on bank. |
| Rear-Admiral-in-Charge and Chief Staff Officer proceeded down harbour. | |
| 0545 | “BOMBAY”, “WHYALLA”, “YANDRA” on patrol outside Heads. |
| 0640 | “STEADY HOUR” dropped depth charge (“STEADY HOUR”, “SEA MIST” on patrol Chowder Bay - Bradley’s Head.) |
| “STEADY HOUR” dropped second charge and marker buoy in same place. | |
| 0658 | “YARROMA” picked up A/S contact of submarine - confirmed dropped one charge. |
| 0718 to 0721 | “YARROMA” - second attack - one charge. Brown oily tinge in disturbance - oily smear arose. |
| 0725 | “STEADY HOUR” reported attacking definite Asdic contact - oil and air bubbles. |
| 0730 | “WHYALLA” and “BOMBAY” joined company and conducted search. |
| C.S.O. proceeded down harbour. | |
| “WINBAH’S” arrival at Taylor Bay | Reported by Commanding Officer, “STEADY HOUR” that his anchor had caught up in submarine and light oil film and large bubbles clearly visible. |
| 0755 | “YARROMA’S” third attack - same attack 0718-0721. (Then stationary.) |
| 0827 | “YARROMA” - 4th and last attack - Oil and air bubbles continued to rise. |
* A likely story!
* In fact there were three, not four.
* An Australian Mine Sweeper.
* It is a bit of a mystery why Muirhead-Gould, with his reference to 1735z/31, should suddenly slip into Zulu time, commonly known as Greenwich Mean Time.Throughout the report he uses Kilo time, usually known as Australian Eastern Standard Time. There is a ten-hour difference between the two.The order referred to was therefore issued at 3.35 am on Monday morning Sydney time, and presumably is the same order as the one which sent the Channel Patrol boats into action.
‡ An anonymous hand has scribbled ‘at immediate notice from 0115’ below this entry.
APPENDIX II SOURCES OF INFORMATION
(a) Documents recovered from Midget 21 (translated at Navy Office, Melbourne).
These disclosed the existence of an “Advanced Detachment” comprising:
Four Surface Vessels.
Call signs for aircraft attached to I 10,I 21, I 29, I 30.
It is interesting to note that Midget No. 14 is not mentioned.
(b) Charts recovered from Midget 21.
(i) “Picking up dispositions” apparently placed five “I” class submarines at various rendezvous North and South of Sydney.
These were –
I 21
I 22
I 24
I 27
I 29
Two of the above, I 21 and I 29, were allotted aircraft call signs.
(ii) The courses from Sydney to the rendezvous off Broken Bay (shown on the Photostat portion of Chart attached) led to four “I” class submarines (I 22, I 24, I 27 and I 29), leaving I 21 apparently free to act as leader and possibly with her aircraft in lieu of, and not in addition to, a midget.
(iii) A working chart showing fixes due East of Sydney Heads, the seaward one being marked “1625”.
These fixes (marked on attached Photostat of portion of Chart) were :
Outer South Head Light 260° 7.2 miles
Outer South Head Light 253° 4.1 miles
Outer South Head Light 247° 3.6 miles
Outer South Head Light 260° 1.7 miles
(iv) Courses were marked on a Sydney Harbour chart recovered from Midget No. 21.
APPENDIX III
SUBMARINE AND TORPEDO PARTICULARS
(operational only)
APPENDIX IV
LOOP INDICATIONS AND SIGNATURES
Although two loops were in operation (No. 11, laid in 14/15 fathoms, and No. 12, laid in 6/7 fathoms) signatures were registered on No. 12 only.
Four signatures were observed on this loop, at 2001, 2148, 0158 and 0301.
At first these were all believed to indicate inward crossings.
Subsequently, however, it was decided that the 0158 signature could have recorded a crossing in the opposite direction from the other three.
It has accordingly been taken as an outward crossing.
Prints of signatures are attached.
APPENDIX V
LESSONS LEARNT
MISTAKES MADE AND REMEDIES
(a) Unidentified loop crossings at 2001 and 2148 were not recognized. Considerable confusion is caused by traffic over loops.
Remedies
(i) Manly Ferry Service has been curtailed and arrangements have been made to stop it at short notice.
(ii) Port will be closed to small boats at night.
(iii) Loop Indicator Signal Apparatus is being fitted to Local Defence Vessels.
(iv) Searchlight illumination of the loop area has been improved.
(v) Maritime Services Board is stopping trips by spoil lighters and tugs at night.
(b) “YARROMA” failed to engage the submarine.
Remedy
All officers commanding Channel Patrol Boats have been given more definite instructions.
(c) Depth charges were not capable of exploding in depths under 42 feet.*
Remedy
All depth charge pistols issued to Channel Patrol Boats and Naval Auxiliary Patrol have been modified to fire at 25 feet.
(d) Communications through the Port War Signal Station were very slow. The correct R/T transmitter at Port War Signal Station was not fitted as it was not completed. The improvised set was not satisfactory.
The F.S.6.R/T in the Channel Patrol Boats was unsuitable and could not be used when engines were running.
Remedies
A suitable R/T Teleradio Set has been tried out and is being recommended for fitting in Channel Patrol Boats and Naval Auxiliary Patrol boats.
It is recommended that R/T Sets be fitted in Examination Vessels, and the Staff Office, Pott’s Point. This will save personnel in Examination Vessels and permit control of Channel Patrol Boats from Staff Office, if required.
It is recommended that W/T Set ex Port War Signal Station be fitted in Staff Offices, Pott’s Point, for use as Port Wave W/T Station. This will reduce delay in working Local Defence Vessels and save overloading telephone lines between Port War Signal Station and Staff Office. (See also Lt.Cdr Cox’s AC/5?42 on 3rd June, 1942, to D.N.I. & D.S.C.)
(e) Naval Auxiliary Patrol vessels were not armed.
Remedy
Naval Auxiliary Patrol Vessels are being supplied with depth charges, machine guns, Verey Pistols and Aldis lamps.
APPENDIX VI
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RECOGNITION OF PERSONNEL
The following are recommended to the notice of the Naval Board for their display of zeal and determination throughout the operation :-
(1) Mr. J. Cargill. For vigilance and initiative in his personal efforts to report a suspicious circumstance to the proper authorities. (It is for consideration whether this man has merited an award under the provisions of A.F.O. 1464(1) of 1941.)
and
(2) Mr W. Nangle who, to a lesser degree, assisted Mr Cargill. *
(3) Lieutenant A.G. Townley, R.A.N.V.R.
and the crew of H.M.A.S. “STEADY HOUR”.
(4) Sub-Lieutenant J.A. Doyle, R.A.N.R. (S) and the crew of H.M.A.S. “SEA MIST”.
(5) Lieutenant J.A. Taplin R.A.N.R. (S)
and the crew of H.M.A.S. “YANDRA”.
(6) Engineer Captain A.B. Doyle, C.B.E., R.A.N
and
(7) Commander (E) G.C. Clark, R.A.N. These officers arrived on the scene minutes after the explosion which sank “KUTTABUL”, and displayed commendable fortitude in searching the vessel for any man who might be trapped. In doing so, they had to wade in deep water, under hazardous conditions, in darkness, as it was not known at the time which portion of the decks had been rendered dangerous by the explosion. They lent assistance to a number of men who had been shocked by the suddenness and force of the action.
(8) Bandsman M.N. Cumming, Official No. 20501. This rating, who was onboard “KUTTABUL” at the time of the explosion, showed determination in diving into the water from the vessel, swimming a few yards and assisting a rating on to “KUTTABUL’S” deck. He also again dived into the water into “KUTTABUL’S” wreckage in order to see whether anyone needed assistance. Although no great courage or endurance was necessary, he displayed considerable initiative.
(9) Mr F.J. Lingard (Torpedo Fitter). For the removal of pistols and primers from torpedoes, and demolition charges from submarines, this work being carried out entirely voluntarily.
The Skipper and crew of Naval Auxiliary Patrol Boat, “LAURIANA”.
For prompt action in illuminating the submarine.
The Captain and crew of H.M.A.S. “YARROMA”.
For their part in the sinking of Midget 21. It is considered that this action redeemed, to some extent, their earlier failure.
All personnel of the Dockyard First Aid Party. For their efficient handling of casualties.
* It should have been H.M.A.S.
* An anonymous hand has written below this entry: ‘The charges were dropped in greater depths than 7fm.’ Seven fathoms is, of course, 42 feet.
* The words ‘to a lesser degree’ have been crossed out in ink.